par J. Evans, University of Plymouth

Dual-process theories have been widely applied to the psychology of reasoning, as well as a number of related fields (learning, decision making, social cognition). Broadly, the idea is that performance in thinking and reasoning reflects the combination of two kinds of thinking: fast, automatic and high capacity (type 1), and slow, controlled and low capacity type 2). Theories fall into two broad categories, according to whether they envisage type 1 and 2 processes proceeding in parallel, or else claiming that type 1 processes provide default intuitive responses that may or may not be moderated by slower, reflective type 2 processes. There is considerable empirical evidence to support the existence of dual processing in higher cognitive tasks. I will show, however, that a number of erroneous conceptions have emerged from these research programmes. First, the widespread assumption that type1 (heuristic) processes are responsible for cognitive biases and type 2 (analytic) processes for normatively correct reasoning is simply wrong. Nor is it correct to thinking of type 1 processes as contextualised while type 2 thinking is abstract and logical. The common designation of type2 thinking as conscious and controlled and type 1 thinking as unconscious and automatic is also highly problematic. I conclude with a sketch of a ‘two minds’ theory that can accommodate the existing literatures.

par W.F. Overton, Temple University

Dual-system, dual-process, accounts of adult cognitive processing are examined in the context of a self-organizing relational developmental systems approaches to cognitive growth. Contemporary adult dual-process accounts describe a linear architecture of mind entailing two split-off, but interacting systems; a domain general, content free “analytic” system (System 2) and a domain specific highly contextualized “heuristic” system (System 1). In the developmental literature on deductive reasoning, a similar distinction has been made between a domain general competence (reflective, algorithmic) system and a domain specific procedural system. In contrast to the linear accounts offered by empiricist, nativist and/or evolutionary explanations, the dual competence-procedural developmental perspective argues that the mature systems emerge through developmental transformations as differentiations and intercoordinations of an early relatively undifferentiated action matrix. This development, whose microscopic mechanism is action-in-the-world, is characterized as being embodied, nonlinear, and epigenetic.

par P. Barrouillet, Université de Genève

Conditional reasoning is of particular importance for hypothesis testing, scientific reasoning, but also understanding of causal relations and social rules. Thus, the way children understand conditionals and how this understanding develops with age is one of the main questions of the developmental psychology of reasoning. In this presentation, I will outline a new theory of the understanding of conditional and its development that integrates Evans’ heuristic-analytic theory within the revised mental model theory proposed by Barrouillet, Gauffroy, and Lecas (2008). According to this theory, the interpretation of a conditional sentence is driven by unconscious and implicit heuristic processes that provide individuals with an initial representation that captures its meaning by representing the cases that make it true. This initial model can be enriched with additional models through the intervention of conscious and demanding analytic processes. However, because these processes are optional, they construct representations of cases that are only compatible with the conditional, leaving its truth-value indeterminate when they occur. This theory predicts the successive developmental levels in several tasks evaluating the truth value of the conditional or its probability, as well as how this development is modulated by contents and types of conditionals. Several studies will be presented that verified these predictions, suggesting that the integration of the dual-process approach of reasoning within the theoretical framework of the mental model theory is particularly heuristic.

par H. Markovits, Université du Québec à Montréal

Conditional (if-then) reasoning is one of the most critical components of advanced reasoning. Within the Piagetian framework, such reasoning is one manifestation of formal operations. In theory, formal operational processes are independent of empirical knowledge. However, many studies have shown large effects of content on conditional reasoning with concrete premises. Reasoning with abstract premises is the purest form of formal operational conditional reasoning. Despite the lack of interference with empirical knowledge, very few university students can reason logically with abstract conditional problems. In this presentation, I will give an overview of Piagetian and non-Piagetian approaches to reasoning. I will then present a theoretical framework that claims that contrary-to-fact reasoning might be a bridge between concrete and abstract reasoning, and describe some studies that support this hypothesis.

