

Session 38. Historical variations of mobile borders / *Variations historiques des frontières mobiles (2)*

Adoram SCHNEIDLER, EHESS-CRFJ: Lebanese in the Galilee: Stabilizing the mobile Israel-Lebanon Border.

Negotiated and defined in the 1920's the colonial border between the French Mandate in Lebanon and the British Mandate in Palestine was to become the border between the future states of Lebanon and Israel. The creation of the State of Israel at the expense of Palestinian national aspirations however has laid the foundations for a diversified relation to this border amongst inhabitants of the Galilee today depending notably on their belonging to the indigenous Arab population or the immigrant Jewish population. The bending northwards of this border during the last twenty-five years of the 20th century (Israeli invasions, the "Good Fence" policy, and the establishment of the Security Zone in Southern Lebanon) which ended in the unilateral Israeli withdrawal of May 2000 was accompanied by a rapprochement of two regions (Upper Galilee and Jabal Amil of Southern Lebanon) which had previously undergone nearly 30 years of separation (1948-1976).

This article proposes to explore dynamics in the stabilization and interiorisation of this border among inhabitants of the Galilee through the study of border-crossing practices of Lebanese currently residing in the Galilee. We will be considering two groups of Lebanese migrants, who arrived under two different structural circumstances and settled respectively on opposite sides of the Arab/Jewish spatial divide that runs through the Galilee. The first group is composed of Lebanese migrant workers who crossed the border during the Israeli occupation of Southern Lebanon and the "Good Fence" policy (from the late 1970's until 2000). The second group is composed of members of the South Lebanon Army (SLA) and their families who crossed the border seeking refuge during the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in May 2000.

Drawing on a comparison with Malkki's study of Hutu refugees who settled in two different socioeconomic and political sites in Tanzania, we will see how two different patterns of border crossings, landing on opposite sides of the Arab/Jewish divide in the Galilee, produce different levels of interiorisation of the Israel-Lebanon border and different uses of categories of identity defined by it.

The discreet presence today of southern Lebanese women in Arab villages of the Galilee hints to a moment (late 1970's to 2000) of re-emerging pre-border practices (pre-1948) while their supple use of categories challenges and blurs the nation-state meaning expounded by the border and the spatial division it imposes. Contrastingly, the ripples sent out by the cast stone of SLA refugees throughout the Galilee's double layered social fabric, Jewish and Arab, appear to enhance the more dynamic separation of groups along the nation-state cosmology materialized by the border, resulting in an endorsement and novel use of categories and labels such as "Israeli", "Lebanese", "Phoenician", "Palestinian" and "Arab".

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Noemi GAL-OR, Institute for Transborder Studies (ITS) and Department of Political Science, Kwantlen Polytechnic University & **Michael J.STRAUSS**, Centre d'Etudes Diplomatiques et Stratégiques, Paris: The Shab'a farms: A geopolitical "who's on first?".

The proposed paper looks at the Shab'a Farms - the linchpin excuse in the Hizb'Allah rhetoric justifying the destabilisation of the relationship Israel-Lebanon-Syria.

It contemplates the possibility of defusing a violent conflict by borrowing the lease - a légal instrument in domestic law of contract and real property and private international law – and turning it into a public international legal device.

The Shab'a (Shebaa) Farms, a tiny area located where Israel, Syria and Lebanon converge, is home to a geopolitical version of "Who's on First?" It is arguably the most convoluted dispute over sovereignty and control in modern times, and has exasperated diplomats for decades.

Israel captured the Shab'a Farms from Syria during the Six-Day War of 1967 and still occupies the area today. But Syria says the occupied land is Lebanese. Lebanon agrees – at least in official statements. Its political leaders are not all convinced; one recently said the Shab'a Farms belongs to Syria and that Israel's occupation there isn't Lebanon's problem. Lebanon has proposed that the United Nations take charge of the area. But the United Nations has agreed with Israel's claim that the territory is Syrian. Enter Hezbollah, which insists it is Lebanese, and this is what keeps returning the Shab'a Farms to regional prominence: the militant group regularly shells Israel's forces there, claiming that Israel is illegally encroaching on Lebanese territory.

The United States, the European Union, Egypt and others – all consider it necessary to resolve the Shab'a Farms conflict. As yet, none have had any success in pushing the parties toward a settlement.

Amid this confused situation, there are two things the Shab'a Farms don't have: inhabitants (they left), and a claim by the Palestinians. The absence of these potential obstacles to a solution might make the dispute over the area more amenable to resolution than other territorial conflicts in the region.

Our paper, the first detailed work about the Shab'a Farms, will discuss how resolving this geographically small conflict can create the conditions for broader progress in regional peace talks. It will also propose to view the Shab'a Farms as a proto-type for the resolution of territorial conflicts by proposing a model of international trusteeship enabled by an international lease as a the legal instrument of conflict resolution.

Bastien SEPULVEDA, Université de Rouen: Le fleuve Bío-Bío dans le Chili central: les fonctions multiples et mobiles d'une frontière « naturelle ».

