Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society

demos

WP4 – Integrated Report.

ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORKS. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT

Edited by

Donatella della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca
European University Institute

Florence, December 2006

WP4 Report for "Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society", a project funded by the European Commission, Contract n. CIT2-CT2004-506026, and (for the Swiss case) by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, Contract no. 03.0482.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Organizational Structures and Practices of Democracy: An Introduction

By Donatella della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca

(European University Institute)

1. Introduction[1]

Like the previous one, also this work package concerns conception and practices of democracy in the Global Justice Movement (GJM). Whereas in Work Package 3, however, we focused on the organizational ideologies contained in fundamental documents, WP4 is concerned with organizational practices, as they emerge from interviews with representatives of social movement organizations (SMOs).

Attention to social movement organizations has been at the core of the resource mobilization approach, whose proponents stress that "The entrepreneurial mode of analysis includes both the rational-economic assumptions and formal organizational thrusts of our approach" (Zald and McCarthy 1987, 45). Social movement organizations must mobilize resources from the surrounding environment, whether directly in the form of money or through voluntary work by its adherents; they must neutralize opponents and increase support from both the general public and the elite (for examples, McCarthy and Zald 1987b [1977], 19). Stressing its instrumental role, a social movement organization can be defined as a "complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goals with the preferences of a social movement or countermovement and attempts to implement those goals" (ibid., 20). However, SMOs are also sources of identity for the movements' constituencies as well as their opponents and the public (della Porta and Diani 2006). SMOs play in fact an identification function, being defined as "associations of persons making idealistic and moralistic claims about how human personal or group life ought be organized that, *at the time of their claims making* [italics in the original], are marginal to or excluded from mainstream society" (Lofland 1996, 2-3).

In our project, we look at organizations as both mobilization agents and spaces of deliberation and value construction. In social movement literature, the first approach has been dominant. As Clemens and Minkoff (2004, 156) have recently noted, with the development of the resource mobilization perspective, "Attention to organization appeared antithetical to analysis of culture and interaction. As organizations were understood instrumentally, the cultural content of organizing and the meanings signaled by organizational forms were marginalized as topic for inquiry". In recent approaches, however, SMOs are considered more and more as "contexts for political conversation", characterized by specific etiquettes (Eliasoph 1998, 21).

This evolution reflects changes in the sociology of organization from the closed to the open system approach, and then to neoinstitutionalism. These approaches can be distinguished first of all according to the relative role assigned to environmental influence and the role of organizational agency (see figure 1). When organizational sociology started to develop, the so-called closed system approach presented internal organizational factors as "the prime causal agents in accounting for the structure and behavior of organizations" (Scott 1983, 156). In the 1960s, an open system approach stressed instead the technical interdependence of organizations and their environment, while later on the metaphor of a "garbage can" was used to describe decision making in conditions of high ambiguities of preferences and low information on environmental constraints and opportunities (see March 1988). More recently, with the neoinstitutional approach in organizational theory, there has been a shift of focus from the technical to the socio-cultural environment (ibid., 161). According to two proponents of this approach: "The new institutionalism in organizational theory and sociology comprises a rejection of the rational-actor models, an interest in institutions as

[1] We thank Herbert Reiter for his useful comments on a previous version of this chapter.

independent variables, a turn towards cognitive and cultural explanations, and an interest in properties of sovra-individual units of analysis that cannot be reduced to aggregations or direct consequences of individuals' attributes or motives" (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 8-9).

Figure 1 – Approaches to organizational sociology

		Environmental Influence	
		-	+
Organizational Agency	-	[Garbage can]	Open system
	+	Closed system	Neoinstitutionalism

In our research, we share some of these concerns. First of all, we consider organizations as socialized agents and norms producers, that "do not just constraint options: they establish the very criteria by which people discover their preferences" (ibid., 11). Oganizations are therefore not just means for mobilization, but arena for experimentation. Second, we look at formal as well as informal practices. Within the neoinstitutional approach, "The relevance of relationships was no longer defined by the formal organization chart; forms of coordination grounded in personal networks as well as non authoritative projects of mobilization were made visible, as were influences that transgressed the official boundaries of an organization" (Clemens 2005, 356). Thus, our analysis will go beyond the formal organizational charts and look at the practices and ideas that are embodied in each organization. Third, we share with the neoinstitutional approach an attention to cognitive mechanisms: organizations do not automatically adapt to their environment; environmental pressures are filtered by organizational actors' perceptions. Neoinstitutionalists marked a shift from Parson's conception of internalization (with utilitarianism derived by Freud) to an emphasis on cognitive processes, derived from ethnomethodology and phenomenology and their attention of everyday action and practical knowledge (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, 15ff.). In this sense, "Organization members discover their motives by acting" (ibid., 19). Important for this analysis is Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* as "a system of 'regulated improvisation' or generative rules that represents the (cognitive, affective and evaluative) internalization by actors of past experiences on the basis of shared typifications of social categories, experienced phenomenally as 'people like us'" (ibid., 26). In our research, we aim at combining an analysis of organizational formal roles with that of informal practices, general values, and participation in protest campaigns. While considering environmental constraints as potentially important in shaping organizational behavior, we believe that organizations play an important and active role in shaping their environment. For social movements, as for other social actors, the organization is therefore not just a means, but also an aim in itself.

In this work package, as in the rest of our research, our focus is on the GJM in six European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), and at the transnational level. We have defined the GJM as the loose network of individuals and organizations (with varying degrees of formality), engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe. This means that we focus on an empirical form of transnational activism, without implying that this covers all the existing manifestations of that abstract concept. We operationalized our definition by looking at collective identity, non-conventional action repertoires, and organizational networks (see della Porta 2006).

Our aim with this work package is to asses to what extent principles like horizontal participation and consensual decision-making are embodied in social movement organizations. Moreover, our

attention is focused on different forms of interaction between movement organizations and authorities. In order to grasp the real functioning of GJM organizations (GJMOs), we developed a *semi-structured questionnaire* administered to key informants of the main national and transnational movement organizations with the purpose of analyzing their main strategic choices. We have collected information on various sets of variables that we thought useful in describing and explain changing conceptions of democracy in the GJM (for the complete questionnaire, see the appendix). The explanatory model of our research is synthesized in figure 2 below (numbers in parentheses refer to the questions asked, see again appendix).

This report is divided into eight chapters: an integrated report, six chapters addressing each of our countries respectively, and one addressing organizations active at the transnational level. In this first chapter, we shall first present our methodological choices (part 2), then describe our selected organizations according to some main dimensions (part 3), and finally look at the relationship between practices of democracy and organizational structure, organizational strategies, relations with institutions, relations with the GJM, and contextual characteristics (part 4).

Figure 2 – WP4 analytical scheme



2. A survey of SMOs: methodological choices

Work Package 4 is based upon a survey of organizations active in the GJM. During a preparatory phase of the research we addressed a number of methodological questions connected with the research instrument.

2.1. Instruments for the empirical research. The questionnaire

Our *questionnaire* addresses internal organizational characteristics (name, year of foundation, internal decision-making, types of activity, type of campaigns, type of organization, type of members, type and sources of budget) and the relationships of GJMOs with the outside (relationship with other groups/networks/campaigns of the GJM, types of interactions with the institutions at different territorial levels).

In order to assess the validity of our research instrument, we conducted a pretest at the Perugia "Reclaim our UN" meeting (September 2005), where about 30 questionnaires were collected. The results of the pretest were discussed at the third meeting of the Demos project in Cordoba (November 2005), where a working group (with members from the European University Institute, the Urbino, the Spanish and the German teams) was established with the task of shortening the questionnaire (focusing on factual information on organizational decision-making, networking and interactions with authorities) and rephrasing the questions that had not worked well in the pre-test. Taking into account the logistic of telephone interviews (see below), we also decided to use some open questions, to be recoded after the collection of the empirical material.

At the Cordoba meeting we also discussed the modalities for administering the questionnaire. Because of the high costs of face-to-face interviews (most of our organizations are located in different cities in the different countries) we chose telephone interviews (unless otherwise required by the respondents). Considering the range of issues covered by the questionnaire, we decided that the person to be interviewed should be somebody knowledgeable about the history of the organization, and where necessary to interview two persons (e.g. for questions concerning the budget). Especially for trade unions, political parties or large NGOs we decided to interview the person responsible for protest campaigns, for international relations or for relations with social movements. As for more informal groups, lacking clear organizational roles, we decided to interview activists with long-lasting experience in the group.

2.2. Sampling method: problems and limits

For each country and at the transnational level we selected about thirty-five organizations involved in the main initiatives of the GJM (e.g. the European Social Forums), including those we considered the most representative for the different movements that converged in the GJM. As we stressed already in our integrated report for Work Package 3 (della Porta and Reiter 2006), ours is not a random sampling and therefore cannot be considered as representing the composition of the GJM in each country. Random sampling is however only one of the possible ways of selecting cases; it has some obvious advantages, but difficult preconditions for applicability. As King, Keohane, and Verba (1994, 125) stress, "In qualitative research, and indeed in much quantitative research, random selection might *not* be feasible because the universe of cases is not clearly specified" (ibid., 125, emphasis added). In our case, in fact, random selection is impossible given that the universe is unknown (there is no 'official' list of GJM organizations). The mentioned authors add that, "even when random selection is feasible, it is not necessarily a wise technique to use" (ibid.), since there is the risk of "missing important cases". This reflection also applies to our research design, since we wanted to cover the variety of groups present in the movement. We therefore did not use randomness as a criterion in our sampling strategy, but tried instead to select in each country and at the transnational level organizations representative for what we hold to be

the relevant strands of the Global Justice Movements. Additionally, we tried to reflect the heterogeneity of the movements as far as issues covered and ideological leanings are concerned. In this sense, we were careful not to sample on our dependent variables (conceptions of democracy), following the suggestion that "the best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent variables" (ibid., 140). Because of this sampling strategy, we cannot say that our national samples are representative of the (unknown) universe of GJM organizations in each country. Since however our case selection respected the principle of not searching "for those observations that fit (or do not fit) our a priori theory" (ibid., 141, see also p. 142), we do feel confident that the selection criteria did not bias the statistical correlations among the coded variables.

A main methodological choice of the Demos project (see della Porta and Reiter 2006) was to aim at having similar samples for Work Packages 2, 3 and 4 in order to facilitate integrated analyses of various Work Packages. This ideally implied to include for WP4 all groups that had been sampled for the previous Work Packages. At our fourth meeting in Athens (May 2006; the interview campaign started in January 2006) the progress reports from the teams revealed difficulties in covering the complete WP2 and WP3 samples for WP4. For all countries we had some refusals, especially by small autonomous groups (that refused to participate in a research project founded by the European Commission) but also by large, over-surveyed organizations. In addition, some groups had disappeared. For this reason, most teams were not able to cover the whole WP2 and WP3 sample and had to find substitutes for certain organizations (for the lists of selected organizations, see the appendix). However, as shown in table 1, the rate of substitution was quite limited (below one fifth of the groups) with the exception of the Spanish and the transnational samples that, given high rates of refusals and organizational turnover, were forced to substitute missing organizations with similar ones. The number of interviews conducted was 210. They were distributed as follows: 28 in France, 26 in Germany, 37 in Italy, 35 in Spain, 28 in Switzerland, 29 in the United Kingdom and 27 at the transnational level.

Table 1 – Sampling strategy per country (%)

Sampling strategy	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Organizations in common with WP2 and WP3	89.3	92.3	97.3	51.4	100.0	86.2	48.1	80.5
New organizations	10.7	7.7	2.7	48.6	0.0	13.8	51.9	19.5
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

During the Athens meeting we also discussed how to close the open questions. We decided that a proposal for the coding of the open questions would be elaborated by the same working group set up at the Cordoba meeting for the re-drafting of the WP4 questionnaire. The proposal was then circulated, tested and amended on the bases of comments and feedbacks received by the other members of the project.

3. The organizations of the GJM: A descriptive analysis

The main purpose of our research is the analysis of models of democracy as they are elaborated "from below" and implemented both in the internal organization of social movements and in experiments of participatory and deliberative decision-making. The focus of the Demos project is on different conceptions and practices of democracy.

3.1. The dependent variable: a typology of democratic decision-making

Although representative models of democracy remain dominant, they are challenged by a crisis of legitimacy as well as of efficiency: a declining use of conventional forms of political participation is accompanied by the perception of poor performances of representative democratic government. Other models of democracy (re)emerge as possible correctives of the malfunctioning of representative democracy; experiments in participatory and deliberative forms of democracy are underway within political institutions as well as political and social actors. In this context, various conceptions of democracy coexist, stressing different indicators of democratic quality. A main assumption of our research is in fact that the general principles of democracy (representative versus participatory, majority versus deliberative, etc.) can be combined in different forms and with different balances. We did not aim at measuring degrees of democracy, but instead at constructing a typology of the different models of democracy that are present, in a more or less 'pure' form, in GJM organizations. In this sense, we aim at analyzing in detail the plurality of conceptions and practices of democracy expressed by GJM organizations.

As in other parts of our research (wp1 and wp3), we constructed a typology of democratic forms of internal decision-making (see della Porta and Reiter 2006). The first dimension concerns the degree of *participation/delegation* and is operationalized by distinguishing groups characterized by a central role in the decision-making process of the organization of an assembly consisting of all members from all other types of organizations (executive-centered, leader-centered, mixed models, etc.). The second dimension refers to degree of *consensus* that is the emphasis on decision-making methods assigning a special role to public discussion, common good, rational arguments and transformation of preferences. These aspects are particularly embedded and valorized by the *method of consensus* that put a special emphasis on the decision-making process *per se* than on the outcome of such process. Considering this dimension we separated groups employing the method of consensus from all other organizations employing different decision-making methods (simple majority, qualified majority, mixed methods, etc.).

These questions are relevant for social movement research that has described different organizational models as typical for social movements. On the one hand, social movements have been defined as *loosely structured collective conflict*, in which "hundreds of groups and organizations - many of them short-lived, spatially scattered, and lacking direct communication, a single organization and a common leadership - episodically take part in many different kinds of local collective action" (Oberschall 1980, 45-6). In this vein, social movements are: (1) *segmented*, with numerous different groups or cells in continual rise and decline; (2) *policephalous*, having many leaders each commanding a limited following only; and (3) *reticular*, with multiple links between autonomous cells forming an indistinctly-bounded network (Gerlach 1976). In a recent contribution, Gerlach (2001) qualified his argument by stressing the undirected, acephalous (rather than policephalous) nature of such networks.

Widespread in social movements, grassroots organizations are said to combine a strong participatory orientation with a low level of formal structuration and orientation to consensus. Social movement organizations would therefore be collectivist organizations with an horizontal structure sense of community and solidarity, task sharing and job rotation (Rothschild-Whitt 1979), as well as encouraging spontaneity (Obershall and Farris 1985). Francesca Polletta (2002, 7) also stressed the use of deliberative discussion by activists: "they expected each other to provide legitimate reasons for preferring one option to another. They strove to recognize the merits of each other's reasons for favoring a particular option … the goal was not unanimity, so much as discourse. But it was a particular kind of discourse, governed by norms of openness and mutual respect". In particular, "Many newer movements explicitly foreground non-hierarchical models of organizations, and the alliance structures and consensus-based decision-making that are emblematic of many environmental and global movements" (Clemens 2005, 355). Having only limited access

to material resources, unlike political parties or pressure groups, social movement organizations may substitute these with other resources. Their existence depending on their members' willingness to participate in their activities, they tend to strengthen such participation through different combinations of ideological and solidaristic incentives. A participatory structure also tends to favour internal solidarity through the gratification of immediate needs (Donati 1984). Social movement organizations give particular importance to internal relations, transforming the very costs of collective action into benefits through the intrinsic rewards of participation itself (della Porta and Diani 1999, 141). Within cohesive groups the conditions for the development of alternative value systems are constituted and "communal associations become free spaces, breeding grounds for democratic change" (Evans and Boyte 1992, 187). In "free spaces" a "sense of a common good" develops alongside the construction of "direct, face-to-face, and egalitarian relationships" (Gamson 1990, 190-1). A small group of activists "uses naturally occurring social relationships and meets a variety of organizational and individual needs for emotional support, integration, sharing of sacrifice, and expression of shared identities" (ibid., 175).

