

EXPLANATORY POWER

University of Geneva, 14–15 June 2018

A workshop in the DACH project

Inferentialism, Bayesianism, and Scientific Explanation

PROGRAMME

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| 14 June University of Geneva, Boulevard des Philosophes 22, room 211 | 15 June University of Geneva, Boulevard des Philosophes 22, room 211 |
| 09:30–10:30 Laura Franklin-Hall (New York University), <i>TBA</i> (keynote) | 09:30–10:30 Tania Lombrozo (University of California, Berkeley), <i>The role of explanation in learning</i> (keynote) |
| 10:30–11:00 <i>coffee break</i> | 10:30–11:00 <i>coffee break</i> |
| 11:00–11:45 Ashton T. Sperry (Ronin Institute), <i>No! Equilibrium explanations are not better than their causal counterparts</i> | 11:00–11:45 Dingmar van Eck and Erik Weber (Ghent University), <i>The explanatory power of decompositional explanations</i> |
| 11:45–12:30 Juha Saatsi (University of Leeds), <i>Explanatory power: modal vs pragmatic dimensions</i> | 11:45–12:30 Lorenzo Casini (University of Geneva) and Michael Baumgartner (University of Bergen), <i>Constitution and causal roles</i> |
| 12:30–14:00 <i>lunch break</i> | 12:30–14:00 <i>lunch break</i> |
| 14:00–15:00 Vincenzo Crupi (University of Turin), <i>One, but not the same: probabilistic confirmation vs explanatory power</i> (keynote) | 14:00–15:00 Matteo Colombo (Tilburg University), <i>Explanatory judgement, intellectual humility and risk</i> (keynote) |
| 15:00–15:45 Lilia Gurova (New Bulgarian University), <i>Comparing two approaches to assessing explanatory power: inferential content vs statistical relevance</i> | 15:00–15:45 Anton Donchev (New Bulgarian University) and Mila Marinova (KU Leuven), <i>The relation between explanatory power, degrees of confirmation, and prior probabilities</i> |
| 15:45–16:15 <i>coffee break</i> | 15:45–16:15 <i>coffee break</i> |
| 16:15–17:00 David Kinney (London School of Economics), <i>Causal explanations: power, depth, granularity, and accuracy</i> | 16:15–17:00 Ben Eva (University of Konstanz) & Reuben Stern (MCMP, LMU), <i>Causal explanatory power, blameworthiness, and negligence</i> |
| 17:00–18:00 Raphael van Riel (University of Duisburg-Essen), <i>Real-world dependence, negative explanation, and explanatory power</i> (keynote) | 17:00–17:45 Jan Sprenger (University of Turin), <i>A Bayesian unification of causal strength and explanatory power</i> |
| 19:00 <i>dinner</i> | |