



Guidelines for developing sustainable international scientific collaborations

Why those guidelines?

Scientific collaboration with international partners might sometimes lead researchers to complex situations that are difficult to assess, due to different social and political organizations and value systems. Those guidelines have been drafted in order to help UNIGE researchers to self-evaluate their collaborations on a voluntary basis and develop reliable and safe practices. It can also be used by principal investigators (PI) to increase awareness among members of their teams about risky practices. By doing so, it is foreseen that international academic links can be made sustainable and operational in the long term, leading to a mutually enriching collaboration.

How to use these guidelines?

- ➔ **The first section** proposes a checklist of questions for voluntary self-evaluation, which will help you to quickly identify best practices, possible risks and relevant regulations/procedures.
- ➔ **The second section** provides the scholars with basic background information on the questions, while the **third section** lists numerous references that are necessary to read in order to grasp the complexity of the issues.
- ➔ **If you identify problematic practices or issues**, a group of experts is available to give you further guidance and refine your self-evaluation. It can be contacted by sending an email to: Olivier.Vincent@unige.ch

SECTION 1

Questions for self-evaluation¹

I. Breaches of academic integrity:

Academic freedom:

1. Have you been able to cover every desired subjects and include all relevant people in your joint activities?
2. Have you been able to ask the questions you needed to ask?
3. Have you been asked to modify or hide the results of your project?
4. Are you free to disseminate the results of your project as planned?
5. Have you been contacted by networks of foreign influence (embassies, associations, foreign students based in Switzerland) in order to modify your project?
6. Have you been granted access to reliable and pertinent information in the partner country?
7. Do you find that your collaboration meets the same freedom standards of other international cooperations? If not, why and is it acceptable or not?

Self-censorship:

8. If you are censoring yourself, is it beyond “courtesy” standards?
9. Is self-censorship necessary to continue the collaboration without jeopardizing personal safety of people involved in it?
10. Can you use a different vocabulary and rephrase sensitive issues to avoid self-censorship?
11. Are you subject to pressures from students in the classroom or during public events?
12. Are you subject to pressures from colleagues, official bodies or informal actors?
13. Have you benefited from incentives that may reduce your freedom of speech?
14. Do you fear retaliation measures: visa denial, access to sources or individuals in the field, etc? Does it impact your research or studies?
15. Are you dependent on funding from foreign partners? If yes, does it impact your freedom of speech?

Ethical standards in research:

16. Is personal data used for research correctly protected?
17. Is research on human beings compliant with UNIGE’s ethical standards?²
18. Is animal use compliant with UNIGE’s ethical standards?²
19. Are individuals discriminated in the project?
20. Is the region in which you are operating in the partner country subject to breaches of Human Rights? If yes, what are the consequences of your project on this situation?

Political influence and foreign interference:

21. Is your collaboration with international partners subject to political influence?
22. Is your project financially sustainable without foreign funding?
23. What is the political background behind the collaboration? (even if it is about fundamental research)
24. Have you identified soft power mechanisms affecting your collaboration?
25. What are the links of interest and affiliations (e.g. military) of your partners?
26. Have you researched the political background of the partner institution?

¹ Categories based on d’Hooghe and Lammertink “Towards Sustainable Europe-China Collaboration in Higher Education in Research”, 2020, the Leiden Asia Centre, p. 37-38

² <https://www.unige.ch/recherche/fr/policies/> and <https://www.unige.ch/commissionethique/liens/>

27. If you receive funding from foreign sources, are you aware of the legal and ethical implications linked to it?
28. If you change or adapt your project in order to have access to foreign funding, are you significantly restricting your academic freedom?

Dual-use and unintended use of findings³:

29. Is your field of research subject to dual-use?
30. Is your field of research subject to dual-use Concern?
31. Even if you are active in fundamental research, could the cooperation lead to undesirable transfer of knowledge and be translated in technology that can be used for actions which are contrary to your values?
32. Are you aware of the links between your partner and the military sector?
33. Have you clarified if you are collaborating with colleagues/students who have direct links with the military sector?