par V. Girotto, University IUAV of Venice, Université de Provence, CNRS

According to Piaget & Inhelder (1951), children are not able to reason correctly about probability. Young children lack the most basic logical abilities necessary to compute a probability ratio. Older children are not able to conduct a combinatorial analysis until the acquisition of complex logical abilities during adolescence. We defend an alternative hypothesis. According the extensional reasoning view (Johnson-Laird et al., 1999), naïve adults assess probabilities extensionally, by considering the possible ways in which events may occur. Following this view, we have hypothesized that children, like naïve adults, draw probabilistic inferences extensionally. We have corroborated this hypothesis, by showing that 12-month-olds have rational expectations about future events based on their estimation of possibilities (Teglas et al., 2007); preschoolers draw correct posterior inferences when they can reason extensionally (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2008); 7-year-olds assess probabilities from combinations (Girotto & Gonzalez, 2009). We consider the import of these findings for the Piagetian view, and for some recent accounts of probabilistic reasoning, according to which the human mind is intrinsically unable to deal with probabilities.

par V. Reyna, Cornell University

Approaches to reasoning and rationality are contrasted, including Piagetian logicism (thinking as logic), information-processing formalism (thinking as computation), and intuitionism (thinking as intuition) as exemplified in fuzzy- trace theory and other dual-process models. By ‘‘intuition’’ I mean fuzzy, impressionistic thinking using vague gist representations, but I distinguish mindless impulsive reaction from insightful intuition that reflects understanding. Thus, there are two kinds of fast and simple ways of thinking: a stupid kind that represents the most primitive form of thinking and a smart kind that represents the highest form of thinking, insightful intuition. In the foundations of mathematics, intuition is a similarly advanced form of thinking. Fuzzy-trace theory draws on evidence for independent gist and verbatim-memory representations of information, but differs from other dual- process models in emphasizing that there are degrees of rationality and that intuition is an advanced form of reasoning. Such claims are based on empirical evidence comparing reasoning by children and adolescents to that of adults and reasoning of adult novices to that of experts. The theory predicts parallel development of verbatim-based analysis and gist-based intuition, which produces developmental reversals (e.g., children outperform adults) under specific circumstances. As an example, despite increasing competence in reasoning, some biases in judgment and decision making grow with age, producing more ‘‘irrational’’ violations of coherence among adults than among adolescents and younger children. The latter phenomena are linked to developmental increases in gist processing with age. Implications for health and well-being, especially regarding adolescent risk taking, are discussed.

par C.J. Brainerd, Cornell University

It is widely held that false memories decline steadily between early childhood and young adulthood. This belief is even enshrined in the law, where it is used to judge the reliability of memory reports that children give during investigative interviews and sworn testimony.

Piaget challenged this pervasive belief in his work on memory intelligence. He conjectured that false memories increase with age when they are based on constructive processing of logical principles (e.g., serial order). Recently, such reverse age trends have been extensively documented in the literature on forensic memory. The counterintuitive possibility that false memory, whether spontaneous or pursuant to suggestion, can increase dramatically with age is now well established.

The impetus for this work was provided by fuzzy-trace theory (FTT), which posits that humans store dissociated episodic traces of the surface form (verbatim traces) and meaning content (gist traces) of experience. Processing gist traces foments false memories of meaning-consistent events, while processing verbatim traces suppresses such errors. FTT predicted that false memories would increase with age on specific types of tasks, and that prediction has been confirmed in over three-dozen experiments. In addition to consistent detection of predicted age increases in false memory, those increases have been tied to experimental manipulations that embody FTT’s process assumptions. Most surprising of all, FTT predicts that when false memories increase with age, net memory accuracy (total true memory divided by total true memory plus total false memory) will sometimes decline with age. These developmental declines in overall memory accuracy have also been detected in several studies.

Other counterintuitive patterns are predicted late in life, when healthy adults transition to mild cognitive impairment or dementia. Although the key diagnostic criterion for these cognitions is a decline in episodic memory, it is now well established that these conditions also exhibit reduced false memory.

par P. Klaczynski, University of Northern Colorado

Before entry into formal school, children develop “theories” of illness that allow them to generate hypotheses and explanations for sickness. Although their theories are rudimentary, children understand that diseases can be contracted through contamination and can be contagious. However, both children and adults tend to overgeneralize their beliefs about illnesses to unfamiliar conditions that may bear only superficial resemblance to actual illnesses. This tendency may have adaptive value: Children are, in fact, reluctant to use objects that may have been contaminated by sick peers. The wariness children expressed toward individuals with actual diseases may, however, give rise to unwarranted beliefs and fears. For instance, obese individuals have some characteristics that parallel those of contagious illnesses (e.g., rashes, profuse sweating, breathlessness). Because their understanding of contagion is limited and they generalize their theories of illnesses to individuals on the basis of surface-level appearance cues (i.e., false positives) that could signify contagious diseases, children may react to obese individuals as though obesity can be interpersonally transmitted and, consequently, may be wary of obese peers, objects that have come into contact with obese children, and non-obese peers who have been associated with obese children.

