Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy

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Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy

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1. Visions of democracy. An Introduction

The third Work package of Demos focuses on the images of democracy inside the movement. Based upon the analysis of organizational documents, it is composed of two parts: one is based on an extensive content analysis of the documentation (off line and on line) produced by social movement organizations; the other is an in-depth analysis of four organizations in each country and at the transnational level. The documents we analyzed portray the dominant views within movement organizations and so constitute an important source of information. They highlight the main tenets behind social movement initiatives, advancing critique of global policy making, and providing a systematic series of proposals and strategies. A detailed analysis allows to identify the main trends in the proposals and strategies, providing some preliminary insights on one of the project's central issues: how the social capital involved in transnational movement organizations could be brought into the domain of politics in a fruitful co-operation with institutions. The analysis addresses the general tensions between deliberative/participatory and representative patterns, both in internal dynamics of the social movements and in their relationships with institutions.

This part of our research is not supposed to capture the real functioning of the organizations/groupings, but their organizational ideology. The assumption is that when a group has strong normative statements about internal democracy, these tend to be written in a "visible" document such as a constitution, a mission statement, an "about us" section on the organization's website, etc.. We are aware that in some cases constitutions or mission statements are strategically instrumental—i.e. they can be adapted to the requirements of external sponsors/state institutions etc. in order to obtain funds and influence (and this will be assessed with interviews and other documents). However, even if "instrumental", we can assume that the formalized decision making procedures tend to have an impact on the organizations by constraining institutional structures and frames.

Besides information on the conception of democracy, we have also analysed the relevant data on organizational structures, general themes covered and main (perceived) functions. We expect these internal characteristics to be related with the development of the different conceptions of democracy. We have collected data by country and at a transnational level, and also coded the date of foundation of the organizations. Space and time are in fact expected to play a role in the organizational culture. As neoinstitutional approaches to organizational sociology have pointed out (March and Olsen 1989; Boli and Thomas 1999), organizations tend to be *isomorphic* to their environment, adapting to some of its characteristics. This has meant for many social movements to adapt their organization by imitating the main organizational features of the most important institutional actor they had to interact with: the state. However, it could also be expected that social movements try to build their own organizational culture emphasizing their critics to both the state's and political parties' organization (Rucht 1996). In any case, we expect that the history of the interaction between states and social movements in each specific country and at the transnational level is embedded in the SMOs' organizational culture that defined appropriate behaviours and attitudes. Neoinstitutionalists have however also suggested that organizational characteristics are path-dependent: organizational features are resilient over time. In fact, we expect that the historical periods in which SMOs were founded plays an important role in determining organizational structures and values.

We have synthesised our research model in figure 1.

Figure 1. A research model for the analysis of organizational conceptions of democracy ("cod" refers to variables contained in the codebook; "new" refers to new recoded variables)



In WP3 we have focused on the analysis of written statements of the organizations/groupings about their organizational ideology and their visions of (internal and external) democracy. We aimed at collecting information on a relatively large number of organizations/groupings per country and on very different organizational models. This is why we added to the traditional dimensions analysed in research on NGOs, parties, unions, associations etc., some "simplified" indicators for organizations/groupings that adopt a less-structured organizational models.

We do not aim at measuring degrees of democracy, but instead at constructing a typology of the different models of democracy that are present, in a more or less "pure" form, in the GJM organizations. A main assumption of our research is indeed that the general principles of democracy as power (*kratos*) by/from/for the people (*demos*) can be combined in different forms and with different balances between a representative versus participatory dimension and a majority versus deliberative one (see below). The plurality of repertoires that we have singled out in the GJM (see WP1 report) is also reflected in the variety of conceptions of democracy that are expressed by the GJM groups and organizations.

In what follows, we shall present some results about the conceptions of democracy revealed by the analysis of organizational documents, and discuss some possible explanations for the differences which emerged between models of democracy. We shall, first of all, present the main methodological choices (part 2), highlighting their potentialities and limitations. After having presented our research instruments and sampling strategies (part 2), we shall proceed by presenting some data from the quantitative analysis focusing of the characteristics of our organizations on the dependent variable, conceptions of democracy (part 3), and then discuss the explanatory value of internal/organizational (part 4) and external/environmental (part 5) conditions for the different conceptions of democracy.

2. Research instruments and sampling strategies

In this work package as in others, the research is composed of a quantitative (large N) and a qualitative (small N) part.

For the quantitative part of the research, we developed a code book aiming at conducting a structured analysis of a specific aspect of the movement discourse on democracy, i.e. the organizational ideology of social movement organizations (see Deliverable 2). This part is quite new from the methodological point of view. Documents describing the structure of social movement organizations have been analysed in various research projects, but mostly within qualitative in-depth analyses of few groups that had the advantage of "thick" description but were difficult to summarize in larger comparison (among others, TEA project, second year report; for a review of the literature, Clemens and Minkoff 2004; della Porta and Diani 2006). In this work package, we tried to go beyond a "thick" description, trying to devise instruments for a larger comparison. One of the rationale for enlarging the number of selected cases was indeed the heterogeneity of the Global Justice Movement/s (GJM) in terms, among others, of organizational designs (see della Porta, WP1 report) that made the selection of a large number of different groups interesting. Enlarging the number of observed organizations, some instruments for quantitative analysis became necessary.

For the development of these instruments, we could rely upon some previous experiences in other fields of research. In particular, the constitutions of political parties have been studied in research on party organizational models, and party electoral manifestos have been analysed as important sources of information on party ideology (see Klingeman, Hoffenbert and Budge 1994). The challenge in our research is however the presence of very different types of organizations: from political parties to unions, from large associations to small informal groupings, from transnational networks to local groups. We could of course have focused our attention only on organizations of the same type—for instance, organizations with a constitution. This would have implied however to exclude from our analysis relevant alternative forms of organizations. We therefore accepted the challenge deriving from the fact that the quantity and character of written material varies a lot by group: in fact, a large written production makes it more likely to find statements about democracy, while the absence of a formal constitution makes it more unlikely to find detailed information about the formal rules of decision making. In the interpretation of our results, we shall take into account these differences, and their consequences. A related problem is that, while access to the selected documents is often easy for more formal organizations (that mostly put them on their websites, see Demos WP2 report), this is not

always true for less formalized organizations. In addition, informal organizations also proved to be more reluctant to provide documents offline. This meant that, especially in some countries, the corpus of documents on some groups was reduced. This is also a caveat we shall have to take into account in interpreting our results.

To our knowledge, this is the first attempt to develop a systematic content analysis of SMOs organizational documents on democratic values. We therefore invested considerable energies in the preparation of the code book, taking into account both our main research questions and the characteristics of the available materials. We built our code book around the following sets of variables: general information on the organizational characteristics (among which, country and date of foundation, territorial level of activity, number of individual and collective members), membership rules (among which the requirements for being admitted and procedures for admission as well as expulsion), organizational structures and decision-making methods (among which, if mentioned, the role of assemblies, executive committees and presidents or general secretaries; their composition and functioning; the methods for the choice of delegates; the limits on delegation; incompatibility rules), relationships with public institutions (distinguishing between collaboration, democratic control and refusal of relationships with local institutions, national institutions, international governmental institutions, as well as with economic actors); identity and conceptions of democracy (including references to: internal organizational values such as limitation of delegation, inclusiveness, deliberation, general democratic values, such as participation, equality, dialogue; themes covered, such as democracy, social justice, human rights, ecology; specific functions of the organization, such as protesting or lobbying).

Some main problems we had to address in the development of the code book derived from the expected plurality of the organizational models. Especially during the first pre-test we noticed that the first version of the code-book was better fit for the analysis of more structured organizations. We therefore devised some new variables, and corrected some existing ones. The new pre-test run on 15 February 2005 gave satisfactory results (see appendix).

During the pre-test phase, we also specified the choice of the types of documents to be coded. The analysis of the organisational documents' focused on: a) the constitution of

the organisation; b) a document of fundamental values and/or intent; c) a formally adopted program; d) the "mission statement"; e) the "about us" section of the website; f) the "frequently asked questions" section of the website; f) equivalent or similar material on the website, expressing the "official" position of the organisation as a whole (e.g. internal documents referred to in documents a) – f), like annual reports, membership application forms, etc.). Many but not all these materials were available on websites. In fact, after an analysis of the websites, we contacted the social movement organizations to ask for missing documents.

On the bases of these sources, data have been collected (online and offline) and coded on 244 organizations. For the sampling of the organizations, we relied upon the analysis of the organizational websites conducted for WP2, selecting the same organizations that we had already analysed for that work package, with minor corrections (for instance for organizations that had meanwhile disappeared). In our more general research design, the quantitative parts of Demos Work Packages 2, 3 and 4 are in fact to be linked in order to be able to cross the information on web-site models, organizational ideology and visions of democracy as expressed in documents, and organizational models emerging in interviews.

Our quantitative analysis of organizational documents is complemented, in a second step of WP3, by a qualitative analysis of a reduced sample of groups, for which we have collected an additional number of documents. For this qualitative analysis, each team selected four groups (covering the four categories in our typology of internal decision-making) for which in the course of the quantitative part a considerable body of documents had already been assembled. This material was supplemented by a further check on the websites of the four organizations, looking for material containing "visions of democracy" (both external and internal) beyond those documents used for the quantitative part. In addition, the four organizations were directly approached, asking them to provide any written document containing their ideas on internal and external democracy.

We decided to concentrate our attention on organizations founded during the rise of the GJM for two reasons: as these organizations went through a "constitutional phase" during the last five or six years, the likelihood to find relevant documents is high; the documents of these organizations will more "genuinely" reflect the visions of democracy of

the new movement. In exceptional cases, however, national teams could include organizations that were significantly changed by their participation in the GJM. Moreover, for obvious reasons, we decided to focus on groups that have produced relevant written material. Where possible, the national teams selected the national branch of Attac for the in-depth analysis. In order not to miss important discussions within the movement, which might take place outside of the selected organizations, we further agreed to look at the most important debates on democracy within the GJM, as they emerged from the analysis of the selected organizations. The following forums and themes were suggested as potentially relevant: the debate on the European Constitution; the representation in international movement events (ESF, WSF); specific campaigns (Gatt, WTO). For practical reasons, we could however concentrate only on debates for which written material was easy to collect (for instance, already published in books, special issues of journals and magazines, etc.).

The qualitative part of WP3 allows a more detailed view of some central aspects of conceptions of democracy circulating within the GJM. In particular, the meanings given to concepts such as consensual decision making, participation and deliberation have been analyzed in-depth. In the qualitative part, we also paid particular attention to visions of external democracy, reporting the main criticism movement organizations address to representative institutions and Intergovernmental organizations as well as their proposals for reforms.

Before moving to the results of our empirical analysis, some brief remarks on the sampling strategies are in order. For the quantitative part, it has to be stressed that ours is not a random sampling. Random sampling is only one of the possible ways of selecting cases, which has some obvious advantages, but difficult preconditions of applicability. As, among others, King, Kehoane and Verba state, "if we have to abandon randomness, *as it is usually the case in political science research*, we must do with caution" (1994, 124, emphasis added). They add that, first of all, "In qualitative research, and indeed in much quantitative research, random selection might not be feasible because the universe of cases is not clearly specified" (ibid., 125). In our case, in fact, random selection is impossible given that the universe is un-known (there is no "official" list of GJMOs). The same authors add that "even when random selection is feasible, it is not necessarily a wise technique to use" (ibid.), since there is the risk of "missing important cases". This reflection

also applies to our research design, where (given the time consuming tasks of acquiring and coding documents) we could select only about 30-40 groups per team. In our sampling strategy we therefore did not used randomness as a criterion, but tried instead to select in each country and at the supranational level organizations that were at the core of the Global Justice Movements. Additionally, we tried to reflect the heterogeneity of the movements by issues covered and ideological leanings. In this sense, we were careful not to sample on our dependent variables (conceptions of democracy), following the criterion that "the best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables" (ibid., 140). As a consequence of this sampling strategy, we cannot say that our national samples are representative of the (unknown) universe of GJM organizations in each country. Since our case selection also respected the principle that "we must not search for those observations that fit (o do not fit) our a priori theory" (ibid., 141, see also p. 142), we do however feel confident that the statistical correlations among the coded variables are not biased by the selection choices.

3. Conceptions of democracy: the dependent variables

Our research focuses upon conceptions of democracy. We first coded the democratic values mentioned in the documents we have analysed. Additionally, we combined indicators on the organizational structures and values in order to empirically analyse the typology of associational models developed in Work Package 1. Finally, we looked at the attitudes of the social movement organizations towards public institutions and private corporations.

3.1. Participatory and deliberative conceptions of democracy

It is a main assumption in our research that social movements do not limit themselves to developing special channels of access for themselves but, more or less explicitly, they express a fundamental critique of conventional politics, thus shifting their endeavours from politics itself to meta-politics (Offe 1985). From this point of view, social movements affirm the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to parliamentary democracy, criticizing both liberal democracy and the 'organized democracy' of political parties. Their

ideas resonate with ”an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organisation of collective decision making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy” (Kitschelt 1993, 15). At least since the 1960s, the conception of democracy developed by social movements is founded on bases at least partly different from representative democracy. According to the representative democracy model, citizens elect their representatives and exercise control through the ballot box. The direct democracy favoured by social movements limits the principle of delegation, viewed as an instrument of oligarchic power, and asserts that representatives should be subject to recall at all times. Moreover, delegation is general in a representative democracy, representatives deciding on a whole range of matters for citizens; delegation relates only to a particular issue in a system of direct democracy. Whereas representative democracy foresees the creation of a specialised body of representatives, direct democracy opts for continual turnover. Representative democracy is based on formal equality (one person, one vote); direct democracy is participatory, the right to decide being recognised only to those who demonstrate their commitment to the public cause. While representative democracy is often bureaucratic, with decision making concentrated at the top, direct democracy is decentralized and emphasizes that decisions should be taken as near as possible to ordinary people’s lives.

In this sense, social movements are also a response to problems which have emerged in the system of interest representation, ‘compensating’ for the tendency of political parties to favour interests which have a better pay off in electoral terms, and of interest groups to represent social strata better endowed with resources while marginalizing the rest. Participatory democracy should give a voice to those with neither material resources nor strength of numbers but who are committed to a just cause. While the principal instrument in the hands of citizens in representative democracy is the vote, direct democracy legitimates all those forms of bringing pressure to bear on the decision-making process that are defined as protest repertoires.

If participatory democracy has long been present in social movement theorizing about democracy, we suggest that some emerging developments in social movements can

be usefully discussed in the light of the growing literature on deliberative democracy, with its attention to communication, particularly of the works developing within a participatory approach (della Porta 2004a; WP 1 Report) and locating democratic deliberation in voluntary groups (Cohen 1989), social movements (Dryzek 2000), protest arenas (Young 2003, 119) or, more in general, enclaves free from institutional power (Mansbridge 1996).

Trying to summarize various, and not always coherent, existing definitions of deliberative democracy we suggest concentrating on some elements which resonate with the traditional participatory element of democracy and others that signal a new concern with the quality of communication. We propose a definition of deliberative democracy as decisional processes in which under conditions of equality, inclusiveness and transparency, a communicative process based on reason (the strength of the good argument) is able to transform individual preferences, leading to decisions oriented to the public good.

Some elements of this definition echo those already included in the participatory models we have just described as typical of (new) social movements, although with an emerging emphasis on the quality of the discourse. In particular, deliberative democracy "requires some forms of apparent equality among citizens" (Cohen 1989, 18); in fact, deliberation takes place among free and equal citizens (as "free deliberation among equals", ibid., 20). At least, "all citizens must be able to develop those capacities that give them effective access to the public sphere", and "once in public, they must be given sufficient respect and recognition so as to be able to influence decisions that affect them in a favourable direction" (Bohman 1997, 523-24). Deliberation must exclude power deriving from coercion, but also an unequal weight of the participants as representatives of organizations of different size or influence. In this sense, deliberative democracy stresses direct partecipation "from below".

Also common to traditional conceptions of direct democracy is the emphasis on inclusiveness. All citizens with a stake in the decisions to be taken have to be included in the process and have to be able to express their views. This means that the deliberative process takes place under conditions of plurality of values including people with different perspectives but facing common problems. Deliberation (or even communication) is based upon the belief that, while not necessarily giving up my perspective, I might learn if I listen to the other (Young 1996). Moreover, transparency resonates with direct, participatory

democracy: assemblies are tipically open, public spheres. In Joshua Cohen's definition, a deliberative democracy is "an association whose affairs are governed by the *public* deliberation of its members" (1989: 17, emphasis added).

What is especially new in the conception of deliberative democracy, and in some of the contemporary movements' practices, is the emphasis on preference (trans)formation with an orientation to the definition of the public good. In fact, "deliberative democracy requires the transformation of preferences in interaction" (Dryzek 2000, 79); it is "a process through which initial preferences are transformed in order to take into account the points of view of the others" (Miller 1993, 75). In this sense, deliberative democracy differs from conceptions of democracy as the aggregation of (exogenously generated) preferences. In this model of democracy, "the political debate is organized around alternative conceptions of the public good", and, above all, it "draws identities and citizens' interests in ways that contribute to public building of public good" (Cohen 1989, 18-19).

A deliberative setting facilitates the search for a common end or good (Elster 1998). Especially, deliberative democracy stresses reason: people are convinced by the force of the better argument. In particular, deliberation is based on horizontal flows of communication, multiple producers of content, wide opportunities for interactivity, confrontation on the basis of rational argumentation, attitude to reciprocal listening (Habermas 1981; 1996). Deliberations are based upon arguments that the participants recognise as reasonable (Cohen and Sabel 1997). In this sense deliberative democracy is discursive. These conceptions also often refer to practices of consensus, with decisions approvable by all participants, in contrast with the majority rule, where decisions are legitimated by vote. Consensus had already been mentioned by previous movements, but now acquires more relevance.

3.2. Internal and general organizational democratic values

Previous research has often stressed that social movement organizations pay strong attention to the issue of democracy, often developing alternative values. Traditionally, social movement organizations have stressed the participatory dimension of democracy, calling for an increase in the channels of democratic participation. They have also stressed

direct democracy, as the direct expression of citizens' preferences, and a corrective to representative democracy. Social movement organizations have also been said to be self-reflexive, in so far as they tend to debate the issue of democracy as it applies to their internal life. Investigating recent movements, Francesca Polletta stressed the use by activists of deliberative attitudes and practices: "they expected each other to provide legitimate reasons for preferring one option to another. They strove to recognize the merits of each other's reasons for favouring a particular option… the goal was not unanimity, so much as discourse. But it was a particular kind of discourse, governed by norms of openness and mutual respect" (Polletta 2002, 7).

Our data confirm that the issue of democracy continues to be a very relevant one: most of the organizations we have sampled mention democratic values in their documents. Looking at the values on internal democracy (table 1), participation is still a main dimension of SMOs' visions of democracy, mentioned by one third of the organizations as an internal value. Not only the pure forms of social movement organizations have participation as a founding principle, but also trade unions and left-wing political parties. However, additional values emerge specifying (and differentiating) the conceptions of participatory democracy. References to limits to delegation, rotation principle, mandated delegation, criticism of delegation or deliberative democracy as internal organizational values are present but not dominant (between 6% and 11%). References to the consensual method and non-hierarchical decision making are more significant (17.2%; 16%), even more frequently mentioned are inclusiveness, and the autonomy of local chapters or member organizations (between and 21% and 29%).

Looking at the general democratic values (table 1), it is remarkable that references to plurality, difference, and heterogeneity as important democratic elements have been singled out in the documents of as much as half of our sample, with a value very near to that of the reference to (more traditional) participation. Equality is mentioned in the analysed documents of about one third of our sample and values such as transparency, inclusiveness and individual freedom in about one fourth. Significantly, representative values are mentioned by only 6% of our organizations.

Table 1. Internal and general democratic values (frequencies)

Dependent variables	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
	Internal values of the organization	
Explicit critic of delegation/representation	11.1	244
Limitation of delegation explicitly mentioned	6.6	244
Rotation principle explicitly mentioned	6.6	244
Consensual method explicitly mentioned	17.2	244
Deliberative democracy explicitly mentioned	7.0	244
Participatory democracy explicitly mentioned	27.9	244
Non-hierarchical decision-making explicitly mentioned	16.0	244
Inclusiveness explicitly mentioned	20.9	244
Autonomy of member organizations explicitly mentioned[1]	33.1	130
Autonomy of the territorial levels explicitly mentioned[2]	38.5	182
Mandate delegation explicitly mentioned	6.1	244
General Democratic values of the organization		
Difference/plurality/heterogeneity mentioned	47.1	244
Individual liberty/autonomy	21.7	244
Participation	51.2	244
Representation	6.1	244
Equality	34.0	244
Inclusiveness	25.8	244
Transparency	23.8	244
Autonomy (group; cultural)	18.9	244
Dialogue/communication	31.6	244

For further analysis, we decided to aggregate our data. As far as the internal values are concerned we grouped positive responses on critique of delegation, limitation of delegation, non-hierarchical decision making and mandated delegation into an index of "critique of delegation/non-hierarchical decision-making". A new variable grouped responses on autonomy of member organizations and autonomy of local chapter. In what

[1] This variable is not applicable for 114 (46.7%) groups, because they do not mention organizations as members.

[2] This variable is not applicable for 62 (25.4%) groups, because they do not mention territorial levels of organization.

follows, the variables on consensual method and deliberative democracy will not be explored as internal principles since they were used in the construction of our typology of democratic internal decision-making, the dependent variable (see § 3.3. below). As for the data on the general democratic values, they were recoded on the basis of the correlations shown in a factor analysis into "deliberative general values" (references to participation, equality, inclusiveness, transparency, dialogue/communication) (see footnote 4). For the "deliberative general values" we created a new dichotomised variable as well as an additive index (see footnote 5).

On the basis of the recoded data, we can notice (table 2) that about one fourth of the organizations express critique of delegation and more than one third stress autonomy of member organizations or local chapters as a positive value. Moreover, most organizations tend to mention more than one value, for instance qualifying their participatory appeal with references to inclusiveness and/or autonomy.

Table 2. Internal and general democratic values recoded (frequencies)

Dependent variables	**Frequencies of yes (%)**	**Total of valid cases**
Internal principle of the organization (recoded)		
Participatory democracy	27.9	244
Inclusiveness	20.9	244
Critique of delegation (including limitation of delegation) or non hierarchical decision making	23.4	244
Autonomous member organizations or local chapter[3]	39.8	216

[3] In 28 (11.5%) cases both autonomy of members organizations and of local chapters are not applicable.

General democratic values of the organization (recoded)		
Deliberative general values (factor dichotomized with No<0.5 and Yes>0.5)[4]	28.7	244
Additive index of deliberative general values[5]		
0	30.7	75
1	25.4	62
2	15.6	38
3	12.7	31
4	6.1	15
5	9.4	23
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Mean	1.7	244
Individual or collective/cultural autonomy	32.4	244

3.3. The typology of democratic internal decision-making

By crossing the two dimensions of participation (referring to the degree of delegation of power, of inclusiveness and equality) and deliberation (referring to the decision making model and to the quality of communication), we suggested a typology whose heuristic relevance will be checked in our research. In particular, we dichotomise the two variables as following: on the first dimension, we can distinguish participatory conceptions that stress inclusiveness of equals (high participation) from conceptions based upon delegation of power to representatives (low participation); while on the second dimension of the typology, we distinguish conceptions that pay little attention to deliberation and transformation of preferences, and instead highlight the aggregation of conflicting interests (low deliberation) vis-à-vis a conception that pays more attention to the quality of communication, stressing consensus building (high deliberation) (see Figure 2).

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[4] This is the first component of a factor analysis run with the Varimax Rotation Method. This factor alone explains 32% of the total variation of 8 variables. The variables which weight in this factor are the following ones: Participation (.58); Equality (.71); Inclusiveness (.74); Transparency (.63); and Dialogue/Communication (.74).

[5] This is an additive index of the variables included in the first factor of the general values: participation, equality; inclusiveness, transparency, and dialogue/communication. The Pearson correlation between the factor and the additive index is .98 (significant at .001 level). This means that the factor actually measures the level of mentioning of values of deliberativeness of the organizations.

We therefore have four conceptions of internal democracy (or models of internal democracy) emerging from the movement documents reflecting organizational ideology: in the *associational model* the assembly chooses the executive body and the president of the association, while the everyday politics of the group is managed by delegates who make decisions in a process that leaves relatively little space to argumentation and consensus building. When, according to the selected documents, delegates, elected by the assembly, make decisions on a consensual basis we speak of *deliberative representation*. Especially in social movement organisations, important decisions are often made directly by the members in the assembly: when they decide by majority, the model is the classic *assembleary* one, while when consensus and communicative processes based on reason are mentioned as important values, the type of decision-making can be called *deliberative participation*. In our research we will try to understand under which conditions these conceptions of democracy (especially, but not only as far as internal decision making in movements is concerned) take one form or the other.

Figure 2. Typology of democratic internal decision-making

		Delegation of power	
		High	**Low**
	Low	**Associational model**	**Assembleary model**
Consensus	**High**	**Deliberative representation**	**Deliberative participation**

In this part of our research we have operationalized our typology considering a series of indicators on decision-making mentioned in the organizational documents analyzed (the frequencies on the variables for the typology are available in the appendix). The presence of an assembly (see table1A, appendix) is mentioned in three quarters of our cases, but also other roles are quite widespread: a president or general secretary was mentioned by about half of our groups and an executive committee by 62% of them. If the assembly is mentioned as a body making decisions on future activities in 61% of the cases, the executive follows in as many as half of our cases. In more than one third of the valid cases, the assembly is formed by delegates, but in again more than one third by all members, and in 8% of the cases by whoever wants to participate. Of the groups that

mention the decision-making method of the assembly, about one third declares the use of consensual methods, which is also mentioned by less than one fourth of those that mention the decision-making rule of the executive. Rotation of delegates and mandatory delegation, although present, are quite rare.

By crossing these and other data (see appendix for details), we have operationalized our types of internal decision-making as follows, setting narrow conditions for an organization to be considered assembleary or deliberative participative. In consequence, the associational type is, if anything, overrepresented. .

a) We defined as following an *associational* model those SMOs whose documents: did not mention an assembly but other decision making bodies; did mention an assembly but not as making decisions and at the same time mentioned other decision making bodies; did mention the assembly as one or the main decision making body, but the assembly as composed by delegates; did mention an assembly composed by all members as one or the main decision making body, but at the same time mentioned an executive committee as decision making body. These are cases in which the assembly is not mentioned but other potential decision makers are; the assembly does not play an important role as a decision maker; it is important but does not consist of all members or of whoever wants to participate; the assembly is important and consists of all members, In addition, in these cases consensus is *not* mentioned as an organizational value or decision making method and/or as the decision making rule for the assembly or for the executive committee.

b) We considered as belonging to the *deliberative representative* type those organizations that, in terms of declared decision-making, fulfil the conditions of the associational type, but that, differently from the organizations of that type, do mention deliberative democracy or the consensual method as general principles of internal debate and decision making, or use consensus as a decision making method for the assembly or the executive committee.

c) We operationalized the *assembleary* type as formed by all cases in which the documents analyzed mention the assembly as one or the main decision making body, and the assembly consists of all members or of whoever wants to participate.

d) We considered as belonging to the *deliberative participative* type those organizations that fulfil the conditions of the assembleary type, but that, differently from the

organizations of that type, do mention deliberative democracy or the consensual method as a general principle of internal debate and decision making, or use consensus as a decision making method for the assembly or the executive committee.

In interpreting our results, we must bear some caveats in mind. First of all, the different quantity and quality of the material we were able to collect for the different groups can reduce the degree of confidence in the allocation of especially informal organizations, and therefore the reliability of our indicators. This problem is not new: for instance, in research on party manifestos similar problems emerge when comparing long electoral manifestos with short ones. Second, the dycotomization of ordinal variables (such as the role of the assembly) imposes a simplification, linked among others to the decision on what should be considered as a threshold point (for instance, which characteristics of an assembly should be mentioned for an organization to be considered as belonging to the assembleary type?). This is also a typical problem deriving from the necessity of reducing complexity. Third, as stated in the introduction, this is a new exercise and we therefore had to develop our indicators and typology through a (time-consuming but intellectually challenging) process of trial and error. This is why we consider this report as part of a work-in-progress in which our method and specifically the validity of some indicators is tested and, hopefully, improved.

Table 3. Types of internal decision-making

	Frequencies	**Valid cases**
Typology of internal decision-making (not ordinal)		
Associational type	51.6	126
Deliberative Representative	13.5	33
Assembleary	13.1	32
Deliberative participative	9.4	23
Not applicable	12.4	30
Total valid cases	100.0	244

As we can see in table 3, half of the organizations in our sample support an associational conception of internal decision-making. This means that – at least formally –

a model based upon delegation and majority principle is quite widespread. Here the typical form of internal accountability is the representative one: delegates elected by the assembleary body have an important role in organizational decisions, and the decision-making system stresses the majority principles: preferences are aggregated either by pure majority or by bargaining, and the balance of aggregated preferences determines the group line. To a certain extend, this is an expected result: the presence of well established, large and resourceful organizations such as parties, unions and third sector associations in the global justice movement has often been noticed. However, our results push for a (not yet developed) reflection on the conditions for and consequences of the presence of large numbers of associations in common campaigns and networks.

This is however only part of the picture. 13.1% of the organizations were classified as assembleary, since in the documents we analysed they stress the role of the assembly in a decision making process which remains tied to aggregative methods of decision making, such as voting or bargaining. The participatory elements are emphasized via the important role attributed to the assembly and its inclusiveness, but consensus is not mentioned as a principle, nor used as a decision-making method.

In an additional one fourth (23%) of the organizations, the deliberative element comes to the fore. In particular, these organizations stress the importance of deliberation and/or consensus over majoritarian decision-making. In these groups, consensus and/or deliberative democracy are explicitly mentioned as an organizational value and/or consensus is used in the decision making process in the assembly or in the executive committee. We can distinguish between a 13% of the organizations which apply consensus within an associational type (deliberative representation), and a 9% which apply consensus within an assembleary model (deliberative participation).

Table 4. Importance of the assembly within the types of internal decision-making

Types of internal democracy	Assembly importance recodified			
	0	1	2	Valid cases
Associational type	21.4	57.1	21.4	126
Deliberative Representative	9.1	60.6	30.3	33
Assembleary	0.0	46.9	53.1	32
Deliberative participative	0.0	17.4	82.6	23
Cramer's V		.325***		

The typology of internal decision making, however, contains a high variation in the degree of the importance that the organizations, also of the associational type, attribute to the assembly (see table 4). Within the associational type, about one fifth (21.4%) of the organizations do not mention the assembly in their documents, in more than half (57%) the assembly is composed by delegates while in 21% the assembly is composed by all members and it plays an important role in the decision making, counterbalanced, however, by the prominent role of an executive committee. The importance of the assembly increases in the different types of internal democracy, being very relevant for 21% of the groups allocated to the associational model, 30% of those supporting deliberative representation, 53% of those belonging to the assembleary type and 82.6% of those following a deliberative participative model (table 4, see also means of the degree of assembly importance in table 5).

Table 5. Degree of importance of the assembly and types of internal decision-making (means)

	Assembly importance degree (mean)		
Typology of internal democracy			
	Mean	**Standard deviation**	**Valid cases**
Associational type	1.00	.66	126
Deliberative Representative	1.21	.60	33
Assembleary	1.53	.51	32
Deliberative participative	1.82	.39	23
Total valid cases	1.20	.66	214
ETA		.432***	

Crossing the typology of internal decision-making with the previously mentioned internal and general democratic values, we notice that the two dimensions are in fact related. Participatory values are mentioned more often by the organizations that we have ranked in the deliberative representation and deliberative participation types and the same is true for the critique of delegation, inclusiveness, autonomy, and deliberation (table 6). The relatively low mentioning of participation by the assembleary organizations could be explained by the reduced availability of documents, especially those referring to internal decision-making. Organizations that mention consensual values also seem to be sensitive to a cluster of connected values, including not only deliberation and critique of delegation, but also individual and cultural autonomy. In addition, a connection between participation and deliberation emerges, indicating, although with different emphasis, the attempt to bridge the two. In general, all internal and general democratic values are more often (in most cases markedly more often) mentioned by SMOs that do belong to the two deliberative categories (deliberative representative and deliberative participative).

Table 6. Organizational values and types of internal decision-making

	Organizational values					
Type of internal decision-making	**Participatory Democracy**	**Inclusiveness**	**Critique of Del. and non hier.**	**Auton. member org. or local chapters**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Indiv. or coll. Autonomy**
Associational model	20.6	14.3	13.5	42.7	25.4	28.6
Deliberative representative	57.6	45.5	39.4	61.3	42.4	39.4
Assembleary	18.8	3.1	25.0	17.9	6.3	34.8
Deliberative participative	60.9	43.5	60.9	53.3	47.8	34.8
Cramer's V	.370***	.368***	.367***	.252**	.273***	n.s

3.3. Attitudes towards institutions (local, national, international) and economic actors

Finally, social movement organizations address representative democracy. They struggle against—but often also collaborate with—representative institutions. Social movements are traditionally seen as challengers of institutional actors. Trying to influence institutional decisions, they use a variety of strategies and reveal different attitudes towards institutional politics. Protest is only a small part of overall social movement activity: it is undoubtedly considered important, but also often not effective unless accompanied by more direct interactions with government and public administrations.

In the late twentieth century, social movements have indeed been instrumental to the introduction of institutional changes towards greater grassroots control. In many European countries administrative decentralization has taken place since the 1970s, with the creation of new channels of access to decision makers at the local level. Social movements also contribute to the creation of new arenas for the development of public policy. These new loci of decision making do vary in terms of their openness, duration and range of power. They have some characteristics in common, however: their legitimation is not based on the principles of representative democracy; they stress the communication of

knowledge; and they have greater visibility than institutional spheres of decision-making. Expert commissions are frequently formed on issues raised by protest and social movement representatives may be allowed to take part, possibly as observers. Other channels of access are opened by the creation of consultative institutions on issues related to social movement demands. State ministries, local government bureaux and other relevant administrative bodies now exist on women's or ecological issues, in many countries but also in IGOs. Such institutions, which are frequently set up on a permanent basis, have their own budgets and the power to implement policies. The public administrators working in these institutions mediate particular social movement demands through both formal and informal channels and frequently ally themselves with movement representatives in order to increase the amount of public resources available in the policy areas over which they have authority. Some regulatory bureaucracies established under the pressure of movement mobilizations see movement activists as potential allies (Amenta 1998): movement activists have been coopted inside specific public bodies as staff members, or vice versa administrative staff of the latter have supported movements. New opportunities of "conflictual cooperation" develop within regulatory agencies that are set up to implement goals that are also supported by movement activists (Giugni and Passy 1998, 85). Collaboration can take various forms, from consultation to incorporation in committees, to delegation of power (ibid., 86). Besides a certain degree of institutional recognition NGOs specialised in the supply of various services have received funding for development programmes they have submitted, or for joining in projects already elaborated by national or international governments (even in the most extreme cases of exclusionary IGOs: see O'Brien, Goetz Scholte and Williams 2000, 120).

In particular, social movement activists keep direct contacts with decision makers—participating in epistemic communities, composed by representatives of governments, parties, and interest groups of various types and persuasion. NGOs critical of neo-liberal globalization have in particular resorted to pressures both at the national and international levels, cultivating specific expertises. From human rights groups to environmentalists, "advocacy networks" –composed of activists, bureaucrats belonging to international organizations and politicians from many countries – have won significant gains in a number of areas such as a ban on anti-personnel mines, decontamination of radio-active waste and the establishment of an international tribunal for violations of human

rights (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002; Klotz 1995; Risse and Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2001).

Most important, so-called deliberative arenas, based on the principle of participation of "normal citizens" in public arenas for debates, empowered by information and rules for high quality communication, developed in the last two decades especially at the local level. Deliberative arenas have been promoted in the forms of Citizens' Juries in Great Britain and Spain; Planungszellen in Germany; Consensus Conferences in Denmark, Conferences de citoyens in France, as well as Agenda 21 and various experiments in strategic urban planning.

Experiments as diverse as participatory budgeting, the Chicago inner-city neighbourhood governance councils for policing & public schools, joint labor-management efforts to manage industrial labor markets, stakeholder participation in ecosystem governance arrangements under the US Endangered Species Act, village governance in West Bengal India are presented as part of an "Empowered Deliberative Democracy" model centered on participation, quality of discourse, and citizens' empowerment (Fung and Wright 2001). The focus of these experiments is the solution of specific problems through the involvement of ordinary, affected people. It implies the creation of new institutions and the devolution of decision-making power, coordinated, however, with representative institutions. The institutional mission of these institutions includes effective problem-solving; equitable solutions; broad, deep and sustained participation. Actors associated with social movements intervened in the development of some of these processes, sometimes as promoters, somtimes as critical participants or external opponents. In particular, the participatory budget has been credited with creating a positive context for associational life, fostering more activism, better interconnectedness, and a city-wide orientation of associations (Baiocchi 2002).

Numerous arenas of interaction between movement and institutions therefore can be present at the local, national or international level. Although the local level is traditionally considered to be more open to innovation and closest to the citizens (and citizens' control), recent research on International Governmental Organizations has stressed the presence of some niches for direct contacts with activists also within international public bureaucracies (della Porta and Tarrow 2005). In multilevel governance, SMOs often tend to differentiate

their attitudes towards different territorial levels and also towards non-institutional, but powerful actors, such as economic corporations. In the quantitative part of our research, we coded references to different attitudes towards institutions ranging from open refusal to cooperation, distinguishing attitudes towards local, national, and international governmental organizations as well as economic actors. For this battery of variables we had a high rate of organizations whose documents did not mention relationships with institutions (slightly over 50%, concentrated in particular in some countries). However, our data indicate that GJM organizations are quite open to interaction with institutions—they are not simply emphasizing a negative message, but they also often accept collaboration on specific problems. However, they tend to be critical of institutions, perceiving their own role as the active engagement in citizens' control of institutional politics, implementing channels of discursive accountability. As we can see in table 7, in relationship with representative institutions, statements of open refusal of collaboration are rare (11.5%), while an attitude of either collaboration or democratic control is more frequent (about one third each). Collaboration with IGOs and economic actors seems less frequent than with national institutions, but still relevant. Relations of collaboration are more often mentioned at the national than at the supranational level (where instead relations of control prevail) or with economic actors (where refusal is more often mentioned). Differences between institutions are however limited, indicating that attitudes tend to spread from one institution to the others.

Table 7. Relationships with institutions and economic actors (frequencies)

Relationships with institutions and economic actors		
Collaboration with representative institutions	26.6	244
Democratic control of representative institutions	32.4	244
Refusal of relationship with representative institutions	11.5	244
Collaboration with local institutions	22.5	244
Democratic control of local institutions	21.3	244
Refusal of relationship with local institutions	4.5	244
Collaboration with (national) state institutions	24.6	244
Democratic control of (national) state institutions	32.0	244
Refusal of relationship with (national) state institutions	9.0	244
Collaboration with IGOs	18.9	244

Democratic control of IGOs	27.9	244
Refusal of relationship with IGOs	7.4	244
Collaboration with economic actors	14.3	244
Democratic control of economic actors	22.5	244
Refusal of relationship with economic actors	14.8	244

Recoding these variables, we first of all combined the responses concerning the local level, the national level, and representative institutions (table 8). Additionally, we built a typology which combines statements of collaboration with and control of institutions, leaving aside the small number of organizations that mentioned refusal of relations with institutions (table 9). Uncritical collaborators are those that expressed interest in collaboration with institutions, but did not mention a function of control; uncollaborative controllers vice-versa. Critical controllers are those that mention both. In fact, very often (about half of the cases where either one is mentioned) collaboration and democratic control overlap, being present within the same organization. Finally we built variables which signal any collaboration with, refusal of, and control of, national institutions, transnational institutions and economic actors (table 10). Here we can distinguish between SMOs which mention at least once refusal (22%), at least once collaboration (37%) and at least once democratic control (43%).

Table 8. Relationships with at last one level of national institutions (frequencies)

Relationships with at least one level of national institutions		
Collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	33.2	244
Democratic control on at least one level of national institutions	36.9	244
Refusal of collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	12.7	244

Table 9. Typology of collaboration/control for at least one level of national institutions

Typology of collaboration/control for at least one level of national institutions		
Not mentioned	52.9	129
Uncritical collaborators	10.2	25
Uncollaborative controllers	13.9	34
Critical collaborators	23.0	56
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Table 10. Relations with national, transnational institutions and economic actors, recoded

New dependent variables	Frequencies	Cases
Relationships with institutions		
Any collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	37.3	244
Any refusal of collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	22.1	244
Any democratic control on national, transnational institutions and economic actors	43.0	244

Crossing attitudes towards institutions with the internal and general democratic values mentioned in organizational documents (table 11), while references to participation correlate positively only with refusal of relationships with institutions, references to inclusiveness correlate both with refusal and democratic control. A stronger correlation emerges with organizations stressing their critique of delegation, increasing references to refusal and reducing those to collaboration. Also the mentioning of individual and collective autonomy and of autonomy of local chapters or member organizations seem to increase the tendency to refuse collaboration. References to deliberative values increase for more collaborative and more control-oriented organizations. It seems therefore that explicit references to democratic values that are different (if not opposed) from those implemented in representative institutions reduce the tendency to collaborate and, especially, lead to stressing the role of civil society as a controller of institutions. Deliberative values are associated with a communicative attitude with existing institutions, but "deliberative" organizations seem to stress especially their role as controllers.

Table 11. Relationships with institutions and organizational values

Organizational values	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
Participatory demo.	n.s.	.131*	n.s.
Inclusiveness	n.s.	.260***	.123*
Crit. Del. and non hier.	.225*** (-)	.266***	n.s.
Autonomous org. or loc.	n.s.	.179**	.133*
Deliberative values (dic.)	.129*	n.s.	.291***
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	n.s.	.243***	n.s.

Finally, if we cross models of internal decision-making with relationships with institutions (table 12), we can notice that organizations belonging to the associational and the deliberative representative models tend to mention more often collaboration and democratic control, while refusal is more often mentioned by groups located in either the deliberative representation or the deliberative participation or the assembleary model.

Table 12. Relationships with institutions and democratic types

	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
Type of internal democracy	**Any collaboration**	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
Associational model	46.0	15.1	48.4
Deliberative representation	48.5	30.3	54.5
Assembleary	21.9	25.0	21.9
Deliberative participation	8.7	26.1	26.1
Cramer's V	.280***	n.s.	.235**

4. Conceptions of democracy: internal explanations

In our model, we indicated expected relations between democratic values and organizational characteristics such as organizational structure, identity and repertoire of action. In this section, we shall empirically investigate these relations.

4.1. Movement organizational structures

The organizational structure has been linked to conceptions and practices of democracy—either the organizational structures have been seen as constraining the conceptions of democracy, and the latter as the rationalization of previous choices, or viceversa values have been seen as orienting the choices of organizational models. Mansbridge (2003) has suggested that a decision making model based on consensus is advantageous for organisations that do not have other legitimate tools for convincing members to act collectively. More informal organizations (such as Earth First) seem to be more able to promote good communication than those which are hierarchically organised (such as Friend of the Earth--FOE) (Whitworth 2003). As for the global justice movement, the emphasis on consensus seems greater in decentralised networks such as Rete Lilliput (an Italian ecopacifist group) (Veltri 2003) and lesser in more centralized ones, such as Attac-Italia (Finelli 2003). Also transnational networks (countersummits or social forums) seem more sensitive to deliberative values and more able to integrate different organisations through the construction of master-frames (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006; Andretta 2005a). Mobilisation in specific campaigns at the national or local level (against the war, for immigrant rights or on labour issues) often includes moments of negotiation between representatives of social movement organisations (Andretta 2005b).

The organizations belonging to our sample cover different territorial levels and are of different size in terms of individual and collective membership. They present different levels of formalization, centralization, reticularity, size and characteristics of membership. These differences are clearly visible in the frequency tables presented below (tables 13, 14 and 15).

More than half of our organizations (57%) have an organizational structure formalized by a constitution, If we look at the territorial levels covered, we notice that local

presence is considered to be important by three quarters of the organizations of our sample. This is all the more relevant for a sample that by definition (see above) under-covers local groups. However, also the international level is important: about one third of our groups declare that they are organized at that level. Among the organizations with a supranational level, we can find hierarchical "single" organizations (such Greenpeace, 6.6%), traditional federations (such as ETUC, 11.5%), modern/loose networks (such as ATTAC-International, 11.5) and campaigns (such ad Euromayday, 8.2). Also significant for the GJM is the high presence of network organizations: in our sample this is reflected in about half of our cases being networks/federations or ad hoc umbrella organizations. An additional indicator of the high reticularity of the GJM organizations is that almost half of the groups in our sample allow for collective membership. Additionally, as many as about 80% of our organizations mention in their documents collaboration/networking with national SMOs and about the same percent with transnational SMOs. Of the organizations mentioning collaboration/networking, about one third (slightly more at the transnational level) points at the relevance of collaboration with groups working on other issues than they do. About half of our groups stress collaboration with alternative economic actors.

Table 13. Organizational structure variables 1

	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Presence of a constitution	57.0	244
Territorial levels		
Local level presence	74.2	244
Regional level presence	55.7	244
National level presence	83.6	244
International level presence…	37.7	244
Of which Hierarchical "single" organization	6.6	244
"Traditional" federation (Etuc model)	11.5	244
"Modern/loose" Network (ATTAC-International Model)	11.5	244
Campaign (Euromayday-model)	8.2	244
Type of organization		
Single Organization	53.7	131
Network or federation	30.7	75
Ad-hoc umbrella organization	15.6	38

Total valid cases	100.0	244
Kind of members		
Only individual	31.1	76
Only collective	19.3	47
Both individual and collective	32.8	80
Not applicable	16.4	40
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Collaboration/networking with national SMOs		
Not mentioned	18.9	46
Yes, in general	34.8	85
Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	31.1	76
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	15.2	37
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Collaboration/networking with TSMOs		
Not mentioned	23.8	58
Yes, in general	29.1	71
Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	28.7	70
Collaboration/networking with TSMOs		
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	18.4	45
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Collaboration with “alternative” economic actors	30.7	75

Our organizations cover a wide range in terms of size of individual and collective membership. Of the valid cases, about 50% declare to have up to 1000 individual members. As for those organizations that allow for a collective membership, they often involve quite a wide range of groups: in two thirds of the valid cases they have more than 25 collective members.

Table 14. Size of Individual and collective membership

Number of individual members		
Up to 100	10.2	25
101-1000	13.1	32
1001-10000	9.4	23
10001-100000	9.0	22
100000+	6.6	16
Missing and not applicable	51.6	126
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Number of collective members		
Up to 25	13.1	32
26-100	12.7	31
100+	12.7	31
Missing and not applicable	61.5	150
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Our organizations emerge as inclusive in terms of membership: only 15% mention requirements for becoming an individual member and 20% for becoming a collective one.

Table 15. Membership Characteristics

Requirements for individual members		
No requirements mentioned	18.9	46
Everyone can join	11.1	27
To apply and to endorse the principles and rules or the group	19.3	47
Requirements mentioned	14.8	36
Not applicable	36.1	88
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Requirements for collective members		
No requirements mentioned or everyone can join	20.5	50
To apply and to endorse the principles and rules or the group	12.7	31

Requirements mentioned	19.3	47
Not applicable	47.5	116
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Others characteristics of membership		
Possibility to become a member	83.6	244
Formalization with membership card	23.0	244
Fee paying membership	57.8	244
Possibility to expel members	38.5	244

For further analysis we built a number of new variables, combining the very detailed original ones. For "structural participation" we assigned a positive value to those organizations in which the assembly meets more than once a year, or the members of the executive are elected by the general assembly, or the president is elected by the general assembly, or the spokesperson is elected by the general assembly. These are formal organizations, but they assign significant power to the assembly. "Structural inclusiveness" is measured by the lack of requirements for membership (other than endorsing the principles of the organization), and of provisions to expel members. As indicators for "structural guarantee" we considered the presence of an arbitration board, or of a committee of guarantors, or the possibility for the expelled members to appeal to a body different from the one which decided on the expulsion. "Structural accountability" refers to the presence of a board of auditors and/or the approval of the budget by the assembly, the control of the executive by the assembly, the possibility for a certain percent of members to convene an extraordinary assembly, and the mention of a quorum required for the decision-making body/bodies to deliberate. We considered as decentralized an organization in which local executives or local assemblies can convene an extraordinary assembly, or, if the assembly is composed by delegates, these are nominated by local executives or assemblies, or if the members of the executive are nominated by the local executives or local assemblies. The additive index of formalization includes the presence of a constitution, the presence of a document of fundamental values, the presence of a formally adopted program, the presence of formal membership, and the presence of membership cards. The index is normalized by the number of variables included and varies from 0 to 1. Finally, the presence of thematic or scientific committees seems to reflect the importance assigned to knowledge.

We might stress once again that this is only the first attempt at interpreting the large amount of documents that we have collected and translated into numbers. The construction of indicators and their combinations in indexes are part of a process of trial and error, which we do not yet consider as completed. More specifically, all our "structural" indexes are likely to score higher for formal organizations—and this is something we should take into account in our analysis when interpreting our data. In fact, in the future these indicators might be more fruitfully used for internal comparisons within the associational and deliberative representative models. As we can see in table 16, the organizations that stress structural participation and structural accountability are respectively more than half and almost half of our sample. Also thematic or scientific committees are mentioned by two fifths of our groups. Only a minority of our sample (11.5%) stressed organizational autonomy by prohibiting the holding of positions within the organization to those holding positions in institutions, parties or other associations.

Table 16. Organizational structure variables, recoded

	Frequencies of yes (%)	**Total of valid cases**
Networking		
Networking with national SMOs dichotomized	81.1	244
Networking with TSMOs dichotomized	76.2	244
Additive territorial level		
Only one territorial level	25.4	62
Two territorial levels	20.9	51
Three territorial levels	35.7	87
Four territorial levels	18.0	44
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Indexes of organizational structures		
At least one prohibition with institutions, parties or associations	11.5	244
Structural participation	59.4	244
Structural inclusiveness	39.3	244
Structural guarantee	27.9	244
Structural accountability	47.5	244
Decentralization	23.8	244
Normalized additive index of formalization-mean	.42	244
Role of Knowledge (presence of thematic or scientific committees)	39.8	244

Ordinal variable for the use of knowledge		
Thematic or scientific groups not mentioned	60.2	147
Thematic or scientific committees existing but not deciding	29.9	73
Thematic or scientifc committees existing and deciding	9.8	24
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Looking at the interaction between organizational characteristics and democratic values, we can notice that the mentioning of participation as a principle is more frequent in those organizations that stress structural accountability, incompatibility with other political and administrative bodies, structural inclusiveness (table 17). Due to the very frequent reference to participation in our sample, we can interpret these results with the higher presence of documents in more structured organizations, and the related higher probability to find reference to a value to which, it seems, most organizations tend to pay attention. The value of inclusiveness is also more often mentioned by organizations characterized by elements of structural participation and structural inclusiveness indicating some congruence between the general principle and the designing of an organizational structure. Along the same line of reasoning we can interpret the fact that the values of autonomy are more often stressed by organizations belonging to national and (more pronounced) to transnational networks, and by organizations stressing incompatibility, structural participation, and structural inclusiveness. Participation in network structures also increases the probability that the values included in our index of deliberative general values were mentioned, as does the presence of structural participation and structural inclusiveness.

Table 17. The impact of organizational values on the organizational structure 1 (Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)

Organizational values	Organizational structure				
	Structural participation	**Structural inclusiveness**	**Decentralization**	**National net**	**Transnational net**
Participatory demo.	.160**	.168**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Inclusiveness	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Crit. Del. and non hier.	n.s.	.164**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Autonomous org. or loc.	.130*	.166*	n.s.	n.s.	.131*
Deliberative values (dic.)	n.s.	.180**	n.s.	.120*	n.s.
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Structural Accountability	**Formalization (ETA)**	**Organizational Autonomy.** [6]	**Role of knowledge**	**Ordinal knowl. (ETA)**
Participatory demo.	.159**	n.s.	.120*	.205***	.236***
Inclusiveness	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.131*
	Structural Accountability	**Formalization (ETA)**	**Organizational Autonomy.** [7]	**Role of knowledge**	**Ordinal knowl. (ETA)**
Crit. Del. and non hier.	n.s.	.151*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Autonomous org. or loc.	n.s.	.191*	.137*	n.s.	.160**

[6] We considered as an indicator of organizational autonomy the fact that SMOs mention at least one prohibition for who has an office in the organization to hold similar position in institutions, political parties and other associations.

[7] We considered as an indicator of organizational autonomy the fact that SMOs mention at least one prohibition for who has an office in the organization to hold similar position in institutions, political parties and other associations.

Deliberative values (dic.)	n.s.	.155*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	n.s.	n.s..	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Indicating some congruence between democratic conceptions and organizational structures, participation is especially mentioned by organizations with less than 1000 individual members (55%) and less than 25 member organizations (44%), and characterized especially by individual membership (46%). Also inclusiveness is especially mentioned by organizations with individual membership (50%). Deliberativeness as a principle is frequent above all in organizations that allow for individual membership (36% and 32% both individual and collective) and tends to increase for multilevel organizations (67% with three or four territorial levels). Critique of delegation is expressed especially by smaller groups (68% with less than 1000 individual members) and groups with individual membership (44%) but also by network organizations (46%). Also autonomy of local chapters and organizational members is related with size of individual membership (62% of the organizations mentioning this value in their documents have more than 1000 individual members), and the territorial level covered (70% have three or four levels). Similarly, cultural autonomy is a value more often mentioned by groups with larger individual membership and multilevel organizations (58% with three or four levels)[8]. Concluding, cross-tabulation indicates that anti-hierarchical values are, as expected, more present in smaller and informal groups, active at the local level. Larger groups, active transnationally and formed by organizational networks tend to stress those principles of good communication, inclusiveness and autonomy that facilitate interaction between different groups.

We performed a number of analyses to check to which extent the relations noted in the cross-tabulation tables (not reproduced here, but available upon request) are statistically strong and significant. We can notice (see table 18) that the values critique of delegation and autonomy of member organizations or local chapters are related with the network character of an organization, whereas inclusiveness resonates with individual membership.

[8] Those data are available upon request.

The autonomy of member organizations and local chapters as well as deliberative values are connected with the existence of different territorial levels within an organization.

Table 18. The impact of organizational values on the organizational structure 2 (Cramer's V)

	Size (individual members)	Size (collective members)	Type of organization	Kind of members	Territorial Level	Territorial levels (mean and ETA)
Participatory demo.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.191* (3)	n.s.
Inclusiveness	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.176* (individual)	n.s.	n.s.
Crit. Del. And non hier.	n.s.	n.s.	.180* (network)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Autonomous org. or loc.	n.s.	n.s.	.204** (network)	n.s.	.191* (3)	.163* (2.8)
Deliberative values (dic.)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.249*** (3,4)	.198*** (2.8)
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Looking now at our types of internal decision making, our data confirm that larger size groups tend to rely more upon majoritarian procedures and delegation. For similar reasons, the assembleary type is more present in single organizations than in networks, the deliberative participatory type in organizations that favour individual memberships, the deliberative representative type in those that allow for collective membership. We can conclude from this that the presence of "organizations made of organizations" increases the use of delegation, but sometimes also pushes towards consensual methods as the most useful for keeping these organizations together.

We can notice (table 19) that organizations of the associational model are less likely to mention elements of structural inclusiveness, but more often include references to decentralization. Groups belonging to the deliberative representative model instead pay

more attention to elements of structural participation, inclusiveness and accountability, and stress the role of knowledge by mentioning thematic or scientific committees as organizational bodies. Deliberative representative and associational organizations not surprisingly share more or less the same (high) level of formalization. Precisely because the assembleary organizations are less formal they mention less organizational values in their documents. This, however, is not true for deliberative participative organizations, that also show a low level of formalization, but mention much more decentralization, structural participation, and the role of knowledge. The level of formalization of the organizational structure does not affect the level of networking with other national and transnational SMOs.

Table 19. Organizational structure and democratic types (Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)

Type of internal democracy	**Organizational structure**				
	Structural Participation	**Structural inclusiven.**	**Decentraliz.**	**National net**	**Transnational net**
Associational model	66.7	44.8	40.0	87.3	76.2
Deliberative representation	78.8	66.7	31.3	78.8	90.9
Assembleary	59.4	42.9	11.1	78.1	71.9
Deliberative participation	69.6	46.2	50.0	82.6	65.2
Cramer's V	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
	Structural Accountability	**Formalization (Mean)**	**Organiz. Autonomy**	**Role of knowledge**	**Ordinal knowledge (Mean)**
Associational model	59.5	.60	14.3	42.1	1.5
Deliberative representation	84.8	.62	21.2	63.6	1.8
Assembleary	25.0	.31	9.4	25.0	1.3
Deliberative participation	21.7	.22	0.0	60.9	1.9

Cramer's V	.403***	.531*** (ETA)	n.s.	.243***	.282*** (ETA)

	Type of organization	**Kind of members**	**Territorial levels (mean)**
Associational model	Single organization	Individual	2.71
Deliberative representation	Single organization	Individual	2.94
Assembleary	Single organization	Both individual and collective	2.03
Deliberative participation	Single organization and network	Individual and both individual and collective	1.96
Cramer's V	n.s.	n.s.	.329*** (ETA)

As far as relations with institutions are concerned the presence of elements of structural participation and of structural accountability reduces the likelihood that refusal of relations with institutions is mentioned and increases the probability of collaboration with institutions at all levels (see table 20). The more formalized groups and groups with multiple-territorial levels tend towards relationships of collaboration and of democratic control. The same picture emerges for groups advocating national networking, whereas those organizations advocating transnational networking tend towards refusal of relations and democratic control. Both large individual and large collective membership increase the likelihood that a relationship of collaborative control with institutions is mentioned. Ad hoc-umbrella groups are more likely to support collaboration and especially democratic control.

Table 20. Relationships with institutions and organizational structure ***(Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)***

	Relations with institutions and economic actors		
Organizational structure	**Any collaboration**	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
Organiz. Autonomy	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Structural participation	.189***	.122*(-)	n.s.
Structural inclusiv.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Structural accountability	.216***	.211*** (-)	n.s.
Decentralization	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Formalization-mean	.247***(ETA)	n.s. (ETA)	.186* (ETA)
Territoral level (mean)	.199*** (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)	.300*** (ETA)
National net.	.177***	n.s.	.228***
Transnational net.	n.s.	.159**	.213***
N. of individual members			
Up to 100	12.0	16.0	20.0
101-1000	15.6	25.0	18.8
1001-10000	43.5	17.4	60.9
10001-100000	36.4	13.6	50.0
100000+	68.8	12.5	50.0
Cramer's V	.414***	n.s.	.368***
N. of collective members			
Up to 25	34.4	12.5	40.6
26-100	51.6	16.1	45.2
100+	54.8	22.6	54.8
Cramer's V	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Type of Organization			
Single organization	38.2	20.6	38.9
Network or federation	28.0	20.0	38.7
Ad-hoc umbrella	52.6	31.6	65.8
Cramer's V	.165*	n.s.	.197**

4.2. Movement discourses and identities

That the ideology of a movement affects its view of democracy can be seen as a truism. Nevertheless, the relationship between internal decision making and general values has been for a long time neglected in empirical research and theorizing. The resource mobilisation approach emphasised the role of institutionalisation for the achievement of movements' goal, but little emphasis has been put on how cultural processes influence the internal organisational structure (Minkoff 2001). Not only does the resource mobilisation approach tend to present social movement organisations as homogeneous entities, without paying too much attention to the variation of forms, but also "the spirit of Michels infuses resource mobilisation arguments through a sort of syllogism: organisations are resources; effective organisations are hierarchies, therefore, hierarchical organisations are valuable resources for movements" (Clemens and Minkoff 2004, 156; see also Gamson 1990). Indeed, only recently organisational forms have been analysed in relation to the cultural meaning that activists give to them. If Clemens (1993) claims that organisational forms are part of a broader social movement repertoire, Breines (1989) shows that the organisation may have a "prefigurative" function, by embedding the kind of social relations that activists would like to see in the world outside.

If organizational values are not just means but also ends themselves (Polletta 2002), it is interesting to investigate which types of values/ideologies favour which types of organizational models. This can be done by looking at the resonance of individual values with organizational values (della Porta 2005 on tolerant identities; Gundelach 1989 on antihierarchical values); at the relations between democratic values and other values at the organizational level (Katsiaficas 1997 on autonomous values); or at the realtions between

organizational values and general cultural values (e.g. Eber 1999 on values of social responsibility). Multiissue organizations and supranational networks are expected to invest more in the participation of their members and in the development of channels of communication (Faber and McCarthy 2001). Environmentalists which deal with social justice have been proven to elaborate a particular view of democracy stressing fair democratic procedures, inclusion and equal treatment (Salazar and Alper 2002). Research on the decision-making process of international protest events (such as countersummits), involving many and different groups, indicated that consensual decision-making allowed for the development of a master-frame which connected the different meanings given to the protest, and culturally integrated the different organisations (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006; Andretta 2005a; Mosca 2005). Vice-versa, single-issue movements seem to be less participatory-oriented: Staggenborg (1988) and Kriesi (1996) found a correlation between decision-making centralisation, professionalisation and specialisation.

Table 21. Basic Values/Themes (Frequencies)

Independent variables	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Basic Values/Themes		
Another globalization/a different form of globalization	50.0	244
Democracy	52.0	244
Social Justice/defence of the welfare state/fighting poverty/social inclusion	68.9	244
Global (distributive) Justice	45.1	244
Ecology	47.1	244
Sustainibility	32.8	244
Anti-neoliberalism	39.3	244
Anti-capitalism	23.0	244
Socialism	7.8	244
Cummunism	3.3	244
Anarchism (traditional or libertarian)	3.7	244
Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	9.0	244
Animal rights	3.7	244
Human rights	47.1	244
Workers' rights	40.2	244
Women's rights	42.6	244
Gay/lesbian rights	15.2	244
Immigrants'right/anti-racism/rights of asylum seekers	45.9	244
Solidarity with third world countries	46.3	244
Alternative knowledge	12.7	244
Religious principles	7.0	244
Critical consumerism/fair trade	29.1	244
Ethical Finance	16.8	244
Peace	49.6	244
Non-violence	27.5	244

In this part of WP3 of the Demos project we collected information on the general themes organizations subscribe to. Our data (see table 21) on the basic themes and values mentioned in organizational documents confirms the "bridging" function of such frames as "alternative globalization" and "democracy" (about half of the groups mention them) as well as "social justice" (almost two thirds of our groups mention it), "global justice", and

"workers' rights" (about half of mention each). Ecological values also emerge as quite relevant (about half of the groups cite ecology, and the same percent mentions sustainability, with much lower attention for animal rights). Reference to the World South emerges in about half of the groups calling for solidarity with third world countries, but also in the half of them stressing human rights and in the one third referring to fair trade. Mentioning of women's rights and peace are also well present (in half of the groups sampled) and the same is true for migrant rights.

On the bases of bivariate correlations between all themes (see appendix: Glossary), we recoded these variables aggregating under "new globalism" references to another globalization, democracy, and social justice. As we can see (table 22), almost all groups cite these fundamental issues. Ecominority includes groups mentioning issues that reverberate with new social movements' discourse—such as ecology, animal rights, women' rights and antiracism. These are present in about two thirds of our organization. Roughly the same number center on issues of peace and non-violence. "Critical sustainability", counting at ca. 60%, contains references to sustainability, solidarity with the third world, critical consumerism, ethical finance. Anticapitalism includes also the mention of anarchism and autonomy; and traditional left groups references to socialism and communism. As we can see, the anti-capitalist wing is quite present, although minoritarian, with about one fourth of the sampled groups.

Table 22. Aggregated basic themes and values (frequencies)

	Frequencies of yes (%)	**Total of valid cases**
New globalism	87.3	244
Eco-Minority Groups	70.9	244
Critical sustainibility	58.6	244
Peace and non-violence	69.3	244
Anti-capitalism	26.6	244
Traditional Left	8.6	244
Additive index of all basic themes-mean	7.66	244
Normalized additive index of critical sustainability-mean	.31	244
Normalized additive index of new globalism-mean	.49	244
Normalized additive index of eco-minority – mean	.31	244
Normalized additive index of peace and non-violence	.33	244

Crossing basic themes and values with internal and general democratic values (table 23), eco-minority groups emerge as stressing more all the democratic values we have analyzed and the same is true for new-globalism (with the exception of critique of delegation and autonomy of member organizations and local chapters) and anticapitalism (with the significant exception of deliberative values). Groups that mention peace and non-violence tend to stress especially participation. With the exception of groups mentioning the themes of the traditional left and of critical sustainability, reference to the other basic values/themes tends to increase the likelihood of an interest in the various aspects of participatory and deliberative democracy we are investigating.

Table 23. Aggregated basic values/themes and internal and general democratic values *(Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)*

	Additive all themes/values (ETA/means)	**Critical Sustainabilty**	**New Globalism**	**Eco-minority**	**Anti-capitalism**
Participatory democracy	.396***	n.s.	.210***	.277***	.163**
Inclusiveness	.367***	n.s.	.136*	.263***	.283***
Crit. Del. and non hier.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.140*	.259***
Autonomous org. or loc.	.321***	n.s.	n.s.	.186***	.211***
Deliberative values (dic.)	.464***	.257***	.188***	.287***	n.s.
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	.193***	n.s.	.132*	.154**	.217***

	Peace and non-violence	**Traditional left**	**Additive Eco-minority (ETA/means)**	**Additive Critical sustainibility (ETA/means)**	**Additive New globalism (ETA/means)**	**Additive peace and non violence (ETA/means)**
Participatory democracy	.196***	.135*	.407***	.150**	.343***	.248***

Inclusiveness	n.s.	n.s.	.326***	.152**	.287***	.190***
Crit. Del. and non hier.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

	Peace and non-violence	**Traditional left**	**Additive Eco-minority (ETA/means)**	**Additive Critical sustainibility (ETA/means)**	**Additive New globalism (ETA/means)**	**Additive peace and non violence (ETA/means)**
Autonomous org. or loc.	.180**	n.s.	.300***	.187***	.173**	.250***
Deliberative values (dic.)	.167**	n.s.	.310***	.361***	.389***	.311***
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	n.s.	n.s.	.153**	n.s.	.157**	n.s.

Crossing the aggregated basic themes and values with the types of internal democracy (table 24), we notice that deliberative representative organizations mention the widest range of values/themes, in particular new globalism, eco-minority and peace and non-violence. The anticapitalist values/themes are especially shared by assembleary and both deliberative types of organizations. It is worth noticing that new globalism themes are shared by almost 90% of the groups, whatever the type of internal democracy.

Table 24. Basic values/themes and types of internal democracy ***(Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)***

	Themes				
Type of internal democracy	**Additive all themes/values (ETA/means)**	**Critical Sustainibility**	**New Globalism**	**Eco-minority**	**Anti-capitalism**
Associational model	8.0	66.7	88.1	69.0	18.3
Deliberative representation	10.1	69.7	97.0	90.9	36.4
Assembleary	5.8	37.5	87.5	62.5	34.4
Deliberative participation	6.3	39.1	87.0	82.6	39.1
Cramer's V	.292***	.261***	n.s.	.207**	.206**

	Peace and non-violence	**Traditional left**	**Additive Eco-minority (ETA/means)**	**Additive Critical sustainibility (ETA/means)**	**Additive New globalism (ETA/means)**	**Additive peace and non violence (ETA/means)**
Associational model	74.6	9.5	.31	.37	.50	.37
Deliberative representation	78.8	18.2	.44	.37	.65	.43
Assembleary	56.3	6.3	.26	.17	.40	.21
Deliberative participation	60.9	0.0	.29	.14	.43	.24
Cramer's V	n.s.	n.s.	.197*	.277***	.247***	.248***

Finally, crossing basic themes with relations with institutions (table 25) we can see that references to new globalism and, especially, critical sustainability increase the mention of collaboration and of democratic control while reference to anticapitalism increases the likelihood of relations characterized by refusal and decreases collaborative attitudes (but not democratic control).

Table 25. Basic themes and values and relationships with institutions *(Cramer's V, or Eta for comparing means when explicitly mentioned)*

Basic Themes and Values	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
Critical sustainability	.287***	n.s.	.327***
New globalism	.167**	n.s.	.158**
Eco-minority	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Anti-capitalism	.235*** (-)	.416***	n.s.
Peace and non-violence	.183***	n.s.	.166**
Traditional left	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Additive all basic themes (mean)	.176*** (ETA)	.175*** (ETA)	.244*** (ETA)
Additive critical sustain. (mean)	.311*** (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)	.331*** (ETA)
Basic Themes and Values	**Relation with institutions and economic actors**		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any collaboration**
Additive new globalism (mean)	.127* (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)	.256*** (ETA)
Additive eco-minority (mean)	n.s. (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)
Additive peace-n.violen. (mean)	.186*** (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)	n.s. (ETA)

4.3. Repertoires of action

Finally, movement repertoires of action are expected to have an impact on conceptions of democracy. Emphasis upon protest mobilisation should push to stress a "logic of membership" that favours participatory models (Schmitter and Streek 1981). Studies on union democracy show that "radical" unions are more prone to advocate larger participation by members (Heckscher 2001). Class ideology and collective experiences (such as mobilization in strikes and demonstrations) significantly increase workers interest in workplace democracy (Collom 2000; 2003). Of the eight women's movement organisations examined by Jennifer Disney and Joyce Gelb in the USA (2000), those who privileged the mobilisation of women and cultural changes were more inclusive. Groups that use more

disruptive forms of direct action, such as Earth First!, tend to be more able than moderate ones to implement internal communicative rationality (Whitworth 2003). Research on local movement organisations shows that the more a group emphasises the need for effective decisions and lobbying, the less its decision-making will be inclusive (Andretta 2005b). Participation in common protest campaigns tends to increase reciprocal trust and tolerance of diversity (della Porta and Mosca 2005). Social movements that embrace non-violent ideologies and practices— stressing value change—are more likely to emphasise consensual internal decision-making (Kats and Kendrick 1990; Mushaben 1989). Consensus methods of decision-making are seen as a non-violent organisational strategy, which does not repress internal minorities (Veltri 2003). Violent forms of action require instead discipline and foster hierarchical values, as the case of left-wing terrorist organisations shows (della Porta 1995). More generally if there is a search for innovative and creative forms of action, deliberation may be useful in so far as it gives everyone the possibility to freely express his/her ideas. In an interesting experiment Walter Podilchak (1998) shows that when a group search for intrinsically rewording form of protest (such as happenings etc.), it tend to favour inclusionary organising, consensus decision-making, interpersonal collective bonds and personal attachment.

Our data include statements about the perceived functions of the organizations (see table 26). If protest is mentioned by a large majority of our groups (more than two thirds), it is interesting to notice that a similarly large share mentions influencing the media, spreading alternative information and raising awareness as a main function of their group, and that almost half of the organizations mention the political education of the citizens. Although smaller, the significant percentages of groups mentioning political representation, advocacy, provision of services and self-help (oscillating between 11 and 22%) signal that most organizations engage in different types of activities. More than one third of our organizations even mention lobbying, and almost one fifth the defense of specific interests. This plurality of functions confirms the internal differentiation of the GJM, as well as a pragmatic attitude towards the use of multiple tactics.

Table 26. Organizational functions (frequencies)

Organizational functions (% yes)		
Protest/mobilization	69.3	244
Lobbying	35.7	244
Political representation	11.5	244
Representation of specific interests	18.4	244
Self-awarness/self-help	13.9	244
Advocacy	27.5	244
Offer/supply of services to constituency	21.7	244
Information/media/awareness	68.0	244
Political education of the citizens	42.6	244
Legal protection	17.6	244

Crossing organizational functions with internal and general democratic values (see table 27), the mentioning of participatory democracy is positively related with protest (Cramer's V .196) and political representation (.178). Organizations that mention inclusiveness as a democratic value are less likely to lobby (-.130) and more likely instead to present themselves as agents of a political representation (.163) and of education of the citizens (.168). Similarly, the groups who criticize delegation are less likely to be involved in lobbying (-.229) or to offer services (-.150), and those who stress autonomy are more likely to engage in protest (.251). The mentioning of deliberative values is more frequent among groups that stress their role in political representation (.170).

Table 27. Organizational functions and organizational values

Objective/functions	Organizational values					
	Part. Democ.	**Inclusiveness**	**Crit. Del. and non hier.**	**Autonomous org. or loc.**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy**
Protest/mobilization	.196***	n.s.	n.s.	.251***	n.s.	n.s.
Lobbying	n.s.	.130* (-)	.229*** (-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Political representation	.178**	.163**	n.s.	n.s.	.170**	n.s.
Rep. of specific interests	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Self-awareness/self-help	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Advocacy	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.158**	n.s.
Offer services	n.s.	n.s.	.150**(-)	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Spreading information	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.202***	n.s.
Political education	n.s.	.168**	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Legal protection/repres.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	.163**

As far as types of internal democracy are concerned (table 28), protest is mentioned more frequently by groups adopting a model of deliberative participation, but also of deliberative representation. Lobbying, the defense of specific interest, the provision of services and advocacy are quoted more often by organizations adopting an associational model. Spreading of information and the political education of citizen is more often declared as an important function by groups belonging both to the deliberative representative and the associational models, with groups belonging to the deliberative representative model privileging also political representation.

Table 28. Organizational functions and types of internal democracy

Objective/functions	Type of internal democracy (% of column)				
	Associational	**Delib. Repres.**	**Assembleary**	**Delib. Partic.**	**Cramer's V**
Protest/mobilization	69.0	81.8	59.4	87.0	.182*
Lobbying	46.0	36.4	15.6	21.7	.246**
Political representation	14.3	21.2	6.3	0.0	.181*
Rep. of specific interests	26.2	18.2	9.4	0.0	.229**
Self-awareness/self-help	14.3	12.1	9.4	13.0	n.s.
Advocacy	35.7	24.2	18.8	4.3	.234**
Offer services	31.0	21.2	12.5	4.3	.224**
Spreading information	75.4	63.6	53.1	56.5	.195*
Political education	46.8	54.5	31.3	39.1	n.s.
Legal protection/repres.	18.3	3.0	18.8	21.7	n.s.

