The Effect of Referendums on Social Policy in Switzerland1

Ladina Caluori, Ursula Häfliger, Simon Hug, and Tobias Schulz2
 
Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Swiss
Political Science Association, November 18-19, 2004, Balstahl

First version: January 2003, this version: Jul 24, 2005

Abstract

Recent studies have assessed the effect of referendums on various policy outcomes, though most often these effects have been measured in terms of expenditures alone. Similarly, in many studies the preferences of the voting population are not explicitly included in the empirical models. In the present paper we wish to overcome these two limitations when studying social policies at the cantonal level in Switzerland. On the one hand we employ comprehensive indicators on social policy legislation derived from content analyses of the cantonal laws to get better indications on the differences among cantons in the social policies. On the other hand we employ aggregated survey data stemming from the Swiss Household Panel to glean information on the preferences of the voters in each canton.

Combining this data allows us to test for the hypothesis whether well-developed institutions allowing for referendums lead to a closer match between the voter preferences and policy outcomes in the area of social policy. Such a closer link between preferences and outcomes is suggested by several game-theoretic models dealing with the policy effects of referendums. The empirical tests rely on a novel empirical model which allows for accurate tests of the implied hypotheses.



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