Yet another look at vote buying in the UN
General Assembly
Fang-Yi Chiou1, Simon Hug2, Bjørn Høyland 3
First version: September 2019; this (incomplete) version:
Sep 25, 2019
Abstract
From the very early writings assessing how Ronald Reagan's policy of
asking the state department to report on UNGA votes to ensure
punishement and rewards for aid recipients, strategic interactions have
been considered as important. A clean way to assess these interactions
has, however, eschewed scholars so far. In this paper we propose a
statistical strategic model that allows for everything. Replicating
analysis we find that some of their findings
are likely due to a mis-specification of the model. Correcting for this mispecification suggests that . . . In parallel we introduce a statistical strategic model that allows for correlated errors and ensures for equilibrium behavior by all actors.
File translated from
TEX
by
TTH,
version 4.08.