II. Breaches of knowledge security

Undesirable transfer of knowledge or data

34. Have you thoroughly discussed the use and ownership of project results with your partner?
35. Have you thoroughly discussed the use and ownership of personal data with your partner?
36. Have all your agreements been reviewed by the competent offices at UNIGE? (Legal affairs, Research, UNITEC)?
37. Do you comply with regulation on data protection?⁴

Use of digital tools (while abroad):

38. Have you considered using different phones or computers for different purposes?
39. Have you considered using external hard drives and USB-sticks for your sensitive data?
40. Are you using public Wi-Fi, university networks or hotspots to have access to the internet?
41. Have you clarified with your partner the possibility to use UNIGE's/the host's VPN?

Cyber attacks and espionage (in Switzerland):

42. Do you know UNIGE's IT security policy and general security rules?⁵
43. Have you evaluated the level of security needed for your project?
44. Have you checked UNIGE's portal on cybersecurity?⁶
45. Do you carefully identify phishing practices and use secured passwords?

Infringements on intellectual property rights:

46. Have you contacted UNIGE's Legal affairs Office, UNITEC or the Research Service in order to negotiate and formalize the agreements concluded within the framework of the collaboration?
47. If the partnership is mainly funded by a foreign source, have you discussed how intellectual property rights will be shared?

³ For internal recommendations on dual use issues, see : <https://cureg.unige.ch/>

⁴ [Law on public information, access to documents and protection of personal data \(LIPAD\)](#)

⁵ <https://memento.unige.ch/doc/0174>

⁶ <https://www.unige.ch/cybersecurite/>

III. Lack of reciprocity in cooperation

Lack of transparency:

- 48. Do you understand your partner's agenda and motivations?
- 49. Have you inquired about the affiliations of your (institutional/individual) partner?
- 50. Do you understand the responsibilities and the roles of the project's stakeholders?
- 51. What problems could arise from the partner's side that could modify the project?
- 52. Do you know which rules and legislation apply?
- 53. If foreign law applies, do you understand the consequences on your project?

Lack of equal access to research, facilities and data:

- 54. Have you thoroughly discussed equal access issues with your partner?
- 55. Are objectives and expectations integrated in written in the collaboration agreement?
- 56. Which guidelines are you following to protect your own research, facilities and data?

Non-compliance with contracts:

- 57. Does your collaboration agreement include a clause for immediate termination of the collaboration which can be activated by both sides at any moment?
- 58. Have you thoroughly discussed sensitive topics with your partner before the beginning of the collaboration?
- 59. Are you regularly and overtly discussing potential issues of non-compliance with your partner?

IV. Personal security and health risks:

- 60. Have you checked UNIGE's policy on risk areas⁷ and the associated websites before going to abroad?
- 61. Are you aware of how the legal and cultural environment can impact your activities?
- 62. Are you aware of possible zero tolerance policies on drugs?
- 63. If you are dual national, are you aware of the recommendations of your second home country's government regarding your partner country?
- 64. Are you aware of discrimination issues abroad or in Switzerland by foreign or Swiss colleagues on the basis of gender, ethnic or social origin, religion or sexual orientation?

→ If your self-evaluation raises concerns about one or more of these questions, you can contact Olivier.Vincent@unige.ch, in order to liaise with the Group of experts on international collaboration for further advice.

⁷ <https://www.unige.ch/exchange/en/outgoing/study-abroad/policy-regarding-risk-areas/>

1. Higher Education and Research in a political context

a. Politics and Science: a strong link

In almost every country of the world, investment in universities and research institutions is part of governmental planning aiming at developing better societies, thanks to high-level research and a well-educated population with competitive skills.

However, the degree of top-down planning and institutional autonomy varies from country to country and even inside a specific country.

Authoritarian states might have developed a stronger state apparatus, sometimes led by a single party where power is concentrated in the hands of a minority of decision makers. In this case, the governance of universities and research institutions is often composed of people with a strong political background – sometimes with no proven track of academic experience. Therefore, partnerships with Swiss institutions can be embedded in larger political plans aiming at reinforcing the position of the ruling party, increasing its legitimacy and developing its military power and coercive capacities. Partnerships with foreign institutions can be used to legitimize some policies or a contrario be silenced in order to hide some negative aspects of the regime.

Democracies are also active on the world stage in order to gain influence, military power and international goodwill - as well as markets. This action can be more or less hidden and can be performed through research institutes, companies or individuals.