As for the relations with institutions (table 29), it is not surprising that organizations declaring lobbying as one of their functions favour a more collaborative attitude with institutions (and this is true for all levels, from the local to the internationl). Organizations stressing political representation are more frequent among collaborators and controllers, and the same is true for those stressing advocacy. Self-help is more often mentioned by those who refuse to collaborate. The spreading of information and political education of the citizens are more frequent among collaborative controllers. We can notice, however, that a wide range of functions is declared no matter which type of relationship is expressed towards institutions.

Table 29. Organizational functions and relationships with institutions

Functions/objectives	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
Protest/mobilization	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Lobbying	.470***	.150*(-)	.338***
Political representation	.254***	n.s.	.181**
Rep. of specific interests	.201***	n.s.	.120*
Self-awareness/self-help	n.s.	.128*	n.s.
Advocacy	.266***	n.s.	.170**
Offer services	.128*	.137* (-)	n.s.
Spreading information	.220***	n.s.	.276***
Political education	.261***	n.s.	272***
Legal protection/repres.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

5. Environmental context and democratic values

There is no doubt that the context influences the development and types of democratic values, although we have to specify that a variety of models do exist in any single country and historical period. Social movement studies have connected contextual factors especially with political opportunities. Organizational studies on organizational population have mentioned mechanisms of path dependency and institutional isomorphism (March and Olsen 1989). Our data base allows us to check especially the influence of environmental characteristics by time and space, looking in particular at the date of foundation of an organization and the country (or transnational sphere) it belongs to.

5.1. Path dependency: the impact of organizational origins

Research on different types of political organizations has stressed their tendency to remain influenced by the specific conditions in which they were created as well as by the choices made at the very beginning of their existence. Clientelistic structures tend to survive in political parties that had to distribute individual incentives when they emerged (Shefter 1977), and left-wing parties tend to reproduce the democratic centralism they had chosen at their origins (Panebianco 1982). Similarly, social movement organizations – notwithstanding much lower rates of survival – tend to maintain, when they do survive, some of the characteristics they developed at their origins. Notwithstanding processes of institutionalization, the Italian women's groups in the 1980s and the 1990s maintained a reliance upon affinity groups and small size structures that had characterized the consciousness raising groups that had been so important in the phase of high mobilization of the 1970s (della Porta 1996). Similarly, the autonomous squatted youth centers, although becoming partly more efficient in selling cultural products and more open to collaborative interactions with local institutions, maintained a concern for autonomy, often expressed in the refusal of occupying spaces officially allocated to them and in their preference for illegally squatted spaces.

A characteristic of the GJM is its capacity to remobilize organizations that had emerged in previous cycles of protest, including quite old unions and political parties. In our sample, we have in fact, about one third of organizations born before 1990 (about 13% before 1968), one third between 1990 and 1999 and one third after the year 2000 (table 30).

Table 30. Year of foundation (frequencies)

Year of foundation	Frequencies	Valid cases
Before 1968	13.5	33
1969-1989	20.5	50
1990-1999	34.8	85
2000+	27.9	68
Missing	3.3	8
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Significantly, the mentioning of most democratic values tends to grow with time of foundation (table 31). It is particularly frequent in organization founded after 2000, which refer more often to participation, inclusiveness, deliberation. Vice-versa, references to individual and cultural autonomy are more present in older organizations (1969-1989). As far as types of internal democracy are concerned, the presence of deliberative participation, deliberative representation, and assemblearism also grows in time (table 32), with peaks of deliberative representation in the organizations founded between 1990 and 1999 and of deliberative participation and assemblearism in those founded after 1999. The associational model is particularly present in organizations funded before 1999. As far as relations with institutions are concerned, collaboration is more frequently mentioned by older organizations (table 33).

Table 31. Year of foundation and internal and general democratic values

Year of foundation	Internal and general democratic values					
	Part. Democ.	**Inclusiveness**	**Crit. Del. and non hier.**	**Autonomous org. or loc.**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy**
Before 1968	18.2	18.2	12.1	48.4	24.2	27.3
1969-1989	26.0	24.0	22.0	38.8	26.0	34.0
1990-1999	27.1	15.3	24.7	38.4	22.4	31.8
2000+	36.8	29.4	30.9	40.0	38.2	32.4
Cramer's v	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

Table 32. Year of foundation and types of internal democracy

Type of internal democracy	Year of foundation				
	Before 1968	**1969-1989**	**1990-1999**	**2000+**	**Total**
Associational model	**23.6**	**27.6**	**35.8**	13.0	123 (100.0)
Deliberative representation	12.5	21.9	**34.4**	**31.3**	32 (100.0)
Assembleary	0.0	12.9	**38.7**	**48.4**	31 (100.0)
Deliberative participation	0.0	13.0	**30.4**	**56.5**	23 (100.0)
Cramer's V	.252***				

Table 33. Year of foundation and relationships with institutions

Year of foundation	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
Before 1968	57.6	18.2	42.4
1969-1989	46.0	24.0	52.0
1990-1999	27.1	21.2	35.3
2000+	30.9	25.0	41.2
Cramer's v	.230***	n.s.	n.s.

5.2. Political opportunities and democratic visions

If the mentioned data about the year of foundation of an organization confirm what neoinstitutionalists have called path dependency, cross national analyses allow to check hypotheses of institutional isomorphism, i.e. the tendency to adapt to environmental features. Among the institutional variables considered as relevant for social movements are the territorial division of competences and the functional division of power (Kriesi 1995; Kriesi et al 1995; Rucht 1994; Rucht 1996). Territorial centralisation and functional concentration of power reduce institutional channels for challengers; and vice versa. For instance, decentralised states tend to produce decentralised movement organisations. However, as Dieter Rucht (1996, 192) argues, "In the long run, this [decentralisation] encourages the formalisation of centralised and professional interest groups within the movement (and movement parties)", while "strong executive power structures in a given political system tend to induce a fundamental critique of bureaucratic and hierarchical political forms, which is then reflected in the movements' emphasis on informal and decentralised structures". Moreover, comparing France, West Germany and the United States, Rucht (1996, 198) found that in the two federal states the grassroots level of the movements is much stronger than in the centralised France. In the USA and Germany, he also found a very strong interest groups' type of social movements structure. This means that in federal states we have both professional and grassroots organisational structures, with all together more space for participation. Similarly, more inclusive states, opening channels of participation, have favoured the development of large, well structured and formalized associations. At the same time, however, smaller groups have contested the institutionalization and moderation of those associations, experimenting with alternative organizational models. If repression does not stimulate collaboration, refusal of relationship with institutions can also derive from a fear of cooptation.

Our sample includes organizations based in one of the six European countries covered by the Demos project or at the transnational level (table 34).

Table 34. Organizations' country (frequencies)

	Countries	
UK	15.6	38
France	13.1	32
Germany	12.7	31
Italy	16.8	41
Spain	15.2	37
Switzerland	14.3	35
Transnational	12.3	30

A cross national analysis confirms that different internal and general democratic values are indeed present in all analyzed countries and at the transnational level (table 35). References to participation are more widespread among the more mobilized Italian and Spanish organizations, but also among the Swiss ones. Reference to inclusiveness is more frequent in consensual Switzerland but also in majoritarian Great Britain. References to deliberative values are more numerous in Switzerland, where they resonate with a tradition of direct democracy, but also at the transnational level where such a tradition is lacking. The same is true for references to autonomy and cultural rights. Critique of delegation is more frequent in centralized France and Great Britain, but also in decentralized Spain.

Table 35. Organizations'country and internal and general democratic values

Country	Internal and General Democratic values					
	Part. Democ.	Inclusiveness	Crit. Del. and non hier.	Autonomous org. or loc.	Deliberative values (dic.)	Ind. or Coll. Autonomy
UK	15.8	34.2	31.6	34.5	34.2	23.7
France	9.4	6.3	28.1	33.3	15.6	28.1
Germany	32.3	19.4	25.8	12.5	29.0	38.7
Italy	51.2	9.8	17.1	45.9	22.0	22.0
Spain	35.1	21.6	24.3	35.5	0.0	16.2

Country	Internal and General Democratic values					
	Part. Democ.	Inclusiveness	Crit. Del. and non hier.	Autonomous org. or loc.	Deliberative values (dic.)	Ind. or Coll. Autonomy
Switzerland	40.0	42.9	17.1	57.1	57.1	51.4
Transnational	3.3	10.0	20.0	50.0	46.7	53.3
Cramer's V	.363***	.312***	n.s.	.262**	.395***	.289***

We can notice a larger presence of organizations belonging to the associational all countries except in Germany and (especially) Spain (table 36). The model of deliberative representation as well as deliberative participation is more present in (semi)federal Spain and Germany, but also in the centralized UK . The assembleary type is more widespread in Germany, Spain and France.

Table 36. Organizations' country and types of internal democracy

Country	Type of internal democracy				Total Row cases	Cramer's V
	Associational	Delib. Repres.	Assembleary	Delib. Partic.		
UK	60.0	17.1	5.7	17.1	35 (100.0)	
France	58.1	16.1	19.4	6.5	31 (100.0)	
Germany	45.8	12.5	20.8	20.8	24 (100.0)	239***
Italy	70.0	7.5	15.0	7.5	40 (100.0)	
Spain	27.3	24.2	30.3	18.2	33 (100.0)	
Country	**Type of internal democracy**				**Total Row cases**	**Cramer's V**
	Associational	**Delib. Repres.**	**Assembleary**	**Delib. Partic.**		
Switzerland	85.7	10.7	3.6	0.0	28 (100.0)	239***
Transnational	65.2	21.7	8.7	4.3	23 (100.0)	

Organizations mentioning refusal of relationships with institutions are more present in the Swiss case (where however also the other attitudes are mentioned more often than in the other countries), and in the French and British samples (table 37). Collaborative groups prevail at the transnational level and in Switzerland, where however control of institutions is also very often mentioned. Democratic control is less frequently mentioned in Spain and Italy. In interpreting these data we should keep in mind that here our selection process matters: each national team had to include the most important organizations of the GJM in each country, providing as much variation in terms of organizational structures (formal/informal, big/small and so on) and ideological orientations (environmentalist, leftist, anticapitalist, and so on) as possible. This is why we find it difficult to determine the impact of political opportunities on the organizational values, and especially on the conceptions of democracy. Moreover, a potentially relevant intervening variable is the national configuration of the GJM in each country (see WP1).

Table 37. Organizations' country and relationships with institutions

Country	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
UK	44.7	31.6	52.6
France	34.4	31.3	43.8
Germany	29.0	19.4	25.8
Italy	22.0	4.9	17.1
Spain	21.6	10.8	10.8
Switzerland	54.3	37.1	77.1
Transnational	60.0	23.3	83.3
Cramer's V	.292***	.272**	.530***

6. Some (provisional) conclusions

The analysis of the quantitative part of our research on visions of democracy allowed highlighting some interesting results. First of all, we noticed the dominance of a participatory discourse, but also the frequency (in about one third of our organizations) of

deliberative values. Our data also confirmed the importance that movement organizations assign to the metadiscourse of democracy: notwithstanding the different amount of materials collected on the different types of organizations, the high relevance of the discourse upon democracy is confirmed by the frequent and multiple references to a wide range of democratic values. Similar emphasis upon values of participation and deliberation is however compatible with different balances between different models. We noticed, in fact, a large presence of organizations of an associational type, followed by assembleary, but a relevant number of groups mentioning of consensus building as a central aspect of their decision making. Groups that stress deliberative values also tend to pay more attention (at least in written form) to democratic values in general. In terms of attitudes towards the political institutions, we noticed that our organizations in most of the cases do not perceive themselves as just outsiders. If we noticed a low presence of refusal to interact with institutions, however also low was an attitude of uncritical collaboration, the most widespread attitude being one of critical collaboration. We could also notice that internal conceptions of democracy do influence the propensity and forms of collaboration with institutions.

Focusing on the internal structure, as emerging from the written documents of the selected SMOs, our data confirm the multilevel nature of the GJM. If transnational movement organizations are growing in number, our population is in large part made up of groups active at local, regional, national level. Also worth stressing is the large presence of networks and their transnational and trans-issue nature. Although social movements are traditionally considered as "networks of networks" (della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 1), the large number of organizations made up of other organizations is testified by the large presence of collective membership, as well as the frequent use of terms like campaigns, networks or table in the names of the groups. Very high is also the expressed tendency to advocate networking with groups from other countries as well as with groups active on different issues. Notwithstanding a high heterogeneity in the size of our organizations (ranging from a dozen to millions of members), they share high degrees of structural inclusiveness. If assembleary models are more present at local level, the mentioning of deliberative values and structures is also very widespread at the transnational level. In terms of attitudes towards the institution, our data also confirm that more formal structure and larger size increase attitudes of collaboration with public institutions at different levels.

Looking at the values mentioned by our organizations, we found a strong emphasis upon a multiplicity of issues. If social movements have been considered (especially in some periods) as instances of "single issue" politics, our groups do not fit this image, mentioning instead a large range of claims and interests. Significantly, social justice, democracy, peace and human rights emerged as bridging frames, being core concerns shared by most groups. Also ecology, worker rights, and gender rights are often referred to by our groups, while anticapitalism is mentioned by about one fourth of our sample. Critical collaboration resonates within all of the mentioned themes, with the exception of anticapitalism.

Our organizations were not only multi-issue, but also multi-forms: in fact, they often presented themselves as acting through a combination of different strategies. Most of them mentioned protest but also the development of (a different) knowledge as at the basis of their modus operandi (about 70% on both). However, also more conventional strategies were present: for instance about one third of the groups declared that lobbying was part of their repertoire of collective action. Rarer is instead the mentioning of political representation and defence of specific interests. Significantly, and in line with previous results, organizations supporting deliberative and participative models of democracy tend to rely more upon protest, while it is among those groups supporting an associational model that the use of lobbying, representation of specific interest, and provision of services is more often mentioned. We also noticed a certain congruence between the type of action repertoire and the general attitudes towards institutions (e.g., those groups that mention lobbying among their functions are more open to acritical collaboration; those who emphasize the education of the public are more oriented towards critical control).

Our data confirmed the role of contextual conditions. In a historical perspective, we observed that the GJM is formed by groups of quite different age and "generations". Many groups already existed before the emergence of the GJM, having been founded during previous waves of protest and on different concerns: some are labour movement organizations or charities born a long time ago, others were founded in the wave of the '68 movement/s; still others emerged with the "new" social movement of the last two decades. As with previous waves of mobilization, however, also the one which started at the turn of the millennium produced new organizations. And it is worth mentioning that the "younger" organizations are more likely to mention democratic values. Our data also confirm a

mechanism of path dependency: assembleary models are more likely to be stressed among post-68 groups, deliberative models among those developed after 1989.

With some caution -- as we repeatedly mentioned our cases cannot be considered as representative of the different countries -- looking at our data in a cross-national perspective, we can observe that political conditions are filtered through different group ideologies. In fact, all models are present in all countries and, if some expectations about country specificities are confirmed, the effects of the specific movement cultures (decentralization in Spain, formalization in Germany etc.) are however filtered by the specific constellations of the global justice movement in the various countries.

Providing a thick description at the country level and combining quantitative with qualitative data is in fact what the next chapters, focused on six national case studies and a transnational one, will do. Before moving on to them, a summary of our methodological consideration is in order. As mentioned, the attempt at summarizing data on the organizational ideology of social movement organizations has proved a challenging tasks. Although previous research existed on a small number of SMOs or a large number of well structured organizations (e.g. parties), we had to face the difficult task of addressing a large number of heterogeneous groups. Our methodological choices allowed us to handle a large amount of documents (totalling several thousands of pages), on a large number of cases (244) and to transform some of the information in numbers. In this process, we had however to address several problematic choices, for which we tried to devise solutions, in a trial-and-error procedures that we consider as still ongoing.

First of all, we could not use random sampling, given the lack of information on our universe. We therefore chose some selection criteria (centrality vis-à-vis the GJM in given country; inclusion of groups covering different issues) that, although not insuring representatives, would not jeopardize our statistical analysis. We were therefore careful to avoid selection on the depending variables.

Second, the different amount of written production we were able to collect for our different groups (especially, a systematically lower tendency of informal groups to put their ideas in a written form) might affect the reliability of some of our indicators. A way to address this concern, beyond a careful interpretation of the data, is a focus on comparable types of organizations in future exploration of our data. In particular, some indicators

would be more reliable if the comparison were limited to the more formalized groups, while others might be more able to provide information about more informal groups.

Third, we developed some concerns about the validity of some of the indicators we have devised, as well as some of the indexes we constructed. These are issues that can be addressed in further analyses of the dataset, also in combination with the datasets from other work packages, in particular WP4, based upon interviews with organizational representatives. Here as well, however, another important caveat for keeping biases under control is to interpret our quantitative data with a good qualitative knowledge of our cases. This is one of the task of the next chapters of this report.

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Appendix

Table 1A. Decision making variables 1 (frequencies)

Dependent variables	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Presence of president/leader/secretary	48.4	244
Presence of spokesperson	13.1	244
Presence of executive	61.9	244
Presence of committee of founding members	3.7	244
Presence of assembly	75.4	244
Presence of scientific committees	7.8	244
Presence of thematic groups	36.5	244
Presence of arbitration board	13.9	244
Presence of board of auditors	20.9	244
Presence of committee of guarantors	2.9	244
President/leader/secretary decides on future activities	20.9	244
Executive decides on future activities	50.4	244
Committee of the founding members decides on future activities	0.8	244
Assembly decides on future activities	60.7	244
Scientific committees decide on future activities	2.5	244
Thematic groups decide on future activities	8.2	244
Assembly composition		
Delegates	31.5	76
All members	22.5	55
Whoever wants to participate	7.4	18
Other	1.2	3
Not specified	13.9	34
Not applicable	23.8	58
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Method of nomination/election of delegates in the assembly		
Not mentioned	11.5	28
Nominated by executive bodies of chapters/affiliates	2.0	5
Elected by assemblies of chapters/affiliates	10.2	25
Not applicable	76.2	186
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Table 2A. Decision making variables 2 (frequencies)

Dependent variables	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Type of delegates who compose the assembly		
Not mentioned	12.3	30
Permanent delegates	10.2	25
Rotating delegates	1.2	3
Not Applicable	76.2	186
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Decision-making method of the assembly		
Not mentioned	35.2	86
Simple majority rules	16.4	40
Qualified majority rule	3.7	9
Mixed simple and qualified majority rule	7.0	17
Consensus	6.6	16
Mixed consensus and majority rule	5.7	14
Unanimity	0.4	1
Mixed consensus and unanimity	0.4	1
Not applicable	24.6	60
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Frequency of assembly meeting		
Not mentioned	15.2	37
Less then once a year	16.0	39
At least once a year	29.1	71
At least twice a year	4.5	11
More often than twice a year	10.7	26
Not applicable	24.6	60
Total valid cases	100.0	244
The assembly is the main decision-making body	41.8	244
The assembly elects the executive	43.9	244
The assembly defines the program	45.1	244
The assembly controls the executive	21.3	244
Method of nomination for the members of the executive		
Not mentioned	18.4	45
Nominated by executive bodies of chapters/affiliates	6.1	15
Elected by assemblies of chapters/affiliates	3.7	9
Elected by (general) assemblies	32.0	78
Other	1.6	4

Not applicable	38.1	93
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Table 3A. Decision making variables 3 (frequencies)

Dependent variables	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Type of delegates who compose the executive		
Not mentioned	29.1	71
Permanent delegates	29.5	72
Rotating delegates	3.3	8
Not applicable	38.1	93
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Decision-making method of the executive committee		
Not mentioned	36.9	90
Simple majority rules	14.8	36
Qualified majority rule	3.7	9
Mixed simple and qualified majority rule	1.2	3
Consensus	1.6	4
Mixed consensus and majority rule	3.3	8
Unanimity	0.4	1
Mixed consensus and unanimity	0.0	0
Not applicable	38.1	93
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Presence of a minimum number of members		
Not mentioned	58.9	143
Yes, only for the assembly	5.7	14
Yes, only for the executive	9.4	23
Yes, both	6.6	16
Not applicable	19.7	48
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Body responsible for the election/nomination of president/leader/secretary		
Not mentioned	9.8	24
Elected by the assembly	18.9	46
Nominated by the executive	18.4	45
Not applicable	52.9	129
Total valid cases	100.0	244

Body responsible for the election/nomination of spokesperson(s)		
Not mentioned	4.5	11
Elected by the assembly	4.1	10
Nominated by the executive	4.1	10
Not applicable	87.3	213
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Mandatory delegation for the president/leader/secretary	3.7	244
Mandatory delegation for the spokesperson(s)	2.5	244
Mandatory delegation for the delegates to the assembly	2.5	244
Mandatory delegation for the delegates to the executive	6.1	244
Dependent variables	**Frequencies of yes (%)**	**Total of valid cases**
Body deciding on the expulsion		
No body is mentioned	2.0	5
Assembly	9.0	22
Executive	17.2	42
Other	10.2	25
Not applicable	61.5	150
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Possibility for expelled members to appeal to other bodies	21.7	244
National legislation on associations mentioned	25.0	244
Presence of a body approving the budget of the organization		
No body is mentioned	44.7	109
Assembly	21.7	53
Executive committee	20.9	51
Other	1.2	3
Not applicable	11.5	28
Total valid cases	100.0	244
Possibility to convene extraordinary assemblies	38.5	244
A certain % of individual/collective members convenes an extraordinary assembly	22.5	244
The executive convenes an extraordinary assembly	27.5	244
Local executive committees (representing a certain % of members) convene and extraordinary assembly	7.4	244
Local assemblies (representing a certain % of members) convene an extraordinary assembly	3.7	244

Prohibition to hold posts/functions in public national institutions	6.1	244
Prohibition to hold posts/functions in public local institutions	6.1	244
Prohibition to hold posts/functions in political parties	9.8	244
Prohibition to hold posts/functions in other associations	0.8	244

Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy: The Transnational GJMOs

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Introduction: Selection Process of Most Relevant GJMOs

This report aims to examine the visions and discourses on democracy of the global justice movement/s organisations (GJMOs) at the transnational level, as emerging from fundamental documents available both online and offline. While also taking position for a more direct democratic model at the local and domestic level, the principal characteristic of the transnational organisations here under study consists in their clear focus on the global dimension of democracy, more specifically on denouncing the serious democratic deficiencies of international affairs.

Within the overall focus on the visions of democracy, this report addresses in particular the structure of the organisations (types of organisation; size; date of foundation; and territorial level); the internal democratic principles (organisational internal principles and general democratic values); the relationship with external actors; the repertoires of actions (functions); and the discourses and identities (themes). In the second part of the report, four organisations have been selected for in-depth analysis of democratic discourses on both internal and external democracy: the World Social Forum, Via Campesina, the campaign Reclaim Our UN, and the Seattle to Brussels network. The study surveyed the following 30 organisations:

1. S2B Network (Seattle to Brussels)
2. Stop EPA (European Partnership Agreements)
3. Bite Back
4. Global March Against Child Labour
5. People's Caravan 2004 for Food Sovereignty

6. Make Trade Fair
7. World Trade Fair Day
8. Attac (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens)
9. European Farmers Coordination
10. Center of Concern
11. Cuts International (Consumer Unity & Trust Society)
12. IFI Watchnet (International Financial Institutions)
13. ENAAT (European Network Against Arms Trade)
14. Committee for the Abolition of the Third World Debt
15. Global Unions
16. Oxfam International
17. Caritas Internationalis
18. Friends of the Earth International
19. Indymedia (Indipendent media center)
20. European Left
21. International of Anarchist Federations
22. International Metalworkers' Federation
23. Pax Christi International
24. Via Campesina
25. Euromarches
26. World March of Women
27. WSF (World Social Forum)
28. OWINFS (Our World Is Not For Sale)
29. PGA (Peoples' Global Action)
30. Reclaim our UN (United Nations)

These organisations were selected considering various characteristics.

a) Geographical scope: transnational/international

The organisations surveyed are all transnational in scope. Differently from international organisations working mainly on the intergovernmental level, our cases are active also below and above the (inter)state dimension. Since the problems they tackle are global in kind, the push toward going transnational is high. The scope of action of these organisations is always international, though it is so for different reasons. Some organisational forms develop in reaction to the specific political opportunity structure at the transnational level. Sometimes they respond functionally to transnational/international issues, other times they go transnational in order to address specific institutional problems. Some are formed in reaction to the policies of specific intergovernmental organization; others are instead motivated by the scope of the principles they support. Examples of the first kind are Stop EPA and ENAAT, while typical cases of the second include Caritas Internationalis, and Pax Christi International. The transnational scope of the surveyed organisations is of great importance for the question of democracy. The extension of the organisation (single organisation, network or ad hoc umbrella group) over different national domains has implications in terms of a wider and more complex organisational coordination, and a more open publicity and accountability toward different 'constituencies'.

b). Organisational structure: network or single organisations

The second criterion used to select the organisations of the study is centred on their organisational structure. Obviously, a vast presence of transnational networks characterises the transnational level, where stable or ad hoc coalitions and co-ordinations are often formed in order to strengthen the impact of specific campaigns. Examples of this type can be found in the S2B Network and the European Farmers Coordination. Together with these transnational organisational forms, we have also analysed a number of single international organisations since they present useful cases for comparative purposes with the national studies of the Demos project. Here we took into consideration the documents of

organisations such as Oxfam International and Friends of the Earth International. The democratic potential varies according to the different organisational structure.

c). World-wide coverage (Europe, North and South America, Asia)

Another criterion used to select a comprehensive set of organizations is world-wide coverage. We covered the European component of the global justice movement/s studying organisations such as the European Farmers Coordination, European Left, and Euromarches. The North American side was examined in the cases of Center of Concern (USA), Friends of the Earth International (USA), and World March of Women (Canada). The South American side was analysed through the cases of IFI Watchnet (Uruguay), and WSF (Brazil). Finally, the Asian part of the movement/s was considered by looking at Via Campesina (Indonesia), Global March Against Child Labour (India), People's Caravan 2004 for Food Sovereignty (Malaysia), Cuts International (India), and World Trade Fair Day (Japan). As for Africa, important organisations exist, but they often lack structured websites.

d). Single-issue or multi-issue

A significant feature of many important transnational organisations consists in their orientation toward specific issues. The concentration on single issues allows for the establishment of tight, cross-border links between different groups. Examples of this can be found in the cases of Bite Back, ENAAT, Reclaim our UN, Global March Against Child Labour. By contrast, a number of multi-issue or generalist organisations have also been selected for drawing interesting comparisons. They include: Oxfam International, Caritas Internationalis, European Left, International of Anarchist Federations, and the WSF.

e). Main activity: action-oriented or research-oriented

The opposition between action-oriented and research-oriented organisations constitutes another relevant dichotomy we used in order to select a meaningful set of transnational organisations within the global justice movement/s. Among the research and information-

oriented organisations we selected the IFI Watchnet, Cuts International, and Indymedia. In opposition to them, most part of the organisations studied are action-oriented. Typical among them are PGA, People's Caravan 2004 for Food Sovereignty, and Euromarches.

f). Forms of action: radical or reformist

Another dichotomy used to select the transnational sample concerns the action repertoires of our organisations: either radical (e.g. road blocking) or reformist (e.g. lobbying). Among radical organisations we selected International of Anarchist Federations, Euromarches and PGA. Among more moderate organisations that accept a certain degree of institutional co-operation we included the following: Global March Against Child Labour, European Farmers Coordination, Global Unions, and Reclaim our UN.

g). Trade and food sovereignty

We devoted special attention to the organisations dedicated to trade and food sovereignty-related issues, because of the special place that the overall theme of trade plays in the global justice movement/s' activities. Selected trade-related organisations include: S2B Network, Stop EPA, Make Trade Fair, World Trade Fair Day, Attac, and OWINFS. Conversely, selected food-sovereignty-related organisations include: Bite Back, People's Caravan 2004 for Food Sovereignty, European Farmers Coordination, and Via Campesina.

h). Transnational events and meta-networks

Finally, a special category we devoted attention to consists of ad-hoc coalition for the coordination of transnational events and meta-networks. Obviously, the first reference here is to the WSF, for its centrality in the growth and consolidation of global justice movement/s. Through its open space the WSF facilitated the strengthening and sometimes the establishment itself of many transnational networks or organisations. Other regional social fora such as the ESF, have been excluded as subsections of the main WSF. Other significant transnational events in this category include also the People's Caravan 2004 for

Food Sovereignty. Being meta-network, these organisations present specific features for what concerns their democratic potential.

1. Quantitative Analysis

The first section of the report aims to examine the organizational ideology of 30 transnational organisations of the GJM as they are expressed in a specific number of documents produced by the organisations themselves. The objective of the report is to illustrate not the actual functioning of the organisations, but rather their self-understanding and their programmatic ideals as publicly stated. This report investigates two aspects of GJMOs: both how they present themselves to the wider public and how they perceive themselves as democratic actors. A discrepancy between *words* and *actions* should thus always be considered as a possibility, though not as an inevitable one. Moreover, even in the case of discrepancy we should not underestimate both the (possibly unintentional) capacity of official documents to shape the future course of actions and the strategic role that official documents may play in legitimizing the organisation. The documents analyzed for our study include the following:

- the organisations' constitutions, or Articles and Memorandum of Association of the organization;
- documents of fundamental values and/or intent;
- formally adopted program;
- "mission statements";
- the "about us" sections of websites;
- the "frequently asked questions" section of the websites;
- equivalent or similar material on the website, expressing the "official" position of the organization as a whole (e.g. internal documents referred to in documents a) like annual reports, membership application forms, etc.).

These documents were mainly downloaded from the organisations websites. However when this was not possible, printed copies were requested to the organisations.

1.1 Type of organisation

In comparison with the national case studies, the first particularity to be underlined refers to the kind of membership of transnational SMOs. Our 30 cases are all predominantly composed by collective agents and no case of only individual membership is recorded.

Collective membership characterizes not only networks or ad hoc umbrella groups, but single international associations such as Caritas, or international associations with both individual and collective membership, such as the ad hoc umbrella organisation STOP EPA. Collective membership constitutes a fundamental characteristic of the transnational organisations.

Table 1. Kind of membership

	TN sample (n=30)		Entire sample (n=244)	
Kind of membership	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Collective	19	63,4	48	19.7
Individual	-	-	76	31.1
Both individual and collective	7	23,3	80	32.8
Not applicable	4	13,3	40	16.4

In our sample, networks or federations are predominant. This tendency is confirmed by other data, analysed later, confirming the centrality of the network organisational forms as the most apt for facing the transnational or global political domain. In the overall sample, instead, single organisation is the most frequent organisational structure.

Table 2. Types of organisation

Type of organisation	TN sample (n=30) Frequency	TN sample (n=30) Percent	Entire sample (n=244) Frequency	Entire sample (n=244) Percent
Single organisation	3	10,0	131	53.7
Network or federation	18	60,0	74	30,0
Ad-hoc umbrella organisation	9	30,0	39	16,0

1.2 Size of collective membership

Among our 30 transnational organizations we have comparatively more organizations with large collective membership. Crossing size with the type of organization (see table 4), we notice that ad hoc umbrella organizations tend to have a larger collective membership than single organization and network or federation.

Table 3. Size of collective membership

Collective members	TN sample (n=30) Frequency	TN sample (n=30) Percent	Entire sample (n=244) Frequency	Entire sample (n=244) Percent
Up to 25	6	20,0	32	13.1
26-100	6	20,0	31	12.7
More than 100	10	33,3	31	12.7
Missing	8	26,7	150	61.5

Table 4. Types of organisation and size of collective membership

	Collective members			TOTAL
	up to 25	26-100	more than 100	
Type of organization				
Single organization	1	-	1	2
Network or federation	5	6	4	15
Ad-hoc umbrella organization	-	-	5	5
TOTAL	6	6	10	22

1.3 Date of foundation

Most of our organisations are of recent foundation. In the last five years, almost the same number of organisations was created as in the previous 10 years and in the previous 20 years. This can be interpreted in different ways. It can either mean that SMOs have a short life, or that they have strongly increased in number since the nineties. While both interpretations can be applied to both national and transnational cases, in the latter we expect that a trend of "going global" can be reflected in our data.

Table 5. Organisational age

	TN sample (n=30)		Entire sample (n=244)	
Year of foundation	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Before 1968	4	13,3	33	**13.5**
1969-1989	5	16,7	50	**20.5**
1990-1999	10	33,3	85	**34.8**
2000+	9	30,0	68	**27.9**
Missing	**2**	**6,7**	**8**	**3.3**

1.4 Territorial level

Our 30 cases, as expected, are all centred on the international level. Despite this, however, they are also active on the other territorial levels. Almost all of our transnational organizations have a national level, and more than 50% have a local presence.

Table 6. Territorial levels

	TN sample (n=30)	Entire sample (n=244)
Territorial level of the organisation	**Percent**	**Percent**
Local level presence	56,7	73,4
Regional level presence	70,0	55,3
National level presence	96,7	82,8
International level presence	100,0	34,8

More specifically on the international level, the data confirm a predominance of the network and campaign forms. Networks are four times more frequent than single organizations.

Table 7. International level recoded

TN cases	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Hierarchical "single" organization	3	10,0
"Traditional" federation	6	20,0
"Modern/loose" network	12	40,0
Campaign	9	30,0
Not applicable	-	-
Total	30	100,0
All cases		
Hierarchical "single" organization	16	6,6
"Traditional" federation	28	11,5
"Modern/loose" network	28	11,5
Campaign	20	8,2
Not applicable	152	62,3
Total	244	100,0

1.5 Internal democratic model

Our main dependent variable consists in a typology of internal decision-making. As expressed in the introductory report explains "in the *associational model* the assembly chooses the executive body and the president of the association, while the everyday politics of the group is managed by delegates who make decisions in a process that leaves little space to argumentation and consensus building. When delegates, elected by the assembly, make decisions on a consensual basis we speak of *deliberative representation*. Especially in social movements organisations, decisions are often made directly by the members in the assembly: when they decide by majority rule, the model is the classic *assembleary* one, while when consensus, reasoning and discourses prevail, the type of decision-making can be called *deliberative participation*". Not surprisingly, considering the dominance of collective membership, almost all of our cases fall in the category of the associational model or deliberative representation. A decision was, in fact, taken to consider assembleary and deliberative participation as models in which individual members' participation is key. When this perspective is applied to the transnational case, the result is almost inevitably the quasi-absence of assembleary cases for practical constraints and functional imperatives that

impede the adoption of a more participatory organisational model. In comparison with the full data set, it is interesting to note that while associational and deliberative representative present similar values, while assembleary and deliberative participative are far less present. In addition, at the transnational level we observe a higher rate of missing cases.

Table 8. Types of internal decision-making

	TN sample (n=30)		Entire sample (n=244)	
Type of internal decision making	**Frequency**	**Percent**	**Frequency**	**Percent**
Associational	15	50,0	123	50,4
Deliberative representative	5	16,7	33	13,5
Assembleary	2	6,7	32	13,1
Deliberative participative	1	3,3	23	9,4
Not applicable	7	23,3	28	13,5
TOTAL	30	100,0	244	100,0

Taking a closer look at the single organizations, the final decision on the indicators to be taken into consideration seems to have produced unproblematic results for cases such as COC, FoEI, or Caritas. Some cases, however, such as PGA or Indymedia, might have been mislocated because of the limited information on internal decision making available in their fundamental documents. The organizations were allocated to the specific models of internal decision making as follows (some organizations are missing organisations since we were not able to collect enough documents):

Deliberative representative

European Left

International of Anarchist Federations

Our World Is Not For Sale

Oxfam International

World March of Women

Associational

Caritas Internationalis

Center of Concern

Commitee for the Abolition of the Thirld World Debt

Cuts International

ENAAT-European Network Against Arms Trade

European Farmers Coordination

Friends of the Earth International

Global March Against Child Labour

IFI Watchnet

Indymedia

International Metalworkers' Federation

Pax Christi International

People Global Action

World Social Forum

Via Campesina

Assembleary

Euromarches

Reclaim Our UN

Deliberative participative

Seattle to Brussels Network

The data on the degree of importance of the assembly confirm that an assembly composed by all members is never present at the transnational level. Transnational organizations are, in fact, mostly composed by groups, and do not foresee the participation of individual members in a transnational assembly. Even more, at the transnational level in half of the cases the presence of an assembly is not mentioned at all.

Table 9. Degree of importance of the assembly

TN cases	Frequency	Percent
,00	15	50,0
1,00	15	50,0
2,00	-	-
Total	30	100,0
All cases		
,00	60	24,6
1,00	111	45,5
2,00	73	29,9
Total	244	100,0

Crossing our typology of internal decision-making with the degree of importance of the assembly indicates (despite the limited number of cases) that the importance of the assembly is higher in the more participatory models (assembleary and deliberative participative).

Table 10. Importance of the assembly within the types of internal decision-making

Type of internal decision making		Degree of importance of the assembly		Valid cases
		0	1	
Associational	Count	6	9	15
	% within Type of int. mak.	40,0%	60,0%	100,0%
Deliberative	Count	2	3	5
Representative	% within Type of int. dec. mak.	40,0%	60,0%	100,0%
Assembleary	Count		2	2
	% within Type of int. dec. mak.	-	100,0%	100,0%
Deliberative Participative	Count		1	1
	% within Type of int. dec. mak.	-	100,0%	100,0%
Total	Count	8	15	23
	% within Type of int. dec. mak.	34,8%	65,2%	100,0%

We can observe (see table 11) that both single organizations and networks adopt more frequently an associational model. Ad hoc umbrella organizations instead, have a more diversified internal decision making method and tends to have a more technical rather than political organizational coordination.

Table 11. Types of organisation and types of internal decision making

Type of organisation		Type of internal decision making					
		Associational	**Deliberative representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative participative**	**Not applicable**	**TOTAL**
Single organisation	% within type of organisation	66,7%	33,3%	-	-	-	100,0%
	% of Total	6,7%	3,3%	-	-	-	10,0%
Network or federation	% within type of organisation	66,7%	16,7%	-	5,6%	11,1%	100,0%
	% of Total	40,0%	10,0%	-	3,3%	6,7%	60,0%
Ad-hoc umbrella organisation	% within type of organisation	11,1%	11,1%	22,2%	-	55,6%	100,0%
	% of Total	3,3%	3,3%	6,7%	-	16,7%	30,0%
TOTAL	% of Total	50,0%	16,7%	6,7%	3,3%	23,3%	100,0%

Moreover, there is a correlation between size and type of internal decision making. The larger the organisation, the more frequently it adopts an associational model. Conversely, smaller organizations more readily adopt a deliberative model.

Table 12. Size of collective membership and types of internal decision making

Collective members		Type of internal decision making					
		Associational	**Deliberative representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative participative**	**Not applicable**	**TOTAL**
up to 25	% within collective members	33,3%	50,0%	-	-	16,7%	100,0%
	% of Total	9,1%	13,6%	-	-	4,5%	27,3%
26-100	% within collective members	66,7%	-	-	16,7%	16,7%	100,0%
	% of Total	18,2%	-		4,5%	4,5%	27,3%
More than 100	% within collective members	60,0%	-	10,0%	-	30,0%	100,0%

	% of Total	27,3%	-	4,5%	-	13,6%	45,5%
TOTAL	% of Total	54,5%	13,6%	4,5%	4,5%	22,7%	100,0%

Finally, we can notice that older organisations (up until 1989) tend to be more associational than more recent ones. In particular, assembleary and deliberative participative organisations are recorded only after 1990.

Table 13. Organisational age and types of internal decision making

Type of internal democracy (TN cases)	**Year of foundation**				**TOTAL**
	before 1968	**1969-1989**	**1990-1999**	**2000+**	
Associational	20,0	33,3	33,3	13,3	15 (100.0)
Deliberative Representative	25,0	-	50,0	25,0	4 (100.0)
Assembleary	-	-	50,0	50,0	2 (100.0)
Deliberative Participative	-	-	100,0	-	1 (100.0)
Type of internal democracy (all cases)					
Associational	24.2	28.3	34.2	13.3	120 (100.0)
Deliberative Representative	12.5	21.9	34.4	31.3	32 (100.0)
Assembleary	0.0	12.9	38.7	48.4	31 (100.0)
Deliberative Participative	0.0	13.0	30.4	56.5	23 (100.0)

1.6 Internal principles

Concerning the internal principles of organisations, it can be observed that participatory democracy and inclusiveness are rarely mentioned. On the contrary, autonomy of local chapter or members is recalled in half of the cases. This is consistent with the transnational character of our date set, according to which transnational organisations tend to be decentralised and offer a set of thin instruments for coordination rather than a thick political aggregation. The case of the WSF is the most illustrative one in this respect.

Table 14. Internal democratic values of the organisations

Internal principles of the organisations	TN sample (n=30)		Entire sample (n=244)	
	Frequency of yes	Frequencies of yes (%)	Frequency of yes	Frequencies of yes (%)
Participatory democracy	1	3,3	68	27.9
Inclusiveness	3	10,0	51	20.9
Critique of delegation (including limitation of delegation) or non hierarchical decision making	6	20,0	57	23.4
Autonomous member organisations or local chapter	15	50,0	86	35.2

If we focus on the general democratic values of the organisations, instead, the results of our survey indicate a larger attention by our transnational organizations. When we search for values expressed in documents, we find that inclusiveness, transparency, equality, cultural and group autonomy, and dialogue and communication are all values that are publicly and explicitly mentioned. We therefore observe a gap between publicly declared internal principles and publicly declared general democratic values.

If not with the internal decision making method, these values are however related with the external practices of the organisations under scrutiny (to be elucidated in the next table). Activities such as advocacy and spreading information are supported by values such as transparency and communication. Being a group-based set of cases (i.e. with collective membership), collective/cultural autonomy is mentioned in more than 40 % of the cases.

Table 15. General democratic values of the organisations

General democratic values of the organisations	TN sample (n=30)		Entire sample (n=244)	
	Frequency of yes	Frequencies of yes (%)	Frequency of yes	Frequencies of yes (%)
Participation	15	50	125	51.2
Representation	1	3.3	15	6.1
Equality	10	33.3	83	34.0
Inclusiveness	15	50	63	25.8
Transparency	11	36.7	58	23.8
Autonomy (group; cultural)	13	43.3	46	18.9
Dialogue/communication	16	53.3	77	31.6
Individual liberty/autonomy	7	23.3	53	21.7
Deliberative general values (factor dichotomized with No<0.5 and Yes>0.5)[1]	13	43.3	65	26.6

Data on organisational structure (recoded) reflect the fluid nature of many of our groupings. Structural participation, structural inclusiveness and structural accountability are much lower than in the entire sample. Networking, both national and transnational, is instead high, but this comes as no surprise. The role of knowledge is in line with the general sample.

Table 16. Indexes of organisational structures

Organisational structure	Frequencies of yes (%) TN sample (n=30)	Frequencies of yes (%) Entire sample (n=244)
Structural participation	26,7	59,4
Structural inclusiveness	23,3	39,8

[1] This is the first component of a factor analysis run with the Varimax Rotation Method. This factor alone explains 32% of the total variation of 8 variables. The variables which weight in this factor are the following ones: Participation (.60); Equality (.64); Inclusiveness (.74); Transparency (.72); and Dialogue/Communication (.71).

Structural Accountability	26,7	47,5
Decentralization	16,7	23,8
Organisational autonomy	13,3	14,3
Role of knowledge (Presence of thematic or scientific committees)	40,0	39,8
National networking	90,0	81,1
Transnational networking	90,0	76,2

Groups that follow associational and deliberative representative models of decision making tend to give more weight to autonomy, but much less to inclusiveness.

In particular, when participation is explicitly mentioned in documents it is most likely that participation will be effectively implemented in the structure of the organisation. But also in cases in which participation is not mentioned, we find structural participation. Summing up these observations, we can deduce a higher degree of correspondence between statements and actions than in the national cases, or at least a more developed awareness of one's own structure.

Table 17. Structural participation and participatory democracy explicitly mentioned

Participatory democracy explicitly mentioned (TN cases)		**Structural participation**		**Total**
		no	yes	
no	Count	22	7	29
	% within participatory democracy mentioned	75,9%	24,1%	100,0%
yes	Count	0	1	1
	% within participatory democracy mentioned	-	100,0%	100,0%
Total	Count	22	8	30
	% within participatory democracy mentioned	73,3%	26,7%	100,0%
Participatory democracy explicitly mentioned (all cases)				
no	Count	80	96	176
	% within participatory democracy mentioned	45,5%	54,5%	100,0%
yes	Count	19	49	68
	% within participatory democracy mentioned	27,9%	72,1%	100,0%
Total	Count	99	145	244
	% within participatory democracy mentioned	40,6%	59,4%	100,0%

However, the same result does not emerge if we crosstabulate structural inclusiveness with mentioning of inclusiveness rather than participation as a value (see table 18).

Table 18. Structural inclusiveness and inclusiveness explicitly mentioned

Inclusiveness explicitly mentioned (TN cases)		**Structural inclusiveness**		**Total**
		No	yes	
no	Count	17	7	24
	% within inclusiveness mentioned	70,8%	29,2%	100,0%
yes	Count	2	0	2
	% within inclusiveness mentioned	100,0%	-	100,0%
Total	Count	19	7	26
	% within inclusiveness mentioned	73,1%	26,9%	100,0%
Inclusiveness explicitly mentioned (all cases)				
no	Count	92	74	166
	% within inclusiveness mentioned	55,4%	44,6%	100,0%
yes	Count	16	22	38
	% within inclusiveness mentioned	42,1%	57,9%	100,0%
Total	Count	108	96	204
	% within inclusiveness mentioned	52,9%	47,1%	100,0%

Moreover, we can notice that organizations of the associational type mention general democratic values such as equality, transparency, and individual freedom less than deliberative representative groups. The one organization mentioning representation as a value is also of the associational type. In comparison with the national cases, values such as dialogue and autonomy score distinctively higher for the transnational cases.

Table 19. General democratic values and types of internal decision making

Type of int. dec. making (all cases)	**General democratic values of the organisations**								**TOT**
	Individual liberty	Participation	Representation	Equality	Inclusiveness	Transparency	Autonomy (group; cultural)	Dialogue /commun.	
Associational	18,9%	45,7%	7,1%	36,2%	24,4%	27,6%	15,7%	28,3%	127 (100%)
Deliberative representative	20,6%	79,4%	14,7%	47,1%	32,4%	35,3%	23,5%	44,1%	34 (100%)
Assembleary	25,0%	40,6%	3,1%	12,5%	15,6%	3,1%	25,0%	15,6%	32 (100%)
Deliberative participative	30,4%	69,6%	0,0%	39,1%	26,1%	13,0%	13,0%	47,8%	23 (100%)

Type of int. decis. mak. (TN cases)									
Associational	20,0%	46,7%	6,7%	33,3%	46,7%	26,7%	53,3%	53,3%	15 (100%)
Deliberative representative	40,0%	80,0%	0,0%	80,0%	80,0%	60,0%	80,0%	60,0%	5 (100%)
Assembleary	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	50,0%	50,0%	50,0%	0,0%	0,0%	2 (100%)
Deliberative participative	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	100,0%	100,0%	0,0%	100,0%	1 (100%)

1.7 Relationship with external (political and economic) actors

Looking at relationships with external actors, it has to be underlined above all that these are mentioned far more in our transnational sample than in the overall sample. Transnational GJMOs, therefore, seem more policy oriented than national ones. Concerning relationships with institutions, transnational cases reveal an inverted picture. While the primary attitude with national institutions is critical collaboration, with international governmental institutions the predominant attitude is uncollaborative control. This shows a higher trust for national institutions and conversely a cautious, if not fully antagonist, approach toward international institutions. Alliances with national governments are in fact sometimes promoted in order to strengthen the capacity of influencing international institutions. The "Cancun case" provides a good examples of how non governmental organisations can at times deploy a collaborative attitude with some national governments in order o be more effective in the negotiations at the international level. Finally, concerning relationships with economic actors, collaboration is more often mentioned than control.

Table 20. Relationships with national and international institutions and with economic actors

Typology of collaboration/control for national institutions	**TN sample(n=30)**	**Entire sample (n=244)**
Not mentioned	20,0	52.5
Uncritical collaborators	3,3	10.7
Uncollaborative controllers	26,7	13.9
Critical collaborators	50,0	23.0
Typology of collaboration/control for intergovernmental institutions	**TN sample (n=30)**	**Entire sample (n=244)**
Not mentioned	26,7	65,6
Uncritical collaborators	3,3	6,6
Uncollaborative controllers	40,0	15,6
Critical collaborators	30,0	12,3
Typology of collaboration/control for economic actors	**TN sample (n=30)**	**Entire sample (n=244)**
Not mentioned	53,3	73,0
Uncritical collaborators	10,0	4,5
Uncollaborative controllers	20,0	12,7
Critical collaborators	16,7	9,8

There is an interesting relation between type of internal decision making and the relation with institutions and economic actors. We note that the more participative organisations mention collaboration with institutions and economic actors less, privileging democratic control. This however can also be due to the specific decision making mechanisms of a number of participative organisations, in which a fast decision-making procedure and a high fluidity of the organizational structure do not allow for more long term institutional collaboration. Conversely, we note a tendency toward collaboration with institutions in the associational organisations.

In comparison with the national data, we note that refusal of collaboration with national and transnational institutions and with economic actors is more often mentioned than in national cases (see table 21). This is probably due to a sophisticated awareness of

the democratic deficiencies of many international actors such as MNCs and international economic institutions. In a similar vein, democratic control (see table 23) is mentioned twice as much in comparison with the national cases. As mentioned, the fact that collaboration with national institutions (see table 22) is more often mentioned is probably due to the fact that it is not unusual to have complex alliances between some national governments and some organisations of the GJM.

Table 21. Refusal of collaboration with national and transnational institutions and economic actors and types of internal decision making

Type of internal decision making	Any refusal of collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors (frequencies and % of yes)		TN valid cases	All valid cases
	Transnational cases	All cases		
Associational	4 (26.7%)	20 (15.7%)	15 (100%)	127 (100%)
Deliberative Representative Assembleary	2 (40%)	11 (32.4%)	5 (100%)	34 (100%)
Deliberative Participative	1 (50%)	8 (25%)	2 (100%)	32 (100%)
Total	0 (0%)	6 (26.1%)	1 (100%)	23 (100%)
	7 (30.4%)	45 (20.8%)	23 (100%)	216 (100%)

Table 22. Collaboration with national and transnational institutions and economic actors and types of internal decision making

Type of internal decision making	Any collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors (frequencies and % of yes)		TN valid cases	All valid cases
	Transnational cases	All cases		
Associational	10 (66.7%)	58 (45.7%)	15 (100%)	127 (100%)
Deliberative Representative Assembleary	3 (60%)	16 (47.1%)	5 (100%)	34 (100%)
Deliberative Participative	1 (50%)	7 (21.9%)	2 (100%)	32 (100%)
Total	-	2 (8.7%)	1 (100%)	23 (100%)
	14 (60.9%)	83 (31.4%)	23 (100%)	216 (100%)

Table 23. Democratic control on national and transnational institutions and economic actors and types of internal decision making

Type of internal decision making	Any democratic control on national, transnational institutions and economic actors (frequencies and % of yes)		TN valid cases	All valid cases
	Transnational cases	All cases		
Associational	12 (80%)	61 (48%)	15 (100%)	127 (100%)
Deliberative	4 (80%)	18 (52.9%)	5 (100%)	34 (100%)
Representative Assembleary	2 (100%)	7 (21.9%)	2 (100%)	32 (100%)
Deliberative Participative	1 (100%)	6 (26.1%)	1 (100%)	23 (100%)
Total	19 (82.6%)	92 (42.6%)	23 (100%)	216 (100%)

1.8 Functions

Among the functions and objectives of the transnational organizations, the most often mentioned are spreading information, influencing mass media and raising awareness. Still significant are also more institutional approaches, such as advocacy and lobbying. However, about half (46%) of our groups mentions protest and mobilisation among their principal activities.

In comparison with the entire sample, major differences can be found for advocacy, lobbying, protest and political education of the citizens. While the former two functions are much more often referred to by the transnational organizations, the latter are more frequently mentioned in the domestic cases where they are most likely intended as activities to be done from below. Protest and education are then considered activities to be done more effectively at the national than at the transnational level. The same applies, though to a less marked degree, to legal protection.

Table 24. Organisational functions

Functions, objectives of the organisations	Frequencies of yes (%) TN sample (n=30)	Frequencies of yes (%) Entire sample (n=244)
Spreading information/influencing mass media/ raising awareness	80,0	68,0
Advocacy	63,3	22,5
Lobbying	53,3	35,7
Protest/mobilisation	46,7	69,3
Offer/supply of services to constituency	26,7	21,7
Representation of specific interests	23,3	18,4
Political education of the citizens	20,0	42,6
Political representation	16,7	11,5
Self-awareness/self-help	16,7	13,9
Legal protection and denunciation on the specific theme of repression	10,0	17,6

Interesting results come from the crosstabulation of organisations' functions with their year of foundation. Protest remains stable in time: the age of the organisation does not matter in this respect. It matters, instead, in relation with lobbying, where older organisations are more prone to engage in this activity, maybe because they enjoy a higher credibility constructed during their life through stable contacts. But age also matters, in a different direction, for advocacy, in which case we notice an increase of groups mentioning it in the nineties, in coincidence with the large global campaigns that stimulated world public opinion to pay attention to problems exacerbated by globalisation. Finally, political representation is more frequently quoted by older organisations.

Table 25. Organisational age and organisational functions

Functions, objectives of the organisations TN cases (frequency of yes and %)	Year of foundation				
	before 1968	1969-1989	1990-1999	2000+	Valid cases
Advocacy	2 (11,1%)	3 (16,7%)	9 (50,0%)	4 (22,2%)	18 (100,0%)
Lobbying	3 (21,4%)	5 (35,7%)	3 (21,4%)	3 (21,4%)	14 (100,0%)
Protest/mobilisation	2 (15,4%)	2 (15,4%)	5 (38,5%)	4 (30,8%)	13 (100,0%)
Spreading information/ influencing mass media/ raising awareness	3 (13,0%)	5 (21,7%)	8 (34,8%)	7 (30,4%)	23 (100,0%)
Offer/supply of services to constituency	2 (25,0%)	2 (25,0%)	2 (25,0%)	2 (25,0%)	8 (100,0%)
Representation of specific interests	1 (14,3%)	2 (28,6%)	1 (14,3%)	3 (42,9%)	7 (100,0%)
Political education of the citizen	1 (20,0%)	1 (20,0%)	3 (60,0%)	-	5 (100,0%)
Legal protection and denunciation on the specific theme of repression	2 (66,7%)	1 (33,3%)	-	-	3 (100,0%)
Self-awareness/self-help	1 (20,0%)	-	3 (60,0%)	1 (20,0%)	5 (100,0%)
Political representation	3 (75,0%)	-	-	1 (25,0%)	4 (100,0%)
Other	-	-	5 (83,3%)	1 (16,7%)	6 (100,0%)

Functions, objectives of the organisations All cases (frequency of yes and %)	before 1968	1969-1989	1990-1999	2000+	Valid cases
Advocacy	14 (21,9%)	14 (21,9%)	27 (42,2%)	9 (14,1%)	64 (100,0%)
Lobbying	18 (22,0%)	23 (28,0%)	22 (26,8%)	19 (23,2%)	82 (100,0%)
Protest/mobilisation	23 (14,0%)	34 (20,7%)	57 (34,8%)	50 (30,5%)	164 (100,0%)
Spreading information/ influencing mass media/ raising awareness	22 (13,7%)	38 (23,6%)	60 (37,3%)	41 (27,5%)	161 (100,0%)
Offer/supply of services to constituency	15 (28,3%)	11 (20,8%)	21 (39,6%)	6 (11,3%)	53 (100,0%)
Representation of specific interests	10 (22,7%)	14 (31,8%)	13 (29,5%)	7 (15,9%)	44 (100,0%)
Political education of the citizen	18 (18,2%)	24 (24,2%)	34 (34,3%)	23 (23,2%)	99 (100,0%)
Legal protection and denunciation on the specific theme of repression	8 (21,1%)	6 (15,8%)	11 (28,9%)	13 (34,2%)	38 (100,0%)
Self-awareness/self-help	6 (18,2%)	6 (18,2%)	15 (45,5%)	6 (18,2%)	33 (100,0%)
Political representation	6 (23,1%)	7 (26,9%)	8 (30,8%)	5 (19,2%)	26 (100,0%)
Other	1 (2,8%)	9 (25,0%)	21 (58,3%)	5 (13,9%)	36 (100,0%)

Crossing functions with the size of the organisations, we found that advocacy is more often mentioned by intermediate organisations (with collective membership between 26 and 100 units), larger organisations are engaged in spreading information and smaller organisations and networks in lobbying. It is also worth mentioning that the result on lobbying and protest is inverted in the case of small organisations.

Crossing functions with typology of organisation, it is interesting to note that ad hoc umbrella organisations are not prone to lobbying and political representation; networks prefer advocacy and lobbying, spreading information and protest; and single organisation spreading information, advocacy and lobbying, but not protest.

Crossing functions with types of internal decision making, a number of previous considerations can be confirmed. Associational and deliberative representative have a sort of 'monopoly' of lobbying activities. Protest, instead, is a function that is homogenously present in all models.

Table 26. Types of internal decision making and organisational functions

Functions, objectives of the organisations (frequency of yes)	Type of internal decision making				Valid cases
	Associational	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	
Advocacy	10	2	1	1	14
Lobbying	10	2	0	0	12
Protest/mobilisation	6	3	2	1	12
Spreading information	14	3	0	1	18
Political representation	3	1	0	0	4

Also the functions of the organisation and the presence of thematic and scientific committees seem related. In this, a strong link can be evidenced between the function of spreading information and the presence of scientific or thematic committees. While for protest such presence is invariant, it can be noticed that such committees are also important for advocacy and lobbying, though less than for the spreading of information.

Table 27. Organisational functions and presence of thematic committees

	Functions, objectives of the organisations		TOTAL
	Advocacy		
	no	yes	
Presence of thematic or scientific committees (frequency of yes)	4	8	12
	Lobbying		
	no	yes	
Presence of thematic or scientific committees (frequency of yes)	4	8	12
	Protest/mobilisation		
	no	yes	
Presence of thematic or scientific committees (frequency of yes)	6	6	12
	Spreading information/influencing mass media/raising awareness		
	no	yes	
Presence of thematic or scientific committees (frequency of yes)	1	11	12
	Political representation		
	No	yes	
Presence of thematic or scientific committees (frequency of yes)	8	4	12

Another interesting result concerns ad hoc umbrella organizations. This kind of organizations (i.e. Bite back, WFTDay, World March of Women, Make Trade Fair, Global March Against Child Labour, Euromarches, Peoples' Caravan, Stop Epa, Reclaim Our UN) lacks in most of the cases scientific body for they are intended as light coordination campaign with minimal web-sites.

1.9 Themes

As far as themes and values are concerned, our cases show high mentioning of social justice, defence of the welfare state, fighting poverty and social exclusion (76,7%). Other values that are often mentioned (by over 50% of our groups) are human rights, sustainability, women's rights and democracy. References to more traditional ideology such as socialism and communism are not present, and peace and non violence are mentioned

less than in the entire sample. Religious values are higher than in the entire sample, but this may be related to our sampling criteria. Finally, rare are also references to anti-capitalism and anti-liberalism, and this is consistent with the collaborative attitude toward economic actors (to be examined later).

Table 28. Basic themes/values

Basic themes and values of the organisations	Frequencies of yes (%) TN sample (n=30)	Frequencies of yes (%) Entire sample (n=244)
Social justice/defence of the welfare state /fighting poverty/social inclusion	76,7	68,9
Human rights	63,3	47,1
Sustainability	60,0	32,8
Women's rights	60,0	42,6
Democracy	56,7	52,0
Another globalisation/a different form of globalisation	46,7	50,0
Workers' rights	43,3	40,2
Solidarity with third world countries	43,3	46,3
Peace	36,7	49,6
Critical consumerism/fair trade	33,3	29,1
Anti-neoliberalism	30,0	39,3
Global (distributive) justice	26,7	45,1
Ecology	26,7	47,1
Immigrants' rights/anti-racism/rights of asylum seekers	23,3	45,9
Ethical finance	20,0	16,8
Anti-capitalism	16,7	23,0
Religious principles	13,3	7,0
Non-violence	13,3	27,5
Gay/lesbian rights	6,7	15,2
Alternative knowledge	6,7	12,7
Anarchism (traditional anarchism and/or libertarian anarchism)	3,3	3,7
Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	3,3	9,0
Animal rights	3,3	3,7
Socialism	-	7,8
Communism	-	3,3
Other	30,0	30,3

When aggregating the data on mentioned themes, the results confirm -the emergence of new forms of identity which are starkly divergent from traditional anti-capitalist and traditional left forms. Being a highly transnational issues, critical sustainability is the only set of value which is more often mentioned by transnational than by domestic organizations.

Table 29. Aggregated basic themes/values

	Frequencies of yes (%)	**Frequencies of yes (%)**
Main campaigning themes	**TN sample (n=30)**	**Entire sample (n=244)**
New globalism	90,0	87,3
Critical sustainability	76,7	58,6
Peace and non-violence	70,0	69,3
Eco-minority groups	66,7	70,9
Anti capitalism	16,7	26,6
Traditional left	-	8,6

Crossing campaigning themes with type of internal decision making, we can notice that the theme of anticapitalism is almost completely absent from the associational organisation, in which instead critical sustainability, new globalism, and peace and non violence are frequent.

Table 30. Aggregated basic themes/values and types of internal decision making

Type of internal democracy (TN cases % of yes)	Main campaigning themes (frequency of yes, % column)					
	Critical Sustainibility	New Globalism	Eco-minority	Anti-capitalism	Peace and non-violence	Traditional left
Associational	12 (70,6%)	13 (61,9%)	10 (58,8%)	1 (20%)	11 (64,7%)	-
Deliberative representation	4 (23,5%)	5 (23,8%)	4 (23,5%)	3 (60%)	4 (23,5%)	-
Assembleary	-	2 (9,5%)	2 (11,8%)	1 (20%)	1 (5,9%)	-
Deliberative participation	1 (5,9%)	1 (4,8%)	1 (5,9%)	-	1 (5,9%)	-
Type of int. dem. (all cases % of yes)						
Associational	84 (65,6%)	111 (57,8%)	87 (55,4%)	23 (41,1%)	94 (61,8%)	12 (60,0%)
Deliberative repres.	23 (18,0%)	33 (17,2%)	31 (19,7%)	13 (23,3%)	26 (17,1%)	6 (30,0%)
Assembleary	12 (9,4%)	28 (14,6%)	20 (12,7%)	11 (19,6%)	18 (11,8%)	2 (10,0%)
Deliberative participation	9 (7,0%)	11 (10,4%)	19 (12,1%)	9 (16,1%)	14 (9,2%)	-
Type of internal democracy (TN cases, % of yes)	**Main campaigning themes (frequency of yes, % row)**					
	Critical Sustainibility	**New Globalism**	**Eco-minority**	**Anti-capitalism**	**Peace and non-violence**	**Traditional left**
Associational	12 (80,0%)	13 (86,7%)	10 (66,7%)	1 (6,7%)	11 (73,3%)	-
Deliberative representation	4 (80,0%)	5 (100,0%)	4 (80,0%)	3 (60,0%)	4 (80,0%)	-
Assembleary	-	2 (100,0%)	2 (100,0%)	1 (50,0%)	1 (50,0%)	-
Deliberative participation	1 (100,0%)	1 (100,0%	1 (100,0%)	-	1 (100,0%)	-
Type of internal democracy (all cases, % of yes)						
Associational	84 (66,1%)	111 (87,4%)	87 (68,5%)	23 (18,1%)	94 (74,0%)	12 (9,4%)
Deliberative representation	23 (67,6%)	33 (97,1%)	31 (91,2%)	13 (38,2%)	26 (76,5%)	6 (17,6%)
Assembleary	12 (37,5%)	28 (87,5%)	20 (62,5%)	11 (34,4%)	18 (56,3%)	2 (6,3%)
Deliberative participation	9 (39,1%)	11 (87,0%)	19 (82,6%)	9 (39,1%)	14 (60,9%)	-

Interesting results are generated by crossing themes with functions. Protest is correlated with anti-capitalism and anti-liberalism, but much less with religious principles and critical consumerism. Lobbying is very much correlated with solidarity with third world. In this case we can point to organizations such as Caritas and Oxfam that are simultaneously engaged in third world relief and lobbying as part of their mission strategy. But lobbying is also correlated with ethical finance. For the remaining functions, we observe that the organization that mention spreading of information and advocacy among their functions are also those more likely to mention most themes, excluding anticapitalism

Crossing campaigning themes with functions, most interesting results come from the relationship between anti-capitalism that has a 0% correlation with lobbying and 80% with protest.

Table 31. Organisational functions and aggregated themes/values

Main campaigning themes (TN cases, % of yes)	**Functions, objectives of the organisations (% of yes)**			
	Spreading information/ influencing mass media/ raising awareness	**Lobbying**	**Advocacy**	**Protest/mobilisation**
Critical sustainability	87,0%	60,9%	73,9%	43,5%
New globalism	81,5%	51,9%	70,4%	48,1%
Eco-minority groups	80,0%	55,0%	75,0%	50,0%
Peace and non-violence	85,7%	57,1%	66,7%	47,6%
Anti-capitalism	60,0%	-	60,0%	80,0%
Traditional left	-	-	-	-
Main campaigning themes (all cases, % of yes)				
Critical sustainability	74,8%	46,2%	35,7%	74,1%
New globalism	67,6%	36,6%	30,5%	73,7%
Eco-minority groups	68,2%	35,8%	28,3%	76,9%
Peace and non-violence	71,0%	42,0%	32,5%	75,7%

Main campaigning themes (all cases, % of yes)				
Anti-capitalism	55,4%	7,7%	13,8%	84,6%
Traditional left	61,9%	4,8%	9,5%	81,0%

Crossing organisational themes with the year of foundation of the group, we found that themes such as human rights, sustainability, fighting poverty, women's rights, and democracy are more frequently mentioned by younger organisations founded after 1990. This confirms a change in the agenda of transnational social movements toward what has been called "globalisation from below'.

2. Qualitative In-Depth Aalysis of Four Case Studies

In the second part of the report, a qualitative in-depth analysis of four selected case studies will be developed in order to deepen the investigation on both the internal and external visions of democracy in transnational social movements organizations-TSMOs.

Among the 30 cases studied so far, 4 have been selected as most significant according to a combination of parameters regarding both internal practices of democracy and visions on how the democratic model should be implemented in the political sphere outside TSMOs.

Figure 1. Degree of participation versus degree of deliberation within GJMOs

		Degree of Participation	
		Low	**High**
Degree of Deliberation	**Low**	Associational model	Assembleary model
	High	Deliberative representation	Deliberative participation

Differently from the national cases, from the transnational perspective, the selection of the four in-depth cases for WP3 analysis needs to be based on a wider, slightly different

ground. The taxonomy we adopted for the WP3 questionnaire as based on the correlation between delegation of power and consensus provides, in fact, only a partial insight for the case of TSMOs. Using such taxonomy for the selection of our in-depth cases would thus focus only on internal democratic models. In order to grasp the specificities of our transnational data set, instead, an enlarged focus is needed. What we propose, therefore, is to integrate such taxonomy with a complementary taxonomy that in taking into account the delegation/consensus variable also considers other variables such as focus and external relationships. These further dimensions would allow us to draw a more complete picture of TSMO in that also elements of external democracy would be taken into consideration. This would compensate for the insufficient attention paid to external democracy in the quantitative part of WP3, and would thus better meet the requirements on examining visions of democracy both on internal and external matters. In particular, we constructed an interpretative grill that cross interaction with institutions and with social movements, and focus of action (either general or issue specific). Following from this, our selection for the 4 case studies will be as in the following figure:

Figure 2. The interpretative grill for the selection of four case studies

	General focus	**Issue specific**
Interaction with institutions	Reclaim Our UN	S2B
	Assembleary	Deliberative partecipative
Interaction with social movements	WSF	Via campesina
	Associational	Associational

2.1 World Social Forum

Few preliminary considerations need to be developed before going into the content of the WSF visions and practices concerning democracy. First of all, there's a large amount of documents available on-line for the public. This is a signal of transparency, especially for the documents produced by the International Council which provide a good overview of the Council discussion and intellectual-political development, though they are limited in the sense that they are just summaries and not minutes of the meetings. Second, a chronological

consideration needs to be highlighted. The first WSF was held in 2001 and followed by a first International Council Meeting in the same year. After that, there were 4 meetings in 2002, and 2 every following year, attesting a regularization of the organization time frame. Third, the WSF web-site is visited by a huge number of activists. As for today (27/1/06), there have been 3.769.431 visitors for the Portuguese sites; 186.658 for the English; 156.823 for the Spanish; and 87.550 for the French one. The Brazilian predominance is evident even from this side-data.

The WSF was first organized by a group of 8 Brazilian organizations that developed the idea and created linking with a number of French intellectuals, first and foremost Bernard Cassens, and with an international network of similarly-minded anti neo liberalism organizations, which was later established as International Council. Quantitatively, the WSF has progressively grown during the years. Registered participants were 4.700 in 2001; 12.274 in 2002; 20.000 in 2003; 74.126 in 2004; and 92.300 in 2005.

Following its official self-definition, the WSF should be considered as an 'open meeting place', neither a group nor an organization, constituted by social movements, networks, NGOs and other civil society organizations. This space remains characterised by plurality and diversity, and is non-confessional, non-governmental and non-party. Among the activities that it aims to foster are: reflexive thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action. It thus proposes to facilitate decentralized coordination and networking among organizations engaged in concrete action towards building another world, at any level from the local to the international.

After the first forum held in Porto Alegre in 2001, it has taken the form of a permanent world process seeking and building alternatives to neo-liberal policies. This process entailed the drafting of a Charter of Principles by the Brazilian Organising Committee (later approved by the International Council and that subsequently became a document to compulsorly subscribe in order to join the WSF), the consolidation of the orientating leadership of the International Council, the development of regional Social For a, and the 'exportation' of the main Forum to India in 2004, and in the would-be 2007 Forum in Kenya.

As for their conception of *internal democracy*, as mentioned earlier, the WSF is not intended as an organisation and does not intent to represent world civil society. In this sense, then, there is no final decision taken by the Forum as such, thus apparently no problem of democratic decision-making. However at least two instances arise in which democratic conceptions are at stake: decision taken by organisations within the Forum and decision taken by the International Council.

Concerning the first, the Charter recognises the right of organisations participating in the Forum to deliberate on declarations or actions that they may decide to implement singly or in coordination. The Forum commits itself to allow the maximum participation possible through open access and decentralisation (provided the principles of the Charter are abided), and to circulate such decisions without directing, hierarchizing, censuring or restricting them. The only limitation that the WSF imposes on participation regards political parties and military organisations. This decision lead to the exclusion of various armed groups including the Colombian FARC and the Mexican Zapatistas, despite the fact that the latter had an enormous impact in the consolidation of the global social movement in the nineties. Political parties are also supposed to be excluded, but in fact many political leaders, from the Brazilian President Lula to the Venezuelan Chavez, have been invited to speak at the Forum. This possibility is admitted by the Charter as in the form of personal capacity, but still this remains a contentious issue debated also in the International Council meetings for its risk of political cooptation.

The other democratic issue concerning activities within the Forum regards the decisions on the thematic terrains, i.e. the sections in which each Forum is organised. Here a consultation process from below has been implemented in which each single organisation can propose a workshop or seminar and submit it to the WSF place-based Organising Committee. In this way, the WSF opens itself up for different kind of activities and issues and stimulate efforts for self-articulation through a process that would resemble self-organisation. The democratic side of this remains in the process of aggregation, using the WSF jargon ‘agglutination’, through which the thousand of submitted proposal are grouped. Here, small, less networked organisations risk to be overshadowed, practically excluded. To this phenomenon, it must be added that the Organising Committee can freely promote extra or common activities.

Concerning the democratic participation in the International Council-IC the issue is similarly delicate and much debated. While the WSF as a forum explicitly declares that it is "open to all and does not operate on the basis of invitation", the WSF in the form of International Council is still very much criticized for exclusionary practices, for its unequal geographical participation, and for the obstructed access to IC membership. The IC is supposed to discuss and decide on general political questions and the WSF's heading line and the methodologies of each annual event. It is set up as a permanent body for playing a leading role in defining policy guidelines and the WSF's strategic directions. At the moment, it is composed by 130 organisations and 6 sub-commissions: Methodology, Content and Themes, Expansion, Strategies, Resources, and Communication.

The IC is claimed not to be an authority located within a power structure; thus it is not supposed to have a mechanism for resolving disputes nor for voting. It is also supposed to have a balanced make-up in terms of regional and sectorial diversity, though it will not represent world civil society. The representativity of the IC will result, as stated in the first meeting of the IC, from its ability to take the WSF to the world level, to give it roots, organicity and continuity. Beyond this output orientation, however, it is a matter of fact that five years after its establishment the IC is still unbalanced in terms of geographical and sectorial membership. It is not only underrepresented as far as participation from Africa, Asia, the Arab World, and young people is concerned, but also Brazilian organisations are overrepresented. An integration has been decided in 2004 and 19 new members were added to the IC that increased the youth and women membership, but remained fundamentally anchored to a Portuguese-Spanish bias. The new members had to meet a number of conditions including: agreement with the Charter; endorsement by two IC members; internal need of the IC for its re-balancing; etc. By contrast, the European Social Forum adopts a more open mechanism of participation on strategic decisions through its open and inclusive European Preparatory Assembly (EPA). This led to some degree of tension between the WSF and the ESF, so much so that, for instance, the Athens ESF 2006 is not formally included in the triptych of the polycentric 2006 WSF, but only considered a regional event.