The literature on social movements has however also stressed an alternative model: a *professional social movement organization* characterized by "(1) a leadership that devotes full time to the movement, with a large proportion of resources originating outside the aggrieved group that the movement claims to represent; (2) a very small or non-existent membership base or a paper membership (membership implies little more than allowing a name to be used upon membership rolls); (3) attempts to impart the image of 'speaking for a constituency'; and (4) attempts to influence policy toward that same constituency" (McCarthy and Zald 1987a [1973], 375). In this model, ordinary members have little power and "no serious role in organizational policy-making short of withholding membership dues. The professional staff largely determines the positions the organization takes upon issues" (McCarthy and Zald 1987a [1973], 378). In the 1980s and the 1990s, social movement organizations have been described as more and more approaching this second model. Among others, Hanspeter Kriesi (1996) has described a trend of *internal structuration* as deriving from: (1) formalization (with the introduction of formal membership criteria, written rules, fixed procedures, formal leadership and a fixed structure of offices or bureaus); (2) professionalization (understood as the presence of paid staff who pursue a career inside the organization); (3) internal differentiation (involving a functional division of labour and the creation of territorial units); and (4) integration (through mechanisms of horizontal and/or vertical coordination).

As we are going to see, our research confirms the presence in the GJM of various types of organizations, confirming that social movements are characterized by "considerable variation in organizational strength within and between movements" (Klandermans 1989, 4). Crossing the two mentioned dimensions of participation/delegation and consensus/majority vote[2], our typology distinguishes four democratic types: a purely assembleary model (where the refusal to delegate power is mixed with majoritarian methods of decision-making), a deliberative participative model (where the refusal to delegate power is mixed with consensual methods of decision-making), an associational model (where the delegation of power is mixed with majoritarian methods of decision-making), and a deliberative representative model (where the delegation of power is mixed with consensual methods of decision-making) (see figure 3).

[2] As for the operazionalization of the two dimensions, our interviewees were asked to indicate the main decision-making body within their organization (see question 9 in the appendix) and to specify the decision-making method adopted by it (see questions 10g and 11c in the appendix). To build the typology presented above answers to question 9 were re-aggregated in a dummy variable (0 = president / leader / secretary; executive committee or similar body; 1 = assembly / open meeting; when possible the categories "thematic groups" and "other" were attributed to one of the two categories, otherwise they became missing values). Questions 10g and 11c were re-coded in two dummy variables distinguishing between 0 (majority vote and mixed methods; value 0 and 9 in the original variable) and 1 (only pure forms of consensus; value 1 in the original variable).

Figure 3 – Models of Democracy

Decision-making method: Consensus	*Decision-making body: delegation of power*	
	Low	**High**
Low	Assembleary 9.8% (N = 18)	Associational 30.4% (N = 56)
High	Deliberative participative 21.7% (N = 40)	Deliberative representative 38.0% (N= 70)

We could classify 184 out of the overall 210 cases: in 13 percent of the cases it was not possible to collect enough information on the main decision-making body or on the method of decision-making (see table 2). Almost two fifths of the selected organizations fall in the deliberative representative category where principle of consensus is mixed with the principle of delegation. Almost one third of the groups adopt an associational model that is based on majoritarian decision-making and delegation Around one fifth of the groups combines a consensual decision-making method with the principle of participation (refusal of delegation to an executive committee) while almost 10% of the selected organizations mixes the principle of participation with the majoritarian principle (assembleary model). Thus, our sample confirms a significant variation on the democratic models employed by the organizations.

The prevalent model in the British and German samples is the associational one (almost 50% of the cases) while in all the other samples–with the exception of the Spanish one– the deliberative representative model prevails. In the Spanish sample, half of the cases are classified as deliberative participative, a result that reflects the large number of informal organizations, active mainly at the local level, with few members and a limited budget. Deliberative representative models are employed by almost half of the French, the Swiss, and the transnational organizations. Democratic models mixing consensus and participation are instead particularly uncommon in the French, German, and British samples, while instead characterizing about one fifth of the groups in the other samples. Overall, assembleary democratic models are quite rare and characterize especially the German and the French groups.

Table 2 – Democratic models per country (%)

Democratic models	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Associational	32.0	48.0	30.6	15.6	23.8	46.2	15.8	30.4
Deliberative representative	48.0	28.0	36.1	28.1	47.6	34.6	52.6	38.0
Assembleary	16.0	16.0	11.1	6.3	4.8	3.8	10.5	9.8
Deliberative participative	4.0	8.0	22.2	50.0	23.8	15.4	21.1	21.7
Total **(N)**	13.6 (25)	13.6 (25)	19.6 (36)	17.4 (32)	11.4 (21)	14.1 (26)	10.3 (19)	100.0 (184)
Missing cases (N)	3	1	1	3	7	3	8	26

Cramer's V is 0.250**

The correlation between the type of internal decision-making resulting from WP3 and the one resulting from WP4 (0.371**, N=137) indicates some consistency, but the democratic conceptions emerging from written documents and the democratic practices declared by our interviewees are not identical. Comparing the results of the two workpackages, we can notice that interviewees tend to stress consensus more than their organizational documents do. These discrepancies –analyzed in

more detail in the single country chapter-- can be explained in different ways: respondents might be more up to date and accurate in describing the actual decision making in their groups, or they might want to give a better image of decision making in their organization. Whatever the explanation, norms of consensus appear indeed as very much supported in the movement.

In our interviews we tried to deepen our understanding of the internal decision-making processes of the selected organizations. We asked our respondents to provide information on the main decision-making bodies in their organizations: their qualitative and quantitative composition, the frequency of their meetings, the management of the agenda, the rules for discussion, and decision-making methods.

As table 3 illustrates, in more than half of the cases the most important decision-making functions are delegated to a monocratic body (11%) or to a collective body like an executive committee (46%). Around one quarter of the groups leave these powers to the assembly and one tenth attributes them to other bodies or distribute them among multiple bodies. In just 4% of the cases thematic groups function as important decision making bodies.

As for national peculiarities, in the Spanish sample the role of the assembly is particularly strong; the role of monocratic body is especially mentioned in the British case (around one third of the cases); the executive committee and similar bodies are more widespread in France, Germany, and Italy. The relevant presence of "other bodies" in the Swiss case is explained by the federal structure of the state: most of those bodies are in fact national coordinations of cantonal sections or cantonal sections themselves. Finally, also at the transnational level "other bodies" (mostly international coordination committees) play an important role.

Table 3 – Most important decision-making body per country (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
President / leader /secretary / director	3.6	7.7	5.4	2.9	10.7	34.5	11.1	10.5
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / board of directors	60.7	61.5	51.4	31.4	46.4	37.9	37.0	46.2
Assembly / open meeting	21.4	23.1	27.0	54.3	21.4	17.2	22.2	27.6
Thematic group	0.0	3.8	5.4	2.9	3.6	3.4	7.4	3.8
Other bodies	14.3	3.8	10.8	8.6	17.9	6.9	22.2	11.9
Total **(N)**	13.3 (28)	12.4 (26)	17.6 (37)	16.7 (35)	13.3 (28)	13.8 (29)	12.9 (27)	100.0 (210)

Cramer's V is 0.255**

To better understand the internal democratic functioning of our groups we focused on the decision-making method of the main decisional body, with particular attention to the use of the method of consensus. We therefore distinguished groups that only use consensual methods from the ones using a majoritarian one (simple majority and qualified majority) sometimes mixed with consensus. The method of consensus is particularly mentioned by the groups sampled for Italy, Spain, and at the transnational level, while in the other national samples more traditional decision-making methods prevail (see table 4).

Table 4 – Decision-making method of the main decisional body per country (%)

Decision-making method of the main decisional body	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Majority + other	79.2	69.2	48.6	38.2	54.5	66.7	26.1	53.9
Consensus	20.8	30.8	51.4	61.8	45.5	33.3	73.9	46.1
Total	12.6	13.5	19.2	17.6	11.4	14.0	11.9	100.0
(N)	(24)	(26)	(37)	(34)	(22)	(27)	(23)	(191)

Cramer's V is 0.332**

We also asked our interviewees about the size of the most important decision-making body, since we suppose that its scale could explain the decision-making style of the organization. Consensual decision-making should be easier to implement in smaller groups while other types of decision-making methods (i.e. simple majority, qualified majority, mixed methods, etc.) better adapt to bigger decisional bodies. Table 5 shows that small decision-making bodies are very important in the Italian, Spanish, and Swiss samples (in the latter middle-sized ones are also widespread) while large decision-making bodies characterize especially French, British, and transnational groups. A considerable amount of German groups (almost one third) presents a middle-sized format. If we correlate the indicator concerning the dimension of the main decisional body with the indicator referring to its decision-making method we find a confirmation of our hypothesis (-0.304** Kendall's Tau B): the smaller the scale of decision-making bodies the more often consensus is used.

Table 5 – Size of the main decisional body per country (%)

Dimension of the main decisional body	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Less than 30	30.8	46.2	63.9	60.0	59.1	44.4	28.6	48.9
Between 30 and 100	26.9	30.8	16.7	23.3	36.4	25.9	28.6	26.1
More than 100	42.3	23.1	19.4	16.7	4.5	29.6	42.9	25.0
Total	13.8	13.8	19.1	16.0	11.7	14.4	11.2	100.0
(N)	(26)	(26)	(36)	(30)	(22)	(27)	(21)	(188)

Cramer's V is not significant

For the groups mentioning the presence of an executive committee, it is also important to assess the decision-making method of this body and the source of its legitimacy (see table 6). Around two thirds of our groups have an executive committee (with a low 40% for the Spanish sample), and when present, this body (often characterized by a small size) tends to adopt the method of consensus (with lower figures for the German and the British samples, with respectively one third and two fifth of the cases). In most of the cases the executive committees are elected by the general assembly/congress or by assemblies of local groups/affiliates.

Table 6 – Characteristics of the executive committee per country (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Yes	78.6	84.6	75.7	40.0	63.0	72.4	63.0	67.5
Total	13.4	12.4	17.7	16.7	12.9	13.9	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(27)	(29)	(27)	(209)
Decision-making method of the executive								
Majority + other	40.9	65.2	42.9	35.7	41.2	57.1	25.0	454
Consensus	59.1	34.8	57.1	64.3	58.8	42.9	75.0	54.6
Total	15.6	16.3	19.9	9.9	12.1	14.9	11.3	100.0
(N)	(22)	(23)	(28)	(14)	(17)	(21)	(16)	(141)
Election of the executive committee								
By an assemblearian body	88.2	88.2	85.0	90.9	81.3	93.3	80.0	86.5
By other bodies	11.8	11.8	15.0	9.1	18.8	6.7	20.0	13.5
Total	15.3	15.3	18.0	9.9	14.4	13.5	13.5	100.0
(N)	(17)	(17)	(20)	(11)	(16)	(15)	(15)	(111)

Cramer's V is: 302** (presence); not significant (decision-making method); not significant (election)

In order to have a more complete picture of the internal democratic functioning we also focused on the agenda setting process and the rules for discussion within the organization. The power to define the agenda and the rules of a discussion are considered as potential sources of hidden power. Table 7 shows that in almost two thirds of the cases the agenda is set by a monocratic body or by the executive committee (or similar bodies). The role of monocratic bodies in setting the agenda is particularly relevant in the Italian and in the Swiss samples that, together with the German one, show also an important role of the executive body (more than half of the cases). The Spanish sample represents an exception: in the majority of cases the agenda is set directly by the assembly. This result is not surprising if we consider the peculiar features of the Spanish groups discussed above and their high decentralization and informality, due to a lack of resources and the presence of pro-local cultures like peripheral nationalisms and libertarian ideologies. In the French sample and at the transnational level, an important role in setting the agenda is played by small committees representing different membership groups. In the same two samples and in the British one other bodies are also mentioned, like international committees or local groups organizing the meeting (for the transnational groups) and members and affiliates defining the agenda through Internet communication (for France and the UK).

Table 7 – Body proposing the agenda per country (%)

Body proposing the agenda	Country (%)							Tot.
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
President / leader / secretary / director	16.0	15.4	24.3	2.9	22.7	18.5	8.7	15.5
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / board of directors	44.0	57.7	54.1	35.3	59.1	40.7	47.8	47.9
Assembly / open meeting	8.0	7.7	10.8	44.1	13.6	14.8	8.7	16.5
Small committee representing different membership groups	12.0	3.8	0.0	8.8	0.0	7.4	13.0	6.2
Other bodies	20.0	15.4	10.8	8.8	4.5	18.5	21.7	13.9
Total	12.9	13.4	19.1	17.5	11.3	13.9	11.9	100.0
(N)	(25)	(26)	(37)	(34)	(22)	(27)	(23)	(194)

Cramer's V is 0.231**

Only one quarter of our groups declared not having adopted specific and formal rules for the discussion (table 8). Around half of the groups regulate their discussions with traditional regulations such as time limits for interventions, the presence of moderators/facilitators/chairs, the drafting of minutes, lists of speakers, rules of procedure (contained in the constitution), division in (small) working groups in order to offer possibility the possibility to participate in the discussion to everybody, transparency/accountability in decision-making (i.e. the discussion ends with a clear statement about the decisions made, specifying the responsibilities for the decision-making process), etc. Only 5% of the groups (not shown in the table) foresee exclusively innovative rules for the discussion like rotating moderation, gender quota, enforcement of rules of conduct (no male dominance, no authoritative behaviour, let speakers finish their statement), protection of minorities, specific kinds of seating arrangements (i.e. circular), use of hand signals, etc. Almost one fourth of the groups mixes traditional and innovative rules or adopts just innovative rules. As for the crossnational comparison, especially at the transnational level rules are not present (almost two thirds of the groups), while German, Italian, and Swiss groups are particularly oriented towards what we have called "traditional rules of discussion". The German sample, however, also presents a significant amount of groups experimenting exclusively "innovative rules" (data not shown in the table). In the French, Spanish, Swiss, and British samples around one third of the groups uses innovative rules (alone or mixing them with traditional ones) in managing the discussion. In the British case, one out of five groups adopted a peculiar technique of discussion (use of hand signals) that is barely present in the other samples.

Table 8 – Rules of discussion per country (%)

Rules of discussion	Country (%)							Tot.
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Not present	21.7	12.5	26.1	20.0	0.0	25.9	65.0	24.5
Only traditional rules	47.8	62.5	65.2	50.0	68.8	40.7	30.0	51.5
Both traditional and innovative rules + only innovative rules	30.4	25.0	8.6	30.0	31.3	33.3	5.0	24.8
Total	14.1	14.7	14.1	18.4	9.8	16.6	12.3	100.0
(N)	(23)	(24)	(23)	(30)	(16)	(27)	(20)	(163)

Cramer's V is 0.274**

Concluding, our results indicate the presence of very different democratic models in the GJM. As emerged also from the analysis of organizational documents, associational models are quite widespread, reflecting the presence in the movement of formal NGOs, unions, and parties. However, there are also more participatory models (testified by a significant role granted to the general assemblies), as well as significant references to deliberation and consensual decision-making.