When entering a new scientific collaboration, a due diligence exercise should be performed on the new partner, in order to understand its agenda and motivations. This is especially true of partners based in authoritarian states. Do not hesitate to seek help of experts to gather the necessary information.

b. Human Rights and personal freedom

Human rights also include the right to food, to education, to work, to health and to personal liberty. From a Swiss perspective, personal rights and freedoms must be a central point in our relations with foreign countries (see [Switzerland's foreign policy strategy for 2020-23](#)). However, Swiss attempts to promote freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of demonstration, can lead citizens from foreign countries to serious problems in their home country.

Some years ago, a common belief in liberal democracies was that international cooperation could ultimately lead to a desire for more democratic processes in authoritarian states. This view is now strongly challenged, including by a significant part of the population in those states, sometimes under the pressure of propaganda, or simply by people in favour of their government's policies and support to cultural values. The last decade has shown that increased collaboration has not necessarily led to less authoritarian states all around the world.

Relations between authoritarian states and liberal democracies are now characterized by a game of mutual influence and colliding societal models. Recent international disputes have dramatically deteriorated the global geopolitical climate. Standard collaborations that were non problematic a couple of years ago have become more difficult or even impossible in some cases.

2. Issues raised in the checklist:

I. Breaches of academic integrity

- Academic freedom

The UNESCO defines academic freedom as “the right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies.”⁸ In this sense, academic freedom as defined by the UNESCO is not guaranteed in many countries in the world. Sensitive topics cannot be openly discussed without jeopardising well-established collaborations. This is particularly true in social sciences and humanities.

Sensitive topics, among others, are:

- Territorial issues
- Human Rights and Universal Values
- Ethnicity
- Religion
- Criticism of the government

Sometimes, criticizing the government’s political line on those topics is not allowed at all and can lead to severe punishment. However, as Swiss universities are operating under greater academic freedom, those issues can be addressed by scholars based in Switzerland in a way that will not conform to the partner’s official line. In this case, there will be a confrontation between two value systems and particular attention must be paid to the personal security of the partners.

- Self-censorship

Self-censorship of Swiss scholars is a subtle mechanism that can be triggered by different factors. In most cases, self-censorship is very much about not offending foreign colleagues or embarrassing them. From this point of view, a pragmatic approach is dictated by mutually respectful relations and behaviours. Particular attention must be paid to the language used and public criticism –if necessary- must be worded very carefully. There are often different views on governmental policies among the academic community, which makes room for differentiated exchanges.

It is important to be aware of self-censorship mechanisms, in order to be able to stand-up for your values and continue a productive dialogue.

⁸ “Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher Education Teaching Personnel,” UNESCO, November 11, 1997, paragraph 27, http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=13144&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

- Ethical standards in research

The University of Geneva defines its ethical framework around 4 axes (c.f. “Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct” <https://www.unige.ch/ethique/charter>)

1. The search for truth
2. Freedom of teaching and research
3. Commitment and responsibility
“The utmost attention is given to individuals who are the subject of research in the social and life sciences in order to preserve their independence and personal integrity and to ensure they are safeguarded against the disclosure of data that could harm them. Research based on experiments involving living beings is conducted in strict accordance with the specific ethical principles that guide its use.”
4. Respect for the individual
“The Institutions of Higher Education promote the principle of equal opportunity. They prohibit any discrimination based on, among other things, sex, ethnic or social origin, genetic characteristics, religious beliefs, political opinions, membership in a national minority, disability, age, sexual orientation or gender identity, both in fulfilling the tasks of teaching and research ...”

Those ethical standards may not be fully integrated and interpreted in the same way all over the world. The partner may breach this code of conduct without being aware of our requirements, and the Swiss side is vice versa not aware of potential breaches of ethical standards coming from the partner’s side. It is the responsibility of the Swiss partner to inquire proactively about possible breaches of academic integrity.

In any case, it is strictly prohibited to exploit weaker regulation contexts in foreign countries to conduct research that could not take place in Switzerland due to stricter regulations and ethical rules.