On visions of *external democracy*, the Charter explicitly recognises a globalization in solidarity as a major objective of the alternative proposed, resting on the respect for

universal rights of all citizens (men and women) of all nations and of the environment, and the democratic international system and institutions at the service of social justice, equality, and the sovereignty of peoples. A common political theme is the opposition to neo-liberalism and a world dominated by capital or by any form of imperialism. The WSF endorses the practice of non violent social resistance to the process of dehumanization, exclusion, and social inequality produced by the process of capitalist globalization. The Charter also underlines that real and participatory democracy will be striven for, together with peaceful relations in equality, solidarity among peoples, ethnicities, genders. Actions from the local to the national level are considered, seeking active participation in international contexts, interpreted as an issue of planetary citizenship and society. This project is however entrenched in the organisational form of the Forum as an open space which does not allow, in principle, the formation of a common political agenda to be pursued in the name of the Forum. And yet, the self-proclaimed legitimacy of the Forum is based on the capacity of the Forum (and its bodies: IC, OCs etc) to go global in political terms.

This is a core political issue for the external democratic dimension of the Forum. Beyond the difficult issue of measurement of the impact and growth of the WSF at the global scale, two main positions on the future of the Forum have emerged in the IC and the WSF at large. Some would like to keep the Forum as it has always been: an open space for exchange of political ideas and experiences. Others, instead, would like to see the Forum more politically engaged, identifying political issues and proposing political struggles. Among the former are, for instance, many Brazilian organizers; among the latter part of the Assembly of the Social Movements (which has always been in a not well defined position within the WSF) and some independent intellectuals such as those that signed the famous Porto Alegre Consensus Manifesto during WSF 2005. The impulse to raise the stakes and turn the World Social Forum into a more consolidated political force is in some ways an expression of frustration for the ambiguous results so far achieved. In this vein, Ignacio Ramonet[2] indicates five chronological stages of GJM: 1) intellectual elaboration of neo-liberal globalization in the second half of nineties; 2) protest, from Seattle 1999 onward; 3)

[2] Reported in Liberti, S. (2005). A Bamako la ‹Bandung dei popoli›. *Il Manifesto,* pp. 2 (January, 19).

Meeting of the activists for discussion. WSF 2001; 4) Diversification of activists within the following WSFs; 5) need for transformation of this process into a political counter-power.

2.2 Via Campesina

Via Campesina is an international movement that co-ordinates movements and organizations of peasants, small and medium-sized producers, small craft-workers, indigenous communities, and agricultural workers and defends the basic interests of these sectors. It is an autonomous, pluralist movement, independent of any political, economic, or other type of affiliation. It is composed of national and regional representative organizations, indigenous communities and agricultural workers, whose autonomy will be strictly respected.

Its origin goes back to April 1992, when several peasant leaders met. In May of 1993, the First Conference of Via Campesina was held in Mons, Belgium, where it was constituted as a World Organization, and its first strategic guidelines and structure were defined. The Second International Conference was held in Tlaxcala, Mexico, in April, 1996, which was attended by 37 countries and 69 organizations.

Via Campesina is at present in a process of expansion and consolidation, and from its very nature, it is a pluralistic, democratic, multicultural movement, with a wide geographical coverage as a result of which, it is one of the most representative organizations for small and middle-sized producers world-wide. This complexity demands an enormous effort in order to accomplish the articulation, communication, and coordination needed among the regions, their respective member organizations, as well as the whole movement in general.

The starting political assumption of Via Campesina consists in the affirmation that "eating has became a political act" for food production touches the wellbeing and identity of citizens and peoples. In global inequality statistics farmers have the first place in marginality and are primary agents of poverty. This situation is due to the current global capitalistic political economic institutions that force neo-liberal free trade policy on peasants. This has not always been the case, according to Via Campesina. In a perhaps too literary way, they recall the fact that "the peasants originally lived in peace and in harmony

with nature that was unpolluted and with a wealth of adequate food and clean water" (Annual report, 2005, p. 2). The contrast between these two situations creates the necessity for an 'irreversible' historical moment of struggle, under the motto *Globalize our struggle and globalize our hope*.

On *internal democracy,* the documents consulted contained few details. The internal discrimination of women is recognise and the subsequent need for counter measures admitted. The documents also recognise the necessity of real participation of the social bases of the organisations in its leadership. Hence proposals are advanced to establish a group of affirmative actions, and to create a code of conduct establishing the basic criteria and compromises. Finally, the documents also mention the existence of a human rights commission as internal body in charge of drafting the Annual Report on Violations of Peasants Rights.

As for *visions of democracy,* more interesting is the political discussion on external democracy. The primary goal of Via Campesina is to develop solidarity of global peasantry and unity within the diversity of rural organizations in order to combat the neoliberal model of industrialised agriculture and struggle against the neoliberal capitalist system and the export-based, business agricultural model.

The free trade model has destroyed livelihood, community diversity, culture, environment and natural resources. Liberalization has forced agricultural producers to create unsafe, culturally unacceptable, and unaffordable food. Moreover, cheap imported food has flooded local markets, peasants can no longer produce food for their own families and are forced to migration and poverty.

The international institutions (WB, IMF, WTO and ADB-Asian Development Bank) are considered major instruments serving the interests of MNCs. The WTO is especially indicated as the most serious danger to the lives of peasants, for it is considered fully undemocratic and thus illegitimate. The entire system of economic-financial institutions in particular is accused of :

- imperialism
- violation of human rights
- imposing a dehumanising market society

- ignoring and marginalise the poor and the peasants of the world
- destroying bio-diversity and practising bio-piracy
- fostering a process of feminization of poverty
- allowing for food dumping and subsidized export
- decreasing health condition through depletion of genetic resources

If we look at their *objectives,* in opposition to this situation, Via Campesina promotes, as an overarching goal, food sovereignty. This is constituted by a number of sub goals including political goals (democratic participation of peasants to the formulation of agricultural policies at all levels; democratic access to and defence of land-agrarian reform; women participation), economic goals (access and control of natural resources; labour intensive, vs. capital intensive, mode of production; opposition to any intellectual property over any form of life or genes[3]; production of quality food for local production for it increases transparency between farmers and consumers and offers incentives for farmers to preserve and improve soil fertility); and environmental and cultural goals (protection of biodiversity and the environment; sustainable and equitable agricultural production based on small and medium-sized producers; preservation of traditional knowledge and respect for culture).

In particular, Via Campesina discourse is centred on the recognition of a set of human rights related to food and production. The cardinal concept here is food sovereignty, a concept developed by Via Campesina and introduced to the international public debate during the FAO World Food Summit 1996. This entails that each country a) defines its own agricultural policy in order to meet its internal need; b) each country sets food quality criteria; c) produces its own food and protects its production through prohibition or taxation of imported food; and d) produces its own food with great diversity in production and consumption according to cultural preferences. Implied by food sovereignty is food security as a fundamental, non-negotiable right of all peoples to the extent that each nation should declare it as constitutional right. Subsets of human rights related to food sovereignty are the

[3] According to Via Campesina, the essence of life cannot be owned for the only owner of life is the holder of that life, who lives it, sustains it, feeds and preserves it. Ownership of knowledge on forms of life carries a risk of the monopolization of patents. Thus Via Campesina opposes ceding community collective heritage to private sectors.

following: women's rights; peasants' rights (vs. intellectual property rights); free and public technologies developed with public money and public knowledge; access to land[4]; fair trade oriented toward food internal production and consumption, and biodiversity and free access to bio resources for this is a guarantee of human diversity, cultures, systems of production, human and economic relations, forms of government: in essence freedom.

In order to achieve these objectives, Via Campesina has defined its *strategies* as those that are the most effective, non violent strategies available, ranging from refusing to participate and direct action to negotiations. Within these are the following:

- The articulation and strengthening of its member organizations and in particular strengthening of women's participation in social, economic, political, and cultural matters.
- Networking and building alliances with other social movement organisations (active participation to the WSF and promotion of international campaigns).
- Influencing power and decision-making centers within governments and multilateral organizations in order to redirect the economic and agricultural policies that affect small and middle-scale producers. This is pursued with a wide variety of instrumental objectives including: a) Networking with 'good' international institutions (UN, FAO, Cartagena protocol, International Forest Forum, Biodiversity Convention) and 'good' national governments (Venezuela). b) Making each state respecting International Human Rights Covenants, but also campaigning for a new *International Conventions on the Rights of Peasants*. To this effect, Via Campesina produces each year a Annual Report on Violations of Peasants Rights in order to denounce and raise awareness around this kind of human rights violations, on the assumption that "no one else can do this. Peasants have to do this". The Report is presented each year at the Human Rights Commission in Geneva; c) Fighting for the abolition of WTO, or at least agriculture out of WTO or better WTO out of agriculture. Immediate moratorium on further WTO

[4] In particular, only those that work the land, depend on it and live there with their families have the right to land. The principle of maximum size of the social ownership of the land per family should be respected and prohibition for capitalist enterprises to own large amount of land imposed. *Social ownership,* right to use land for the survival and in a beneficial way for society, entails that land cannot be used for commercial purposes in that access to land by peasants has to be understood as a guarantee for survival and the valorisation of their culture, the autonomy of their communities and a new vision on the preservation of natural resources for humanity.

negotiation on agriculture. d) Promoting the creation of genuinely democratic international mechanisms to regulate food trade while respecting food sovereignty of each country and supporting the international peoples tribunal. e) formulating proposals in relation to important issues such as: agrarian reform, food sovereignty, production, trade, research, genetic resources, biodiversity, environment and gender.

2.3 Reclaim Our UN

The international campaign *Reclaim Our UN* was launched in 2004 by a group of organisations coordinated by the Italian Peace Roundtable. This was the result of the combination of two political processes developing over several years: the Assemblies of the United Nations of the Peoples and the World Social Forum. In order to understand such a campaign, we need to look at both of these processes.

The Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples is a project carried out by the Tavola della Pace (Peace Roundable), a coordinating body of 500 associations and groups and of 350 local authorities active on peace issues. The First Assembly was held in 1995, on the 50th anniversary of the foundation of the UN and was inspired by the Peace Agenda published by the Secretary General Boutros Ghali in 1992. In that Agenda the issues of peace, civil society, and democracy were explicitly linked. Following from Ghali's recognition of the role of civil society, 120 representatives of world's people and civil societies (rather than government nominees) gathered to demand the reform and democratization of the UN. The following year the Peace Roundtable was established in Italy and five more Assemblies have been convened so far every two years (1997, 1999, 2001, 2003, and 2005) in which an intense interaction of civil society organisations from all over the world occurred regarding the themes of peace, economic justice, and international democracy. To this process of the United Nations of the Peoples connects the later initiative of the international campaign *Reclaim Our UN* which was developed within the network as part of the International Council of the World Social Forum.

During the preparation of the World Social Forum 2005, the "Contents" and "Strategy" Commissions of the WSF International Council recognised the need to prepare the next World Social Forum edition through thematic seminars. In April 2004, during a

meeting of the International Council, a number of organisations of the WSF International Council started an open, participatory process of discussion to be presented to the 2005 WSF, focusing on the theme of the future of the United Nations and other international institutions. Among these organisations were Peace Roundtable (coordinator), Ibase, InterPressService, Euralat, Cives, Attac Brasil, Conseu, Cadtm, and Ubuntu. This process begun with the UBUNTU conference in Barcelona (23-24 September 2004) and developed through different initiatives including the "Reclaim Our UN" Seminar in Padua (19-20 November 2004); the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre (January 2005); the "Save the United Nations" 6th Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples held in Perugia (8-10 September 2005), and the final demonstration in the form of a Global Day of Mobilisation against poverty, war and unilateralism, for a new just, peaceful and democratic world (10 September 2005), which was implemented in the Italian case with the Perugia-to-Assisi March for Justice and Peace the following day (11 September 2005). Underpinning the decision to develop the *Reclaim Our UN* campaign are thus several reasons:

- The political heritage of the Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples
- The decision of the IC of the WSF to focus on specific themes, and more in particular to concentrate on international democracy
- The increasing unilateralism and injustice of the current international scenario
- The increasing interest of transnational civil society to the theme of the democratization of the international sphere
- The necessity to link political analysis of the international democratic deficit to a strategy and plan of action shared by different civil society actors

In the documents analysed, few remarks are dedicated to the issue of *internal democratic decision making processes*. Values that are stressed include participation, diversity, consensus, whereas key agents in all political processes are civil society organisations and peoples (as opposed to states).

More specifically, on the drafting of documents, the document in Padua was drafted by the reporters of the thematic group and read and approved in the final assembly. The final document in the WSF was discussed and approved by 140 organisations attending the *Reclaim Our UN* seminar. Finally, the documents drafted in Perugia were also discussed

and approved during the Assembly. The drafting team was composed by very few members.

As for their *visions on external democracy*, it is first of all interesting to remark that the campaign started with the motto *Reclaim Our UN*, but ended with the final meeting title of *Save the UN*. This is to signify that according to the promoters, despite the effort of the campaign, the general trend in the process of democratization of the UN is rather negative. The critical side of the campaign is focused on the following 'evils':

- Unilateralism
- Neo-liberalism, including deregulation and privatization
- economic power and unrestrained transnational corporations
- exclusion of peoples from international decision making
- preventive war
- UN marginalization from international affairs
- Poverty as a result of the current system

To this dramatic situation, the campaign opposes the promotion of a number of issues, that are grouped in three principal categories (peace, economic justice, and international democracy). The campaign specifically focuses on the third, but the other two remain central in order to understand the political and programmatic background of the entire process.

Peace. Among peace-related objectives are the following: banning war; peaceful prevention of war (vs. extensive interpretation of art. 51 UN Charter); protection of civilians; strengthening peace building and ensuring peace keeping; disarmament and a ban of nuclear arms and arms of mass destruction; elimination of military spending in national budgets; abolition of the death penalty; increasing the role of civil society in peace building; solidarity actions; denouncing violations of human rights. In particular the role of civil society is stressed for 1) preventive diplomacy, because NGOs are familiar with the situation on the ground and are well placed to alert governments to nascent crises and emerging conflicts; 2) peacemaking, where NGOs can give humanitarian and social aid under perilous and difficult conditions; 3) post-conflict peace-building, where NGOs can

help fragile governments and destitute populations to find the confidence and the resources to make peace last.

Economic justice: is intended as fighting poverty (interpreted as the most serious violation of human rights), unemployment and social exclusion. It is stressed that peace and security depend on economic justice and the revision of personal life styles. Among more specific objectives related with economic justice are the following: cancellation of debt; recognition of right to development (not intended as economic growth); achievement of MDGs, as a minimum (including 0.7%); adoption of a World Social Charter (based on different UN Conventions); institution of a World Fund for Human Food Security; formulation of a Code of Conduct for MNC; creation of a World Anti-Monopoly Authority; promotion of fair trade and ethical finance; respect for labour standards; solidarity and critical consumption; local production and food self-sufficiency; respect environment/ sustainable development; and finally the transformation of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) into the Council for Economic, Social and Environmental Security, whose functions shall be: to guide the world economy according to the principles of social and economic justice; to supervise world public policies in the management of global common goods and to implement the Action Plans deliberated in World Conferences; to coordinate the specialized Agencies and to institutionalize cooperation with Regional Organizations on economic and social issues; to effectively coordinate the World Bank and International Monetary Fund; to manage the complex international human rights system; to manage the system of United Nations "own resources".

International and supranational democracy: Among the objectives related to international democracy the following are particularly significant: multilateralism; international cooperation (vs. power politics); new world citizenship of worlds peoples and civil societies with access to mechanisms for direct legitimisation of international institutions and popular political participation (*Grassroots Globalization*: responsible participation of every citizen); strengthening of international law; recognition that there are no human rights without international, democratic, independent institutions capable of ensuring they are respected; ensuring civil society participation; adoption of an International Convention on the legal recognition of INGOs; establishment of a civil society observatory to monitor

international institutions; broadening the membership of the Human Rights Commission, where NGOs may submit reports; strengthening the consultative functions, including the competence to issue official "opinions", of the current United Nations Advisory Committee on Local Authorities, UNACLA; formulation of new immigration law based on a dignified reception of immigrants and refugees; extend the sphere of competence of the International Court of Justice to include cases submitted by individuals; establish a force of international judiciary police; establishing a permanent Human Rights Council (now adopted by the UN); adoption of an Additional Protocol to the two International Covenants (1966) which recognizes the rights to peace, development and the environment as fundamental human rights; subordination/integration of WB, IMF, WTO to the UN and international covenants (1966); support for the principle of subsidiarity; and recognition of human rights, humanity common good, human development, and human security (economic, social and legal) as core principles. In particular, for what concerns the reform of the UN, interpreted as the common house of humanity, the following reforms are invoked in the form of the creation of : a) UN of peoples, not of states; b) Human Security and Development Council, made of SC and a new Council for economic, social and environmental security (transformation of ECOSOC); c) General Assembly: tripartite (Gov, Parliament, CS). For the future: direct election of a Parliamentary Assembly; d) enlargement of the security Council (also with regional organisations) and restriction/abolishment of the veto; e) ensuring financial resources; f) more status to CSO and local Authorities Consultation with CSO for nomination of Secretary General and transformation of ECOSOC Conference of NGOs in a permanent and subsidiary body of GA

Finally, in order to effectively promote this issues, the strategic perspective is discussed. The following actions are encouraged and envisaged: recognition that for any significant reform at the international level it is necessary participation and pressure from GCS; acceptance of institutional politics; recognition that globalization can be good for human development if properly managed (i.e. putting people first); bottom up strategy with a process of education and communication within civil society; sharing grassroots experience and overcoming single issue nature of SMO thanks to building coalitions across countries and concentrating on linking themes and campaigns; combination of local action

and direct involvement with demand to national and international institutions, avoiding specific project with limited impact and policy making without grassroots contact; agenda of reforming international institutions, not abolishing them, for global problems need global solution and global institutions; recognition that UN has contributed toward the development of transnational cooperation to NGOs; politics to be done at all level: local, national and international and with all actors: CS, local authorities, national government (Italy), regional institutions (EU), global institutions (UN); recognition that the role of global civil society is essential in filling the gap of governmental action, in raising awareness and in practising alternatives; finally promotion of global days of action.

2.4 Seattle to Brussels Network

> "EU Governments and the European Commission have been leading promoters of trade liberalisation. Faced with growing evidence of the social, economic and environmental costs of these policies, and under pressure from public opinion, the rhetoric has begun to change. However, while the rhetoric has shifted, the practice has substantially remained unchanged." (European NGO Statement to the EU informal Trade Council, 24 April 2005)

The Seattle to Brussels Network – Taking Action Against Corporate Globalisation (S2B) was formed in the aftermath of the WTO's 1999 Seattle Ministerial to challenge the corporate-driven agenda of the European Union and other European governments for continued global trade and investment liberalisation. It includes development, environment, human rights, women and farmers organisations, trade unions, social movements as well as research institutes in Europe. Actually 67 organisations from 21 European countries are part of the network. Its fields of activity, research and mobilisation are related to trade policies and referred to the role of international institutions – mainly the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the European Union (EU) – and multinational corporations. The political objectives of S2B can be summarized as follows:

- to roll back the power and authority of the fora and agreements used to implement the EU's corporate driven trade and investment agenda (WTO, EPAs, regional trade agreements, EU internal trade-related policy, etc);
- expose and challenge the undemocratic nature of EU decision making on trade issues;
- promote a sustainable, socially and democratic accountable system of trade;

While the strategic objectives of the network are:

- increasingly engage in co-ordinated campaigns with broad participation that focuses on activities where pan-European civil society activity is essential for challenging decisions taken at EC and Council level (i.e. work together on integrated activities);
- ensure that the network activities are co-ordinated with those of other global networks and reflect the concerns of Southern groups;
- develop a profile and visibility by expanding the capacity of the network to engage in diverse activities including grassroots campaigning, education and outreach, advocacy, research, monitoring, media work and mass mobilisation;
- and maintain transparent and democratic ways of working together.

As for their conception of *internal democracy*, we can start by observing that the Seattle to Brussels Network is the European branch of the global Our World Is Not For Sale Network (www.owinfs.org). All the S2B members are signatories of the Our World Is Not For Sale Network Statement. In order to become member of the network it's strongly recommended that each organisation search for an active member which can vouch for it to the network. The current activities of the network are carried out by a coordination committee, established to:

- prepare and consult the agenda of S2B meetings and ensuring broad participation of active groups in co-operation with the host group;
- ensure that the whole network is informed about the outcome of all meetings;
- moderate membership and messages of the S2B email listserver;
- ensure the maintenance of the S2B website;

- facilitate the smooth running of the network in between meetings;
- liaise with other pan-European trade networks and the Our World Is Not For Sale Network, in terms of information-sharing, including specific continental events.
- coordinate the financing for the network's activities.

The Network meets at least once a year. During the meeting working groups on specific topics (i.e. a GATS action, ESF intervention, G8 organising) are formed and the coordination committee is elected. Ideally the representatives in the coordination group should be sectorally representative, be gender balanced and be a mix of NGOs and social movements based in Brussels as well as in national countries from North, South, West and Eastern Europe. On *external democracy*, the group observes that

> "Democracy is not simply a matter of holding elections. Democracy means not being on the receiving end of a top-down, one-size-fits-all set of values, priorities, and policies that are imposed through multilateral bodies, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO). Democracy means not being subjected to non-transparent and non-accountable decision-making, such as the WTO's dispute settlement processes. Democracy means people taking control over forces directly impacting their lives." (Stop corporate globalization: another world is possible! A Statement of Unity from the Our World Is Not For Sale Network)

The political starting point of S2B regards the assumption that the current trade policies supported and carried out by the European Union – through the European Commission, which negotiates trade policies on the basis of a mandate provided by the European Council of Ministers in 1999 – are absolutely not democratic nor transparent. The pro-liberalisation policies promoted by the EU are based upon the premise that the most important goal to achieve is the opening-up of free markets for European goods, agricultural products and services, without any kind of concern about the impact on the environment, the health, the working conditions and the rights to food sovereignty and food security of the people affected by such a neo-liberal approach. Moreover, the EU trade policy is highly dependent on the pressure and the lobbying practices exerted by powerful corporate lobby groups, i.e. the European Round Table of Industrialists (ERT) and the

Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE). Just to make an example, only in Brussels there are more than 10.000 professional lobbysts from the major European corporations that try to influence the setting of the agenda and the decision-making process of the European Commission on trade issues. Particular attention is paid to the trade policy decision making in the EU. Here, it is stigmatized that:

> "EU trade policy-making, including the internal processes of the 133 Committee, is opaque, nontransparent and deeply undemocratic. Sustainable development should become the central objective of all sectors and policies. As a first powerful step, towards ensuring EU trade policy making reflects this aim, would require the enhancement of the transparency and the accountability of the process […]. Greater parliamentary involvement is crucial, but cannot be limited to ex-post-assent to a done deal after a lengthy round of trade negotiations." (European NGO Statement: 12 key demands to the EU in the run-up to the 6th WTO Ministerial Conference)

As we have seen, the Seattle to Brussels Network strongly challenges the decision making process in the EU for what concerns trade policies. This is motivated by the fact that decisions are taken in an undemocratic and not transparent way. Trade policies represents a privileged point of view to shed light on the lack of democratic procedures and rules that undermines the role of this institution. Formally, the European Union has a common trade policy ("Common Commercial Policy") that is carried out by the European Commission on behalf of the 25 EU Member States. But, as the S2B puts it:

> "The legal basis for the EU's trade policy is Article 133 of the European Community Treaty. On this basis, the Commission negotiates on behalf of the Member States, in consultation with a special advisory committee, the "Article 133 Committee". While the role of the Committee is formally consultative, the assistance it provides to the Commission forms the core of EU decision making on trade. The Commission usually follows its advice. Only the major formal decisions […] are then confirmed by the Council of Ministers. The Committee 133 meets on a weekly basis […]. The full members meet on a monthly basis. They are often senior civil servants drawn from all 25 members states […]. *These representatives are not democratically elected* but simply appointed by the Member States. Due to the status of the Article 133 Committee as an

> advisory body, no formal votes are recorded and its deliberations are not published. The European Community Treaty grants a very limited role to the European Parliament (EP) in terms of trade policy. According to the current treaty, the "assent" of the EP may be required for major treaty ratifications, when these cover more than trade. Essentially, this means that *the Parliament has no formal say in the current trade negotiations*. However, the Commission consults and informs the Parliament through the Committee on International Trade."[5]

Thus, the EU formal procedure of the decision making process on trade issues shows serious problems of legitimacy and accountability. On one side, there's a technical body – the Article 133 Committee – that *de facto* concentrates a large amount of political power. On the other side, the members of the Committee are not elected by the Member States. All this leads to the condition that the European Parliament – which should be the institutional place appointed to control and regulate the activities of the European Commission – loses control over the political outcomes related to trade issues. Moreover, all the deliberations deriving from the Article 133 Committee are not published and made publicly available. For these reasons, the Seattle to Brussels Network moves a strong critique to the way the current trade policies are treated, discussed and implemented in the EU context and advances a clear proposal:

> "The EU must promote enhanced transparency and democratic participation and accountability in EU trade policy making. Consultations with national and regional parliaments and civil society groups should proceed on the premise that trade policy is a means of enhancing other policy goals. In view of the critical role of trade policy for sustainable development, other working groups on the environment and development should be formally consulted in the course of trade negotiations, and proceedings of the Committee 133 be made fully transparent."[6]

The critique of undemocratic practices is particularly strong as far as the *WTO* is concerned.

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[5] *The EU Corporate Trade Agenda. The role and the interests of corporations and their lobby groups in Trade Policy-Making in the European Union*, p. 12. [Italics added]

[6] *The EU Corporate Trade Agenda,* pp.30-31.

> "What is actually needed is a much stronger and far more progressive system of governance based on multilaterally agreed principles and goals that works to protect and promote people and their environment. Choices about trade — local and regional trade, as well as international trade — should be embedded within that system, not separate and in conflict with it. They also need to be based on the principle of economic subsidiarity, with decisions being made at the most local level possible — people should be able to choose whether they wish to use resources locally or engage in international trade. Current export-led development policies must be recognised for what they are — tools that strip that right of choice away from communities — and abandoned." (From Cancun to Hong Kong: challenging corporate trade led globalisation)

Agriculture, industrial products and raw materials, services and intellectual property rights – respectively negotiated in the AoA (Agreement on Agriculture), NAMA (Non-Agricultural Market Access), GATS (General Agreement in Trade and Services) and TRIPs (Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property rights) negotiations – are currently being dealt with in the WTO. It's easy to understand why the World Trade Organisation is the major international economic institution in which the "corporate led trade liberalisation" promoted by the EU take place. Behind all these rounds of negotiations, the "theoretical frame" towards which the WTO is oriented can be exposed as follows:

> "The fact of the matter is that the current trade system distorts systems of governance to favour trade over and above all other societal concerns, on the basis that increasing corporate profits will eventually benefit all and generate the income needed for environmental protection and social development."[7]

But:

> "[…] there is a growing body of evidence to show that this just isn't happening. Companies may be benefiting from trade, but this tends to be at the expense of people

[7] Ronnie Hall, *Another world is possible!* in The Seattle to Brussels Network, *From Cancun to Hong Kong: challenging corporate trade led globalisation*, p. 5.

> and their environment. In particular, inequality, both between and within countries is increasing, not decreasing. And legislation designed to promote health and protect the environment is being challenged and undermined in trade negotiations and around the world. The simple fact of the matter is that the trade system as it is currently constituted is a threat to progressive multilateral governance. Perpetual trade liberalisation at any price is part of the problem not the solution — and alternatives not only exist, they are an absolute must."[8]

Then, the Seattle to Brussels Network is actively involved in promoting a different approach to trade issues. In this view, trade must be a mean to achieve an environmentally sustainable world-society. This primarily implies an assessment of the impact that each trade agreement produces on the lives of the people and the environment that it affects. Furthermore, the transnational corporations must be held accountable "through legally binding rules of liability and accountability". So far, we can summarize some major claims upheld by the Seattle to Brussels Network:

- protect and fulfil social, economic, cultural and human rights;
- protect livelihoods and the environment;
- provide access to essential services and affordable medicines;
- create a just international property rights regime;
- ensure people's food sovereignty and necessary policy space for peoples to define their own sustainable development policies;
- address the imbalances of the WTO agreements;
- stop imposing trade conditions directly or through World Bank and IMF.

The civil society is called for participation in democratic development. As a network, the inner structure of the Seattle to Brussels Network allows to develop, throughout Europe, a repertoire of action that includes advocacy, lobbying, campaigning and protest's forms of mobilisation. Moreover, the S2B is involved in major efforts towards spreading information on trade policies of institutions such as the EU or the WTO. Two

[8] Ronnie Hall, *Another world is possible!* in The Seattle to Brussels Network, *From Cancun to Hong Kong: challenging corporate trade led globalisation*, p. 5.

challenges that need to be tackled by the Seattle to Brussels Network can be identified: first of all the political gap between national institutions – democratic – and international institutions – not so much democratic, as we have seen. Susan George puts the problem in this way:

> "What's left to us as activists? We must act upon those selfsame member governments. Democracy stops, for the moment, at the national level, and this means that civil society, particularly in Europe, has got to be organised internationally. Our campaigns must pick common national targets and employ common strategies."[9]

Secondly, there's an obvious difficulty in coordinating the struggles over different sectors affected by trade policies, struggles that usually involve different civil society actors in Europe:

> "The challenge for civil society groups at the European levels lies in establishing a stronger coordination among those fighting against corporate globalisation in the various sectors, whether it be agriculture, services or any other area. […] The current trend to continuously shift trade policy competence from the national to the EU level, without a democratic institutional setting at this level, has already led to an enormous democratic deficit of European trade policy making. […] To change the current course of EU trade policy, we face the challenge to create commonly an EU-wide network, which includes civil society groups from all EU member countries. Given the different history and development of eastern and western European countries, we also face the challenge to mutually understand the current processes at the local level, our differences and special needs to successfully work together."[10]

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[9] Susan George, *The road ahead – Challenges for civil society after Cancun*, in The Seattle to Brussels Network*, From Cancun to Hong Kong: challenging corporate trade led globalisation*, p. 43.

[10] Leonhard Plank, *The EU-25: Europe's trade policy making and challenges for civil society in old and new member states*, in The Seattle to Brussels Network*, From Cancun to Hong Kong: challenging corporate trade led globalisation*, p. 33.

Conclusion

This report has shown a number of interesting findings on transnational organizations of the GJM. They can be summarized as follow:

- Membership: mainly collective
- Type of organizations: mainly networks and ad hoc umbrella organizations (mainly campaigns) as most apt organizations for a flexible and fast changing international scenario.
- Date of foundation: most of the organizations are of recent foundation mostly due to a combination of factors including short organizational life and a trend of going global from the nineties
- Internal democratic model: almost all cases fall in the category of associational or (in smaller part) deliberative representative. More specifically, single organizations and networks adopt more frequently an associational model, whereas ad hoc organizations have a more diversified internal decision making model. Plus, a correlation between decision-making model and size and date of foundation: the bigger and older the organizations are the more associational they are likely to be.
- Internal principles: decentralization and autonomy rather than participatory democracy and inclusiveness
- Relationship with institutions: while with national institutions the primary attitude is critical collaboration, with international governmental institutions the predominant attitude is un-collaborative control. This shows a higher trust for national institutions and conversely a most cautious, when not fully antagonist, approach toward international institutions. Also, national governments are sometimes used to strengthen the strategy of influencing international institutions.
- Functions: mostly spreading information, influencing mass media and raising awareness, but also significantly advocacy and lobbying. At the transnational level general objectives are less relevant than in the domestic cases for most of transitional organisations are concretely and specifically policy-oriented.

- Themes and values: social justice, fighting poverty and social exclusion, but also human rights, sustainability, women's rights and democracy. Scarce presence of ideologically charged or polarised cases.

The qualitative part has shown that transnational organisations of the GJM are much more attentive to the external dimension of democracy rather than to the internal one. Scarce attention to the internal decision making processes is balanced by a sophisticated awareness of the democratic deficit at the international level. Solution to this problem are proposed which vary from social movements collaboration from below to the reform or indeed abolishment of major (mainly economic) international institutions.

Appendix

Documents consulted online for qualitative analysis

World Social Forum

Documents consulted at www.forumsocialmundial.org.br :

- Charter of Principles
- Note from the Organizing Committee on the principles that guides the WSF
- FAQ
- World Social Forum in numbers
- What the WSF is
- World Social Forum: origins and aims (by *Francisco Whitaker*)
- International Council documents:
  - Composition, functioning, nature and responsibilities - June 2001
  - List of organisations - IC
  - Resolutions from International Council meeting held in Utrecht, Netherlands, from March 31 to April 2, 2005
  - The WSF International Council meeting was held in Porto Alegre, between January 24 and 25, 2005
  - The WSF International Council meeting was held in Perugia, Italy, between April 4 and 7, 2004
  - The WSF International Council meeting was held in Mumbai, India, January 15, 22 and 23, 2004
  - Meeting of the IC in Miami, USA - June 23 to 26, 2003 - Rules for the operation of the International Council
  - Resolution of the International Council - Porto Alegre, Brazil - January 21 and 22, 2003

- Resolution of the International Council - Florence, Italy - November 11 to 13, 2002
- Resolution of the International Council, Bangkok, Thailand, August 13 to 15, 2002
- Resolution of the International Council - Barcelona, Spain, April 28 to 30, 2002.
- Resolution of the International Council - Porto Alegre, Brazil, January 28 and 29, 2002
- Resolution of the International Council - Dakar, Senegal, October 30 to November 1st, 2001.

Via Campesina

Documents consulted at http://viacampesina.org/en/index.php

- Annual Report on Human Right Violation (2005)
- Woman Peasant Say No to WTO And Neoliberalism (2005)
- Quisqueya Declaration (2005)
- Call of the social movements and mass organisations (2004)
- Declaration to support land reform and farmers movement in Venezuela (2003)
- What is food sovereignty? (2003)
- Toward farmers' rights (2002)
- Proposals for family farm based, sustainable agriculture (2002)
- Gender (2002)
- Land reform (2000)
- Bangalore declaration (2000)
- Biodiversity and genetic resources (2000)
- Agricultural research (2000)
- Seattle declaration: Take WTO out of agriculture (1999)
- Women farmers in Seattle say no to WTO (1999)
- Isarn declaration (1999)

Reclaim Our UN

Documents consulted at http://www.reclaimourun.org/reclaimourun.html

- Draft Resolution on UN Reform. 6Th Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples. *Save the United Nations!* Perugia, 8 – 10 September 2005
- Perugia-to-Assisi March for Justice and Peace APPEAL *Let's ban want and war. Let's reclaim the UN. I want it. You want it. Together we can*. 11 September 2005
- Appeal discussed and approved by 140 organisations attending the "Reclaim Our UN" seminar *We the people…for a new just, peaceful and democratic world order* (January 28 2005, Porto Alegre, V WSF)
- Towards the WSF 2005. Working Document of the International Seminar "Reclaim Our UN" *Reclaim Our UN*. Padua, 19-20 November 2004

Other documents consulted:

- *Another World is Possible. The Experience and Proposals of the Assemblies of the UN of the Peoples*. Tavola della Pace: Perugia (2000). Printed booklet that includes, among other:
  - Resolution of the I Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples (1995)
  - Resolution of the II Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples (1997)
  - Resolution of the III Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples (1999)
- Resolution of the IV Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples (2001)
- Resolution of the V Assembly of the United Nations of the Peoples (2003)

Seattle to Brussels Network

Documents consulted at http://www.s2bnetwork.org:

Statements

- Seattle To Brussels Statement in the run up to Hong Kong - The EU's Trade Agenda: Serving Corporates Interests at the Expense of Development, the Environment and Human Rights

- 12 key demands to the EU in the run-up to the WTO's 6th Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong
- NGO statement to the EU Trade Council, Luxembourg 24th April 2005
- Appeal to EU Member States and the European Commission from more than 100 European Civil Society Groups. After Cancun: Drop the demand to start WTO negotiations on the Singapore Issues once and for all from the EU trade agenda!
- Statement of European Civil Society Against An Investment Agreement in the WTO
- Our world is not for sale International Sign-on Statement

Open Letters

- Open letter to Commissioner Lamy - Call for transparency and assessment of services negotiations in the WTO by more than 90 civil society groups
- Second open letter by European civil society groups to EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy on the General Agreement on Trade in Services negotiations
- Open letter to Pascal Lamy concerning the Transatlantic Business Dialogue
- Open letter to Pascal Lamy concerning the civil society dialogues

Publications

- S2B Briefing Paper: The EU's Corporate Trade Agenda, The role and the interests of corporations and their lobby groups in Trade Policy-Making in the European Union
- From Cancun to Hong Kong: Challenging corporate led trade negotiations
- Investment and competition negotiations in the WTO - What is wrong with it and what are the alternatives?
- GATS and democracy brochure.

Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy: The French GJMOs

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1. General Characteristics of the Organizations in the French Sample

In the WP2, we had shown that in France, the Internet still remains an instrument which is very unevenly used by the GJMO. The mailing lists and the personal websites of the activists show a great vitality. This happened to be very true during the debate about the European Constitution. On the other hand, the websites are generally very little interactive and provide very limited internal information (WP2). Their use depends on the organizations, on their nature, their activist tradition, their degree of professionalization and the cycle of mobilizations. The documents that can be found on the Internet are very heterogeneous according to the organizations. Some sites provide quite a lot of information. However, the majority of them provide a limited vision of the organizational ideology of the organization. Internet does not always play an essential role for the public image. In the case of the French sample, 71.9% of the organizations do not give any information about a program formally adopted, and 31.3% do not provide any document of fundamental values. In 21.9% of the cases, the website does not make any reference to the constitution, and in one third of the cases (exact rate in WP2) the constitutions are not on line. As in the Spanish case, there is a scarcity of investment of resources and organizational efforts in offering a comprehensive organizational ideology through the web sites. It has not been possible to compensate this problem in a satisfying way by contacting directly door-to-door the organizations. This is a real specific problem for the constitutions. However, in a more general way, answers were coded for the whole sample, whereas the documents were very brief, and even, in some cases, inexistent in the websites. The interpretation of the French results must be very cautious. The qualitative analysis of the internal functioning will be absolutely essential in order to have a view of the functioning of the organization.

Table 1. Negative answer to the mention of the following principles or bodies

	Complete French sample	Organizations for which the constitutions or information was provided
Limitation of delegation	87.5	50.0
Consensual method	87.5	50.0
Critique of delegation	81.2	43.8
Rotation principle	90.6	53.1
Participatory democracy	90.6	53.1
Deliberative democracy	84.3	46.9
Non-hierarchical decision-making	90.6	53.1
Inclusiveness	93.7	56.2
Autonomy of collective members or local chapters	87.5	50.0
Mandated delegation (imperative mandate)	62.5	28.1
Presence of: president	31.3 (+ 9,4 rejected)	12.5 (+ 9,4 rejected)
Presence of: spokesperson	78.1 (+3,1 rejected)	50 (+3,1 rejected)
Presence of: executive committee	28.1 (+6,3 rejected)	6.2 (+6,3 rejected)
Presence of: assembly	18.8	3.1
Presence of: committee of founding members	93.8	53.1
Presence of: scientific committees	93.8	59.4
Presence of: arbitration board	87.5	50.0
Presence of: board of auditors	96.9	62.5
Presence of: committee of guarantors	90.6	53.1
Decision making: president	28.1	6.2
Decision making: executive committee	18.7	6.2
Decision making: assembly	50.0	34.3
Decision making: founding members	9.3	9.3
Decision making: thematic groups	25.0	15.6
Decision making: other body	50.0	37.5
Assembly as the main decision making body	53.1	37.5

The very important gap between these results shows the extent of the bias implied by the choice of Internet as a main source of collection of documents. This gap regards the negative answers, but this brings a problem because in many cases this implies an imprecise vision on the presence of bodies or principles. Furthermore, in some cases, we had to completely exclude some organizations because we have not been able to have an access to the most elementary information about their internal functioning. Thus, for instance, the media - *Le Monde diplomatique*, *Politis*, Samizdat – have been completely excluded from the WP3.

After these methodological warnings, we will look again briefly at some general characteristics of the sample. In the French sample, all the organizations that have been selected have a national level. This choice reflects the structuring of the French contention space, marked by a certain centralisation of political life[1].

Table 2. Territorial levels (%)

Level	Frequencies of yes (%) French sample	Frequencies of yes (%) all
Local	68.8	74.2
Regional	62.5	55.7
National	100.0	83.6
International	34.4	37.7

68.8 % of the organizations have a local level (74.2% for the European sample), 62.5% a regional one (62.5% for the European sample), 100% a national one (83.6% for the European sample) and 34.4% a international one (37.7% for the European sample).

Table 3. Type of organization (%)

Type of organization	Frequencies of yes (%) French sample (n=32)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244)
Single organization	56.3	53.7
Network or federation	37.5	30.7
Ad-hoc umbrella organization	6.3	15.6
Total	100,0	100.0

The French organizations of the sample are essentially single organizations (56.3%). There is also a relative proportion of networks – generally coming from former episodes of mobilization – and federations – mostly unions. But on the contrary, the *ad hoc umbrella organizations* are less represented in the French sample than in the whole European sample: if we exclude the transnational level (Urbino Team), these organizations represent 14% of

[1] However, the existence of a bias bound with the location of the French team in Paris also has to be taken into consideration, and be related with the fact that the proportion of national organizations is higher than in the other national samples of Demos.

the European sample versus only 6.3 % in the case of the French sample (15.6% for the complete sample). The weakness of the proportion of *ad hoc umbrella organizations* is related to the relatively weak tradition of campaigning in France: the creation of an ad hoc umbrella organization, around a specific issue, is quite exceptional. Whereas this method of action seems to be internationalized, and even related to transnational forms of action, the French protest is very weakly structured on this model. This low proportion can be related to the weak internationalization of the organizations of the French sample (34.4% have an international level of organization, compared to 37,7% for the whole sample). The organizations having a transnational level are mostly traditional federations.

Table 4. International level

	Frequencies of yes (%) French sample (n=32)	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244)**
Hierarchical "single" organization	12.5	6.6
"Traditional" federation (Etuc Model)	15.6	11.5
"Modern/loose" network	6.3	11.5
Campaign	0.0	8.2
Not applicable	65.6	62.3
Total	100	100

The date of foundation can be considered in relation with the world or the national chronology. 15.6% of the French organizations were born before 1968, 25% between 1969 and 1989, 37.5% between 1990 and 1999 and 15.6% after 2000 (see table 1 in annex). If one establishes a chronological framework in relation with national episodes, the organizations of the sample have been created in their majority after 1981, the year in which the left came into power (65.6%, see table 1)[2], and half were created after 1995, year of the movement against the social security reform plan which marks the “renewal” of protest in France. 21.8% of the organizations of our sample were born after 1998, year of the foundation of ATTAC, and correspond with the generation of the GJM properly speaking.

[2] Among the five associations created before 1968, two were created before 1900.

Table 5. Year of Foundation (connecting with the French contention episodes)

Year of foundation	% of organizations	N
Before 1968	15.6	5
Between 1968 and 1981	15.6	5
Between 1982 and 1995	28.1	9
Between 1996 and today	37.5	12 of which 7
… after 1998	21.8	

The organizations of the sample have very heterogeneous characteristics as far as internal structuring and number of activists is concerned. We find in our sample very small organizations with less than 50 activists as well as very large ones having up to 700 000 activists[3] (see table 2 in annex). In 53.4% of the cases, the organizations analyzed have less than 10 000 activists. The networks or the federations can have between 20 and 1000 collective members. Considering the size of the sample, it will however be difficult to assess the impact of the size of the organization on the choices in terms of internal functioning.

2. Internal Democracy

2.1 General characteristics of internal organization

We will briefly describe the characteristics of the organizations in terms of internal organization[4].

[3] It is often difficult to get this information: it is missing in 53.1% of the cases.

[4] We can already mention that we consider the results are deeply altered by the lack of information, and it will be difficult for us to interpret them. We will have a purely descriptive approach in this paragraph.

Table 6. Organizational structure

	Frequencies of yes (%) French sample	Frequencies of yes (%) all teams
Presence of a president indicated	59.4	48.8
Presence of a spokesperson indicated	18.8	13.3
Presence of an executive committee indicated	65.6	61.9
Assembly	81.3	75.4

9.4% of the organizations explicitly reject the presence of a president (this is for instance the case of AC !), 6.3% the presence of an executive committee and 3.1% of a spokesperson.

Table 7. Assembly decision making method

	%
Not mentioned	50.0
Majority rules	25.0
Consensus	6.2
Not applicable	18.8

In 50% of the cases the decision making method of the assembly is not mentioned. In 25% of the cases the majority rule is used and in 6.3% of the cases the consensus method. This is for instance the case in AC ! Consensus is defined within AC ! in the following terms :

> «Consensus: Majority which emanates without vote or with a widely majority indicator vote. Those who are « against » let the militant experiences take place, and they are afterwards criticized collectively. This does not prevent the minorities to develop their own militant experiences, criticized in the same conditions (History shows that

minorities are not always wrong...). If a large majority does not keep emerging (a minimum of 75%), the debate continues.»[5]

In 71.9 % of the French cases no formally adopted program is mentioned in the documents analysed. 59.4% of the associations mention the presence of a president and 65.6% the presence of an executive committee. This does not mean that 40.6% do not have a president and 34.4% do not have an executive committee. The great majority of organizations of our sample are formal organizations (WP2[6]), 1901 associations, and must therefore in accordance with the law, have a president, an executive committee and a general assembly. The low rate for a president being mentioned in the documents analyzed is explained by the difficulties of obtaining the constitutions (on the Web sites or directly from the organizations). The assemblies are more frequently pointed out (81.3%), and in a larger number of documents. But there are the same difficulties of lacking information on the functioning of assemblies.

The figure of the spokesperson is clearly less present than that of the president: 18.8%. However it seems to be relatively widespread in France (in relation to the whole European sample: 13.1%). The organizations with a spokesperson are mostly organizations of the "without" ("sans") movement (Droit au logement, AC !7, etc.), which were created at the end of the 80s or during the 90s. The presence of a spokesperson shows their will for a rupture with the traditional forms of internal organization of power. One also finds a spokesperson at the Confédération Paysanne, an organization created as an alternative to traditional farmers' unionism. In the majority of cases, there is a spokesperson when it is decided to do without a president (even if the idea is not explicitly rejected). In the French case, only the Greens combine the figure of the spokesperson and of the president. The Greens emerged from social movements, and are strongly influenced by them as far as their internal functioning is concerned, and they have thus combined organizational principles stemmed from several activist traditions.

[5] http://www.ac.eu.org/IMG/html/charte_2002.html

[6] WP2 variable : nfrmgr.

[7] Demazière, Didier and Maria-Teresa Pignoni. 1998. *Chômeurs : du silence à la révolte*, Paris : Hachette ; Mouchard, Daniel. 2002. « Les mobilisations des "sans" dans la France contemporaine : l'émergence d'un "radicalisme autolimité" », in *Revue française de science politique,* vol.52:n°4, p.425-447.

The scientific committees, the boards of auditors or the committees of guarantors remain marginal figures within the organizational setup.

Table 8. Decision-making bodies mentioned

	Yes	No	Not applicable
President mentioned as deciding on future activites	34.4	25.0	40.6
Executive committee mentioned as deciding on future activities	43.8	21.9	34.4
Assembly mentioned as defining the prgramme	50.0	31.3	18.8
Assembly mentioned as main decision-making body	28.1	53.1	18.8

In France (43.8%), as well as in the whole set of European countries (50.4%), the executive committee remains an important decision-making body. In France (50.0%), the assembly as a body defining the programme of the organization is mentioned more frequently than in the complete sample (45.1%). However, in only 28.1% of our French case the assembmaking body, compared to 41.8% for the complete sample. On the contrary, the mentioning of the actual role of the assemblies their composition, their decision making system or their everyday functioning (frequency of the assemblies) are very close to the rest of the European sample.

As far as the executive committee is concerned, since the information is not mentioned in the documents analyzed for a part of the organization, it is difficult, in the French case, to work on the information coming from the data base. We can only say that the delegates are almost always full time permanents and that decisions are made under a majority rule, most often simple majority.

Consensus decision-making remains a very rare method of decision making, as well as the deliberative functioning properly speaking. Imperative mandates are almost non-existent. The prohibition of the accumulation of functions is rare.

2.2 Types of internal decision making

Table 9. Types of internal decision making

Type of internal decision making	Frequencies of yes (%) French sample	Frequencies of yes (%) all
Associational	56.3	51.6
Deliberative representative	15.6	13.5
Assembleary	18.8	13.1
Deliberative participative	6.3	9.4
Not applicable	3.1	12.3

According to the typology of internal decision making, 56.3% of the organizations of the French sample are of the "associational" type (51.6% for the complete sample), 15.6% follow the "deliberative representative" model (13.5% for the complete sample), 18.8% the "assembleary" model (13.1% for the complete sample), and 6.3% the "deliberative participative" one (9.4% for the European sample)[8].

ATTAC and the Catholic Committee Against Hunger (CCFD) function on the « deliberative representative » model. The case of ATTAC will be developed further.

The CCFD is composed of a « general assembly », composed itself of 29 organizations and sector-based delegations of the Catholic Church (one per member association). There is then very classically (and statutory in the French case) a board of directors (8 members) with an executive committee (composed of the president, the treasurer and the general secretary of the association). The CCFD has a quite atypical decision making body, the National Deliberative Council (CND), composed of representatives of the 29 movements and sector-based delegations of the Catholic Church[9], together with 12 presidents elected on a regional scale and representing the network, with the participation of representatives of the permanent staff.

[8] The results of this typology must be used with great caution in the french case (cf. the lack of information in the documents analyzed).

[9] These are mostly sectorial catholic organizations like « Action Catholique Ouvrière » (ACO) (Workers Catholic Action), « Chrétiens dans le Monde Rural » (CMR) (Christians in the Rural World), « Jeunesse Ouvrière Chrétienne/Féminine » (JOC/JOCF) (Workers/ Female Christian Youth), etc.

On the other hand, there are also three commissions called "national dioceses" where are representatives of the diocesan committees and of the organizations members of the collegial structure. They elaborate proposals for the actions of the CCFD in three fields: projects, animations and communication, finances. Their propositions are submitted to the approval of the general assembly and of the national deliberative council.

19% of the organizations are classified as belonging to the "assembleary" model[10]. This is the case of Alternative Libertaire, Act-up and the Coordination of the temporary workers in the cultural and show business sector. If we look at the example of Alternative libertaire (AL), the organization sees itself as a counter-power to the "capitalist society". Its internal functioning is based on self-organization: "The organization lives, and this until the membership decides differently, in a federalist self-managing state of mind."[11]. AL refuses to function on a model of stiff constitutions but has opted for a "manifesto". "Neither a historical program, nor an immutable declaration of principles, this manifesto is as a matter of fact only a moment of a theoretical, practical and organizational process which contains itself a potential dynamic of surpassing"[12].

All decisions are taken, according to the manifesto, by the vote of "the base of the organization", which itself is considered as a « field of experimentation of self-managed and federalist democracy[13]. In that respect, AL appears as the counter model of a political party, favoring "horizontal and decentralized debates". Plurality is also a value clearly expressed in its manifesto: "If it is natural to chose democratically a majority orientation, it nevertheless guarantees scrupulously rights of minorities and of base groups to express themselves, in the internal debate of course, but also in the press of the organization, according to modalities established by the manifesto"[14].

[10] Sel'idaire, Co-errances, Espace Marx appear in this category, but this does not correspond to the reality of their functioning.

[11] http://alternativelibertaire.org

[12] http://alternativelibertaire.org

[13] http://alternativelibertaire.org

[14] http://alternativelibertaire.org

Only two groups are classified as belonging to the deliberative participative model: the local social forums (Paris 13) and Pajol, a network of illegal immigrants ("Sans papiers"[15]).

Local social forums refer to the Sao Paulo Charter and present themselves as a tool for "bringing together, debating, proposing and acting". Little documentation is available on the forums websites, which would allow to understand the principles of their internal functioning. But ATTAC has proposed a direction for use of the organization of FSL (Local social forums)[16]. This document is a guide of "good" functioning of a Local social forum[17]. According to ATTAC, three directions are recommended in order to create a local social forum:

- Set a list of organizations able to take the initiative of the forum.
- Form piloting structures.
- Define functioning rules for the piloting structures.

What is the precise functioning recommended? It is for instance proposed to define rules of democratic functioning for the piloting structures. Thus, ATTAC notes that "it is necessary to get to keep a delicate balance between the "spontaneity" of these initiatives and the respect of a minimum of democratic rules. Two risks must be avoided: the risk of too much formalism which could disconnect the FSL from forces with little experience, little or not organized, and which would hardly fit in a too rigid framework, and the risk of a lack of formalism which, on the contrary, would put off the FSL from forces traditionally well organized and looking for efficiency"[18]. ATTAC insists however on the fact that each social forum will have to find its own model of functioning. Nevertheless, its legitimacy to give advices of functioning has been strongly criticized by the FSL, especially during the preparation of the second ESF in 2003.

Some local forums organize workshops on the goal and the functioning of the FSL. General principles are thus enounced, like "to be respectful of the plurality of organizations

[15] Siméant, Johanna. 1998. *La cause des sans-papiers,* Paris : Presses de Sciences Po.

[16] Déclaration du Conseil d'administration d'Attac du 31 mars 2003 (" Appel à la généralisation des Forums sociaux locaux")

[17] http://www.france.attac.org/a1924

[18] http://www.france.attac.org/a1924

(and of the diversity of their structures – multiple activist models-), to be a place of integration of individuals without any political affiliation, according to the principle of respect of their diversity, not to be a "super-organization" (vertical), with its representatives (notion which is contrary to the Porto Alegre Charter). Nevertheless, practically, some committees – like the one of Ivry in the Parisian suburb for instance, chose to constitute into an association (1901 Law), which, de facto implies a model close to the "associational" type.

Table 10. Internal democracy and action repertories

	Protest/ mobilisation (n=21)	Lobbying	Political representation	Representation of specific interest	Self-awareness	Advocacy
Associational (n=18)	61.1	22.2	5.6	33.3	22.2	33.3
Deliberative representative (n=5)	100.0	20.0	0.0	20.0	20.0	20.0
Assembleary (n=6)	50.0	33.3	0.0	16.7	33.3	16.7
Deliberative participative (n=2)	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0

	Offer of services	Spreading information, influencing mass media	Political education	Legal protection
Associational (n=18)	16.7	27.8	50.0	27.8
Deliberative representative (n=5)	20.0	40.0	40.0	0.0
Assembleary (n=6)	0.0	33.3	33.3	16.7
Deliberative participative (n=2)	0.0	0.0	50.0	50.0

The organizations belonging to associational model have recourse, more than the others, to various means of action: protest/mobilization, political education of citizens but also lobbying, representation of specific interest, self-awareness, advocacy, legal protection. As far as the other models are concerned, protest and education of citizens are the main means of action.

The issue of internal democracy is a crucial point in the life of the organizations of the GJM, which advocates a democratization of the life of organizations which sometimes creates tensions and contradictions within the organizations. ATTAC is a good example.

2.3 Internal democracy: the ATTAC case

The recurrent tensions and debates concerning the mode of operation of ATTAC, and more precisely the nature of democracy within the organization, are related to the very nature of ATTAC. Born as a grouping of individuals (natural persons), organizations, unions and newspapers (legal entities), and conceived as a lobby, it grew rapidly from 5,000 members at its creation in 1998 to 30,000 the following year. But its constitution, thought for a small group – copied from those of the association "Amis du Monde Diplomatique" – has not been modified since its founding and very rapidly was viewed as a denial of democracy. The direction and orientation of the association remain in the hands of the founding members.

The founders did not foresee the spectacular growth of the organization and the development of its local committees. The strategy of the founders was to create an organization that would last, that would not be reduced to constant last-minute coordination, and that would protect the group from outside penetration and risks of political co-optation. The strategy adopted in order to assure stability and balance was to associate existing organizations by integrating into the leadership the plurality of founding organizations. The constitution, based on a small organization, led to a complex structure characterized by a double distinction between individuals and legal entities on the one hand and between founding members and active members. The majority of the board of directors, composed of founding members and their associates (a majority of 18 out of 30 seats), plays a preponderant role that allows them complete control of the association. The board is composed of "persons and legal entities who created the association and those whom they designate by a two-thirds majority as new members or replacements as needed" and "proposes to the board the principle direction and policies of the association" (constitution art. 11). Also, the college of founding members maintains the upper hand as far as the establishment of the agenda of the general assembly (article 10-3) and all changes of the constitution (article 10-9) are concerned. The president of the association is elected by the board and must be a founding member.

As early as September 1998 the explosion of the number of local groups without a formal legal status caught the founders by surprise, having never anticipated such a large number of members: 200 local committees. These committees, like the national association, were composed of individuals or organizations. But the national ATTAC France organization remains an association of individuals to the extent that the national Board of Directors is composed of individuals and not representatives of collectivities – in other words they represent no committee. ATTAC is still an association of members and not a federation of organizations.

The first criticisms of the national leadership were not slow in coming. The issue of changing the constitution in order to integrate the local groups became a major question for the movement, henceforth subject to a permanent tension between the "local" which had undergone an exponential development in members and organizations, and the "national" which remained at a limited and stable number of members. The unexpected rise of ATTAC brought on an organizational imbalance, quite paradoxical given that the principles of participatory democracy are proposed as a model for society as a whole, while the internal functioning of the association is suspected of being an example of the "iron law of oligarchy" that it denounces elsewhere.

Activists and local groups progressively federated and coordinated with each other in order to put pressure on the national leadership. By the end of 2000 it was recognized that there was a "problem" of "internal democracy" symbolized by the national constitution which did not recognize the existence and roles of local groups, who continually denounced the absence of democracy. Bernard Cassen progressively gave up trying to regulate local functions, implicitly expecting in return that the local level would have nothing to do with the functioning at the national level. In other words, the national Board of Directors tacitly considered ATTAC as having two independent structures.

But a part of the local actors were not satisfied with this arrangement: they easily accepted that the national level left them their local freedom, but wanted to have some input on the policies and strategic choices – to participate in the deliberations and decisions of the association at the national level. In 2000 they obtained the creation of a mixed group "CA-CL" (Board of Directors- Local Committees), given the task of studying the opportunity for changing the constitution. This group remained closely controlled by Bernard Cassen and

did not succeed in its objectives**.** The local actors also obtained the creation of a National Conference of Local Committees (CNCL), a consultative body representative of the local Committees, scheduled to meet three times a year. In spite of a strong control of the national direction on the organization of the CNCL, the militants used the CNCL as a space of expression and confrontation (among themselves, and with the national level), and, to a certain extent (considering their very uneven participation) a representative organism of the local committees. The general assembly of December 2003 adopted a partial rectification of the Board of Directors in favor of the active members (elected by the members) by increasing their number from 12 to 18. However the six new members may participate in debates, but have no vote.

Many activists remained unsatisfied with their small gains and started discussion groups on the Internet (most notably "Democratize Attac" and "Demograttac") demanding more participatory democracy within ATTAC as well as the adoption of a participatory budget along the lines of that of Porto Alegre. For reasons of a lack of structure and leadership these minority initiatives failed. They were, furthermore, confronted with the difficulty of channeling the (rather anarchic) discussion on the Internet, regularly taken over by certain internautes considered as "polluters." It should be noted that certain voices were raised to demand, very classically, that "the internal functioning of ATTAC be based on representative democracy."[19]

This explains the implication of activist criticism in the CNCL, the only place allowing the ensemble of local committees to structure themselves and acquire some visibility. Nevertheless, the national leadership has never admitted the existence of a problem of internal democracy and has limited itself to evoking problems in communication or even denouncing attempts at destabilization.

From 2004 on, the conflicts between the local committees and the national level, coupled with a crisis within the leadership itself and the College of Founding Members. Already in 2002, the designation by Bernard Cassen of his successor Jacques Nikonoff, without any collective decision, had provoked strong tensions and controversies focused around the authoritarian methods of the founder-president. The conflict came up again in April 2004, when Bernard Cassen and Jacques Nikonoff were suspected by several

[19] Local Committee of ATTAC-Loire, provisional project on ATTAC's constitution, January 2003.

founding members to have secretly arranged the constitution of "100% No Global" lists of candidates for the European election of 13 June 2004. Several leaders criticized the secrecy surrounding this operation, and criticized Bernard Cassen and Jacques Nikonoff for the fact that they neither discussed it in any meeting nor informed the Board of Directors. The union group among the College of Founding members (representing the CGT[20], the FSU, the group of the 10-Solidaires) together with three vice-presidents (Gus Massiah (CRID), François Dufour, (Confédération Paysanne) and Susan George, reacted vigorously and directly opposed Cassen and Nikonoff. They co-signed a text protesting against the initiative of the 100% No Global lists, in substance as well as in form, and refused the instrumentalization of ATTAC for the creation of any kind of new political force. The conflict calmed down a month later with a compromise signed by the unanimity of the members of the Board of Directors, admitting that the situation created by the "100% No global" lists was prejudicial for the identity of the association. A few days later, the idea of the "100% No Global" list was abandoned.

The apparent consensus during the campaign against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty through the referendum of 29 May 2005 collapsed again in June, during a meeting of the College of the Founding members to prepare the election of the Board of Directors at the General Assembly scheduled for December. Already at the end of 2004, a committee had been appointed by the Board of Directors and was in charge of renewing the constitution, unchanged since 1998. The committee failed since the different factions did not succeed in finding a new compromise on internal functioning. Since then, two factions face each other:

- On one side, the leadership and its entourage (Nikonoff, Cassen), who consider that the balance of powers does not have to be changed, and who want to rely on the membership, as was the case with the internal referendum on the European Constitution organized in autumn 2004. According to them, this principle would be realized with the election of a president by all the members. This is the line of "collective presidentialism" advocated by Bernard Cassen since the beginning, and which is strongly opposed to transform ATTAC into a federation.

[20] Beroud, Sophie, Georges Ubbiali, « La CGT, entre soutien distancié et refondation de l'activité internationale ». In *L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause,* ed. Eric Agrikoliansky, Olivier Fillieule and Nonna Mayer, 265-290. Paris: Flammarion, 2005.

- On the other side, the representatives of the associations and unions that are founding members of ATTAC (P. Khalfa, J. Bové, Gus Massiah), and whose legitimacy comes from the outside, wish to strengthen the influence of the local committees in the Board of Directors, and give the CNCL a power of co-decision. They radically refuse to change the system of election of the president without a preliminary reform of the constitution.

This conflict couples with severe criticism on the assessment of Nikonoff's presidency by some founding members of the association, who criticize what they consider his authoritarian and bureaucratic methods, asking for a plurality of candidates for the election of the president, together with a collegial and pluralist leadership team.

During the General Assembly in December 2005, 70% of the voters asked for better representation, in the leading instances, of the rank and file militants compared to the Founding members, and 59% declared themselves in favor of the principle of a "co-presidency". The outgoing leadership was put in the minority within the College of the Founding members itself. The association is currently going through a transition period, managed by a "collegial directory with equal responsibilities". A new leadership will be elected by the extraordinary assembly scheduled in May in order to adopt a new constitution.

Behind this crisis about the methods of leadership and of internal functioning of ATTAC, the question is raised about the nature, the function and the status of ATTAC within society.

The crisis relating to internal democracy led to a crisis of the activism. ATTAC lost 17% of the its members and had a negative image in the media. More generally, the case of ATTAC tends to discredit the GJM as regards internal democracy. Many militants made known their discouragement *vis-a-vis* the incapacity of the GJM to overcome the internal power struggles.

3. Visions of Democracy

Table 11. Democratic principles (French sample)

	Yes (%)	No (%)
Critique of delegation (including limitation of delegation) or non hierarchical decision making	28.1	71.9
Consensus or deliberative method	25.0	75.0
Participatory democracy	43.8	56.3
Inclusiveness	21.9	78.1
Autonomy of member organisations or local chapters	31.3	68.8

What are the principles mentioned in the corpus selected? 28.1% of the French organizations criticize or limit the principle of delegation, which is a more important proportion than for the whole European sample (23.4%). As far as the reference to certain principles is concerned, the results of the French sample are close to the whole European sample: 43.8% of the French organizations insist on the principle of participation, 25% insist on the principle of consensus and deliberation, and 31.3% on the principle of autonomy of the members or the local chapters. On the contrary, the principle of inclusiveness is less present in France. We must however remark that the reference remains most of the time rhetoric, and is rarely concretized with the creation of decision making mechanisms.

We will now look at the relationship with the representative authorities. 18.8% of the French organizations refuse any relationship with national institutions (results close to the whole sample). 50% do not mention any relationship with these institutions. As far as the international scale is concerned, the results must be assessed very cautiously. Except in very rare cases, this question is evoked only very briefly in our corpus of documents.

Only 25% of the French organizations refer to international governmental organizations. 9.4% advocate a critical collaboration. For 6.3% one can consider it as non-critical collaboration. The issue of the relation with economic actors is still less present.

3.1. Types of issues

Table 12. Basic themes and values mentioned at French GJM sample

Basic themes and values	French sample (%)	Complete sample (%)
Another globalization / a different form of globalization	78.1	50.0
Democracy	59.4	52.0
Social justice/defense of the welfare state /fighting poverty/ social inclusion	81.3	68.9
Global (distributive) justice	46.9	45.1
Ecology	31.3	47.1
Sustainability	21.9	32.8
Anti-neoliberalism	40.6	39.3
Anti-capitalism	28.1	23.0
Socialism	6.3	7.8
Communism	9.4	3.3
Anarchism (traditional anarchism and / or libertarian anarchism)	3.1	3.7
Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	6.3	9.0
Animal rights	3.1	3.7
Human rights	46.9	47.1
Worker's rights	40.6	40.2
Women's rights	37.5	42.6
Gay/lesbian rights	21.9	15.2
Immigrants' rights/anti-racism/ rights of asylum seekers	34.4	45.9
Solidarity with third world countries	62.5	46.3
Alternative knowledge	15.6	12.7
Religious principles	3.1	7.0
Critical consumerism/fair trade	31.3	29.1
Ethical finance	12.5	16.1
Peace	34.4	49.6
Non-violence	31.3	27.5

78.1 % declare struggle against another globalization, a different form of globalization (50% for the global sample). In the French case, "another globalization" is close to national issues like the defense of the welfare state ("défense des services publics"). 28.1% declare themselves anti-capitalist, which shows a strong filiation of the GJM with the traditional radical left. We actually consider that this indicator is more significant than the one "traditional left", elaborated in relation with the reference to socialism and communism. As a matter of fact, the use of these terms is very stigmatizing in the French public debate. If these terms are rather often used by the activists among themselves, on the contrary, they are very often erased in the public documents or in the meetings.

Table 13. Campaigning themes: aggregated basic themes and values (frequencies)

	Frequencies of yes (%) French sample	Frequencies of yes (%) all teams
New globalism	93.8	87.3
Eco-Minority Groups	56.3	70.9
Critical sustainibility	71.9	58.6
Peace and non-violence	62.5	69.3
Anti-capitalism	28.1	26.6
Traditional Left	9.4	8.6

New globalism is the most present of the aggregated themes in the French sample. 93.8% of the organizations of the French sample fit in this category (87.3 for the complete sample). The struggle "against liberalism and for another globalization" is indeed present as a central and even essential principle of the organizations of our sample. Critical sustainability is also an important theme, explicit in the internal documents, among organizations for which the defence of production and work is a core value, like the CGT. The eco-minority is another core principle, involving 56.3% of the organizations.

Finally, 28.1% have principles which fit into anti-capitalist values. These are the most radical organizations, for instance Alternatives Libertaires. But one must notice that if, in the official discourse, the rather consensual "struggle against neo-liberalism" has replaced the struggle against capitalism, it is nonetheless very often a new expression for it.

Table 14. Type of issues and action repertories (%)

	Protest/ mobilisation	Lobbying	Political representation	Representation of specific interest	Self-awareness
New globalism (n=30)	66.7	20.0	3.3	26.7	26.7
Ecominority (n=18)	88.9	11.1	5.6	16.7	16.7
Critical substainibility (n=23)	65.2	26.1	4.3	21.7	26.1
Anti-capitalism (n=9)	66.7	0.0	0.0	11.1	0.0

	Advocacy	Offer of services	Spreading information, influencing mass media	Political education	Legal protection
New globalism (n=30)	26.7	13.3	26.7	43.8	26.7
Ecominority (n=18)	22.2	5.6	22.2	33.3	27.8
Critical substainibility (n=23)	21.7	8.7	26.1	47.8	21.7
Anti-capitalism (n=9)	11.1	0.0	11.1	22.2	0.0

Whatever the types of issues are, the means of action are predominantly mobilizations. Organizations which fit in the category of eco-minority are those having recourse to mobilizations in their largest number. Then comes the category “Political education” and, on a smaller scale, spreading information in order to influence the media. Lobbying is quite less used (20% for the new globalism, 11.1% for the “eco-minority”, 26.1% for the “critical substainability” and 0% for the « anti-capitalism”).

Table 15. Types of issues and organization levels

	Local level	Regional level	National level	International level
New globalism	66.7	63.3	100	33.3
Ecominority	88.9	66.7	100	44.4
Sustainibility	73.9	69.6	100	34.8
Anti-capitalism	66.7	55.6	100	22.2

It is interesting to notice that organizations having “eco-minority” as a type of issue are at the same time more present on the local scale (88.9%) and on the global scale

(44.2%). On the contrary, only 33.3% of those fitting in the category "new globalism" have an international scale.

Table 16. Types of issues and democratic values

	Individual liberty/autonomy	Participation	Representation	Equality
New globalism (n=30)	16.7	43.3	6.7	13.3
Ecominority (n=18)	11.1	50	11.1	16.7
Critical substainibility (n=23)	13	43.5	8.7	17.4
Anti-capitalism (n=9)	11.1	33.3	0	11.1

As far the internal principals are concerned, the types of issues are not decisive. The principle of "Individual liberty and autonomy" is a bit more present in the organizations belonging to "new globalism" (16.7% versus 11.1% for the "eco-minority" and "anti-capitalism" and 13% for the "critical sustainability). Participation appears as an internal principle quite well shared, with a slight over-representation in the category of the "eco-minority" and a slight under-representation in the case of the "anti-capitalism" category.

3.2 Relations with institutions

Table 17. Relation with at least one national institutions

Relation with at least one national institutions		
Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
34.4	18.8	43.8

34.4% of our sample collaborates with at least one level of national institutions. 43.8% claims a democratic control on at least one level of national institutions and 18.8% refuses to collaborate with at least one national institution.

For example, "Alternative libertaire" refuses the hierarchical form of the party, together with its administrative function. It experiments the self-managing federalism, and

proposes an open frame of political thought and intervention which expresses itself outside of the field of the state institutions"[21].

Table 18. Relation with at least one national institutions and type of issues

Type of issues	Relation with at least one national institutions		
	Any collaboration	**Any refusal**	**Any democratic control**
New Globalism (n=30)	36.7	20.0	40.0
Ecominority (n=18)	27.8	22.2	44.4
Substainibility (n=23)	34.8	17.4	39.1
Anti-capitalism (n=9)	11.1	22.2	11.1

The type of issues is not decisive in the type of relations developed or claimed by the organizations of our sample with institutions. The organizations belonging to the group "anti-capitalism" don't interact very much with institutions. Only 11.1% collaborate with at least one national institution, 11.1% claim a democratic control. But this does not produce a massive denial of collaboration (only 22%). The issue of the (non) collaboration is represented only in a marginal way among the preoccupations of the organizations concerned with the issue of anti-capitalism.

Table 19. Relation with at least one national institutions and type of internal democracy

Type of internal decision making	Relation with at least one national institutions		
	Any collaboration (n=11)	**Any refusal (n=5)**	**Any democratic control (n=14)**
Associational model (n=18)	38.9	16.7	50.0
Deliberative representation (n=5)	40.0	20.0	40.0
Assembleary (n=6)	33.3	16.7	33.0
Deliberative participation (n=2)	0.0	0.0	50.0

[21] http://alternativelibertaire.org

The organizations referring to the associational model or the deliberative representation model of internal decision making have, more than the other organizations, a tendency to collaborate with at least one national institution (respectively 38.9% and 40%). They are also those claiming the most democratic control.

Table 20. Relation with at least one national institutions and repertoires of action

	Relation with at least one level of national institutions		
Functions/objectives	**Any collaboration (n=11)**	**Any refusal (n=5)**	**Any democratic control (n=14)**
Protest/mobilization (n=22)	36.4	27.3	45.5
Lobbying (n=7)	57.1	0.0	85.7
Rep. of specific interests (n=8)	50.0	12.5	37.5
Self-awareness/self-help (n=8)	62.5	25.0	50.0
Advocacy (n=2)	37.5	25.0	25.0
Offer services (n=4)	50.0	25.0	25.0
Spreading information (n=11)	55.6	0.0	66.7
Political education (n=11)	64.3	0.0	64.3
Legal protection/repres. (n=11)	37.5	25.0	50.0

The recourse to protest and mobilization is not incompatible with the collaboration with institutions. In our sample, 36.4% of the organizations having recourse to mobilization also collaborate with at least one level of institutions and 45.5% exercise a democratic control. 57.1% of those having recourse to lobbying collaborate with at least one level of institutions and, above all, 87.5% exercise a democratic control. On another hand, none of the organizations focused on political education and spreading information refuse to collaborate.

Table 21. Internal democracy and democratic values

	Individual liberty/autonomy	Participation	Representation	Equality
Associational (n=18)	11.1	33.3	11.1	16.7
Deliberative representative (n=5)	0.0	40.0	0.0	20.0
Assembleary (n=6)	50.0	50.0	0.0	0.0
Deliberative participative (n=2)	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0

	Inclusiveness	Transparency	Autonomy	Dialogue/ communication
Associational (n=18)	27.8	16.7	5.6	16.7
Deliberative representative (n=5)	0.0	0.0	20.0	0.0
Assembleary (n=6)	16.7	0.0	50.0	33.3
Deliberative participative (n=2)	50.0	0.0	0.0	50.0

The principle of « individual liberty » is mostly associated with organizations belonging to the assembleary model: 50% of the organizations of this model claim to embrace this principle versus only 11.1% for the associational model and 0% for the two other models. Participation seems to be a principle which is quite present, whatever the models are, with nonetheless large variations: 33.3% for the participative model and 100% for the deliberative/participative model.