Three studies tested the hypothesis that children avoid objects and peers associated with ("contaminated by") obese children. In each study, children were identically flavored drinks "created" by obese and non-obese children; each bottle was labeled with the beverage's name, nutrition information, and a picture of the child "drink creator." After tasting each drink, children rated drink flavor and the likelihood of getting sick from the drink. In Studies 1 and 2, prior to tasting the drinks, participants were read an "illness only" or "contagious illness" priming story. Priming stories involved hypothetical children who ate became ill after eating an 

unfamiliar food; in "contagious illness" condition, this illness was transmitted to other children. Approximately 7-10 days after tasting the drinks, participants were asked to remember the child who had "created" the worst drink.

In Study 1, drink creators varied by gender, ethnicity (Chinese or Caucasian), and weight (average or obese); participants were 7-10 year-old Chinese and American children. Study 2 was conducted with American 6-10 year-old children, but a new category of "drink creator" was added: Children who had an amputated limb. Study 3 extended Studies 1 and 2 by examining (a) 3.5-5.5 year-old children, (d) reactions to yet another "drink creator" category—average weight children whose faces had been modified to show by symptoms of contagious diseases—and (c) liking for and beliefs about "target" average weight children who were associated either with other average weight children or with obese children.

With one exception in Study 3, ratings of beverage test were lower, the rated probability of sickness from tasting drinks was higher, and false memories were more frequent for obese-created drinks (i.e., indicating that the worst taste drink was a non-obese children, but later “remembering” that the worst drink was “created by an obese child) than for all other categories. In Studies 1 and 2, these findings were particularly powerful when contagious illness condition. In Study 3, both “obese-created” and “disease-created” drinks were rated as worst tasting, more likely to result in illness, and misremembered more often than drinks created by children in each other social category. Critically, results for “disease-created” drinks did not differ from those for “obese-created” drinks. Children also evidenced a “mere” proximity effect: Average-weight children associated with obese children were less liked and considered less friend than average-weight children associated with other average-weight children—but obese children associated with average children were liked no better or worse than obese children associated with other obese children. Finally, by and large, none of the effects listed above were related to age.

The findings support an illness overgeneralization theory of “obesity aversion” and suggest that children are not consciously aware of the biases they display toward obese children or the objects and peers that have been associated with obesity. The null age effect further support the conjectures that magical thinking or, at least, this form of magical contagion, does not decline with age and that implicit illness overgeneralization tendencies are not replaced by—but instead accompany the development of—more advanced reasoning abilities.

par U. Goswami, University of Cambridge

Reasoning by analogy was defined by Piaget as a late-developing skill, characteristic of the period of formal operations. More recent research suggests that analogy is available from infancy, and is a core cognitive skill. Following an analysis of Piaget and Sternberg's early work on analogy, this lecture will review more recent research on reasoning by analogy, beginning with the work conducted by Goswami and Brown (1989, 1990) with children aged 3 to 6 years. It will be suggested that as long as children are reasoning about familiar relational structure, there is early availability of analogy. In terms of developmental theory, this position suggests that analogy should play an important role in learning in many core domains. Relevant work in the "foundational domains" of biology, physics and psychology will then be reviewed, along with relevant work on the transfer of learning, on learning to read, and in mathematics.

par D. Moshman, University of Nebraska

Research in cognitive and developmental psychology has led to a consensus that automatic inferences play a major role in human functioning at all ages. I define thinking as the deliberate application and coordination of one’s inferences to serve one’s purposes. I define reasoning as epistemologically self-constrained thinking. Over the course of development our automatic inferences are increasingly supplemented by acts of thinking and our thinking increasingly takes the form of reasoning. Neither thinking nor reasoning replaces automatic inference, however. Even among high- functioning adults, thinking and reasoning are the rational tip of the iceberg of cognition. The role of developmentalists, however, is to study what develops. A focus on development leads to a focus on thinking and, especially, reasoning, which leads in turn to a focus on the development of metacognition and, especially, epistemic cognitionknowledge about the basic nature of knowledge and justification.