3.2. Organizational structure

As we already anticipated in the previous paragraph, the organizational structure and history of a group could be very important factors in explaining the model of internal democracy adopted. In what follows we will assess the material and human resources available for the selected organizations focusing on their membership, their budget, their paid staff, their volunteers (a term usually employed by more formal organizations to indicate members that devote a significant amount of time to the organizations, usually getting involved in provision of services) and also their funding period. The organizations selected for the survey are quite heterogeneous. Considering the type of membership, the great majority of our groups (over 80%) are either organizations with individual membership (36%) or organizations with mixed individual and collective membership (41%); the groups with only collective membership are less than one fourth (table 9). Individual membership is more widespread among the French, Spanish, British, and Swiss organizations while mixed individual and collective membership prevails for the Italian and the German groups. Unsurprisingly, at the transnational level we find a very high presence of groups with collective membership, and the absence of groups with only individual membership. Considering only individual membership, groups with a high number of affiliates are only present in the Italian and the French samples (more than 40% declares more than 10,000 members). Small groups of 1 to 100 members are more widespread in the Spanish and in the transnational samples. As for the former one, there are no groups declaring exclusively an individual membership and a very high percentage of them (almost 70%) declared no individual membership at all. Only a few transnational groups stated to have both individual and collective membership.

As for the the Swiss and British samples the intermediate categories (respectively between 100 and 1,000 members and between 1,000 and 10,000 members) are prominent. Considering only collective membership, the majority of the groups have between 10 and 100 members, with some variations: the British and transnational groups have the largest collective membership (more than 100 members), followed by the French and Swiss groups (between 10 and 100 collective members) while groups with small collective membership are particularly relevant in the Italian, Spanish, and Swiss samples.

Table 9 – Number of individual and collective members per country (%)

Type of members	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Individual	46.2	40.9	31.0	58.3	46.4	42.1	0.0	35.8
Collective	15.4	13.6	13.8	0.0	14.3	21.1	69.2	22.8
Both individual and collective	38.5	45.5	55.2	41.7	39.3	36.8	30.8	41.4
Total	16.0	13.6	17.9	7.4	17.3	11.7	16.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(22)	(29)	(12)	(28)	(19)	(26)	(162)
Number of individual members								
Between 1 and 100	6.3	33.3	16.0	58.3	9.1	7.7	60.0	21.6
Between 101 and 1,000	31.3	33.3	32.0	16.7	40.9	23.1	20.0	30.6
Between 1,001 and 10,000	18.8	11.1	8.0	25.0	31.8	38.5	0.0	19.8
More than 10,000	43.8	22.2	44.0	0.0	18.2	30.8	20.0	27.9
Total	14.4	16.2	22.5	10.8	19.8	11.7	4.5	100.0
(N)	(16)	(18)	(25)	(12)	(22)	(13)	(5)	(111)
Number of collective members								
Between 1 and 10	10.0	0.0	33.3	50.0	38.5	0.0	15.4	20.5
Between 11 and 100	70.0	50.0	33.3	50.0	53.8	40.0	46.2	47.9
More than 100	20.0	50.0	33.3	0.0	7.7	60.0	38.5	31.5
Total	13.7	11.0	20.5	5.5	17.8	13.7	17.8	100.0
(N)	(10)	(8)	(15)	(4)	(13)	(10)	(13)	(73)

Cramer's V is: 0.378*** (members' type); 0.322*** (individual members) 0.360*** (collective members)

The type of membership provides a first insight into the differences between the selected groups. Not only human, but also material resources are however relevant for their potential impact on organizational strategies. In fact, groups with a higher budget tend to be more formal (adopting formal rules) and professional (the availability of money for the hiring of people to develop technical, administrative and other kind of tasks). Table 10 presents the amount of material resources available to the selected organizations. Very few of them have no budget at all (with a high 27% in the Spanish sample). Around one tenth of our respondents declared that it was impossible for them to give an estimate of their budget since it varies a lot from one year to another. This is particularly frequent among transnational organizations (more than two thirds). Italy has a relatively high proportion of "poor" organizations with an annual budget below 50,000 euros. Most of the German and Swiss groups in our samples are quite wealthy with a budget between 50,000 and 500,000 euros. Among the selected organizations, the "richer" ones are settled in France, Germany, Italy and at the transnational level: around one third of the groups declared a yearly budget higher than 500,000 euros.

Table 10 – Budget of the groups per country (%)

Budget of the groups	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Highly variable	4.5	0.0	6.9	0.0	17.9	21.4	36.8	12.1
None	4.5	0.0	0.0	26.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.6
Less than 50,000	27.3	9.5	37.9	26.9	21.4	25.0	15.8	24.3
Between 50,000 and 500,000	27.3	52.4	17.2	30.8	39.3	21.4	10.5	28.3
More than 500,000	36.4	38.1	37.9	15.4	21.4	32.1	36.8	30.6
Total	12.7	12.1	16.8	15.0	16.2	16.2	11.0	100.0
(N)	(22)	(21)	(29)	(26)	(28)	(28)	(19)	(173)

Cramer's V is 0.335**

Unsurprisingly, the relationship between budget and paid staff is linear and strong (Cramer's V 0.619**). Groups with a higher budget are also the ones that have the higher number of paid staff. As illustrated in table 11, the national samples with less paid staff are the Spanish (47%) and British (35%). Most of the groups have less than 16 paid staff members (especially Swiss and transnational groups). The Swiss sample has also a considerable quota of groups (almost one fifth) declaring between 16 and 100 paid staff members. The countries with a significant number of groups (around one fifth) with more than 100 paid staff members are France, Germany, and the UK.

Table 11 – Number of paid staff per country (%)

Paid staff	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
None	28.6	24.0	30.6	47.1	25.0	34.5	16.0	30.2
Up to 16	42.9	44.0	41.7	41.2	50.0	34.5	60.0	44.4
Between 16 and 100	10.7	12.0	16.7	11.8	21.4	13.8	12.0	14.1
More than 100	17.9	20.0	11.1	0.0	3.6	17.2	12.0	11.2
Total	13.7	12.2	17.6	16.6	13.7	14.1	12.2	100.0
(N)	(28)	(25)	(36)	(34)	(28)	(29)	(25)	(205)

Cramer's V is not significant

Groups with a low budget can overcome the lack of material resources thanks to the contribution of volunteers devoting their work for free to the organization. The presence of volunteers could be especially important for organizations with few material resources, overcoming their deficiency thanks to the contribution of members devoting their work for free to the organization. Table 12 shows that budget and volunteer trends are not very different. In fact British, French, German, and Italian organizations have the highest number of volunteer, with more than one third declaring more than 100. Spanish, Swiss and transnational organizations are in between with more than one third of the groups declaring a number of volunteers between 16 and 100. Half of the British groups declared a limited number of voluntary staff (less than 16 volunteers).

Table 12 – Number of volunteers per country (%)

Number of volunteers	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Less than 16	23.8	21.7	34.5	34.4	22.2	50.0	36.8	32.4
Between 16 and 100	28.6	34.8	27.6	37.5	59.3	14.3	36.8	34.1
More than 100	47.6	43.5	37.9	28.1	18.5	35.7	26.3	33.5
Total	11.7	12.8	16.2	17.9	15.1	15.6	10.6	100.0
(N)	(21)	(23)	(29)	(32)	(27)	(28)	(19)	(179)

Cramer's V is not significant

However, the correlation between budget and volunteers is positive with a Cramer's V of 0.331**. This means that the groups with a higher budget also tend to have higher number of volunteers (with less clear-cut results in the British sample).

Another characteristic of our groups that could influence a series of strategic choices is their founding period. Our organizations in fact could be shaped by the cultural, political, social and economic features of the historical generation to which they belong. Our groups are part of different generations of social movements. As table 13 illustrates, almost one fifth of the groups were created before the mobilizations of 1968 and another fifth between 1968 and the fall of Berlin's wall (1989) while almost one third was founded during the 90s and almost another third after the protest of Seattle (1999). National groups are differently distributed among the diverse period of contention: around one fourth of German and British groups were created before 1968, around one third of French and Swiss groups between 1968 and 1989, more than half of the Italian groups were founded (or re-founded) during the 1990s and almost half of the Spanish, British and transnational groups after 1999.

Table 13 – Generational belonging of selected organizations per country (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Before 1969	21.4	23.1	10.8	7.7	22.2	25.0	15.4	18.6
Between 1969 and 1989	28.6	23.1	13.5	15.4	33.3	10.7	7.7	19.8
Between 1989 and 1999	28.6	30.8	54.1	30.8	22.2	14.3	30.8	31.4
After 1999	21.4	23.1	21.6	46.2	22.2	50.0	46.2	30.2
Total	16.3	15.1	21.5	7.6	15.7	16.3	7.6	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(13)	(27)	(28)	(13)	(172)

Cramer's V is 0.233**

We can therefore conclude that our survey confirms the pluralistic picture emerging from the analysis of the organizational documents of WP3. Our selected organizations cover a wide range in terms of the *size* of individual and collective membership, the amount of material resources and the levels of *formalization and centralization.* Also the *age* of the organizations involved in the movement varies, confirming that the GJM has created new SMOs, but also re-mobilized groups coming from previous waves of protest (della Porta, Andretta, Mosca and Reiter 2006).

3.3. Relationship with the institutions

Another central focus for our research is the relationship between our groups and the institutions at different territorial levels. Institutions can act as important allies of social movement organizations, providing opportunities, resources, and spaces. The attitudes of social movements towards institutions tend to vary with the territorial levels of the latter. International institutions are often criticized by the Global Justice Movement because of their democratic deficit: they lack a popular legitimation and transparency in the decision-making process. National institutions are the most often selected target of protest: they are sometimes allies (especially, but not always, when the left is in power), but more often opposed for their neo-liberal policies. Finally, local governments are generally perceived as closer to citizens and their problems, more legitimated, more open to movements' claims, and therefore more trusted by the activists of the GJM (Andretta *et al.* 2002 and 2003; della Porta *et al.* 2006).

The tables below show that the selected organizations tend to collaborate especially with local and national governments. However, relationships are also frequent with international governmental organizations (less so among Spanish and Swiss groups, mostly active at the local level; see table 14). Overall, more than half of our groups declares to collaborate (in general or selectively/critically) with international institutions. Refusal to collaborate involves about 14% of our groups (but almost one fourth for the Spanish and British samples), with an additional one third showing indifference towards IGOs, or denouncing a refusal of cooperation on the side of the authorities. Interestingly, collaboration concerns 39% of the Swiss and 52% of the transnational organizations, while critical/selective collaboration is particularly widespread among French, German, British, and transnational groups.

Table 14 - Relationship with international institutions per country (%)

International institutions	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Refusal of collaboration	8.7	16.0	13.9	21.9	7.1	24.1	0.0	13.5
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	30.4	24.0	33.3	46.9	53.6	20.7	14.8	32.5
Critical/selective collaboration	34.8	44.0	25.0	6.3	0.0	34.5	33.3	24.5
Collaboration	26.1	16.0	27.8	25.0	39.3	20.7	51.9	29.5
Total	11.5	12.5	18.0	16.0	14.0	14.5	13.5	100.0
(N)	(23)	(25)	(36)	(32)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(200)

Cramer's V is 0.276***

As for the relationship with national institutions, according to previous research (that however did not produce univocal results on this issue) the presence of left-wing governments tends to ease the relationship with institutions. At the time of the interviews, we had center left governments in Spain and the UK (where however Blair's government was strongly criticized by the movement for its leading role in the war on Iraq). Contrary to the image of a "no-global", antagonist movement, the table below shows that as many as two thirds of our organizations declared to cooperate with national governments (in one third of the cases however defining this collaboration as critical or selective). Only 10% declared to refuse to collaborate on principle (with a higher rate for the Spanish sample where many organizations also declared a lack of contacts at the national level). Selective collaboration was more often mentioned by French, German, and British interviewees. Unconditioned collaboration with institutions is most frequent among Swiss and transnational groups.

Table 15 - Relationship with national institutions per country (%)

National institutions	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Refusal of collaboration	4.2	16.0	5.6	26.5	10.7	17.2	0.0	11.8
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	12.5	20.0	19.4	38.2	28.6	6.9	18.5	21.2
Critical/selective collaboration	62.5	48.0	38.9	11.8	3.6	51.7	33.3	34.5
Collaboration	20.8	16.0	36.1	23.5	57.1	24.1	48.1	32.5
Total	11.8	12.3	17.7	16.7	13.8	14.3	13.3	100.0
(N)	(24)	(25)	(36)	(34)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(203)

Cramer's V is 0.304***

Also for local institutions we find cross-national variation (table 16). This relationship is more difficult to interpret since we do not have sufficient information on the political orientation of local administrations in our six countries (in fact our groups belong to different cities with different local governments). Again, more than two thirds of the groups declared experiences of collaboration (in most cases unconditioned). Not surprisingly, lack of contact (but not refusal) is declared by more than one third of the transnational groups (they interact less with local institutions), but also by the British groups. The refusal of collaboration is frequently mentioned by German, Spanish, and British groups. Selective collaboration is widespread among French, German, and Italian groups while unconditioned collaboration regards especially Switzerland and, again, Italy (where the lack of contacts with local authorities is hardly present).

Table 16 - Relationship with local institutions per country (%)

Local institutions	**Country (%)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Refusal of collaboration	0.0	16.0	2.7	18.2	3.6	17.2	0.0	8.4
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	13.0	24.0	8.1	27.3	21.4	31.0	37.0	22.8
Collaboration with restrictions	56.5	44.0	37.8	21.2	0.0	27.6	25.9	29.7
Collaboration	30.4	16.0	51.4	33.3	75.0	24.1	37.0	39.1
Total	11.4	12.4	18.3	16.3	13.9	14.4	13.4	100.0
(N)	(23)	(25)	(37)	(33)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(202)

Cramer's V is 0.305***

Using dummy variables (collaboration/no collaboration)[3] and comparing the different territorial levels (see table 17), the most striking result is the high level of collaboration with institutions at the international level. We should keep in mind that the result could be biased by the fact that the category "international institutions" is very heterogeneous because it mixes under the same label UN agencies, European Union institutions and international institutions such as World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank. The European Union and the United Nations sometimes provide funding and support for social movement organizations and are therefore more likely to receive a positive evaluation than those international financiary institutions that are considered the very symbol of neoliberalism and strongly opposed by the movements.

[3] We created dummy variables by assigning value 1 to all forms of collaboration (both with restrictions and indiscriminate), and value 0 to all other categories.

Transnational organizations show a positive attitude toward collaboration especially with international and national institutions (above 80%). A positive attitude towards collaboration grows for French, Italian, Spanish, and Swiss organizations moving from international to national and to local institutions, while among British and German ones collaboration is higher with national institutions, followed by international and local ones.

Table 17 – Attitudes toward institutions at different levels per country (%)

Collaboration with institutions	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
International level	60.9	60.0	52.8	31.3	39.3	55.2	85.2	54.0
National level	83.3	64.0	75.0	35.3	60.7	75.9	81.5	67.0
Local level	87.0	60.0	89.2	54.5	75.0	51.7	63.0	68.8
Total (N)	23-24	25	36-7	32-4	28	29	27	200-203

Cramer's V is: 0.320*** (international); 0.341*** (national); 0.311*** (local)

We also asked our interviewees their opinion on experiments of participatory public decision-making such as agenda 21, participative budgeting, etc. As table 18 illustrates, about 40% of the groups did not discuss this issue or have no clear stance on it. Over one third declared that these participative experiments improve the quality of political decisions; about one fifth was skeptical. Positive opinions were more widespread among French, Italian and transnational groups, negative opinions among German and Swiss groups.