The principle of inclusiveness is present for the organizations belonging to the associational model (27.8%), for those belonging to the assembleary model (16.7%) and those belonging to the deliberative/participative model. The French organizations don't claim very often to embody the principle of transparency, and the principle of dialogue/communication is present in a quite unequal way.

3.3 Visions of democracy: the European constitutional treaty case

The movement for voting "no" in the referendum on the European constitutional treaty is in many ways part of the no global movement. One can even say that it is a very concrete

example of the no global movement in France. On one hand, the French organizations of the no global movement have, as we already said, originally initiated the movement against the EU constitution. On the other hand, the constitution is perceived, on the European scale, as embodying the neoliberal model which is fought by the no global movement. In the eyes of the organizations, fighting neoliberal globalization and fighting the EU constitution merge into the same struggle.

In France, ATTAC in 2002 started the debate on the constitutional treaty, submitted to a referendum in May 2005. The association has been the spearhead of the campaign against the treaty. Many other organizations of our sample have been very active in the debate against the ratification of the treaty. But ATTAC happened to be the central point, the principal provider of arguments and the inescapable organizer of the main public debates. Political parties also played a fundamental role, because of their function but also because of their privileged access to the media[22]. Such was the case of the LCR and PCF. Within our sample, only the Greens, in spite of internal divergences, declared in favor of the constitutional treaty. This party (8.806 members) organized an internal vote in which 58.5% of the militants participated[23].

Table 22. Internal vote of the Greens about the referendumI want the Greens to call for voting:

	YES	NO	I abstain	Voters
Number of votes	2 698	2 156	272	5 126
% of votes	52.63	42.06	5.31	100

Source: http://www.lesverts.fr/

The campaign against the ratification has been a moment of crystallization of the GJM and of reactivation of its activities. According to our analysis, 63% of the

[22] One must notice that during the campaign, traditional media solicit ATTAC only very rarely, for instance for TV debates.

[23] There is another example of an internal vote: the Catholic organization Emmaüs, which has a solidarity network oriented toward people in great social precarity , has addressed a questionnaire on the constitutional treaty to 4000 of its "companions" belonging to a marginalized population. The questionnaire was answered by 929 of them. 31% were in favor of yes, 24% in favor of no. This initiative is to be underlined because it regards a population which is generally not even registered on the electoral lists. . http://www.emmaus-france.org/actu_parole

organizations of our sample became involved actively against the treaty, 9% decided to keep a position of neutrality, 25% did not participate in the debate.

Table 23. Positions of the GJM organizations of our sample on the European Constitutional Treaty.

In Favor of the Treaty	Against the Treaty	Choice of Neutrality	Is not Involved in the Debate
3%	63%	9%	25%

Source: Elaborated on the base of internet websites

As we already mentioned, in our sample, only the Greens declared themselves in favor of the treaty. The large majority of the organizations of our network were engaged in the campaign, but in different ways and with a more or less important role. If some organizations essentially took position on some specific issues of the treaty related to their field of action (human rights, gender equality, etc.), in most cases the organizations took position on the basis of general principles. For instance, Co-errance, a cooperative of cultural diffusion, denounced the fact that "this 'European Constitution' contains very precise ideological and political choices which can only come from universal franchise"[24], and developed a very general argumentation in which the question of cultural production did not appear.

Some organizations choose a position of neutrality and mainly a function of information. The Cedetim, for instance, collected the articles published in the commercial press and the activist press on the referendum[25], whether or not they were in favor or against the ratification. Thus, they mostly adopted a role of citizen's education. As another example, the Ligue des Droits de l'Homme (League of Human's Rights) opted, in this debate, for a quite atypical position of claimed neutrality. It choose to clearly position itself in a function of citizen's education, and organized for instance workshops for analyzing the treaty which aim at "providing the citizen critical tools in order to make him be able to

[24] http://www.co-errances.org/

[25] One can then find contributions of activists in favour of the Treaty (with articles like "Why any GJM Activist Should Vote Yes"), as well as articles arguing against the treaty.

choose with full knowledge of the facts, when the moment comes, his position toward the constitutional Treaty"[26].

The organizations of our sample which did not participate in the debate can be classified in two categories: first of all the French branches of international organizations like Amnesty and Greenpeace, and secondly organizations dedicated to international solidarity like "Agir Ici" or "l'Ethique sur l'étiquette", very much inserted into transnational networks and little oriented toward the national context.

On the other hand, the referendum campaign was characterized by an important collaboration between the different organizations involved. Therefore union activists of the CGT and Solidaires, of the Confédération Paysanne, leaders of the LCR (Olivier Besancenot) and of the PCF (Marie-George Buffet) but also the fringe of the PS against the ratification (Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Henri Emmanuelli) joined together in many meetings[27]. A call gathering 500 unionists was also launched. One must underline that the position of the European Confederation of Unions which stood for the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, has been strongly condemned by the French unions belonging to the GJM. The position of the European Confederation of Unions was criticized for its substance and its form. It indeed revealed, according to the French unionists, the absence of internal democracy within the Confederation.

It is important to underline that a part of the debate against the ratification of the Treaty developed on the fringe of activist organizations. Internet for that matter played a quite innovating role. Blogs and personal pages developed, outside the activist structures. For instance, the website of Etienne Chouard[28], a high school teacher in southern France enabled the diffusion of a simple demonstration against the Treaty, which, probably because of its simplicity, had a very large success. Etienne Chouard's text has been very widely diffused *via* activist lists but also enormously by individuals (cf. networks of mutual acquaintances). His website was visited by almost 700.000 people during the referendum campaign, surpassing by far the frequentation of the activist's websites.

[26] http://www.ldh-france.org/actu_internationale.cfm?idactu=1032

[27]http://www.pcf.fr/?iddoc=4673

[28] http://etienne.chouard.free.fr/

After the referendum, the « May 29 collective» replaced the "National collective for a 'no' from the left" which was created after the "Appeal of the 200" that was made public on October 19, 2004. This appeal was signed by 200 activists prior to being signed by 200 000 people. It is subtitled "Say no to the constitutional treaty, to built Europe". It asserts the "need for Europe" and the rejection of the "so-called Europe which takes the market as an idol and the secret negotiation as a liturgy", and calls for a " 'no' from the left, in rupture with the liberal system, which could express through the vote all the expectations carried by the social and no global mobilizations during these past years with the support of the majority of the population, wage-earners, and youth. On this basis, we create a collective of initiative and call for the constitution of such groups in all cities and sectors of society".

The Fondation Copernic and Espaces Marx activated their network Transform !, which had initiated the "Call of the 200 Europeans supporting the French 'no' from the left" of May 9, 2005, whereas the European network of critical marxist journals Projet K initiated the "Call for the no to the Constitution. Solidarity with the no from the left in France". One must eventually mention the "Call of the 1000 feminists from Europe for the no from the left".

This double level, on the national and European scale, of the 'National Collective for a no from the left' is directly linked with its issue, but also with the pre-existing groups which were the most involved in the experience, which are closely mixed with the French area of antiglobalization with its clearly social orientation. It called for instance for the European demonstration in Brussels on 19 March 2005, which came from two initiatives: the one by the European Confederation of Unions on employment, and the one by the European Social Forum of London (November 2004) with a very broad title "Against war and racism, against neoliberal Europe, against privatizations, against the Bolkestein directive and the attack against the number of working hours, for a Europe of the rights and solidarity among peoples".

On the European and even world scale, the aim of the May 29 Collective is to fight "against liberal offensives" which clearly bring them close to the no global movement. In particular, the Collective calls for: "the removal of the Bolkestein directive, of the directives on liberalization (transportation, ports, copyrights of software and living

organisms, etc.) and of the texts aiming at dismantling public services, the adoption of a directive clearly limiting the number of working hours, a decisive European economic policy for employment and the environment, solidarity measures and social and fiscal harmonization, the rethinking of the common agricultural policy outside of the liberal goals of the WTO, a questioning of the AGCS negotiations, a revision of the status and of the missions of the European Central Bank, the questioning of the Monetary Stability Pact, the appropriation and social management of water, the real cancellation of the poor countries' debt, etc."

On the domestic front they mostly raise the question, which is rather a union issue, of the dismantling of the labor legislation and the defence of public services, which are issues carried by the traditional left and the Comités Guéret for the defence of public services: "against the privatization of EDF and GDF, the closing of the post offices, the opening to the free market of the train transportation, the transposition of the directives of liberalization of public services, the questioning of the rights of unemployed, the collective layoffs, the dismantling of labor legislation, and the underhanded actions to come within the "100 days" of the new government; in favor the creation of jobs by the reduction of the number of working hours, in favor of fighting poverty by raising salaries and social minima." This declaration is followed, practically, by the call for national initiatives (demonstration on October 4 in favor of employment and on November 19 in favor of the defence of public services, common declaration with other political and associative forces regarding the suburbs, against the privatization of EDF, etc.), and of European initiatives (on October 15 against the Bolkestein directive, petition for another Europe) and No Global initiatives, like the week of action against the WTO (October 17-21, 2005) or the meeting scheduled at the European Social Forum in Athens in May 2006[29].

We will not analyze further here the dynamic of the campaign on the referendum. In the perspective of this report, we want to focus on the conceptions of democracy of the GJM organizations which have structured this debate.

What is the substance of the debate? The critique of ATTAC, and more widely of the very large majority of the organizations of the GJM in France of the functioning of the

[29] This part on the May 29 collective was written by Isabelle Sommier for the reediting of *La France rebelle* (forthcoming in October in Michalon editions).

EU and against the Constitutional Treaty, focuses mostly on the lack of a social dimension of democracy. The Stability Pact (Pacte de Stabilité) on liberalization of public services (article 86) and the absence of substantial rights are called into question. These criticisms are mostly made on the basis of a vision of social democracy focused on the access to education, the struggle against poverty, gender equality, the right to health, etc.

The groups situated on the extreme left of the political spectrum clearly condemn the treaty because of its capitalist character. For instance, as one can see on the following poster, the slogan of the anarchist group "Alternative Libertaire" is "European Constitution, the Capitalists Answer Yes, we Answer no"

Source: http://www.alternativelibertaire.org/?dir=Dossiers/Constitution&n=1

More generally, the constitutionalization of free competition has been condemned by ATTAC, the PCF, Group of ten-Solidaires, etc. In the French context, this criticism

clearly connected with the defense of public services (which are often in a situation of monopoly). The issue of the defense of public services, perceived as guaranteeing the social rights of the citizens, has been one of the key points of the debate. The question of the defense of public services is precisely the very central issue justifying the denunciation of the Constitutional Treaty. "A Constitution should, on the basis of values and goals shared by society, build a constitutional frame giving the means to democratically decide public policies and allowing them to evolve according to the choice of the citizens. This is absolutely not the case in the project on which we are asked to vote"[30]. Public service is equivalent to social democracy.

The issue of the constitutionalization of competition is the core question in the call of the 500: "Unionists, we have to face everyday, in France and in Europe, the consequences of a European policy based on the only principle of a "market economy opened to free and non distorted competition. It is this principle that the project of treaty submitted to the referendum intends to constitutionalize"[31].

The lack of "democratic legitimacy" is also a central theme of the critique of the EU. In the arguments developed, this lack of "democratic legitimacy" proceeds from the lack of social democracy. The problem is not globalization, but the way it is managed [32]. The EU – and more generally international organizations – are said to be managed according to "private interests within developed countries". ATTAC France but also the Group of ten-Solidaires consider that this direction is connected with the very origins of Europe, with the stress put on the economy, which led to "an institutional confusion" which has subordinated politics to the economy. "The market and the single currency have been imposed as non democratic forms of federal unification, progressing in the secret of government decisions, to the detriment of a real European citizenship"[33]. In the same way, Solidaires also insists on the "influence of the market": "the European construction is made

[30] Solidaires, « Pour une autre Europe : mobilisons-nous ! », http://www.solidaires.org

[31] http://appeldes500.ras.eu.org/index.php

[32] http://www.france.attac.org/i1083, p.3.

[33] http://www.france.attac.org/i1083, p.4.

under the influence of the market and becomes more and more a fortress (Schengen Agreements) toward the outside, and a space of police control inside its borders"[34].

The GJM organizations of the GJM mostly stress the social dimension of democracy. Therefore, according to the LDH[35] (League of Human Rights), "the stakes of Human Rights and of democracy, essential for the political project of the European Union, are rarely discussed in the current media debates"[36]

It would however be fallacious to claim, like the LDH, that the question of formal democracy was not present in the debate. Beyond this criticism of the subordination of policy to the economy, the different institutions are criticized for their democratic "deficiency". This criticism is, of course, prior to the debate about the ratification, but in the eyes of its detractors the treaty itself does not bring about much improvement, and contributes to reinforce a "Europe against the people", as the union Solidaires says.

The Council of Europe is pointed at as a rather non democratic institution (meetings in camera, etc.). The European Commission is perceived as the spearhead of the liberal policies (of the Maastricht Treaty or of the EU role in the WTO negotiations). As far as the European Parliament is concerned, the limitation of its powers is underlined. The high abstention rate in the European elections (50% in 1999, 57% in 2004) is set forth in order to reinforce the argument of the weak democratic legitimacy of Europe, as well as the polls showing that in 1998, 41% of the citizens of the member States were complaining about the way Europe was being built[37]. Another institution much criticized, especially by ATTAC, is the European Central Bank, considered as being harmful for social policies in Europe and also unfavorably disposed to the countries of the South.

Thus, the criticism of European institutions focuses on their "democratic deficiency" but also on the fact that they stand for "the market ideology". On the one hand, it is affirmed that "the respect of fundamental rights, of social justice and of security of persons and goods is not organized in the internal market by taking into account everyone's

[34] Solidaires, *Résolution 1. Combattre la mondialisation libérale*, 30 décembre 2004.

[35] AGRIKOLIANSKY, Eric, La Ligue française des droits de l'homme et du citoyen depuis 1945 : sociologie d'un engagement civique, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002.

[36] http://www.ldh-france.org/actu_internationale.cfm?idactu=1032

[37] http://www.france.attac.org/i265, p. 5.

interests".[38] On the other hand, the Charter of Fundamental Rights is perceived as carrying "social regressions" which "favor social dumping". The union Group of 10 Solidaires demands the development of "a Europe which helps harmonizing the social and economic rights from the top: right to a good quality job with a decent income, right to a social security guaranteeing an equal access to health, right to a retirement allowing a decent living, enlargement and consolidation of public services and solidarity tools"[39]. The call of the 500 underlines: "This Charter is, on the other hand, problematic in many respects: it replaces the right to have a job by the right to work, it does not recognize the European right to strike and it refuses the equality of rights to those living in Europe without having the nationality of one of the member states, etc."[40] Other more specific aspects of the constitutional treaty are also pointed out. The Gender and Mobilization Commission shows for instance the extent to which the constitutional treaty is a regression for women's rights (i.e. the non affirmation of the principle of secularity which opens the door to the influence of the Church, the non-affirmation of the right to contraception, to divorce, to abortion, to live without violence, etc.) [41].

3.4 Vision of global democracy

As for the constitutional Treaty, in many cases the word democracy does not appear explicitly in the declarations of the organizations but behind their actions, their campaigns and their declarations, one can clearly see a vision of social democracy with the search for more social justice, more equality between genders, between countries of the North and the South, etc.

The qualitative analysis of the discourses of the organizations of the GJM confirm the results of the quantitative analysis, which showed that 81.7% of the organizations support the welfare state, struggle against inequalities, etc., all themes connected with a social, substantial vision of democracy.

[38] http://www.france.attac.org/i1083, p. 10.

[39]Solidaires, « Pour une autre Europe : mobilisons-nous ! », http://www.solidaires.org.

[40] http://appeldes500.ras.eu.org/index.php

[41] http://www.france.attac.org/i4010, p. 1.

On the other hand, the mechanisms of representative democracy are criticized and even called into question. With representative democracy, politicians, once elected, "are out of reach of the direct citizen control. Furthermore, at the time of neo-liberal globalization, the decision making power is concentrated in the hands of international political institutions (G7, European Commission, IMF, World Bank, WTO) which are widely out of reach of democratic control", as ATTAC says. [42].

Then, what does democracy mean for the GJMO? In the case of ATTAC, the word "democratic" stays associated with formulas which remain vague: "conquer democratic spaces, develop democratic processes, settle democratic instances, organize a democratic control"[43]. In a more general way, democracy is mentioned on the mode of metonymy and circumlocution. About the role of ATTAC in society, the authors evoke the "regrouping of citizens learning again to talk to each other, to question, to organize, (who) are producers of democracy", the promotion of "practices of active citizenship" and the constitution of a "tremendous civic pressure group" working for the "construction of credible alternatives, carried by the largest number », whose goal is to « create counter-powers"[44].

Only the issue of participatory democracy is tackled in a direct way, by a large number of organizations. However here again, the concrete modalities of this participatory democracy remain vague.

On the other hand, organizations specialized in the issues of international solidarity have a discourse on the "world governance" and the democratization of international organizations. The attitudes toward international organizations fit in the perspective of a clear rejection (vis-à-vis the IMF or the World Bank), or in the perspective of critical expectation as far as the UN is concerned: "They did not really act in a blameworthy manner, they did not convince at all"[45].

In this context, "a reform of the international system relies on the taking into account of the scales of social transformation, on the articulation of the local, national, large areas and worldwide scales. It is in this articulation that the institutional framework of

[42] http://france.attac.org/

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] *Ibid.,* p. 11

[45] http://france.attac.org/

worldwide democracy is built. The local scale is the one of satisfaction of needs, of the relationship between populations and territories, of the relation between democracy and development. The reinforcement of local collectivities, citizen decentralization, local development are priorities. Proximity democracy carries the two forms of representation, delegation and participation"[46].

[46] Gustave Massiah, *La réforme de l'ONU et le mouvement altermondialiste*, *15 mars 2005, http://www.reseau-ipam.org/article.php3?id_article=465&var_recherche=d%E9mocratie.*

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Appendix

Table1A. Year of foundation (French sample- International episodes)

Founding date	% of organizations	n
Before 1968	15.6	5
1969-1989	25.0	8
1990-1999	37.5	12
2000-	15.6	5
Missing	6.3	2

Table2A. Individual members

Individual members	%	n
Up to 100	6.7	1
101-1000	26.7	4
1001-10000	26.7	4
10001-100000	33.3	5
More than 100 000	6.7	1
Total	100	15
Missing		17

Attac functionning

photos du mouvement

4 (ans), date de l'AG

Schéma 1 : les instances statutaires de l'association ATTAC France



Schéma 2 : les composantes du mouvement ATTAC France

(cf. schéma ci-contre issu du mémoire de fin d'étude de Julien Deroin « L'engagement des clercs face à l'investissement militant. L'intégration des comités locaux d'Attac », I.E.P. de Rennes, *Op. Cit.*)



MOUVEMENT ATTAC FRANCE

Organigramme simplifié établi à partir de l'analyse de la charte des relations entre l'association Attac et les comités locaux et du règlement de la CNCL

Reproduit de Julien Berain, "L'engagement des clercs face à l'investissement militant. L'intégration des comités locaux d'Attac", Op cit, p. 116

Visions of Democracy in German GJMOs

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1. Introduction

Various scholars have underlined the democratising effect of social movements. On the macro-level, social movements raise issues that are neglected by institutional politics. On the meso- and micro-level, social movement organisations (SMOs) enhance democratic participation. They are important forums to deliberate on democratic values. Moreover, democratic practices are invented and practised by SMOs. In the following we will refer to both the debate about democracy and the ways global justice movement organisations (GJMOs) in Germany try to organize their own affairs democratically.

In our analysis we will identify democratic values as they are proclaimed in the sampled documents and crystallize in the formal structures of GJMOs. These democratic norms will be considered with regard to group characteristics. Next, we will briefly refer to the external consequences of democratic values resulting in the action repertoire of GJMOs. The relationship with political institutions and economic actors as well as the choice of strategies are manifest expressions of democratic values shared in a political group. Whereas the first part of the analysis is based on quantitative data drawn from the coding of constitutions and other documents portraying the organizations, the following section adds qualitative findings about the groups and their debate on democracy in general. Taking four organisations as a starting point, we will shed light on the main themes and trajectories in the discussion about democracy within global justice movements (GJMs) in Germany.

2. Selection of Organizations

In order to cover the entire spectre of the GJMs in Germany, a set of 43 organisations has been chosen for the analysis of websites in work package 2 of the DEMOS-project. The selection was based on information about the preparation and/or organisation of

conferences, protests and other events of the GJMs. In addition, scholarly knowledge, movement publications and internet searches were used to identify relevant actors. This sample of organisations included more actors than necessary to get an overview about the ideological and organisational aspects of the movement. The rationale behind this extended sample was to guarantee that – at least – one satisfying case for each given actor category could be identified. Thus, we wanted to secure that dropped cases, which appeared to be inadequate for our purpose, would not leave us with empty categories. While this did not happen, nonetheless we could reduce our sample for the analysis of organisational ideology and democratic visions within the movement. Eventually, we concentrate on 31 organisations in our analysis (see Table 1). The remaining twelve cases are excluded not because they are not part of the movement but for two reasons: First, nine organisations are redundant because equivalent organisations that identify more with the movement are in the sample.

Table1. Short descriptions and sample categories of selected organizations

Name	Short Description	Actor category
BUKO[1]	Coordinating committee of annual antagonist congress	Antagonist area organization
Antifaschistische Linke Berlin	Local antifacist organization	Antagonist area organization
Attac	German branch of the Attac-network	Attac
erlassjahr.de	Debt relief campaign network	Debt relief
erwerbslos.de	Part of Euromarches, unemployed affiliated to trade unions	Euromarches
BUND[2]	Biggest Environmentalist organisation engaged in the GJMs	Environmentalist organization
Kanak Attak	Ethnic media activists	Ethnic minority group
Kampagne für saubere Kleidung	Clean Clothes Campaign	Fair trade group
Kein Mensch ist illegal	Campaign to promote migrants' rights	Group of immigrants or vs racism
FIAN[3]	Human rights organisation on food	Human rights organization
Nadir Infosystem	Independent internet media	Independent communication network
Indymedia	Indymedia knot	Indymedia knot
Hamburger Sozialforum	Local social forum	Local social forum
Sozialforum Berlin	Local social forum	Local social forum
Sozialforum in Deutschland	Coordinating body of the national social forum	Local social forum
aerzte-ohne-grenzen	Médecins Sans Frontières	Médecins Sans Frontières
IG Metall	Metalworkers union	Metalworkers union
die tageszeitung	Newspaper of the critical left	Newspaper of the critical left
Misereor	Catholic development assistance organization	NGO or Solidarity organization
Solid	Party youth organisation of the socialist party Linkspartei	Party youth organization
Pax Christi	Catholic development assistance	Pax Christi
Iz3w[4]	Magazine of the One-World spectre	Periodical magazine
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung	Foundation in affiliated to the socialist party Linkspartei	Political party
FAU[5]	Anarchist Union	Rank and file union
EED[6]	Protestant development assistant organization	Religious inspiration
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative	Peace movement network	Stop the war coalition
Ver.di[7]	Service Sector Union	Union in the public sector
Marsch 2000	Part of World March of Women	World March of Women
Medico international	Postsocialist development assistance organization	Other
Sozialisitische Alternative (SAV)	Trotskyist organization	Other

[1] Bundeskoordination Internationalismus

[2] Bund für Natur- und Umweltschutz Deutschland

[3] FoodFirst Informations- und Aktions-Netzwerk

[4] Blätter des Informationszentrums 3. Welt

[5] Freie Arbeiter - und Arbeiterinnen Union

[6] Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst

[7] Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft

WEED – World Economy, Ecology and Development	Alternative think tank for world economy, ecology and development	Other

In addition it should be recalled that the criterion to select GJMOs for WP2 was their participation in relevant events of the movements. For example, an organisation like *amnesty international* regularly attends and supports those events. During our first field observations we backed up this criterion with information on how much these organisations identify with the GJMs. For example, *amnesty international*, though providing support to the GJMs, does not strongly identify with them, as an activist told us. Therefore it was sufficient to include in the data set the human rights organisation *FIAN* which is closer to the movement, while *Amnesty international* could be dropped. For the same reason, we excluded the development aid organisations *Weltfriedensdienst, Brot für die Welt, Weltladen-Dachverband, terre des hommes, Germanwatch,* the internet media *Labournet, Pro Asyl* (engages in migrant politics), and *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung* which is tightly connected to the green party. The second reason for the exclusion of certain groups is related to methodological problems. Neither the Hamburg based radio group *Freies Sender Kombinat* nor the Trotzkyist *Linksruck* answered to any of our contact requests via internet, phone or by mail.[8] The Turkish migrant organisation *DIDF* could not be analysed because of language problems. All three cases could be substituted by satisfying alternatives. For example, instead of *Linksruck* we analyse the socialist group *SAV* as a part of the "antagonist" spectre.

3. Sources and Measurement of Organisational Ideology and Structures

We only can get insight into organisational forms insofar as information is given by self-portrayals and responses of the organizations. The following data and information are not based on observations about the day-to-day practices within the GJMOs. Therefore, we cannot assess the actual organisational forms and mechanisms. Thus it is important to separate information on organisational ideology, understood as a set of normative demands, from the actual formal structures.

[8] This is not surprising, since the scarce information which can be found in the internet suggests that both groups – for very different ideological reasons – are not interested in public relations. Below we will refer to the relevant ideological tendencies.

We identify the visions and practices of democracy in GJMOs on the basis of written material that documents ongoing discussions and prescribes procedures and practices. The introductory section referred to the limits of this method: the declarations displayed in these documents do not necessarily mirror the reality within the respective GJMO. On the one hand, ideals proclaimed in documents may be far from reality. On the other hand, formal structures could be adopted for external reasons without playing a role in the organization's everyday life. In the German case, one has to consider important external influences on these documents (e.g. legal requirements for associations). Adding to this, documents tend to be fragmentary with regard to the variables chosen for our analysis. Some groups even refuse to formulate written rules. Hence we will not be able to comprehensively reconstruct visions of democracy for all groups in our sample but only for those offering the required information.

4. Internal Democracy in GJMOs: Quantitative Analysis

4.1. Organisations in categories of decision-making models

We draw on the four models that differ according to the rule of decision-making und the role of representation and participation. Thus, the associational and assembleary model apply the majority rule to take decisions, while deliberative representation and deliberative participation favour the consensus principle. Regarding the relation between representation and participation, both the assembleary and deliberative participative model stress that decisions should be taken on the basis of direct participation of all members. By contrast, participation is weak and not a priority in decision-making in those GJMOs that follow the associational or deliberative representative model.

Table 2. Attribution of groups to types of internal decision-making

		Representation	Direct Participation
		Associational model (N = 11)	**Assembleary model (N = 5)**
Consensus or deliberation mentioned/ foreseen	**No**	erlassjahr.de, Misereor, Pax Christi, EED, BUND, erwerbslos.de, IG Metall, Ver.di, SAV, TAZ, WEED	aerzte-ohne-grenzen, FIAN, iz3w, BUKO, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung,
		Deliberative representation (N = 3)	**Deliberative participation (N = 5)**
	Yes	Attac, Solid, Medico International	Clean Clothes Campaign, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative, FAU, ALB, Sozialforum Berlin

Informal Networks (7):
Marsch 2000, Kein Mensch ist illegal, Kanak Attak, Nadir Infosystem, indymedia, Hamburger Sozialforum, Sozialforum in Deutschland

Table 2 presents the categorization of 31 organisations according to these four models. The distribution between consensus-orientation and majority rule is similar to those in the other analyzed countries. There are twice as many organisations which do not apply or stress consensus as decision-rule than organisations which do. For the other countries, this relation was even three to one. In contrast to the other countries, where the role of direct participation is marginal, one of three German organisations stresses the role of direct participation. In the German sample, one in five cases could not be attributed to the decision-making categories, while the corresponding figure was around 11 % for (the average of) the other countries.

There are mainly two reasons for the fact that seven German cases could not be categorized according to our scheme. First, three of them are not "regular" organisations but they stem from the autonomous tradition which distances itself from organizing in terms of formalization and stabilization. Therefore, they do not express rules of decision-making or make no statement about participation in the assembly. The anti-racist campaign *Kein Mensch ist illegal*, for example, briefly notes on its website that it does not have a "fixed apparatus". The network of several local groups can be reached via a mobile phone which is handed periodically from group to group. Similarly, the network of anti-racist cultural groups *Kanak Attak* sees itself as a platform for migrant perspectives but not as body to organise interests. The network strictly rejects any identity politics and seeks to practice media activism beyond the traditional patterns of anti-racist initiatives. There is no

central bureau, speakers and the like. The third group, the internet network *Nadir*, denominates its organisational structures in an ironic way. From their view point, coordination shall be reduced to the organisational necessities. The *NadirKombüse* - 'Kombüse' means 'kitchen' in sailor's slang - is neither an assembly nor an executive committee. It is simply the place where the daily work is done; it can be understood as the central node within the network and the stage for discourse. In contrast to the two other groups, all activists engaged in *Nadir* are located in the Hamburg area.

The second reason for the dropping out of cases has to do with the task-orientation of two groups. Both *Marsch 2000* and *Kein Mensch ist illegal* are campaigns and therefore do not require a broad range of joint decisions to be taken. In contrast to other campaigns in the data set (e.g. *erlassjahr.de*), they did not develop stable and formal structures. *Nadir*, the local social forum in Hamburg, as well as the preparation group for the Social Forum in Germany primarily serve to create spaces for discussions rather than developing their own distinct political line. Accordingly, these groups do not have explicit rules for discussion and delegation.

The common denominator of all seven groups is a highly informal structure including the absence of formal membership. Therefore, these are categorized as "informal networks" even when the groups differ in their internal structure.

Anti-organizational ideology and task-orientation were also relevant for the categorization of other cases within the data set. Apart from the above mentioned seven cases which could not be categorized, only one additional case did not have an assembly: the highly formalized Christian solidarity organisation *Misereor* that is part of the wider organisational framework of the Catholic Church in Germany. Because all members are at the same time delegates of other units within the Church, one can hardly speak of an assembly of members. Voting members are task-oriented officials rather than individuals or representatives of local groups. Yet because of its executive and representative structures in contrast to the six non-categorized cases *Misereor* was nonetheless attributed to the associational sector.

The case of *Misereor* illustrates that the categorization of groups presupposes a consequent reduction of actual complexity. In order to further substantiate our categorization, we will discuss exceptions and deviance within the four spaces of

democratic decision-making. Within the associational field one must consider that, when looking at the general statements and constitutions of the organisations as a whole, one usually gets a picture of the top of the organization. While organisations like *SAV* and the trade unions conform well to the associational model, the Christian organisations and environmentalist *BUND* comprises a broad network of regional chapters and local groups. Especially on the local level, deliberation and participation are frequent, contrary to what written documents suggest.

The appearance of the political party foundation *Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung* in the assembleary field is quite counterintuitive as it is a professionalized organisation with a high degree of formal representation. The *clean clothes campaign* is deliberative participative in its ideology and at the same time it relies on employees and spokespersons.

For the deliberative representative field there is no case which fully meets the requirements of representation and deliberation at the same time. *Solid* states that consensus is desired for its executive committee but not for its assembly. Deliberative participation is, according to the written information, best implemented in the *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative* which explicitly rejects representation. Consensus is promoted as a rule for decision-making and the assembly is supposed to be the body having the ultimate say.

4.2 Types of decision making in different thematic fields

The organisations in our data-set are concerned with a broad range of issues. On average each organisation addresses around seven of the 25 proposed thematic fields (see introduction). Associational organisations deal on average with around nine and deliberative representative organisations with around 12 thematic fields. In contrast, deliberative participative organisations on average deal with around four, assembleary organisations with around seven and informal networks with around six different areas. If we cluster these 25 thematic fields into five broader categories (critical sustainability, new globalism, eco-minority groups, anti-capitalism, peace/non-violence, traditional left) we see not much difference between the types of decision-making. In general, traditional left themes such as socialism, communism and anti-capitalism are less important than others.

Though being important in the German context, anti-fascism, as a field of action closely related but different to anti-racism, is not covered by the original scheme of thematic fields. Five German organisations stated to engage in this field of action: *Solid*, *BUKO*, *Antifaschistische Linke Berlin* (ALB) and the trade unions *IG Metall* and *Ver.di*. Other themes added during the analysis include the rights of unionists, disabled, freedom information and media, and health. The characteristics of the different decision-making models become more visible if one takes into account the variegated spectres within the GJMs in Germany. Many organisations promoting social justice, Third World solidarity, peace and ecology fit the associational model. Other significant themes are the engagement for democracy, human rights and immigrants' rights. The assembleary organisations coincide with engagement for immigrants' rights, social justice at the national level, and ecology. Additional important themes are human rights, global distributive justice, and women's rights. This picture differs much from that of deliberative participative organisations which promote anti-neoliberalism and democracy. Common for assembleary organisations are the notion of immigrants' rights, women's rights and the defence of social justice on the national level. The three deliberative representative organisations focus on a very broad range of issues that are comparable to those promoted by the assembleary and deliberative participative organizations. One should note that this mixture of thematic fields is not an expression of an overall ideological framework like sustainable development. On the contrary, sustainability was only mentioned five times in our analysis, and only by three associational organisations, one assembleary organisation, and one informal network. Informal networks most frequently mention anti-racism as part of their thematic repertoire. Also, they emphasize social justice, women's rights and human rights.

4.3 Different forms of participation: assembly characteristics and formal membership

Formalization can be read as a means to limit access to organisational decision-making. Thus formal rules mark the boundaries between those who are entitled to influence the organisational decisions and those without formal access. This channelling can be done by limiting the frequency of assembly meetings and/or the access to the assembly or to the organizations' activities.

The associational organisations all use the same model to restrict access to organisational decision-making. The assembly is composed of delegates or formal members and is held only once a year or even less. Formal membership separates insiders and outsiders. It exists also in all deliberative-participatory organisations with the exception of the *Berliner Sozialforum* and *ALB*. Less formalized groups such as *ALB* and *indymedia* mention no formal restrictions and even no formal membership. *BUKO* as well as *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative*, *Attac* and *Sozialforum Berlin* keep their assemblies open to everybody who wants to participate. Just like organisations of the associational type, nearly all assembleary organisations have a general assembly at least once a year and require formal membership. Compared to other groups in the sample, the assemblies of deliberative participative organisations take place most frequently. *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative* and *FAU* meet at least once a year, two deliberative participative organisations meet twice or more frequently.

4.4 Cultures of democratic organisation

As stated above, the four decision-making types are constructs of scientific observers. The crucial question is to which extent the organisations under study commit themselves to democratic values and whether there is a consistency between stated procedures and promoted values.

Consistent with our typology there are eight groups who draw a negative picture of delegation of power and/or hierarchical decision-making. These groups cover a broad range of thematic fields. The trade union *FAU* is one of the few anarchist proponents of anti-hierarchical attitudes within the movements. *Indymedia*, the Social Forum in Berlin, and the Social Forum on the national level are important groups within the GJMs to promote a similar position. But also the peace network *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative* and the migrants' group *Kanak Attak* openly criticize representative structures. While most of the groups are categorized as deliberative participative, assembleary or informal networks, there are several exceptions. The *FAU, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, aerzte-ohne-grenzen,* and *FIAN* have vertical structures. In addition, *BUKO* is an organisation with vertical structures due to its organisational task as preparing committee for the annual conference of the left-radical internationalist spectre. *BUKO*'s own structures seem to be a compromise between

ideological positions and organisational necessities. In the case of *FAU*, the autonomy of member organisation is stressed explicitly to downplay the role of delegation structures.

Consensus – at least in the scientific meaning as the agreement of all participants – is sometimes bearing another meaning within the movement. A good example is *Attac* which defines consensus as a minimum of 90 percent agreeing to a proposal.

Apart from the deliberative and participatory organizations, participatory democracy is stressed by *BUND*, *SAV*, *BUKO*, *Marsch 2000* and *Sozialforum in Deutschland*. In the case of *BUND* one must acknowledge that its emphasis on participatory democracy refers to its large network of local groups. In other cases, consensus has its own meaning. For example, the organisational principle of democratic centralism favoured by the Trotskyist *SAV* suggests a vertical structure of delegation from local groups to top leaders. In this sense participation must culminate in centralized decisions taken by a majority vote. These decisions are binding for its members and then are presented as a "consensus".

Interestingly, most organisations urging for inclusiveness have no clear membership or even decision-making structures. This is true for *ALB*, *Indymedia*, *Nadir*, *Marsch 2000*, *Sozialforum in Deutschland*. Only to the *FAU*, ideological inclusiveness implies transparent access to the organisation and its decisions.

Individual or collective/cultural autonomy seems to matter as a motivation for deliberative decision-making models. *Medico International*, *FAU*, *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative*, *Attac*, which are categorized as deliberative, mention this principle. Again *SAV* endorses this ideological position too. But also the church organisation *EED*, the unemployment organisation *Kein Mensch ist illegal*, and the *TAZ* positively refer to this principle.

4.5 Organisation as a framework for democratic decision-making

Hitherto social movement research on organisations stressed predominantly the mobilising functions for protests. Organisation as a framework for democratic decision-making was largely neglected. In order to elucidate which basic organisational structures build the framework for which type of democratic decision-making, we will concentrate in the

following on the founding year, the membership structure and the territorial range of organizations.

Organisational Generations and Democratic Types

In general, the organisations of the GJMs were founded before the movements took shape. The oldest organisation was founded in 1891, the youngest in 2005. On average, the analyzed population of organisations is 19 years old. Thus, one would assume that the organisational distribution within the GJMs in Germany falls apart into a pre and post-movement generation. While organisations older than the movement itself tend to maintain their decision-making culture within the movement rather than adopting entirely new practices, those organisations founded during the evolution of the GJMs seem to significantly differ in their styles of decision-making – as far as these are visible. For the founding of organisations one must take into account that every protest activity needs some organisational preparation. Thus we can take the year 1999, when the protests in Seattle stimulated social movement activists in Germany, as one possible threshold to separate genuine GJMOs from those groups which entered the GJMs around this time but have been active before. Only one in five organisations in our data set was founded in 1999 of afterwards (see Table 3). While the Seattle events were important for the actual structuring of the movement, the Genoa protests in 2001 were more decisive for the public perception of the GJMs in Germany. Only with the Genoa protests, GJMs became widely recognized as a political actor.

Table 3. Organisations founded during the rise of GJMs

Year of foundation	Name	Decision-making model
1999	Marsch 2000	informal network
2000	Attac	deliberative representative
2001	Indymedia	informal network
2003	Sozialforum Berlin	deliberative participative
2004	Hamburger Sozialforum	informal network
2005	Sozialforum in Deutschland	informal network

If one takes a closer look at the motives of the founding of groups and situates the rise of genuine GJMs in the years of 1999 and 2000, one can identify six GJMOs that were founded in this period. These are the three Social Forums, *Marsch 2000*, *Attac* and *Indymedia*. The creation of other groups in this period, for the example the merger of existing trade unions into *Ver.di* in 2001, has occurred for reasons that, in part, are not related to the GJMs and, more generally, globalisation.[9] Yet facing neo-liberal economic policies and a globalizing economy, the pre-existent trade unions that merged into ver.di felt the need for a bigger, more centralized and more powerful organisation to fight against the multinational corporations.

The six organisations are at the same time at the core of many activities of the GJMs. *Attac,* the most prominent organisation, was founded in 2000. *Indymedia* is the most important internet media for the movement. The three remaining cases represent only one segment of a growing social forum structure in Germany. Deliberation is an ideological essential of three of these organizations, while the others limit their organisational efforts to informal networking.

The age distribution of the analysed organisations helps us to understand the historical roots of different models of democratic decision-making. Assuming that organisations did not change their structures so radically that they moved from one democratic category to another, one can relate the founding year to the current decision-making model. In general, it is likely that the consensus-oriented and participatory procedures got momentum within West-German leftist spectre with the rise of the student movement in the late 1960s and flourished during the evolution of the subsequent new social movements. By contrast, the associational model – representative structures combined with majority rule – dates back to the early labour movement. Also, the professionalization of many social movement organisations should lead to a growth of associational models in the 1990s.

[9] First, the pre-existing trade unions faced a heavy loss of membership. They hardly would have survived without finding a new way of organization. Second, transformations within the labour market put into question the existing separation between unions according to economic branches. This made the merger appropriate, since the competition between the unions for different service sector employees now can be negotiated within the bigger *Ver.di* union.

Table 32. Year of foundation for different models of decision-making

Year of foundation	Associational	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Informal networks	Total
Before 1968	3	1	0	0		4
1969-1989	3	0	3	2		8
1990-1999	4	1	2	1	4	12
2000-2005	1	1	0	2	3	7
Total	11	3	5	5	7	31

As Table 4 shows, this assumption holds for the limited sample of organisations active within the GJMs. The oldest representative organisation deciding by majority rule was founded in 1891. Not surprisingly, it is a component of the labour movement – the metal workers union *IG Metall*. Within the associational sector two other organizations, the catholic organisations *Pax Christi* (1948) and *Misereor* (1958), were founded before 1968. From the remaining associational organisations actually only the *WEED* (1975) and the *SAV* (1994) can be seen as new foundations, since both *EED* and *Ver.di* are composites of existing church and trade union structures, respectively. This may be true for other organisations as well, since every creation of an organisation has some roots dating further back. For example, *Ver.di* adopted the structure of the old founding trade unions. The data thus support our initial hypotheses about the importance of labour movement proponents. The same holds for the churches' tradition influencing post-war charity initiatives. On average, associational organisations are older than the other cases in our sample.

By contrast, the oldest participative organisation *iz3w* was founded in 1970, while the oldest deliberative group, *Medico International*, came into existence in 1968.The expected growth of associational models due to an NGOisation of social movements in our small sample is limited. There are organisations like *erlassjahr.de* or *WEED* that fit into this picture well. But also NGOs like *FIAN*, *Ärzte ohne Grenzen* stress the role of participation by all members of their organisation. The *Clean Clothes Campaign* even promotes internal deliberative participatory practices.

Thus the founding years tell us something about the historical prevalence and perpetuation of decision-making models. While older organisations tend to maintain their traditional models, the much younger informal networks tend to reject stable and formalized structures as it was more typical in their founding period. Participative as well as deliberative models in the GJMs can be traced back to the late 1960s and the maturation

of the NSMs in the 1980s. Groups with an assembleary and deliberative participative model were founded between the early 1960s and until today while the representative model is practiced most frequently within GJMOs that were founded before and after the Second World War.

Whom to speak for? Membership structures of organizations

The democratic question arises in our context only if a group claims to speak and decide on behalf of a larger social entity. This does not apply to all groups investigated. The seven informal networks do not speak for a particular membership base. Instead, they are task-oriented campaigns, working groups, or media platforms for other groups. Thus, we hypothesize a tight relation between the kind of membership and the promoted decision-making model. Membership bases will be analysed in the following along four distinctions. First, the membership can be composed of individuals, collective bodies, or both. Second**,** the organisation can be centralized or have a network structure. Third, the number of individual as well as collective members can be more or less high. Fourth, the organisations can be open or closed to new members. This relates also to the question of how large is the gap between members and non-members regarding possibilities to participate.

First, one quarter of the sample comprises organisations with individual membership only. Another quarter has no fixed membership (see Table 5). Nearly half of the organisations allow for group membership but only five of them exclusively consist of group members. To our surprise, the structure of membership is not closely related to the decision-making model. The only clear link is between the absence of fixed membership and the stress for deliberative participative decision making. Apparently, the promotion of participation and deliberation does not exclude collective membership or mixed collective and individual membership.

Table 33. Kind of membership and decision-making models

Kind of membership	Associational	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Informal networks	Total
Individual	4	1	2	1	0	8
Collective	3	0	0	1	1	5
both individual and collective	4	2	3	1	0	10
No fixed membership	0	0	0	2	6	8
Total	11	3	5	5	7	31

Second, the reason why there is no relation between membership structure and decision-making model may lay in the centralization or decentralization of organisational structures. Table 6 shows that the associational model comes along with a centralized structure of a single organisation that does not value the heterogeneity of individual and collective members. Assembleary or deliberative organisations seem to be better suited to host heterogeneous collective and individual members within a decentralized network structure.

Table 7. (De-)centralisation and decision-making models.

	Associational	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Informal networks	Total
single organization	10	2	4	2	2	20
network or federation	0	1	1	2	3	7
Ad-hoc umbrella organization	1	0	0	1	2	4
Total	11	3	5	5	7	31

Third, besides the structural features of central or federal and individual and/or collective membership, the mere size of the organisation should be considered as factor for selecting a decision-making model. One would assume that the larger an organization, the more likely it will promote representation and majority vote. The average number of individual and collective members of different kinds of groups clearly support this hypothesis (see Table 7).

Table 34. (De-)centralisation and decision-making models

	Number of individual members	Number of collective members	Number of cases
associational	650,265	438	11
deliberative representative	5,537	147	3
assembleary	498	68	5
deliberative participative	168	37	5
informal networks	1,800	200	7
Total	307,198	234	31

Table 7 shows that on average associational organisations integrate many more individuals than participative or deliberative types. Here one must acknowledge the range of distribution. Both the associations *IG Metall* and *Ver.di* comprise each about 2.4 million members whereas *SAV*, the smallest organisation in this field, has only 385 individual members. Also the sheer number of official members within the trade unions does not refer to the actual individual participation in events of the GJMs. Interestingly, both the deliberative representative as well as the informal networks have on average much less collective members than the associational organizations. It seems that membership of whole organisations is quite likely in context of informal structures and deliberative representative structures. The debt relief campaign *erlassjahr.de* with its nearly 1,900 participating groups demonstrates that the associational model can successfully integrate a large number of collective actors into collective decision-making. As an example of a loose network, the *Kein Mensch ist illegal* campaign comprises about 200 groups. The absolute number of individuals within the deliberative representative *Attac* is quite impressive with 15,700. It seems to suggest that deliberation and/or consensus are compatible with mass organizations.

Fourth, compared to associations those groups that stress the role of direct participation and/or deliberation are not receptive to many new members. The discussion about the "entryism" of *Linksruck* and *SAV* within *Attac* shows that an open discussion culture is vulnerable to attempts of infiltration. The lowest numbers of members can be found where both the principles of direct participation and deliberation are stressed.

Geographic levels of organizations

The rationale behind the assumption that a large membership does not favour deliberative structures is the higher probability of deep cleavages within a heterogeneous constituency when compared to small and usually more homogeneous groups. If heterogeneity is conducive to representative structures and majority decisions, it follows that organisations which span large territories are less prone to deliberative and participative models. By contrast, organisations whose constituency can regularly meet face-to-face are better suited to deliberative and participatory practices. The same applies to local groups. On the basis of our sample, these assumptions can be verified only partially (Table 8). We find an inner-organisational complexity which needs further elaboration. Especially, the international organisational links of the GJMs in Germany have to be differentiated. An organisation or network can be part of relatively stable and bureaucratized international organisations or federations such as *Greenpeace* or *Friends or the Earth International* or it can participate regularly as a member of international networks like *Attac* or the international *jubilee campaign*. In general, there is nearly no organisation or network of the GJMs in Germany which does not have international contacts or does not take part from time to time in international campaigns, conferences and protests. Thus the international level was restricted in our data-set to those organisations and networks which regularly are actively involved in international organisational entities as formal members and thus can be described as parts of international federations, organizations, networks or campaigns.

Table 35. Geographical range of 31 organisations according to types of decision-making

	Organizational bodies on			Part of
	local level	regional level	national level	international
Associational, N = 9				
Misereor				
EED				
erwerbslos.de				
SAV				Federation
IG Metall				Federation
Ver.di				Federation
Pax Christi				Organization
BUND				Federation
Erlassjahr.de				Campaign
deliberative representative, N = 3				
Medico International				Network
Solid				
Attac				Network
Assembleary, N = 7				
iz3w				
TAZ				
FIAN				Organization
WEED				
BUKO				
Ärzte-ohne-Grenzen				Organization
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung				
deliberative participatory, N = 5				
ALB				
Sozialforum Berlin				
Clean Clothes Campaign				Campaign
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative				
FAU				Federation
Informal Networks, N = 7				
Nadir				
Hamburger Sozialforum				
Kanak Attak				
Sozialforum in Deutschland				
Marsch 2000				Campaign
Kein Mensch ist illegal				Campaign
Indymedia				Network

In all fields of democratic decision-making there are actors who span from the local/regional to the international level. In the associational field these are *erlassjahr.de,*

Pax Christi and *BUND*. In the deliberative representative field *Attac* is actively engaged on the regional and the international level. *Medico* has a sister organisation in Swiss and therefore should be regarded as international too. The assembleary organisations *FIAN* and *Ärzte-ohne-Grenzen* integrate all four levels. Also, the deliberative participatory group *FAU* and the German *Clean Clothes Campaign* have member groups and organisational bodies working on problems from the local to the global. The international presence of the informal networks is with three out of seven cases quite impressive. Organisations and networks of the GJMs in Germany are part of different kinds of international entities. Predominantly, deliberative organisations and informal networks in Germany participate in international campaigns and networks. Associations and assembleary organisations instead are sections of international organisations and federations. Thus deliberative organisational structures are compatible with international organisational affiliations. Yet they are rather part of loose networks or campaigns, in which bureaucratic structures are largely absent.

Regarding grassroots orientation as a decisive factor for deliberative decision-making models, the results support our initial assumption. Seven of the 16 groups favouring majority vote have no local roots. On the contrary, only two of the eight deliberative organisations lack local level activities. Thus deliberative models more frequently have groups on the local level. Participative organisations instead do not include significantly more often local groups than representative organizations.

Geographical distribution shows still another pattern of internal decision-making. Participative organisations cover less geographical fields *in row* than representative ones. On average participative organisations comprise two levels, while the representative organisations cover two or three. Interestingly, amongst the participative organisations there are mainly two kinds of groups: those working on one level, which is normally the local or national, and those working on all four levels like *Attac* and *erlassjahr.de*. Eight of the twelve representative groups are present at three levels or more. The supposed reason for this is that the delegation of power, which is promoted by representative organizations, needs to be transferred step by step within representative organisations from the local to the regional, national and finally the international level. For participative organisations the direct attendance of local activists in international decision-making meetings substitutes this organisational ladder of delegation. This may also explain why most of the eight

representative organisations working on three or more levels include regional activities. Because regions in Germany are of low importance as political units, regional bodies of organisations mainly serve as an intermediary level of interest formation.[10]

The often praised nexus between the local and the global level seems to be already achieved for most of the groups. To work regularly and on an organisational basis on the international level it seems even necessary to have some kind of local or at least regional anchorage. Only *Medico*, *Marsch 2000* and *Ärzte ohne Grenzen* work at the international level without having local or regional member groups.

Formalisation of organisational structures

The indicators for the analysed types of internal decision-making are formal structures as described in written documents or official statements. We define formalization as written or officially stated norms and rules that have a binding effect for the organizations. Formal rules and structures stabilize organisational practices in the long run; they separate the internal affairs of the organisation from the external and prescribe a division of labour and responsibilities. We expect a relation between the general level of formalization of an organisation and its decision-making structures. A high degree of formal structures is negatively correlated with deliberative principles and practices. The fixing of functions and objectives as well as the separation between members and non-members are not conducive to participative models.

Formalization of internal decision-making relates to different dimension. *First*, the amount of written documents about the organizations' goals and structures is a good indicator of formalization. We searched for the following written documents: constitutions, documents of fundamental values, formally adopted programs, statements about membership, information about membership fees. Of course, these documents can overlap. Thus, a constitution can include a statement on fundamental values and/or aims.

[10] For the two trade unions and *Pax Christi* a supposed reason to have regional chapters are the formal political opportunities offered by the federal structures of the German *Bundesländer*. For less established and less formalised groups, the *Bundesländer* and other regional entities play a less important role. Only four of the 15 participatory organisations include regional chapters.

The associational organisations offer on average 2.5 formalized statements about their internal structure. This is more than for the other types groups. It can be explained by the advantages of tax relief for non-profit associations having a certain legal status based on specific constitutional features, including decision-making according to the majority principle and having an elected steering committee. This might also explain the larger presence of documents in GJMOs with an assembleary character. The majority of them is recognized as a non-profit association. Not surprisingly, the informal networks offer fewer of such (formal) elements. And if so, these referred to aims and values. No information was given about membership requirements or constitutions. Table 9 shows that assembleary or associational groups do have written constitutions regulating aspects of leadership and delegation. The rather informal character of deliberative participative organisations does not prevent these organisations from publishing formal programmes and statements on basic values. Interestingly, deliberative representative groups are the most formal actors after the associational organizations.

Table 10. Written documents and decision-making types

	Number of written documents on average	Written Constitutions	Formal programmes	Document of fundamental values	Totals
Associational	2.5	11	5	0	11
Deliberative representative	2.3	2	2	0	3
Assembleary	1.8	4	1	0	5
Deliberative participative	1.8	1	3	2	5
Informal networks	0.7	0	2	3	7
Total	1.9	18	13	5	31

Second, formalization implies regulations of the vertical order of interpersonal relations. We built a simple additive index of the three variables relating to this order, i.e. (1) the presence of spokespersons, (2) a president or functional equivalent, and (3) the existence of an executive committee or a similar body. If we cross the ensuing index by types of groups based on their model of decision-making, we find that all eleven associational organisations have exactly two formalized vertical organisational roles. With the exception of the Trotskyist *SAV, TAZ* and *erlassjahr.de* which have no presidents, but a spokesperson, an executive committee and a president exist in all of the other associations. All five assemblearian organisations have at least one vertical organisational function.

Among them, the alternative media *iz3w* was the most verticalized organisation and the *BUKO* the least. When comparing the two deliberative groups we find a paradoxical distribution. Out of the three deliberative representative organisations only *medico International* has a president and a spokesperson, while *attac and Solid* both have only executive committees. Among the five deliberative participative organizations, two (*FAU*, *Clean Clothes Campaign*) have bodies comparable to executive committees. *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative*, which explicitly rejects a president, *Sozialforum Berlin* and *ALB* are the only groups within the deliberative participative category without vertical structures. Additionally, the absence of formalized vertical structures cannot be taken as a hint for the absence of hierarchy. Informal networks may well have informal vertical power structures.

Third, the internal horizontal division of labour can be considered as another aspect of formalization. Based on the information on the organisational bodies mentioned in the documents, we operationalize formalization as the sum of all mentioned organs: president, spokesperson, executive committees, committee of founding members, assembly, scientific committees, thematic groups, arbitration boards, boards of auditors, committees of guarantors and others bodies. The explicit rejection of a formal body, for example of a president, scored higher on a scale towards informality than the absence of such a statement. On average the associational organisations made more than five positive statements about formal bodies (5.3) and deliberative representative organisations made almost six such statements (5.7). Assembleary organisations are less formalized than their deliberative representative counterparts. On average they made five positive statements. Deliberative participative organisations on average had two formal bodies and informal networks with few exceptions had no such bodies. In the deliberative participative camp *clean clothes campaign* mentioned the most bodies (four), while *Indymedia* as an informal network explicitly rejected formalization. The media actor *iz3w* as well as Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung were with six organisational entities the most differentiated assembleary organizations. As with regard to the number of organs, the associations *Medico International* and *BUND* (seven bodies) were the most formalized organizations.

Based on an additive index, these three aspects of formalization - number of written documents, horizontal and vertical formalization – allow to situate the organisations on a continuum from the most informal to the most formal organizations. Yet one should be

aware about three characteristics of this index. First, the variable on the existence of an assembly was used for the attribution of the decision-making model and this index. Second, the fact that informal networks do not make statements about formalized structures leads to rating these groups as being more formalized than organisations which explicitly denied having formal structures. Third, the addition of values results in different weights of the various dimensions of formalization. Thus, horizontal formalization has a maximum of eight points, the amount of written documents is up to three points, and vertical formalization can reach five points. The final formalization index potentially has a range from 0 to 16. The added actual values range from one point to 15 points. Here we see that high informality in general is only partly mirrored in numbers because the measurement of formalization requires some structures to be observed. Nevertheless, with the exception of informal networks, the results are highly plausible. One indication for this is that only highly formalized organisations propose restrictions for their members. For example, the assembleary *Ärzte-ohne-Grenzen* prohibits executive officials to hold positions in public institutions. Similarly, the associational *BUND* does not allow people in its higher ranks to have business relations that may influence their behavior within the group.

Table 36. Average degree of formalization for decision-making models

	General Formalization	Written documents	Vertical formalization	Horizontal formalization	Total N
Associational	8	3	2	5	11
Deliberative representative	6	2	2	6	3
Assembleary	6	2	2	5	5
Deliberative participative	1	2	0	2	5
Informal networks	1	1	0	0	7
Total	5	2	1	4	31

Table 10 shows that assembleary and associational organisations are the most formalized ones. On average, the associational organisations clearly are more formalized than the other groups of decision-making models. Deliberation and consensus combined seems to be more important in informal organisations than in those stressing either majority votes and participation or deliberation and representation. As one would expect, informal groups have a very low degree of formalization. The most informal were the network *Indymedia* and the deliberative participatory *Sozialforum Berlin*. They lack positive

statements about leaders or other vertical structures. The only reference point for formalization in the case of *Indymedia* was the existence of a written self-portrayal. The most formalized organisations are *BUND* and *Medico International*. Here the number of organisational bodies was decisive. Both groups stated to have seven out of eleven possible internal bodies. It is remarkable that with *BUKO*, *Attac*, *Sozialforum Berlin* and *Indymedia* those actors that identify strongly with the GJMs are the most informal examples in their respective field (with the exception of the associational model).

As further analysis showed the informal groups had on average much lower numbers of both collective and individual members. Another important difference between formal and informal organisations seems to be political radicalism. The radical organisations tend to be more informal, while most of the highly formalized groups are politically moderate.

5. Organisational Strategies

Ideas about democracy that can be found in written documents of GJMOs are likely to correspond with both the objectives of the organisation and the relationship towards political institutions and economic actors. Yet it is hard to make substantiated assertions on activities because of missing information in many cases. Whereas for the associational type half of the GJMOs provide two documents, the density of information is lower for the other types. Having this in mind, we will present a profile of activities that are mentioned as an objective of the GJMOs according to their type of internal decision-making.

The most visible activity of the organisations under study is protest. This way to express grievances is mentioned by half of the groups under study. Grassroots groups following the deliberative participative model are most prone towards protest. By contrast, only one out of five assembleary groups specifies its preference for protest. Interestingly, two thirds of GJMOs categorized as associational do resort to protest. This high involvement is counterintuitive because the associational type includes organisations with a rather non-confrontational attitude. However, the figures can be explained in two ways. On the one hand, they might be an expression of the higher density of information provided by associational GJMOs. This increases the probability to find several objectives for one

single organization. On the other hand, the fact that protest is approved by these organisations may indicate at a trend towards a more variegated strategy of moderate actors. This is supported by a comparison of other objectives specified by the GJMOs (see Table 11).

Table 37. Functions/Objectives of GJMOs

Functions / objectives	**Type of internal decision-making**					**N**
Total of affirmations	**associational**	**deliberative representative**	**assembleary**	**deliberative participative**	**missing**	
protest/mobilisation	7	2	1	4	2	16
Lobbying	6	2	1	1	0	10
political representation	3	0	1	0	0	4
representation of specific interests	4	0	0	0	0	4
Self-awarness/self-help	5	0	0	1	3	9
Advocacy	2	1	1	0	2	6
services to constituency	5	1	1	0	2	9
Spreading information	10	2	5	4	5	26
political education	7	3	3	0	1	14
legal protection	2	0	1	1	1	5
N	11	3	5	5	7	31

The data show that organisations of the associational type pursue different tracks to reach their goals. Half of the organisations engage in lobbying. Adding to this, four out of eleven emphasize their role to represent specific interests. Obviously, these associational organisations are ready not only to engage in a confrontational manner but also to participate in bargaining. Those groups that embrace lobbying and are classified as non-associational – *Medico*, *Fian*, the *Clean Clothes Campaign*, and *Attac* – do nevertheless have attributes close to the associational type. They do not stick to consensus in a strict sense and have informal structures akin to associational structures. Groups that are even more critical towards the principle of representation bluntly reject the bargaining of interests. None of them name the representation of interests or lobbying. The central activity of a vast majority (26 out of 31) of the GJMOs is spreading information. Access to information and transparency are regarded as a touchstone for democracy. Adding to this, GJMOs consider knowledge about social problems as a prerequisite to participation in general and the mobilisation of protest in particular. Some GJMOs offer political education as way to put the emphasis on information into practice. But a closer look at the category of

political education shows interesting differences. Those groups that rely on deliberation in decision-making and have a critical stance towards representation do not tend to focus on education. To them, political education as a unidirectional process might collide with their idea of democratic participation and the autonomy of the individual. Another GJMO objective, the provision of services to the constituency, is most frequent in the associational category. Obviously, these organisations are interested in strengthening ties to their constituency. Trade unions, for instance, were explicitly founded with the aim to promote the concerns of workers. To them, providing information about the rights of employees is important to legitimate their existence and to attract new members.

Ideas about democracy also affect the preferences of GJMOs whether or not to collaborate with authorities and economic actors. This depends on whether such activities are perceived as instrumental to promote democracy. Eight out of 31 GJMOs in our sample positively comment on collaboration with a political institution on the local, national or international level. These are mostly development organisations such as *FIAN* and *EED* which depend on collaboration with the authorities to realise their development projects. Adding to this, the environmentalist *BUND*, the trade union *Verdi* and the *Clean Clothes Campaign* seek to achieve their goals by influencing governmental regulations. By contrast, five organisations refuse to collaborate with established institutions. Some of these groups are part of the antagonist spectre and reject, or are sceptical towards, the state as such (this is true for *BUKO*, *FAU*, *Indymedia*, and the campaign *Kein Mensch ist illegal*). Other groups (like the social forum in Germany) insist on their autonomy from state actors. Particularly those groups critical towards representation abstain from cooperation. This is a consequence of their democratic ideal of self-determination.

Those eight organisations that mention control of political or economic actors as a positive value hardly have common characteristics. But the relation of GJMOs with political representative and economic actors can be better shown when preferences for control and collaboration (or refusal) are combined. Except *Medico* – a rather critical group –, none of the organisations in the development sector collaborates with authorities while at the same time claiming to monitor these. Out of the moderate organisations only the trade unions combine control and collaboration with economic actors. Among the five groups that relate to control affirmatively but refuse to cooperate with authorities or corporations

are three of the core organisations of the GJMs (*Attac*, *BUKO* and *Weed*), plus the Women's march and the *Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung*.

6. Visions of Democracy: Qualitative Analysis

To present a broader picture of the critical potential of the GJMOs beyond the statistical evidence, it is crucial to reconstruct the content of current debates. At first glance, questions of democracy do not seem to be the primary focus the GJMOs in Germany. With few exceptions, the term democracy is not part of the core definition of what is at stake. Even when democracy is explicitly mentioned, it is mainly used as a catchword to lament, for example, on the "crisis of democracy". Many debates on organizing groups and movements are held without explicit reference to democracy. Still, hierarchy and domination by authoritative activists are issues that continue to play a role in internal discussions of the GJMs.

6.1 Notions of democracy and their consequences for organisation

We shall try to illustrate visions of democracy as they can be found in discussions of German GJMs by giving a general overview and providing details about four groups that can be allotted to one of the types in the scheme of internal democracy respectively. These groups are specified in Table 12.

Table 13. Groups referred to in depth

		Delegation of power mentioned/foreseen	
		Yes	**No**
Consensus or deliberation mentioned/ foreseen	**No**	SAV **representing the associational model**	BUKO **representing the assembleary model**
	Yes	Attac **representing the model of deliberative representation**	Sozialforum Berlin **representing the model of deliberative participation**

The question how grassroots participation can be achieved within GJMOs has partially been answered above in the quantitative part of the analysis. To compare the four types that have been specified and to illustrate these categories we will refer to the four groups in detail.

The Trotskyist SAV is a case in point representing the *associational* form of decision-making. For them, democratic centralism is the "natural principle of organisation" (Stanicic 2001: 39) of the labour movement. The concept of democratic centralism follows primarily the goal to form a revolutionary mass organisation which is capable of acting. This premise given, *SAV* members consider representation to be inevitable. Power is delegated successively from the local level via the national to the international level – the *Committee for a Workers' International*. Following the constitution, delegates are always accountable to their rank and file and can be elected or voted out at any time. With efficiency as a major goal, the second organisational premise of the *SAV* is to follow the majority principle in a strict form. Once a decision has been made all members are obliged to conform to this decision.

BUKO, a network of more than 150 member organisations in the development assistance sector, emphasises the value of self-organisation and bottom up-politics. The network offers direct participation without formal reference to the consensus principle. Thus it serves to exemplify the *assembleary model* of internal democracy. Formal roles within the organisation are scarce. At least once a year – on the occasion of a conference – *BUKO* holds an assembly open to members and non-members to discuss the network's policies and decide about future activities.[11] An elected council of spokesmen which defines its role as an "advisory board" speaks for *BUKO* between these conferences. In the formal sense the election of this council is a form of representation. But due to its limited competencies the council can not be compared to a steering committee in an association. Most of the political field work is actually carried out by issue-specific working groups and campaigns whose activities are independent from the assembly and the council of spokesperson.

Compared to *BUKO* the *Sozialforum Berlin* is even less structured. The network is an open meeting for Berlin-based activists with a core of eight to ten people. Activists

[11] Open assemblies play an important role also in the organisation of the annual conference *Bundeskongress*.

characterize the forum as an "public and open space" that allows for discussions marked by mutual respect and learning (Initiative für ein Berliner Sozialforum 2003). In this spirit, group decisions are made following the consensus principle. Because of their local character delegation does not appear as an option for internal decision-making but decisions are made collectively. Activities are prepared and coordinated by a monthly assembly and a preparatory assembly which meets every two weeks. Direct participation and the reference to the consensus principle characterize the social forum's method of decision-making as an example of *deliberative participation*.

Attac Germany follows the model of *deliberative delegation* in their decision-making. Attac is one of the few GJMOs in Germany which explicitly refer to the ideal of deliberative democracy. In a heterogeneous network like *Attac* activists consider structures facilitating participative and deliberation to be vital to offer opportunities for political engagement beyond the ballot (Shahyar & Wahl 2005). Whereas the assembly of *Attac* (*Ratschlag*) originally provided open access akin to the model of BUKO and the *Sozialforum Berlin*, it is composed by delegates since 2002. These delegates represent local groups, affiliated organisations and national Attac working groups. At the *Ratschlag* non-members and non-delegates are welcome but only delegates have the right to vote and take decisions. The disadvantages of delegation[12] are supposed to be compensated for by the consensus principle. But decisions on certain issues are excluded from the consensus principle. When it comes to rules of procedure and the budget, decisions are made by the majority. Considerable debates have accompanied the rise of *Attac* that became the most visible organisation of the German GJMs within a short time. As a project that attracted hopes of many activists, the rapid process of formalisation and professionalisation triggered broad debates. For instance, the executive committee elected by the assembly has become increasingly important. Accordingly, grassroots activists continue to broach the issue of oligarchies and internal democracy (Bergstedt 2004).

Generally, democratic deficits within the GJMOs are dealt with in a pragmatic way. Accumulation of power and a lack of transparency are mostly stated without much anger. Critics persistently point to these malfunctions but they do so without a habit of revelation.

[12] The heterogeneous membership of Attac results in noticeable inequalities between delegates. Both the trade union Verdi (2.3 million members) and a national working group with 15 or 20 members are represented by two delegates.

Especially those GJMOs which claim to follow the principle of grassroots organisation engage in lively discussions about internal democratic structures. Ideals of democratic decision-making can also be underscored in contrast to other groups, especially when they are perceived as competitors. In opposition to the German branch of the Trotskyist *International Socialist Tendency* (IST), for instance, the SAV underlines the importance of democratic debate in their organisation (Stanicic 2001). These debates should allow for a broad participation of as many members as possible. Therefore, the right to express a deviating opinion and to form a fraction are guaranteed in the constitution.

6.2 Criticism against democratic practices

Movement actors with different backgrounds agree on basic perceptions on representative democracy in Germany, Europe and beyond. Central to their criticisms are worries about the hegemony of economic logics which activists perceive as a threat to democracy. As the think tank *Weed* puts it: "parliamentary democracy is eroded by neo-liberal globalization."[13] The neo-liberal doctrine is seen as being fundamentally anti-democratic as it aims at restricting the nation-state's capacity to political intervention. Some activists refer to von Hayek's fear of "totalitarian democracy" as an incentive of the neo-liberal ideology. *Attac* criticises that with their decisions investors have influence on social developments without a democratic legitimation.[14] Unlike the advocates of free trade, GJM activists interpret negative developments in liberal democracies, such as concentration of power, corruption, and disproportionate bureaucracy, as the result of a lack of democracy (Reitzig n.d.).

Heterogeneous networks such as *BUKO*, *Attac* and theSozialforum Berlin do not have a common focus for their criticism of democracy. But most of the activists in these networks perceive the representative model as outdated. They affirm the notion of Rosanna Rossanda at the European Social Forum in Florence[15]: "Our societal crisis is also a 'crisis of representativity', an open crisis of the party democracy which in fact does not represent elementary interests of the population but has become an agency of economic interests that

[13] Weed website www.weed-online.org/themen/finanzen/background.html

[14] http://www.attac.de/ueber-attac/was-ist-attac/

[15] http://sozialforum2005.de/forum/?open=thread.forum.5&Partition=2

are hardly legitimated democratically". Representative democracy is seen as a "hindrance for civil engagement" (Wahl 2004: 16) as it fails to integrate those who want to participate. The authoritative and representative structures prevailing in parties and parliaments de-motivate activists who do not see their individual preferences reflected in aggregated positions. Thus the will to engage politically is believed to be better hosted by social movements given their internal pluralism and their offers to participate.

The *SAV* representing the associational model utters a diagnosis similar to that of the more grassroots-oriented GJMOs: „The FRG is a parliamentary democracy which concedes a number of democratic rights – which have been won in struggles from below. But the actual power is concentrated in the management of corporations."[16] However, the consequences the Trotskyists draw differ from the other GJMOs. They do not question the parliamentary model to represent citizens' interests but the actual way it is practised in Germany and the rest of the world (see section 5.4).

The analysis of the democratic status quo presented by the GJMs is most negative with regard to the international level where decision-making is assumed to be dominated by the logics of warfare and power politics. Adding to this is the lack of a transnational public sphere and democratic institutions to control international governments. Also the European Union (EU) is not seen as a democratic alternative as it means "democracy in a homeopathic dose" (Noll 2004: 1). Except the members of the European Parliament, a parliament with restricted competencies, no representative of the EU is elected democratically. The scepticism is illustrated by results of a survey among participants of the first nation-wide social forum in Germany: 73 percent of the activists did not believe that European integration could be a remedy against neo-liberal globalization. This view was also shared by most activists engaged in the campaign against the European Constitution. However, the lack of democracy was not the main reason to reject the constitution (though many deplored the absence of a referendum). Critics in Germany were more concerned about the constitutional fixing of capitalism and joint military action. Unlike in France, the EU constitution was approved by the parliament, and no lively public debate about pros and cons took place in Germany. Hence many German *Attac* activists engaged in the French debate. The rejection of the constitution in France and the

[16] http://www.sozialismus.info/index.php?name=News&sid=1414

Netherlands was after all perceived as a de-legitimation of representative institutions in the respective countries that supported the constitution against the majority of the electorate (Klein 2005).

6.3 Visions of democracy

The visions of democracy uttered in the context of the GJMOs focus on three topoi: democratic control, grassroots democracy and lack of hierarchy. These focal points signal an emphatic understanding of democracy by stressing aspects of freedom, justice, self-determination and the active shaping of society beyond aspects of legitimacy and efficacy (Brand 2005: 114). By most activists democracy is emphasized as a weapon in the fight against neo-liberalism. As an activist of the Social Forum Berlin puts it: "The defence and fortification of individual rights, the democratisation of society and the spread of solidarity – particularly with the weak – are the main alley to overcome neo-liberalism."[17]

Democratic control is emphasized as a means to fight malfunctions of both the economic and the political system. The primacy of economic aims and the abuse of power should be reduced by the inclusion of those who are affected by the decisions that have to be made.[18] These arguments are shared by the trade unions. They call for limiting the power of the business world. Likewise, the democratic control of financial markets is the key objective of *Attac*. A more radical approach is hold by the *SAV*. In line with the Marxist tradition their aim is a democratic socialism which entails a planned economy serving the needs of all members of the society. The *SAV* assumes that "You can only control what you possess. Thus the *SAV* advocates a socialisation of banks and corporations under the democratic control and management of the working population."[19] Related to the ideal of democratic control, GJM activists demand transparency and the free flow of information. This is seen as a necessary precondition to fight the uneven distribution of knowledge and to facilitate the forming of political opinions under equal conditions. In this context, the internet is given high importance (Kimpel 2003).

[17] http://www.sozialforum-berlin.de/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=155

[18] See the open theory project of *Attac*: www.opentheory.org/attac-awwo/text.phtml

[19] http://www.sozialismus.info/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=646

Most GJMOs agree that the democratic ideals are best realized in grassroots organisations. The highest legitimacy is attributed to processes that are controlled 'from below'. GJM activists expect that the more direct the will of citizens is incorporated in decision-making processes, the better the result. Part of this process is access to decision-making. Anyone willing to should have the chance to participate in political discussions and decisions. Accordingly, "direkte Demokratie" (direct democracy) and "Basisdemokratie" (grassroots democracy) are the keywords to describe the ideal conception of democracy.

The ideals of equality and autonomy of the subject embedded in the concept of grassroots democracy include another feature of the vision of democracy: the absence of hierarchy. This goal is mainly applied to organisational processes within the GJMOs. Some groups such as the *Projektwerkstatt Saasen* seem to concentrate predominantly on the denunciation of hierarchies and authoritative behaviour within the GJMs. They state that organisation "'from below' as a process of equal, autonomous people as well as equal, autonomously acting groups and networks does never – or rarely – take place."[20] Various activists demand transparency as a key tactic to evade hierarchies in groups and networks. Grassroots democracy and the absence of hierarchy are emphasised particularly in groups in the tradition of an autonomous left such as *BUKO* and the *Social Forum Berlin*.

