Probing PR: Does proportional representation induce power sharing?
institutions, proportional representation and power-sharing practices
on civil wars
Nils-Christian Bormann1, Simon Hug2 3
Department of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Witten/Herdecke University,
Germany
Département de science
politique et
relations internationales,
Université de Genève
CefES, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca
Paper proposed for presentation at the ISA 2022 Annual Convention - March 30th - April 2nd, 2022
First version: February 2021, this version: Aug 2, 2021
Abstract
Recent work on power sharing and civil conflicts in ethnically divided societies emphasizes the crucial distinction between mandates and their implementation. Formal power-sharing rules reduce the risk of armed conflict, but power-sharing practices mediate this effect. Some scholars argue that proportional electoral systems belong to the broader class of power-sharing institutions and lead to power-sharing practices, which in turn reduce the likelihood of intrastate armed conflict. Empirical evidence for this claim is indirect at best. Using mediation analysis, we comprehensively assess whether PR rules alone or their combination with other formal power-sharing institutions engender elite power sharing, and thus reduce the chances of intrastate conflict. The results suggest that PR does not have this general positive effect on power-sharing practices and thus does not complement the conflict-reducing effect of formal power-sharing institutions.
Footnotes:
1 Department of Philosophy, Politics, and Economics, Witten/Herdecke University,
Germany; phone: +44 1206 873070; email:
Nils.Bormann@uni-wh.de
2 Département de science politique et relations internationales, Faculté des sciences de la société; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone ++41 22 379 83 78; email:simon.hug@unige.ch
3 CefES research fellow, Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca
File translated from
TEX
by
TTH,
version 4.08.