Table 18 – Attitudes toward public decision-making per country (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
No	17.9	30.8	16.2	15.2	32.1	20.7	3.7	19.2
Yes	46.4	11.5	70.3	33.3	28.6	24.1	44.4	38.5
No definite position	35.7	57.7	13.5	51.5	39.3	55.2	51.9	42.3
Total	13.5	12.5	17.8	15.9	13.5	13.9	13.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(33)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(208)

Cramer's V is 0.300***

When asked to qualify their judgment on experiments of public decision-making, almost one fifth of the groups spoke of both advantages and risks. About half underlined the positive aspects and almost one third pointed at the negative side of institution-driven experiments (table 19). Criticism concerns both the input and the output sides of the decision-making process. Such experiments are considered elitist ("they involve mostly experts and not citizens"), but also useless ("no real changes occur") and even dangerous ("serve for cooptation of critical engagement", "are used to create political consensus and legitimation of institutions"). These processes are also labeled as artificial (not true experiments of a new democratic model) or "top-down" (promoted and implemented from the top of the political system). Other groups instead underline the positive effects of public decision-making based on citizens' participation. Positive judgments concern the input side of the decision-making process: they are considered as being inclusive ("they stimulate active citizens' participation") and bottom-up ("they express the real needs of citizens", "people become closer to politics"). Additionally, these experiments are positively evaluated for their consequences on the output of the decision-making process: they attribute more responsibility to the

people, foster transparency and publicity of the decision-making, produce a more consensual decision-making and allow for the emergence of new political styles and administrative practices.

Table 19 – Evaluation of public decision-making per country (%)

Evaluation of public decision-making	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Negative	23.5	45.5	25.8	35.3	50.0	20.0	9.1	30.4
Both negative and positive	17.6	45.5	19.4	17.6	0.0	20.0	9.1	17.4
Positive	58.8	9.1	54.8	47.1	50.0	60.0	81.8	52.2
Total (N)	14.8 (17)	9.6 (11)	27.0 (31)	14.8 (17)	15.7 (18)	8.7 (10)	9.6 (11)	100.0 (115)
Motivation of the evaluation								
Instrumental	8.7	22.7	9.1	25.0	3.6	0.0	5.0	9.4
Artificial	4.3	0.0	12.1	0.0	21.4	3.4	0.0	7.0
Exclusive	4.3	0.0	9.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.3
Placebo politics	21.7	18.2	15.2	31.3	7.1	6.9	5.0	14.0
Top-to-bottom-politics	8.7	13.6	6.1	0.0	3.6	3.4	5.0	5.8
Bottom-up-politics	17.4	4.5	24.2	43.8	0.0	6.9	20.0	15.2
Responsibility	0.0	4.5	6.1	0.0	7.1	3.4	10.0	4.7
Inclusive	26.1	4.5	45.5	0.0	14.3	3.4	40.0	20.5
Transparency/publicity of the decison-making	17.4	0.0	18.2	6.3	0.0	6.9	10.0	8.8
More consensual decison-making	4.3	4.5	0.0	0.0	3.6	3.4	10.0	3.5
Creative effect	4.3	0.0	6.1	12.5	0.0	0.0	20.0	5.3
Total (N)	13.5 (23)	12.9 (22)	19.3 (33)	9.4 (16)	16.4 (28)	17.0 (29)	11.7 (20)	100.0 (171)

For the evaluation Cramer's V is 0.299*

NB – for the motivation overall % of column can sum above 100% because of multiple responses

For the issue of relationships with the institutions, the sources of the budget of GJMOs are an important factor to consider. In fact, groups depending upon governmental funding might be conditioned by their desire to keep this kind of revenue while groups mostly financed by their members are freer from this point of view.

Our groups are funded by a multiplicity of different sources (table 20).[4] Most of them rely on contributions coming from members (the Spanish, Swiss and British groups in our sample are particularly dependent on this kind of financing). Above one third of the groups receive money from governmental funded project (at the transnational level the percentage is almost doubled), but also from non governmental source (i.e. donations from privates and financing from foundations). The latter is especially significant among the German, Swiss and transnational groups. Two fifth of the groups collect funds through initiatives of self-financing like the organization of concerts, festivals, sales of books and other materials (this is especially the case of the Spanish organizations).

[4] It is worth noticing that we asked about the more important sources of their budget but we have not information about the percentage of their budget funded by different sources.

Table 20 – Type of funding per country (%)

Type of funding	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
From members	75.0	64.0	77.8	87.9	96.4	92.9	72.0	81.3
Governmental	42.9	36.0	36.1	27.6	39.3	28.6	60.0	38.2
Non governmental	14.3	56.0	19.4	13.8	42.9	32.1	72.0	34.2
Sales of goods/service/rent	35.7	24.0	38.9	53.3	42.9	46.4	36.0	40.0
Total **(N)**	28	25	36	29-33	28	28	25	199-203

Cramer's V is: 0.272** (members); n.s. (governmental); 0.425*** (non governmental); n.s. (sales)

In an additional step we distinguished between groups on the basis of the type of funding they received, i.e. whether material resources were provided by members, governments or both. Table 21 shows that the percentage of groups receiving money only from governments is very limited except for German and transnational groups. Spanish, Swiss and British groups rely the most on funds coming only from members. Around 40% of Swiss, French, and transnational groups tend to have both sources of revenue. Around one fifth of French, German and Italian groups do not receive any funding neither from members nor from governments.

Table 21 – Type of funding per country (%)

Type of funding	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
None	21.4	20.0	22.2	12.1	3.6	7.1	12.0	14.3
Only from members	35.7	44.0	41.7	63.6	57.1	64.3	28.0	48.3
Only from governments	3.6	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	4.4
Both from members and governments	39.3	20.0	36.1	24.2	39.3	28.6	44.0	33.0
Total **(N)**	13.8 (28)	12.3 (25)	17.7 (36)	16.3 (33)	13.8 (28)	13.8 (28)	12.3 (25)	100.0 (203)

Cramer's V is 0.250**

In conclusion, confirming the results from the previous Work Package (della Porta and Reiter 2006), our data indicate that notwithstanding their critical position, social movement organizations of the GJM frequently *interact with the institutions of representative democracy*. Our organizations are in fact quite open to interactions with institutions—they are not emphasizing a negative message, but often offer specific advice and cooperation on specific problems. At the same time, however, they tend to be critical of those institutions, and to perceive their own role as actively engaging in citizens' control of institutional politics and implementing channels of discursive accountability.

3.4. Organizational strategies of the groups

In this paragraph we will pay attention to the organizational strategies of our groups, focusing on the main areas of activity of the groups, their main strategies, their repertoire of collective action, their relationship with the Global Justice Movement (participation in its events, campaigns and

networks, and vision of the movement) and their perception of the communicative role of the Internet (to interact with public administrators, media and members).

As far as the main issue of activity is concerned, each group responded to an open question and responses were then recoded into up to five thematic issues. The recoded answers were later aggregated into five different categories: social issues (rights, immigrants, labour, welfare, common goods, social justice, civil liberties, education), international issues (against war, international solidarity, cooperation, fair trade, food sovereignty, world trade, Aids/health), new social movement issues (women's rights, gay/lesbian/ queer's rights, youth problems, environment/ animal/ agriculture), democracy (democracy and alternative knowledge) and religion. As many as two thirds of our groups focus their activity on social issues (table 22). Also international issues are very embedded in the everyday activities of the selected organization. Issues related to the so-called post-materialist values widespread among the "new social movements" (ecologist, feminist etc.) are mentioned by (only) around one third of the groups while the issue of democracy was indicated as the main issue of activity by one fifth of the sample. The issue of religion is chosen only by a very small number of groups. German, Italian and British groups are particularly focused on social issues while international issues are more often mentioned by Italian, British and transnational respondents (more than two thirds). British and transnational groups show also higher percentages on post-materialist issues and on religion while the issue of democracy is particularly relevant for the Spanish and the transnational samples (around 40%).

Table 22 – Main issue of activity of the group per country (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	65.4	84.6	75.7	42.9	71.4	78.6	59.3	67.6
International issues	26.9	57.7	70.3	51.4	60.7	67.9	74.1	58.9
New social movement issues	19.2	23.1	29.7	17.1	32.1	42.9	40.7	29.0
Democracy	19.2	7.7	18.9	37.1	7.1	7.1	44.4	20.8
Religion	0.0	0.0	2.7	0.0	0.0	7.1	3.7	1.9
Total	12.6	12.6	17.9	16.9	13.5	13.5	13.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(28)	(27)	(207)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Groups can employ different strategies to reach their goals: protest, lobbying, constructing concrete alternatives, or promoting political education and trying to raise citizens' awareness. Most of our groups do not limit themselves to a single strategy but try to maximize their possibility of success by employing and mixing different strategies (also depending on the political situation they face). As table 23 shows, almost 90% of the groups value cognitive activities disseminating information, organizing conferences, seminars and workshops, publishing research reports, etc.. Both around three quarters of the groups declare to perform protest activities and to engage in the construction of concrete alternatives. About one half of the groups employ a strategy of lobbying with direct pressure on public decision-makers. Contrary to the assumption that lobbying and protest are opposite strategies used by different actors, we found evidence of use of both by a significant percentage of our groups. This result is consistent with most observations concerning the Seattle protests and similar events: involved organizations feel that a heterogeneous blend of tactics and strategies can multiply the opportunity to reach their objectives. However, organizations from different countries favor different strategies. While lobbying concerns more organizations belonging to the Northern European countries (Britain in particular) and to the transnational level, protest regards especially the ones belonging to Southern European countries (Spain in particular). Finally, almost all German and Swiss groups invest in political education of citizens while most of

the French, Swiss and transnational groups declared to employ a strategy aimed at building concrete alternatives.

Considering the use of multiple strategies, we can note that few groups (less than 10 per cent) focus on a single strategy. More than two thirds of the organizations employ at least three strategies at the same time while one fifth employs only two different strategies. As for cross-national variation, all the strategies are used by more than 2 out of 5 German, British, and transnational groups. The use of three strategies concerns more than 2 out of 5 British, Italian, and Swiss groups.

Table 23 – Main strategies of the groups per country (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Protest	78.6	73.1	81.1	97.1	75.0	75.9	59.3	78.1
Building concrete alternatives	85.7	61.5	64.9	62.9	89.3	79.3	88.9	75.2
Lobbying	42.9	57.7	51.4	37.1	57.1	69.0	70.4	54.3
Political education/raising awareness	78.6	100.0	89.2	82.9	96.4	89.7	92.6	89.5
Number of overlapping strategies								
0-1	10.7	7.7	8.1	5.7	3.6	10.3	7.4	7.6
2	21.4	34.6	21.6	31.4	10.7	6.9	22.2	21.4
3	39.3	15.4	43.2	40.0	50.0	41.4	22.2	36.7
4	28.6	42.3	27.0	22.9	35.7	41.4	48.1	34.3
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is: 0.257** (protest); 0.269** (alternatives); 0.232* (lobbying); n.s. (political education)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

As for the repertoire of action of the selected group, groups very engaged with different forms of action (both conventional and unconventional) are more likely from Southern European countries (table 24). Petitioning and demonstrations are used by most of our surveyed organizations (over 75%). Less widespread instead are more radical and/or unconventional/innovative forms of action like boycotts (especially spread in Italy, Spain and UK), blockades (particularly mentioned for France, Germany and Spain), occupations and civil disobedience (especially spread in France and Spain). The creative and symbolic side of collective action is shared by most groups: almost two thirds of our organizations engage in artistic and cultural performances (especially in Southern European countries and the UK). In some countries the strike is still limited to groups organizing workers while in other countries this form has spread from the trade union sector to the social movement sector. This seems especially the case for Italy and Spain.

Table 24 – Repertoire of action of the groups per country (%)

Forms of action	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Petition	82.1	76.9	67.6	88.6	53.6	72.4	88.9	75.7
Demonstration	92.9	61.5	91.9	85.7	75.0	75.9	66.7	79.5
Strike	21.4	11.5	37.8	45.7	21.4	13.8	7.4	24.3
Boycott of certain products	32.1	11.5	48.6	37.1	17.9	41.4	22.2	31.4
Blockade	35.7	34.6	32.4	40.0	25.0	10.3	11.1	27.6
Occupation of buildings	50.0	11.5	16.2	45.7	10.7	17.2	18.5	24.8
Civil disobedience	71.4	30.8	35.1	57.1	35.7	24.1	29.6	41.0
Artistic/cultural performance	64.3	57.7	67.6	71.4	46.4	65.5	40.7	60.0
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is: 0.270** (petition); 0.275** (demonstration); 0.315*** (strike); 0.269** (boycott); 0.247** (blockade); 0.353** (occupation); 0.319*** (civil disobedience); n.s.. (artistic/cultural performance)

Together with strategies and repertoires of action, we considered the communicative strategies of our organizations. We decided to focus our attention especially on the Internet, to which a specific Work Package (WP2) of the Demos project has been devoted (see della Porta and Mosca 2005). The Internet has been said to empower resource-poor groups such as social movement organizations, but also to be selective (privileging the most educated) and to substitute offline for online participation (see della Porta and Mosca 2006 for a review). To estimate the perception of the impact of the Internet on communicative strategies, we asked an open question on the effect of the Internet in general and of their organizations' website in particular on their communication with different actors and constituencies. We then recoded each answer in up to three categories. Table 25 --distinguishing between negative, positive, and mixed perceptions of the communicative role of the Internet--presents a synthesis of our results. The overall judgment concerning the impact of the Internet on the communication with *public administrators* is negative, with however, above 40% of the groups registering a positive impact. Negative perceptions concern particularly French, Italian and Swiss groups while Spanish and transnational organizations appear as more optimistic. The judgment on the impact on relationship with the *mass media* is significantly different: only one fifth of the groups give a negative evaluation while for more than 70% the Internet improved communication with the mass-media. Negative evaluations are more widespread among French and British groups while groups from other countries appear as more enthusiastic. One eighth of British, Spanish, and transnational groups expressed a mixed judgment. Finally, optimism prevails when respondents are asked about the contribution given by Internet to communication with *members and sympathizers*. Negative evaluations are very few and were recorded only in Southern European countries where about one quarter of the groups showed a mixed position. Positive evaluations are expressed in particular by Northern European and transnational groups.

Table 25 – Evaluation of the role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Negative	70.8	50.0	65.0	33.3	64.3	53.6	22.2	52.9
Both negative and positive	4.2	5.6	5.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	5.6	3.2
Positive	25.0	44.4	30.0	61.9	35.7	46.4	72.2	43.9
Total	15.3	11.5	12.7	13.4	17.8	17.8	11.5	100.0
(N)	(24)	(18)	(20)	(21)	(28)	(28)	(18)	(157)
Internet and mass media								
Negative	42.9	9.1	17.2	8.3	21.4	34.5	16.7	21.6
Both negative and positive	4.8	4.5	6.9	12.5	0.0	10.3	11.1	7.0
Positive	52.4	86.4	75.9	79.2	78.6	55.2	72.2	71.3
Total	12.3	12.9	17.0	14.0	16.4	17.0	10.5	100.0
(N)	(21)	(22)	(29)	(24)	(28)	(29)	(18)	(171)
Internet and members								
Negative	7.7	0.0	6.3	6.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3
Both negative and positive	26.9	13.0	25.0	23.3	0.0	7.7	4.2	15.4
Positive	65.4	87.0	68.8	70.0	100.0	92.3	95.8	81.3
Total	14.3	12.6	17.6	16.5	11.5	14.3	13.2	100.0
(N)	(26)	(23)	(32)	(30)	(21)	(26)	(24)	(182)

Cramer's V is: n.s. (public administrators); n.s. (media); 0.246** (members)

Exploring campaigns can tell us about action strategies and networking of our groups. Each group indicated up to five of the most important campaigns (and their territorial level) promoted or supported during the last three years. We classified the different campaigns according to their issue and territorial level. More than four fifth of the groups (in particular from the British, Italian, and transnational samples) are involved in campaigns concerning international issues (table 26). Social issues are mentioned by around two fifth of the groups (more than half in the Italian, British and Swiss samples). One fifth of the campaigns are specifically focused on national issues (i.e. campaign to reform national legislation on international cooperation, campaigns for a new national law for the associations, alternative proposals for public spending of national budget, campaigns against repression, pro-independence campaign, campaigns against mafia), on the promotion of transnational party federations or on the creation of think thanks. The issue of democracy is raised by almost one fourth of the campaigns, involving especially German and Spanish groups. Around one tenth of the campaigns concern so-called post-materialist values, promoted by "new social movements". This type of campaign is more widespread among French and Swiss groups.