The investigated documents suggest that the ideal of deliberative democracy is not a central concern of the GJMs in Germany. Even though the practices of many groups are implicitly oriented towards this ideal, only few activists embrace the very concept of deliberative democracy on the macro level. Thus, statements indicating that deliberative discourse is a "central element of emancipatory politics" (Wahl 2004: 5) are rare to find. Only in the *Attac* network discussions about democracy explicitly refer to deliberation.

6.4 Alternatives

In order to realise democratic ideals as they are sketched above, several approaches are discussed and practised within the GJMOs. Different ideas about alternative democratic organisation mirror the various approaches to democratisation. Activists agree that the

[20] www.projektwerkstatt.de/hoppetosse/hierarchNIE/index.htm

GJMs are an important actor for the "re-invention of democracy", as *BUKO*-activist Ulrich Brand puts it (2005: 116). Providing alternatives: open, egalitarian forms of organisation to overcome representative models is a "strategic challenge" (Wahl 2004: 2).

As early as the 1950s the attempts for democratic control have resulted in an institution that has had deep impact on the socio-economic constitution in Germany – the model of co-determination. It was introduced by law to ensure the participation of employees, represented in staff associations and supervisory boards in certain economic decisions. As economic actors are perceived to be more influential than ever before, trade unions promote co-determination as one way to submit economic decisions to democratic control. Particularly in recent years, trade unions had to defend co-determination against the attacks of entrepreneurs and conservative politicians who see this model as hindrance to entrepreneurial freedom.

Charity and development organisations which direct most of their resources to non-democratic countries in the south have another focus. Rather than focusing on the state of domestic democracy their aim is to develop a basis for democratic awareness and democratic practices in those countries. Accordingly, charity organisations define the empowerment of poor and marginalized people as one of their core missions. NGOs and churches are supposed to „help the poor articulate their concerns and enforce their claims vis-à-vis those responsible".[21] Participation regardless of the social status is seen as an essential of legitimate democracy. Accordingly, participation, not democracy, is the key word for the catholic *Misereor* to interpret injustice in the world. Following this idea, tangible projects are funded to raise political awareness and the ability to articulate and organize interests.

As a concrete step to enhance democratic participation in the south and the north, the idea of an *orçamento participativo* (participatory budget) as developed in Porto Alegre is applauded by several German GJMOs. Among other groups, this model is discussed by local social forums. Beyond these perspectives for a democratic administration, parts of the GJMs are engaged in discussing their visions for a future Europe. On the European level, local social forums have started to network in a trans-local process. They promote a reticular European integration beyond EU institutions and dominant groups of the national

[21] *Misereor* website: www.misereor.de/index.php?id=5482

GJMs. With a similar intention but another thematic focus the *euroforums* have been created to discuss alternatives to the European constitution and advance the discussion on the future shape of Europe. More specifically, representatives of Attac specified concrete requirements to democratize the EU.[22]

Socialist groups such as the *SAV* promote a re-invention of the idea of representation. Their aim is a socialist democracy, understood as the „organised participation of all in all societal concerns […] Delegates are always accountable to their electorate, can always be unseated and do not have material benefits."[23] These ideas are very close to the organisation's own organisational ideal that is stipulated in the *SAV* constitution (see chapter 5.1). With this concept in mind it stands to reason that the *SAV* embarks also on electoral strategies. „Since the mid-90s the SAV engages in the organisation of a new workers' party. The chance represented by the new *Partei Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit* (WASG) has to be seized."[24] For SAV activists influencing the party founded by leftist unionists and social democrats in 2004 is an attractive strategy to disseminate their ideas and seize power in the parliaments. Thus many *SAV* members are very active in the *WASG*.

The *Social Forum Berlin* by contrast, shows an explicit grassroots approach to improve democratic participation. The activists hope to empower in particular marginalised groups to speak out and take matters into their own hands. In this vein, the social forum has supported a tenants' initiative and the protest of poor people to reintroduce a reduced ticket for public transportation.

As indicated earlier, concepts of democratic self-organisation vary significantly when different GJMOs are compared. Regarding their internal organization, some GJMOs are trying to realize their ideals of grassroots democracy by establishing certain rules such as the consensus principle and rotating moderation. Some of them also reject formal roles which are linked to the accumulation of power. At least for some GJMOs, overcoming hierarchies is seen as a core task to prove that "another world is possible". Efforts to

[22] www.attac.de/aktuell/rundbriefe/sig/SiG45.pdf

[23] „Was ist Sozialismus?" on the SAV website: http://sozialismus.info/index.php?name=News&sid=404

[24] „Wer wir sind & was wir wollen" on the SAV website: www.sav-online.de/index.php?name=mail&inh=abo

implement this idea could be witnessed at the first nation-wide social forum in Erfurt were a "social forum from below" was created parallel to the official forum.

6.5 Conflicting concepts of democracy

The events that led to the establishment of a "social forum from below" are a good example for the controversies about democracy within the GJMs in Germany. Those actors in the preparatory group that downplayed democratic organisation provoked those who insisted on low hierarchies. Eventually, the latter people quit the preparatory group.

More generally, criticism of democracy obviously follows political ideologies. One current of the GJMs embraces the concept of representative democracy. Legitimate representative institutions are defended against an anti-democratic influence of economical actors. The other current questions the representative model as a whole. This current of the GJMs promotes grassroots organisation as an alternative to representative democracy.

The moderate form of criticism aims at the realization of democratic values within the framework of the existing societal model. It is primarily expressed by GJMOs that apply the representative system in their own organization. But as the example of the *SAV* – a group that incorporates the principle of democratic centralism – shows, this interrelation is not stringent. Trotskyist groups try to shape the representative model in a revolutionary perspective. To them hierarchies and majority voting are important to meet the organisation's goals. Similar to the revolutionary rationale in the *SAV* some actors in the moderate current regard intra-organisational hierarchies as necessary to fulfil the organisation's democratic role as a corrective ("Das Auftreten der NGOs spiegelt nur das Versagen der offiziellen Politik" 2002). On the general political level, moderate organisations consider equal rights, participation, democratic control, and the primacy of politics vis-à-vis the economy as preconditions for a legitimate representative parliamentary system. This does not mean that state action is beyond criticism. The German branch of *amnesty international*, for instance, refused to join a campaign for "Democracy and Tolerance" initiated by the German Department of the Interior because of the violations of refugees' rights by German authorities. Moderate GJMOs wish to take advantage of the opportunities the representative system offers to social movements to contribute to social

change. Accordingly, referenda and petitions are considered as democratic correctives to established politics. On the whole, the moderate current of criticism emphasizes the idea of democratic control by critical citizens. Following this line, many GJMOs do not hesitate to cooperate with political institutions. As a representative of the green-leaning *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung* suggests: "NGOs and social movements need many allies. Among others these are parliaments and parties, where ever they are legitimated by democratic and free elections." (Unmüßig 2003: 4)

The radical branch in the debate on democracy does not rely on the representative model. For instance, activists engaged in *BUKO* concede the formal equality provided by representative democracies, but emphasize that these formal structures are "embedded in social conditions of dominance" (Brand 2005: 113). Democracy is rather understood in an emphatic sense as a "mode of living together, in which everybody equally decides on his/her concerns, which consequentially permits comprehensive self-determination and thus absence of domination".[25] To these actors there can be no affirmative relation to the state as it is an integral part of the complex to be challenged: "To criticise domination means to us that states or formally democratic parliamentary politics have to be systematically included in the criticism."[26] Whereas a crisis of representation is broadly agreed upon in the German GJMs, many activists organised in *Attac* do not share the strict interpretation offered in the context of *BUKO*. Accordingly, elections are a regular occasion to exhibit the problematic relation of the radical current with political parties. The pros and cons of voting for a left party are repeatedly discussed in the radical community when elections are scheduled. Whereas the majority of activists participate in elections, a significant proportion abstains. In the survey conducted at the first nation-wide social forum in Germany, around three percent expressed their disapproval of representative democracy as such when asked about their voting behaviour in the last federal elections. Yet criticism of representative democracy is rarely made explicit. This may be due partly to the lack of alternatives on the macro level. For instance, few activists consider the model of a democracy of councils as desirable. In this view, councils as "institutions of self-government" (Kimpel 2003) would allow for a decentralized grassroots democracy. A significant share of movement activists

[25] *BUKO*-website www.buko.info/asww/international.html

[26] *BUKO*-website: www.buko.info/BUKO/positionen3.html

is sceptical about revolutionary models and implicit concepts of democracy that dominated the discussion in the 1960s and 1970s (cf. Bruns 2003).

7. Conclusion

Our analysis shows that, contrary to initial assumptions, German GJMOs are less formalised and rather leaning towards deliberative ideas when compared to their counterparts in other countries. In their documents, many of the German groups embrace the ideas of participation and deliberative decision-making. Of course, their real practices may be different. It appears that in their daily practice GJMOs try to find a compromise between their ideals and the organisational necessities. Thus, in some cases representative structures might play a greater role than displayed in the constitutions. By contrast, organisations which appear to be hierarchical according to our categorisation may have a vibrant rank and file activity that is not mirrored in the formal documents.

Despite the occurrence of principles nurturing deliberation in many groups, according to the material we have analyzed here, the term "deliberation" does not play a significant role in the discussion about internal democracy. But equivalent claims might be brought up in internal discussions about hierarchies. Broadly speaking, German GJMOs envision democracy in two ways: One current promotes the representative model and seeks to realise the democratic promises of equality and participation within this framework. The other current calls for democratic processes beyond representation and puts more emphasis on participation in grassroots structures. It is very likely that these different concepts will continue to create tensions within but probably more so between GJMOs in Germany.

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The Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy of British GJMOs

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Introduction

This paper consists of two main sections. Section 1 presents a quantitative analysis of thirty-eight British GJMOs' formal statements of organisational principles and visions of democracy. Section 2 presents a qualitative analysis of a broader range of documentation on democracy from a sample of four British GJMOs – the World Development Movement, Friends of the Earth, Rising Tide and the Wombles.

1. Quantitative Analysis of British GJMO's Ideology and Discourse on Democracy

1.1 Purpose of the quantitative analysis

This section of the paper is concerned with the ideologies and discourses on democracy of British global justice movement organisations (GJMOs), but only to the extent that these are reflected in a specific range of documents that detail organisational structures and practices. This is not, therefore, a report about the actual functioning of GJMOs. We should remember that the way in which organisations present themselves in (sometimes very dated) formal documents, such as mission statements and constitutions, may differ from how they actually behave today. However, even if it is true that the rules as presented in such documents do not fully reflect the organisations' actual conceptions or practices of democracy, they may have shaped the organisations' behaviour, and the organisational cultures espoused may have become entrenched in their functioning. Whether this is true or not, it needs to be stressed that the data used in this report is from websites and documents, and that it *does not*, and is *not supposed to* represent actual organisational practices.

Documents analysed

For this report, the documents of thirty-eight British GJMOs were analysed. The 38 GJMOs were selected on the basis of their participation within key movements that we consider to be part of the GJM (Rootes and Saunders 2005), and their presence at key GJM protest events since 1998. The selected websites cover the following movement sectors: debt relief, anti-war, religious inspiration, youth, the environment, trade unions, anarchist, antagonist, international solidarity, lesbian/gay groups, anti-racism/immigrants rights, political parties, human rights, fair trade, movement communication (journals, radio and internet communication) and social forums. The most important organisation from each of these sectors was chosen on the basis of the extent of its participation in global justice movement events and our own nominal judgements about its importance within the movement (Saunders and Rootes 2005). No attempt has been made to weight the data for the relative importance of the various strands within the GJM. As a result, a minor strand such as lesbian/gay groups is represented by a single organisation just as a major strand such as international solidarity, and no allowance is made for the much larger number of members / supporters of the latter compared with the former. If available, documents were selected from the following list for each of the 38 organisations:

a) the organisations' constitutions, or Articles and Memorandum of Association of the organization;

b) documents of fundamental values and/or intent;

c) formally adopted program, e.g. strategic plans;

d) "mission statements";

e) the "about us" sections of websites;

f) the "frequently asked questions" section of the websites;

g) equivalent or similar material on the website, expressing the "official" position of the organization as a whole (e.g. internal documents referred to in documents a) – f), like annual reports, membership application forms, etc.).

Websites were used as an initial source of documents, but if the information was not available online, we requested hard copies of the documents from the organisations themselves. Thus, although we were unable to include Manchester Social Forum in the sample for WP2 because its website was down, we were able to include it in the sample for this paper because it was able to provide an offline document on its organisational structure.

Inevitably, the results of this analysis are, at least to some extent, an artefact of the information that was available. For example, informal networks and organisations such as Rising Tide, Radio Rampart, the Sexual Freedom Coalition and the Wombles, have only brief details of their organisational structures and practices on their websites, and they do not have formal constitutions, memoranda / articles of association (because they are not charities or registered companies), formally adopted programmes, or strategic plans. A respondent from the Sexual Freedom Coalition responded to a request for documents with the following statement:

> We do not have a constitution nor a mission statement. We respond to the social situation of the day, and adapt our work according to needs. We do not have members, but our board vote on important values. Our fundamental values of intent is "to defend the sexual freedoms of consenting adults". (personal correspondence)

According to the coordinator of the Global Justice Movement, 'Constitutions, articles of association, memorandum of association, and standing orders do not exist, and do not need to exist.' (personal correspondence, 29/04/05).

Furthermore, we need to be aware that even when these documents *do* exist, they differ drastically in form and content from website to website, and organisation to organisation, making it difficult to make useful or reliable comparisons between organisations. The 'about us' section of the trade union Unison, is, for example, over one page long, and goes into some depth about the four main objectives of the organisation - recruiting and organisation members, negotiating and bargaining to promote equality, promoting and campaigning on behalf of members, and developing an effective union. In contrast, the information available on the Urban 75 website was restricted to a very scant

introduction to Urban 75, and a brief 'frequently asked questions' section consisting of just seven questions, each answered with sentences less than two lines long. Like the Wombles, Rising Tide and Radio Rampart, Urban 75 did not have any additional documents on its organisational structure.

At the opposite end of the spectrum, more formal organisations, including Unison, Oxfam, and Friends of the Earth were able to provide mission statements, strategic plans / lists of key priorities, annual reports, and memoranda of association (see Appendix 1 for a full list of the documents consulted). However, the amount of information within these documents also varies significantly between organisations. For example, the WDM's *Strategic Plan 2003-7* is only two pages, whereas Friends of the Earth's *Strategic Plan 2003-2005* is thirty-eight pages long. And the *Constitution and Standing Orders* of the National Assembly Against Racism is less than two pages, compared to the eighty-four page 'rule book' of the trade union Unison. In short, the analysis would have yielded much more reliable results if the quantity and quality of the information produced by each organisation had been comparable.

1.2. Conceptions of and practices of democracy, and attitudes towards representative institutions: the dependent variables

On the issue of democracy, British GJMOs have a similar profile to the entire European sample with regard to mentioning critiques of delegation / representation, limitation of delegation, the rotation principle, consensual decision-making, and autonomy of member organisations in their documents (Table 1 and Table 2). As elsewhere, a range of organisations, including those that are organised on representative lines themselves, are critical of delegation or representation. Organisations critiquing delegation or representation include, for example, the Green Party, Unison and the Transport and General Workers' Union, as well as the more obvious candidates such as the Wombles, Indymedia Collective, and London and Sheffield Social Forums. Although a higher proportion of British GJMOs claim to have representation as a general democratic value (13.2%) than in the European sample as a whole (6.1%), a higher proportion of British GJMOs are also critical of representative democracy.

Deliberative democracy was explicitly mentioned in over twice the proportion of organisations in the British sample (15.8%) as in the entire sample (7.8%), whereas participatory democracy was mentioned much less amongst organisations in the British sample (15.8% versus 27.9%). A higher proportion of British GJMOs mention non-hierarchical decision-making, inclusiveness and mandated delegation. Thus, it is not so much that British GJMOs are less democratic or participatory than their European counterparts, but that they appear to be rather more concerned with participation with a view to preference transformation in deliberative settings. Indeed, the British GJMOs score higher on dichotomised deliberative general values than their European counterparts.

Table 1. The Associational democratic values

Dependent variables	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)
Internal values of the organization		
Explicit critique of delegation/representation	13.2	11.1
Limitation of delegation explicitly mentioned	5.3	6.6
Rotation principle explicitly mentioned	5.3	6.6
Consensual method explicitly mentioned	13.2	17.2
Deliberative democracy explicitly mentioned	15.8	7.0
Participatory democracy explicitly mentioned	15.8	27.9
Non-hierarchical decision-making explicitly mentioned	26.3	16.0
Inclusiveness explicitly mentioned	34.2	20.9
Autonomy of member organizations explicitly mentioned	31.25 (n=16)	33.1 (n=130)
Autonomy of the territorial levels explicitly mentioned	32 (n=25)	38.5 (n=182)
Mandate delegation explicitly mentioned	10.5	6.1
General Democratic values of the organization		
Difference/plurality/heterogeneity mentioned	44.7	47.1
Individual liberty/autonomy	13.2	21.7
Participation	52.6	51.2
Representation	13.2	6.1
Equality	39.5	34.0
Inclusiveness	31.6	25.8
Transparency	21.1	23.8
Autonomy (group; cultural)	18.4	18.9
Dialogue/communication	31.6	31.6
Internal principle of the organization (recoded)		
Critique of delegation (including limitation of delegation) or non hierarchical decision making	31.6	23.4
Autonomous member organizations or local chapter	10	35.2
General democratic values of the organization (recoded)		
Deliberative general values (factor dichotomized with No<0.5 and Yes>0.5)1	34.2	28.7

As in the European sample, according to information available in the analyzed documents, the majority of British GJMOs fit the associational model (Table 3). Associational internal decision-making refers to a decision-making structure in which participation in decisions is exclusive, and in which there is little discussion or deliberation. British GJMOs that fit this model include the Tobin Tax Network (now called Stamp Out Poverty), Christian Aid, the Fairtrade Foundation and Globalise Resistance.

[1] This is the first component of a factor analysis run with the Varimax Rotation Method. This factor alone explains 32% of the total variation of 8 variables. The variables which weight in this factor are the following ones: Participation (.60); Equality (.64); Inclusiveness (.74); Transparency (.72); and Dialogue/Communication (.71).

In deliberative representative decision-making, representatives or an elite make their decisions by consensus. Organisations that fit this model, on the basis of the information available in organisational documents, include Oxfam, the National Assembly Against Racism, Friends of the Earth, The Green Party and the Socialist Workers' Party. Organisations classified as having an assembleary decision-making structure, such as the Global Justice Movement and Rising Tide mention in their documents that they have an assembly that consists of all members as their main decision-making bodies, but the decisions are *not* made by consensus. There are some inconsistencies between these results and our knowledge of the *actual* organisational structures. Ethnographic research (Saunders 2004) suggests that Rising Tide, for example, is far from assembleary in practice. All group members, and any others who wish to participate, attend open weekly strategizing meetings in which decisions are made on a consensus basis. These weekly meetings are preceded and followed by deliberative discussion on the group's email listserve. However, Rising Tide does not have formal documents about its organisational structures, and although it mentions that it has open networking meetings, it does not mention its consensus decision-making practices in its formal organisational documents.[2] For these reasons it has been misleadingly classified as assemblearian. In practice, and in its unwritten discourse, Rising Tide has a deliberative participative decision-making style.

In the deliberative participative model, the assembly is the main decision-making body, and decisions *are* made by consensus. The Wombles, the Sexual Freedom Coalition, the Green Party, the three local social forums (London, Manchester and Sheffield) and Dissent, according to documents on organisational structures, fit this model.

[2] Rising Tide only has a short political statement, and a brief 'about us' section.

Table 2a. Typology of internal decision making

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)
Typology of internal democracy (not ordinal)		
Associational type	52.6	52.0
Deliberative Representative	15.8	13.9
Assembleary	5.3	13.1
Deliberative participative	15.8	9.4
Not applicable	10.5	11.5

Table 2b. UK sample and the typology of internal decision making

		Delegation of power	
		High	**Low**
		Associational model	**Assembleary model**
Consensus	**Low**	Jubilee Debt Campaign, Tobin Tax Network, Pax Christi UK, Christian Aid, Stop the War, National Assembly of Women, People and Planet, Unison, TGWU, Anarchist Federation, Fairtrade Foundation, World Development Movement, *Red Pepper*, *New Statesman*, Muslim Association of Britain, Globalise Resistance, War on Want, Catholic Agency for Overseas Development, Make Poverty History, Trade Justice Movement.	Global Justice Movement, Rising Tide.
		Deliberative representation	**Deliberative participation**
	High	Friends of the Earth, Oxfam, National Assembly Against Racism, Green Party, Indymedia, Socialist Workers' Party	Wombles, Sexual Freedom Coalition, London Social Forum, Manchester Social Forum, Sheffield Social Forum, Dissent!

The importance of the assemblies / open meetings has been calculated for each of the categories of organisations' internal democratic types. A score of 0 is given to organisations that do not mention whether they have an assembly, a score of 1 is given for assemblies that consist of delegates or for which the composition of the assembly is not specified, a score of 2 is given if the assembly exists and is composed of all members or whoever wants to participate, and a score of 3 is given for cases in which the assembly has the characteristics of those give a score of 2, but it is also mentioned in documentation that

it makes organisational decisions. The mean scores for each category in the British sample are very similar to the entire sample (Table 3a). The organisations with the highest scores in both samples are assembleary and deliberative participative – those that do not have delegation of power. Such organisations do not have an assembly that consists of delegates, and therefore will be unable to score more than 1 in the index of the importance of the assembly. Indeed, as shown in Table 3b, all of the assembleary and deliberative participative organisations have assemblies that are composed of members, or whoever wants to participate, universally scoring 2 on this index. In contrast, 24% of associational and 16.7% of deliberative representative organisations do not even mention the presence of an assembly, and half or more organisations in these categories have an assembly that is only open to delegates.

Table 3a. Typology of internal decision making and importance of assembly / open meeting

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)**
Typology of internal democracy . Assembly Importance degree (mean)		
Associational type (n=20)	0.95	1.2
Deliberative Representative (n=6)	1.2	1.5
Assembleary (n=2)	2	2.0
Deliberative participative (n=6)	2	2.5
ETA	N/A	.413***

Table 3b. Importance of assembly and typology of internal decision making

	Assembly importance degree (recodified)		
Typology of internal decision making			
	0	*1*	*2*
Associational type (n=20)	23.8	61.9	14.3
Deliberative Representative (n=6)	16.7	50	33.3
Assembleary (n=2)	0.0	0.0	100
Deliberative participative (n=6)	0.0	0.0	100

The cross tabulation between internal models of democracy and organisational democratic values shows some interesting results. Very few of the assembleary organisations have deliberative values, or mention internal democratic principles, and a slightly higher proportion of associational organisations have these principles and values. Unsurprisingly, the organisations that have been coded as deliberative representative, or deliberative participative score the highest on indicators of deliberation and democratic values. In particular, all but one of the deliberative participative GJMOs mention in their documents a critique of delegation, inclusiveness, or non-hierarchical decision-making as a positive value (Table 4).

Table 4. Internal democracy and organizational values

	Organizational values					
Type of internal decision making	Part. Democ. (n=6)	Inclusiveness (n=13)	Crit. Del. and non hier. (n=12)	Autonomous org. or loc. (n=10)	Deliberative values (dic.) (n=13)	Ind. or Coll. Autonomy (n=9)
Associational model (n=20)	0.0	20.0	27.8	(n=19 valid assc orgs) 27.8	15.0	15.0
Deliberative representation (n=6)	66.7	50.0	50.0	(n=6 valid del rep orgs) 50	66.7	33.3
Assembleary (n=2)	0.0	50.0	50.0	(n=2 valid assemb orgs) 50	50.0	0.0
Deliberative participation (n=6)	33.3	83.3	100	(n=1 valid del part org) 100	83.3	66.7

Attitudes towards representative institutions

In Britain, the electoral system is relatively closed, but is balanced by a relatively open administrative system. The administration has been sufficiently open to green groups, and by implication to other moderate SMOs working on *some* issues. This allows them to 'remain well-ordered' (Rawcliffe 1998:55). As with environmental groups, it appears that aid, trade and development groups have been knocking on an open door, in that the Labour

government at least listens to its demands, even if it does not act upon them. Although the current government has not bowed to the aid, trade and development lobby's demand to increase the proportion of official aid to 1% of GNP, it has not reduced the aid budget as Conservative governments had previously. Of course, the openness of the state depends very much on the nature of the group that is campaigning, or the particular strategy that a group is using. Groups with more moderate demands will be more readily received, and issues that are already on the policy agenda will be listened to more than those that are not.

The British government has increasingly created new arenas of governance, which have had the effect of reducing the direct patterns of accountability and control that it once had. These new arenas are in quangos (quasi-governmental organisations) and private organisations (Gray 2000:298-9). Additionally, there has been a degree of decentralisation in governance, following the creation of Scottish and Welsh Assemblies, although there is no consistency with regard to the power that these assemblies hold. In Britain as a whole, there appears to be little engagement in local politics, with voting turnout in the 1999 general election reaching an unprecedented low of 29 percent (Norton 2001, Chapter 11).

The result is that Britain has a relatively open administration, which has devolved power to the regions and to quangos, and given increasing responsibilities for policy implementation to local government. Since the 1970s there has been a steady drift to centralization of power from local government. We should therefore expect GJMOs to find it worthwhile to attempt to influence state institutions, and to collaborate with them. The lack of accountability that has resulted from this centralization and devolution and of power, could be a good reason for British GJMOs to seek to 'democratically control' state institutions.

Not only is the government relatively receptive to GJMO demands (at least to those that do not present radical demands), it also provides both direct and indirect funding, increasing their incentive to collaborate with state institutions. The top 500 charities received £53 million from National Lottery funding (government controlled, rather than government financed), and £1,405 in direct government grants in 2003-4 (Table 5).

Table 5. Source of income to the 2003/04 CAF Top 500 Charities

	Income in £millions
Fundraising income	3,229
Legacy income	1,065
Income from the Lottery	252
Income from goods donated to shops	383
Total voluntary income	4,930
Government grants	1,405
Other grants	507
Other income	2,250
Total non-voluntary income	4,163
Total income	9,093

(Source: Charities Aid Foundation website)

Public sector funding for environmental and conservation activities carried out by voluntary organisations is estimated to have totalled £197 million in 2003-4 (Lee & Cracknell 2005:19-20). This is an amount nearly ten times as much as the total disbursed by the thirty-five charitable trusts active in this area. The largest sources of funding are the Lottery Fund (£47 million), the Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs (£35 million), the Scottish Executive (£31 million), the Countryside Agency (£28 million), and the Heritage Fund (£25 million). Interestingly, EU grant schemes accounted for only £7 million. The great majority of these funds was for practical conservation, recycling, or community regeneration. Only 20% of even charitable trust funding was devoted towards advocacy and/or campaigning. However, as with charity funding more generally, only a small proportion of the public sector funds (0.1%) was expended on advocacy and/or campaigning. Indeed, the Charity Commissioners' have a tradition of frowning on overt political campaigning by registered charities (Black 1992).

British GJMOs relationships with institutions are similar to the relationships of the entire European sample. As in Britain, the governance of states in continental Europe has become decentralised, and institutions are becoming increasingly open. Perhaps Britain is more open than most other states. Indeed, British GJMOs cooperate with institutions of governance to a greater extent than the average of the European sample (44.7%, UK, 37.3% all) (Table 6d). Over a third of GJMOs in the British sample cooperate with local or national governmental institutions, and, as expected, over half of them seek to exert democratic control. However most of the organisations that collaborate with national and

intergovernmental institutions are critical of those institutions. Additionally, even though a relatively high proportion of British GJMOs collaborate with governmental institutions, nearly a third explicitly refuse to collaborate with national and transnational institutions and economic actors (Table 6d).

The British sample has a considerably lower frequency of occurrences of GJMOs engaging in democratic control of local institutions than the entire sample (10.5% vs. 21.3%), and this can be attributed to the fact that, besides the three local social forums, the sample does not include local organisations (Table 6a). The three organisations that do mention democratic control of local institutions in their documents all have active local groups: the Green Party, Friends of the Earth and Oxfam.

Whereas over half (58%) of the GJMOs mention in their documents that they are either seeking to improve democracy within national institutions (democratic control), or to collaborate with them, only 42% mention engagement with institutions at the intergovernmental level (Table 6c). Clearly national government is still regarded as a fruitful target for GJMOs, and claims that the GJM is concerned primarily with redressing the democratic deficit of intergovernmental institutions (such as the EC, the UN, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisations) appear to be exaggerated.

Table 6a. Comparing relationships with institutions and economic actors between the British and entire sample

Relationships with institutions and economic actors	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)
Collaboration with representative institutions	31.6	26.6
Democratic control of representative institutions	39.5	32.4
Refusal of relationship with representative institutions	13.2	11.5
Collaboration with local institutions	18.4	22.5
Democratic control of local institutions	10.5	21.3
Refusal of relationship with local institutions	2.6	4.5
Collaboration with (national) state institutions	39.5	24.6

Democratic control of (national) state institutions	50	32.0
Refusal of relationship with (national) state institutions	7.9	9.0
Collaboration with IGOs	31.6	18.9
Democratic control of IGOs	36.8	27.9
Refusal of relationship with IGOs	7.9	7.4
Collaboration with economic actors	28.9	14.3
Democratic control of economic actors	21.1	22.5
Refusal of relationship with economic actors	18.4	14.8

Table 6b.

Relationships with national institutions recoded

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)**
Collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	44.7	33.2
Democratic control on at least one level of national institutions	50	36.9
Refusal of collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	15.8	12.7

Table 6c.

Typology of collaboration/control for national institutions

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)
Not mentioned	42.1	52.9
Uncritical collaborators	7.9	10.2
Uncollaborative controllers	13.2	13.9
Critical collaborators	36.8	23.0

Table 6d.

New dependent variables Relationships with institutions	**Frequencies**	**Cases**
	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)**
Any collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	44.7	37.3
Any refusal of collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	31.6	22.1
Any democratic control on national, transnational institutions and economic actors	52.6	43.0

In the entire sample, there were five highly significant relationships between organizational values and relations with institutions and economic actors. Based on the entire sample, we find that organisations that mentioned inclusiveness in their documents tend to refuse relationships with economic actors and institutions, and organisations that are critical of delegation and pro-non-hierarchical democracy tend *not* to collaborate with them, and to refuse relations. Those GJMOs scoring high on deliberative values (>0.5) engage in democratic control, and those that espouse individual or collective autonomy tend to refuse relations with such institutions. However, only the latter two of these associations look to apply to the British sample in isolation. Although there are not enough cases to carry out a test of associations, we can see that a high proportion of GJMOs that stress participatory democracy tend to mention that they engage in collaboration with institutions, or to refuse it, and/or to democratically control it. Over 2/3 of those GJMOS that mention inclusiveness as an organisational value in their documents mention also democratic control of institutions and/or economic actors. Other variables that look as though they may be significant in the British sample are highlighted in Table 7a.

Table 7a.

Organizational values	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration (n=17)	Any refusal (n=12)	Any democratic control (n=20)
Participatory demo. (n=20)	66.7	83.3	83.3
Inclusiveness (n=13)	38.5	53.8*	69.2
Crit. Del. and non hier. (n=12)	33.3*	50.0*	58.3
Autonomous org. or loc. (n=10)	60.0	80.0*	90.0
Deliberative values (dic.) (n=13)	46.2	46.2	69.2*
Ind. or coll. Autonomy (n=9)	44.4	66.7*	66.7

* = variables that have a Cramer's V score >0.220 in the *entire* sample.

= variables in which over 2/3 of valid UK cases with given organisational values have a particular relationship with institutions and economic actors .

The majority of organisations that engage in any kind of collaboration with governmental institutions and economic actors[3] (local, national and/or international) tend to be associational, but this is largely due to the high number of associational organisations in the sample. Half of the deliberative participative, and half of the deliberative representative organisations engage in some type of collaboration, whereas only one fifth of the associational ones do. Of those organisations refusing relationships with institutions and economic actors, only a small proportion are associational (20% of associational organisations refuse relationships). Nonetheless, several organisations that refuse relationships with some form of economic actors and institutions cooperate with other forms of them. It may be that, with reference to economic actors, these organisations are, like Friends of the Earth, seeking to work with the 'best' (i.e. the most ethical), whilst pressuring the 'rest' to change (Juniper 2000). FoE's annual report of 2001, for example, states that:

> Clearly, it wouldn't make sense for FoE to criticise every corporation every time they did something that campaigners disagreed with. That's why FoE uses the best of sector and worst of sector concepts to help select corporate targets … If the worst of sector corporations are likely to be influenced by a FoE campaign, then they make good targets. If not, then it might be best to

[3] Alternative economic actors were excluded from this analysis.

target the middle of sector corporations, to encourage them to improve their environmental and social performance first, it will then be easier to tackle the more obstinate corporations, as by then they will be way behind the rest of their sector.(FoE 2001a, p.2)

Attempts to democratize institutions and economic actors are widespread across all types of internal decision-making models (Table 7b).

Table 7b. Relation with institutions by type of internal decision making

Type of internal decision making	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration (n=17)	**Any refusal (n=12)**	**Any democratic control (n=20)**
Associational model (n=20)	60.0	20.0	55.0
Deliberative representation (n=6)	50.0	50.0	66.7
Assembleary (n=2)	50.0	50.0	50.0
Deliberative participation (n=6)	16.7	50.0	50.0

1.3. Movement organisational structures

In respect of territorial levels, in the British sample the representation of the national and local levels is very similar to that in the whole European sample. However, the regional level is relatively under- represented and the international level more substantially so. There are far fewer organisations that have an international territorial level in the UK sample, and of those that do, none has a modern loose network (such as the Euro May Day model). The most common form of international level in the British sample is a traditional federation, such as Friends of the Earth (Table 8).

The majority of the organisations in the British sample are single organisations, like Pax Christi, Christian Aid, People and Planet and Friends of the Earth (Table 8). This is because these single organisations are the most significant GJMOs within their respective movement sectors. For example, there was not, at the time of coding, a significant environmental movement network that could be considered part of the movement. In September 2005, however, the Climate Change Movement was established by a range of environmental and development groups, seeking to make climate change a public issue in the way that Make Poverty History was able to raise the profile of 'more and better aid, fair trade and dropping the debt'. Ad hoc umbrella groups that focus on a single issue, or

specific group of issues, like the Climate Change Movement, MPH, JDC and Stop the War Coalition. are more common in Britain than in the rest of the sample. Networks of organisations working on a range of issues are much less common in Britain (Table 8). Membership profiles and the tendency to mention networking with national and transnational SMOs in documents are very similar in the British and in the entire samples (Table 8).

Table 8. Comparing movement organisational structures of the British sample with the entire sample

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)
Territorial levels		
Local	76.3	74.2
Regional	39.5	55.7
National	84.2	83.6
International levels	15.8	37.7
Type of organization		
Single Organization	73.3	53.7
Network or federation	2.6	30.7
Ad-hoc umbrella organization	23.7	15.6
Kind of members (UK n=30, all n=204)		
Only individual	46.7	37.2
Only collective	20	23.0
Both individual and collective	33.3	39
Collaboration/networking with national SMOs		
Not mentioned	10.5	18.9
Yes, in general	39.5	34.8
Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	31.6	31.1
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	18.4	15.2
Collaboration/networking with TSMOs		
Not mentioned	23.7	23.8
Yes, in general	31.6	29.1
Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	28.9	28.7
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	15.8	18.4
Collaboration with "alternative" economic actors	3 6	30.7

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=6 unless otherwise stated)	Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=92 unless otherwise stated)
Type of international level		
Hierarchical 'single' organization	16.7	17.4
Traditional federation	50	30.4
Modern 'loose' network	0	30.4
Campaign	33	21.7

In the British sample, as with the entire sample, data on membership figures was only available for under half of the organisations. For those organisations for which data is available, we can see that the GJMOs in the British sample tend to be relatively large, with few organisations having fewer than 100 members, but also with several having in excess of 100,000 members. Of the 12 British GJMOs with collective members, half have over 100 organisations affiliated to them. Christian Aid has over 20,000 local churches / church groups affiliated to it, Pax Christi has 745, and the Jubilee Debt Campaign has 168 collective members, Stop the War Coalition 650, War on Want 303 (mostly trade unions), and Make Poverty History 400 (figures were correct at the time of coding. At its peak, in July 2005, Make Poverty History had 550 collective members) (Table 9).

Table 9. Size of organisations

	UK sample (n=38)	**Entire sample (n=244)**
Number of individual members		
Up to 100	5.3	10.2
100-1,000	5.3	12.7
1,001-10,000	18.4	9.4
10,001-100,000	10.5	6.6
More than 100,000	7.9	9.1
Missing and not applicable	52.6	52
Number of collective members		
Up to 25	2.6	13.1
26-100	13.2	12.7
100+	15.8	12.7
Missing and not applicable	68.4	61.5

Membership in the British sample is much more inclusive than in the entire sample. Fifty-four percent of the 24 British GJMOs allow for 'everyone to join', compared to 17.3% of the 156 valid cases of GJMOs in the entire sample. Only 8% of the British GJMOs ask for individual members 'to endorse the principles and rules of the group', compared to nearly one third in the entire sample. By contrast, GJMOs are much more stringent about whom they allow to be collective members. Only one quarter of GJMOs with collective members have no requirements for membership and only 6.3% of such

GJMOs claim in their documents that for collective membership it is sufficient to apply and to endorse its principles and rules. Additionally, we can see that formalisation of membership is relatively rare in Britain, being most common in political parties and trade unions (Table 10).

Table 10. Requirements for membership

Requirements for individual members	**Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=24)**	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=156)**
No requirements mentioned	25	29.5
Everyone can join	54	17.3
To apply and to endorse the principles and rules of the group	8	30.1
Requirements mentioned	12.5	23.1
Requirements for collective members	**Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=16)**	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=128)**
No requirements mentioned or everyone can join	25	39
To apply and to endorse the principles and rules or the group	6.3	24.2
Others characteristics of membership		
Formalization with membership card (n=24 UK, n=156 all)	20.1	35
Fee paying membership (n=24 UK, n=156 all)	91.7	92.3
Possibility to expel members (n=24 UK, n=156 all)	46	60.2
Presence of a constitution (n=38 UK, n=244 all)	47.4	57

As with the entire sample, networking with national and transnational GJMOs is very common, as nearly 90% of British GJMOs network with national SMOs, and just over three quarters do so with transnational ones.

A high proportion of British GJMOs mention structural participation (76.3%) and structural inclusiveness (59.4%). Structural participation was coded as mentioned in cases in which an organisation mentioned one of the following in its documents:

1. An assembly that meets at least twice a year
2. An executive committee that is elected by the assembly
3. A president who is elected by the assembly
4. A spokesperson who is elected by the assembly

The only organisations not scoring on this index are the media ones (*Schnews, Urban 75, Red Pepper, New Statesman*), The Tobin Tax Network, CAFOD and the Muslim Association of Britain. Although British GJMOs tend not to mention participatory democracy explicitly, they are clearly not averse to participation in decision-making and electing movement representatives. Structural participation in the entire sample is considerably lower (59%) than among the British. Structural inclusiveness was coded as present in cases in which:

1. Everyone can join the organisation, or all you have to do is to endorse the principles of the organisation (even though a subscription fee may be required)
2. In cases in which it is *not* possible for members to be expelled.

In the British sample, the majority of organisations for which there was sufficient data to make a judgement (21 of 30) scored on this index. With regard to structural guarantee, which was coded as positive if there was mention of an arbitration board, committee of guarantors, or a body for dismissed members to appeal to, just over one fifth of British GJMOs scored on this index, for which valid cases were restricted exclusively to the more formal organisations in the sample.

British GJMOs score relatively low on accountability (although slightly higher than the European sample). This, however, should not be construed as lack of accountability *per se* amongst British GJMOs. Structural accountability is a measure of formal accountability, based on the presence of a board of auditors, a body to approve the budget, an executive committee that is accountable to the assembly, the possibility to hold extra-ordinary assemblies convened by a certain percentage of members, and insistence on the presence of a quorum of members before decisions can be made. Small radical organisations which have small, if non-existent budgets, and no formal organisational structures (and especially no formal documents), do not score on this index, even if, in practice, they are accountable by virtue of their open and inclusive meetings.

Decentralisation is low in the British sample, party because of the way in which the variable has been operationalised. Decentralisation was coded if organisations hold extraordinary assemblies that can be convened by local executive committees, or by local assemblies. There is a limited number of valid cases for this variable, given that just 16

organisations mention the possibility of convening extraordinary assemblies, and only 12 of them have presence at the local level, and three of these – the local social forums - are active *only* at the local level. Decentralisation was also recorded in cases in which delegates to the assembly, or members of the executive committee, are nominated by executive bodies or assemblies of local organisations (again limited to a maximum of nine valid cases, 23% of the sample)

With regard to formalization, no single British GJMO in this sample meets all five requirements of formalization – the presence of a constitution, a document of fundamental values, a formal program, formal members and fee-paying members. Nearly half of them, however, manifest two or three of these indicators of formality (Table 11). Nonetheless, British GJMOs score slightly higher for the mean of the normalised additive index of formalisation than the mean for the entire sample. Under a third of British GJMOs mention the presence of thematic councils in their documents, which has been coded as the 'role of knowledge' (Table 11).

Table 11. Organisational characteristics

	Frequencies of yes (%) UK (n=38 unless otherwise stated)	**Frequencies of yes (%) all (n=244 unless otherwise stated)**
Networking		
Networking with national SMOs dichotomized	89.5	81.1
Networking with TSMOs dichotomized	76.5	76.2
Indexes of organizational structures		
At least one prohibition with institutions, parties or associations	5.3	11.5
Structural participation	76.3	59.4
Structural inclusiveness (n=30 UK, n=204 all)	93.3	47.1
Structural guarantee	23.7	27.9
Structural accountability	47.7	47.5
Decentralization (n=23 UK, n=157 all)	34.8	36.9
Normalized additive index of formalization-mean	.50	.42
Role of Knowledge (presence of thematic or scientific committees)	26.3	39.8
Ordinal variable for the use of knowledge		
Thematic or scientific groups not mentioned	73.7	60.2
Thematic or scientific committees mentioned but not mentioned as deciding	7.9	29.9
Thematic or scientific committees mentioned and mentioned as deciding	5.3	9.8

1.4 The impact of organizational values on the organizational structure

The variables that refer to organisational structures appear relatively constant regardless of organisational internal principles, with the exception of organisations that mention structural inclusiveness (i.e. have unrestrictive memberships) (Table 12). These GJMOs score slightly lower on inclusiveness as an internal democratic principle and on critiques of delegation or the mentioning of non-hierarchical decision-making as a positive value. Paradoxically, the variables that define the index of structural inclusiveness tend to be mentioned in isolation from inclusiveness as a general democratic principle. This suggests that these organisations are most likely to be formal membership organisations, which allow any person to join, but tend not to include them in everyday decision-making. A good example is the average Oxfam supporter, who pays a regular monthly subscription fee and receives the organisation's newsletter, but does nothing else.

There are three significant patterns in the data between the intervening and dependent variables in the British case. Firstly, organisations that engage in transnational networking are more likely to score on indicators of autonomy than those that do not. Of the twenty-nine GJMOs that engage in transnational networking, ten score on indicators of autonomy. None of the nine organisations that do not engage in transnational networking score on indicators of autonomy. Secondly, organisations that stress the role of knowledge by noting in their documents that they have thematic councils, tend to be more prolific in critiquing delegation and/or holding a positive attitude towards non-hierarchical decision-making than their counterparts; just under two-thirds of GJMOs with thematic councils are critics, compared to just over one quarter of those not mentioning thematic councils. Thirdly, although only two-thirds of organisations with thematic councils stress participatory democracy, less than ten percent of those without thematic councils do so.

Almost across the board, the GJMOs in the British sample tend to score between zero and two more frequently than between three and five in the additive index of democratic values. This is less pronounced amongst organisations that mention structural participation (58% of them score between 0-2, and 42% between 3-5) than among organisations that mention decentralisation (80% versus 20%). The only exceptions are GJMOs with thematic councils, of which 45.5% score 0-2, and 54.4% score 3-5. Autonomy as a value is relatively evenly spread throughout the sample regardless of organisational

structure, but deliberative general values are noticeably more commonly held by organisations that have thematic councils.

Table 12. Organisational values and organisational structure

Organizational values	**Organizational structure**				
	Structural Participation n=29	Structural inclusiveness n=22.	Decentraliz. n=5	National net n=34	Transnational net n=29
Participatory demo. (n=6 unless stated otherwise)	83.3	100 (n=3)	25 (n=4)	83.3	83.3
Inclusiveness (n=13 unless stated otherwise)	84.6	75 (n=8)	42.9 (n=7)	89.5	84.6
Crit. Del. and non hier. (n=12 unless stated otherwise)	83.3	100 (n=7)	21.7 (n=6)	91.7	75.0
Autonomous org. or loc. (n=10 unless stated otherwise)	90.0	77.8 (n=9)	14.3 (n=7)	90.0	100
Deliberative values (dic.) (n=13 unless stated otherwise)	92.3	87.5 (n=8)	12.5 (n=8)	92.3	76.9
Ind. or coll. Autonomy (n=9 unless stated otherwise)	100	66.7 (n=6)	33.3 (n=6)	89.5	76.3
	Structural Accountability	Formalization (mean)	Organiz. Auto.	Thematic councils.	Ordinal knowl. (ETA)
Participatory demo. (n=6)	50.0	0.6 (n=3)	66.7	16.7	83.3
Inclusiveness (n=13)	38.5	0.51 (n=7)	38.5	38.5	15.4
Crit. Del. and non hier (n=12)	41.7	0.57 (n=6)	33.3	50.0	25.0
Autonomous org. or loc (n=10)	50.0	0.6 (n=6)	50.0	50.0	20.0
Deliberative values (dic.) (n=13)	53.8	0.5 (n=6)	30.8	46.2	23.1
Ind. or coll. Autonomy (n=9)	44.4	0.6 (n=5)	77.8	33.3	13.2

With regard to organisational values against membership patterns (number of members, and kind of members), there are no striking patterns worthy of discussion, except for the fact that those organisations that have collective memberships (quite logically) tend *not* to mention participatory democracy. The two GJMOs that have between 100 and 1,000 individual members (Globalise Resistance and the National Assembly of Women) do not display any evidence of these organisational internal democratic principles in their documents. Of the six GJMOs with over 100 collective members, half of these mention in

their documents that their affiliated organisations are autonomous. With regard to organisational types, it is scarcely surprising that a higher proportion of organisations that are umbrella groups have autonomous organisations affiliated to them, because that is the nature of umbrella groups. This variable is not applicable for single organisations, unless they have local chapters.

By cross tabulating the typology of internal democracy with the variables on organisational structure, we can see that structural participation is common amongst all types, but slightly less so in assembleary and deliberative participative organisations. Additionally, associational organisations have less structural inclusivity, and deliberative participative organisations score significantly lower on structural accountability, but higher on organisational autonomy. This is not because the deliberative participative organisations – the Wombles, the Sexual Freedom Coalition, Dissent and the local social forums – are not accountable, but rather because the index is constructed to measure formal accountability, found in larger organisations that are required by law to produce accounts. Little extra effort is required to make these documents public once they exist, and they serve to increase transparency,

The majority of organisations in all categories of internal democratic types are single organisations, and this is an artefact of the sample, which is heavily biased towards single organisations. However, Table 13 does indicate that British GJMOs that are assembleary tend to have collective members, and that deliberative representative GJMOs have mostly individual members and few collective ones.

Table 13. Type of internal decision making and organisational structure

Type of internal decision making	Organizational structure				
		Structural inclusiveness (n=22)	**Decentralization (n=5)**	**National net (b=34)**	**Transnational net (n=29)**
Associational model (n=20 unless otherwise stated)	80.0	60.0	25.0	95.0	80.0
Deliberative representation (n=6 unless otherwise stated)	83.3	100 (n=5)	0 (n=5)	95.0	80.0
Assembleary (n=2 unless otherwise stated)	100	100	0 (n=1)	100	100
Deliberative participation (n=6 unless otherwise stated)	100	100 (n=1)	100 (n=1)	100	50.0

	Structural Accountability (n=18)	**Formalization (Mean)**	**Organizational Autonomy (n=7)**	**Role of knowledge (n=10)**	**Ordinal knowledge (n=5)**
Associational model (n=20)	60.0	0.537	15.0	20.0	2
Deliberative representation (n=6)	83.3	0.560	16.7	50.0	0
Assembleary (n=2)	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0
Deliberative participation (n=6)	16.7	No valid cases	50.0	50.0	3

	Type of organization
Associational model (n=20)	65% =Single organization
Deliberative representation (n=6)	83%=Single organization
Assembleary (n=2)	50% = Single organization 50% = ad hoc
Deliberative participation (n=6)	Single organization and network

Regardless of their organisational structure, British GJMOs have a higher tendency to mention a refusal of relationships with, or democratic control of institutions and

economic actors than they do to collaboration with them. Collaboration with organisations that score high on structural accountability is especially low, possibly because they regard cooperation with institutions and economic actors as a practice that may undermine their accountability. Organisations that stress the role of knowledge, by mentioning thematic councils in their documents, are twice as likely to exert democratic control on institutions and economic actors than they are to refuse or collaborate with them.

There are two interesting relations between organisations that refuse relations and score on indicators of structural accountability; firstly between organisational structures and relationships with institutions and secondly, between organisations that refuse relations and have structural inclusiveness. The first can be attributed to the reasoning expressed above: collaboration with institutions is seen to weaken structural accountability and refusal of relationships to strengthen it. Eighteen GJMOs mention a refusal of relations, and only six of them do not score on accountability. Of the twenty that do not mention a refusal of relations, all but five of them do not mention accountability. With regard to the second interesting relation, of the twenty-two organisations that mention structural inclusiveness, ten of them refuse relations with one type of institutional or economic actor (excluding alternative economic actors). Of those sixteen that do not mention structural inclusiveness (or for which it is not applicable), nine do not mention refusal of relationships. Thus, British GJMOs that claim in their documents to have open and unrestrictive memberships, or the possibility to expel members are more likely to mention that they refuse relationships with institutions and organisations. Twenty-nine of the 38 GJMOs in the sample score a positive value on the index of structural participation. Of the nine that do not score, only one has any collaboration with institutions and economic actors. Three quarters of the organisations that do not have organizational autonomy do collaborate with institutions and economic actors. Three quarters of the organisations that do not engage in networking with other GJMOs do *not* engage in democratic control of institutions, compared to near 2/3 of those that do network. Perhaps it is through national networking coalitions that GJMOs seek to bring about democratic control. A good example would be the Corporate Accountability Network, consisting of FoE, WDM and others. It seeks improved accountability of corporations using laws and direct lobbying of organisations (Table 14).

Table 14. Organisational structure and relations with institutions and economic actors

Organizational structure	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration (n=17)	**Any refusal (n=12)**	**Any democratic control (n=20)**
Organiz. Autonomy (n=7)	57.1	85.7	85.7
Structural participation (n=29)	55.2	34.5	58.6
Structural inclusiv. (n=22)	45.5	27.3	54.5
Structural accountability (n=18)	66.7	22.2	66.7
Decentralization (n=5)	100	40	100
Formalization-mean (n=24)	0.564	0.521	0.550
National net. (n=34)	50	32.4	55.9
Transnational net. (n=29)	48.3	37.9	58.6

GJMOs with larger memberships tend more to engage with, and to seek to exert democratic control over institutions and economic actors. One of the two British GJMOs with a membership size less than 100 stresses its refusal of relations with institutions and economic actors (Table 15).

Table 15. Organisational structure and relations with institutions and economic actors

Organizational structure	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration (n=17)	**Any refusal (n=12)**	**Any democratic control (n=20)**
N. of individual members			
Up to 100 (n=2)	0.0	50.0	50.0
101-1000 (n=2)	0.0	0.0	0.0
1001-10000 (n=7)	4.0	14.3	71.4
10001-100000 (n=4)	75.0	25.0	50.0
100000+ (n=3)	100	66.7	100
N. of collective members			
Up to 25 (n=1)	100	0.0	100
26-100 (n=5)	60.0	0.0	40.0
100+ (n=6)	66.7	33.3	66.7
Type of Organization			
Single organization (n=28)	39.3	32.1	46.4
Network or federation (n=1)	0.0	0.0	0.0
Ad-hoc umbrella (n=9)	66.7	33.3	77.8

1.5 Basic themes and values

The most prevalent theme for British GJMOs is new globalism (coded if globalisation, democracy and social justice are mentioned in the organisations documents), followed by peace and non-violence, eco-minority (NSM issues – ecology, animal rights, women's rights, anti-racism) and critical sustainability. Few organisations are explicitly anti-capitalist (autonomist or anarchistic), and fewer still are part of the traditional left (Table 16).

Table 16. Campaigning themes

Main campaigning themes		
Critical sustainability	50.0	58.6
New globalism	81.6	87.3
Eco-minority	68.4	70.9
Anti-capitalism	18.4	26.6
Peace / non-violence	73.7	69.3
Traditional left	7.9	8.6
Normalized additive index of critical sustainability – mean	0.25	0.31
Normalized additive index of new globalism - mean	0.40	0.49
Normalized additive index of eco-minority – mean	0.24	0.31
Normalized additive index of peace and non-violence – mean	0.31	0.33

British GJMOs that mention participatory democracy in their documents tend mostly to work on the themes of critical sustainability, eco-minority and peace and non-violence. Those that mention inclusiveness tend to focus on new globalism, eco-minority and peace and non-violence. The former pattern is the same for GJMOs that are critical of delegation or positive towards non-hierarchical decision-making and those with autonomous organisations, deliberative values, individual or collective autonomy. What sets new globalism organisations apart is their tendency to mention inclusiveness in their documents to a greater extent (Table 17). Overall, there are few GJMOs with an anti-capitalist or traditional theme, however the greatest proportion of anti-capitalist organisations have autonomous collective affiliates or local organisations (although only

57.1% of those with autonomous collective affiliates or local organisations) (Table 17). Additionally, GJMOs working on the theme of peace and non-violence, have a high tendency to have autonomous organisations. None of the GJMOs in the sample that did not have peace / non-violence as an explicit theme claimed to have autonomous local chapters / organisations, whereas ten of the 18 GJMOs working on this theme claimed *to* have these. Cross tabulation reveals that organisations with an anti-capitalist theme appear more likely to mention inclusiveness in their documentation than those without it. Just under three quarters of anti-capitalist organisations explicitly mention inclusiveness, whereas three quarters of the organisations that do not have a theme of anti-capitalism do *not* mention inclusiveness. Those organisations *not* mentioning inclusiveness score the lowest in terms of their reference to new globalism. Five of thirteen inclusive organisations score more than 0.83, whereas none of the non-inclusive organisations do. Six of the twenty-five GJMOs that do not mention inclusiveness are not new globalists in any sense, and just one of the thirteen GJMOs that mentions inclusiveness has a new globalist theme (Table 17). The implication is that within the broad umbrella of the GJM we have two distinct strands – a new politics, new globalist strand, and an anti-capitalist / social inclusivist strand that scarcely relates at all to new politics / new globalism.

Table 17. Basic themes and organisational internal values

	Critical Sustainibility (n=19)	**New Globalism (n=31)**	**Eco-minority (n=26)**	**Anti-capitalism (n=7)**
Participatory demo.	83.3	100	100	33.3
Inclusiveness	53.8	84.6	84.6	38.5
Crit. Del. and non hier.	50.0	83.3	83.3	41.7
Autonomous org. or loc.	42.9	100	85.7	57.1
Deliberative values (dic.)	69.2	92.3	84.6	30.8
Ind. Or coll. Autonomy	70.0	90.0	80.0	20.0

	Peace and non-violence (n=28)	**Traditional left (n=3)**
Participatory demo.	100	0.0
Inclusiveness	84.6	7.7
Crit. Del. and non hier.	91.7	16.7
Autonomous org. or loc.	100	0.0
Deliberative values (dic.)	92.3	0.0
Ind. or coll. Autonomy	100	0.0

As with the other variables already discussed, it is not possible to carry out a test of significance on the associations between the internal model of democracy, and organizational democratic values because of the nature of the data. However, a glance at the cross tabulation between these two sets of variables shows some interesting results. Very few of the assembleary and associational organisations have deliberative values. Unsurprisingly, the organisations that have been coded as deliberative representative, or deliberative participative score the highest on indicators of deliberation and democratic values. In particular, all but one of the deliberative participative GJMOs mention in their documents a critique of delegation, inclusiveness, or non-hierarchical decision-making as a positive value (Table 18).

Table 18. Typology of internal decision making and organisational values

	Organizational values					
Type of internal decision making	**Part. Democ. (n=6)**	**Inclusiveness (n=13)**	**Crit. Del. and non hier. (n=12)**	**Autonomous org. or loc. (n=10)**	**Deliberative values (dic.) (n=13)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy (n=9)**
Associational model (n=20 unless otherwise stated)	0.0	20.0	15.0	27.8	15.0	15.0
Deliberative representation (n=6 unless otherwise stated)	66.7	50.0	66.7	50.0	66.7	33.3
Assembleary (n=2 unless otherwise stated)	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	50.0	0.0
Deliberative participation (n=6 unless otherwise stated)	33.3	83.3	83.3	100	83.3	66.7

GJMOs working on the theme of critical sustainability have a high tendency to collaborate with, and exert democratic control over institutions and economic actors. Only 21.1% of the organistions that *do not* have the theme of critical sustainability do not engage in collaboration, and just over one third do not engage in any democratic control. Over half

of the GJMOs working on all of the other themes with the exception of peace and non-violence also engage in collaboration. Unsurprisingly, those most inclined to refuse relations with institutions are those working on an anti-capitalist theme (Table 19).

Table 19. Basic themes and relations with institutions and economic actors

	Relations with institutions and economic actors		
Basic Themes and Values	**Any collaboration (n=17)**	**Any refusal (n=12)**	**Any democratic control (n=20)**
Critical sustainability	68.4	42.1	68.4
New globalism	51.6	38.7	61.3
Eco-minority	38.5	42.3	53.8
Anti-capitalism	14.3	57.1	42.9
Peace and non-violence	46.4	42.9	57.1
Traditional left	0.0	0.0	33.3

1.6 Repertoires of action

The main functions of the organisations in the British sample are protest / mobilization, lobbying, spreading information / engaging with the media / raising awareness, and political education. Few British GJMOs have the functions of political representation, representing specific interests, offering / supplying services to their constituencies and legal protection / denouncing repression. The British appear distinctive in the extent to which they emphasize lobbying, advocacy and political education (Table 20).

Table 20. Repertoires of action

Functions / objectives		
Protest / mobilization	73.7	69.3
Lobbying	63.2	35.7
Political representation	10.5	11.5
Representation of specific interests	10.5	18.4
Self awareness / self help	10.5	13.9
Advocacy	34.2	22.5
Offer / supply of services to constituency	10.5	21.7
Spreading information / media / awareness	71.1	68.0
Political education	84.2	42.6
Legal protection and denunciation on specific theme of repression	13.2	17.6

When we cross tab repertoires of action and organizational values, we can see that roughly 30% of organisations involved in each of protest/mobilization, lobbying, information raising and political education mention a critique of delegation, and a positive attitude towards non-hierarchical decision-making. They also mention the presence of autonomous local chapters / organisations, and state that they are inclusive. Few British GJMOs mention participation, regardless of their main functions, and GJMOs that engage in advocacy work generally mention fewer internal democratic principles (table 21).

With regard to organisational themes, we can see that none of the GJMOs in the sample that did not have peace / non-violence as an explicit theme claimed to have autonomous local chapters / organisations, whereas ten of the 18 GJMOs working on this theme claimed *to* have these. Cross tabulation also reveals that organisations with an anti-capitalist theme appear most likely to mention inclusiveness in their documentation than those without it. Just under three quarters of anti-capitalist organisations explicitly mention inclusiveness, whereas three quarters of the organisations that do not have a theme of anti-capitalism do *not* mention inclusiveness. Those organisations *not* mentioning inclusiveness score the lowest in terms of their reference to new globalism. Five of thirteen inclusive organisations score more than 0.83, whereas none of the non-inclusive organisations do. Six of the twenty-five GJMOs that do not mention inclusiveness are not new globalists in any sense, and just one of the thirteen GJMOs that mentions inclusiveness has a new globalist theme (Table 21).

Table 21. Repertoires of action and organizational values

Objective/functions	**Organizational values**					
	Part. Democ.	**Inclusiveness**	**Crit. Del. And non hier.**	**Autonomous org. or loc.**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy**
Protest/mobilization (n=28 unless stated otherwise)	17.9	32.1	35.7	34.7 (n=23)	39.3	21.4
Lobbying (n=24 unless stated otherwise)	20.8	29.2	25.0	33.3 (n=21)	33.3	16.7
Political representation (n=4)	25.0	25.0	50.0	25.0	50.0	0.0
Rep. of specific interests (n=6 unless stated otherwise)	0.0	25.0	50.0	0.0 (n=4)	25.0	0.0

Self-awareness/self-help (n=4)	25.0	50.0	25.0	0.0	50.0	0.0
Advocacy (n=13)	15.4	46.2	23.1	23.0	46.0	15.4
Offer services (n-4)	25.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	0.0
Spreading information (n=27 unless stated otherwise)	18.5	33.3	29.6	34.8 (n=23)	33.3	11.1
Political education (n=32 unless stated otherwise)	15.6	31.1	34.4	40.0 (n=25)	31.3	15.6
Legal protection/repres. (n=5 unless stated otherwise)	20.0	20.0	40.0	45.0 (n=4)	40.0	40.0

Protest/mobilization is most common for deliberative participative and deliberative representative organisations, and least common for assembleary organisations. Associational organisations, which are most likely to be working on the theme of development/trade and aid, are the most prolific lobbyists. Political representation, representation of specific interests and self-awareness/self-help are generally relatively uncommon, but are not a function at all of assembleary and deliberative participative organisations. All democratic types of GJMOs engage in spreading information and political education, but associational and deliberative participative organisations do so less. Only a few deliberative participative GJMOs engage in legal protection.

Table 22. Repertoires of action and type of internal decision making

Objective/functions	**Type of internal decision making (% of column)**			
	Associational (n=20)	**Delib. Repres. (n=6)**	**Assembleary (n=2)**	**Delib. Partic. (n=6)**
Protest/mobilization (n=27)	75.0	83.3	50.0	100
Lobbying (n=23)	75.0	66.7	50.0	50.0
Political representation (n=4)	15.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
Rep. of specific interests (n=4)	10.0	33.3	0.0	0.0
Self-awareness/self-help (n=4)	15.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
Advocacy (n=13)	50.0	33.3	50.0	0.0
Offer services (n=4)	15.0	16.7	0.0	0.0
Spreading information (n=27)	80.0	100	100	33.3
Political education (n=32)	85.0	100	100	66.7
Legal protection/repres. (n==5)	10.0	0.0	0.0	33.3

Cross tabulation of functions / objectives against relationships with institutions and economic actors reveals shows that over 70% of the British GJMOs that engage in lobbying collaborate with such institutions. Of the 15 GJMOs that do not engage in lobbying, not a single one collaborates. Thus, lobbying and collaboration appear to go hand-in-hand with collaboration (again, this represents FoE's approach). GJMOS that are involved in political representation and the representation of specific interests tend not to refuse relationships with institutions – involvement with such institutions is, of course, the main focus of their activity. However over one third of GJMOs that do not have these functions refuse relationships with institutions and economic actors. Another striking set of figures worth mentioning is that 60% of the GJMOs that spread information collaborate, compared to under 10% of those that do not spread information (Table 23).

Table 23. Repertoires of action and relations with institutions and economic actors

Functions/objectives	**Relation with institutions and economic actors (horizontal %)**		
	Any collaboration (n=17)	**Any refusal (n=12)**	**Any democratic control (n=20)**
Protest/mobilization (n=27)	50.0	32.0	57.1
Lobbying (n=23)	70.8	33.3	62.5
Political representation (n=4)	75.0	0.0	75.0
Rep. of specific interests (n=4)	50.0	0.0	50.0
Self-awareness/self-help (n=4)	75.0	25.0	50.0
Advocacy (n=13)	69.2	23.1	53.8
Offer services (n=4)	75.0	25.0	50.0
Spreading information (n=27)	59.3	29.6	63.0
Political education (n=32)	50.0	34.4	56.3
Legal protection/repres. (n==5)	40.0	40.0	40.0

1.7. Environmental context and democratic values

The British sample has a higher proportion of organisations that were founded prior to 1968 than the entire sample does (Table 24). These organisations are largely aid / trade / development organisations (including Christian Aid, Oxfam and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development), most of which formed between 1942-1952, but also include the Transport and General Workers' Union (est. 1922), the National Assembly of Women (est. 1952) and the *New Statesman* magazine (est. 1913). People and Planet, Friends of the Earth, the Anarchist Federation, the World Development Movement, the Green Party and

the Socialist Workers' Party are more overtly political organisations that were formed between 1969 and 1989. Organisations in the sample that formed in the 1990s are Unison, the Fairtrade Foundation, the National Assembly Against Racism, the Sexual Freedom Coalition, *Schnews*, and *Red Pepper*.

Additionally, the British sample has a higher number of organisations that were established post-2000, and these include the huge trade / aid / development coalitions of the Trade Justice Movement, the Jubilee Debt Campaign (which continued the work of the Jubilee 2000 coalition that was established in 1997), Make Poverty History, and the smaller Tobin Tax (Stamp Out Poverty) network. The Stop the War Coalition has also been established since the onset of the new millennia, along with some radical organisations such as the Wombles, Radio Rampart (which formed to provide radio coverage for the London ESF in October 2004), Indymedia, and the three local social forums (London, Sheffield and Manchester). One reason for the higher number of organisations established post-2000 in the British sample compared to the European sample could be the relatively slow and late development of social forums in Britain compared to continental Europe. It could also be an artefact of the purposive selection of organisations.

Table 24. Year of foundation

	Foundation year	
	UK sample (n=38)	**Entire sample (n=244)**
Before 1968	21.1	13.5
1969-1989	15.8	20.5
1990-1999	21.1	34.8
2000+	39.5	27.9
Missing	2.6	3.3

Table 25 shows that GJMOs established post-2000 are most likely to score more highly with regard to the democratic organizational values of participatory democracy, inclusiveness, critiques of delegation / positive attitudes towards non-hierarchical decision-making, to have autonomous collective members / local organisations, deliberative values and individual or collective autonomy.

Table 25. Year of foundation and organisational values

Year of foundation	Organizational values					
	Part. Democ. (n=6)	**Inclusiveness (n=13)**	**Crit. Del. and non hier. (n=12)**	**Autonomous org. or loc. (n=10)**	**Deliberative values (dic.) (n=13)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy (n=9)**
Before 1968 (n=8)	16.7	15.4	0.0	10.0	15.4	11.1
1969-1989 (n=6)	13.3	15.4	33.3	40.0	15.4	33.3
1990-1999 (n=8)	0.0	15.4	25.0	0.0	15.4	22.2
2000+ (n=15)	50.0	53.8	41.7	50.0	53.8	33.3

Recently established GJMOs are also more likely to be deliberative participative – indeed, all of the local social forums in the sample were established after 2000. The associational model, which is generally more characteristic of older GJMOs also fits a relatively high proportion of recently established GJMOs, most notably the large coalitions that have formed to campaign against the debt burden and unfair trade (such as Make Poverty History). Deliberative representation is the preferred method of democratic organisation for organisations established between 1969 and 1989.

Table 26. Year of foundation and type of internal decision making

Type of internal decision making	Year of foundation			
	Before 1968 (n=8)	1969-1989 (n=6)	1990-1999 (n=6)	2000+ (n=14)
Associational model (n=20)	35.0	15.0	20.0	30.0
Deliberative representation (n=6)	16.7	50.0	16.7	16.7
Assembleary (n=2)	0.0	0.0	0.0	100
Deliberative participation (n=6)	0.0	0.0	16.7	83.3

Older GJMOs, which we would expect to be more institutionalised, and therefore to in collaborate with institutions and economic actors to a greater extent in fact appear, on the basis of their documentation, to collaborate with them to a *lesser* extent than their more modern counterparts. Indeed, it is the most recently formed GJMOs that appear to

collaborate, refuse and seek to democratically control institutions and economic actors to the greatest extent (Table 27). This surprising result is almost certainly an artefact of our method. We have, in our focus upon what is novel in the GJM, deliberately included in our 'sample' the new organisations which we believe to be most characteristic of or central to the GJM, or which have been especially prominent in the public manifestations of the GJM. Several of these 'organisations' are new campaigning confederations anxious to influence public and corporate policy at what they perceive to be a critical moment in history. As a consequence, in order to emphasize their seriousness and potential impact, as well as to attract support to what are generally 'virtual' organisations, which flourish only as long as the spotlight is upon them, they proclaim their willingness to collaborate. Older, more established organisations are generally more substantial, and have less need to proclaim their centrality to virtual networks or their collaboration with others. In fact, they often *do* collaborate, but they do so routinely and less publicly. Our method systematically underestimates the extent of such interactions.

Table 27. Year of foundation and relationships with institutions and economic actors

Year of foundation	Relation with institutions and economic actors		
	Any collaboration (n=17)	**Any refusal (n=12)**	**Any democratic control (n=20)**
Before 1968 (n=8)	29.4	16.7	15.0
1969-1989 (n=6)	23.5	25.0	20.0
1990-1999 (n=8)	11.8	8.3	20.0
2000+ (n=15)	35.3	50.0	45.0

1.8 Conclusion

Significant associations and patterns in the data

The research model (see comparative chapter based on the entire sample) clearly oversimplifies the reality. In contrast to the (general) research model, there are no significant relations between the two sets of dependent variables (associational model vs. general democratic values). There are associations between the organisational types (independent variables) and organisational democratic principles / values, but *not* between them and organisational structure (intervening variables). Although there are associations between the intervening variables and the dependent variables of internal democratic types

and relations with institutions, these are associated much more closely with the independent variables.

Unsurprisingly, associational and assembleary organisations mention fewer internal principles and organisational general democratic values than their more deliberative counterparts. British associational organisations also score less for structural inclusivity, whilst British deliberative participative GJMOs tend to be the most decentralised, yet engage the least in transnational networking. Participatory democracy is mentioned mostly by deliberative representative organisations. Most of the deliberative participative organisations have been established since 2000 and so are less likely to have settled decision-making practices. These organisations also tend to score higher than their older and less deliberative and participative counterparts on internal principles of democracy. Those GJMOs that mention in their documents that they refuse relations with economic actors and institutions tend to have a high proportion of autonomous local groups or collective members. Democratic control of institutions and economic actors is most common, and is found in tandem with a broad range of democratic organisational internal principles, such as inclusiveness, deliberative values and individual or collective autonomy. Organisations working on the theme of anti-capitalism are, unsurprisingly, those least likely to collaborate with institutions and economic actors. On the other hand, those that engage in lobbying and advocacy – campaign strategies shunned by many anti-capitalists – do tend to collaborate. GJMOs that mention the campaign themes of new globalism and eco-minority are the most critical of delegation / pro-non-hierarchical decision-making, and score highest on indicators of deliberation.

However, we should remember that, in practice, the presence of an apparent relationship between two variables does not indicate causality. It is impossible, with this type of analysis, to tell which is the cause, and which is the effect. Additionally, we should be especially cautious in the interpretation of these results given that they are based only on the analysis of documentation rather than actual organisational practices, and because the sample of organisations is too small and unrepresentative to sustain satisfactorily robust statistical tests.

Reflections on the method

This has been an interesting exercise, but, because of problems with the research design, it is necessary to reflect upon the method, and to consider ways in which it could be improved in further research. To begin with, there are problems with the ways in which some of the variables have been interpreted and indexed. For example, the presence of thematic councils has been used as an indicator of the 'role of knowledge' in organisations. In cases in which these councils either do not exist, or are not mentioned in documents, the assumption was made that knowledge does not play an important role in these organisations. Oxfam, for example, does not mention thematic councils in its documents, but the organisation *does* carry out extensive primary and secondary research, and uses the knowledge gleaned from this to inform its work. Some of the indexes, for example the 'structural accountability' index, are biased towards finding positive values for formally organised GJMOs, which have local chapters, perhaps having the effect of underplaying the extent to which informal organisations seek to be open, accountable, inclusive and transparent. The biggest concern, however, is the reliance upon documents which vary in quantity and quality between GJMOs. Perhaps this is unique to the British case, but it seems that many GJMOs have been misrepresented simply because their documents do not fit their organisational practice, or because they do not have the documents that were required for this analysis. In order to carry out this exercise more robustly, it would have been necessary to select organisations for study which had comparable documents, even this compromised our ability to compare different types of data. For example, if we were to study only those GJMOs that are private limited companies or charities, we should be able to consult their Articles of Association and Memorandums of Association and have roughly comparable data. However, even if we were to do this, because of differences in the national systems of regulation of non-governmental organisations, the amount of information in a British GJMO's Memorandum and Articles of Associations is still not equivalent to what we might expect to find in the statute / constitution of an Italian or French GJMO. The variability in the shape and form of information in the sample used for this work package casts doubt on the reliability of much of the data, to such an extent that it would probably be worthwhile to cross- tabulate a list of documents analysed against the

organisational types, structures, and democratic practices to see whether there are significant associations. This paper only reports on a fraction of the variables that were coded, and even so, has yielded a complex array of numbers. The national data-sets are most definitely too small to sustain robust significance tests. This suggests that a future exercise in discourse analysis of GJMOs' documents should be carried out on a larger number of organisations, and should involve the coding of fewer, more meaningful variables, or, alternatively, investing more resources in more in-depth qualitative examination of a smaller number of cases.