UNIGE researchers can find further information on ethical standards and procedures that are applying in the following websites:

<https://www.unige.ch/recherche/fr/policies/>
<https://www.unige.ch/commissionethique/liens/>

- Political influence and foreign interference

Definition: “(...) political influence and interference in [Higher Education and Research], (...) refers to attempts by a foreign actor to influence the perceptions of staff, scholars and students at [Higher Education and Research] institutions with the aim of aligning research, education and the international academic debate with the strategic visions, opinions, interests or political system of a foreign actor, which are not supported by the receiving side and or are contrary to the receiving side’s norms and values” (d’Hooghe and Lammertink 2020)

Some countries are devoting tremendous efforts to make their voice heard on the global scene, especially regarding the pertinence of their political system and values. They have developed numerous soft power tools to support those outreach policies, including in the academic field.

Specific attention must be paid to ensure that partnerships are not overly dependent on foreign resources – and hence liable to undue pressure if people’s salaries or research funding depends on this.

Another important aspect linked to foreign funding is that students who receive grants from a foreign government might be asked to accept, while working abroad, to abide by local University rules.

Finally, some institutions might be more involved in implementing governmental policies than others: do not hesitate to investigate on the partner institution's links with the government.

- Dual-use and unintended use of findings

"Dual-use Research ("DUR") is defined as research conducted for legitimate purposes that generates knowledge, information, technologies, and/or products that could be utilized for both benevolent and harmful purposes." (c.f. Boston University Research support, <https://www.bu.edu/researchsupport/compliance/ibc/dual-use-research-of-concern/>)

The Research Service of UNIGE has developed recommendations for researchers who may face dual-use Research issues. (<https://www.unige.ch/recherche/fr/policies/ethique-protection-des-donnees-personnelles/>)

DUR issues are especially sensitive when collaborating with authoritarian states, due to the blurred frontier between the academic and the military worlds.

The proximity between the military and political sectors will accelerate the transfer of knowledge and technology to the armed forces, with the risk of serving repressive practices, or violations of human rights.

Research conducted at UNIGE is most of the time not directly linked to applied technologies that could be subject to dual-use. However "Dual Use Research of Concern ("DURC") must also be considered. It is defined as "life sciences research that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to provide knowledge, information, products, or technologies that could be directly misapplied to pose a significant threat with broad potential consequences to public health and safety, agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment, materiel, or national security." (c.f. Boston University Research support, see link above)

Here are some examples of technologies with higher risk of dual use:

- *quantum computing*
- *big data*
- *semiconductors*
- *5G*
- *advanced nuclear technology*
- *aerospace technology*
- *Artificial Intelligence*

For a detailed list of dual-use items, please refer to the list developed by the European Commission: <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016R1969>

II. Breaches of knowledge security

- Undesirable transfer of knowledge or data

As described above, some authoritarian states are particularly efficient in quickly translating science into applied technologies. Transfer of knowledge must then be carefully regulated when entering a collaboration, in order to avoid unwanted consequences such as impacting negatively Swiss companies' competitive advantage or national security interests.

The following principles, developed by Empa (c.f. <https://www.empa.ch/fr/web/empa/ip-policy>) are a useful framework to manage the use of knowledge generated by the partnership:

- **Use of project results by the industrial partner**

Non-exclusive right of use in the partner's field of application

Option to negotiate an exclusive right of use in a specified field of application

- **Ownership of project results**

Project results owned by the generating party

Co-ownership for jointly generated project results

- **Protection of project results**

Industrial partner may take the lead in filing jointly owned results for protection, supported by Empa

- **Fair compensation**

For an exclusive right of use by the industrial partner

For an commercial right of use of Empa's pre-existing intellectual property

- **Publications**

Right of Empa to publish project results while respecting confidentiality obligations

Delay of publication if required for a patent application

- **Freedom to operate**

Right of the project partners to use unprotected project results independently of one another

Right the project partners to use all protected project results for research and teaching purposes

"Freedom to operate" for future collaborations

In individual cases, the project partners may agree on deviations from these principles, taking into account the mutual interests and specific circumstances.

In the field of data protection, the University of Geneva is subject to the Loi sur l'information du public et l'accès aux documents (LIPAD; RSG A 2 08) and its implementing regulation (RIPAD; A 2 08.01) and the Directive "Loi sur l'information du public, l'accès aux documents et la protection des données personnelles (LIPAD) : application à l'Université" (c.f. <https://memento.unige.ch/doc/0160>).