As for the territorial levels of campaigns, consistently with the main issues of these campaigns, three fourth are transnational campaigns, less than two thirds national and just one fifth are local. Here we find interesting crossnational variations: local campaigns are more diffused in Germany, Spain (one third of the groups) and especially in Switzerland (three fourth of the groups). French, Italian and Spanish groups are focusing more on the national level, while the transnational level characterizes mostly French, Italian, British and, obviously, transnational groups.

Table 26 – Characteristics of campaigns per country (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	38.1	11.8	55.6	42.9	53.8	50.0	30.0	42.0
International issues	81.0	70.6	88.9	61.9	69.2	90.9	95.0	81.3
National issues/political parties/think thanks	9.5	17.6	41.7	19.0	30.8	9.1	0.0	20.0
Democracy	4.8	47.1	30.6	47.6	15.4	22.7	0.0	24.7
New social movement issues	23.8	0.0	16.7	9.5	30.8	4.5	10.0	13.3
Territorial levels of campaigns								
Local	9.5	35.3	13.9	33.3	76.9	4.5	0.0	20.7
National	81.0	41.2	80.6	71.4	53.8	54.5	0.0	58.0
Transnational	81.0	70.6	88.9	38.1	46.2	81.8	100.0	75.3
Total	14.0	11.3	24.0	14.0	8.7	14.7	13.3	100.0
(N)	(21)	(17)	(36)	(21)	(13)	(22)	(20)	(150)

Concluding, our analysis again confirms the plurality of issues covered by the movement and the plurality of repertoires used by most groups. As also our results on the organizational discourses had indicated (della Porta and Reiter 2006), in trying to influence institutional decisions, social movement organizations use a variety of strategies. A multiple repertoire confirms the pluralistic nature of the movement, with a (somewhat pragmatic) orientation towards the use of multiple tactics.

3.5. Relationships with the movement

Our research project concerns especially the Global Justice Movement and its national declinations and constellations in Europe. In this paragraph we will focus on the relationship between the selected organizations and the GJM.

First of all, we tried to map the participation of our group in a series of events organized by the GJM (table 27). This information indicates the degree and type of involvement of the selected organizations in the dynamics of collective action. More than 75% of the groups participated in a transnational event like a World Social Forum or/and a European Social Forum. A similar share took part in Global Days of Action (i.e. against war) and more than 70% in counter-summits to meetings of International Governmental Institutions. Less then two thirds of the groups participated instead in national or local social forums.

Regarding national specificities, the groups in the French and Italian samples appear to be the most engaged in the GJM events we listed. This is probably due to the organization of important movement events in those countries during the last decade (especially counter G8 summits and European Social Forums). National and local social forums have been important events also for German (national social forum of Erfurt), Swiss and transnational groups, while the 3rd European Social Forum (2004) in London has been particularly important for the British groups. Global days of action against war figured prominently for the Spanish groups. Engagement in the GJMs increases in all samples except the British, the German and the Swiss ones when moving from local to national and transnational activities.

Table 27 – Participation in movement events per country (%)

Participation in movement's events	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
World/European social forums	96.4	73.1	94.6	54.3	67.9	79.3	85.2	78.6
National/local social forums	82.1	73.1	54.1	48.6	71.4	17.2	63.0	57.6
Counter-summits	85.7	46.2	91.9	74.3	60.7	65.5	66.7	71.4
Global days of action	89.3	73.1	89.2	82.9	75.0	58.6	66.7	77.1
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is: 0.354*** (WSF/ESF); 0. 394*** (NSF/LSF); 0.317*** (counter-summits); 0.255** (GDA)

We also asked our respondents to indicate the five organizations, campaigns and networks dealing with global justice issues with which their groups interacted most intensively. Table 28 presents the issue and the territorial level of these groups/campaigns/networks (more in-depth information will be provided in the country reports). More than two fifth of them concern international issues (even more present for the Swiss and transnational groups), around half social issues (even more for France and UK) while between 10 and 20 percent concerns national issues, democracy or new social movement issues. National issues are raised especially by German and Italian campaigns/networks, the issue of democracy is addressed mainly by Spanish groups, while the focus on new social movement issues concerns especially British and transnational campaigns/networks. As for the territorial level, most are active transnationally (almost 85% --especially French and transnational organizations) and nationally (almost 70%--especially German, French and British groups) but very few locally (4% --especially Spanish, Swiss and British groups).

Table 28 – Issues of networks/campaigns of the movement per country (%)

Issues of networks/campaigns	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	66.7	45.5	56.7	38.5	36.8	81.5	33.3	53.3
International issues	70.4	81.8	76.7	88.5	94.7	85.2	100.0	84.0
National issues/political parties/think thanks	14.8	22.7	20.0	3.8	0.0	3.7	5.6	10.7
Democracy	7.4	4.5	10.0	34.6	5.3	7.4	5.6	11.2
New social movement issues	18.5	13.6	3.3	19.2	10.5	22.2	33.3	16.6
Total	16.0	13.0	17.8	15.4	11.2	16.0	10.7	100.0
(N)	(27)	(22)	(30)	(26)	(19)	(27)	(18)	(169)
Territorial levels of networks/campaigns								
Local	3.7	0.0	0.0	7.7	10.5	7.4	0,0	4.1
National	88.9	100.0	56.7	53.8	68.4	96.3	0,0	69.0
Transnational	96.3	70.8	86.7	88.5	89.5	66.7	100.0	84.4
Total	15.8	14.0	17.5	15.2	11.1	15.8	10.5	100.0
(N)	(27)	(24)	(30)	(26)	(19)	(27)	(18)	(171)

We also asked our respondents how close their group felt to the Global Justice Movement (see table 29). While almost 80% answers affirmatively, almost one tenth declare to feel part of the movement but with some reservation. Very few groups (less than 10%) don't perceive themselves

as being part of the movement or don't have a shared view on the question. This information helps to define more clearly the borders and the geography of the movement in different European countries (with reference, e.g., to the role of the NGOs, the relationship with anarchist and antagonist groups generally critical toward the social forum process, etc.). French and German groups have a more critical stance towards the movement: around 15% feels part of the movement but express reservations while around one fifth declare not to be part of it. In all other countries (and at the transnational level) a full involvement in the movement is dominant, with in a few cases (about one tenth) a conditioned involvement, and (except in Italy) no cases of non-involvement.

Table 29 – Sense of belonging to the movement per country (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Country (% of Yes)**							**Tot.**
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
No	17.9	23.1	13.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.6
The group doesn't have a shared view	14.3	0.0	2.7	2.9	3.6	0.0	0.0	3.3
Yes, but with reservations	14.3	15.4	5.4	11.4	0.0	10.3	11.1	9.5
Yes	53.6	61.5	78.4	85.7	96.4	89.7	88.9	79.5
Total	13.3	12.4	17.6	16.7	13.3	13.8	12.9	100.0
(N)	(28)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(28)	(29)	(27)	(210)

Cramer's V is 0.270***

We also wanted to grasp the opinion of our groups on the main aims of the Global Justice Movement. As table 30 shows, the main aims of the movement are perceived to be social by two thirds of the groups, international by more than one third. More than half of our groups points at new social movement issues and around one fourth underline the issue of democracy. The picture is more nuanced if we consider crossnational variation: international aims are raised (unsurprisingly) especially by transnational groups while national groups (with the exception of the Swiss ones) point at social aims; Swiss and Spanish groups focus more on new social movement issues while democracy (together with free access to information) is seen as being at the core of the movement by a significant number of British, French, and Italian groups.

We recoded claims raised by our groups distinguishing between general statements and specific proposals and between negative/contra-claims and positive/pro-claims. This also helps to have more information on the character of national movements. Our groups underline especially the *pars construens* of the movement, with 85% (especially British and transnational groups) advancing positive claims while almost 40% (especially French and Spanish groups) mentioning negative claims. As for the type of statement, most groups (around 80% --especially Swiss and transnational groups) advance general statements (i.e. equality for all, society transformation) while one third (especially Spanish and transnational groups) raise specific issues and/or policy proposals (i.e. climate change, peace, Kyoto agreement, corporate accountability law, etc.).

Table 30 – Perception of the movement per country (%)

Main aims of the movement	Country (% of Yes)							Tot.
	F	*G*	*I*	*SP*	*SW*	*UK*	*TN*	
Social issues	77.3	71.4	88.2	58.6	22.2	68.0	83.3	67.0
International issues	27.3	33.3	32.4	37.9	29.6	36.0	70.8	37.9
New social movement issues	50.0	47.6	52.9	65.5	88.9	24.0	54.2	55.5
Democracy / free access to information	45.5	9.5	38.2	27.6	3.7	40.0	29.2	28.0
Total	12.1	11.5	18.7	15.9	14.8	13.7	13.2	100.0
(N)	(22)	(21)	(34)	(29)	(27)	(25)	(24)	(182)
Type of claim								
Negative/contra claim	78.3	45.0	44.1	51.7	44.4	15.4	16.7	42.1
Positive/pro claim	82.6	85.0	85.3	89.7	66.7	96.2	95.8	85.8
Total	12.6	10.9	18.6	15.8	14.8	14.2	13.1	100.0
(N)	(23)	(20)	(34)	(29)	(27)	(26)	(24)	(183)
Type of statement								
General statement	77.8	57.7	83.8	74.3	100.0	69.0	100.0	80.0
Specific proposal	37.0	34.6	27.0	45.7	14.8	17.2	50.0	32.2
Total	13.2	12.7	18.0	17.1	13.2	14.1	11.7	100.0
(N)	(27)	(26)	(37)	(35)	(27)	(29)	(24)	(205)

Concluding, our data indicate a high level of identification with the Global Justice Movement also by organizations that pre-date its emergence (we did not find a significant correlation between the year of foundation and sense of belonging to the movement). Our data also point at the importance of networking (especially at the transnational levels) for our groups, that express high levels of participation in campaigns, forums and global days of actions, as well as in transnational umbrella organizations.

4. How to explain models of internal democracy? Some findings

In this paragraph we will evaluate the influence of different sets of variables on internal democratic practices. Concerning the dependent variable, we will consider most of the variables presented in paragraph 3.1: main decision-making body, decision-making method of the assembly, presence of an executive committee, decision-making method and source of legitimation of the executive and, finally, the model of internal decision-making.[5]

We will test different hypotheses concerning competing explanations of internal democratic practices, using five sets of independent variables: organizational structure, relationship with the institutions, organizational strategies, relationship with the movement, contextual characteristics (see figure 2).

4.1. Organizational characteristics and internal democratic practices

The first set of hypotheses tests the importance of organizational characteristics for the internal democratic practices. We will consider in particular the size of the organization (number of individual and collective members), its budget, the presence of paid staff (one of the possible indicators of professionalization), and its capacity to mobilize volunteers.

[5] Ordinal variable varying from lower levels to higher levels of deliberation and participation.

Organizational structures are important elements of social movements. As Bert Klandermans noted (1989, 7): "Social movements are organized. Clearly the organizational forms they adopt very often, although not always, differ from the bureaucratic, formal structures we are used to thinking of as an organization". More in general, "Formal structure is a blueprint for activities" (Meyer and Rowan 1983, 23). In social movement organizations resources vary in scale and type (Rucht 1989, 73). "Organizational capacity refers to the organization's financial and human resources as well as the administrative knowledge and capabilities to implement procedures and programs relevant to movement-related goals" (Zald, Morrill and Ro 2005, 265). The organizational decision-making model and conceptions of democracy in fact have been linked to some organizational characteristics. Availability of resources has been linked to formalized models and, conversely, bureaucratization and centralization are said to generate revenues (Knoke 1989, 136). On the other hand, informal SMOs based upon face-to-face interaction of people that know each other personally tend to rely upon direct democracy through reasoned debates followed by collective choices (Rosenthal and Schwartz 1989, 45 ff.).

As table 31 shows, organizational characteristics are very useful in explaining internal democratic practices. Large numbers of individual and collective members are correlated with hierarchical organizations where an executive committee is present as the main decision-making body employing non consensual decision-making methods. Most important, the larger the number of members the lower are possibilities for participative and deliberative democratic models. The same pattern emerges in connection with the budget and the presence of paid staff (indicator of professionalization). Wealthier and more professionalized organizations are much less oriented towards participative and deliberative democratic models. Better said, large budgets and paid staff require delegation of power within the organization and the adoption of majoritarian rules in the decision-making process. The number of volunteers does not mitigate these tendencies: also their presence is inversely related with internal models that encourage participation and deliberation.

Table 31 – Role of the organization (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE *Organizational Structure*	DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES			
	Main decision-making body (0=executive)	Decision-making method of the main body (0=majority)	Presence of an executive committee (0=no)	Democratic Model
Type of member	n.s.	n.s.	-0.154*	n.s.
Number of individual members	-0.372**	-0.367**	0.454**	-0.449**
Number of collective members	n.s.	-0.268*	0.291**	-0.316**
Budget	-0.277**	-0.278**	0.440**	-0.312**
Presence of paid staff (dummy)	-0.347**	-0.296**	0.568**	-0.396**
Number of volunteers	-0.197**	-0.320**	0.259**	-0.334**
Total (N)	73-204	66-189	73-204	63-179

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant

Summarizing, the hypotheses concerning the impact of organizational variables on internal organizational functioning tend to be confirmed by our data.

4.2. Internal and external democracy

A second set of variables tests hypotheses concerning the impact of relationships with institutions on the internal democratic functioning of an organization. As Zald and McCarthy observed (1987,

45): “Social movements are not created outside of the traditions and institutional bases of the larger society in which they are nested. Instead, the cadre and networks of adherents and activists grow out of, build upon, and use the repertoires of action, the institutional forms and physical facilities of the larger society”. According to neoinstitutional theory, growing similarity in organizational forms derives from institutional isomorphism linked to either coercion (political influence), imitation, or professionalization (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 67). Organizational structures can be imposed, authorized, induced, acquired, imprinted, incorporated or bypassed (Scott 1991, 170). Dependence from state agencies would increase pressure to isomorphism (ibid., 74); more specifically, “The greater the extent to which the organizations in a field transact with agencies of the state, the greater the extent of isomorphism in the field as a whole” (ibid., 76). The conditions governing access to public and private funding, tax exemption or advantageous postage rates influence the organizational structure of groups who wish to benefit from these possibilities.[6] The establishment of a working relation with the authorities, however, also has ambivalent implications for the development of the SMO: “On the one hand, public recognition, access to decision-making procedures and public subsidies may provide crucial resources and represent important successes for the SMO; on the other hand, the integration into the established system of interest intermediation may impose limits on the mobilisation capacity of the SMO and alienate important parts of its constituency, with the consequence of weakening it in the long run” (Kriesi 1996, 155-6).

Some of the mentioned variables proved in fact useful in explaining internal democratic practices of our groups (table 32). While collaboration with local institutions is not significantly correlated with our set of dependent variables, collaborating with international and national institutions is associated with hierarchical organizations (where the executive is the main decision-making body) and with majoritarian rules of decision-making. In both cases the collaboration with institutions characterizes organizations with a democratic model based on principles of high delegation and low deliberation. The perception of experiments of public decision-making is not related with internal democratic practices, while the variable concerning evaluation of such experiments provides more interesting results. In fact, less hierarchical organizations tend to have more negative views on this type of experiments, while the presence of an executive committee is associated with positive judgments. Consistently with this result, the more the internal democratic model is based on principles of participation and deliberation, the more critical is the evaluation of experiments in participatory public decision-making. This result can be explained by the fact that the associational democratic conception fits better within democratic experiments promoted by the institutions that often require some elements of internal delegation and formal representativity. More innovative democratic conceptions tend instead to fuel mistrust in this kind of experiments that are generally considered as ineffective and instrumental. Although the participatory budgeting, imported from Porto Alegre, has been usually perceived with more sympathies, it just started to develop in Europe, and few of our organizations have participated in it. Unsurprisingly, receiving funds from governmental sources is associated with the presence of an executive committee and with internal democratic models characterized by low deliberation and high delegation.