However, with the data that we have, it would be inappropriate to run statistical tests that systematically violate the assumptions upon which the validity of such tests depends. In particular, our method has yielded a very peculiar 'sample'. It is emphatically *not* a random sample of the whole range of organisations involved in the GJM. Instead, it is a very uneven collection of organisations chosen because they are exemplary of certain categories of organisation nominated mainly because, on the basis of familiarity with the GJM elsewhere, especially in Italy, they are considered to be the 'interesting' constituents of the GJM. Other, possibly interesting examples within those categories are not included, and no weighting is applied to the categories or organisations. As a result we have a purposive selection of cases that might be useful for exploratory or illustrative purposes but which is not a 'sample' to which it is appropriate to apply any quantitative, much less statistical, analysis, and certainly not one that presupposes the randomness of the data. This is particularly so for the intra-country comparison. Cross-national comparison of genuinely comparable organisations may be less problematic, but the number of cases involved is so small that they are surely best treated qualitatively rather than quantitatively. Even then, discrepant results for similar / the same organisations in different countries may as likely result from eccentricities or inconsistencies in the documentation or the difficulties in coding ambiguous documents as from any *real* differences in the actual practices of the organisations concerned, as well as from the variable extent to which 'interesting' types of organisations were over-sampled in some countries. In view of all this, we reluctantly conclude that the quantitative part of this investigation has produced results of questionable scientific value.

2. Qualitative Analysis of British GJMOs' Ideology and Discourse on Democracy

2.1 Introduction

This part of the report presents the results of a more in-depth and qualitative analysis of the documents of four GJMOs; one selected from each of the categories of the typology of internal decision-making as shown in Table 2b. The World Development Movement (WDM) has been chosen as 'associational', Friends of the Earth (FoE) as 'deliberative representative', the Wombles as 'deliberative participative', and Rising Tide as 'assembleary'. WDM, FoE and the Wombles were chosen, not only because they fit the categories of analysis, but also because they have a range of documents available that shed light on their views of democracy within and outside of the global justice movement. Rising Tide, however, was selected because it was the most suitable 'assemblearian' organisation to analyse, even though, in its actual practice it is deliberative participative. The Global Justice Movement (an organisation, not *the* movement) appears to be more of a talking shop than an actual movement organisation, and *Schnews*, which also came out as assembleary is also, in actual practice, deliberative participative. *Schnews* could not be analysed because it has few documents on democracy, and it was deemed inappropriate to attempt to analyse the content of its weekly newsletter. Unfortunately, Rising Tide has also written few documents on the issue of democracy. This is partly because its deliberative democratic organisational practices and anti-hierarchical / anarchistic views are a taken-for-granted aspect of the organisation, which have never been formalised. I asked an activist from Rising Tide for documents that met our criteria for analysis, and received the following reply:

CS Do you know whether Rising Tide has written / published any documents on any of the following:

CS 1. The ESF and the way it was organised

RTA *No*.

CS 2. The internal democratic functions of the Rising Tide network?

RTA *Not that I'm aware of.*

CS 3. And lastly, a critique of any international financial institutions - G8, WTO, IMF, EU, UN etc

RTA *...Umm ... we tend to use other peoples' as we are not a researching organisation - Platform or Corporate Watch.* (personal correspondence with Rising Tide Activist)

Documents were analysed, where they existed, for each of these four organisations on the following themes:

1. Internal democratic practices
2. Critiques of the functioning of national government, the European Union and international financial institutions (IFIs) including the G8, WTO, IMF, World Bank and the UN, and relationships with corporations.
3. On the organisation and practice of the ESF in London, which sparked a heated debate between 'horizontals' and 'verticals'.

The purpose of this part of the report is two-fold; firstly to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the quantitative approach to analysing social movement discourse on democracy, and secondly to look in more depth into these organisations' views on external democracy.

2.2 Evaluating the quantitative analysis

One particular problem with the quantitative analysis is the difficulty of trying to capture the nature of complex organisations like Friends of the Earth (FoE) and the World Development Movement (WDM). For a start, these two organisations are not single entities and they work at a range of territorial levels, from the local to the national.

Like many formal British social movement organisations, FoE and WDM are composed of both a political campaigning arm, and a Trust. The former is the public face of each organisation, and mostly engages in overt political campaigning. The Trusts, on the other hand, carry out research, and develop educational material and undertake fundraising activities. They are registered as Charities, a status for which their counterparts, being overtly politically in nature, do not qualify. For the analysis of both of these organisations, only the political wings were analysed. In legal terms, the Trusts are separate entities, and as such, have their own independent Memoranda and Articles of Association. Thus, if the

two types of organisations had been merged for the analysis, the results would have been confusing, if not contradictory. This multiplicity problem also exists at the intra-organisational level. The World Development Movement Ltd (excluding the charity arm) for example, has both a Board of Directors and a Governing Council. And FoE (excluding the FoE Trust) has a Board and an Organisational Management Team (OMT). In both cases, the Board, or Board of Directors, is the body which has overall legal responsibility to the Registrar of Companies, the Inland Revenue and Customs and Excise, and has the final say in strategic decision-making. However, the Governing Council and OMT are responsible for delivering the strategic plans of the organisations. Furthermore, these bodies both devolve decision-making to lower levels as they see fit. The problem here is twofold. Firstly, there is the difficulty of working out which body equates to an "Executive Committee or equivalent". Although the Governing Council / OMT probably make more decisions concerning the day-to-day running of these organisations, the Boards of Directors was regarded, perhaps problematically as being equivalent to an 'executive committee'. Secondly, although the Executive Committee was regarded as being the main decision-making body of both organisations for the quantitative analysis, in practice we can see that it devolves decision-making down to lower levels within the organisation. The method of decision-making in these lower levels of the organisation is not specified, and, in practice, it may be by consensus.

Furthermore, it is problematic to assume that the same principles of decision-making apply to all hierarchical levels of an organisation, and in all decision-making situations. FoE, for example, has over one hundred members of staff, who are split up into 'activity teams' (based around campaigning themes such as corporates, resource use, derailing the WTO) and 'home teams' (based around specialisms such as IT use and management skills). It also has just under 200 local groups, some of which make decisions by 'consensus', whilst others vote. Similarly, WDM has 74 local groups, and each one can make decisions using the method of its choice. Some of these local groups might, therefore better fit an assembleary decision-making model, whereby every member attends meetings, and decisions are made by votes. Others may be deliberative participative.

Even if local FoE groups do make their final decisions by voting, they are encouraged by national FoE to, at the very least, engage in non-hierarchical discursive

debate involving all group members. Local group meeting facilitators should, according to a FoE briefing on *Facilitating Local Group Meetings*, 'insist on hearing everyone's opinion' because 'too many bad decisions are made because people stare at their feet rather than clearly agree or disagree' (FoE undated a). Furthermore, these guidelines recommend the use of hand signalling, commonly seen in consensus decision-making sessions, in order to help meetings to run more smoothly. In a different set of guidelines on local group meetings, FoE suggests that the meeting space 'should be comfortable and set up to encourage participation. A circle of chairs works well – everyone can see each other and there is no automatic hierarchy.' With regard to 'maintaining democracy and participation', FoE suggests that 'a healthy group needs equity and respect. It is therefore important for you to make sure everyone not only gets the chance to air their views, but feels like they have been listened to, and their contribution valued' (FoE undated b). This is rather different from a representative situation in which participants are given the opportunity only to tick a box, or to raise their hands to show their preferred choice of a pre-determined set of possible answer options, or a choice of representatives.

FoE has been categorised in this analysis as deliberative representative. However, it is not, according to its documents, structured very differently from WDM, which has been classed as associational. In fact, the only difference appears to be that FoE mentions deliberative democracy as an organisational value, even though the Boards and Annual General Meetings of both organisations make decisions by simple majority votes. The model (Table 3a) suggests that to be deliberative representative, an organisation makes decisions by consensus, but with delegated power. Of course, as we have already seen, there may be considerable deliberative debate prior to the casting of votes, but voting is not usually a characteristic of deliberative democracy. Just because FoE mentions deliberative democracy, does not mean that it actually practices it. And here we stumble across another problem with the quantitative analysis. Although FoE mentions deliberative democracy, perhaps it does not understand the term in the way in which social scientists do. For the social scientist, it involves preference transformation, orientation to the public good, rational arguments, consensus, equality, inclusiveness and transparency (della Porta 2005:4-5). But it might mean something very different to the average member of staff at FoE. The practice of consensus decision-making, for example, implies, for social scientists, a discussion which ends with agreement that the chosen decision is the best possible course

of action. However, according to Paul de Zylva, Head of FoE England, 'consensus does not mean everyone agreeing; it means everyone agreeing to go along with a decision even if some don't like it much' (de Zylva, undated document). This type of consensus is very different from the consensus decision-making style of radical organisations such as Rising Tide, which is much closer to the ideal-type espoused by academic students of democracy.

Decisions that affect others within FoE are made using a 'sponsorship group', which is a group of 3-6 people with expertise or responsibility for an issue. This sponsorship group seeks to involve all those affected in decision-making (Walsh 2002). This sponsorship group may, in practice, work like the deliberative participative decision-making setting of Rising Tide, with a small number of people discussing an issue in order to achieve consensus. One of the main differences between organisations that seek make decisions by consensus and those that use voting mechanisms appears to be organisational size. Larger organisations find it more difficult to make decisions by consensus. Even London Reclaim the Streets, in its hey day when over 70 activists attended, found it difficult to make consensus decision-making work. Thus, when Friends of the Earth needs to make a decision that affects an organisational value, and therefore everyone who is part of the organisation, it adopts what it calls a 'representative approach', consisting of a steering group that is composed of delegated representatives of local groups, activity teams and board members. The representatives may gain a mandate either through voting, or through consensus. The Board accepts decisions, providing representatives are truly representative of their constituents, that they are properly involved in the decision-making process, and that they agree to challenge the steering group if it is not working effectively (Walsh 2001: paragraph 3.2).

Even if consensus decision-making is actually being attempted, there is the problem that Monbiot (2000) calls the 'myth of consensus'. According to him:

> The direct action movement insists that it is non-hierarchical, but this has never been true. Some people, inevitably, work harder than others, making things happen whether or not everyone else in the movement agrees. Consensus, often unwittingly, is manipulated or overridden, as people with a burning vision, with time and energy, drive the rest of the movement forward.

The label 'deliberative representative' implies that FoE has a low level of participation in decision-making. However, to the contrary, FoE seeks to be as participatory as possible. According to Walsh (2001:paragraph 1.3) 'everything we do, from the day to day, to the strategic is viewed through a commitment to participation … Participation means making decisions at the right level and making that level as devolved as possible … Participation makes the best use of Friends of the Earth's most valuable resource – its staff, local groups members, supporters, Board and other volunteers. It empowers people by giving them a genuine voice and enables better decisions to be reached because they do not rely purely on the expertise and opinions of a few'.

Even if FoE is participative, in practice, the Board does make the key decisions with regard to the strategic direction of the organisation (unless it has been resolved through the steering group procedure). Although local group members can raise motions (campaign / strategy ideas) and have the opportunity to vote on these at conference (one vote per group), the Board still has the power to override a motion, even if it is supported by a clear majority of votes. For example, in 2003, 30 local groups were for, 19 were against and 19 abstained in a vote over whether FoE should embark upon a campaign against radioactive contamination. Despite this, the Board rejected the motion, stating that 'the Board feels that the best use of our limited resources lies in securing an increase in renewable energy provision as opposed to campaigning on radioactive pollution (Maguire 2003:3). In this sense, FoE is deliberative representative, especially so if the Board made its decision on the basis of deliberative debate and consensus, rather than voting. However, this discussion hopes to have illustrated that FoE is a complex organisation, and much of its decision-making style is *not* deliberative representative, even if elements of it are.

Additionally, it is clear that written documents on discourse do not accurately reflect actual organisational practices. FoE, for example, has an ambitious guide to its participatory culture (Welsh 2001). It is not intended to be a bureaucratic rulebook, and it is merely a guide, not a reflection of actual organisational practice. FoE's Director of Resources admits 'we do not currently have all elements of this culture in place' (Welsh 2001: paragraph 1.1).

The Wombles, on the other hand, are deliberative representative, even if they might suffer the problems associated with the 'myth of consensus' (Monbiot 2000):

> 'We have no formal membership; all meetings are weekly & open to anyone who wishes to attend. These meetings are where any & all decisions concerning the group are made. The politics we espouse are those we wish to live by – self-organisation, autonomy, direct democracy & direct action against the forces of coercion and control'.[4]
>
> Beyond its consensus decision-making meetings, it has no formal organisational structure …
>
> 'As such, no individual can speak on behalf of the Wombles as all group & all decisions are made collectively based on consensus'.

Rising Tide has just one document on its website that could be used as an indication of the organisation's internal democracy. This document is a factsheet / guide to 'managing large groups and meetings' (Rising Tide 2000), and appears to be more a guide for large-scale workshops than a guide for running the average Rising Tide meeting. In practice, local Rising Tide groups make decisions by consensus, and the network communicates using rotating delegates, which Rising Tide calls 'toads'. None of this is mentioned in Rising Tide's documentation.

2.3. External democracy

This section on external democracy focuses particularly on FoE's and WDM's views on democracy within the British government, the EU, the G8, the WTO/IMF and GATS**.** What is clear from the documents of both organisations is that they share a concern that democracy at each of these levels is being overridden in favour of the interests of large corporations. The Wombles have significantly less written discourse on democracy within these institutions, because the need for it is precluded by a more anti-systemic critique of hierarchical structures, and of any form of power. Whereas FoE and WDM stress that domestic democracy is being undermined by IFIs that are pursuing a corporate-led agenda, the Wombles stress that there is little 'democracy' in the first place. They claim (Wombles 2005) that:

[4] The Wombles use '&' instead of 'and' in most of their documentation.

> A criticism of the G8 by liberal or left factions is that it is out of our hands, beyond our control. Yet when have parliamentary democracies ever not been these things? We do not elect cabinet members in government, we are not consulted on laws and decisions enacted on our behalf, nor do we protest when Tony Blair holidays with Silvio Berlusconi at his private villa.

Much of the Wombles discourse on democracy focuses upon what they perceived to be a lack of democracy in the preparation of and the actual European Social Forum that was held in London in October 2004. This material will be discussed towards the end of this qualitative section. Rising Tide also has few documents that analyse democracy within governmental institutions.

Like the Wombles, Rising Tide advocates radical social change. They say that 'it is up to communities the world over to challenge the power structures that are playing havoc with our climate, and to create new structures built on local, diverse, ecological and socially just foundations' (Rising Tide 2003). In a street theatre episode, that was scheduled to coincide with the UN's COP9 climate change talks (December 2003), Rising Tide made its views of the UN explicit. The play evoked the UN as 'a cloak of irresponsibility', behind which it encourages profiteering from carbon trading, allows unethical corporations like McDonalds to sign up to its Global Compact, and ignores the plight of refugees seeking refuge from climate change related disasters. However, none of this is reported on the Rising Tide website, and it has no formal documents on its views of the UN or any other international institutions. Now we turn to a more in-depth discussion of FoE's and WDM's views on external democracy.

2.4. The UK government

Both FoE and WDM seek to influence the policies of the UK government. Their documents mention their lobbying efforts, and they both regularly produce parliamentary briefings. This illustrates that, unlike the Wombles and Rising Tide, FoE and WDM view the UK government as a legitimate entity, able to bring about positive change.

Even though they believe that it can help to bring about reforms, this does not mean that they do not critique democracy in Britain. Both organisations are concerned that the UK government is prioritising the demands of big business over the majority of people. In

2003, FoE mass-produced a pocket-sized cardboard cut out of Tony Blair. This was used as a prop at a demonstration outside of the Houses of Parliament that coincided with the WTO ministerial in Cancun. The message was that Tony Blair 'should be in the pockets of the people and not big business' (FoE 2005b). Additionally, FoE expresses its concerns about the links between political representatives and corporations, regarding this as having a negative effect upon democracy:

> Corporations are linked to parties in many ways, both direct and indirect. All of these links raise questions about the impartiality of those politicians involved, about the transparency of corporate influence on the political process, about the balance of power in decision making – in other words about democracy. These concerns are increased even further when the links are between politicians and companies that have bad environmental and social records' (FoE 2001a:2)

It provides several examples of the direct links between large corporations and politicians, including Lord Simpson who sits in the House of Lords, but is also director of the arms trade firm Marconi, the infamous baby-milk manufacturer Nestle, and the chemical company ICI. Additionally, FoE raises the point that MPs and peers often also carry out consultancy work for companies, for example, Michael Portillo is international adviser for Kerr McGee, a company that proposed to build a controversial pipeline across protected rainforest in Ecuador (FoE 2001a p.2), and asks 'how can a political party be seen to be credible when prominent members are working for companies operating in a questionable manner?' (FoE 2001a p.2). FoE concludes its analysis of the complicity of big business in government by stating that:

> Questions should be asked about the general implications for democracy of having corporations fund our political parties. As political parties increasingly rely on the financial backing of big business they increasingly need to court the support of companies by making policies that are attractive to them. As the corporate agenda is to make money, policies which attract them will be those which enable them to do just this. Environmental and social issues become secondary concerns. Should politicians and political parties be representing corporate interests more than the interests of citizens? … The infiltration of corporate lobbyists, executives and money into political parties and Parliament has surely influenced Tory and Labour policies on business and contributed

> to them being so bland and unchallenging. Both parties have proved unwilling to address concerns about the accountability and social and environmental performance of big business. FoE is campaigning to ensure democracy and the rights of citizens prevail. We want to see better national and international laws to ensure corporations are accountable to the citizens they affect. (FoE 2001a p.3-4).

Although its analysis is less trenchant WDM agrees that corporations are more or less running the nation. According to Dave Timms (WDM's Media Officer) 'Mr Blair clearly sees the role of government as managing the people for the benefit of global corporations, rather than managing the global market for the benefit of people' (Timms 2005). Without a mandate from its electorate, the British government, along with the EU, has been promoting the idea of extending the GATS agenda to a broader 'investment agreement', opening up trade borders for Direct Foreign Investment. Both organisations are critical of this (FoE 2003a:8, Oxfam et al 2003:2).

Additionally, they have two separate gripes that reflect their specific interests on aid/trade (WDM) and the environment (FoE). WDM is concerned that the government's stance on debt amounts to rhetoric rather than action, and that loans for development from the Department for International Development (DFID) are attached with conditions that mirror those of the IMF, and FoE has been engaged in a protracted campaign that attempted to prevent the British land use planning system from being made less democratic.

WDM notes how the British government's promised '100% debt cancellation' has not been implemented, and probably never will be. This declaration has wooed the British public into a false sense of security, giving them a misconstrued belief that the debt problem has been solved. This has stifled democratic protest on the issue by reducing levels of concern. WDM claims that the government's promise is …

> extremely misleading. The UK does not propose complete cancellation of poor country debt stock. Instead the proposals is for "up to" 100% relief of debt service payments between 2005 and 2015 for the debts owed by (currently) 23 eligible countries to the IMF, the World Bank's concessionary lending arm the International Development Association (IDA), and the African Development Bank (AfDB)'. Although some debt will be reduced, due to the long-term payment plans and high interest rates, about 70% of the debt will remain come 2015. In other words, pending a concrete

> commitment beyond 2015, the UK Government proposal currently amounts to at best a 30% debt cancellation initiative for a strictly limited group of countries. (emphasis as in original, WDM 2005a:2)

Furthermore, WDM accuses DFID of funding privatisation consultants that impose a privatisation agenda on developing countries. 'The framework [for privatisation] is largely imposed by external interests in a non-transparent process that has deliberately avoided public scrutiny and democratic debate'. In Ghana, DFID-sponsored consultants were 'firms [that] all happened to be ideologically favourable to privatisation and had a track record working for the large private water companies' (WDM 2005b:17)

In 2001, the UK government released a Green Paper on the planning system, which proposed to abolish Structure, Local and Unitary Development Plans and replace them with broad, less detailed Local Development Frameworks. It was proposed that the planning powers of Shire Counties would be handed over to non-elected regional bodies, local development plans replaced with broader local development frameworks, the rights of members of the public to speak at public inquiries abolished, and new business zones – regions where developers do not need to apply for planning consent - were proposed, alongside a slimming down of important national planning policy documents. 'The Green Paper suggests that only those with property interests directly affected by a plan will have the right to be heard in public' (FoE 2001b:3). Individuals would have no longer be able to challenge the principle of a development, only its fine tunings – 'precise alignment, and layout of the proposal, land take, mitigation measures, conditions and legal agreements'. According to FoE,

> Democratic accountability has been fundamental to the planning system since its creation in 1947. Representative democracy, innovative public participation schemes and robust rights of redress should form the basis for reinvigorating the planning process. But instead, the Green Paper seeks to strip powers from directly elected County Councils and Unitary Authorities and hand them to unelected regional planning bodies. Local Strategic Partnerships were outlined as playing a key role in involving the community, but they are not democratically accountable … Friends of the Earth is campaigning for a planning system that is accountable, transparent, participatory and delivers sustainable development … The Government must think again and produce proposals that

> have the potential to deliver progressive social policy agendas of inclusion, community empowerment and democratic renewal at the national, regional and local levels. (FoE 2001b:4-5)

FoE may take some of the credit for the fact that all of the most controversial proposals in the Green Paper have subsequently been quietly abandoned.

2.5 The EU

Both FoE and WDM are concerned that the EU is aggressively pushing a neo-liberal agenda which seeks to extend GATS to the foreign direct investment sector (FoE 2004a:3), and to introduce 'benchmarks' (non-flexible targets and indicators of service liberalisation) (WDM 2005c:1). WDM believes that 'The EU should drop its insistence on forcing through its aggressive agenda in the face of longstanding developing country opposition at the WTO' (Oxfam et al 2003:8), and is concerned that the EU is putting the corporate agenda before the quality of life of people in the developing world:

> The long-term benefit of improving the quality of life of people all over the developing world is surely more important to the people of Europe than the short-term interests of European multinationals. Sadly, the European Union is still pursuing these short-term corporate interests rather than the long-term public interests. (Peter Hardstaff, WDM Head of Policy, WDM 2005c:2)

Just as corporations appear to have a major influence in politics at the domestic level, so do to they appear to be influencing politics at a European level. WDM claims that:

> Throughout the GATS negotiations, the European Commission's position has been informed by the European Services Forum, a network of high-level representatives from the European services industry … The EU … wants and expanded GATS just as much as it wants new investment rules. (WDM 2004b:1)

WDM also report how the EU has been increasingly pushy in its demands for poor countries to sign up to GATS. It has accused South Africa of blocking GATS negotiations,

when in actual fact it has been working with UNCTAD to investigate the South African service sector in order to properly assess how it might fare under GATS commitments. South Africa has a democratic sovereign right to do this, but the EU has been seeking to speed up the process of implementing GATS in South Africa, for the benefit of its own service sector (Hardstaff 2005).

2.6 The G8

FoE has little to say in its documents about the G8, save for the fact that it sought to push for 'climate justice' at the G8 summit in Gleneagles, Scotland. The Wombles is concerned about the G8 because of the 'power' it holds, and its ability to impose its agenda through the IMF, WTO and World Bank, in which it holds the lions share of power (Wombles 2005). WDM cites that the G8 hold 48% of the votes in the IMF, and industrialised countries as a whole have 64% (WDM 2005d:32). Despite their lack of voting power, poor developing countries essentially fund IFIs. The IMF stated itself that 'administrative expenses and target net income are effectively financed by debtors. In 2002, debtors contributed 75% of IMF income, compared to 25% for creditors (WDM 2005d:35).

WDM's biggest concern about the G8 is that it appears to be a talking shop whose actions fall far short of its rhetoric. According to WDM:

> The G8 – the club of the world's most powerful leaders – has a credibility problem … Staying well away from electorates in order to make pronouncements about democracy, amongst other things, seems to have become the "modus operandi" of the G8' … Although the output (in terms of documents) has increased, its democracy seems to have decreased … Perhaps this is symptomatic of the G8's desperate search for legitimacy, attempting to make up for the lack of real scrutiny and democracy that characterises this exclusive club of decision-makers (WDM 2005e:3).

'Summit gimmickry' consisting of grand statements that result in few concrete commitments, or at worst outright lies, is how WDM interprets the output of G8. For example, the G8 is a long way off meeting the 30-year old target of providing 0.7% of GNP as aid, but it masks the fact that only two G8 countries were even half way towards meeting

this commitment by declaring that it had drafted a 'timetable' for aid provision (WDM 2005e:10). The impressive sounding 'Global AIDS and Health Fund' that was announced at the G8 summit in Gleneagles is according to WDM 'a drop in the ocean compared to what is needed' (WDM 2005e:10). Thus WDM declare that:

> The G8's output on trade therefore tends to be particularly anodyne. Grand rhetoric and either (re)stating the obvious and/or (re)stating existing policy positions is the name of the game … The main role of the G8 discussions on trade seems to be trying to stitch up broadly agreed agendas for the major trade powers in advance of WTO negotiations. (WDM 2005e:11)

WDM also accuses the G8 of double standards:

> More or less every year the G8 will recommit to "resisting protectionism" and demand the same of the rest of the world … Yet such statements seem hardly worth the paper they are written on. In March 2002, four months before agreeing at the G8 to "resist protectionist pressures", the US Government hiked its tariffs on steel to protect the US steel industry from low price competition. (WTO 2005b:12).

2.7 International Financial Institutions

One of FoE's and WDM's largest concerns about IFIs is that they have the power to override 'democratically' derived national laws. However, the focus of the two organisations is significantly different; FoE is more concerned with the potential for social and environmental laws to be overridden, and WDM focuses more on the anti-democratic nature of the strings that are attached to aid and debt relief. FoE for example states that 'the WTO could overrule domestic legislation that it considers to be "more burdensome than necessary"', and is concerned that the WTO's insistence on scientific proof for deciding what is burdensome effectively rules out the precautionary principle. 'In short, Friends of the Earth is extremely concerned that the ability of Government to regulate for the public or environmental good is essentially being given away' (FoE 2003c:5-6). 'Progressive regulation regarding local and ethical procurement, cultural preservation and environmental protection could all be challenge by the WTO as being unlawfully "trade distorting"' (FoE

2004b:3). These arguments are particularly relevant in the context of FoE's campaign against GM food. The US government claimed that the EU's moratorium on GM food was unlawful under WTO regulations, leading FoE to claim that 'the US Government, at the behest of the US biotechnology lobby, is deliberately using the WTO to undermine the democratic will of Europeans lawfully exercised' (FoE 2004c:6). FoE is especially concerned about GATS:

> GATS has the potential to reach much further into the UK's domestic policymaking space than other WTO agreements, in part because domestic regulations are *the* trade 'barriers' targeted rather than border controls … Because of the GATS' corporate focus, the risk then is that those domestic regulations and standards that protect communities and their environment will be sacrificed to benefit service exporters and economic growth in general (possibly even to the extent that the official regulators could find themselves over-ruled by the WTO). But these regulations and standards have been hard fought for over the years and have very real purposes. They cannot simply be abandoned' (FoE 2003c:5).

WDM however, is more concerned with the effects of structural adjustment programmes (SAPS), which are now called Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, upon which aid or debt relief is often conditional. The most fundamental part of its argument is that 'imposing trade conditions on poor countries in return for giving aid or debt relief is unfair, undemocratic and ineffective. Poor countries should be in control of their own government' (WDM 2005f:3). Although the World Bank claims that PSRPS are much more participatory than their forebears, WDM shows that 'Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility conditions are almost identical to the old ESAF (Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility) and that PSRPS closely resemble SAPS'. As with SAPS, the outcome is that 'most governments, seeking to retain power and be accepted internationally, choose the IMF over their own people' (Woodroffe & Ellis Jones 2000:2). As a result, PSRPs reduce the ability of democratic governments to work to their own agenda, and reforms are rushed through without adherence to proper legislative or democratic processes.

> While governments are held responsible for the social and economic upheaval which results, the IMF and World Bank escape largely unscathed. These institutions have little accountability to any

> electorate and remain forever at arms length … Civil society's attempts to democratise their own governments is made substantially more difficult, if not impossible by the imposition of IMF conditions. (Woodroffe & Ellis Jones 2000:2)

Thus, it argues that national governments are undermined, and the 'democratic contract' between citizens and their governments is weakened:

> If governments cannot perform basic functions like providing social services because of budget cuts of debt servicing, they slowly lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens. While governments are held responsible for the social and economic upheaval that may result, the IMF and World Bank escape largely unscathed. (Bailey et al 2003:1)

According to WDM, the result is a 'tragedy for people in the poorest parts of the world', because 'those who ultimately decide their country's economic policies – the targets of their protest – are not elected by them, are not accountable to them and thus have a kind of "immunity from public disaffection"' (WDM 2005d:24).

In addition to the distorting effect that IFIs have upon national 'democracy', WDM and FoE express concerns about the lack of internal democracy that such institutions have. FoE states that '… there are considerable problems with the development and operation of international trade policy and practice, including in the EU. Most of these either stem from or are facilitated by a lack of basic transparency'. In particular, it notes that IFIs are often accountable to no-one, lack transparency – i.e. they do not make it clear what their remit is, or what decisions have been formally made – they act in secrecy, and they are exempt from public and parliamentary scrutiny (FoE 2004c:4-6). WDM agrees; for WDM, truly democratic decision-making in an international context would involve:

> fair representation on the Boards of the IFIs for those countries affected by IFI decisions; transparent decision-making so that the citizens of affected countries can know how their government has acted (and how other governments have acted) so that politicians can be held to account; and transparent ways of working so that the bureaucracy functions in the public interest and legal accountability so that citizens have some form of recourse if the actions of IFIs infringe

their rights'. However, it reports that 'Sadly … both the World Bank and IMF largely fail on all of these issues. (WDM 2005d p.32)

WDM regards transparency as an essential part of 'democracy':

One of the fundamental requirements of modern democracy is transparency in what decisions have been taken, how those decisions have been made, and for what reasons. If such information is unavailable, the IFIs and countries running them, cannot be held to account for their actions' (WDM 2005d p.38)

And yet it notes that the documents of the IMF executive board are only published five years after the meetings, the minutes are released after ten years, and other archive material is available only after twenty years. And even then, the documents are only available at the IMF offices in Washington DC! It is also critical of the IMFs internal decision-making practices:

IMF Executive Directors decisions are not made by consensus or formal votes, even though they claim that they are made by consensus. 'Those countries with dominant voting positions on the Board can collectively impose decisions, whilst claiming a "consensus" had been reached on the issue. Individual Executive Directors cannot be made accountable for their role in decisions that are taken.' (WDM 2005d p.39)

WDM also notes that the IMF has immunity from parliamentary scrutiny, quoting its articles which state that:

The Fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings of by the terms of any contract, (cited in WDM 2005d p.40-1)

A WDM critique of the World Bank and IMF notes that it is not especially democratic because the leadership of the World Bank is always, without question, granted to an American, whilst presidency of the Fund is always in the hands of a European. Similarly, secrecy, lack of transparency, and a lack of parliamentary scrutiny also form part of FoE's critique of GATS:

> Part of the problem with GATS is that it is being negotiated secretly in the WTO. There has been no public, Parliamentary (at both EU and member state level) of Assembly scrutiny of the proposals, and requests for greater transparency have been repeatedly ignored. As the liberalisation of services will affect everyone, it is unacceptable for these negotiations to be conducted behind closed doors.' (FoE 2004b. p.3).

Similar concerns were expressed in a document written jointly by Oxfam, Action Aid, Christian Aid, CAFOD, World Development Movement and Save the Children:

> 'GATS already provides direct experience of how … pressures are brought to bear on developing countries in secret bilateral negotiations, and UNCTAD's survey of developing country delegates reveals that lack of transparency in that process is hindering their ability to defend their own interests in the negotiations (Oxfam et al 2003:7).

However, probably the most significant concern that WDM and FoE have regarding GATS is the manner in which it appears to be blindly appeasing short-term corporate interests. According to FoE:

> GATS negotiations have been initiated and prompted by those transnational service providers that stand to gain the most by the opening up of new service markets aboard and the removal of domestic regulatory hurdles that they consider impede their trade (regardless of their purpose). In our experience, however, other key concerns have been virtually – and wrongly – excluded from the process, by both the UK and other governments … The very existence of GATS is the result of an intense drive by corporate special interest groups … this US-based corporate lobby group worked symbiotically with the US Government to put liberalisation of services on the international trade agenda for the first time. (FoE 2003c:4)

WDM literature addresses this issue more specifically, but draws the same conclusion – GATS is the product of intensive non-democratic corporate lobbying –

> Business lobby groups have developed close relationships with governments and WTO negotiators to ensure their interests are protected. This has been particularly true of GATS … David Hartridge, former Director of the WTO Services Division has admitted that "without the enormous pressure generated by the American financial services sector … there would have been no services [GATS] agreement" … Given the delicate nature of decisions which governments must take to balance corporate and citizens' interests, it is extremely worrying that corporations have had so much influence' (WDM 2001b:3).

2.8 Corporations come first

Friends of the Earth believes that large unethical businesses, rather than IFIs *per se* are the underlying cause of social and environmental ills. It claims that 'we can start with laws to make sure business works for the planet and everyone on it' (FoE undated c:4). The power of corporations has an unbalancing effect on democracy. FoE's analysis states that:

> It could be argued that the world's largest corporations are now more powerful than most governments. If they were listed in an economic league table together with countries, corporations would form 51 of the world's largest economies. This concentrates enormous economic power in the board rooms. Yet corporations are legally accountable to their shareholders, not to the wider public of the people their decisions affect … Their number and size, and the speed and ease with which money can be moved around the world, often gives them the power to trade off governments against each other, reducing the ability of states to set economic, social of environmental standards in the public interest. Southern governments in particular often find this economic power overwhelming … We believe that the power and influence of big corporations must be balanced by citizens' rights and democratic control. FoE's agenda is about: democracy, equity, rights, standards. (FoE undated, d).

2.9 Democracy in the European Social Forum

The Wombles shunned the official forum for what they perceived to be its overly reformist character and its domination by hierarchical left-wing organisations and political parties. They supported the London Social Forum (LSF) which was calling for the ESF to be organised in a more participatory and decentralised fashion. This they viewed as a 'progressive attempt by ex-leftists and academics to go beyond the hierarchical characteristics of their previous involvement in politics' (Wombles 2004a). The Wombles appeared to have been impressed that broader swathes of the movement were shunning models of representative democracy and demonstrating commitment to collective consensus decision-making. This was something they had assumed was confined to their own much smaller networks of anti-authoritarians.[5] Although the Wombles retained links with London Social Forum, Indymedia and other groups that were to become part of a collective of self-proclaimed 'horizontals', they gave up attempts to democratise the ESF organisational process when the Organising Committee insisted on affiliation fees, something the Wombles considered too 'capitalist'. Subsequently, the Wombles website denounced the ESF process as overly reformist, with its plurality serving to dilute radicalism to the lowest common denominator (Wombles 2004b).

One of the 300 activists who took part in the Wombles-organised intervention involving the 'storming' of an official ESF session at which Ken Livingstone was scheduled to speak seized the microphone off the speaker and claimed 'never again must a social forum be organised like this. It has been a travesty of democracy' (Kingsnorth 2004). However, many social forum attendees allegedly felt that the act of disrupting the ESF session was itself undemocratic. The fact that only a few people walked out of the plenary in solidarity with those who disrupted the meeting, and the fact that there was much negative feedback on the post-event list-serve, has been taken as evidence that many attendees felt that the action served to stifle rather than open up dialogue. The Wombles, however had a different interpretation and felt that they were justified to challenge what they perceived to be Livingstone's attempted ownership of the social forum, the monophonic nature of the stage-managed plenaries and the compulsory registration fees, which, they argued, excluded the poor and immigrants and refugees. According to their

[5] NB. Some of the activists in LSF were more radical and 'progressive' than the Wombles had given them credit for. Several of the organisers of the first LSF open meeting, for example, had previously taken part in the Intercontinental Encuentro for Humanity and Against Neoliberalism.

version of events, the hall was half empty when they arrived, and during the course of the action filled up with more people who were clapping and cheering in a supportive manner (Wombles 2004c). Whether or not the action (and the ESF preparatory process) was a travesty of democracy is debatable, but one thing is certain; most of the activists who gave speeches during the autonomous action read them from scripts in exactly that unidirectional stage-managed fashion of which they had previously been so critical.

Although NGOs such as FoE and WDM were not critical of the ESF itself – they did not see it as a manifestation of capitalism, or a reformist cop out – they were, like the Wombles, dissatisfied with the preparatory process. In an open letter, the NGO ESF Forum, consisting of FoE and WDM, along with Action Aid, ACTSA, Greenpeace, Jubilee Debt Campaign, Oxfam, Trade Justice Movement, Traidcraft and War on Want, expressed its concerns about the lack of deliberation, and the apparent hijacking of the ESF preparatory movement by left-wing organisations (such as SWP and Socialist Alliance):

On Thursday 27 August the UK ESF NGO group met to choose the speakers it would like to represent the sector in the plenary sessions as part of the UK quota … asking for only 4 speakers … to convey the knowledge, skills and experience of the whole sector. This included just one environment NGO, one human rights group and two development campaigns. The decision was made by consensus and … These were then proposed later that evening to a full meeting of the UK Programme Group … Just two of these survived the UK selection process. The UK will now go to the Brussels Preparatory Assembly without a single representative of any development organisation in its quota of plenary speakers … The method chosen to select the UK quota did not include any deliberative element to ensure that all sections of the movement were represented and was entirely based on the number of votes secured. Numerous members of small political groups who had packed the room with their supporters dominated the voting for the UK quota. This falls well short of the charter of the World Social Forum to which we have all subscribed. We must now face the facts that our work and our members will be sorely under-represented by the UK ESF. This will do nothing to help broaden the movement in the UK and build confidence in the process among NGOs. (UK ESF NGO group, 2004)

2.10 Conclusion

This qualitative analysis has demonstrated the shortcomings of attempting to use a content analysis of documentation to convey the internal decision-making styles of GJMOs. Content analysis appears to be least effective at representing large and complex organisations that may use a range of different decision-making styles, such as FoE, and small informal organisations that produce few documents, such as Rising Tide. In practice, it is difficult satisfactorily to classify organisations into the four internal democratic types upon which the quantitative analysis has been based. In particular, the model of democratic types does not allow for a situation in which there is much deliberative debate within an organisation, but in which decisions are made by voting, as in local FoE groups. This is different from a purely representative situation because of the amount of participation, and yet a suitable category for this type of decision-making does not exist. Another problem with the content analysis is that it takes it for granted that researchers and movement participants interpret the vocabulary in the same way. As this report has demonstrated, we should not assume that everyone shares the same understanding of the meaning of 'consensus'. Thus, it is essential that this research be followed up with in-depth interviews with movement participants.

With regard to external democracy, if the four organisations selected for this analysis are any guide to the views of the entire movement in Britain, it appears that the GJM's central concern is the manner in which corporations and corporate lobbyists are influencing so-called 'democracy' so that it represents their interests over the rest of the populace. This holds true for WDM's and FoE's critiques of democracy at the British, European and IFI levels. External democracy is also critiqued because of an apparent mismatch between rhetoric and action, a lack of transparency and accountability, and the power that IFIs – acting in the interests of rich countries that have disproportionate voting powers – have to override domestic legislation that has been democratically derived. GJMO's critiques of external democracy vary according to both their ideology and their issue foci. The Wombles, who are anti-capitalist, have a broad critique of more or less anything that resembles a power structure, and their critique and eventual shunning of the official ESF in London in 2005 demonstrated this. In contrast, the NGOs were more critical

of the lack of representative democracy, for example by their not being adequately represented in the ESF itself. With regard to the issue focus, much more of FoE's literature on external democracy is concerned with laws that impact upon social and environmental equity, and therefore it tends to focus much of its critique upon WTO trade laws and GATS. WDM, being more concerned about developing countries, devoted most of its attention in its literature towards the strings attached to aid, and therefore focuses more on the World Bank and the IMF. However, for all three organisations – FoE, WDM and the Wombles – democracy is a central concern. Reducing the power of corporations, and addressing the democratic deficit of the EU, the G8 and the IFIs would, at least for WDM and FoE, be huge steps towards creating the sustainable and just world that they seek.

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Appendix 1. List of documents consulted

Organisation	Sources of documents	List of documents / sections of the website used for coding
Jubilee Debt Campaign	both online and offline	mission statement, about us, founding document, Memoradum and Articles of Association (2001)
Tobin Tax Network	both online and offline	about us, Tobin Tax Declaration, global partners
Pax Christi UK	both online and offline	foundation and history, how to join, about us, organisation profile, constitution, Annual Report 2003-4
Christian Aid	online	mission statement, about us, frequently asked questions, 2004 annual report, dream of a new earth, a brief history, organisational structure
Stop the War Coalition	both online and offline	steering committee statement in electoral policy, steering committee (details), on-line membership forms, about us, Steering committee resolutions 2005, constitution
National Assembly of Women	both online and offline	about us, policy statements on: pensions, social exclusion, children and young people, domestic violence, and equality at work, constitution, National Assembly of Women (introduction to our policies).
People and Planet	online	about us, annual report 2004, social audit, the staff team, why we are here, a brief history of People and Planet
Friends of the Earth England, Wales and Northern Ireland	both online and offline	mission statement, about us, annual report 2004, Strategic Plan 2003-8, Articles of Association of FoE Ltd., Memorandum of Association of FoE Ltd.
Unison - the Public Services Union	online	on-line rulebook (constitution), about us, membership forms, objectives, people in Unison, Labour LInk rules, UNISON political funds review
Transport and General Workers' Union	both online and offline	about us, frequently asked questions, 2004 rule book
Anarchist Federation	both online and offline	aims and principles, constitution
White Overalls Movement Building Libertarian Effective Struggles	both online and offline	background, collective statement
Oxfam UK	online	brief history, strategic plan 2003-6, statement of legitimacy and accountability, annual report 2004, frequently asked questions, about us, mission statement
Sexual Freedom Coalition	online	about us, annual report 2004
National Assembly Against Racism	both online and offline	annual report 2004, about us, National Assembly Against Racism Constitution & Standing Orders
Green Party	both online and offline	statement of core principles, London 2004 manifesto, European manifesto, manifesto, constitution
Fair Trade Foundation	both online and offline	annual report 2004, frequently asked questions, about us, articles of association, memorandum of association, Strategic Plan 2005-10
World Development Movement	both online and offline	about us, annual report, articles of association, memorandum of association, Strategic Plan - Key Priorities 2003-7
Red Pepper Magazine	online	editorial guidelines, short history

Radio Rampart	online	about us
New Statesman	online	about us
Independent Media Center	both online and offline	mission statement, about us, frequently asked questions, principles of unity
Schnews	online	about us
London Social Forum	online	about us
Manchester Social Forum	offline	Manchester People's Assembly / Social Forum (document, October 2003)
Sheffield Social Forum	online	about us
The Muslim Association of Britain	online	about us
Dissent!	online	about us
Globalise Resistance	online	about us
Rising Tide	online	political statement, about us
War on Want	both online and offline	council of management, who we are, about us, Strategic Plan 2004/6, Memorandum and Articles of Association
Socialist Workers' Party	online	constitution, post conference report, membership forms
Committee to Defend Asylum Seekers	online	membership forms, campaign backers, CDAS demands
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development	online	about us, mission and values, short history
Urban 75	online	frequently asked questions, about us
Make Poverty History	both online and offline	about us (who we are, what we want), membership forms, join, terms and conditions, manifesto, mobilisation structure terms of reference. founding 2005 mobilisation statement
Trade Justice Movement	both online and offline	about the TJM, founding statement, membership application process, what are we calling for?, standing orders and regulations, articles of association
Global Justice Movement	online	the five principles, origins of the Global Justice Movement, Join us

Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy of Italian GJMOs

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1. Introductory remarks

The Italian data seem to confirm the expectations expressed in the introductory chapter, i.e. organizational features of social movement organizations do reflect the history of the interaction between states and social movements in Italy, and are shaped by the historical period in which these organizations were founded. The Italian social movement organizations, in fact, seem to give little importance to collaboration with institutions, reflecting a traditionally deep-rooted mistrust towards the state.

The organizational ideology of the majority of the organizations also seems to show the influence of their founding period, the 1990s – 21 of our 41 organizations were founded in that decade – characterized by the collapse of the Italian party system. This collapse on the one hand resulted in the re-foundation of political parties and collateral organizations (in our sample Rifondazione comunista, Giovani comunisti, Sinistra giovanile, ARCI), subsequently particularly open to new mobilizations. As the qualitative analysis indicates, these organizations, participating in GJM mobilizations, integrated certain values and themes of the movement into organizational documents, even if in some incidents a largely tactical attitude seems predominant. This contamination seems to have remained largely restricted to visions of external democracy, rarely touching long established internal values and procedures. However, involvement in the GJM seems to have led to a "reappropriation" by organizations of those of their values resonating with the movement.

On the other hand, in consequence of the delegitimation of politics the demand for "associational participation" increased. Some of the SMOs and NGOs emerging in the 1990s openly embraced the movement after 1999, but also for these organizations the new influences, as they manifest themselves in organizational documents, rarely seem to have had effects on their internal structure, but rather on their attitudes towards collaboration

with other SMOs (in the sense of "democracy within the movement") and on their visions of external democracy.

A conscious effort to go new ways as far as internal structures are concerned, corresponding to the demands for external democracy of the movement for a "globalization from below", is visible in the documents of some "genuine" GJM organizations. It is here that we find the attempt to realize participative and deliberative democratic values within the own organization, within the GJM, and within the larger body politics.

2. Quantitative Analysis

2.1 Selection of organizations

For the selection of cases, we relied on the list of organizations compiled for WP2 (see WP2 final report, 16ff.). For the web analysis conducted in that work package, we had focused on the most relevant (not the largest, but the most representative) SMOs involved in the GJM, covering SMOs focusing upon different issues (environment, peace, women's rights, labour issues, solidarity, gay rights, migrant and human rights, etc.) and those trade unions and political parties that had participated in mobilizations of the GJM. As an indicator for involvement in the GJM we had considered the signing of calls for action for important movement events like the Genoa G8 counter-summit and for national, European, and World social forums. In addition, local social forums had been included. Finally, a number of organizations active in independent/alternative information and communication had been added, as well as some informal groups (like Chainworkers or the Comitato Immigrati in Italia).

For the purposes of WP3 the WP2 sample had to be adapted in one specific aspect: if for WP2 we had been interested above all in the websites of those organizations focusing on independent/alternative information or communication (e.g. Unimondo, Radio popolare, Il Manifesto, Carta, Indymedia, Isole nella rete, Peacelink), for WP3 we analyzed the organizations behind these websites (predominantly cooperatives). This proved impossible for the website "Global Project", and consequently this case was dropped for WP3.

Table 1. Short descriptions and sample categories of selected organizations

Name	Short Description	Actor category
Sdebitarsi	Debt relief campaign network	Solidarity
Chainworkers	Local autonomous group	Labour issues (informal group)
Attac Italia	Italian branch of the Attac-network	GJM Network
Pax Cristi	Catholic solidarity organization	Solidarity (religious organizarion)
Rete di Lilliput	Network of environmentalist, solidarity, and development organizations and campaigns	GJM Network
Comitato fermiamo la guerra	Campaign aginst the war in Iraq	Peace movement campaign
Marcia mondiale delle donne	Italian branch of the World March of Women	Women's Movement
Emergency	NGO organizing humanitarian intervention in war zones	Humanitarian NGO
Cobas (Confederazione dei comitati di base)	Confederation of grass-roots unions	Grass-roots union (signer of calls for action)
Legambiente	Environmental organization traditionally close to the PCI	Environmental organization
FIOM (Federazione impiegati e operai metallurgici)	Metal workers union affiliated to the CGIL	Trade union (signer of calls for action)
CGIL (Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro)	Left wing national trade union federation	Trade union federation (signer of calls for action)
FAI (Federazione anarchica italiana)	Traditional anarchist federation	Anarchist organization
Rete Noglobal	Network founded in preparation of the protests against the UN forum on e-government 2001	GJM Network (informal)
Arcigay	Main Italian gay and lesbian organization	Gay movement organization
ICS (Italian consortium of solidarity)	Federation of solidarity organizations	Solidarity NGO
Associazione antirazzista interetnica 3 febbraio	Organization of immigrants	Immigrants' rights
Comitato immigrati in Italia	Network of immigrant organizations	Immigrants' rights (informal group)
Partito della rifondazione comunista	Italian communist party	Left-wing party close to the GJM
Verdi	Italian green party	Ecologist party close to the GJM
Associazione botteghe del mondo per il commercio equo e solidale	Association of fair trade shops	Fair trade
Unimondo	Italian branch of OneWorld; cooperative publishing an alternative information website	Independent/alternative information
Cooperativa radio popolare	Cooperative responsible for an independent radio station	Independent/alternative information
Cooperativa di Carta	Cooperative publishing a weekly magazine	Independent/alternative information
Il Manifesto società cooperstiva	Cooperative publishing a daily newspaper	Independent/alternative information
Indymedia Italia	Italian knot of the Indymedia network	Independent/alternative information
Isole nella rete	Organization responsible for an	Independent/alternative

	alternative internet server	information
Torino Social Forum	Local Social Forum	Social Forum
Venezia Social Forum	Local Social Forum	Social Forum
Abruzzo Social Forum	Regional Social Forum	Social Forum
ARCI nuova organizzazione	Cultural and recreational association traditionally close to the PCI	Other (traditional left, signer of calls for action)
Tavola della Pace	Network of the peace movement	Peace movement
Un ponte per	Solidarity NGO	Solidarity NGO
Peacelink	Organization responsible for an alternative internet server	Independent/alternative information
Campagna die pressione alle "banche armate"	Campaign of the catholic peace movement	Peace movement
Euromayday	National campaign network	Labour issues (informal group)
Sinistra giovanile	Socialist Youth organization	Socialist party youth organization (close to the GJM)
Giovani Verdi	Green party youth organization	Ecologist party youth organization (close to the GJM)
Confederazione Unitaria di Base	Federation of grass-roots unions	Grass-roots union (signer of calls for action)
Forum permanente del terzo settore	Network of third sector organizations	Solidarity and development organization
Giovani comunisti	Communist party youth organization	Communist party youth organization (close to the GJM)

2.2. Internal principles of debate and general democratic values

Looking at the general principles of internal debate and decision-making of the organizations composing the Italian sample, a comparison with the overall data (in the following tables in brackets) shows similarities (the limited presence of critique of delegation; the absence of representative values), but also important differences. Participation (followed by autonomy of territorial levels and autonomy of member organizations) emerges as the by far dominating value, whereas inclusiveness, consensus and deliberation are less represented than in the overall data. In part these results could reflect a problem of terminology: in Italian, in fact, a term equivalent to "inclusiveness" does not exist, nor is the English term commonly used. Some of the mentions of the value participation seem to be based on a conception resembling inclusiveness. However, also consensus and deliberation reveal a fairly weak showing: if we group these two values together, they are mentioned by only six Italian organizations (14.6%), but by 52 organizations (21.3%) in the overall sample.[1] As far as the general internal principles of

[1] In the following consensus and deliberation as values will not be explored, as they were used for the associational model.

debate and decision-making are concerned, among the Italian organizations a more traditional concept seems to dominate, stressing above all participation.

A complementary picture emerges in fact from the general democratic values, with a strong affirmation of participation and equality against a weak showing especially of inclusiveness and dialogue/communication. These results are further underlined by a comparison between an index of participation and an index of inclusiveness, uniting the respective variables for internal principles and general democratic values: participation reaches 65.9% (against 53.7% in the complete sample), whereas inclusiveness remains at 12.2% (34.8%). In general, values connected with "post modern" trends like autonomy, dialogue, or (less pronounced) difference/heterogeneity are underrepresented in the Italian sample.

Table 2. Internal principles of debate and decision-making and general democratic values

Dependent variables	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Internal values of the organization		
Explicit critic of delegation/representation	14.6 (11.1)	41 (244)
Limitation of delegation explicitly mentioned	4.9 (6.6)	41 (244)
Rotation principle explicitly mentioned	7.3 (6.6)	41 (244)
Consensual method explicitly mentioned	14.6 (17.2)	41 (244)
Deliberative democracy explicitly mentioned	4.9 (7.0)	41 (244)
Participatory democracy explicitly mentioned	51.2 (27.9)	41 (244)
Non-hierarchical decision-making explicitly mentioned	4.9 (16.0)	41 (244)
Inclusiveness explicitly mentioned	9.8 (20.9)	41 (244)
Autonomy of member organizations explicitly mentioned2	50.0 (33.1)	20 (130)
Autonomy of the territorial levels explicitly mentioned3	43.8 (38.5)	32 (182)
Mandate delegation explicitly mentioned	2.4 (6.1)	41 (244)
General Democratic values of the organization		
Difference/plurality/heterogeneity mentioned	36.6 (47.1)	41 (244)
Individual liberty/autonomy	12.2 (21.7)	41 (244)
Participation	63.4 (51.2)	41 (244)
Representation	0.0 (6.1)	41 (244)
Equality	39.0 (34.0)	41 (244)
Inclusiveness	4.9 (25.8)	41 (244)
Transparency	24.4 (23.8)	41 (244)
Autonomy (group; cultural)	12.2 (18.9)	41 (244)
Dialogue/communication	9.8 (31.6)	41 (244)

[2] This variable is not applicable for groups that do not have organizations as members, i.e. for 21 (51.2%) groups in the Italian sample and for 114 (46.7%) groups in the overall sample.

[3] This variable is not applicable for groups that do not have territorial levels of organization, i.e. for 9 (22%) groups in the Italian sample and for 62 (25.4%) groups in the overall sample.

If we consider the recoded internal values (see introductory chapter for information on the recoding) we notice (apart from the very strong preference for participation already underlined) a weaker showing of critique of delegation and a stronger preference regarding the autonomy of member organizations or local chapters. As far as the general democratic values are concerned, the relatively low preference for values connected with "post modern" trends is reflected in the 22% (32.4%) for individual or collective/cultural autonomy. Considering the deliberative general values, the Italian case seems to be quite close to the overall average, but we have to keep in mind that the value participation weighs more than for the other countries.

Table 3. Internal principles of debate and decision-making and general democratic values (recoded)

Dependent variables	**Frequencies of yes (%)**	**Total of valid cases**
Internal principle of the organization (recoded)		
Participatory democracy	51.2 (27.9)	41 (244)
Inclusiveness	9.8 (20.9)	41 (244)
Critique of delegation (including limitation of delegation) or non hierarchical decision making	17.1 (23.4)	41 (244)
Autonomous member organizations or local chapter	41.5 (35.2)	41 (244)
General democratic values of the organization (recoded)		
Deliberative general values (factor dichotomized with No<0.5 and Yes>0.5)4	22.0 (28.7)	41 (244)
Additive index of deliberative general values5		
0	26.8 (30.7)	11 (75)
1	29.3 (25.4)	12 (62)
2	22.0 (15.6)	9 (38)
3	19.5 (12.7)	8 (31)
4	2.4 (6.1)	1 (15)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Mean	2.0 (1.7)	41 (244)
Individual or collective/cultural autonomy	22.0 (32.4)	41 (244)

2.3. The typology of democratic internal decision-making

[4] This is the first component of a factor analysis run with the Varimax Rotation Method. This factor alone explains 32% of the total variation of 8 variables. The variables which weight in this factor are the following ones: Participation (.60); Equality (.64); Inclusiveness (.74); Transparency (.72); and Dialogue/Communication (.71).

[5] This is an additive index of the variables which appeared to weight in the first factor of the general values: participation, equality; inclusiveness, transparency, and dialogue/communication). The Pearson correlation between the factor and the additive index is .97 (significant at .001 level). This means that the factor actually measures the level of mentioning of values of deliberativeness of the organizations.

If we look at our main dependent variable, the typology of democratic internal decision-making, we see that in Italy the preference for the associational type, based on delegation and the majority principle, is considerably more pronounced than for the overall sample (see table 4). Present, but in limited numbers, are the organizations of the deliberative representative and the deliberative participative type, whereas the number of groups of the assembleary type more or less corresponds with the overall figures.[6]

The stronger weight of more traditional organizations probably reflects, apart from the longer term factors mentioned in the introductory remarks of this report, the specific conditions of the period of affirmation and expansion of the GJM in Italy, stretching from the G8 counter-summit in Genoa to the ESF in Florence: after Genoa and especially in preparation of the ESF, organizations of the more traditional left moved closer to the movement, strongly opposed by the centre-right government of Silvio Berlusconi.

Table 4.Typology of internal democratic decision-making

	Frequencies (%)	**Valid cases**
Typology of internal democracy (not ordinal)		
Associational type	68.3 (51.6)	28 (126)
Deliberative Representative	7.3 (13.5)	3 (33)
Assembleary	14.6 (13.1)	6 (32)
Deliberative participative	7.3 (9.4)	3 (23)
Not applicable	2.4 (12.4)	1 (30)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)

[6] Among the organizations of the assembleary type we find, however, also the Cooperativa Carta, which probably was grouped in this category on the basis of lacking information. We were not able to get the constitution, but according to national law as a cooperative Carta should have a president (in fact, we did send a letter asking for documents to the president) and an executive committee and should therefore be considered of the associational type. The Abruzzo Social Forum also seems misclassified. Neither the composition of the assembly nor the decision-making methods are mentioned in the available documents. As a regional social forum it is highly likely that the assembly consists of delegates of local social forums and that the method of consensus is used. This would make the ASF a participative-representative group.

Figure 1. Typology of democratic internal decision-making

		Delegation of power	
		High	**Low**
Consensus	**Low**	**Associational model:** ARCI, Arcigay, Associazione 3 Febbraio, Associazione botteghe del mondo, Cobas, Comitato fermiamo la Guerra, CGIL, CUB, Cooperativa Radio Popolare, Emergency, FAI, FIOM, Forum permanente terzo settore, Giovani comunisti, Giovani Verdi, Il manifesto società cooperative, Isole nella rete, Legambiente, Marcia mondiale delle donne, Rifondazione comunista, Pax Cristi, Peacelink, Sdebitarsi, Sinistra giovanile, Tavola della pace, Un ponte per, Unimondo, Verdi	**Assembleary model:** Abruzzo Social Forum, Chainworkers, Comitato Imigrati, Cooperativa Carta, Euromayday, Rete Noglobal
	High	**Deliberative representation:** Attac Italia, Italian Consortium of Solidarity, Torino Social Forum	**Deliberative participation:** Indymedia Italy, Rete Lilliput, Venezia Social Forum

The typology of internal decision making, however, contains a high variation in the degree of the importance that the organizations, also of the associational type, attribute to the assembly (see table 5). In comparison with the overall figures, far less (7.1% vs. 21.4%) of the Italian organizations of the associational type do not mention the assembly in their documents. In 64.3% (57%) of the Italian associational cases the assembly is composed by delegates or the composition of the assembly is not specified, in 28.6% (21%) the assembly is composed by all members and it plays an important role in the decision making, counterbalanced, however, by the prominent role of an executive committee. The importance of the assembly increases in the different types of internal democracy, being very relevant for 28.6% (21%) of the groups allocated to the associational model, 66.7% (30%) of those supporting deliberative representation, and 82.6% of those following a deliberative participative model (table 5, see also means of the degree of assembly importance in table 6). The low result (16.7% vs. 53%) for the Italian organizations belonging to the assembleary type is explained by the fact that only one organization out of the six in this category mentioned the composition of its assembly.

Table 5. Importance of assembly within the types of democratic decision-making

	Assembly importance degree (recoded)		
Typology of internal democracy			
	0	1	2
Associational type	7.1 (21.4)	64.3 (57.1)	28.6 (21.4)
Deliberative Representative	0.0 (9.1)	33.3 (60.6)	66.7 (30.3)
Assembleary	0.0 (0.0)	83.3 (46.9)	16.7 (53.1)
Deliberative participative	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (17.4)	100.0 (82.6)
Total valid cases	2 (32)	24 (111)	14 (73)

Table 6: Importance of assembly within the types of democratic decision-making (means)

	Assembly importance degree (mean)	Valid cases
Typology of internal democracy		
Associational type	1.5 (1.2)	28 (127)
Deliberative Representative	2.3 (1.5)	3 (34)
Assembleary	1.3 (2.0)	6 (32)
Deliberative participative	2.7 (2.5)	3 (23)
Total valid cases	(1.5)	3 (216)

It is above all among the organizations of the associational type, that we find groups of very diverse character (see figure 1): political parties and their youth organizations (like Rifondazione Comunista and the Giovani Comunisti), traditional trade unions (like the CGIL or the FIOM), grassroots unions (like Cobas or CUB), SMOs covering different themes from ecology (Legambiente) to solidarity (Un ponte per), and campaigns like Sdebitarsi (solidarity) or Fermiamo la Guerra (peace). If we look in detail at the importance that the assembly has for these organizations, we find in the intermediate category large established organizations like trade unions or political parties and groups allowing for only collective membership. The highest degree of importance is attributed to the assembly by Pax Cristi and the anarchist federation FAI, but above all by smaller groups of recent foundation (Associazione 3 Febbraio, Emergency, Un ponte per) and by cooperatives

specializing in independent/alternative information (Radio popolare, Il manifesto, Unimondo).[7]

Crossing associational types with the previously mentioned democratic values (table 7), we see that the Italian organizations of the associational and of the assembleary type stress participatory democracy as an internal value more than the organizations of the other countries, and that all Italian groups of the two deliberative types underline this value. The mentions of inclusiveness are almost completely concentrated in groups of the latter types, whereas critique of delegation is a value we find almost exclusively in the assembleary and the deliberative participative categories. Individual or collective autonomy is especially underlined by organizations of the assembleary type.

Table 7. Organizational values and typology of decision-making

Type of internal democracy	**Organizational values**					
	Participatory Democracy	**Inclusiveness**	**Crit. Del. and non hier.**	**Autonomous org. or loc.**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy**
Associational model	42.9 (20.6)	3.6 (14.3)	7.1 (13.5)	48.0 (42.7)	21.4 (25.4)	21.4 (28.6)
Deliberative representation	100 (57.6)	66.7 (45.5)	0.0 (39.4)	66.7 (61.3)	33.3 (42.4)	0.0 (39.4)
Assembleary	50.0 (18.8)	0.0 (3.1)	50.0 (25.0)	20.0 (17.9)	0.0 (6.3)	50.0 (34.8)
Deliberative participation	100 (60.9)	33.3 (43.5)	66.7 (60.9)	66.7 (53.3)	66.7 (47.8)	0.0 (34.8)
Cramer's V	.403 (sig. 0.10) (364***)	.601*** (.370***)	.551** (373***)	n.s.. (244**)	n.s.. (.280***)	n.s. (n.s.)

2.4. Attitudes towards representative institutions

Turning to the relationship of the Italian movement organizations with state institutions, our results show above all that this argument is rarely covered in the documents we analyzed. In fact, if we look at the typology of collaboration/control with national institutions (see table 10), in 73.2% of the Italian cases this is not mentioned, compared to an overall 52.5%. It may be noted that also among the organizations of an associational type we find critical

[7] The two organizations not mentioning an assembly in their documents are the campaign Fermiamo la guerra and the youth organization of the Italian Green party (Giovani Verdi), at the time of the coding undergoing a period of re-foundation with the process of writing a constitution not yet concluded.

collaborators (four concerning national institutions) and uncollaborative controllers (three concerning IGOs). The organizations showing some collaboration are all of the associational or the deliberative representative type; some refusal is expressed by one organization of the associational type and one of the assembleary type. Some democratic control is shown by four organizations of the associational type, one deliberative representative, and one deliberative participative.

The high number of missing in the variables concerning the relationship of the Italian movement organizations with state institutions and the corresponding small number of valid cases does not make it worthwhile to explore correlations with other dimensions. Crossing attitudes towards institutions with the organizational democratic values, in fact, produces few results. Critique of delegation and individual/collective autonomy seem negatively related with democratic control and collaboration, and positively with refusal. Inclusiveness and deliberative values weakly correspond with democratic control and with collaboration.

Table 8. Relationships with institutions and economic actors (frequencies)

Relationships with institutions and economic actors		
Collaboration with representative institutions	9.8 (26.6)	41 (244)
Democratic control of representative institutions	12.2 (32.4)	41 (244)
Refusal of relationship with representative institutions	2.4 (11.5)	41 (244)
Collaboration with local institutions	19.5 (22.5)	41 (244)
Democratic control of local institutions	9.8 (21.3)	41 (244)
Refusal of relationship with local institutions	2.4 (4.5)	41 (244)
Collaboration with (national) state institutions	7.3 (24.6)	41 (244)
Democratic control of (national) state institutions	14.6 (32.0)	41 (244)
Refusal of relationship with (national) state institutions	4.9 (9.0)	41 (244)
Collaboration with IGOs	2.4 (18.9)	41 (244)
Democratic control of IGOs	7.3 (27.9)	41 (244)
Refusal of relationship with IGOs	4.9 (7.4)	41 (244)
Collaboration with economic actors	2.4 (14.3)	41 (244)
Democratic control of economic actors	7.3 (22.5)	41 (244)
Refusal of relationship with economic actors	2.4 (14.8)	41 (244)

Table 9. Relationships with national institutions recoded (frequencies)

Relationships with national institutions recoded		
Collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	22.0 (33.2)	41 (244)
Democratic control on at least one level of national institutions	17.1 (36.9)	41 (244)
Refusal of collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	4.9 (12.7)	41 (244)

Table 10. Typology of collaboration/control for national institutions

Typology of collaboration/control for national institutions		
Not mentioned	73.2 (52.9)	30 (129)
Uncritical collaborators	9.8 (10.2)	4 (25)
Uncollaborative controllers	4.0 (13.9)	2 (34)
Critical collaborators	12.2 (23.0)	5 (56)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)

Table 11. Relations with national, transnational institutions and economic actors, recoded

New dependent variables	Frequencies	Cases
Relationships with institutions		
Any collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	22.0 (37.3)	41 (244)
Any refusal of collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	4.9 (22.1)	41 (244)
Any democratic control on national, transnational institutions and economic actors	17.1 (43.0)	41 (244)

2.5. Organizational structure

Turning to the organizational structure (table 12), the presence of a constitution is recorded slightly more often than in the overall sample (63.4% vs. 57%), reflecting the fact that the Italian sample is composed by a larger number of formal organizations of the associational type. As far as territorial levels and type of organization are concerned, our results for the Italian cases closely mirror the overall results. Three quarters of the Italian organizations indicate a local presence, whereas 41.5% (37.7%) mention an international level, for which, however, there is a preference for the traditional federation with comparatively fewer modern/loose networks. The reticularity of the Italian organizations, indicated by the fact

that 39.7% (30.7%) are networks or federations, is further underlined by the relatively high number of Italian organizations allowing for both individual and collective membership. This feature is characteristic for the most recent generation of Italian organizations: 13 of the 17 organizations allowing for both individual and collective membership were founded after 1990. If some organizations may allow for collective membership for very specific (practical) reasons – the cooperative running the newspaper "Il Manifesto", for instance, in order to include the cooperative doing the cleaning – the reticularity of the Italian organizations seems further confirmed by the comparatively high number stressing collaboration also with organizations working in thematic areas different than their own (but sharing similar values). Surprising is the result of the low number of organizations declaring collaboration with alternative economic actors.

Table 12. Organizational structure variables 1

	Frequencies of yes (%)	**Total of valid cases**
Presence of a constitution	63.4 (57.0)	41 (244)
Territorial levels		
Local level presence	75.6 (74.2)	41 (244)
Regional level presence	56.1 (55.7)	41 (244)
National level presence	82.9 (83.6)	41 (244)
International level presence	41.5 (37.7)	41 (244)
Of which Hierarchical "single" organization	4.9 (6.6)	41 (244)
"Traditional" federation (ETUC model)	19.5 (11.5)	41 (244)
"Modern/loose" Network (ATTAC-International Model)	7.3 (11.5)	41 (244)
Campaign (Euromayday-model)	9.8 (8.2)	41 (244)

Type of organization		
Single Organization	51.2 (53.7)	21 (131)
Network or federation	39.0 (30.7)	16 (74)
Ad-hoc umbrella organization	9.8 (15.6)	4 (39)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Kind of members		
Only individual	22.0 (31.1)	9 (76)
Only collective	7.3 (10.7)	3 (26)
Both individual and collective	41.5 (32.8)	17 (80)
Not applicable	29.3 (16.4)	12 (40)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Collaboration/networking with national SMOs		
Not mentioned	19.5 (18.9)	8 (46)
Yes, in general	24.4 (34.8)	10 (85)

Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	24.4 (31.1)	10 (76)
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	31.7 (15.2)	13 (37)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Collaboration/networking with TSMOs		
Not mentioned	34.1 (23.8)	14 (58)
Yes, in general	19.5 (29.1)	8 (71)
Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	19.5 (28.7)	8 (70)
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	26.8 (18.4)	11 (45)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Collaboration with "alternative" economic actors	4.9 (30.7)	2 (75)

The organizations of our Italian sample vary considerably in size (see table 13). As far as individual membership is concerned, medium size groups seem to be quite rare: half of the valid cases have a membership of up to 1.000 individual members, and almost the same number count more than 10.000, of these six (23.1% of valid cases) more than 100.000. For collective membership we find a higher concentration in the lower ranges, with almost half the valid cases in the category of up to 25 collective members, but also four organizations (23.5% of valid cases) that count more than 100 collective members.

Table 13. Size of individual and collective membership

Number of individual members		
Up to 100	12.2 (10.2)	5 (25)
101-1000	22.2 (13.1)	9 (32)
1001-10000	4.9 (9.4)	2 (23)
10001-100000	12.2 (9.0)	5 (22)
More than 100000	14.6 (6.6)	6 (16)
Missing and not applicable	34.1 (51.6)	14 (126)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Number of collective members		
Up to 25	17.1 (13.1)	7 (32)
26-100	14.6 (12.7)	6 (31)
100+	9.8 (12.7)	4 (31)
Missing and not applicable	58.5 (61.5)	24 (150)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)

In correspondence with the results we had for internal values, in terms of membership requirements our Italian organizations do not emerge as particularly inclusive, to the contrary (see table 14): the number of those mentioning requirements for individual (29.3%) or collective (39.0%) membership is particularly high. This probably reflects the tradition of ideological groups in Italy. Other elements of the membership rules confirm the low inclusiveness (the very high 61.0% for the possibility to expel members) and indicate a

relatively strong formalization (63.5% for fee paying membership, 41.5% for membership cards).

Table 14. Membership Characteristics

Requirements for individual members		
No requirements mentioned	9.8 (18.9)	4 (46)
Everyone can join	0.0 (11.1)	0 (27)
To apply and to endorse the principles and rules or the group	24.4 (19.3)	10 (47)
Requirements mentioned	29.3 (14.8)	12 (36)
Not applicable	36.6 (36.1)	15 (88)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Requirements for collective members		
No requirements mentioned	4.9 (20.5)	2 (50)
To apply and to endorse the principles and rules or the group	4.9 (12.7)	2 (31)
Requirements mentioned	39.0 (19.3)	16 (47)
Not applicable	51.2 (47.5)	21 (116)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Others characteristics of membership		
Possibility to become a member	70.7 (83.6)	41 (244)
Formalization with membership card	41.5 (23.0)	41 (244)
Fee paying membership	63.5 (57.8)	41 (244)
Possibility to expel members	61.0 (38.5)	41 (244)

The picture emerging for Italy from the new variables on organizational structure we built (table 15; for details on the recoding see introductory chapter), is that of a movement consisting of organizations networking more with national SMOs than with TSMOs. Moreover, the new variables underline the comparatively low inclusiveness and high formalization of the Italian organizations, which however see the importance they attribute to participation as an internal value confirmed by a high score for structural participation. In addition, the Italian organizations are characterized by strongly developed features of structural accountability and of structural guarantee, with the difference with the overall results especially striking for the latter.

Table 15. Organizational structure variables, recoded

	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Networking		
Networking with national SMOs dichotomized	80.5 (81.1)	41 (244)
Networking with TSMOs dichotomized	65.9 (76.2)	41 (244)
Additive territorial level		
Only one territorial level	19.5 (22.5)	8 (55)
Two territorial levels	29.3 (24.6)	12 (60)
Three territorial levels	26.8 (32.0)	11 (78)
Four territorial levels	24.4 (20.9)	10 (51)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)
Indexes of organizational structures		
At least one prohibition with institutions, parties or associations	19.5 (11.5)	41 (244)
Structural participation	73.2 (59.4)	41 (244)
Structural inclusiveness	26.8 (39.8)	41 (244)
Structural guarantee	53.7 (27.9)	41 (244)
Structural accountability	61.0 (47.5)	41 (244)
Decentralization	29.3 (23.8)	41 (244)
Normalized additive index of formalization-mean	.65 (.42)	41 (244)
Role of Knowledge (presence of thematic or scientific committees)	39.0 (39.8)	41 (244)
Ordinal variable for the use of knowledge		
Thematic or scientific groups not mentioned	61.0 (60.2)	25 (147)
Thematic or scientific committees existing but not deciding	26.8 (29.9)	11 (73)
Thematic or scientific committees existing and deciding	12.2 (9.8)	5 (24)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)

As far as the interaction between organizational characteristics and democratic values is concerned (tables available upon request), some congruence between general principles and the designing of an organizational structure emerges. In the interpretation of the results we have to consider the high relevance that participatory democracy as an internal value has for the majority of Italian organizations. Reference to participation as a principle is in fact more frequent not only in organizations that stress structural participation, but also in those featuring structural inclusiveness, structural guarantee, decentralization, role of knowledge and (especially transnational) networking. The value of inclusiveness is more often mentioned by organizations characterized by elements of structural participation, structural inclusiveness and networking. Looking at the general democratic values, we find deliberative values mentioned above all by organizations featuring structural inclusiveness and (to a lesser extent) structural participation and the role

of knowledge. References to individual or collective/cultural autonomy occur for organizations characterized by structural inclusiveness and transnational networking.

Confronting the internal principles and the single (not aggregated) general democratic values with the other organizational characteristics, we find references to participation, equality, transparency, the autonomy of member organizations and local chapters especially in formal groups, organized on different territorial levels and with large individual membership. Mentions of critique of delegation and individual and collective/cultural autonomy concentrate in informal groups with small individual membership.

Looking at our types of internal decision making, the associational type is clearly concentrated in the large organizations with more than 10.000 and more than 100.000 individual members (five and six cases, respectively), the assembleary type in the small organizations with up to 1.000 individual members (all four for which we have data on the size of membership). The one deliberative representative organization for which we have data on the size of membership falls into the category up to 10.000 members. All deliberative participative organizations are small groups with up to 1.000 individual members.