Following Swiss authorities, the legislation in some countries does not provide sufficient personal data protection. It is therefore not possible to outsource personal data to those countries without encrypting or anonymising it under the full control of UNIGE. Exceptions can be granted, please refer to : <https://www.unige.ch/universite/reglements/lipad/>

- Use of digital tools (while abroad)

“[In some countries], data protection and privacy have a different status compared to Switzerland. Large-scale monitoring, face-recognition and surveillance of individuals as well as their technical equipment (i.e. mobile phones, laptops) is considered to be beneficial to public security and is largely accepted by the public. In public spaces and universities (including lecture halls, shared facilities at dormitories, etc.), cameras, microphones and/or select individuals [might] monitor speeches or events. Transmission of undesirable or harmful information may be reported to the authorities.

Due diligence is needed when handling personal, academic or institutional data and information processing on the internet or external data storage devices. You may want to bring and store just as much information as needed for your stay, and use simple work or communication equipment that does not contain sensitive material. (...) There is no full protection of the data you are carrying with you. Your mobile phone or laptop may be retrieved by customs or government authorities upon entry for checkups unannounced at any time. Make sure that your devices do not include any sensitive or personal data of yourself and other people (such as address books and contact lists, patient records, social media caches, documents violating local regulations, sensitive data from Switzerland or your home country, etc.). For more details on data protection for individuals, companies and institutions, refer to the [Federal Act on Data Protection](#) of the Swiss government or the website of the [Australian Department of Education, Skills and Employment](#).”⁹

- Cyber attacks and espionage (in Switzerland)

Global superpowers have all develop concepts for cyberwarfare. In 2019, the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service “detected a record number of state-sponsored cyber attacks on Swiss interests, most of which were of Russian, North Korean, Chinese and Iranian origin.” (c.f. [Switzerland’s security 2020](#), Federal Intelligence Service). Universities are a key target for state sponsored groups of hackers and particular attention must be paid to protecting sensitive data and knowledge produced at research institutions.

According the Swiss Federal Intelligence Service: “The activity of (...) intelligence services is evident in the stationing of intelligence officers not only under diplomatic cover, but also and in particular under non-official cover, such as officers who pose as researchers, students, tourists or business people.” (c.f. [Switzerland’s security 2020](#), Federal Intelligence Service).

UNIGE’s policy is to protect sensitive projects or information and strengthen the traceability of accesses to them. Projects and data can be classified following different categories of confidentiality, to which appropriate measures can be associated. Please refer to: <https://memento.unige.ch/doc/0174/>

If applicable, UNIGE’s Committee for Ethical Research (c.f. <https://cureg.unige.ch/en>) will assess your project.

- Infringements on intellectual property rights

The Legal affairs office, UNITEC or the Research Service of UNIGE must be contacted to negotiate and formalize agreements concluded within the framework of collaboration with international partners. Intellectual property rights issues will be clearly regulated in the agreements.

⁹ University of Zurich internal document, not published

III. Lack of reciprocity in cooperation

- Lack of transparency

Transparency is a key factor to maintain sustainable collaborations with partner institutions. Swiss researchers must be able to understand the whole environment surrounding their collaborations. They must also be able to explain it to a wider audience if doubts are arising regarding compliance with ethical or knowledge security standards. Sometimes, this task is a difficult one because of a lack of transparency from the partner or because of cultural and language problems.

Swiss and foreign partners should be able to mutually require the same level of transparency, and be able to clearly identify the objectives of the partnership as well as indicators for failure or success.

- Lack of equal access to research, facilities and data

Reciprocal access to research, facilities and data is sometimes difficult to guarantee, as those might be classified by the partner as being strategic or sensitive. It is therefore important to make clear beforehand what are the expectations and the objectives from both sides of the partnership.

From a Swiss perspective, protection of research, facilities and data is sometimes too weak and could benefit to be strengthened.

- Non-compliance with contracts

The collaborators of UNIGE shall comply with the regulations applicable to UNIGE when collaborating with international partners. In the general area of contracts, it includes but is not limited to:

- Directive "Concluding collaborative research agreements and service mandate" (c.f. <https://memento.unige.ch/doc/0283>);
- Directive "Signature d'une commande, d'un contrat ou d'un accord au nom de l'Université" (c.f. <https://memento.unige.ch/doc/0069>);
- Directive "Dons, legs et subsides" (c.f. <https://memento.unige.ch/doc/0217>).