[6] See the concepts of ‘funded’ SMOs in McCarthy and Zald 1987a, 358ff. or ‘registered’ SMOs in McCarthy, Britt and Wolfson 1991, 68.

Table 32 – Role of relationship with institutions (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE *Relationships with institutions*	DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES			
	Main decision-making body	Decision-Making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic model
Collaboration with international institutions (dummy)	-0.381**	-0.213**	0.394**	-0.345**
Collaboration with national institutions (dummy)	-0.370**	-0.262**	0.415**	-0.371**
Collaboration with local institutions (dummy)	-0.264**	n.s.	0.229**	-0.162*
Perception of public decision-making (dummy)	-0.195*	n.s.	0.251**	-0.182*
Evaluation of public decision-making	-0.370**	n.s.	0.232**	-0.310**
Governative fundings (dummy)	n.s.	n.s.	0.204**	n.s.
Total (N)	115-203	105-187	114-202	106-179

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant

Summarizing, the hypothesis concerning the impact of receiving governmental funds on internal organizational functioning seems to be confirmed by our data.

4.3. Repertoires of action and organizational repertoires

A third set of variables tests hypotheses concerning the impact of organizational strategies on the internal democratic functioning of an organization.

Social movement studies have addressed the issue of the relationship between organizational models and organizational values, but with not very conclusive results. In principle, the choice of an organizational model is—as mentioned—an important piece of a group identity. As noted above, new social movement approaches stressed the non-strategic function of social movement organization: its orientation to identity building and solidarity-expressive behavior (Cohen 1985; Melucci 1985). In the words of Alberto Melucci (1984, 830) "The new organizational form of contemporary social movements is not just 'instrumental' for their goals. It is a goal in itself". It has therefore been stressed that "Studies of SMOs … require an approach which is cognizant of the value component attached to social organizations by the participants" (Brown 1989, 238). Within social movement organizations, judgments on organizational strategies are made not so much on their efficiency or efficacy, but more on their symbolic appropriateness. According to Bert Klandermans (1989b, 219) "In many SMOs, democratic, egalitarian values have generated such arrangements as rotating, distributed, and multiple leadership… Rotating, distributed and multiple leadership are arrangements deliberately designed to prevent SMOs from becoming bureaucratic organizations". In situations of value rationality, moral authority is recognized only to "decisions which appear to carry the consensus of the group behind them" (Rothschild-Witt 1982, 26). In fact, decision-making power apparently lies at the top of the organization, but its effectiveness depends upon degree of compliance by rank and file members (Hartley 1989).

Organizational goals are therefore expected to influence organizational strategies: instrumental and inclusive organizations (that is, organizations that allow for multi-membership) are said to promote formal structures; expressive and exclusive ones are said to be more oriented towards informal small-group structures (Curtis and Zurcher 1974). Also, organizations that pursue policy change are more centralized and bureaucratized than those aiming at societal change (Knoke 1989). Expressive movements are decentralized; those aiming at institutional change more centralized (Rucht 1984). SMOs that are exclusive and/or oriented to individual changes are said to be less susceptible to pressure for organizational maintenance (Zald and Ash 1987, 127). In the environmental movement, different environmentalist frames are related with different organizational forms (Brulle 1996; 2000). Non-profit organizations are more likely to be informal,

at least in comparison with for-profit firms (Gaffney 1984) or, even if formal, relatively free from state surveillance and control (McCarthy *et al.* 1991). Organizational formats vary for advocacy, service and protest oriented groups (Minkoff 1995, see also McCarthy 2005). A main cleavage has been set between organizations oriented to mobilizing funds and those mobilizing people: "The problem of mobilizing money is very different from the problem of mobilizing action, and there are inherent organizational tensions created by trying to do both" (Oliver and Furman 1989, 156). "The basic alternative is therefore between the mobilization of "time" (activism) or "money" (Oliver and Marwell, 1992). The two aims are often in reciprocal tension as they require different "mobilization technologies" and, therefore, different organizational models (Oliver and Marwell 1992; Schwartz and Paul 1992; see della Porta and Diani 2006 for a summary). Emotional messages which provide a clear-cut definition of a movement's identity and opponents are essential to mobilizing core activists (Gamson, 1992), but radicalism may alienate sectors of sympathizers and prospective supporters with less clear-cut orientations and motivations (Friedman and McAdam 1992) and also sympathies within institutions.[7] If these studies stressed the impact of instrumental versus symbolic organizational conceptions, other research indicated that "There are no uniform or definite correlations between particular issues and structures" (Rucht 1989, 73, on ecologist organizations).

In our cases, only some of these dimensions help explaining internal democratic models (see table 33). Confirming the relevance of the action repertoire, the use of lobbying as a strategy is strongly correlated with the set of variables concerning the organizational structure (number of individual and collective members, budget, presence of paid staff, and number of volunteers): richer, bigger (in terms of members and volunteers) and more professionalized organizations are more likely to adopt a strategy of direct pressure on public decision-makers. The use of lobbying is also associated with a central role of the executive, the use of non consensual decision-making methods, and therefore with democratic models based on high delegation and low deliberation. Radical forms of action such as occupation of buildings and civil disobedience present an opposite trend, being correlated with a central role of the assembly, absence of an executive committee and participative and deliberative democratic models.

As for communicative strategies, the expansion of both printed and electronic means of communication has permitted the 'externalization' of certain costs (Tarrow 1994, 143-5). If highly structured organizations were previously required to get a message across, today even lightweight ones can gain media attention. Websites spread information, mobilize activists, and increase identification (Rosenkrands 2004, 72-3; della Porta and Mosca 2006). In some cases, Computer-Mediated Communication simply expands the capacity to act of already solid organizations such as Greenpeace or Oxfam; in other cases, however, it brings together networks of activists with very informal organizational structures, if any. New technologies have increased the capacity for coordinated action; their effects of "deverticalization" have been noticed not only on social movement organizations, but also on corporations (Davies and Zald 2005). In social movements, it allowed for "rapid, synchronous, decentralized movement activities" (ibid., 343). Our data, however, while confirming that Internet is considered as an important instrument of communication with generally positive results on the internal functioning of the organizations do not show any impact of the perceptions on the use of Internet on the organizational model. It seems therefore that organizations adopting different internal democratic models use and assess Internet according to different communicative strategies (see della Porta and Mosca 2006).

[7] Instrumental versus affective motivations also play a role in individual exit; as noted by van der Veen and Klandermans (1989, 195), "depending on the characteristics displayed by a social movement, 'exit' behavior is explicable in terms of either cost/benefit theory or commitment theory".

Table 33 – Role of organizational strategies (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE *Organizational Strategies*	DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES			
	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic Model
Protest	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Building alternatives	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Lobbying	-0.229**	-0.165*	0.268**	-0.187**
Political education	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Overlapping strategies	-0.134*	-0.147*	0.209**	-0.137*
Petition	n.s.	n.s.	0.176*	n.s.
Demonstration	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Strike	n.s.	-0.158*	n.s.	n.s.
Boycott	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Blockade	0.154*	n.s.	-0.163*	0.189*
Occupation of buildings	0.250**	n.s.	-0.224**	0.290**
Civil disobedience	0.201**	n.s.	n.s.	0.222**
Artistic/cultural performance	0.166*	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Internet's impact on public administrators	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Internet's impact on media	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Internet's impact on members	-0.257**	n.s.	0.153*	-0.155*
Total (N)	116-202 157-209	150-210 144-193	142-193 156-209	134-181 139-184

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant

While the use of some action repertoires seems to constrain the choices concerning the organizational model, according to our data the issues on which a group focuses has no relevant effect on the way in which the group is organized. This seems to confirm the transissue character of our groups, as well as the weak effects of previous thematic distinctions of social movements (environmental versus labour, or national versus international) in accounting for the organizational models adopted.

4.4. Networking and internal democracy

A fourth set of variables tests the hypotheses concerning the impact of relationships with the movement on the internal democratic functioning of an organization.

Interactions within the social movement sector have been considered as very important for social movement dynamics. An organizational environment has been defined as a "population", i.e. groups of organizations viewed as similar, or an "interorganizational (or multiorganizational) field", i.e. based upon actual relations, or sectors (Scott and Meyer 1983, 130-131). Interorganizational environments can be of various types and quality: they range from instrumental exchanges to shared identities (see also Diani and Bison 2004) and from occasional to stable, in certain cases leading to the foundation of new organizations (Diani 1995a; Zald and McCarthy 1980, 10ff). The degree of internal competition versus cooperation also varies (della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 5; Staggenborg 1986). Networking tends to intensify in periods of mobilization. Networking has been said to intensify in recent period: "The most dramatic change in the TSMOs [transnational SMOs] population over the past three decades is that these groups are adopting the more decentralized and

informal coalition form" (Smith 2005, 235). Moreover, there is an increase in multiissue TSMOs (from 7% in 1973 to 17% in 2000) and in those active on global justice/environmental issues (from 4 to 11%) (ibid., 233). A high tendency to cooperate, which we observed for our population, might be related with the diffusion of inclusive values. Research in social movements has indeed stressed that inclusive organizations (with low requests to their members) are more likely to participate in coalitions, and competition for resources among them tends to be less intense (Zald and Ash 1987, 133; Zald and McCarthy 1987b, 165). From a micro perspective, "The more SMOs have overlapping constituencies, the more they should be constrained towards cooperation" (Zald and McCarthy 1987b, 174). Variety can increase mobilization capacity: especially when the potential basis of support is heterogeneous, "a protest campaign … is best served when several competitive but cooperative SMOs are permitted to play different roles and are encouraged to pursue different strategic possibilities" (Mushaben 1989, 296). However, the differences in the organizational models adopted might impact on coalition building (Warren 2001) and federation forms (such as those of "franchising") have the problem of "insuring the integrity and uniformity of the organizational product" (McCarthy 2005, 221).

According to our data (see table 34), participation in the social forum process (especially at the transnational level) is associated with a central role of the executive, majoritarian types of decision-making and less participative and deliberative democratic models. We can hypothesize that bigger and wealthier organizations have more opportunities (and resources) to travel and to participate in this type of transnational events. The lack of significant correlation coefficients concerning participation in other types of movement events and in movement campaigns/networks, seems to indicate the spread of networking as a general value independently from the organizational model adopted. The sense of belonging to the movement is associated with consensual types of decision-making and with participative and deliberative democratic models: the more one organization feels part of the movement, the more its internal democratic functioning is oriented toward consensus. While therefore the organizations that participate more often in social forums (at least at the transnational level) are more oriented towards traditional democratic models, the groups identifying more strongly with the movement are more oriented towards innovative consensus-based democratic models.

Table 34 – Role of relationship with the movement (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE *Relationship with the movement*	DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES			
	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic model
Participation in WSF/ESF	-0.223**	-0.180*	0.282**	-0.221**
Participation in NSF/LSF	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Participation in counter-summits	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Participation in GDA	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.
Sense of belonging	n.s.	0.192**	n.s.	0.146*
Total (N)	202-209	186-193	202-209	177-184

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant

Summarizing, the participation in social forums (at least at the transnational level) tends to increase for more formal organizations while the sense of belonging to the movement is stronger in organizations that privilege participation and consensual methods. All organizations, no matter their internal democratic style, equally mobilize in national and local social forum, countersummits, and global days of action.

4.5. Path dependency, institutional isomorphism and democratic model

A fifth set of variables was used to test hypotheses concerning the impact of environmental characteristics on the internal democratic functioning of an organization. In particular, we considered the national characteristics of the Global Justice Movement in the different countries[8] and the founding period of the selected organizations.

The environment in which an organization develops is considered as particularly relevant for its organizational choices. Organizational decision-making is in general influenced by the degree of scarcity of some resources in the organizational environment as well as the information flows from the external environment (Knoke 1989). There is however also an issue of organizational legitimacy, linked to the resonance of some organizational model in a cultural environment (Scott 1991, 170): "Organizations that incorporate societally legitimized rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capabilities" (Meyer and Rowan 1983, 34). In an environment characterized by high support for bureaucratic models (or "rational myths") formal organizations will be privileged (ibid., 42).[9] Looking at isomorphism between SMOs and national political opportunities, it has been observed that the openness of institutional structures may favor the development of formal organizations (Rucht 1994). As for territorial assets, "The extent to which a political system is centralized or decentralized shapes social movements by presenting different targets for social movement activities" (Ash and Zald 1987, 309). However, it was also observed that we cannot generalize the argument that an open institutional system, offering resources to citizens' organizations, results necessarily in formal organizations positively integrated within the system: First of all, "often, formal, hierarchical structures have been established to better fight a hostile state apparatus. … Conversely, an open, decentralized political system may also facilitate similar trends towards decentralization and informality among movement organizations" (della Porta and Diani 2006, 153; see also Rucht 1996). Rather than assuming a rigid relationship between the form that social movement activists give to their organizations, and the characteristics of the institutional system in which they operate, it has been recognized that multiple organizational forms may be accommodated within the same system. This underlines the margins of choice that social movement actors have when trying to adapt creatively to their environment, instead of being determined by it, even if these margins are constrained by historically-specific repertoires of forms of organization (Clemens 1996). In any given country and at any given time, that repertoire is restricted; although it can be expanded by borrowing ideas from other countries or domains, such transformations are slow. The adoption of a particular organizational model becomes more likely "to the extent that the proposed model of organization is believed to work, involves practices and organizational relations that are already familiar, and is consonant with the organization of the rest of those individuals' social worlds" (Clemens 1996, 211).

In this sense, the observed evolution towards a more inclusive network format resonates with a general shift. Since the 1990s, in fact, not only in social movements, bureaucratic models have been contrasted with emerging network models: "In contrast to classic formal organizations, which are

[8] For the statistical analysis, we used a dummy variable attributing value 0 to Germany, UK and Switzerland and value 1 to France, Italy and Spain. This was because the findings from previous workpackages pointed at the existence of two different constellation of GJMs in our countries. The 30 cases concerning the transnational level were excluded.

[9] In neoinstitutional approaches, isomorphism is understood as deriving from either technologic selection or shared social reality (Meyer and Rowan 1983). Myths are "generated by particular organizational practices and diffused through relational networks" (ibid., 29). For instance, "In modern society an important category of the rules and belief system as well as relational networks that arise are sets of 'rational myths'… these beliefs are myths in the sense that they depend for their efficacy, for their reality, on the fact that they are widely shared, or are promulgated by individuals or groups that have been granted the right to determine such matters" (Scott 1983, 14). The rational myth comprises assumptions about a definable purpose, means-ends relationship, resources in the environment, and organizational control (Meyer 1983, 267).

based on the vertical integration of multiple units, the 'network organization' model in organization theory points at another way of coordinating activities, based on the independence of the single components, horizontal integration, flexibility in goals and strategies, multiple levels of interaction with the possibility of communitarian elements" (della Porta and Diani 2006, 159; on network structures see also Powell 1990; Podolny and Page 1998; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Castells 1996, Diani 2003). In parallel, in organizational sociology a shift has been noticed from a vision of organizations as centralized and hierarchical to a vision of them as embedded in non-hierarchical networks of relationship (Clemens 2005, 355).

