Sophisticated Voting in Bicameralism 1

Simon Hug2
Département de science politique, Université de Genève
 
Paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the
Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 22-25, 2010

First version: December 2009, this version: Jan 3, 2010

Abstract

Bicameralism introduces additional complexities into the analysis of sophisticated voting by members of parliament (MPs). The paper proposes a general game-theoretical model to assess the conditions under which MPs may engage in strategic behavior. The implications suggest that these conditions strongly depend on the institutional details of the bicameral system and the informational assymetries that may exist between chambers and among MPs.

Footnotes:

1  The financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (Grants No 100012- 108179 and No 100012-111909) is gratefully acknowledged.

2  Département de science politique, Faculté des sciences économiques et sociales; Université de Genève; 40 Bd du Pont d'Arve; 1211 Genève 4; Switzerland; phone ++41 22 379 83 78; email: simon.hug@unige.ch

File translated from TEX by TTH, version 3.12.
On 3 Jan 2010, 15:05.