As far as the type of organization is concerned (single organization, network/federation, or ad hoc organization), five of our six organizations of the deliberative types are networks (one deliberative representative group is a single organization), as are four out of six organizations of the assembleary type. Most organizations of the associational type (18) are single organizations, but we also find seven networks/federations (we have several trade union confederations in our sample) and three ad hoc umbrella groups.

Confronting the types of internal decision making with the aggregated data on organizational characteristics (see table 16), we have to consider that the more informal organizations (concentrated in the assembleary and deliberative participative types) are less likely to produce documents with detailed information. If structural participation seems important to most Italian organizations, it is especially those of the associational and of the deliberative representative type that give importance to this element. The associational groups seem to give little importance to structural inclusiveness but to pay high attention to

structural accountability and structural guarantee. The deliberative participative organizations (to a lesser extent the deliberative representative ones) emerge as strong in structural inclusiveness. As far as the role of knowledge is concerned, if scientific or thematic groups are present also in nine organizations of the associational type (in 18 not), only in one of these cases do they also have the power to take decisions. In all six organizations of the two deliberative types, to the contrary, scientific or thematic groups are present and in four they have the power to take decisions.

Table 16. Types of internal decision-making and organizational structure

Type of internal decision making	Structural participation	Structural inclusiveness	Decentralization	National net	Transnational net
Associational	82.1 (66.7)	33.3 (44.8)	35.7 (40.0)	82.1 (87.3)	67.9 (76.2)
Deliberative representative	100.0 (78.8)	50.0 (66.7)	33.0 (31.3)	100.0 (78.8)	100.0 (90.9)
Assembleary	33.0 (59.4)	50.0 (42.9)	0.0 (11.1)	83.3 (78.1)	50.0 (71.9)
Deliberative participative	66.7 (69.6)	100.0 (46.2)	100.0 (50.0)	66.7 (82.6)	66.7 (65.2)
Cramer's V	.431* (n.s..)	n.s. (n.s..)	n.s. (n.s..)	n.s. (n.s..)	n.s. (n.s..)

Type of internal decision making	Structural accountability	Structural guarantee	Formalization (mean)	Organizational autonomy	Role of knowledge
Associational	78.6 (59.5)	71.4 (21.4)	.69 (.60)	25.0 (14.3)	35.7 (42.1)
Deliberative representative	66.7 (84.8)	66.7 (20.0)	.80 (.62)	33.3 (21.2)	100.0 (63.6)
Assembleary	16.7 (25.0)	0.0 (20.0)	.30 (.31)	0.0 (9.4)	0.0 (25.0)
Deliberative participative	0.0 (21.7)	0.0 (3.1)	.40 (.22)	0.0 (0.0)	100.0 (60.9)
Cramer's V	.581*** (.403***)	.596***	.603** (ETA) (.531*** ETA)	n.s. (n.s..)	.574*** (.243***)

2.6. Movement discourses and identities

The Italian data on the basic themes/values mentioned in the documents analyzed with relatively minor variations follow the patterns emerging from the overall results (see table 17): the importance of frames such as another globalization and democracy; the high relevance of social justice and workers' rights; the importance of ecological values (ecology, sustainability, animal rights) and of references to the South of the World (global distributive justice, solidarity with the third world) or to women's rights. Confirmed is also

the low importance of ideological references, be it to anarchism (2.4%), communism (4.9%) or socialism (2.4%), with a slightly different picture only for autonomy and/or antagonism (9.8%). The differences of the Italian data if compared to the overall results lie above all in the irrelevance of alternative knowledge (2.4% as to 12.7%) and the high importance of human or civil rights (58.5% as to 47.1%), immigrants' rights (65.9% as to 45.9%), and above all non-violence (39% as to 27.5%) and peace/anti-militarism (82.9% as to 49.6%).

Table 17. Basic themes and values (frequencies)

Basic Values/Themes	Frequencies of yes (%)	Total of valid cases
Another globalization/different form of globalization	48.8 (50.0)	41 (244)
Democracy	43.9 (52.0)	41 (244)
Social justice/defence of the welfare state/fighting poverty/social inclusion	73.2 (68.9)	41 (244)
Global (distributive) justice	39.0 (45.1)	41 (244)
Ecology	58.5 (47.1)	41 (244)
Sustainability	31.7 (32.8)	41 (244)
Anti-neoliberalism	43.9 (39.3)	41 (244)
Anti-capitalism/anti-imperialism	12.2 (23.0)	41 (244)
Socialism	2.4 (7.8)	41 (244)
Communism	4.9 (3.3)	41 (244)
Anarchism (traditional or libertarian)	2.4 (3.7)	41 (244)
Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	9.8 (9.0)	41 (244)
Animal rights	7.3 (3.7)	41 (244)
Human rights/civil rights	58.5 (47.1)	41 (244)
Workers' rights	39.0 (40.2)	41 (244)
Women's right	43.9 (42.6)	41 (244)
Gay/lesbian rights	17.1 (15.2)	41 (244)
Immigrants' rights/anti-racism/rights of asylum seekers	65.9 (45.9)	41 (244)
Solidarity with third world countries	51.2 (46.3)	41 (244)
Alternative knowledge	2.4 (12.7)	41 (244)
Religious principles	2.4 (7.0)	41 (244)
Critical consumerism/fair trade/food sovereignty	24.4 (29.1)	41 (244)
Ethical finance	17.1 (16.8)	41 (244)
Peace/anti-militarism	82.9 (49.6)	41 (244)
Non-violence	39.0 (27.5)	41 (244)

The recoding of these variables on the basis of a factor analysis confirms the high significance of peace and non-violence, and reveals the relatively stronger position of the eco-minority groups on the one hand, on the other the relative weakness of the Italian anti-capitalist component, as well as of the traditional left (see table 18).

Table 18. Aggregated basic themes and values (frequencies)

	Frequencies of yes (%)	**Total of valid cases**
New globalism	87.8 (87.3)	41 (244)
Eco-Minority Groups	80.5 (70.9)	41 (244)
Critical sustainability	58.5 (58.6)	41 (244)
Peace and non-violence	85.4 (69.3)	41 (244)
Anti-capitalism	19.5 (26.6)	41 (244)
Traditional Left	4.9 (8.6)	41 (244)
Additive index of all basic themes-mean	8.22 (7.96)	41 (244)
Normalized additive index of critical sustainability-mean	.31 (.31)	41 (244)
Normalized additive index of new globalism-mean	.48 (.49)	41 (244)
Normalized additive index of eco-minority – mean	.39 (.31)	41 (244)
Normalized additive index of peace and non-violence	.46 (.33)	41 (244)

Crossing general themes with internal principles and general democratic values, participatory democracy (which, however, should be recalled is very dominant in the Italian case) resonates somewhat with all themes (critical sustainability, new globalism, eco-minority groups, peace and non-violence, traditional left), with the exception of anticapitalism. For inclusiveness, although we have only four mentions, it seems significant that all four of them can be found in the new globalism, the eco-minority, and the peace/non-violence areas. Deliberative general values do not resonate at all with anti-capitalism and with the traditional left, somewhat with critical sustainability, more strongly with peace/non-violence, but especially (all eight mentions) with new globalism and eco-minority groups. Critique of delegation does not resonate with critical sustainability, peace/non-violence or the traditional left; it does somewhat with new globalism, eco-minority and anti-capitalist groups. The value autonomy of member organizations or local chapters does not resonate in any particular way with any of the themes. Autonomy as an individual or collective value seems negatively related to the traditional left and to critical sustainability, positively with new globalism, eco-minority groups and anti-capitalism.

Crossing basic themes and values with our typology of internal decision-making (table 19), we notice that new globalism is of great significance for the organizations of all four types. However, new globalism together with critical sustainability and eco-minority seems stronger connected with the organizations of the deliberative type. In addition, peace/non-violence emerges as very important for the Italian organizations of the associational type. Anti-capitalism resonates only with the organizations of the associational and the assembleary type, traditional left only with those of the associational type.

Table 19. Types of internal decision-making and basic themes and values

	Critical sustainability	**New globalism**	**Eco minority**	**Peace/non-violence**	**Anti-capitalism**	**Traditional left**
Associational	60.7 (66.7)	85.7 (88.1)	82.1 (69.0)	89.3 (74.6)	21.4 (18.3)	7.1 (9.5)
Deliberative representative	100.0 (69.7)	100.0 (97.0)	100.0 (90.9)	100.0 (78.8)	0.0 (36.4)	0.0 (18.2)
Assembleary	16.7 (37.5)	83.3 (87.5)	66.7 (62.5)	66.7 (56.3)	33.3 (34.4)	0.0 (6.3)
Deliberative participative	66.7 (39.1)	100.0 (87.0)	100.0 (82.6)	66.7 (60.9)	0.0 (39.1)	0.0 (0.0)

Crossing basic themes with relations with institutions (for which, however, as mentioned above, the number of valid cases is very small for Italy), seems to confirm the overall results: references to new globalism and critical sustainability increase mentioning of collaboration and democratic control; reference to anti-capitalism coincides with absence of both collaboration and democratic control and with the appearance of refusal.

2.7. Organizational functions

Looking at the organizational functions (table 20), we notice the dominance of protest/mobilization, even stronger for the Italian case (82.9%) than for the overall sample (69.3%). A comparatively higher importance has the offer/supply of services to the constituency, considerably less importance political education of the citizens.

Table 20. Organizational functions (frequencies)

Organizational functions (% yes)		
Protest/mobilization	82.9 (69.3)	41 (244)
Lobbying	41.5 (35.7)	41 (244)
Political representation	7.3 (11.5)	41 (244)
Representation of specific interests	14.6 (18.4)	41 (244)
Self awareness/self help	7.3 (13.9)	41 (244)
Advocacy	29.3 (22.5)	41 (244)
Offer/supply of services to the constituency	41.5 (21.7)	41 (244)
Spreading information/infl. media/raising awareness	75.6 (68.0)	41 (244)
Political education of the citizens	17.1 (42.6)	41 (244)
Legal protection/denunciation of repression	17.1 (17.6)	41 (244)

Crossing organizational functions with internal principles and democratic values, participatory democracy is related with protest, but also with lobbying and the representation of specific interests. Also all four organizations mentioning inclusiveness quote protest as a function, as they do spreading information. Critique of delegation seems negatively related with lobbying and the supply of services, positively with legal protection/denunciation of repression. Organizations stressing the autonomy of member organizations and local chapters seem more inclined to the supply of services. Deliberative general values seem weakly related with lobbying and the spreading of information. The value individual and collective/cultural autonomy shows a negative relation with lobbying, a strong positive relation with legal protection/denunciation of repression and a weak one with the supply of services as well as with advocacy. The latter function seems also connected with the value inclusiveness.

As for the types of internal decision-making (see table 21), we can notice that in Italy protest is highly relevant for all four types, whereas political representation, the supply of services and the representation of specific interests are functions privileged by organizations following the associational model. The latter function is also mentioned by one assembleary group (Euromayday). Lobbying and the political education of citizens as functions are mentioned by organizations of the associational and of the deliberative

representative type. Spreading information is privileged by all organizations of the two deliberative types, but also by groups following the assembleary model. The latter groups are dominant as far as legal protection and the denouncing of repression are concerned.

Table 21. Organizational functions and types of internal decision-making

	Type of internal decision-making (% of column)			
Organizational functions	**Associational**	**Delib. Repres.**	**Assembleary**	**Delib. Partic.**
Protest/mobilization	82.1 (69.0)	100 (81.8)	83.3 (59.4)	66.7 (87.0)
Lobbying	46.4 (46.0)	66.7 (36.4)	0.0 (15.6)	33.3 (21.7)
Political representation	10.7 (14.3)	0.0 (21.2)	0.0 (6.3)	0.0 (0.0)
Rep. of specific interests	17.9 (26.2)	0.0 (18.2)	16.7 (9.4)	0.0 (0.0)
Advocacy	35.7 (35.7)	33.3 (24.2)	16.7 (18.8)	0.0 (4.3)
Self-awareness/self-help	7.1 (14.3)	0.0 (12.2)	16.7 (9.4)	0.0 (13.0)
Offer services	53.6 (31.0)	33.3 (21.2)	16.7 (12.5)	0.0 (4.3)
Spreading information	71.4 (75.4)	100 (63.6)	66.7 (53.1)	100 (56.5)
Political education	21.4 (46.8)	33.3 (54.5)	0.0 (31.3)	0.0 (39.1)
Legal protection/repres.	7.1 (18.3)	33.3 (3.0)	66.7 (18.8)	0.0 (21.7)

As far as relations with institutions are concerned, the clearest picture emerges for legal protection/denunciation of repression: none of the organizations mentioning this function declare any collaboration or democratic control, and here we find also the two refusals shown among the Italian cases. The clearest positive relation with collaboration and democratic control is shown by lobbying and by political education, whereas spreading information shows a positive correlation with democratic control. Representation of specific interests and supply of services seem weakly related with collaboration and democratic control. The mention of protest as a function among Italian organizations is so diffuse that we find here 8 out of 9 collaborators, 7 out of seven democratic control and 2 out of 2 refusals.

2.8. Environmental context and democratic values

As already mentioned in the introductory remarks, the Italian organizations seem to be a particular case as far as their founding period is concerned (see table 22): more than half of them were founded in the 1990s. The fact that in some case (e.g. Arci, Rifondazione comunista, Giovani comunisti, Sinistra giovanile) we have to speak more of a re-foundation than of a foundation, can contribute to explaining why in Italy we have a certain number of

organizations combining high formalization with values like participation and functions like protest.

Table 22. Year of foundation (frequencies)

Year of foundation	%	N
Before 1968	9.8 (13.5)	4 (33)
1969-1989	12.2 (20.5)	5 (50)
1990-1999	53.7 (34.8)	22 (85)
2000+	24.4 (27.9)	10 (68)
Missing	0.0 (3.3)	0 (8)
Total valid cases	100.0	41 (244)

In fact, if we cross year of foundation with organizational values, we see that for the Italian cases the internal value participatory democracy, already high before 1989, sees a further growth (see table 23): it is mentioned by two of the four organizations founded before 1968, by one of the five founded 1969-1989, by 11 of the 22 founded 1990-1999 and by seven of the eleven founded 2000 and after. The development of participation as a general democratic value seems to follow a similar trend, indicating also that the 1990s were not congenial times for participation: it is mentioned by three of the four organizations founded before 1968, by four of the five founded 1969-1989, by 11 of the 22 founded 1900-1999 and by eight of the eleven founded 2000 and after. Also equality, mentioned by most of the Italian organizations founded before 1989, sees a sharp drop for the organizations founded in the 1990s and a however less pronounced rise for the groups emerging in the new millennium. Inclusiveness, cultural/collective autonomy and dialogue/communication are heavily concentrated in groups founded after 1990. Critique of delegation as a value seems on the rise especially after the year 2000.

Table 23. Year of foundation and internal and general democratic values

	Democratic values					
Year of Foundation	**Part. Democ.**	**Inclusiveness**	**Deliberative values (dic.)**	**Crit. Del. and non hier.**	**Auton. member org. or loc. chap**	**Ind. or Coll. Autonomy**
Before 1968	50.0 (18.2)	0.0 (18.2)	25.0 (24.2)	25.0 (12.1)	50.0 (48.4)	25.0 (27.3)
1969-1989	20.0 (26.0)	20.0 (24.0)	40.0 (26.0)	0.0 (22.0)	50.0 (38.8)	20.0 (34.0)
1990-1999	50.0 (27.1)	9.1 (15.3)	18.2 (22.4)	9.1 (24.7)	50.0 (38.4)	18.2 (31.8)
2000+	70.0 (36.8)	10.0 (29.4)	20.0 (38.2)	40.0 (30.9)	33.3 (40.0)	30.0 (32.4)

Looking at the connection between type of internal democracy and year of foundation (see table 24), our results seem to underline in general the importance of differences in the development over time of the GJM's organizations between the different countries, and in particular for Italy the importance of the political environment created by the collapse of the party system at the beginning of the 1990s. In Italy a considerably lower number of associations than in the other countries was, in fact, founded before 1989. In addition, up to and including the 1990s the associational model, seems overwhelmingly dominant. Organizations of the assembleary and of the two deliberative types start to appear in the 1990s and affirm themselves in the 2000s.

Table 24. Year of foundation and types of internal decision-making

	Year of foundation				
Type of internal decision-making	**Before 1968**	**1969-1989**	**1990-1999**	**2000+**	**Total**
Associational model	14.3 (23.6)	17.9 (27.6)	60.7 (35.8)	7.1 (13.0)	28 (123) (100.0)
Deliberative representation	0.0 (12.5)	0.0 (21.9)	33.3 (34.4)	66.7 (31.3)	3 (32) (100.0)
Assembleary	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (12.9)	33.3 (38.7)	66.7 (48.4)	6 (31) (100.0)
Deliberative participation	0.0 (0.0)	0.0 (13.0)	33.3 (30.4)	66.7 (56.5)	3 (23) (100.0)
Cramer's V					. 376* (.252***)

As far as the relationships with institutions are concerned, all mentions of collaboration are made by organizations founded between 1969 and 1999, whereas the

references to democratic control are made mostly by groups founded during the 1990s, but also by some emerging after the year 2000.

3. Qualitative Analysis

3.1 "Associational" organizations

As underlined in the quantitative part, in the category "associational", the dominant one of our typology of democratic internal decision-making, we find organizations of very different characteristics, none of which can be defined as a "genuine" GJM organization. Our associational organizations display varying degrees of involvement with and contamination by the movement, but in no case this involvement seems to have had an influence on the internal organization and the organizational ideology. It seems to have led instead to a reaffirmation of those own values resonating with movement ideas. This is evident if we look at some of the organizations representing the traditional left.[8]

As far as democracy within the movement is concerned, we can assume that contamination with deliberative practices took place, especially within the social forum processes, without however leaving significant traces in documents. The influence of the GJM seems visible above all in visions of external democracy, however often restricted either to a negative vision of denunciation of neoliberal globalization or to catch phrases like participative or deliberative democracy or active citizenship. A slightly different picture seems to emerge for grassroots unions, with strong, identifying values of autonomy and self-organization which are proposed also inside the movement. Those organizations of our sample specializing in independent/alternative information or communication seem to remain anchored in an original editorial project and do not produce organizational documents on visions of democracy. Finally, some solidarity organizations emerging in the 1990s subsequently embraced the movement, including a deliberative-participative

[8] In this overview we will not discuss the ARCI, one of the organizations of the traditional left with the most importance for the Italian GJM: it may be recalled that the ARCI was cofounder of ATTAC Italia and that our link analysis had shown the website of the ARCI as playing a brokerage function. However, as far as organizational documents are concerned, references to and discussion of problems of internal or external democracy are few. In Article 1 of its constitution, the ARCI defines itself as an "integrated network of persons, values and places of active citizenship that promotes culture, sociality and solidarity" (available at: http://www.arci.it/testo.php?codice=STATUTO).

conception of democracy within the movement, but without changing their organizational ideology as expressed in documents.

Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro (CGIL)

The (traditionally communist and socialist) trade union confederation CGIL had kept a distance to the mobilizations for the counter-summit against the G8 in Genoa, but subsequently became involved in the organization of the ESF in Florence. Not indifferent for this change in attitude was the argument that democracy had to be safeguarded, touching an important element of its identity. In specific national mobilizations seeing also the participation of the GJM (workers' rights, peace) the CGIL marked the differences to the more radical wing of the movement, it continued, however, to be involved in the ESF and the WSF, and especially in local social forums.

As far as the organizational ideology is concerned, we cannot speak of a contamination by ideas of the GJM, but of a resonance of the CGIL's traditional participatory values with the movement's mobilizations. Article 6 (a) of the constitution underlines "the guarantee of the highest participation, individually or through delegates, of every member of the CGIL" in the formation of decisions.[9] In addition, some social movement claims incorporated since the 1970s (in the constitution we find, for instance, references to peace, ecology, women, immigrants) also resonate with the GJM.

The concluding document of the CGIL's 14th congress (February 2002) shows some influence of the GJM on the union's ideas on external democracy, but also the perception of the movement as a distinct and "different" actor, with the prospected relationship not going beyond dialogue and punctual alliances.[10] In this document the CGIL confirms its commitment to the globalization of rights, solidarity and opportunities, challenging a practice that brought about the affirmation of restricted organisms of transnational governance like the G8, the WTO, the OECD and the IMF. The GJM is defined as a great political resource, because of the many especially young participants, "finally returning to visible, rousing, participated political commitment" [finalmente tornati ad un impegno

[9] "La garanzia della massima partecipazione, personale o a mezzo di delegati, di ogni iscritta/iscritto alla CGIL, in uguaglianza di diritti con le altre iscritte/iscritti, alla formazione delle deliberazioni del proprio sindacato di categoria e delle istanze confederali, o alle decisioni specifiche che li riguardano" (http://www.cgil.it/congXIV/statuto%20CGIL-14%B0congresso.htm).

[10] Available at http://www.cgil.it/ufficiostampa/14°%20Congresso/XIV_Sintesi_Conclusioni2.htm.

politico visibile, coinvolgente, partecipato]. With these movements the CGIL intends to conduct a dialogue and to commit itself on single proposals and objectives, like workers' rights, Tobin tax, debt relief for poor countries, social and environmental clause. Different from large parts of the movement, the CGIL sees a fundamental step in this process in the promulgation of a constitution of the EU defending the "European social model".

The constitution of the CGIL contains also very detailed rules to safeguard the rights of internal minorities, especially the right to present motions and proposals with equal dignity before decision-making. On the official website, in fact, we also find documents of the internal left opposition ("eccoci").[11] In these documents closer relations with the "movement of movements" are auspicated. The interpretation of neoliberal globalization, congruent with the tradition of the Italian left, is that of a process instigated by a "dominant country" (the USA). Also the internal left opposition of the CGIL, more than for the adoption of new ideas developed by the GJM, calls for a reaffirmation of the CGIL's own values concerning internal organization (fight excesses of bureaucratization, assure participation and communitarian values in union life) and external democracy (participatory processes, reactivate democratic and class conflict, defeat neoliberal globalization, redistribution of resources, programmatic intervention by the state in the economy), allegedly forgotten or abandoned during the 1990s, the years of "concertazione" (tripartite agreements between government, unions and employers).

Federazione Impiegati e Operai Metallurgici (FIOM)

The metal workers union FIOM, associated to the CGIL, shows a deeper and more continuing involvement in the movement, evident also on the website, where part of the international section is dedicated to the union's involvement in the (world, European and local) social forum processes. In the introduction to the international section, the FIOM is said to participate in a larger antiliberal movement that continues to develop in the social forums, but this participation is only one of the international commitments of the union, the other being international trade unionism and the fight against war. The international section is in fact divided into: World, Europe (both dedicated to trade unionism), war and peace, FIOM in movement (dedicated to the GJM).

[11] See http://www.cgil.it/eccoci/default.htm.

For the FIOM no contamination of its organizational ideology emerges from its documents, and also the visions of external democracy at least partly are presented as a reaffirmation of values traditionally part of the own tradition. Article 7 of the FIOM's constitution affirms that the internal organization is based on the broadest democracy.[12] Not surprisingly, participation of the members is stressed in terms similar to the CGIL: as a member of the confederation, the FIOM has to present any changes of its constitution for approval to the mother organization. However, in its interactions with other groups within the social forum processes, the FIOM did become acquainted with deliberative practices, and the usefulness of facilitators for instance is underlined in reports on international meetings we find on the website.

The participation of the FIOM in the ESF process goes beyond the simple sending of a delegation. At the ESF in Paris the union (together with the Spanish, German and French metalworkers unions) promoted two seminars, on social conflicts and the relation between trade unions and movements, the other on arms production, war and peace. In addition it participated, on invitation of other organizations, in seminars on the Palestinian conflict, on alternative energies, and on public services, and its general secretary spoke at one of the plenary sessions. On its website, the FIOM also mobilized for participation in the ESF. The document of the political commission for the 23rd congress of the FIOM (2004) explicitly called for the continuation of the union's participation in the mobilizations of the movement.[13]

In preparation of the ESF in Athens the FIOM continues to be involved in the promotion of seminars and in the mobilization of participation. The reports on preparatory meetings (ESF and WSF) and on regional forums (Mediterranean) put on the international section of the website underline however the danger of the ESF becoming a routine event and the difficulties in reforming the WSF process.

From the document of the political commission for the 23rd congress of the FIOM the union's position on the European constitutional treaty emerges, in comparison to that of the CGIL more advanced. The metalworkers demand the inclusion of an article repudiating war as a solution for international conflicts, in analogy with the Italian constitution. In

[12] Available at http://www.fiom.cgil.it/statuto.htm.

[13] Available at http://www.fiom.cgil.it/eventi/2004/xxiii_con/doc_pol.htm.

addition they call for a strengthening of democracy within the EU, giving citizens power over the institutions. If the CGIL called for the defense of the "European social model" referring to the European Charta of fundamental rights, the FIOM called for the defense and development of the European social model as alternative to the "American" one, and to this end defined as necessary to give back, at every level, full sovereignty over economic politics to the democratic institutions. The FIOM subsequently was involved in the discussions about "another Europe", for instance in Florence in November 2005, leading up to the ESF in Athens.

Partito della Rifondazione comunista (RC) and Giovani Comunisti (GC)

From a very early point close to the movement has been the main Italian communist party (RC), which participated in pro-Zapatista mobilizations, G8-counter-summits, and the social forum processes at the different levels. Looking at RC's internal organization, the party itself seems to indicate an influence of the GJM by recently starting to define itself as a "network party". In addition, the constitution (April 2002) affirms the autonomy of the organisms of the alternative left and of the movements, with which the party collaborates on an equal footing and in which its members partecipate in democratic and not sectarian ways.[14] However, in the main documents of RC the traditional organizational ideology and visions of democracy remain dominant.

The constitution refers to Marxism and to the traditions of the socialist and communist workers movements, in particular the PCI, stressing however that a hierarchical or plebiscitary party organization is rejected. References to liberty and democracy remain within this tradition. Article 3 of the constitution underlines that the internal life and the whole fabric of internal relations are oriented towards liberty and democracy, "with this tending also to anticipate and to experiment the completely democratic quality of the relations in the future socialist society for which the party is fighting" [con ciò anche tendendo ad anticipare e a sperimentare la quotidianità e la qualità totalmente democratiche delle relazioni in quella società socialista futura per la quale il partito si batte].

As far as visions of external democracy are concerned the same constitution mentions peace, freedom of nations, ecology, women's rights, etc., but overcoming

[14] Available at http://www.rifondazione.it/v/doc/statuto_definitivo.html.

capitalism remains the ultimate goal. In fact, the constitution of RC always speaks of anticapitalist movements, also when referring directly to the GJM, stating in its constitution that the party is working for "reciprocal solidarity and collaboration between the anticapitalist political forces and movements all around the world and cooperates with the initiatives that tend to unite them and form them into a front against capitalist globalization". [agisce per la reciproca solidarietà e la collaborazione tra le forze politiche e i movimenti anticapitalistici di tutto il mondo e coopera alle iniziative che tendono a raccoglierli e a costituirli in schieramento contro la globalizzazione capitalistica.]

A new phase in the relations between RC and the GJM opened with the 2005 party congress. Party secretary Bertinotti presented a motion defining as a fundamental challenge the construction of a participative democracy in which the critique of the movements could transform itself into a left-wing political and programmatic alternative, a process of transformation of capitalist society. In this context he posed the problem of the participation in government of an antagonist force, not as a decision of value but as a necessary phase to liberate Italy from the Berlusconi government. The primary objective of a future government coalition was to be the construction of participative democracy. In the same period, in occasion of actions of "social disobedience" (like "auto-reduction" of prices in supermarkets) Bertinotti criticized the action repertoire of parts of the movement, demanding an unequivocal choice of non-violence. Already in February 2004 RC had organized a conference on "Acting Nonviolence".

These moves of RC, clearly determined by the upcoming elections, are indicative of a choice for institutional (representative) politics and a tactical attitude towards the movement and its demands. In fact, if the presentation by RC of some movement figures (like the leader of the Rete Noglobal Francesco Caruso) as MP candidates led to a campaign by the centre-right – synthesized in an electoral poster of Berlusconi's Forza Italia party "The no globals in government – no thank you!" – Bertinotti's moves evidently created difficulties for the party's youth organization, the Giovani Comunisti. The GC were deeply involved in the movement, in the sector close to the Disobedients – in fact at their 2002 congress they had voted to join the "Laboratorio della disobbedienza" – and especially in an initial phase had been the link between the movement and the party.

The document that the GC presented at the party congress, as an integrative amendment, testifies that the contamination by the movement touched the identity and the visions of democracy of the organization, although, again, without influence on the internal structure.[15] Defining themselves protagonists of the movement of movements, they underline the positive value of the processes of contamination with others that they underwent already before Genoa at the European marches. They stress the particularity (inside the movement) of their decision to join a political party in a period of crisis of institutional politics, but continue explaining that they understand the word "communist" not as a definite identity handed down form the past, but as a word to be "refounded" in social centres, associations and collectives. Key words of their conceptions of democracy are the promotion of participation and active citizenship, with reference to the participatory budget, explicitly understood as a critique of representative democracy. Participative democracy is further defined as a new space in which politics (and the GC) are called to transform into conflictuality and not into representation in institutions. "Nonviolent practices of conflict" and social disobedience are defended, and the document explicitly states that the category of nonviolence is not absolute, nor a dogma, and can not be a prejudicial for the relations with or within the movement.

Confederazione dei Comitati di base (Cobas)

Similar to the long established organizations of the traditional left, also for the grassroots unions close to the movement – apart from the Cobas the Confederazione Unitaria di Base (CUB) – their involvement in the GJM as far as organizational ideology is concerned seems to have led above all to a reaffirmation of own values resonating with the movement. These values, in particular self-organization, are evident also in the visions of external democracy.

The presentation published on the Cobas website by the international commission in 2002 with the aim of making known their position to the non-Italian parts of the movement

[15] "Emendamento integrativo del documento "alternativa di società" – perché "alternativa di società", offline document. It has to be underlined that the GC, differently from the Sinistra giovanile, do not enjoy a high degree of autonomy from the party. The Sinistra giovanile, although it is to be considered the youth organization of the Democrats of the Left (DS), is more an organization in its own right. In fact, you can be a member of the Sinistra giovanile without being a member of the DS. The GC do have their specific membership card, but are always members of RC. The GC's criticism of Bertinotti's line expressed in the document – "today the idea that the revolution coincides … with the taking of one or more places of power is unsustainable"; "revolution is not the exercise of counter-power but the construction of another kind of power" – and their reaffirmation of their own position – the movement of movements as the political space to construct an alternative society, disobedience as practice – remained uninfluential.

defines the organization as an integral part of the GJM and advances its anti-capitalist and autonomous interpretation of globalization. Equally strong, however, are references to the "hot autumn" of 1969 and the workers' struggles in Italy since the 1970s.[16] The Cobas -- founded as a grassroots union confederation in 1999, but in their organizational beginnings going back to the early 1990s – in fact see themselves in the tradition of the "spontaneous insurgence" of the factory workers of the 1960s, of the service workers, precariously employed and unemployed of the 1970s and 1980s and the "mass contestation of the neo-corporate trade unions at the beginning of the 1990s" (ibid.). Opposition to the established unions, self-organization from below, and the conception of being at the same time a union and a political and cultural subject are in fact basic tenets of the Cobas. The principles of equality, solidarity and rejection of delegation translate in the constitution of the Cobas into explicit critique of delegation, mandated delegation, the absence of a president (a spokesperson exists), an assembly meeting three times a year, and an executive committee in power from one assembly to the next.

These principles and the underlying values are proposed by representatives of the Cobas also inside the movement, as indicated already by the title of the presentation of the international committee: "A new model of social self-organization: from the rejection of delegation to the construction of the movements fighting against capitalist globalization". According to the account given by the international commission on the report of Cobas spokesperson Piero Bernocchi at the WSF in Porto Alegre in 2003 on the nature of the movement, the discussion centered on self-organization and the non-separation of the political, social and unionist.[17] Not surprisingly, in different documents the conceptions of globalization and proposals for problem solution advanced by other sectors of the movement are criticized and confronted with those of the Cobas.

The same principles also shape the visions of external democracy of the Cobas. In a published interview (Pizzo 2002; to be found also on the website in the section "documents concerning the movement") spokesperson Bernocchi envisioned social and political

[16] Available at http://www.cobas.it/Sito/Commissione%20Internazionale/Presentazione/Cobas%20presentazione.doc.

[17] Commissione internazionale Cobas (ed.), Relazione su Porto Alegre. Terza edizione del Forum Sociale Mondiale. February 2003 (available at http://www.cobas.it/Sito/Commissione%20Internazionale/P_Alegre%202002/Relazione%20Porto%20Alegre%20definitiva.doc).

democracy, as a prefiguration for post-capitalism: integral and direct democracy or "real collective decision making in the whole public space", including all public services, with transparency and control assured by the self-organized workers and "users". In the same context he recalled the necessity of not separating the political level from the trade union and the social one.

Organizations specializing in independent/alternative information or communication

As far as organizations specializing in independent/alternative information or communication are concerned, a contamination of their organizational ideology by the GJM does not seem to have taken place and in any case would be difficult because of their very character: most of them being cooperatives, significant features of their constitutions (among others the existence of a president and an executive committee) are prescribed by national law. The organizations of this category also seem to remain anchored in their founding values, in this case an original editorial project, which is reaffirmed also in recent changes of the constitutions.

Il Manifesto is a (declaredly communist) daily newspaper close to ATTAC Italia. The cooperative Il Manifesto was founded in 1971 "in the conviction … that the collective property of a newspaper and its self-management on part of those that produce it are essential conditions to guarantee the independence and autonomy of information from economic interests and political power, indispensable conditions for free information".[18] The constitution further recalls that the cooperative was founded, in the meeting between a radical part of the historical left and the antiauthoritarian and anti-system movements of 1968, as an original form of politics strongly anchored in the values of antifascism and of the resistance, striving at a renovation of critical Marxism, already separated from real existing socialism. "This remains the inspiration in the changed conditions between the end of the last century and the beginning of the years 2000, with globalization in process and in presence of the new *no global* movements. It [the cooperative] proposes to read reality through the double lens of social conflict and the conflict between the sexes, in full freedom of expression and of self-organization."

[18] Statuto del Manifesto Società Cooperativa, approvato dall'assemblea dei soci del 28 aprile 2005 (offline document).

Radio popolare grew out of an independent radio station founded in 1976. The cooperative proposes itself the development of pluralism and democracy in the field of communication. The constitution further states that its activities are conducted "in connection with and at the service of the workers, the democratic, laic and antifascist political forces, the neighbourhood councils, the trade unions and the organizations of the workers. To this spirit the whole activity of the cooperative shall conform."[19]

The cooperative Unimondo, responsible for the Italian portal of OneWorld, in its constitution underlines the promotion of human rights, of social inclusion, of sustainable development and of peace through the use and the development of the democratic potential offered by the new information and communication technologies.[20]

The association Peacelink, an internet portal founded in 1991, in its constitution (to be found on the website) underlines its non-party character and democratic structure and lists the following principles: the promotion of a culture of solidarity in all its forms, the defence of human rights, the education to peace, the coordination of information of the voluntary organizations, international cooperation, the support of humanitarian actions, the sensibility for problems of discomfort and sufferance, the repudiation of racism and of the mafia, the defence of environment, the culture of legality and of civil rights, in particular telematic rights, the right to multimedia expression of thought and the right to pluralism in information.

Un ponte per

Contamination by the movement is largely limited to relations within the GJM and to visions of external democracy also for those organizations of the associational type closest to the movement like Un ponte per. This organization was founded at the time of the first Iraq war, with the immediate aim to promote solidarity initiatives in favour of the Iraqi population.[21] These initiatives were to follow the spirit of a phrase of Catholic priest Ernesto Balducci: "We have to do something to repay the Iraqis for what we have done to

[19] Statuto della Cooperativa Radio popolare a r.l., approvato il 21 Aprile 2005 (offline document).

[20] Statuto della Società Cooperativa Sociale Unimondo, approvato il 19 Aprile 2005 (offline document).

[21] According to the constitution, the association "repudiates war as a means for resolving international controversies, is committed to contrast the cultural and economic tendency of the industrialized states to dominate, also militarily, the nations of the south of the world, and in any case works for alleviating the consequences of this domination".

them". The first initiatives in fact consisted not in demonstrations, but in the collection of funds, not in petitions, but in the sending of medicine. As specified in the "about us" section of the website, however, Un ponte per from the beginning considered concrete intervention in favour of the stricken population indivisible from political commitment centred on the causes of wars and on the construction of ties between Italian society and the societies in which the organization was active (apart from Iraq, ex-Yugoslavia, Lebanon and Turkey).

As the declaration of intent underlines, Un ponte per therefore considers itself at the same time a voluntary association and a political organization.[22] The voluntarism, activism and militancy on which the organization are founded are said to be a guaranty that the political aims of the commitment are maintained and against the danger of becoming self-referential, of the organization transforming itself from a means to an end. At the same time the two-fold character of Un ponte per is said to have made it necessary to build a solid and autonomous organization, stable over time, able to build up the necessary resources and promote professional capacities. The constitution in fact foresees an assembly of all members which meets at least once a year and has considerable power – it approves the budget, decides on campaigns and initiatives, elects a president, an executive committee, a committee of guarantors and a board of auditors – but at the same time an executive committee "invested with the broadest power for ordinary and extraordinary administration".[23] All decision-making bodies use the majority rule.

Un ponte per became involved in the GJM already in its embryonic stage, co-organizing the 1994 G8 counter summit in Naples. However, its 2005 assembly underlined: "For many years Un ponte per was a self sufficient organization, very much restricted to its work, substantially almost without any relations with the other subjects making up the movement for peace and justice".[24] The same document defines the decision, taken by the national assembly in 2002, to integrate the organization into the GJM as "the end of the crossing of the desert". Un ponte per, in fact, considers its founding ideas – the being at the same time voluntary solidarity association and political organization, its non-ideological

[22] Available at http://www.unponteper.it/chisiamo/pagina.php?op=include&doc=intenti.

[23] Available at http://www.unponteper.it/chisiamo/pagina.php?op=include&doc=statuto.

[24] XXV Assemblea nazionale di Un Ponte per… Relazione introduttiva a nome del comitato nazionale uscente. April 2005 (offline document).

nature, the conviction that practical alternatives have to be patiently constructed ("justice needs to be constructed and not only demanded") – the common ground which, all over the world, during the 1990s brought about a refoundation of the movement for peace and for justice, starting from concrete facts, and leading to the social forum process.

In this sense Un ponte per underlines that it is "only a part of the movement for a more just world, ideally uniting the Brazilian landless peasants with the human rights activists in the USA, the boys of the Palestinian Intifada with the organizers of fair trade. In this movement, opposed to war and uncontrolled globalization, many "souls", viewpoints and political practices cohabit. We intend to relate with all these in a spirit of discussion and not of competition" (Declaration of intent). The assembly document quoted above expresses a "political thank you" to the other components of the movement for having learned a lot, above all "the importance of working together in diversity".

In the organizational documents, the visions of external democracy of Un ponte per remain sketchy but visibly contaminated by the participation in the GJM. The Declaration of intent paints the picture of a "world of injustices", with neoliberal economic politics broadening the distance between the poor and the rich of the planet and politics of domination of the industrialized states causing daily violations of human rights, while the United Nations remain impotent, dominated by the same states causing injustice. The commitment to a desirable life draws not only on a sense of justice but also on the prospective of a life less signed by violence. The consumeristic western model of development has to change, so that we and our children don't have to fight for a place in the sun, for well-being in a fortress, defended by mercenaries. For this end concrete solidarity and political commitment have to continue, fighting for human rights and for a democratization of politics in the sense of democratization from below.

3.2 Deliberative representative organizations

In the category "deliberative representative" we find two genuine GJM organizations, Attac Italia and the Torino Social Forum (TSF). The TSF was classified as deliberative representative, because it features a coordinating committee with considerable power, which was coded as an executive committee. In fact, in October 2003 the dominance of

major organizations within the coordinating committee triggered off an internal discussion on the future of the TSF (documented on the website), in which strong calls were made to return to a more assembleary practice.

Attac Italia

Attac Italia is a genuine GJM organization, undergoing a constitutional process in the years 2000-2002, but particular in its character in so far as the impulse to its foundation came from abroad, originating in the international meeting organized by Attac France in Paris in April 2000 with the explicit intent of favouring the spread of Attac to other countries. Among its founding members we find some important realities of the traditional left, from cultural associations like the ARCI, to trade union organizations like Cobas Scuola and the left current of the CGIL, to periodicals like Il Manifesto. Initially displaying what critics denounced as aspirations to hegemony (for instance as far as the social forum processes are concerned), Attac in Italy did not reach the importance of its French or German sister organizations, having to compete with other GJM networks like the Rete Lilliput or the Disobedients.[25]

Although the impulse for its foundation came from abroad, the constitutional process of Attac Italia proceeded differently from the one of Attac France. The founding assembly held in Bologna in June 2001 (ca. 2000 participants) created a provisional directory but as far as the drawing up of a constitution was concerned decided on a "zapatist consultation". The Charta of Intent voted in Bologna stipulated: "Attac Italia wants to be a democratic and open association, transversal and as much as possible pluralistic, composed of diverse individuals and social forces. … It [Attac Italia] wants to contribute to the renovation of democratic political participation and favour the development of new organizational forms of civil society" (all documents of Attac Italia are to be found on the website). From its founding moment on, Attac Italia posed the problems of internal and external democracy.

The internal debate on Attac Italia's constitution saw above all two dividing counter positions: federative vs. national association and effective vs. participated decision-making. In this debate, often characterized by a more or less conscious contrasting of the own

[25] On Attac Italia see Finelli 2003a; 2003b.

experience with the one of the "competitors" of the Rete Lilliput, a compromise was reached which can be synthesized in the formula: federative but not fragmented, participated but not inefficient.

The constitution of Attac Italia (2003) mentions as one of the fundamental values "pluralism understood as a broad, diversified militant presence, not hierarchically organized".[26] The assembly, composed by all members and defined as the highest decision-making organ is said to find its starting point in the local assemblies and its conclusion in the national assembly. In practice, the local level plays a consultative role, with however two important exceptions: the objectives of the program – to be elaborated with the direct participation of the members – in order to be adopted by the association have to have been voted by at least 4/5 of the voting participants of the local assemblies; for the candidates for the executive committee an elaborated consultation procedure between national and local level is foreseen, and for the list of candidates (to be approved by the national assembly), again a 4/5 majority. If this proves impossible, the election of the executive by all members is foreseen.

The normal decision-making method chosen by the constitution of Attac-Italia for the assembly and the national council (the executive committee) is simple majority voting, again with two exceptions: the constitution foresees "the search for consensus" for the definition of the program, and "the search for the unanimity of consensus" for the election of the executive committee. However, in a letter to all members (17 June 2003), in a particularly difficult moment (after the polemic resignation of five of its members) the national council affirmed that it used the consensus method and that it had never made recourse to voting.[27] In this context it has to be underlined that in general the conception of consensus of Attac-Italia translates into unanimity, differently from the Rete Lilliput, where it is possible to dissent from a decision, without however blocking it.

The tendency of Attac-Italia towards the associational model is evident in the role of the national council, its executive committee, criticized also within the organization as being too vertical. The council has the task to discuss and decide all questions of interest to the association on the basis of the program and of the orientation expressed by the

[26] Available at http://www.italia.attac.org/spip/article.php3?id_article=204.

[27] Available at http://www.italia.attac.org/spip/article.php3?id_article=97.

assembly. In addition, the council proposes the program and the initiatives, decides on the themes to be submitted to internal consultation (also through mailing lists), etc.

As far as external democracy is concerned, the political document presented by the national council to the 2005 national assembly observes a deep crisis of institutional politics at the national level and the difficulty also of the parliamentary opposition to recognize the new challenges represented by the movement.[28] The council calls for the autonomy of the movement, understood as the capacity to construct routes, starting from social conflictuality, able to pass through institutional politics and determining the agenda, experimenting in the direction of participatory practices overcoming the politics of delegation and democracy as representation. Within this scenario, Attac Italia is supposed to promote the unity of the movement around key themes and conflicts.

The main campaigns sustained by Attac Italia in recent times were centered on precarious employment and the privatization of public goods and services. The EU constitutional treaty played a minor role, as no referendum was foreseen in Italy, a circumstance sharply criticized. On its website, however, Attac Italia published numerous documents on the constitutional treaty, often translations from the French. The 2005 document of the national council defines the design of the treaty as a-democratic, mercantile and monetary, and the emerging European project as strategically oriented towards the dominance of the North of the world over the South, the construction of a strong European army, the precariousness of work and rights, the privatization of public services and common goods, a fortress character, excluding migrant populations. This European model is contrasted with the slogan "another Europe is possible and necessary", and with the vision of an open and democratic Europe of peace, of public services and common goods, of work and rights.

Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS)

Our third deliberative representative organization, the Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS), is a network founded in 1993 with the aim of coordinating and valorising humanitarian intervention in ex-Yugoslavia. It unites 11 national organizations and 55 local groups working on the themes of international solidarity and peace.

[28] Available at http://www.italia.attac.org/spip/IMG/pdf/Documento_Assemblea_2005.pdf.

The case of the ICS points to the fact that deliberative practices did develop, before the GJM reached visibility, in networks of humanitarian organizations. We should in fact take into account that clear cut majority rules are difficult to propose in organizations with only collective membership, especially if of an international character. Also the European Trade Union Confederation, in its constitution, foresees search for consensual decisions and recourse to majority voting only if this proves impossible. Similarly, the constitution of the ICS in Article 7 foresees for all decision-making the method of the search for consensus, and recourse to voting only if this proves impossible.

The involvement of the ICS in the GJM becomes evident already with the list of fundamental values contained in the latest version of the constitution.[29] Here we find, next to peace, non-violence, international solidarity and intercultural dialogue, also the globalization of social and economic justice and democracy. In his report to the general assembly in 2004 (to be found on the website), president Giulio Marcon confirmed that the ICS was and wanted to continue to be part of the movements against neoliberism and war, underlining however some fundamental principles: non-violence (also in language and behaviour), pluralism in diversity of positions and attitudes, non-ideological concreteness of action. "It is our task to construct opportunities of concrete mobilization and active solidarity for a broad movement".

The influence of the involvement of the ICS in the GJM on both its organizational ideology (again interpreted as a reacquisition of original values) and visions of external democracy emerges from the assembly document "Solidarity in Movement. The challenges of planetary citizenship".[30] According to this document, the crisis of many ONG's is not only connected with the drastic reduction of public development funds caused by the end of the cold war and the neoliberal policies of IGO's like the IMF and the World Bank. It is argued that the instrumentalization of humanitarian intervention for the construction of consensus around military operations had led to the reduction of ONGs to pure contractors and to the loss not only of their political and economic autonomy but also of their social base. It is therefore held necessary to reconstruct non-governmental humanitarian action,

[29] Available at http://www.icsitalia.org/downloads/statuto.pdf.

[30] Solidarietà in Movimento. Le sfide della cittadinanza planetaria. VIII assemblea generale ICS (offline document).

overcoming the logic of acting as a substitute, of being a contractor, by returning to partly lost principles and values, among these the role of the social base and internal democracy. In addition it was underlined that the intervention of ONGs from the North should always favour network dynamics and relationships with communities and civil society.

As far as external democracy is concerned, the document criticizes the insufficiency of the democratic and progressive political forces in front of the challenges posed by the GJM. The necessity to develop alternative politics, capable of designing human rights and democracy internationally, is connected with two levels. At the institutional level ICS calls for the democratization and an empowerment process of international institutions, in particular the UN and the EU. For the EU the ICS prospects the possibility – through an open and participated constitutional process – to play a role of peace and conflict prevention, under the condition that it will be a social, democratic Europe "from below" and not a new super power or a fortress. The second level is seen in the role of the movements, of collective social action and civil society for a "globalization form below", but also in the local communities. For the movements (of Porto Alegre, Genoa, Firenze) the ICS sees a decisive role in contrasting the dynamics of war and the devastating consequences of neoliberalism and in constructing ("from below") concrete alternatives of a participated democracy, of forms of social economy and cooperation, of a global civil society. Also in the local communities, ICS sees the possibility to build concrete alternatives to neoliberal globalization, through forms of participated democracy and local development. The activities in the local communities and in the movements are seen as creating the conditions for the construction of networks and common initiatives at European and international level.

3.3 Assembleary organizations

It is for the organizations of the assembleary type, that the scarcity of organizational documents, especially on internal democracy, emerges as a problem. The lack of available material did lead to the probable misclassification of two organizations. Carta, which publishes a weekly newsmagazine, in all probability, is an organization of the associational type. As a cooperative, according to national law it should have a president and an executive committee, which however are not mentioned in the available documents. The

regional Abruzzo Social Forum in the available documents does not mention the composition of its assembly, nor the decision-making method. We can assume that the assembly consists of delegates of the participating local social forums and that the consensus method is used. This would make the Abruzzo Social Forum an organization of the deliberative representative type.

The remaining assembleary organizations, the local group Chainworkers, the national campaign Euromayday, the immigrant network Comitato Immigrati in Italia, and the regional network Rete Noglobal can all be considered as genuine GJM organizations, i.e. organizations founded during the rise of the movement, especially the latter two: the Rete Noglobal was one of the organizers against the UN-Global Forum on e-government in Naples in March 2001, the Comitato Immigrati grew out of the "tavolo migranti" of the social forums in Rome in July 2002.

Also for these four remaining assembleary organizations, however, organizational documents on internal democracy are few or even, as in the case of the Rete Noglobal, do not exist at all. From spurious mentions in diverse documents, we know that the Rete Noglobal, a network of social centres close to the disobedients, has an assembly and a spokesperson. In addition it is known (but not mentioned in the available documents) that whoever wants to do so can participate in the assembly and that decisions are taken by unanimity.

The situation emerging for visions of external democracy remains substantially the same. The numerous documents to be found on the website of the Rete Noglobal centre on single campaigns and mobilizations, but documents synthesizing ideas on democracy do not exists, as was also confirmed in the telephone interview conducted with the spokesperson of the organization. We are therefore left with assumptions based on the autonomous character of the Rete Noglobal and on the themes on which it mobilizes (precarious employment and unemployment, university and education, peace, the Palestinian conflict, repression and criminalization of the movement, etc.). This leaves us with little more but the concept of direct participation from below.

The Comitato Immigrati in Italia constitutes a particular case, displaying exclusive and inclusive tendencies at the same time. Participation in the network is restricted to immigrants and organizations of immigrants. The fundamental document of values and

intent likens this choice to analogue decisions by the Afro-Americans in the United States, the blacks in South Africa, and the feminist movement and argues the necessity of "being stronger 'among us' in order to fight better for the freedom and the rights of all".[31] The same document expresses interest in and availability for collaboration "with all those fighting for the same, similar or convergent objectives".

The Comitato Immigrati defines itself as a network of communication and collaboration, of common initiatives and of reciprocal support. On the one hand always open to participation and collaboration, on the other hand it leaves its members complete freedom to participate in other networks and movements. The only decision-making body mentioned are local and national assemblies. All decisions taken by the national level have to be ratified by the local realities. In addition, a national working group exists with the exclusive competence to facilitate communication between the different levels.

3.4 Deliberative participative organizations

Three Italian organizations have been classified as being of the deliberative participative type: Indymedia Italy, the Venezia Social Forum, and the Rete Lilliput. For Indymedia, this classification is different from the one for the other countries, where this organization came out as missing. In the documents analyzed, Indymedia Italy in fact not only mentions the possibility of voting via the internet as a "telematic assembly", but also "physical" assemblies of the Italian Indymedia activists. The classification of the Venezia Social Forum draws attention to the fact that social forums established different organizational solutions. In this case, in fact, a strong coordinating committee like the one encountered for the Torino Social Forum does not exist.

The organization that probably more than any other Italian GJMO discussed and reflected upon problems of (especially internal) democracy is the Rete Lilliput.[32] From these open and largely publicly documents discussions, more than definitive answers and positions, what emerges is a picture of the challenges that a horizontal, deliberative, and participative network faces in defining its organizational structure and political identity.

[31] Available at http://www.comitatoimmigrati.it/CosailCII.htm.

[32] On the Rete Lilliput see Veltri 2003a; 2003b.

The Rete Lilliput originated in the "inter-campaign table", set up in 1997 as a place for coordinating organizations engaged in campaigns and initiatives focusing on different issues but with the same general objectives. The organizations involved in this experience comprised small local groups but also well structured national associations, most of them of the traditional associational type. In fact only one participating group, the Rete Radiè Resch, openly refuses a vertical structure, favouring a horizontal network design.

When in 1999 the idea of the Rete Lilliput was launched, it was intended as a local level of participation (the "nodi" [knots]) for the initiatives of the inter-campaign table. At the first national assembly in 2000 three positions concerning internal organization emerged: a horizontal structure rejecting representation and favouring participation, with the inter-campaign table reduced to the role of another knot; a structure adding as a vertical element an elected executive committee substituting the inter-campaign table at the national level; the continuation of the existing model.

The national assembly postponed any definite decision in favour of an additional period of reflection and discussion. It did, however, vote a document of fundamental values, which underlined Lilliput's network character, the importance of local commitment, the centrality of programmatic contents and concrete action, the valorisation of differences, and the promotion of trust in all members. Personalisation and professionalization of political commitment are rejected; direct participation and the limitation of delegation and representation are underlined. The document closes with the promise to apply criteria of constant verification as far as the organizational model, the work done, and eventual offices were concerned. If offices like a spokesperson were to be introduced, they were to be limited in time to the duration of an initiative or campaign, or the rotation principle was to be applied.

It was the experience inside the Genoa Social Forum that gave the impulse to further organizational development. As one of the members of the inter-campaign table, Gianfranco Bologna, put it: "We who did want to introduce, by choice, representatives, then found ourselves with those of the others" (quoted in Veltri 2003a, 11). This experience overshadowed the relationships of the Rete Lilliput with the social forum process and led to the refusal to participate directly in the (failed) attempt to constitute a national social forum. Various proposals for internal organization were elaborated and debated in successive

regional and national assemblies, varying for instance as far as the composition of the national assembly (all members or the spokespersons of the local knots), or the presence or absence of a coordinating committee were concerned.

The organizational structure that evolved from this debate was tailored to realize the maximum of both participation and deliberation.[33] The Rete Lilliput has no formal membership. Individuals and groups adhere by subscribing to the manifesto and by participating in the local knots, which are defined as the heart of the network and the guarantors of the respect for the manifesto and the document of fundamental values. The yearly general assembly is open to all, but reserved to Lilliputians in the deliberative phase, using consensual decision-making methods. The assembly "orientates" the strategies, verifies the thematic working groups and promotes new initiatives and campaigns. Apart from the national assembly, three macro-regional assemblies exist (north, centre, south), with the task of facilitating exchanges between the knots and periodically verifying their activities, discussing new strategies for the network, and preparing the national assemblies. The thematic working groups are open to all, but decision-making is restricted to Lilliputians. They enjoy broad autonomy and if authorized by the national assembly have the power to represent the network on themes of their competence. They can convene thematic assemblies and have decision-making power on the initiatives of the network concerning the specific theme.

In experimental form, subject to monitoring and verification, a coordination committee, the Sub Nodo, was created, composed by one spokesperson per thematic working group, two spokespersons of the inter-campaign table, four spokespersons of the knots, expressions of the macro-regions (two from the north, one each from centre and south). For the members of the Sub Nodo a step by step rotation system was foreseen. As the Lilliput document explains, the Sub Nodo is "a supra-local place intended as a group of interconnected points and not as a pyramidal structure. Decision-making power in any case rests with the national and thematic assemblies and the thematic working groups". The Sub Nodo was to function as a service structure, with the following tasks: functioning as a link and service element between knots, thematic working groups and inter-campaign table;

[33] The following is based on "La Rete di Lilliput: storia, obiettivi, organizzazione", available at: http://www.retelilliput.it/modules/DownloadsPlus/uploads/Documenti_Tematici/tuttosullarete.pdf.

organizing and entrusting external representation case by case, singling out the places within the network most indicated by specific competencies or affinities; proposing and organizing the national assemblies, involving all places of the network in a participative way; facilitating rapid decision-making processes, also in emergency situations.

The role of the inter-campaign table remained largely undefined. It is described as a place autonomous from the network, but connected ("in rete"), and as the guarantor of the manifesto (a task already assigned to the local knots) and cultural and scientific advisor, with an accompanying and sustaining role.

From early on, various problems connected with the organizational structure emerged, documented in the minutes of the Sub Nodo and of the macro-regional meetings (both are to be found on Lilliput's website).[34] In the framework of this report, only some of these problems can be underlined, without detailed documentation.

The high work load for activists was frequently lamented. In addition, the connection between the different levels of the organization was repeatedly criticized as unsatisfactory. This concerned the involvement of organizational members in the activities of the local knots, the relationship between the thematic working groups and the local knots, and the role of the inter-campaign table in the Rete Lilliput. Often debated was also the relationship between local and national level: if on the one hand the scarce interest and participation of the local knots in the national level was lamented (especially in the preparation and proceedings of the national assemblies and seminars), on the other hand the Sub Nodo was accused of forcing decisions and exploiting its role in structuring internal discussion, in short of overreaching its competencies and trying to transform itself into an executive committee.

Problems arose also with the consensus method in decision making, compared to other realities in the movement applied in a very conscientious way by the Rete Lilliput, routinely foreseeing the use of moderators or facilitators. When these same facilitators in an initial phase reported that the method was not frequently used and many people were not acquainted with it, the solution was seen in an intensification of training. However,

[34] These minutes and other internal documents, in particular the minutes of the national assemblies and seminars, are available on the website of the Rete Lilliput, in the section "Vita da rete". See http://www.retelilliput.it/modules.php?op=modload&name=DownloadsPlus&file=index&req=viewdownload&cid=4&POSTNUKESID=8c6dbc3889cbb7359ccedf75548ed9f9.

subsequently the consensus method was also criticized as being too time consuming and proposals were made (for instance in preparation of the 2006 assembly) to introduce limited delegation for precise mandates or majority voting on certain issues, limiting consensus to fundamental decisions.

Notwithstanding mounting problems – repeatedly the fear or conviction was voiced that Lilliput had given itself an organizational structure which was proving too onerous to sustain; the financial situation of the network became more and more precarious; in autumn 2005 the Sub Nodo ceased to function and a temporary coordination group had to take over to prepare the upcoming national assembly; the proposal to declare the experience of the network as finished was launched – also the national assembly held in March 2006 seems to have substantially confirmed the existing organizational structure.[35] The final document ("Capable of future") reaffirmed the validity of the consensus method which is said to have permitted ("even in its complexity") to experiment horizontality, diffuse leadership and participative methods. "We have pursued the coherence between means and ends, between form and content; we have learned to reason collectively." The network model ("even in the difficulty of its administration") is said to have demonstrated its capability to interpret the unease emerging from civil society and to develop new practices and forms of reflection.

Not only internal organization, but also the relationship of the Rete Lilliput with the other realities of the GJM and with politics in general were repeatedly debated. If some argued that the Sub Nodo should play a role of "political synthesis" or that in specific circumstances thematic working groups should be set up to elaborate and represent Lilliput's position, others remained sceptical in general about the existence of a political identity of the network.

[35] Up to this moment only a one page final document has been put on the website (Available at: http://www.retelilliput.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=326&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0&POSTNUKESID=bede7679928c52a38aa97632bbf16b1c). Definite judgements should be suspended until the full minutes of the meeting are made public, and should take into account further evolution.

The political seminar organized in June 2004 for the discussion of these problems did not reach a common position on all points.[36] A main difference emerging concerned the attitude towards the political system: some underlined its fundamental deficiencies (non-democratic, corrupt and clientelistic forms of power) and asked for a commitment of the network to search for structural alternative proposals, while others expressed a "not negative" evaluation of local institutions, seen as a possibility to effectively "count" on the territorial political level. Positive elements were underlined – the network already was a political subject; its disinterest in politics as power made it independent and strong; its values and internal democracy had a strong political impact, visible for instance in the relevance that non-violence had gained in institutional politics and within the movement – but also limits were lamented, which can be directly linked with the horizontal network character and deliberative values of Lilliput: the unclear role of the collective members, the lack of a common denominator emerging from the diverse campaigns and initiatives pursued by the different organizational levels, the difficulty to take fast decisions and at the same time assure transparency, participation and deliberation.

In conclusion of the seminar it was decided to organize an "inter-thematic seminar" in order to discuss the connection between the different campaigns and initiatives pursued. The proposal to write a document on "the world we want" was rejected by a clear majority of the participants (40 against 6), with the following observations: we agree that we all dream a different world, but it is not at all clear that we all want the same things; we are not able to write a document on which consensus can be reached; it does not make sense to freeze in a written document the idea of the world we want, the challenge is to work together in order to invent and construct the alternative.

The "inter-thematic" seminar held in May 2005 confirmed that the Rete Lilliput was not able, or better not willing to provide a political strategy or agenda in the classical sense. This, in fact, would go against its very identity, which includes, as the final document of the 2006 assembly quoted above affirms, the understanding that the Rete Lilliput is a political subject "which questions today's forms of politics, based substantially on a self-referential political class, absolutely lacking in generational change and incapable of

[36] See "Seminario politico 18-19-20 giugno 2004. Sintesi delle assemblee plenarie". Available at http://www.retelilliput.it/modules/DownloadsPlus/uploads/Vita_da_Rete/Incontri_Nazionali/Seminario_Politico_2004/verbaleMMplenarie.pdf.

listening to and dialoguing with civil society". The political identity of Lilliput, however, goes into the direction of 'moral' or 'ethical' politics, including as founding values the horizontal, participative and deliberative structure of the network, reciprocal trust, and the conviction that the alternatives to be constructed together and from below include profound changes in attitudes and lifestyles.

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Organisational ideology and visions of democracy in the Spanish GJMOs

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Introduction

During new cycles of mobilisation, activists look for new structures for participation. Principles, attitudes and methodologies are reviewed, promoting new paradigms for collective action. Decision making processes, alliances, protests repertoires and the development of social alternatives are both debated and experienced. This is a reaction against both a situation perceived as conflictual or unjust, and the belief that previous organisational structures and strategies are not suitable any more to cope with it.

From the 1990s onwards, the so called "neoliberal globalisation" is presented by GJMs as a process in which citizens do not have too much to say. At the same time, previous forms of social contestation are considered to be not appropriate to present alternatives to this process. On the one hand, traditional workers' movements are regarded as obsolete since their "closed" identities, embedded in "closed" organisations, have demonstrated being inappropriate to provoke a radical social change. On the other hand, new social movements although successful in promoting thematic, local (and personal) changes, face a new global context where activists are "forced" to adopt global (and transversal) perspectives and to increase the level of political disruption in order to achieve real political and social transformation.

In this sense, the new cycle of protest, that from a mass media perspective had its outburst after the Seattle demonstrations of 1999, is characterised, among other features, by the demand for a globalisation "from below". A critical empirical question is how social movements' organisations are reflecting and exploring new paradigms of democracy, both internal (among social networks) and external (promoting visions and practices that eventually would challenge the current tide of globalisation) to them. This search will be mainly reflected in the (new) organizational dynamics of GJMs and in the debates about current international economic and political architectures. As an initial step in answering

these questions the aim of this report is to outline the conceptions of democracy in the Spanish GJMs.

We make use of manifestos, programmes and debates poduced by 37 Spanish organisations that, to a different degree, have been active in international GJMs dynamics (protests, social forums, etc.). Most of this documentation has been retrieved from the websites of the different organisations, but we have complemented it by sending written requests to some groups asking for fundamental documents not published on their website. In this way we offer a more complete overview of the issue of democracy in GJMs.

In section 1 we try to identify the main biases of the information obtained through the web pages of the sampled organisations. In sections 2 to 4 we identify principles and statements reflected in public and internal documents in order to offer a picture of the organizational features of the Spanish GJMs. Finally, in section 5 we analyse the meaning frames (diagnosis and prognosis) exhibited by Spanish GJMs concerning global visions of democracy, focusing on the debates upon the European Constitution and international institutions such as the World Trade Organisation or the United Nations.

1. The Spanish Web Bias: Description and Rationales

Internet plays a major role in the construction of a public image of movements because of its accessibility, both for movement organizations and for significant sectors of the population. However, it would be rather ingenuous to consider that organizational images portrayed in web pages (as well as in public documents) reflect real patterns of organizational behavior. This part of our research focuses in fact on organizational discourses. We gathered elements of discourse that help us to differentiate groups according to their statements (what they say) about how they organize internally (organizational practices and ideology) and their visions of external democracy. However, although we had planned to complete our collection of documents offline, we could do so only to a limited extent. We therefore had to rely mainly upon information offered on web pages, and this introduced a bias in our analysis since the extent to which groups resort to Internet in order to reflect publicly on their organizational ideology and internal practices of organization and decision-making varies according to their resources (affecting the richness

or quality of their web pages) and the diverse envisaged functions that each organization pursues through Internet as a communication tool.

In general, this caveat has to be taken into account especially when comparing formal with informal groups. Among the latter, missing information on certain variables concerning democratic principles of internal democracy cannot be interpreted as the absence of those principles.

This situation will have several consequences in our observed data. First, the low scores in the variables related to deliberative values in the Spanish GJMs sample: surprisingly, from an intuitive point of view, organisations with a formal structure and regular access to public funds (NGOs like *Cooordinadora de Comercio Justo* or parties like *Izquierda Unida*), or with ties to traditional left networks (*IU* youth section, the student trade union *Sindicato de Estudiantes*) will tend to be "better off", or at least to get similar (although low) results, at the *Deliberative factor*[1] than other local and assamblearian initiatives, that will get a low score due to their "deficient" websites, as happens in the cases of *Diagonal* (assamblearian journal), *Red de Apoyo Zapatista de Madrid* (local zapatista supporters) or *Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel* (local node of a highly decentralized pacifist network)[2].

Second, on the basis of the documents analysed informal groups show a relatively low profile of narratives or statements made about an issue quite at stake inside GJMs, such as democracy, even for those groups more adamant on participatory principles. This contrasts with the larger presence of these types of statements (above all concerning external visions of democracy) in documents by more formal groups like large NGOs and trade unions (see section 5).

Third, there is a presence in some cases of "fake" statutes. Some groups in fact adopted formal constitutions as instruments that allow them to hire people, have access to funding or protect members against judiciary prosecution. In many cases, however, this is not publicly mentioned. Although a constitution is present foreseeing a different

[1] Values as "deliberative democracy" or "explicit critic of delegation/representation" are scarcely mentioned in the available documentation: 1 out of 36 and 2 out 37, respectively. This situation will result in the score (0.0) that the Spanish sample received on the deliberative values measured through a dichotomized variable. See introductory chapter for a description of this measure.

[2] See appendix for comparative results.

organizational structure, an assembly continues to be the main decision body. This would be the case of projects very linked to the development of what we have defined as the *radical democracy frame*[3] in Spain: *Nodo50* (main web of reference for news, campaigns and internet services), *Sindominio* and *Otra Democracia es Posible* (permanent assembly through internet) or *Diagonal* (a two-weekly journal quite open to social movements and promoter of copy-left practices). In one case, an organisation explicitly rejected to provide any information about its constitution.

From a material perspective, it seems to be more obvious that informal, local and smaller groups will have fewer chances to invest resources in, for instance, developing an exhaustive and comprehensive view of their way of functioning or do not keep minutes or other documents on internal debates. In this sense, the web sites will be of a "lower" quality than in other countries where these resources could be more available. This fact will affect our capacity to get accurate information about what the groups do and which type of links they maintain with other sectors. The case of a *zapatista* organisation operating in Madrid (*RAZ*) is quite illustrative. Although one of the earlier promoters of the counter summit during EU presidency meetings at Madrid (May 2002), its website is mainly focused on informing about their ties with Chiapas, and not even informing about other *zapatista* groups in Spain[4].

Therefore, this *web bias* will distort the picture we will get in our analysis of the Spanish GJMs. We will have to pay attention to missing values or the low explicitation of internal decision making procedures: their absence can not be understood as a refusal or inexistence of some principles or organizational models[5].

[3] A cultural paradigm for mobilisation characterised its deliberative/participative approach that makes horizontal and direct democracy views to permeate discourses, networks coordination and social proposals (Calle 2005).

[4] This situation will reinforce, and it is reinforced by, the atomized profile of Spanish civil society. Apart from scarcity of resources, this atomization has its cultural or attitudinal roots not only in the impact of local oriented ideologies (nationalisms, libertarian), but also in a "lack of motivation" to maintain ties at a State level: ATTAC-Spain does not exist as a political space, networks in the line of PGA environment maintained only punctual contacts (like the MRGs), anti-war platforms have a local character. See Spanish WP1 and WP2 reports.

[5] We will classify organizations according to the role of assembly, consensus and deliberative principles. In some cases, it will not be possible to assign a label to groups because of lack of sufficient information.

2. Democracy, Principles and Organizational Structures

Table 1 compares the percentages of organizations that on their websites explicitly mention a series of democratic principles guiding their internal decision making. As can be observed, and in spite of the low mentioning of democratic values that we attribute to the web bias, Spanish groups seem to emphasize, above the European average, values such as those related to consensus (35%) participatory democracy (35%) or non-hierarchical decision-making (19%), while references to others democratic principles such as those related to deliberative democracy (5%), inclusiveness (22%) or autonomy of members (19%) are less frequent in comparative terms.

Table 1. Explicitly mentioned democratic principles by countries

	British	French	German	Italian	Spanish	Swiss	Trans.	Sample Average
Consensual method	13,2%	12,5%	22,6%	12,2%	35,1%	5,7%	16,7%	17%
Participatory democracy	15,8%	9,4%	32,3%	51,2%	35,1%	40,0%	3,3%	28%
Deliberative democracy	15,8%	15,6%	6,5%	4,9%	5,4%	0,0%	3,3%	7%
Non-hierarchical decision-making	26,3%	12,5%	19,4%	4,9%	18,9%	11,4%	20,0%	16%
Inclusiveness (respect for ideological diversity)	34,2%	6,3%	19,4%	9,8%	21,6%	42,9%	10,0%	21%
Autonomy of member (when applicable)	13,2%	6,3%	6,5%	24,4%	18,9%	17,1%	36,7%	33%
N	38	32	31	41	37	35	30	244

Concerning roles and structures of decision (Table 2) again we find a lower presence than in the other countries, excluding transnational organizations, of explicitly declared roles that reflect concentration of political or symbolic power: only 35% of groups mention a president (compared to the European average of 48%), and only 49% mention the existence of an executive committee or similar body (compared to the 61.9% of the European average). Also the mentioning of a spoke-person is quite low (8.1%), although this could be due to the rotation nature of this figure within informal groups and, again, to

the poor quality of web pages. At the same time, the presence of a central assembly is quite strong (78%)[6].

Table 2. Roles and structures of decision

		British	French	German	Italian	Spanish	Swiss	Transn.
President/leader/secretary presence	explicitly rejected	15,8%	9,4%	6,5%	7,3%	0,0%	2,9%	3,3%
	yes	57,9%	59,4%	41,9%	56,1%	35,1%	51,4%	33,3%
Spokeperson (s) presence	explicitly rejected	15,8%	3,1%	0,0%	4,9%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	yes	13,2%	18,8%	19,4%	14,6%	8,1%	11,4%	6,7%
Executive committee or similar body presence	explicitly rejected	13,2%	6,3%	3,2%	2,4%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%
	yes	55,3%	65,6%	64,5%	75,6%	48,6%	71,4%	50,0%
Committee of the founding members presence	yes	2,6%	6,3%	0,0%	4,9%	5,4%	0,0%	6,7%
Assembly presence	yes	76,3%	81,3%	74,2%	92,7%	78,4%	68,6%	50,0%
Scientific committees presence	yes	18,4%	6,3%	9,7%	9,8%	2,7%	2,9%	3,3%
Thematic groups presence	yes	13,2%	21,9%	54,8%	34,1%	45,9%	48,6%	40,0%
Arbitration board presence	yes	5,3%	12,5%	16,1%	46,3%	5,4%	5,7%	0,0%
N		38	32	31	41	37	35	30

Democracy is not only significantly present among those principles guiding internal organization but it also constitutes a substantive issue on which many groups declare to be working upon. As is shown in Table 3, with respect to the general themes referred to by Spanish GJMs, democracy is the most mentioned one (49%). Other substantive or sectoral topics (characteristics of new social movements) that the GJMs tend to bridge -- issues such as ecology, social exclusion, peace, worker and women rights, etc. -- are also relatively frequent in contrast to those themes referring to traditional or classical ideological perspectives (like anti-capitalism, anarchism, communism), confirming the heterogeneous ideological composition of the GJMs. In contrast to this sort of closed (classical) ideological narratives, political topics (or references) that have permitted the ideological

[6] In spite of the web bias, some of the organizations not referring to a general assembly, however, do rely on this methodology in their decision making processes: *Justicia y Paz* (at least at local levels), *Xarxa de Mobilització Global*, La Haine or Fòrum Social de Barcelona (when articulated during Spanish UE semester presidency at 2002).

amalgam are mentioned more frequently (such as "another globalization" or "global justice").

Table 3. Basic themes mentioned at Spanish GJMs sample (multiresponse)

Themes	Spanish GJMs	Complete sample
Another globalization / a different form of globalization	32,4%	50,0%
Democracy	48,6%	520%
social justice/defence of the welfare state /fighting poverty/ social inclusion	40,5%	68,9%
global (distributive) justice	40,5%	45,1%
Ecology	43,2%	47,1%
Sustainability	10,8%	32,8%
anti-neoliberalism	32,4%	39,3%
anti-capitalism	18,9%	23,0%
Socialism	5,4%	7,8%
Communism	0%	3,3%
anarchism (traditional or libertarian)	5,4%	3,7%
Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	16,2%	9,0%
animal rights	0%	3,7%
human rights	13,5%	47,1%
worker's rights	27%	40,2%
women's rights	29,7%	42,6%
Gay/lesbian rights	16,2%	15,2%
immigrants' rights/anti-racism/ rights of asylum seekers	27%	45,9%
Solidarity with third world countries	16,2%	46,3%
alternative knowledge	13,5%	12,7%
Religious principles	2,7%	7,0%
critical consumerism/fair trade	13,5%	29,1%
ethical finance	0%	16,8%
Peace	32,4%	49,6%
Non-violence	8,1%	27,5%

In terms of "other themes" expressed by GJMs organizations, libertarian roots were significantly exposed by three organizations that mentioned as a value "mutual help". Supporting the idea of a radicalization of the repertoire of action inside the GJMs through the 1990s, two organizations talked of "civil disobedience" as a value. We counted one reference to nationalistic values made by *Hemen eta Munduan*, an organization rooted in the Basque Country and Navarra.