Epistemic developmentthe development of epistemic cognitionbegins about age 4 with children’s recognition that beliefs can be false. Over the next 5 or 6 years, children increasingly distinguish at least three epistemic domains: (1) an objective domain of truth, (2) a subjective domain of taste, and (3) a rational domain of reasonable interpretation. Questions about the truth, falsity, or justification of particular beliefs and inferences arise and are addressed within these domains. Adolescents and adults, unlike children, often theorize about abstract and fundamental issues of knowledge including the nature and possibility of justification. Development beyond age 11 or 12, however, is much less universal and tied to age than earlier development. Individuals who construct advanced forms of epistemic 

cognition proceed from (1) objectivist epistemologies, which take verifiable facts and logical proofs as paradigm cases of knowledge; to (2) subjectivist epistemologies, which view knowledge as opinion, and opinion as a matter of taste; to (3) rationalist epistemologies, which construe knowledge, in a world of inference, as justified belief.

Piaget’s most direct contribution to the psychological study of epistemic cognition is the empirical demonstration that children of 6 or 7 years distinguish logical necessities from empirical regularities and progress from there to higher levels of metalogical understanding that serve as the basis for hypothetico-deductive reasoning beginning about age 11 or 12. This work is central to understanding both logical and epistemic development, but Piaget’s developmental psychology was more concerned with the former. Current research on epistemic development fills a gap in Piaget’s developmental psychology that has important implications for his developmental epistemology.

par I. Noveck, Université de Lyon 2, CNRS

Piaget opened the door to several lines of systematic investigation, the most obvious of which was the study of developmental and adult reasoning. Less obviously, work stemming from the Piagetian tradition has laid some of the groundwork for investigating the role of pragmatic understanding in reasoning (e.g., part of the difficulty in the class inclusion problem lies in its unusual comparison of a class to its subclass). Thus, it comes as no surprise to note that the modern field of reasoning is intimately connected to investigations of pragmatic comprehension. However, with a couple of notable exceptions, pragmatics is usually employed in rather selective ways, i.e., to address a specific reasoning problem, to account for unforeseen outcomes or to refer to effects concerning content and background knowledge. In this talk, I aim to show how an Experimental Pragmatic approach (i.e. a combination of linguistic-pragmatic theory with methods from the fields of psycholinguistics and reasoning), allows one to separate pragmatic influences from semantic ones and provides a basis for better understanding a) the lexical meanings of logical expressions and, b) developmental milestones.

par R. Byrne, Trinity College, Dublin

People often create alternatives to reality and imagine how events might have turned out "if only" something had been different. The "fault lines" of reality, that is, the aspects of reality that are more readily changed in imaginative thoughts, provide clues to the cognitive processes upon which the counterfactual imagination depends. The tendencies to imagine alternatives to exceptional events, actions, controllable events, socially unacceptable actions, causal and enabling relations, and events that come last in a temporal sequence can be explained by the idea that imaginative thought and rational thought have much in common. In this lecture, I will report results from experiments we have carried out with adults which show that the tendency to think about exceptional events in ‘if only’ thoughts is eliminated and reversed when an alternative less exceptional event leads to a better outcome. I will also report results from experiments we have carried out with 3-4 year old children which examine the role of imagery in their counterfactual thoughts about the presence and absence of entities. The experimental results from research on counterfactual ‘if only’ thoughts in both adults and children corroborate the view that imaginative thought is guided by the same processes that underlie rational thought, that is, principles that guide the possibilities that people think about.

R. S. Siegler, Carnegie Mellon University

The relation between short-term and long-term change, also known as learning and development, is among the enduring issues in developmental psychology. The issue plays a prominent role in classical theories of cognitive development; indeed, part of the reason that these theories are considered classic is that they represent clear and well-argued positions about this issue. In this talk, I briefly discuss approaches to the learning/development issue of classical theorists such as Piaget, Vygotsky, and Werner, then examine the contributions that modern microgenetic methods can make to the debate, then illustrate those contributions by presenting detailed empirical data from a microgenetic study that addressed the issue in the context of Piaget’s classic matrix completion problem, and close with 20 general conclusions about learning and development that have arisen from microgenetic studies.