This change might be reflected in the democratic values of our organizations according to their "generation" (measured by the year of foundation). In social movement analysis the effect of time on organizations has been addressed first of all in terms of life cycle. Herbert Blumer (1951, 203), for example, distinguished four stages in the typical social movement lifecycle. The first, or 'social ferment', stage is characterized by unorganized, unfocused agitation during which great attention is paid to the propaganda of 'agitators'. In the second phase, of 'popular excitement', the underlying causes of discontent and the objectives of action are more clearly defined. In the third 'formalization' phase, disciplined participation and coordination of strategies for achieving the movement's aims are obtained by creating a formal organization. Finally, in the 'institutionalization' stage the movement becomes an organic part of society and crystallizes into a professional structure. Alternatively, it was suggested that "organizations are shaped by logics that shift over time" (Lounsbury 2005, 74). Changes in organizational models are related to "critical junctures—that is, major shocks and crises that disrupt the status quo and trigger fundamental changes" (Campbell 2005, 60).

Concerning the context variable, as we already noticed in other parts of this research project (see in particular della Porta and Reiter 2005), in the selected countries the format and density of organizational networks tend to vary generating two different constellations of social movements that correspond with Northern and Southern Europe (della Porta 2007). Social movement networks have different formats (more integrated in the French, Italian and Spanish case; more polarized in the German, Swiss and, to a lesser extent, in the British case); different organizational structures (more horizontal in the first group, more vertical in the second one) and a different attitude toward non conventional collective action (more oriented towards protest in the first group, more oriented towards lobbying in the second one).

As for the organizational "generation", the age of the selected organizations was recoded attributing the groups to different generations of social movements (see also della Porta and Reiter 2006, 65). As we have observed in paragraph 3.2, many groups already existed before the emergence of the movement, having been founded during previous waves of protest and on different concerns: some are labour movement organizations or charities born a long time ago, others were founded in the wave of the '68 movement/s; still others emerged with the "new" social movement of the last two decades. As with previous waves of mobilization, however, also the one which started at the turn of the millennium produced new organizations.

As table 35 illustrates, groups belonging to Southern European movements are more likely to attribute a central role to the assembly and to adopt a deliberative participative model of democratic functioning. However, correlation coefficients are very low even if significant. As for the age of the organizations, our data seem to confirm a mechanism of path dependency: the "younger" organizations are more likely to recognize a central role to the assembly, to employ consensus-based methods, to avoid the presence of an executive committee, and to adopt democratic models based on participation and deliberation.

Table 35 – Role of environmental characteristics (Kendall's Tau B)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE *Environmental characteristics*	DEPENDENT VARIABLE – INTERNAL DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES			
	Main decision-making body	Decision-making method of the main body	Presence of an executive committee	Democratic model
National constellation of movements	0.198*	n.s.	n.s.	0.167*
Generation	0.234**	0.395**	-0.427**	0.285**
Total (N)	172-182	160-170	171-182	154-165

Legenda - level of significance: ** = 0.01 (2-tailed); * = 0.05 (2-tailed); n.s. = non significant

Summarizing, the hypotheses concerning the impact of environmental characteristics on internal organizational functioning seem to be confirmed by our data for the age of our organizations. Going beyond a quantitative analysis, the next chapters will continue the discussion of the impact of transnationalization processes but also of the national contexts on the GJM.

References

Blumer, Herbert. 1951. "Social Movements." Pp. 199-220 in Principles of Sociology, edited by A. M. Lee. New York: Barnes & Nobles.

Brown, M. Helen. 1989. "Organizing Activity in the Women's Movement: An Example of Distributed Leadership." Pp. 225-40 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.

Brulle, Robert J. 1996. "Environmental Discourse and Social Movement Organizations: A Historical and Rhetorical Perspective on the Development of U.S. Environmental Organizations." Sociological Inquiry 66:58-83.

—. 2000. Agency, Democracy, and Nature. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Campbell, John L. 2005. "Where do we stand? Common Mechanisms in Organizations and Social Movements Research." Pp. 41-68 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge University Press, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Castells, Manuel. 1996. The Information Age. The Rise of the Network Society, vol. 1. Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Clemens, Elisabeth S. 1996. "Organizational Form as Frame: Collective Identity and Political Strategy in the American Labor Movement." Pp. 205-26 in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge [England], New York: Cambridge University Press.

—. 2005. "Two Kinds of Stuff: The current Encounter of Social Movements and Organizations." Pp. 351-65 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Clemens, Elisabeth S. and Debra C. Minkoff. 2004. "Beyond the Iron Law: Rethinking the Place of Organizations in Social Movement Research." Pp. 155-70 in The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, edited by D. A. Snow, S. A. Soule, and H. Kriesi. Malden, MA, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Cohen, Jean L. 1985. "Strategy or Identity: New Theoretical Paradigms and Contemporary Social Movements." Social Research 52:663-716.

Curtis, Russell L. and Louis A. Zurcher. 1974. "Social Movements: An Analytical Exploration of Organizational Forms." Social Problems 11:356-70.

Davis, Gerald F. and Mayer N. Zald. 2005. "Social Change, Social Theory, and the Convergence of Movements and Organizations." Pp. 335-50 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Della Porta, Donatella. 2007. *The Global Justice Movement: An introduction*. In Donatella della Porta (ed.), The Global Justice Movement: A Cross-national and Transnational Perspective. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers, forthcoming.

Della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani. 1999. Social Movements. An introduction. Oxford, Malden, MA: Blackwell.

—. 2006. Social Movements. An introduction. 2nd ed.. Malden, MA, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Della Porta, Donatella and Herbert Reiter (eds.). 2005. *The Global Justice Movement/s in Europe*. Demos project WP1 report.

Diani, Mario. 1995. Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

—. 2003. "Networks and Social Movements: A research program." Pp. 299-318 in Social Movements and Networks, edited by M. Diani and D. McAdam. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.

Diani, Mario and Ivano Bison. 2004. "Organization, Coalitions, and Movements." Theory and Society 33:281-309.
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1991. "Introduction." Pp. 1-38 in The New
Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1991. "The Iron cage Revisted: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality." Pp. 63-82 in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
Donati, Paolo R. 1984. "Organization between Movement and Institution." Social Science Information 23:837-859.
Edwards, Bob and Michael Foley. 2003. "Social Movement Organizations beyond the Beltway: Understanding the Diversity of One Social Movement Industry." Mobilization 8:85-105.
Eliasoph, Nina. 1998. Avoiding Politics: How Americans Produce Apathy in Everyday Life. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Evans, Sara M. and Harry Chatten Boyte. 1992. "Free spaces : the sources of democratic change in America : with a new introduction." University of Chicago Press.
Friedman, Debra and Doug McAdam. 1992. "Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices, and the Life of a Social Movement." Pp. 156-73 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Gaffney, Edward M. 1984. Ascending Liability in Religious and Other Nonprofit Organizations. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press.
Gamson, William A. 1990. The Strategy of Social Protest. Belmont , CA: Wadsworth.
—. 1992. "The Social Psychology of Collective Action." Pp. 53-76 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Garner, Roberta Ash and Mayer N. Zald. 1987. "The Political Economy of Social Movement Sectors." Pp. 293-317 in Social Movements in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ, Oxford: Transaction Books.
Gerlach, Luther. 1971. "Movements of Revolutionary Change. Some Structural Characteristics." American Behavioral Scientist 14:812-36.
—. 2001. "The Structure of Social Movements: Environmental Activism and Its Opponents." Pp. 289-309 in Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy, edited by J. Arquila and D. Ronfeldt. Santa Monica: Rand.
Gulati, Ranjay and Martin Gargiulo. 1999. "Where do Interorganizational Networks Come From?" American Journal of Sociology 104:1439-93.
Hartley, Jean. 1989. "Leadership and Decision Making in a Strike Organization." Pp. 241-65 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.
Klandermans, Bert. 1989. "Introduction: Social Movement Organizations and the Study of Social Movements." Pp. 1-17 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.
—. 1989. "Introduction." Pp. 215-24 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.
Knoke, David. 1989. "Resource Acquisition and Allocation in U.S. National Associations." Pp. 129-54 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. "The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context." Pp. 152-184 in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge [England], New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lofland, John. 1996. Social Movement Organizations. Guide to research on insurgent realities, Edited by J. Best. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Transaction.

Lounsbury, Michael. 2005. "Institutional Variation in the Evolution of Social Movements: Competing Logics and the Spread of Recycling Advocacy Groups." Pp. 73-95 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, John D. 2005. "Persistence and Change Among Nationally Federated Social Movements." Pp. 193-225 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

McCarthy, John D., David W. Britt, and Mark Wolfson. 1991. "The Institutional Channeling of Social Movements in the Moderns State." Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 13:45-76.

McCarthy, John D. and Mayer N. Zald. 1987. "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory." Pp. 15-42 in Social Movements in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ, Oxford: Transaction Books.

—. 1987. "Appendix: The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and resource Mobilization." Pp. 337-91 in Social Movements in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ, Oxford: Transaction Books.

March, James G. (ed.) 1988. *Decisions and organizations*. Oxford, Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Melucci, Alberto. 1985. "The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements." Social Research 52:789-816.

Meyer, John W. 1983. "Conclusion: Institutionalization and the Rationality of Formal Organizational Structure." Pp. 261-82 in Organizational Environments. Ritual and Rationality, edited by J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Meyer, John W. and Brian Rowan. 1983. "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony." Pp. 21-44 in Organizational Environments. Ritual and Rationality, edited by J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.

Minkoff, Debra C. 1995. Organizing for Equality: The Evolution of Women's and Racial-ethnic Organizations in America. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Mushaben, Joyce Marie. 1989. "The Struggle Within: Conflict, Consensus, and Decision Making Among National Coordinators and Grass-Roots Organizers in the West German Peace Movement." Pp. 267-98 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.

Oberschall, Anthony. 1980. "Loosely Structured Collective Conflict: A Theory and an Application." Pp. 45-54 in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, vol. 3, edited by L. Kriesberg. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.

Oliver, Pamela and Mark Furman. 1989. "Contradictions between National and Local Organizational Strength: The case of the John Birch Society." Pp. 155-77 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.

Oliver, Pamela and Gerald Marwell. 1992. "Mobilizing Technologies for Collective Action." Pp. 251-72 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Podolny, Joel and Karen Page. 1998. "Network Forms of Organization." Annual Review of Sociology 24:57-76.
Polletta, Francesca. 2002. Freedom is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Powell, Walter. 1990. "Neither Market nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization." Research in Organizational Behavior 12:295-336.
Rosenkrands, Jacob. 2004. "Politicizing Homo Economicus: Analysis of Anticorporate Websites." Pp. 57-76 in Cyberprotest. New Media, Citizens and Social Movements, edited by W. v. d. Donk, B. Loader, P. Nixon, and D. Rucht. London: Routledge.
Rosenthal, Naomi and Michael Schwartz. 1989. "Spontaneity and Democracy in Social Movements." Pp. 33-59 in Organizing for Change: Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Grennwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.
Rothschild-Whitt, Joyce. 1979. "The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic Models." American Sociological Review 44:509-27.
Rucht, Dieter. 1984. Zur Organisation der neuen sozialen Bewegungen, in Juergen Falter et al., Politische Willensbildung und Interessenvermittlung, Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Rucht, Dieter. 1989. "Environmental Movement Organizations in West Germany and France: Structure and Interorganizational Relations." Pp. 61-94 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.
—. 1994. Modernisierung und Soziale Bewegungen. Frankfurt am Main: Campus.
Schwartz, Michael and Shuva Paul. 1992. "Resource Mobilization versus the Mobilization of People: Why consensus Movements cannot be Instruments of Social Change." Pp. 205-23 in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, edited by A. D. Morris and C. M. Mueller. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
Scott, W. Richard. 1983. "The Organization of Environments: Networks, Cultural, and Historical Elements." Pp. 155-75 in Organizational Environments. Ritual and Rationality, edited by J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
—. 1983. "From Technology to Environment." Pp. 13-17 in Organizational Environments. Ritual and Rationality, edited by J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
—. 1991. "Unpacking Institutional Arguments." Pp. 164-82 in The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, edited by W. W. Powell and P. J. DiMaggio. Chicago, London: The University of Chicago Press.
Scott, W. Richard and John W. Meyer. 1983. "The Organization of Societal Sectors." Pp. 129-53 in Organizational Environments. Ritual and Rationality, edited by J. W. Meyer and W. R. Scott. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage.
Smith, Jackie. 2005. "Globalization and Transnational Social Movement Organizations." Pp. 226-52 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.
Staggenborg, Suzanne. 1986. "Coalition Work in the Pro-Choice Movement: Organizational and Environmental Opportunities and Constraints." Social Problems 33:623-41.
Tarrow, Sidney. 1994. Power in Movement. Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. New York, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Veen, Gerrita van der and Bert Klandermans. 1989. ""Exit" Behavior in Social Movement Organizations." Pp. 179-98 in Organizing for Change : Social Movement Organizations in

Europe and the United States, vol. 2, International Social Movement Research, edited by B. Klandermans. Greenwich, Conn., London, England: JAI Press.
Warren, Mark. 2001. "Power and Conflict in Social Capital. Community Organizing and Urban Policy." Pp. 169-182 in Beyond Tocqueville, edited by B. Edwards, M. Foley, and M. Diani. Hanover: University Press of New England.
Zald, Mayer N. and Roberta Ash Garner. 1987. "Social Movement Organizations: Growth, Decay, and Change." Pp. 121-41 in Social Movements in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ, Oxford: Transaction Books.
Zald, Mayer N. and John D. McCarthy. 1980. "Social Movement Industries: Competition and Cooperation Among Movement Organizations." Pp. 1-20 in Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change, vol. 3, edited by L. Kriesberg. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
—. 1987. "Social Movement Industries: Competition and Conflict among SMOs." Pp. 161-80 in Social Movements in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ, Oxford: Transaction Books.
—. 1987. "Introduction." Pp. 45-47 in Social Movements in an Organizational Society. Collected Essays, edited by M. N. Zald and J. D. McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ, Oxford: Transaction Books.
Zald, Mayer N., Calvin Morrill, and Hayagreeva Rao. 2005. "The Impact of Social Movements on Organizations: Environment and Responses." Pp. 253-79 in Social Movements and Organizational Theory, Cambridge Studies in Contentious Politics, edited by G. F. Davis, D. McAdam, W. R. Scott, and M. N. Zald. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.

Democratic Practices in the Transnational Organizations of the Global Justice Movement/s

By Raffaele Marchetti and Duccio Zola

(University of Urbino)

1. Introduction

This report aims at examining the practices of democracy of the global justice movement/s organizations (GJMOs) at the transnational level, as they emerge from the data collected with the WP4 questionnaire. The main characteristic of the transnational organizations here under study is their clear preference for a more participative, consensual and global dimension of democracy.

Within the overall focus on the visions of democracy, this report addresses in particular the internal decision-making practices of the organizations; the organizational characteristics; the relationship with institutional actors; the organizational strategies; and the relationship with the movement.

We have selected our organizations according to the criteria we had followed for WP2 and WP3 selection, i.e. a) Geographical scope: transnational/international; b) Organizational structure: network or single organization; c) World-wide coverage: Europe, North and South America, Asia; d) Single-issue or multi-issue; e) Main activity: action-oriented or research-oriented; f) Forms of action: radical or reformist; g) Trade and food sovereignty; and h) Transnational events and meta-networks.

Of the original 30 cases of the previous WPs, we managed to retain 18 organizations. We integrated this data set with other 9 organizations that fitted the aforementioned criteria and were available for interview. In many of these cases, personal and long-term contacts have been crucial to establish a trusty relationship and convince their representatives to collaborate with the project, by filling the questionnaire. Among the 12 organizations we could not interview, some were not available because of lack of time ("sorry, we are too busy", "please, check the website, you will find all info there"), some were not reachable, whereas three refused to collaborate on a principled ground (since the European Commission funds the project, they did not want to cooperate for they are engaged in contentious politics with this institution).