Indicators concerning democratic principles, organizational structure and themes suggest the relevance of informal and open organizational structures within the Spanish GJM. These results are coherent with the relatively high importance given to the maintenance of (global) links with other organizations as a goal for the different groups. At

the international level, 46% of the organizations declared as an objective to pursue links with organizations working on other themes and 10.8% stated to be open to stable ties with social movements in general. As much as 57% of Spanish organizations advocate collaboration or networking with transnational social movements beyond its traditional thematic profile (above the 47.5% of the European average[7]).

Table 4. Type of links explicitly advocates or foreseen by Spanish GJMs

	Spanish State links	Spanish Transnational links	Complete sample national links	Complete sample Transnational links
Not mentioned	35,1%	29,7%	18,9%	23,8%
Yes, in general	13,5%	10,8%	34,8%	29,1%
Yes, with organizations working in the same thematic area	29,7%	13,5%	31,1%	28,7%
Yes, also with organizations working on other themes	21,6%	45,9%	15,2%	18,4%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%

In general, references to GJMs dynamics (protests or events) are made explicit under different names: antiglobalisation movement, antiglobalisation, alterglobalisation movements, altermundialistas, Global Action Day (Praga 2000 and others), global justice movement (AGP, WSF, CounterSummits), World Social Forum.

3. Practices of Democracy: Relevant Factors and Outputs

By crossing the two dimensions of democracy (the deliberative and participatory dimensions), we can classify selected organizations in the following 4 categories-typology of interna; decision-making (Table 5)[8]. The *associational* and the *deliberative representative model* are characterised by delegation, the latter however uses the consensus method. When participation in the general assembly is direct we will talk of an *assembleary*

[7] Although this information is not made explicit for one third of the Spanish sample.

[8] We have set up our models by distinguishing, through declared values and practices on decision making processes, the emphasis made on delegation of power (participation) and on consensus (deliberation). Participation dimension refers to the degree of delegation of power, inclusiveness and equality. Deliberation refers to the decision making model and to the quality of communication, whether it highlights the aggregation of conflicting interests (low deliberation) or it stresses consensus building (high deliberation).

model; and when within this model consensus, reasoning and the quality of discourses are mentioned goals, the type of decision-making can be called *deliberative participation*.

Table 5. Typology of internal decision-making.

		Delegation of power	
		Yes	**No**
Consensus	**No**	**Associational (N=9)** Coordinadora Comercio Justo, Aministía, Justicia y Paz, Oxfam, APDH, STE, Mujeres en Red, Red con Voz, Sindicato de Estudiantes	**Assembleary (N=10)** Coordinadora contra la Constitución Europea, Foro Social de Sevilla, Otra Democracia es Posible, Derechos para Todos, Nodo50, Plataforma Rural, Red de Apoyo Zapatista de Madrid, Sindominio, Hemen eta Munduan
	Yes	**Deliberative representative (N=8)** ATTAC-Madrid, Corriente Roja, Ecologistas en Acción, Jóvenes IU Madrid, CGT, Izquierda Unida, Espacio Alternativo, Red Acoge	**Deliberative participative (N=6)** Consulta social Madrid, Grupo Antimilitarista Carabanchel, RCADE, Foro Social de Palencia, Baladre, Diagonal
Not classified: informal networks (N=4)		Fòrum Social Barcelona, La Haine, Xarxa de Mobilització Global and Plataforma Aturem la Guerra (Post-Seattle networks, except the last one, an informal platform against war).	

Following this classificatory logic, 24% of the organizations we sampled fall under the associational category, most of them representative of those social movements with a higher level of political institutionalization. A similar percentage follows the deliberative representative model (22%); here we find also pre-existing organizations like leftist political parties, alternative trade-unions, or organizations belonging to the radical sector of new social movements (ecologist and human rights) that maintain regular (albeit conflictual) levels of interaction with institutions (this would be the case of the ecologist group *Ecologistas en Acción* or the NGO *Red Acoge* dealing with immigrant issues). The two models that reject delegation of power group together most of the groupings that emerged during the current cycle of mobilisations (many of them created after Seattle protests).

In tables 6 to 9 different organizational features are confronted with the four organizational models (and a fifth category of not classified that we have labelled as informal networks) in order to identify different profiles among them. It is significant how most recent structures of participation have not ended up conforming to the associational model, adopting in all cases but one deliberative participative models of organization. We

have to recall that some of the organizations excluded due to the web bias could be identified as belonging to the deliberative (participative) type[9].

Table 6. Organization type versus organizational models

	associational	**deliberative representative**	**assembleary**	**deliberative participative**	**Informal network (not classified)**
Post Seattle network	0,0%	37,5%	60,0%	66,7%	75,0%
Informal group	0,0%	0,0%	70,0%	83,3%	75,0%
International level presence	33,3%	12,5%	20,0%	0,0%	25,0%

Inside the more classical *associational* model we find professionalized NGOs such as *Amnistía Internacional* or *Coordinadora de Comercio Justo* (fair trade network). As will be shown in section 5, these groups feel comfortable in explaining their more vertical way of functioning in terms of "efficacy" and, hence, mentioning the "need of delegation" in order to reach political or media leverage. Delegation of power or consensus are not issues at stake in the available documents. These groups have an important international presence, above the Spanish average (19%) but still below the one of the complete sample (38%), as some of them are branches of organizational umbrellas as International Amnesty or Oxfam.

On the contrary, those organizations included in the *deliberative participative* type tend to problematize delegation of power and consensus quite often, as is reflected in their assembly minutes or in their ideological programmes. Most of them are post-Seattle organizations and, in practice, they are local (*Foro Social de Palencia*) or belong to/form loose state-wide networks (*Grupo Antimilitarista Carabanchel*, *RCADE*).

The *deliberative representative* sector is entirely formed by formal organizations. They are pre-Seattle organisations characterized for being state-wide networks that maintain some kind of interaction with the institutions (lobbies, trade unions or political parties). The exception is ATTAC-Madrid, but we have to take into account that members

[9] Among the not classified networks we have organizations quite involved in "alterglobalisation" protests from 2000 onwards such as *Hemen eta Munduan* (platform built up on the wave of Prague counter summit and protests, September 2000), *Foro Social de Sevilla* (local fora) and *Coordinadora Estatal contra la Constitución Europea* (campaign against European constitution project), the anti-war platform at Barcelona *Aturem la Guerra*.

of this group are or have been part of political parties and institutions like universities (Pastor 2002).

Last, the *assembleary model* has a profile of post-Seattle loose organisations with a paramount emphasis on the assembly as the coordinating kernel of the group. In spite of the scarce information that generally we got from these organizations, and their informal and local character, they show an international presence as part of loose networks (virtual or linked to campaigns) but not establishing hierarchical relationships as the mentioned organizations at the associational model.

Concerning functions, protest orientation (characteristic of post-Seattle networks) and political education of citizens are more often mentioned by groups that have been included in the deliberative participative type. Associational (and more formal) organizations seem to be specialized in spreading information.

Table 7. Presence of functions at associational models

	Associational	**deliberative representative**	**assembleary**	**deliberative participative**	**Informal network (not classified)**	**Spanish average**	**European average**
Protest/mobilisation	44,4%	75,0%	60,0%	83,3%	44,4%	64,9%	69,3%
Political representation	0,0%	37,5%	10,0%	0,0%	0,0%	10,8%	11,5%
Spreading information / influencing mass media / raising awareness	55,6%	25,0%	30,0%	50,0%	55,6%	37,8%	68%
Political education of the citizens	33,3%	12,5%	30,0%	66,7%	33,3%	29,7%	42,6%
N	9	8	10	6	4	37	244

The deliberative participative model puts as a pre-requisite a strong emphasis on going beyond spreading information and creating conditions for the participation of all their members. This would explain the importance attached to political education (67%) compared to other models, with a score well above the average of the complete sample(43%). Emphasis on political education is a feature also present among informal networks, in spite of the web bias that tends to reduce the amount of information on theses issues offered by this type of organizations.

Looking at the basic themes mentioned, the results indicate that the new globalism approach (those groups mentioning "another globalization", "democracy" or "social justice") is as dominant in the Spanish sample as it is in the complete one (83% compared to 87%).

Table 8. Presence of basic themes at associational models

	Associational	deliberative representative	assembleary	deliberative participative	Informal network	Spanish average	European average
New globalism	77,8%	100,0%	80,0%	100,0%	50,0%	83,8%	87.3%
Eco-minority	55,6%	87,5%	50,0%	66,7%	0,0%	56,8%	70.9%
Critical Sustainability	44,4%	25,0%	30,0%	33,3%	25,0%	32,4%	58.6%
Peace and non-violence	44,4%	37,5%	50,0%	50,0%	25,0%	43,2%	69.3%
Anti-capitalism	22,2%	37,5%	30,0%	50,0%	25,0%	32,4%	26.6%
Traditional left	0,0%	25,0%	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	5,4%	8.6%
N	9	8	10	6	4	37	244

Organizations of the associational type score significantly higher on an index of critical sustainability, including references to sustainable development, solidarity with the third world, critical consumerism, and ethical finance, while they tend to score lower for references to anti-capitalism[10]. The importance of anti-capitalist frames for the remaining organizational models illustrates the radicalisation of discourses during the new cycle of mobilization.

Finally, Table 9 synthesizes the ideological and practical orientations present in the public image built up by the Spanish GJMs groups under different organizational models. First, we find that the organizations belonging to the deliberative models are very different from the associational ones in terms of mentioned principles. The former groups show strong support for participatory and consensual values, quite above both the Spanish and the overall averages, and even more so the Spanish organizations of the associational type. Second, we realize that assembleary or informal networks do not refer to any of the selected

[10] Anticapitalist references include also anarchists and autonomous groups, along with traditional left positions of socialism and communism.

values, the reason being the web bias already referred to that reduces our capacity to capture their organizational ideology.

Table 9. Organisation principles versus associational models

	associational	deliberative representative	assembleary	deliberative participative	Informal network	Spanish average	European average
Orientation to inclusion or positive view of differences	22,5%	62,5%	0,0%	16,7%	0,0%	21,6%	20,9%
participatory democracy	11,1%	75%	10,1%	83,3%	0,0%	35,1%	27,9%
consensual method	0,0%	87,5%	0,0%	100%	0,0%	35,1%	17,2%
non hierarchical decision making explicitly mentioned	11,1%	25%	20%	33,3%	0,0%	18,9%	16%
N	9	8	10	6	4	37	244

When representation is considered, the need for involving and respecting the diversity of ideological trends (inside parties like *Izquierda Unida*) could be an explanation for the significant role played by the value of "inclusiveness" in the deliberative representative model.

4. Questions of democracy at GJMs: a qualitative view

In this section we develop a qualitative analysis of explicit statements in the GJMs that allow us to grasp ideological profiles of the different organizational models. Firstly, we will comment upon discourses made about organizational internal principles and how these orientations are put into practice. Secondly, we will refer to how groups problematize coordination among GJMs groups. Thirdly, we will provide an overview of global visions of democracy by looking at practical debates inside the GJMs such as the consultation

about the upcoming project of a European Constitution[11] and the diagnosis and prognosis concerning international institutions such as the World Trade Organization and the United Nations.

Due to the lack of availability of documents and the already mentioned web bias in our quantitative data, we have opted for providing a comparative overview of the different groups, instead of focusing on four representative cases of the portrayed organisational models.

We found that, in contrast to the others, groups within the associational model category offer elaborated discourses concerning international institutions. We also observed that existing discourses about internal and external visions of democracy tend to confirm the already mentioned gap between more deliberative or participatory groups (with a citizen/grass-roots orientation) and associational ones (with a greater orientation towards institutions).

4.1. Principles and organizational practices for internal democracy

Organizations that privilege participatory democracy, consensus and non hierarchical decision making tend to define citizen participation as a goal in itself. Most of them are post-Seattle networks and they extensively promote communicative tools through Internet[12].

For those organizations outside of the associational models, the groups' political horizon is not tied, at least not explicitly, to an ideological end (as in organizations of the traditional workers' movements) or oriented towards a specific field (as in new social movements' organisations). Here are some examples:

- *RCADE* (2001a): "The Network [for the abolition of foreign debt] is a social movement, a citizen movement that promotes active participation of people".

[11] It was held in February 20th 2005. Results were in favour of the Treaty, but 58% of potential voters abstained and 6% casted a blank vote.

[12] Websites of post-Seattle networks usually offer the possibility of getting access to a forum or mailing list for debates: only 4 out of 16 did not count with this virtual sphere of debate compared to 10 out of 21 pre-Seattle groups (WP2). We have to bear in mind that post-Seattle networks were born as wide platforms of different social organizations and people.

- *Foro Social Sevilla* (2002a): "We will defend and promote a Europe of social and solidarity values and deeply democratic".
- *ATTAC* (2003b): "[…We should promote]: a) Participatory democracy and b) Alternatives to international economic institutions".

In line with this appeal to a large constituency, these organizations make explicit that to get into their activities no formal requirement is made to future participants. For instance, *ATTAC* (s/d) states: "Those members and supporters interested in participating in Attac Madrid could take part in any of the previously described areas. To get actively involved, they only have to get in touch with any of the members of the executive committee responsible for this area".

In this sense, we find quite often references to the idea of an open project being constructed, to be developed through a "dialogical process"[13]:

- *Derechos para Tod@s* (s/d): "our goal is to contribute to the spreading of debates, not by narrowing spaces, but by opening them to all the people who are critical of this globalization that causes exploitation, repression and/or exclusion […] No alternative to the current system can be regarded as the "true" one. That is, we want to set up a space to reflect and fight for a social and civil transformation".
- *RCADE* (2001b): "Our organizational model should be alive, evolving according to the needs of our local bases; we should never consider it to be close".

A "dialogical process" requires informed participants. Therefore "political education" is said to orient the work of recent non-associational networks (*Foro Social de Palencia*, *Otra Democracia es Posible*, *RCADE*, *SinDominio*) and libertarian networks (autonomous, with an anarchist inspiration) leaning towards new global movements (*Baladre*, *Red de Apoyo Zapatista*, *Alternativa Antimilitarista-MOC* and the trade unions *CGT* and *STE*). In contrast, among the groups within the associational model, *Justicia y Paz* (Christian network Justice and Peace) and a fair trade platform (*Coordinadora Estatal de*

[13] A dialogue between different people, territorial nodes or ideological trends inside the group. This is a key vision for new global movements, as they oppose deliberation and consensus to procedural democracy practices in which real access (in terms of information, resources, issues to be discussed, etc.) to participation and deliberation is emphasized as the kernel of a political interaction (Calle 2005).

Comercio Justo) were the only two groups that declared to be developing "political education".

In terms of decision-making process, consensus is prioritized, above all when dealing with issues considered as "strategic" for the organization:

- *ATTAC* (2001): "We have approved unanimously that the constitution of Attac-Spain should be based on a consensual base [of all local branches of Attac …]".
- *RCADE* (2001b): "Our aim is to take decisions that reach the maximum consensus."
- *Alternativa Antimilitarista-MOC* (2004): "In our general assemblies, local groups interact, carry out general goals and take decisions. These decisions will be taken by consensus. We understand this consensus as a process in which we attempt to reach the most satisfactory agreement for all members".

The concept "deliberation" it is not explicitly or directly proclaimed, however in some cases we can infer that it is practiced by looking at the ways in which debates are managed:

- *Foro Social de Sevilla* (2002c): "Concerning the debate about protest and violence, we agree on establishing a minimum agreement […] we postpone this debate in order to set up a mono-thematic meeting about the proposals".

The diversity of political perspectives concerning practical action and discourses, above all in non-associational GJMs groups, is quite present in some minutes (see *Foro Social Sevilla* 2002c). In this sense, acceptance of "plurality" can be regarded as a pre-requisite for deliberation.

How are these principles put into motion within the different organizational profiles? "Efficacy towards a goal" versus "participative process": this seems to be the two major approaches inside GJMs to the debate about how to bring on and nurture an organization. NGOs like *Amnistía Internacional* (AI Spanish branch) enhance the need to be agile for a limited goal: "International Amnesty has a limited mandate. It is not possible to face in an efficient way all problems of the world (famines, environmental degradation, nuclear threats…). Each organization should focus their scarce resources on a limited task […] International Amnesty is efficacious" (*Amnistía Internacional* s/d).

On the contrary, organizations within deliberative and participatory models, most of them Post-Seattle[14], seem to pay more attention to protest strategies. They tend not to mention "organizational efficacy" but "horizontal experimentation" as a substrate underlining their way of functioning. According to the *RCADE* (2001b), "Participatory democracy it is not just a transversal issue in our work, it is our model for internal decision making. Therefore, we have to develop mechanisms in order to make possible and to foster participatory democracy […] We need to experiment to find out the organizational structures more suitable for us".

Due to their local orientation, political structures like the IMF or political parties, and also the self-perception as promoters of (direct) citizen participation, representation or delegation are under constant criticism or debate. As the *Foro Social de Sevilla* (2002b) states*:* "We have decided not to take part in Marinaleda [meeting of social networks and political groups during the Spanish presidency of the UE, 2002] through official delegates of this forum, nor in any other meeting". Internal issues to be discussed at *ATTAC-Madrid* (2003b) reflect the different visions in terms of organization, classical versus one more oriented to a pluralistic or radical pole characteristic of new global movements: "- Role of 'President' and/or role of 'Coordinator'. - Organizational structures similar to political parties or in the line of 'Attac culture'. - Several spokespersons or just one."

We have not found many debates about reflections and criticism with respect to real organization and coordination among GJMs groups. A significant exception is a one-day seminar organized in Barcelona on November 26th 2005 (*DEMOS* 2005). There, 40 GJMs activists from different ideological backgrounds (from parties, trade unions, *alter-globalisation* platforms, social movements in general) gathered together to discuss the protest cycle going from 2000 to 2005. A general criticism developed concerning the way of functioning of these new networks of protest. It was observed: "Concerning the self-critical process, complaints have been exposed about the lack of ideological contents of platforms like *Aturem la Guerra* [Stop the war]; communicative problems between different generations causing that past mistakes are repeated; there are problems with

[14] As for this type, a calendar of action is present in 81% of the websites (67% in pre-Seattle), but bibliography sections are scarce, present just in 31% of internet sites, quite low from pre-Seattle groups (67%).Only *Oxfam-Intermon* publicly declared to rely upon a scientific committee.

'leaders' (either visible or hidden) and with people that tend to contaminate relationships between sectors and trends inside platforms (radicals versus moderated ones). […]The lack of stable structures in order to make possible a political education, a continuous work and a strategic horizon for action was also remarked".

These problems can be linked to the aversion, particularly among Post-Seattle networks, to building establish organizational structures for citizen participation, a phenomenon also observed during the recent anti-war mobilizations (Calle 2005: 85, 234-5). They tend to privilege (punctual) protests over the construction of (stable) references for citizenship[15].

4.2. Coordination within GJMs

Public reflection about coordinating strategies (criteria for alliances, how to cooperate between sectors, etc) inside the GJMs are quite vague. This fact contrasts with the numerous references among sampled groups to global links or symbolic references to global movements. The groups tend to define themselves as working for a global network (of networks), either in sectors closed to WSF and ATTAC or to PGA (Della Porta 2003: 96, Fillieule and Blanchard 2005: 161, Calle 2005: 79ff). Similarly, collaboration with other transnational organizations (either for general purposes or for specific issues other than the ones that are on the agenda) is advocated or foreseen by 59% of the sampled Spanish groups.

This is also a feature present among those groups rooted in new social movements' milieus, already existing prior to the Seattle protests, but now redefining their scope and practices, towards more global discourses and patterns of alliances. *Alternativa Antimilitarista-MOC* (2004) declared: "Our aim is to promote a confluence with other groups, networks or experiences, participating in projects for common action and social transformation both locally and globally".

[15] Only 31% of post-Seattle networks indicate on their website where to reach the organization (office or similar), compared to 86% of pre-Seattle organizations. Again, we have to take into account that, apart from platforms (*Consulta Social-Madrid*, *Coordinadora contra la Constitución Europea*), many of 16 studied post-Seattle groups came into being as GJMs alliances for action or participation (the social forums of *Palencia*, *Barcelona* and *Seville*, *Hemen eta Munduan*, *RCADE*) or as a virtual network on the internet (*Indymedia Barcelona*, *SinDominio*, *Otra Democracia es Posible*, *La Haine*).

Sometimes, groups express preferences and make use of languages that are closer to "classical" conceptualizations rooted in workers/Marxist environments. This would be the case of *ATTAC-Madrid*'s appeal to the need for "unity" around those sectors more in touch with majoritarian parties and trade unions. As ATTAC (2003a) stated: "we should have a more active attitude and, whenever possible, promote a unity for action with the *Foro Social de Madrid* [local forum quite close to the leftist party of *Izquierda Unida*]."

In contrast to groups classified in other organizational models, in their public presentations the organizations within the associational category tend to stress their alliances in (international) campaigns with other NGOs (as those related to arms' control conducted by the Spanish branches of Amnesty International or Oxfam), not directly relating themselves to "alterglobalisation" protests or networks.

With respect to the relationships between parties and social movements, the coexistence of different trends inside the GJMs and the role played by spaces as the international social forums, the seminar of Barcelona (*DEMOS* 2005) offers these conclusions: "The lack of mutual recognition between the different legitimacies of political parties and social movements was explicit, and also, the difficulties for political parties to 'get into' the assemblies […] When the "left" is in power, social movements are either stopped or they do not receive support, damaging the capability of coordination and stability of some platforms […] A unique model for building up social alternatives does not exist [… and] different perspectives and the plurality of the social sectors that participate in these spaces [networks, platforms…] have to be taken into account". Furthermore the variety of visions about social forums events was specified and the incapacity to build up a common learning process during the new cycle of protest was regretted: "At Barcelona, different visions concerning the World Social Forums existed: those involved at their kernel and being adamants of it; those who think that it is useful to carry out specific meetings; those that are convinced that are alternative spaces; and those that believe that it is useless […] Other observed weaknesses are: learning experiences have not been developed in this [protest] cycle; those social movements that promoted this cycle have exhibited a certain egocentrism, and the self-referential attitude could have weakened 'old' movements (feminism, pacifism)."

4.3. Visions about (global) democracy

General debates about external democracy are scarce. This phenomenon can be predominantly observed in organisations lacking resources or belonging to a deliberative participative model of organisation. Therefore, we have decided to get into the concrete frames developed by GJMs during campaigns and debates about the project of a European Constitution (being presented as a new Treaty by authorities) in order to illustrate general visions about external democracy.

Basically, the core of the GJMs networks (among them all models but the associational) share a diagnostic frame in which current (global) representative institutions and actors (parties and big trade unions) are blamed for imposing a (military) neoliberal agenda through non-democratic processes; an agenda that would be in fact steered by transnational and financial groups. In contrast with this, major trade unions that are part of ETUC (*CC.OO* and *UGT*)[16] and international NGOs (like *Oxfam* and *International Amnesty*) call for reforms inside the current political agenda and its architecture (from the party representation system to international institutions like the European Union). This explains why these sectors could be regarded as punctual allies of the core of GJMs, but also why they have been keeping some distance from their gatherings on the streets (counter summits, global days of action against IMF, WTO or European Union).

In Table 10, we have summarized the specific positions about the EU project of some GJMs organizations that, to a different degree, actively took part in the debates. On the bases of available documents, in order to build up this table we have tried to answer some general questions concerning the master frame (diagnosis and prognosis) about the European Constitution and the consultation process developed by the different groups:

- Do (critical) messages challenge the overall process (strong criticism) or do they just attempt to influence it (soft critic)?
- Which are their alternative proposals?

Among the strongest critics, we find those groups that without rejecting the construction of European institutions, express discontent towards the current model. Also,

[16] Not included among the sample of 37 organizations analyzed at Demos project.

we identify two kinds of proposals, some emphasizing the construction of Europe directly "from citizenships" and others more prone to suggest new rules or institutions.

Table 38. Specific framing of the European Constitution based upon documents available on internet (see appendix)

Type of criticism	Diagnosis: groups say…	Proposals: Need of radical reforms	
		Need for new institutions	**Need for citizen participation**
Strong	Institutions lack of legitimacy	Corriente Roja (workers constitution) CGT (promoter of a social rights chart)	Ecologistas en Acción, CGT (citizens) La Haine (all power to the assemblies)
	We are discontent	ATTAC-Madrid, Espacio Alternativo, Izquierda Unida (a new constitutional process for Europe) ATTAC-Madrid,EspacioAlternativo (participatory democracy)	
		Proposals: consolidate the process with a social view	
Soft/Support	Need to pressure about some topics	Amnistía Internacional, Oxfam-Intermon (need of respect for International Human Right Laws and Charts)	
	We publicly support the overall process	UGT and CC.OO. (part of ETUC)	

ATTAC suggests that the European Union is currently an "instrument of the neoliberal project" governed by transnational corporations through lobbies such as the European Round Table, the Bildeberg Group and committees such as the European Services Forum. The different initiatives against the Constitutional process underline the military aspects of the Treaty, informing that it demands "to improve military capabilities, ensuring that States get into the NATO structure and approving the doctrine of preventive attacks"[17]. With respect to the format of the process, the GJMs groups express a strong critic of the fact that citizens are out of the scene: no direct consultation or Constituent Assembly was set up to bring about the Treaty, Parliament has no legislative power. They also stress that the Spanish referendum was characterized by (a deliberate) lack of information provided by governments to citizens. Vice versa, trade unions involved in the

[17] Manifesto of Platform "No to the European Constitution" in http://www.nodo50.org/noconstitucion/documentos/manifiesto_de_la_plataforma.htm. See also documents at the "European Social Consulta" that promoted a referendum about alternative proposals to the European Union chart (www.nodo50.org/cse-madrid).

ETUC such as *UGT* and *CC.OO* "congratulated themselves for the clear triumph of "yes" ", in spite of the abstention rate of 58%.

Concerning alternatives, inside the kernel of the GJMs two major questions will allow us to identify the existence of "ideological families" when figuring out (global) visions of democracy. On the one hand, the question of "what does it mean to bring about political processes "from below"?" will reflect a division between those more in favour of an institutional re-engineering of globalization and those that lean towards claiming (direct) participatory democracy. Among the first groups, we count ATTAC that promotes a new EU Constitutional process based upon a Constituent Assembly and a Charta that gives more political power to the Parliament. In this line, international global architecture (IMF, WTO) must be deeply reformed and linked to a new UN in which countries are better represented (according population) and the right to veto is suppressed in the decision making system. Similar appeals to the need for a new constitutional process are made by *Izquierda Unida* (coalition party in which the communist party is present) and *Espacio Alternativo* (political group in which the troskyst sector is majoritarian).

The ecologist network more active inside the GJMs, *Ecologistas en Acción* (2006), is among those that advocate a "global approach from below" on citizen participation (decentralization upon global rights) and promote self-management in the economic and productive systems. Institutions like the WTO must be abolished and substituted by a system in which "enterprises must account democratically for their acts and their impacts … [through] an agreement to be negotiated in the UN and other organisms with full participation of the civil society". Sharing this perspective, post-Seattle networks like *Hemen eta Munduan* (2006) demand the extension of "popular democracy" such as "social consultas, referendums, direct participation" and "people's self-determination"[18]. Those groups with a deep Marxist oriented profile, like the political group *Corriente Roja* (Red Trend) share the diagnosis, but tend to substitute the citizen approach by appeals to a "workers constitution".

[18] Manifestos of political parties as *Izquierda Unida* and *Espacio Alternativo* against European Constitution propose the right to self-determination by all nations and the right of citizens based upon residence as expression of a more participative process.

On the contrary, *Intermon-Oxfam* (2006) or the ETUC trade unions, such as *CC.OO* (2006), call for (internal) changes in the current institutions. For instance, they advocate for a WTO operating with greater transparency and adopting as its main goal not the creation of international free-trade regimes but the reduction of poverty and the respect for international agreements of the ILO about workers right and the food security demands of the FAO.

5. Conclusions

The Spanish sample matches the conclusion drawn in the general introductory chapter. On the one hand, deliberative participative models are pursued by post-Seattle networks as organizational reference. On the other hand, democracy "from below" is interpreted with an emphasis on consensus and participatory democracy. In this sense, it can be argued that the GJMs represent a push and some times a starting point towards a radical democracy paradigm19.

The GJMs would be an expression of those social movements inspired by a radical democracy paradigm, being at the same time promoters of the cycle of protest whose peak could be situated between 1998 and 2004.

Concerning principles, themes and proposals, two basic sectors can be outlined inside our sample. The kernel of the GJMs would be composed by those groups that are more involved in the promotion of practices and discourses of a democracy "from below", with a different emphasis on local/citizens participation (grassroots sectors) or in institutional architectures (ATTAC, Marxist rooted groups) as a response to the neoliberal agenda. Forming punctual alliances at international level and participating in the more publicized events such as the World Social Forums, large NGOs and ETUC trade unions would be more prone to legitimate current actors promoting neoliberal agendas (like WTO) and not situating "democratic deficits" at the bases of their diagnosis of global institutions.

[19] Considering GJMs as an exponent of a new cycle of mobilization, new global movements would be characterized by this radical democracy paradigm, being promoters of the cycle of protest whose peak could be situated between 1998 and 2004.

Figure 3. Organizational ideology and the radical democracy impact



Lastly, we have identified in the public image we constructed of the Spanish GJMs what we have called a *web bias*. Available documentation offered by groups can be, in some cases, a distorted mirror of the collective action developed and promoted by an organization. This web bias is due to the lack of resources of the Spanish GJMs characterized by a high degree of atomization; but also, from a political or communicative cultural perspective, by the reluctance of those groups permeated by a radical democracy frame to offer closed and well detailed narratives (ideologies, programmes) about desirable social changes to face global neoliberal agendas.

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La Haine

"Democracia capitalista", posted by Oscar Grácia,
http://www.lahaine.org/pensamiento/gracia_democr.htm

Appendix 1A. Participatory indexes

	Delib. Factor	**Particip. Dem.**	**Critique delegation /Non hier. Dec.making**	**Autonomous members organization /local chapters**	**Type of internal decison making**				
					Ass. Type	Delib. Rep.	Assemb	Delib. Part.	99
Amnistía Internacional - España	-1,00185	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Baladre	-,71638	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Coordinadora Estatal contra la Constitución Europea	-1,00185	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Coordinadora Estatal de Comercio Justo	-1,00185	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0
Diagonal	-1,12501	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel (MOC-AA)	-1,00185	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Indymedia Barcelona	-1,00185	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
Izquierda Unida	-,22222	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Red de Apoyo Zapatista de Madrid	-1,00185	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Sindicatos de Estudiantes	-1,00185	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0

Presence is indicated by “1

Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy in the Swiss GJMOs

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1. Introduction

The aim of this report is to outline the conceptions of democracy in the Swiss GJMOs on the basis of their fundamental documents available online and offline. In other words, we will look at the specificity of the organizational ideology and the visions of democracy the Swiss organizations. Social movements express a critique of conventional politics and favor direct democracy. However, the organizations we are analyzing are situated in a particular context: the context of Swiss direct democracy. Even if direct democracy entails forms of representation, it offers movements access to institutions and, most importantly for our argument, has an impact on the organizational ideology and structure of social movement organizations (SMOs), as the latter tend to be isomorphic (i.e. adapting to their environment), according to the neo-institutionalist approach.

In this report, we address the question of organizational ideology and visions of democracy, and the relationship of the organizations' internal decision making with their environment.

The report has two main parts. The first, a quantitative part, describes and analyzes the characteristics of the visions of democracy and the internal decision-making processes of 35 global justice movement organizations (GJMOs) in Switzerland, on the basis of data collected on the fundamental documents published by the organizations.

The second, a qualitative part, analyzes in more detail the issue of democracy, both internal to the organizations and in relation with institutions, in the Swiss GJMOs, more particularly of three organizations selected on the basis of the typology of internal decision-making. The qualitative analysis looks not only at the fundamental documents of the organizations, but also at other documents published by them, such as calls for

actions, journals, articles, etc. This second step provides a more in-depth analysis of the organizations' ideology and visions of democracy.

As the analysis is based on documents produced by the selected organizations, before presenting the results a caution is in order. Most of the documents consulted for this workpackage were found on the websites of the organizations, the others are those the organizations were willing to provide. We have shown in the report for workpackage 2 that Swiss GJMOs do not merely use the Internet as a tool for increasing participation or for other democratic purposes, but more as a show off of the organization, containing usually only basic information on the organization itself. Many organizations though publish their constitutions (when they do have some; many organizations do not even have this kind of documents) on their websites. Many constitutions only define the role of the main entities required by the Swiss law on organizations (president, secretary, accountant), but do not give extensive information on the internal decision-making process. If they define the existence of different bodies, they usually do not mention how they function and how and by whom they are elected.

2. Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy: Quantitative Analysis

2.1 Introduction

The quantitative part of the report first presents the characteristics of the selected organizations with respect to the general values of democracy, the typology of internal decision-making, and the relation to institutions (i.e., our dependent variables). We then give an overview of their characteristics on the intermediary variable (i.e., the organizational structure). Before we present the values of democracy following the independent variables, we look at some of the interactions between our three sets of variables.

2.2 General values of democracy and relationship to institutions

Concerning the dependent variables, we first look at the internal values of our organizations, and more precisely at the values explicitly mentioned in the documents published by the organizations (tables 1 and 2). The most important values for Swiss organizations are participatory democracy, inclusiveness, and autonomy of the territorial levels. The importance of the autonomy of the different territorial levels of the

organizations evokes the high decentralization of the Swiss political system. Such decentralization is generally reproduced not only by political parties (cantonal sections of governmental and non-governmental parties do also have a large autonomy in defining their priorities as these may differ from one canton to another), but also by SMOs. Even if some SMOs are present on a federal level, their objectives, functions, and values are different according to the cantons they are located in.

The importance of inclusiveness and participatory democracy can be related to direct democracy and the necessity it implies for including all actors in the decision-making process. Indeed, values such as inclusiveness, participatory democracy as well as the autonomy of the territorial level are much higher in Switzerland than for the complete sample.

Table 1. Internal values and general democratic values

	% of yes	N
Internal values of the organizations		
Explicit critic of delegation/representation	5.7	35
Limitation of delegation explicitly mentioned	8.6	35
Rotation principle explicitly mentioned	5.7	35
Consensual method explicitly mentioned	5.7	35
Deliberative democracy explicitly mentioned	0.0	35
Participatory democracy explicitly mentioned	40.0	35
Non-hierarchical decision-making explicitly mentioned	11.4	35
Inclusiveness explicitly mentioned	42.9	35
Autonomy of member organizations explicitly mentioned	17.1	35
Autonomy of the territorial levels explicitly mentioned	54.3	35
Mandate delegation explicitly mentioned	8.6	35
General Democratic values of the organization		
Difference/plurality/heterogeneity mentioned	68.6	35
Individual liberty/autonomy	51.4	35
Participation	57.1	35
Representation	8.6	35
Equality	74.3	35
Inclusiveness	54.3	35
Transparency	57.1	35
Autonomy (group; cultural)	20.0	35
Dialogue/communication	80.0	35

Furthermore, Swiss organizations mention much more the general democratic values listed in table 1 than the international average. Between 51% to 80% of the Swiss organizations give importance to values such as equality, inclusiveness, transparency and communication, whereas the international average varies between 21% and 34%.

Democratic values may vary across organizations according to such factors as the year of foundation of the organization, its structure, or the canton in which it is

located. The latter factor will not be analyzed here, as data on different cantonal institutions are not available, but we should keep in mind that, particularly in Switzerland, the regional context may play a role in explaining differences in democratic values of the organizations, especially in their relationship with local institutions.

Finally, critique of delegation, consensual methods, and deliberative democracy are far less important values for Swiss organizations. In fact, these values are much less mentioned by Swiss organizations than on the international average.

Table 2. Internal principles and general democratic values recoded

	% of yes	N
Internal principle of the organization (recoded)		
Participatory democracy	40.0	35
Inclusiveness	42.9	35
Critique of delegation (including limitation of delegation) or non hierarchical decision making	17.1	35
Autonomous member organizations or local chapter	57.1	35
General democratic values of the organization (recoded)		
Deliberative general values (factor dichotomized with No<0.5 and Yes>0.5)	57.1	35
Individual or collective/cultural autonomy	51.4	35

By crossing the two dimensions of democracy (the deliberative and participatory dimensions), we can locate the selected organizations in the typology of internal decision-making (table 3). Only three types are represented in the Swiss case. None of the organizations belongs to the deliberative participative model. Most of the organizations we could collect data upon follow the associational model, with a high degree of delegation of power and a low degree of consensus. The internal decision-making process of these organizations is based on delegation and majority voting. How come that most of the Swiss organization belong to this type? As already mentioned in the report for workpackage 1, the Swiss global justice movement relies heavily on the new social movements (NSMs). The organizations of the associational model are NSM organizations that have been institutionalized over time, except for the Anti-WTO Coordination. The organizations missing in our typology (more than 25% of our sample) are the less formal ones, the organizations having no formal status and few

documents describing their internal decision-making processes. These organizations do not produce any documents about their internal functioning; they rather produce documents of fundamental values describing their objectives and which do not mention the issue of democracy. Three organizations (two are political parties) follow the deliberative representative model and only one the assembleary model.

Table 3. Typology of internal decision-making

		Delegation of power	
		High	**Low**
		Associational	**Assembleary**
Consensus	**Low**	Aktionfinanzplatz Schweiz, ANti-WTO Coordination, Réalise, Magasins du Monde, Attac, MPS, Bern Declaration, WOZ, Le Courrier, Les Verts, Lora, Swiss Socialist Party, Swiss Communists, PST, Pax Christi, Pro Natura, SOSF, Swiss Social Forum, Alliance Sud, SSP, SIT, Unia	Group for Switzerland without Army
		Deliberative representative	**Deliberative participative**
	High	Lemanic Social Forum, JUSO, Solidarités	

Missing organizations: Antifa, Cetim, Giflelblockade, L'Autre Davos, Marche mondiale des Femmes, Organisation Socialiste Libertaire, Solidarity with Chiapas, Indymedia.

Table 4. Types of internal decision-making

	Frequencies	**Valid cases**
Typology of internal decision-making (not ordinal)		
Associational type	62.9	22
Deliberative Representative	8.6	3
Assembleary	2.9	1
Deliberative participative	0.0	0
Not applicable	25.7	9
Total valid cases	100.0	35

Interestingly, among the more than 25% of the selcted Swiss organizations that cannot be located in the typology, we find most of the GJMOs. Apart from the Anti-WTO Coordination, only the two Social Forums are present in it. As stated earlier, these organizations do not provide any documents defining their internal decision-making process. The Other Davos and the World Women March have been created for

organizing specific events. The Gipfelblockade, Indymedia and Solidarity with Chiapas are typical GJMOs. Antifa and the OSL are autonomous, libertarian or squatter's organizations. The fact that they do not produce any documents on decision-making rules could indicate a willingness to function in a less formal way and to open and adapt the decision-making process to different situations so as to allow for flexibility and reactivity following the requirement of a given situation. Indeed, according to some activists, the reflection and the debates in Switzerland on the issues of democracy as well as "globalization from below" are almost inexistent within the movement. This could explain the very few documents we found on democracy. However, projects implementing alternative ways of functioning are rather frequent. It seems that the Swiss movement rather focuses on new practices, especially new democratic and participatory practices, than on a reflection on this issue.

Another central issue of democracy is the relation of organizations with institutions. Many NSM organizations that are also participating in the GJM became institutionalized over time and often collaborate with the national government, sometimes also getting funds from the national institutions. For example, Alliance Sud (Coalition of the main solidarity organizations) collaborates with the Department for Development and Cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The best illustration of this is that their last publication, in which they are clearly taking position against neo-liberal globalization, is prefaced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. This does not mean that Alliance Sud is not critical toward national institutions, but illustrates the type of relations Swiss organizations can have with institutions.

Before looking at the typology of relationships with institutions, it is helpful to look at the relation with different types of institutions (transnational, national, and economic) (table 5). The most common attitude towards all institutions taken together is the refusal of collaboration. However, the frequent refusal of collaboration here is due to the presence of economic actors. Indeed, almost all Swiss organizations refuse any collaboration with economic institutions, while they do not reject collaboration with national or transnational organizations.

Table 5. Relationship with institutions and economic actors

	% of yes	N
Any collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	37.1	35
Any refusal of collaboration with national, transnational institutions and economic actors	48.6	35
Any democratic control on national, transnational institutions and economic actors	20.0	35

Concerning the relationship with national institutions (table 6), generally the most common attitude is democratic control. Collaboration with institutions is generally not rejected: only 20% of the organizations refuse collaboration. As mentioned earlier, the relations of Swiss SMOs to national institutions is a particular one. The instruments of direct democracy (popular initiatives and referendums) give SMOs a constant possibility of democratic control over national institutions. The inclusiveness of the legislative system also offers the possibility of democratic control by organizations through their inclusion in the decision-making process. For this reason, mainly more radical or autonomous organizations refuse any collaboration with national institutions. In fact, the organizations mentioning the refusal of collaboration with national institutions are organizations from the autonomous/squatters branch of the movement.

Table 6. Relationship with national institutions

	% of yes	N
Collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	45.7	35
Democratic control on at least one level of national institutions	54.3	35
Refusal of collaboration with at least one level of national institutions	20.0	35

The typology of collaboration/control for national institutions (table 7) shows that Swiss organizations are mostly critical collaborators, followed by uncollaborative controllers. Only six organizations are uncritical collaborators. The critical collaborator type is composed of NSM organizations such as the Bern Declaration and Pro Natura, political parties and, the two social forums, while the uncollaborative controllers are the Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz, Attac, the selected media, and some autonomous organizations.

Table 7. Typology of collaboration/control for national institutions

Not mentioned	28.6	10
Uncritical collaborators	17.1	6
Uncollaborative controllers	25.7	9
Critical collaborators	28.6	10
Total valid cases	100.0	35

After having described the characteristics of the Swiss GJMOs, we now turn to the relations between the dependent variables. First, we cross the type of relationship with institutions and economic actors with the typology of internal decision-making (table 8). However, because one type is not represented in Switzerland and there is only one organization in the assembleary model, we limit our analysis to the associational and the deliberative representative models. By crossing these two variables it appears that all three deliberative representative organizations mention collaboration with institutions as well as democratic control. In the associational model, organizations are also willing to collaborate and to exert democratic control, but the refusal of collaboration is much less frequent than for the deliberative representative organizations.

Table 8. Relationship with institutions and economic actors and type of internal democracy

	Type of internal democracy	
Relation with institutions and economic actors	**Associational**	**Deliberative representative**
Any collaboration	59.1	100.0
Any refusal of collaboration	22.7	66.7
Any democratic control	77.3	100.0

In a second step, we cross the typology of internal decision-making with the organizational values (table 9). Democratic values are all mentioned more or less equally by organizations following the associational model, with the exception of critique of delegation which is less often mentioned than the other values.

Table 9. Type of internal democracy and organizational values

	Organizational values					
Type of internal democracy	**Participatory democracy**	**Inclusiveness**	**Critique of delegation**	**Autonomous local chapters/member organizations**	**Deliberative values**	**Individual or collective autonomy**
Associational	40.9	34.6	4.5	54.5	45.5	40.9
Deliberative representative	66.7	66.7	33.3	66.7	100	66.7

The internal democratic values are much more often mentioned by organizations following the deliberative representative type than by organizations belonging to the associational model. Next we look at the characteristics of the organizations on the intermediary and independent variables.

2.3 Organizational characteristics

The set of independent variables include the year of foundation of the organizations, their basic themes and values as well as their functions and objectives. We do not take into account the size of the organizations, as this variable has too many missing cases.

We can first look at the year of foundation and the territorial level (table 10). Concerning the year of foundation, we notice that most of the selected organizations have been founded between 1969 and 1989, followed by organizations founded between 1990 and 1999 as well as organizations founded and from 2000 onward.

The decentralization of Switzerland is once again reflected in the territorial levels of organizations, as most of them are present on the three levels (local, regional, and national), but much less so on the international level.

Table 10. Year of foundation and territorial level

Year of foundation		
Before 1968	17.1	6
1969-1989	37.1	13
1990-1999	20.0	7
2000-	20.0	7
Missing	5.7	2
Total	100.0	35

Territorial level		
	% of yes	N
Local level presence	82.9	35
Regional level presence	85.7	35
National level presence	82.9	35
International level presence	17.1	35

We can also look at the functions and objectives as well as the basic themes and values mentioned by the organizations (table 11). As in the international comparison, some basic themes and values are shared by a large part of the Swiss organizations (table 11). “another globalization”, “democracy” “social justice” “global justice”. In Switzerland “anti-neoliberalism” is another important value for GJMOs (74.3% of the Swiss organizations mention it explicitly, a much higher value than the one for the complete sample which does not reach 40%).

More than half of the organizations also mention “human rights”, “solidarity with third world countries” “critical consumerism” and “ethical finance”. Finally themes such as “communism”, “anarchism” and “autonomy or antagonism” are less relevant, but this again follows the international tendency.

Table 11. Basic themes and values

Basic themes and values		
Another globalization/a different form of globalization	74.3	35
Democracy	80.0	35
Social Justice/defense of the welfare state/fighting poverty/social inclusion	74.3	35
Global (distributive) Justice	60.0	35
Ecology	68.6	35
Sustainability	68.6	35
Anti-neoliberalism	74.3	35
Anti-capitalism	42.9	35
Socialism	22.9	35
Communism	5.7	35
Anarchism (traditional or libertarian)	2.9	35
Autonomy and/or antagonism (disobedients)	14.3	35
Animal rights	5.7	35
Human rights	60.0	35
Workers’ rights	68.6	35
Women’s rights	51.4	35
Gay/lesbian rights	22.9	35
Immigrants’ right/anti-racism/rights of asylum seekers	60.0	35
Solidarity with third-world countries	77.1	35
Alternative knowledge	25.7	35
Religious principles	8.6	35
Critical consumerism	57.1	35
Ethical Finance	54.3	35
Peace	54.3	35
Non-Violence	51.4	35

Concerning the functions and objectives (table 12), all organizations mention the spread of information as an important function. We also note that there is a high share of protest/mobilization. However, this is to be taken with caution. Launching initiatives and referendums is considered here as protest/mobilization, but it is only a weak form of protest and is used by many SMOs in Switzerland. One of them (the Group for a Switzerland without Army) has even been established with the aim of launching an initiative.

Table 12. Functions and objectives and recoded basic themes and values of organizations

	% of yes	N
Functions and objectives		
Protest/mobilization	88.6	35
Lobbying	31.4	35
Political representation	20.0	35
Representation of specific interests	31.4	35
Self awareness/self help	11.4	35
Advocacy	25.7	35
Offer/supply service to constituency	20.0	35
Spreading information	100	35
Political education	57.1	35
Legal protection and denunciation on the specific theme of repression	34.3	35
Basic themes and values (recoded)		
Critical sustainability	82.9	35
New globalism	91.4	35
Eco-minority groups	82.9	35
Anti-capitalism	42.9	35
Peace and non-violence	74.3	35
Traditional left	22.9	35

Concerning the recoded basic themes and values, the selected organizations focus mainly on critical sustainability, new globalism, peace and non-violence as well as eco-minority groups (solidarity, environmental, pacifism), which are typical NSM themes. Themes like anti-capitalism and those of the traditional left are much less often mentioned. Traditional left themes are almost absent from the documents of the organizations, while anti-capitalism is mentioned by more organizations. Traditional left is the less often mentioned theme in Switzerland as only 23% of the organizations are concerned with it. Nevertheless, it is much higher than in the whole international sample. One reason could be that it resurfaced in the public domain in the past few years in this country.

2.4 Types of internal decision-making and independent variables

We now focus on the relation between the year of foundation of the organization and the dependent variable (i.e. the typoplogy of internal decision-making), and the general democratic values. In a second step, we then analyze the relation between the functions and objectives of the organizations, on the one hand, and the dependent variable, on the other. Finally, we look at the relation between the basic themes and values of the organizations and the types of internal democracy.

Table 13 shows the distribution of our organizations according to the year of foundation. Most of the organizations of the Swiss sample (37%) have been established between 1969 and 1989. Once again, this shows the importance of the NSMOs in the Swiss GJM. Indeed, the average international share of organizations created between 1969 and 1989 is much lower than in Switzerland, with only 20% of the organizations founded during this period. If we consider that typical GJMOs are those founded after 2000, only 20% of our organizations are typical GJMOs.

Table 13 . Year of foundation

AGE	Frequencies	Valid cases
Before 1968	17.1	6
1969-1989	37.1	13
1990-1999	20.0	7
2000 +	20.0	7
Missing	5.7	2
Total valid cases	100	35

By crossing the year of foundation with the typology of internal decision-making, it appears that the associational model is more present among the organizations founded before 1968 (table 14). The deliberative representative model is only present after 1969. All organizations founded before 1968 follow the associational model. The other models of internal decision-making are found only from 1969 onward—and especially after 1990. Thus, the older the organization, the higher the chance to find a type of internal decision-making other than the associational model.

Table 14. Year of foundation and type of and type of internal democracy

	Before 1968	1969-1989	1990-1999	2000-
Associational model	100.0	81.8	66.7	80.0
Deliberative representative	0.0	9.1	33.3	20.0
Assembleary model	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	6	11	3	5

Crossing the year of foundation with the general democratic values (table 15), we notice more variation. As the Swiss context suggests, the autonomy of local chapters or the critique of delegation has no link with the year of foundation of the organization. Indeed, the autonomy of local chapters is an important value already for organizations founded before 1968. Inclusiveness and participation increase in time; they are mostly mentioned by organizations founded after 2000. In general, they give more importance in their documents to all the democratic values. Thus, the younger the organization, the more it mentions these values, with the exception of organizations funded between 1969 and 1999, which mention these democratic values much less frequently than organizations created later, but also than organizations created before 1968.

Table 15. Year of foundation and general democratic values

	Before 1968	1969-1989	1990-1999	2000-
Critique of delegation	16.7	7.7	42.9	14.3
Autonomy local chapters	83.3	30.8	71.4	85.7
Inclusiveness	33.3	23.1	57.1	85.7
Participation	33.3	23.1	42.9	71.4
Deliberative general values (dummy)	50.0	38.5	71.4	71.4
Individual autonomy	33.3	46.2	57.1	57.1

The democratic values of the organizations and the definition of their internal decision-making processes can be related to their functions and objectives. Concerning the types of internal decision-making (table 16), there is little variation according to the objectives of the organization. Nevertheless, we note a lower share of political representation and advocacy by the organizations belonging to the associational model, as compared to other functions such as protest/mobilization and political education.

Organizations following the deliberative representative type mention more often political representation and political education than protest/mobilization.

Table 16. Function/objectives and types of internal democracy

	Protest/mobilization	Lobbying	Political representation	Representation specific interests	Self awareness/ self help	Advocacy	Services to constituency	Spreading information	Political education	Legal protection
Associational	81.8	90.0	74.1	90.0	100.0	75	83.3	84.6	80.0	100
Deliberative representative	13.6	0	28.6	10.0	0	12.5	0	11.5	20.0	0
Assembleary	4.5	10.0	0	0	0	12.5	16.7	3.8	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	22	10	7	10	1	8	6	26	15	6

Concerning the democratic values (table 17), organizations mentioning the critique of delegation concentrate more on spreading information, legal protection, advocacy, and mobilization. Protest/mobilization is favored by organizations that mention inclusiveness as a democratic value. Political representation, as compared to other objectives, is mostly used by organizations that mention explicitly participation and general deliberative values. Finally, when political education is considered as an important objective of the organization, almost all democratic values are equally mentioned explicitly in its documents.

Table 17: Function/objectives and general democratic values

	Protest/mobilization	Lobbying	Political representation	Representation specific interests	Self awareness/ self help	Advocacy	Services to constituency	Spreading information	Political education	Legal protection
Critique of delegation	16.1	0.0	14.3	9.1	75.0	22.2	14.3	17.1	15.0	25.0
Autonomy local chapters	64.5	54.5	57.1	63.6	100.0	55.6	71.4	57.1	70.0	58.3
Inclusiveness	45.2	27.3	57.1	45.5	50.0	33.3	14.3	42.9	50.0	41.7
Participation	41.9	36.4	85.7	45.5	50.0	33.3	28.6	40.0	50.0	33.3
Deliberative	58.1	36.4	85.7	45.5	50.0	33.3	14.3	57.1	70.0	50.0

general values (dic)										
Individual autonomy	45.2	36.4	57.1	27.3	100	22.2	28.6	51.4	65.0	66.7

To conclude the analysis of the independent variables, we look at the relation between the basic themes and values mentioned by the selected organizations and the typology of internal decision making (table 18). Themes such as critical sustainability, new globalism and eco-minority are more important for organizations following the associational model. These organizations are less likely to mention themes such as anti-capitalism and themes of the traditional left. Traditional left and anti-capitalism themes are more often mentioned by deliberative participative organizations.

Table 18. Basic themes and types of internal democracy

	Critical sustainability	**New globalism**	**Eco-minority group**	**Anti-capitalism**	**Peace and non-violence**	**Traditional left**
Associational	85.7	82.6	87.5	75.0	77.8	71.4
Deliberative representative	14.3	13	14.3	25.0	16.7	28.6
Assembleary	0.0	4.3	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	21	23	21	8	18	7

2.5 Organizational structure and types of internal democracy

In this last part of the quantitative analysis, we briefly describe the characteristics of the selected organizations with respect to the intermediary variables (i.e. their organizational structure). Then we explore whether there is a relation between the organizational structure and the typology of democracy.

As far as the organizational structure is concerned (table 19), most of the selected organizations stress structural inclusiveness and structural participation. They are also mostly formal organizations, as we already mentioned earlier. Surprisingly, less than 30% of the organizations stress decentralization. However, one dimension of decentralization here is the election of delegates by local executive committees or assemblies, and the presence of delegates in assemblies. As mentioned earlier, the

constitutions of the organizations mention explicitly the presence of delegates in national assemblies, but they do not mention how, and by whom they are elected. Concerning networking, the selected organizations show a higher disposition for national networking than for transnational networking.

Table 19. Organizational structure

	% of yes	N
Structural participation	62.0	35
Structural inclusiveness	57.1	29
Decentralization	28.6	25
National networking	85.7	35
Transnational networking	74.3	35
Structural accountability	51.4	35
Formalization (mean)	.61	35
Organizational autonomy	22.9	35
Role of knowledge	48.6	35

Finally, if we look at the relation between the structure and the types of internal democracy (table 20), we can see that decentralization and the role of knowledge are more often mentioned by organizations following the associational model. Structural inclusiveness is more often mentioned by deliberative representative organizations. Compared to the other structural variables, the role of knowledge seems to be of very little importance for deliberative representative organizations.

Table 20. Organizational structure and types of internal democracy

	Structural participation	Structural inclusiveness	Decentralization	National networking	Transnational networking	Structural accountability	Formalization	Organizational autonomy	Role of knowledge
Associational	81.8	75.0	90.0	81.0	83.3	77.8	-	87.5	94.1
Deliberative representative	13.6	18.8	10.0	14.3	16.7	16.7	-	12.5	5.9
Assembleary	4.5	6.3	0.0	4.8	0.0	5.6	-	0.0	0.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	-	100.0	100.0
N	22	16	10	21	18	21	23	21	8

2.6 Conclusion of the quantitative part

In this first quantitative part we located the 35 Swiss GJMOs in the typology of internal democracy. It came out that only three types of internal democracy are present among the organizations selected in Switzerland and for which we could collect information (the ones on which data are missing seem to prefer other models). Indeed, no organization belongs to the deliberative participative type. Our results show the importance of the NSM heritage in the internal decision-making process of Swiss GJMOs and in their visions of democracy but also that they tend to adapt to their environment. The issue of democracy is less central for Swiss GJMOs concerning their internal decision-making process, but much more with regard to their relation with national or transnational organizations. To provide a more in-depth analysis of the issue of democracy in Swiss GJMOs, the next section will analyze further documents of three organizations selected following their collocation in the typology.

3. Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy: Qualitative Analysis

3.1 Introduction

As we saw in the quantitative part, our typology appeared to be incomplete since we were able to identify three types of organizational behavior in Switzerland.[1] This, however, is not the result of a lack of information concerning the operating modes of the selected organizations, but arises simply from the fact that, among the organizations selected in Switzerland, none is characterized in its formal documents by a participative operating mode based on deliberative participation (see Table 1).

In the qualitative part, we examine the discussions and debates about democracy within the organizations that take part in the GJMOs. More specifically, we focus on three organizations which illustrate three different types in our typology: *ATTAC Switzerland*, the *Group for Switzerland without Army (GSsA)*, and the *Lemanic Social Forum (FSL)*. The analysis will be carried out mainly on the basis of documents published on these organizations' web sites, but also some offline documents. Its main goal is to complement the quantitative part by providing more detailed information of certain aspects related to the relationship between organizational ideology and visions of democracy within the GJMOs in Switzerland.

Table 1. Distribution of the selected organizations according to the typology of visions of democracy

		Delegation of power	
		Yes	**No**
		Associationel Model	**Assembleary Model**
Consensus	**No**	Aktionfinanzplatz Schweiz, Anti-WTO Coordination, Réalise, Magasins du Monde, Attac, MPS, Bern Declaration, WOZ, Le Courrier, Les Verts, Lora, Swiss Socialist Party, Swiss Communists, PST, Pax Christi, Pro Natura, SOSF, Swiss Social Forum, Alliance Sud, SSP, SIT, Unia	Group for Switzerland without Army
		Deliberative representation	**Deliberative participation**
	Yes	Lemanic Social Forum, JUSO, Solidarités	

Missing organizations: Antifa, Cetim, Gipfelblockade, L'Autre Davos, Marche Mondiale des Femmes, Organisation Socialiste Libertaire, Solidarity with Chiapas, Indymedia

[1] Our typology is supposed to classify the organizations on the basis of how they are presented formally in operational terms and according to two dimensions: the delegation of power and the use of consensus.

Of course, this analysis rests on the existence of documents addressing the issue of democracy and we should stress that the results of our research, in this respect, are relatively thin. Indeed, by examining the various documents available, we can see that the issue of democracy within the Swiss organizations, be it internal or external, emerges in a very fragmented way. Most of the time, apart from a few exceptions which we will highlight below, the concept of democracy is approached in a generic way, by evoking general principles, and it does not seem to be a major topic. In other words, when the documents refer to democracy, they do so in order to stigmatize the representative democracy or to stress, in a general way, the crisis of democracy.

3.2 Principles of internal democracy

In order to compare the different categories of our typology, we continue our analysis by examining in more detail the three organizations mentioned earlier.

The associationel model, which is characterized by a delegation of power and little attention paid to consensus, is the category which is most represented in Switzerland and to which ATTAC belongs. The constitution of ATTAC, which specifies its operating mode, distinguishes between two bodies at the national level: the General meeting and the National coordination. The latter functions like an executive committee and is composed by two delegates of cantonal sections. The decisions are made following the majority principle.[1] In the General meeting of September 17, 2005, various motions were adopted. With the one relating to the organization and the development of the group, the General meeting decided to launch a "month of recruitment" aiming at attracting new members in order to strengthen the work in the field during campaigns which they considered a priority in their motion on policy guidelines.[2] In other words, ATTAC conceives citizen participation as a goal to reach, without attaching it to a particular ideology. It suffices for the members to adhere to the charter of the movement and its constitution.

[1] Constitution of Attac-Switzerland – amended by the special general Assembly (01.15.2005).

[2] Motion on the organization and the development of Attac Switzerland – General Assembly (09.17.2005). Motion of policy of Attac Switzerland for the period 2005/2006 – General Assembly (09.17.2005).

The GSsA is the leading organization of the "Stop the war coalition" in Switzerland and illustrates the assembleary model of internal democracy. Founded in 1982 with the aim of launching a popular initiative to abolish the Swiss army, it is today one of the most important peace organizations in Switzerland. The General meeting represents the supreme body, which defines and directs the work of the organization and is composed of all the members. All the decisions are made by simple majority rule, except for changes to the constitution as well as the launching of popular initiatives and referenda, which require a qualified majority. The GSsA aims to promote a peaceful citizen counter power to fight against a military mentality which they consider generalized since September 11: "*The fundamental goal of GSsA is similar to that of the Charter of the United Nations, which promotes the resolution 'by peaceful means' of all the conflicts between the nations and the peoples*".[3]

The FSL, which is an ad hoc umbrella organization born within the GJMOs, follows the model of deliberative representation. This regional social forum was created after the participation of various organizations in the steering committee of the demonstration against the WTO ministerial conference on 10th November, 2001 and the impetus of Porto Alegre. Compared to ATTAC and the GSsA, the FSL appears to be less structured. The charter of the forum mentions that it is based on a feminist perspective. It aims in particular to respect the principles of gender equality in the representation of the various movements, the composition of its authorities, its operation, and its action.[4] In terms of decision-making processes, the FSL operates according to the principles of the democracy of assembly and aims to find a consensus between the various positions. The delegation of power is not clearly mentioned, but one can easily imagine that not all members of the various organizations that are part of the FSL are represented. Furthermore, the charter does not mention whether it is open to all members or only to representatives of collective members. The FSL is open to all generations with respect to the autonomy as well as the initiative and freedom of action of each of them. It aims to promote discussions between the various organizations which are part of it, to develop solidarity among them, and to coordinate their action.

[3] Journal Une Suisse sans Armée, No 57, p.15.

[4] http://www.forumsociallemanique.org/vision9.html (consulted on 20.06.2005).

3.3 Criticisms against Democratic Practices

There seems to be a common trait between the analyzed organizations: they all criticize the influence of financial globalization, which increasingly erodes democracy and represents a barrier to a harmonious development.

In its platform, ATTAC denounces a world increasingly marked by financial globalization, which circumvents the democratic institutions and deprives the citizens of the capacity to shape their destiny. In order to thwart this process and to regain the spaces lost by democracy to the advantage of the financial sphere, they encourage the commitment of the civil society.[5]

Other criticisms deal more specifically with the operation of formal democracy. For example, Juan Tortosa, member of the FSL and co-organizer of the Social summit of Geneva, has addressed these criticisms as follows: "*The social movements carry in themselves a new design of policy and democracy. I think that formal democracy does not correspond to their aspirations. Currently, in most countries, the institutions of formal democracy are hostages of great monopolies and multinationals. In fact, "façade" democracies do not represent the interests of the popular sectors. Democracy does not only mean depositing a ballot paper in the ballot box every four or five years, but participation in public affairs throughout life. One of the main identity signs of current social movements is that each person or group want to take their own decisions. They do not want to delegate their representativeness to a force which only has 'marketing' and money."*[6]

Andreas Gross, a Swiss intellectual and founding member of the GSsA who has now left the organization, thinks that the Swiss political system has serious problems. He stresses in particular the lack of resources of the parliament and its consequences for its autonomy vis-a-vis the power of the lobbies in Switzerland. According to him, direct democracy would be stronger if parties and politicians had more resources: "*In direct democracy, a strong parliament does not weaken the capacity of the people. On the other hand, indirect, representative democracy is threatened by lobbies.*"[7]

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[5] Platform of the movement Attac Switzerland, adopted on the 25th September 1999 during the constitutive Assembly.

[6] www.lecourrier.ch/Selection/sel2001_230.htm (consulted on 09.02.2006).

[7] http://www.andigross.ch/html/site288.htm (consulted on 09.02.2006).

The GJMOs also strongly criticize the international decision making process, which seems even more characterized by the logics of warfare and power politics. For example, the European Union, and more particularly the European commission, is seen as a crucial actor in neo-liberal globalization: "*Appointed by the governments of the Member States, it can issue directives that constrain Member States. In charge of the 'policy of competition,' it is controlled in this field neither by the national parliaments nor by the European parliament, which creates a democratic deficit to the advantage of the powerful.*"[8]

Several campaigns and actions of solidarity were also carried out to fight against the adoption of the EU constitutional treaty. ATTAC Switzerland reacted very quickly to the appeal of ATTAC France to protest against this project and went even further by inviting Swiss activists to participate actively in teams of international volunteers against the European Constitution.[9] Others, like Eric Decarro, founding member of the FSL, considers that European Constitution is undemocratic and in contradiction with a social, peaceful, and interdependent Europe.[10] The GSsA agreed with the conclusions of the discussion forum on Peace and Safety of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation and called to reject the constitutional project by denouncing the militarization of the European Union as well as its project for a common security and defense policy.[11] Thus, this organization considers the constitutional project to be limited in terms of political options or visions of the future and criticizes its concepts of defense and military policy.

3.4 Visions of Democracy

As we mentioned earlier, democracy is far from being a major concern within the GJMOs in Switzerland, at least as far as the documents issued by the chosen organizations are concerned. Except for some general reflections, the main concerns are based on other issues. Of course, general principles like democratic control or equality are mentioned, but a thorough discussion of this issue is absent from the documents.

In its platform, ATTAC mentions the democratic control of the financial markets as a general principle and invites the population to commit to creating a

[8] http://www.local.attac.org/vaud/angles/10.rtf (consulted on 09.02.2006).

[9] http://www.horizons-et-débats.ch/30a/30a_11.htm (consulted on 20.02.2006).

[10] http://www.forumsociallemanique.org/europe01.html (consulted on 20.02.2006).

[11] Journal Une Suisse sans Armée, No 60, winter 2003, p. 14.

democratic space at the local, national, and international level. It intends to launch and extend the debate through the production and dissemination of information in order to act jointly. In a way, one could say that a form of "democratization" of knowledge is one of their main goals. In this regard, the organization of a Summer school is worth mentioning, which was held for the first time in 2004-2005 and gathered dozens of speakers in order to analyze the mechanisms of financial globalization and open new areas of reflection.

Other organizations, like the FSL, tend to focus more on the principle of gender equality in political representation and invite all generations to respect each other's autonomy. The concept of solidarity is also present within the FSL and certainly stems from its goal to bring together all the social movement organizations existing in the area.

Like ATTAC, the GSsA wants to be a place of reflection on disarmament and on the search for peaceful means for the resolution of conflicts. It wants to create a space bringing together all the individuals who disagree with the military mentality which they consider to be omnipresent and which is most overtly symbolized by the army.

With regard to the creation of a world of solidarity and peace, the GSsA considers electronic communication to be an essential tool in order to reach an increasingly larger audience and thus to raise awareness about alternative ideologies.[12] The GSsA also considers that the only real alternatives to the existing system are the social and popular movements, which represent a break from the single thought and create a network of political and social actors that share the same fate and need for alternatives.

Although the absence of a thorough discussion on democracy in the analyzed documents is surprising, we may interpret it in the light of certain features of the Swiss political system. The political opportunity structure in Switzerland may have an influence on the structure of organizations and, consequently, on their discourse concerning internal democracy. More specifically, the relative openness of the political system to the demands of social movements would push the organizations to stress efficiency in the decision-making so as to further their claims within the institutions. As a result, the organizations would tend to favour efficiency instead of the principles of

[12] Journal Une Suisse sans Armée, No 56, winter 2002, pp. 3-4.

inclusion and consensus. This may explain why there isn't much debate on democracy in the GJMOs in Switzerland and why references to alternative types of democracy, like participative democracy, are rare. However, there are some indications that there has been a regain of interest in this issue in the past few years. A number of episodes which we illustrate below are likely to bring the issue of democracy to the forefront, in particular within the GJMOs.

3.5 Practical Democratic Contention

In the documents we analyzed, we were able to record some differences of opinion concerning democratic operation within the selected organizations, in particular compared to the precepts that they put forward. This is reflected in three episodes of practical democratic contention.

The first episode relates to ATTAC Switzerland, which has clearly departed from its French counterpart in its policy guidelines. In particular, ATTAC Switzerland criticized the French attitude because of the absence of consultation within the international network of ATTAC. The issue at the center of the contention is more specifically related to the principles which are supposed to guide the action of ATTAC. Indeed, for the European elections of 2004, ATTAC France had decided to present electoral lists entirely made up of representatives of the movement. ATTAC Switzerland publicly criticized this attitude by specifying that the link of ATTAC with politics was not reduced to its electoral expression and that, in addition, this question was an open one within the movement, thus criticizing the non-democratic attitude of the French section which was likely to divide the movement.13

The second episode, which also concerns ATTAC, but which seems to involve other organizations as well, relates to the "Proclamation of Porto Alegre," which was co-signed by nineteen intellectuals at the end of the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre in 2005. It was not so much the proposals or the claims included in this proclamation that were criticized, but rather the way in which it was adopted by this "scientific council." Indeed, while the Brazilian forum is always meant to be a citizen space, horizontal, multiform, and without a deliberative character, the adoption of this proclamation, was criticized for going against the spirit of Porto Alegre for various

[13] http://www.styvoo.ch/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=395 (consulted on 20.02.2006).

reasons. Firstly, the legitimacy of the nineteen intellectuals was questioned: to what extent can these intellectuals claim to give an opinion for the whole movement? Secondly, the issue of the political translation of the claims of the GJMOs was raised: Has the time come to transform the citizens' claims into a real political program? It is likely that such questions will be addressed within the movement as a whole in the near future, as they represent an "important identity stake."14

The third episode relates to the working procedure of the FSL, in particular in comparison to the principles that it stated at the time of its creation. In its charter, this organization puts forward as a founding principle gender equality in the composition of its authorities, operation, and actions. However, following the anti-G8 mobilizations of 2003, the women in the organization publicly expressed their dissatisfaction, overtly criticizing the gap between theory and practice. They stressed in particular the inequitable distribution of the "ungrateful tasks and especially the lack of democracy of the organizations. They feared a drift towards an authoritative model of decision making and a tendency to homogenize the positions of the FSL. They complained about the fact that women were used as an "alibi" and they felt that the key persons involved in the anti-G8 mobilizations were men.15

3.6 Conclusion of the qualitative part

The documents referring to the issue of democracy that we gathered for the qualitative analysis are rather sparse in references to democracy. Democracy does not seem to be a major issue within the GJMOs in Switzerland. This issue is perhaps discussed in abstract and general terms, but it does not explicitly appear in the documents we have found, both those gathered from the organizations' web sites and those obtained directly from the organizations. As we suggested, this may result from certain characteristic of the Swiss political system. It might be interesting to follow this line of thought in order to determine if the institutional structure has an impact on the organizational ideology and the visions of democracy of the movement. However, the divergent views on the democratic operation of the movement as a whole or of specific organizations are likely to give greater visibility to this issue in the future.

[14] http://www.local.attac.org/vaud/IMG/pdf/17.pdf (consulted on 09.02.2006).

[15] http://www.quellesconnes.com/~anti-g8/breve.php3?id_breve=148 (consulted on 22.02.2006).

4. Conclusion

The aim of this report was to outline the conceptions of democracy in the Swiss GJMOs on the basis of their fundamental documents available online and offline.

The quantitative part has shown the characteristics of the selected organizations with respect to the general values of democracy, the typology of democracy, and the relation to institutions. We saw that the most important values for Swiss organizations are participatory democracy, inclusiveness, and autonomy of the territorial levels. The importance of the autonomy of the different territorial levels of the organizations evokes the high decentralization of the Swiss political system. The importance of inclusiveness and participatory democracy can be related to direct democracy and the necessity it implies for including all actors in the decision-making process. However, the regional context may play a role in explaining differences in democratic values of the organizations, especially in their relationship with local institutions.

It also emerged that our typology is incomplete, since we were able to identify only three types of organizational behavior in Switzerland. None of the organizations belongs to the deliberative participative model. Most of the organizations follow the associational model, with a high degree of delegation of power and a low degree of consensus. The Swiss global justice movement relies heavily on the NSMs, and the organizations of the associational model are NSM organizations that have been institutionalized over time, except for the Anti-WTO Coordination. This is probably the reason why most of the Swiss organizations belong to this type. Another central issue is the relation of organizations with institutions. Many NSM organizations that are also participating in the GJM become institutionalized over time and often collaborate with the national government, sometimes also being funded by the national institutions.

Concerning the functions and objectives, all the organizations mentioned the spread of information as an important function. We also noted that there was a high share of protest/mobilization. However, this is to be taken with caution. Launching initiatives and referendums is considered here as protest/mobilization, but it is only a weak form of protest and it is used by many SMOs in Switzerland.

Concerning the basic themes and values, the selected organizations focus mainly on critical sustainability, new globalism, peace and non-violence as well as eco-

minority groups (solidarity, environmental, pacifism), which are typical NSM themes. Themes like anti-capitalism and those of the traditional left are much less often mentioned. In other words, our results show the importance of the NSM heritage in the internal decision-making process of Swiss GJMOs and in their visions of democracy but also that they tend to adapt to their environment.

The qualitative part has shown that the issue of democracy within the Swiss organizations emerges in a very fragmented way. Indeed, the concept of democracy is, most of the time, approached in a generic way and when the documents refer to democracy it is in particular to stigmatize representative democracy. For all these reasons, the issue of democracy does not seem to be a major concern within the global justice movement in Switzerland. However, the organizations we analyzed are located in a specific context. Indeed, the Swiss direct democracy offers movements access to institutions, and this is maybe the reason why the concept of democracy is not a main concern within the Swiss organizations.

We also suggested that the political opportunity structure in Switzerland may have an influence on the structure of organizations and, consequently, on their discourse concerning internal democracy. More specifically, the relative openness of the political system to the demands of social movements would push the organizations to stress efficiency in the decision-making so as to further their claims within the institutions. As a result, the organizations would tend to favor efficiency instead of the principles of consensus. This may explain why there is not much debate on democracy in the Swiss global justice movement and why the reference to alternative types of democracy, like participative democracy, is rare.