This paper deals with the multiple and mobil functions of a main river of central Chile called Bío-Bío. From 1641 to 1881, this river constituted a formal border between the Spanish kingdom –and then the Chilean state– and an indigenous territory controled by the Mapuches who made themselves famous for the strong resistance they pitted against the colonial power. The Araucanian Pacification campaign, led by the Chilean army in 1861, broke down the mapuche independance and took away from the Bío-Bío river its historic function of border. Progresively colonised and incorporated into the Chilean jurisdiction during the twentieth century, the southern fringe of the river still constitutes the framework of the contemporary indigenous geopolitical program. But rather than separating two different cultural entities, the Bío-Bío river

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can be understood as a link connecting the two poles of the contemporary mapuche identity. From its origins in the andin lakes of the Alto Bío-Bío to its mouth on the Pacific coast among the inner city of Concepción, the Bío-Bío's flow draws the route taken by many generations of Mapuches who've left in search of a better life.

Juan Manuel TRILLO, University Carlos III of Madrid, Valerià PAÛL, University of Santiago de Compostela: One of the oldest boundaries in Europe? A critical approach to the Spanish-Portuguese border in the central raia.

From an international point of view, the boundary between Spain and Portugal is one of the most stable in the world, with some authors arguing that it has a history of almost a thousand years, since Portugal became an independent kingdom at the beginning of the 12th century. However, that is not the case. Firstly, because the boundary was not clearly demarcated until the second half of the 19th century, although some previous attempts were accomplished, and indeed some major changes are reported in that century and before. Secondly, because the boundary has never acted as a line on the ground. Even in the worst period of 'iron curtain' at the middle of the 20th century, when Portugal and Spain were experiencing fierce dictatorships, the boundary was more a door for people coming from both sides than a barrier. It represented more a frontier-zone than a frontier-line, a reason why we suggest that historically it is more accurate to use the term border than boundary. Thirdly, since the entry of both states into the European Community in 1986, the border has substantially shifted towards new meanings and it no longer constitutes an over-imposed impediment continuously kept and reinforced by states, but it is seen as an opportunity for positive development in several ways.

Our case study focuses in the central sector of the border between Galicia (Spain) and Portugal, locally known as raia. Specifically, this is the area corresponding to the counties of Terra de Celanova, Baixa Limia and A Limia in Galicia, and the municipalities of Melgaço, Arcos de Valdevez, Ponte da Barca, Terras de Bouro and Montalegre in Portugal. It must first be stated that the border supposedly established in 1139 separated the kingdom of Galicia and the newly born kingdom of Portugal. Spain did not exist at this stage and consequently it cannot be said that the border between Spain and Portugal has a lifetime of almost nine centuries. Changes have been constant since the 12th century and there are uncertainties about where the border was established during this long time, and also, as it was stated, about the real meaning of border/boundary as a line. In this area of study, the definitive act of demarcation dates from 1864 and it represents the end of most of the existing spatial 'doubts', such as O Couto Mixto, a kind of free republic between Spain and Portugal with obscure roots in the Middle Ages that existed until the second half of the 19th century. Since then, the states have made an effort to close the border, but relations from both sides do persist and also in some critical moments there have been strong links such as the presence of guerrillas crossing the border and fighting against both dictatorships, different migration flows, or the very active smuggling for decades. Since 1986, smuggling has obviously disappeared and now new forms of borders are rising, for instance the creation of a cross-border national/natural park, the development of a shared Biosphere Reserve, or the implementation of different tools to improve cooperation.

This research starts from qualitative interview work carried out amongst the local people in order to understand the reconfiguration of the border and borderlands over the last decades. Also, it feeds from a systematic literature review of historians and geographers who have studied the area. This background revision has been very important in order to understand that the border has

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not been historically stable as it was supposed to be, so that it is best conceived as a mobile and instable border than as a fixed boundary line.

Akihiro HIRAYAMA, Hokkaido University: The Governance of Mountainous Borderlands in North Vietnam during the First Indochina War.

The First Indochina War was fought in the land of Vietnam as a war of independence from 1946 to 1954. At the beginning of the war, the government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam escaped the capital, Hà Nội, and moved to the mountainous provinces such as Thái nguyên and Tuyên Quang, which were located northwestward from Hà Nội. The French troops soon almost surrounded the location of the DRV government. This means that the French troops held a strong position in such regions as the Red river delta, the northern mountainous borderlands between North Vietnam and China, and the western mountainous borderlands between North Vietnam and Laos.

Under such a geopolitically isolated situation, the DRV government started to expand their political influence over the western mountainous regions in order to establish the trade route of military supplies from oversea Vietnamese in Thailand and Laos. Then, after the victory of the Chinese Communist Party over the Kuomintang Party in 1949, the DRV government tried to penetrate through the northern mountainous regions to acquire political and military supports from the People's Republic of China. As a result of the war, the DRV government succeeded in embracing the rural societies and ethnic minorities in mountainous borderlands in North Vietnam.

In this presentation, I would like to illustrate the shifting power relation between the government of the DRV and the French troops during the First Indochina War, and examine how that power relation affected the governance of mountainous borderlands in North Vietnam.