Even if collaboration agreements are correctly drafted in order to cover all the aspects of the partnership, it happens that one of the parties do not comply with the contracts. The consequences can sometimes be serious and there must be a possibility to quickly stop the damaging practices. Legal prosecution is very seldom activated; in order to avoid non-compliance, it is preferred to build mutual trust and understanding between the partners. Expectations about sensitive issues must be clarified before the beginning of the collaboration and then overtly and regularly discussed as soon as they arise.

IV. Personal security and health risks

Exposure to risk is inherent to international travel and include possible exposure to terrorism, violent crime or health issues in any country of the world. In order to assess those risks, students and researchers travelling abroad are required to follow [UNIGE's policy regarding risk areas](#) and refer to the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs' [website](#).

Individuals can be put at risk both in Switzerland or abroad, and both Swiss and foreign citizens. Particular attention must be paid to the following issues:

- Arbitrary jailing for certain nationals might be possible: students and staff with non Swiss citizenship must also check their government's recommendations on travelling abroad before their trip.
- Some governments do not recognize dual nationality
- Ethnic or social origin, religion or sexual orientation can be prejudicial, despite governmental policies on non-discrimination
- Drug detention, even in small quantities can be strictly prohibited and severely punished
- Pollution levels might be higher than in Switzerland, leading to health issues
- Field research must be conducted with the collaboration of a local academic partner. In some cases, foreigners can endanger locals simply by having contacts with them.
- Some western campuses are experiencing rising discrimination on scholars and students of foreign origin. Should it be the case at UNIGE, support for students, staff members and witnesses is available at <https://www.unige.ch/maletre/en/>

SECTION 3

References and links

1. Guidelines from other sources

A review and analysis of the following guidelines can be found in d'Hooghe and Lammertink's "Towards Sustainable Europe-China Collaboration in Higher Education in Research", 2020, the Leiden Asia Centre:

- ['Responsible internationalisation: Guidelines for reflection on international academic collaboration.'](#) Published by the Swedish Foundation for International Cooperation in Research and Higher Education (STINT).
- ['Managing Risks in Internationalisation: Security Related Issues.'](#) Published by Universities UK (UUK), an association of 140 UK universities.
- ['Guidelines to Counter Foreign Interference in the Australian University Sector.'](#) Published by the Australian Department of Education.

2. Politics and Science

- [A special relationship: The US military and Swiss universities](#), swissinfo, Dec 6th 2018
- [Don't Underestimate China's Military-Civil Fusion Efforts](#), Foreign Policy, Feb 5th 2021
- [Party Secretaries in Chinese Higher Education Institutions: What Roles Do They Play?](#) Journal of International Education and Leadership, Volume 6 Issue 2, Summer 2016
- [Switzerland's foreign policy strategy for 2020-23](#)

3. Breaches of academic integrity

- UNIGE staff can find further information on UNIGE ethical standards and procedures in the following websites:
<https://www.unige.ch/recherche/fr/policies/>
<https://www.unige.ch/commissionethique/liens/>
- [Detailed list of Dual Use items developed by the European Commission](#)
- [Export Controls and Sanctions](#), website of the Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs

4. Breaches of knowledge security

- UNIGE's [Politique de sécurité du système d'information](#)
- UNIGE's recommendations on phishing : [Sécurité de la messagerie](#)
- Swissuniversities Digital Skills programme: [Make-IT-easy](#)
- [Empa's IP policy](#)
- [Federal Act on Data Protection](#) (Swiss Federal Law)
- [Guidelines to counter foreign interference in the Australian university sector](#), Australian Government, Department of Education, Skills and Employment

5. Lack of reciprocity in cooperation

- [Towards Sustainable Europe-China Collaboration in Higher Education in Research](#), pp. 42-43, d'Hooghe and Lammertink, the Leiden Asia Centre, 2020

6. Personal security and health risks

- [UNIGE's policy regarding risk areas](#)
- [FDFA travel recommendations, Swiss government](#)
- [Conseil aux voyageurs, gouvernement français](#)
- [Foreign Travel Advice](#), Local laws and customs, British Government