2. Democracy within transnational organizations

With this report we aim to examine the actual internal practices of democracy of the transnational organizations of the GJMs. While in the previous workpackage we studied the organizational ideology and self-understanding as they were expressed in a specific number of documents produced by the organizations themselves, here we administrated questionnaires directly asking the interviewees about the actual functioning and activity of the organizations. This second step allows us to verify if there is a discrepancy between official documents and personal statement and account on their practices by representatives of the organization.

Such discrepancy, for instance, is evident in the data presented in table 1. Here a clear decrease in the spread of an associational model is accompanied by an increase in both deliberative representative and deliberative participative models. As at the national level, but with an even more clear trends, the account on the organizational functioning given by our respondent stress consensual decision making much more than the documents do. The types of democratic models presented in the written documents are then not always followed in the actual practices of GJMOs, except for assembleary organizations.

Table 1 – Sampling for the different Work Packages – (%)

Democratic models	WP3 (TRANSNATIONAL SAMPLE)	WP4 (TRANSNATIONAL SAMPLE)	WP4 (FULL SAMPLE)
Associational	50.0	11.1	32.1
Deliberative representative	16.7	37.0	32.6
Assembleary	6.7	7.4	9.7
Deliberative participative	3.3	14.8	21.8
Missing cases	23.3	29.6	9.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(30)	(27)	(183)

The discrepancy between words and facts is even more evident in table 2. Here of the 8 cases that are univocally comparable between the set of WP3 and the one of WP4, all actual democratic practices are different from what declared in official documents, except for the case of Oxfam. While Oxfam could be considered as an example of transparency, the other cases could perhaps be explained either by the fact that internal practices evolve and written documents do not, or that they want to give a rosier picture for constitutions are sometime needed for "bureaucratic" reasons, but not really implemented.

Table 2 – Shifting classification of sampled groups on the dependent variable

Name of the group	*DEPENDENT VARIABLE*	
	WP4 CLASSIFICATION	WP3 CLASSIFICATION
European Left	Associational	Deliberative Representative
European Global March Against Child Labour	Associational	Missing case (not included)
International Fair Trade Movement - Fair Trade Advocacy Office	Associational	Missing case (not included)
Friends of the Earth International	Assembleary	Associational
The World Conservation Union - IUCN	Assembleary	Missing case (not included)
European Network on Debt and Development – EURODAD	Deliberative Representative	Missing case (not included)
CIVICUS	Deliberative Representative	Missing case (not included)
CRIS - Communication Rights in the Information Society	Deliberative Representative	Missing case (not included)
Campagna EuropAfrica – Terre Contadine	Deliberative Representative	Missing case (not included)
Oxfam International	Deliberative Representative	Deliberative Representative
International Metalworkers' Federation	Deliberative Representative	Associational
La Via Campesina	Deliberative Representative	Associational
World Social Forum	Deliberative Representative	Associational
Seattle to Brussels Network	Deliberative Representative	Deliberative Participative
IFAT - international fair trade association	Deliberative Representative	Missing case (n.a.)
ECA Watch - International NGO campaign on export credit agencies	Deliberative Participative	Missing case (not included)
EuroIFI	Deliberative Participative	Missing case (not included)
Our World Is Not For Sale	Deliberative Participative	Deliberative Representative
Attac International	Deliberative Participative	Missing case (n.a.)
Caritas Internationalis	Missing case (n.a.)	Associational
Center of Concern	Missing case (n.a.)	Associational

Euromarches	Missing case (n.a.)	Assembleary
Reclaim our UN	Missing case (n.a.)	Assembleary
Comitati di appoggio europei al MST brasiliano	Missing case (n.a.)	Missing case (not included)
Euromayday	Missing case (n.a.)	Missing case (not included)
Euromovements	Missing case (n.a.)	Missing case (not included)
WIDE	Missing case (n.a.)	Missing case (not included)
International of Anarchist Federations	Missing case (excluded)	Deliberative Representative
World March of Women	Missing case (excluded)	Deliberative Representative
Indymedia	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
Global March Against Child Labour	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
Pax Christi International	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
People global action	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
Commitee for the Abolition of the Thirld World Debt	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
Cuts International	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
ENAAT-European Network Against Arms Trade	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
European Farmers Coordination	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
IFI Watchnet	Missing case (excluded)	Associational
Make Trade Fair	Missing case (excluded)	Missing case (n.a.)
People's Caravan 2004 for Food Sovereignty	Missing case (excluded)	Missing case (n.a.)
Bite Back	Missing case (excluded)	Missing case (n.a.)
World Trade Fair Day	Missing case (excluded)	Missing case (n.a.)
STOP EPA	Missing case (excluded)	Missing case (n.a.)
Global Unions	Missing case (excluded)	Missing case (n.a.)

3. Internal decision-making practices

Examining the characteristics of the most important decision-making body of the organizations, we notice that at the transnational level the only divergence from the overall, national-based, data-set concerns the minor presence of executive committees and, above all, the existence of other decision-making bodies besides the traditional ones. This proves again (as already stressed in WP2 and WP3) that transnational organizations are more innovative than domestic ones, for they experiment other less conventional decision-making bodies: thematic groups (it is the case of Oxfam International, Euromovements, and EuroIFI), international, regional coordinating committees (as in the case of Reclaim our UN, Via Campesina and Euromarches), local committees (European committees supporting the MST), e-lists (Euromayday), and project staffs (Center of Concern).

Concerning the decision making method, again, we notice a discrepancy with domestic cases, in that the traditional majority rule is less frequent and conversely consensus is adopted in more then 70% of the cases. This can be explained with the characteristics of such organizations. They need continuous consent in order to develop campaigns in that they do not have available other incentives typical of single national organizations, such as common membership and shared values, to convince member groups to engage in. Long-distances and specifically focused issues make necessary to have a permanent consensus on the decision taken and the action carried out. This is the case, for instance, of networks such as “Seattle to Brussels Network” and of campaigns such as “ECA Watch – International NGO campaign on export credit agencies”. At the same time, however, it is also difficult to deny that the principled dimension of many campaigns entails the need for full adhesion of all members.

Finally, for what concerns the size of the decision-making body of transnational organizations, we can notice that such bodies are generally bigger than national ones, with more than 100 participants in almost half of the cases. This can be explained with the actual size of the organizations that is most of the time far bigger in terms of collective membership, than that of domestic organizations.

Table 3 – Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
President / leader / secretary / director	11.1	10.4
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	37.0	47.5
Assembly / open meeting	22.2	28.4
Thematic group	7.4	3.3
Other bodies	22.2	10.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (183)
Decision-making method of the main decisional body		
Majority + other	26.1	57.6
Consensus	73.9	42.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (23)	100.0 (170)
Size of the main decisional body		
Less than 30	28.6	51.5
Between 30 and 100	28.6	25.7
More than 100	42.9	22.8
Total **(N)**	100.0 (21)	100.0 (167)

As for the characteristics of the executive committee, despite its presence is in line with the overall dataset, these committees are at the transnational level less frequently the main decision-making bodies (as shown in table 3) and are in 3 cases out of 4 based on the method of consensus, while this is true in only half of domestic ones. Similarly to what happen in the national cases, the executive committees are mostly elected by the assembly.

Table 4 – Characteristics of the executive committee (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Yes	63.0	68.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (182)

Decision-making method of the executive		
Majority + other	25.0	48.0
Consensus	75.0	52.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (16)	100.0 (125)
Election of the executive committee		
By an assemblearian body	80.0	87.5
By other bodies	20.0	12.5
Total **(N)**	100.0 (15)	100.0 (96)

Concerning the potential sources of hidden power, marginal differences can be identified between the transnational and the national cases. Such differences are mostly due to the distinct internal structuring of the transnational organizations that reflects the different socio-political environment they operate in. For instance, the role of the president is less relevant than in national cases; its tasks for what concerns proposing the agenda are at the transnational level more often performed either by the coordinator of the transnational organization/network or by more informal bodies. Small committees and other bodies taken together, in fact, constitute more than one third of the cases, whereas assemblies are less relevant for practical inconveniences due to the difficulties of organizing transnational meetings. Finally, for what concerns the rules of discussion, we noticed that in 65% of the cases they are not present. This is three times more than in the national cases. Little formalization is thus present on such procedural matter.

Table 5 – Potential sources of hidden power (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
President / leader / secretary / director	8.7	16.4
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	47.8	48.0
Assembly / open meeting	8.7	17.5
Small committee representing different membership's groups	13.0	5.3
Other bodies	21.7	12.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(23)	(171)
Rules of discussion		
Not present	65.0	18.9
Traditional	30.0	54.5
Innovative	0.0	5.6
Both traditional and innovative	5.0	21.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(20)	(143)

4. Organizational characteristics

As shown in WP4 general report, organizational structure has proved to be an important factor in explaining the adoption of different democratic models within the selected organizations. This section is thus devoted to the analysis of such characteristics.

For what concerns the number of individual members, at the transnational level it has to be noted that there are no organizations with individual-only membership. Membership is most of the times based on groups, but in one third of the cases admits also individuals. The number of collective members is concentrated in the class between 11 and more than 100, meaning that transnational organizations tend to have a large membership.

Table 6 – Number of individual members (%)

Type of members	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Individual	0.0	42.6
Collective	69.2	14.0
Both individual and collective	30.8	43.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(136)

Number of individual members		
Between 1 and 100	60.0	19.8
Between 101 and 1,000	20.0	31.1
Between 1,001 and 10,000	0.0	20.8
More than 10,000	20.0	28.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (22)	100.0 (106)
Number of collective members		
Between 1 and 10	15.4	21.7
Between 11 and 100	46.2	48.3
More than 100	38.5	30.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (13)	100.0 (60)

In relation to the main resources of the groups, a number of observations can be developed in the case of transnational organizations. Their budget is either highly variable or high (i.e. more than 500.000 euros). On the one hand, these organizations do not usually have constant funding bodies, since they rely on members' donations or ad hoc financing for specific projects. On the other hand, they can collect considerable amount of funds thanks to their world-wide capacity to attract support.

In terms of paid staff, most of these organizations are small, having in 60% of the cases between 1 and 16 persons as employed. More considerable is instead the quantity of volunteers that is between 16 and 100 in more than 70% of the cases.

Table 7 – Main resources of the groups (%)

Budget of the groups	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Highly variable	25.9	9.1
None	0.0	5.2
Less than 10,000	3.7	16.2
Between 10,000 and 500,000	14.8	39.6
More than 500,000	25.9	29.9
Total **(N)**	100.0 (19)	100.0 (154)
Paid staff		
None	16.0	31.7
Up to 16	60.0	42.8
Between 16 and 100	12.0	14.4
More than 100	12.0	11.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (25)	100.0 (180)

Number of volunteers		
Less than 16	36.8	31.9
Between 16 and 100	36.8	33.8
More than 100	26.3	34.4
Total **(N)**	100,0 (19)	100.0 (160)

Crossing the size of the budget with the different democratic models of the organizations, we find interesting results, despite a limited dataset with some missing cases. The most striking result consists in the perfect correlation between the presence of the budget and the two extreme models of associational and deliberative participative organizations. A clear trend can be observed according to which the more associational your model is, the richer you are (or alternatively, the more participatory your model is, the less rich you are). Being participatory is then clearly associated with less funds, whereas delegation is usually more associated to more funds.

Table 7a – Budget of the groups for different democratic models (%)

Budget of the groups	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Less than 10,000	0.0	37.5	50.0	100.0	50.0
More than 10,000	100.0	62.5	50.0	0.0	50.0
Total **(N)**	7.1 (1)	57.1 (8)	14.3 (2)	21.4 (3)	100.0 (14)

NB - 13 missing cases

Crossing the presence of paid staff with the different democratic models. Paid staff is absent only in the deliberative participative models. This connects to two types of considerations. On the one hand, the more participatory perspective allows for more personal engagement beyond strict paid work. On the other hand, however, we notice that deliberative participative organizations are the poorest, thus the less able to support paid staff.

Table 7b – Presence of paid staff for different democratic models (%)

Presence of paid staff (dummy)	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
No	0.0	0.0	0.0	33.3	5.9
Yes	100.0	100.0	100.0	66.7	94.1
Total **(N)**	11.8 (2)	58.8 (10)	11.8 (2)	17.6 (3)	100.0 (17)

NB - 10 missing cases

Crossing number of volunteers with the different democratic models we notice that associational organizations tend to have an higher number of volunteers than the other organizations. This might

be linked to the fact that associational organizations are usually richer and more established than the others, having therefore a greater capacity of attraction. At the same time, the larger the number of volunteers, the higher the need for formal structures in order to coordinate them, including majority voting and delegation of power.

Table 7c – Number of volunteers for different democratic models (%)

Number of volunteers (dummy)	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Up to 15	0.0	37.5	50.0	33.3	33.3
More than 15	100.0	62.5	50.0	66.7	66.7
Total	13.3	53.3	13.3	20.0	100.0
(N)	(2)	(8)	(2)	(3)	(15)

NB - 12 missing cases

As shown in table 8, most of the transnational organizations in our dataset were created after 2000, with an evident discrepancy with respect to the national cases. As mentioned in other *DEMOS* reports, this is due to the transnationalization of social mobilization that had a scale shift in the turn of the millennium.[10] Caritas Internationalis (1950), Friends of the Earth International (1971), International Metalworkers Federation (1893) and Oxfam International (1942) represent instances of traditional organizations founded since several decades. Conversely, Euromovements (2004), Euromayday (2003), EuropAfrica Campaign – Farmers Lands (2004), and EuroIFI (2002) are examples of recently established organizations.

Table 8 – Generational belonging of selected organizations (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Before 1968	15.4	18.9
Between 1969 and 1989	7.7	20.8
Between 1989 and 1999	30.8	31.4
After 2000	46.2	28.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(13)	(159)

Crossing generational belonging with different democratic models, we observe that deliberative representative and especially deliberative participative organizations are all more recently founded than the more traditional organizations based on associational or assembleary model. Recalling the fact that most of our cases belong to the two deliberative models, we may state that transnational cases are for the most part recent and based on the values of participation and consensus.

[10] See for example, Zola and Marchetti 2006. For a complementary transnational perspective on GJMOs, see also Pianta and Marchetti 2006.

Table 8a – Generational belonging of different democratic models (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Before 1968	50.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	20.0
Between 1969 and 1989	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Between 1989 and 1999	50.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	40.0
After 2000	0.0	40.0	0.0	100.0	40.0
Total	20.0	50.0	10.0	20.0	100.0
(N)	(2)	(5)	(1)	(2)	(10)

NB – 17 missing cases

5. Relationship with institutions

An interesting aspect of transnational organizations belonging to the global justice movement/s is their attitude toward political and economical institutions. Overall, transnational organizations do foresee collaboration with international, national, and local institutions. Our interviewees never expressed refusal to collaborate with institutions. And the variable "collaboration" is even always higher than the variable "collaboration with restrictions". This positive attitude toward collaboration marks a neat difference with national cases, which are characterized by a more skeptical approach toward institutions.[11] We have to remind however, that few critical groups, with more conflictual attitudes, refused to be interviewed.

This has to be interpreted within the framework of the political opportunity structure at the international level. Within such framework, the possibility to interact with institutions is at times crucial for it provide a necessary support for truly global actions. More, we have to notice that, with the exception of the more accused institutions such as WTO or WB, other institutions such as a number of UN Agencies are considered as potential allies. Finally, we should also take into consideration a more pragmatic attitude that admits lobbying and pressuring for achieving concrete results on specific issues rather fighting uncompromisingly for global ideological positions. Given the transnational perspective of our sample, contacts with local institutions are, as expected, reduced.

Table 9 - Relationship with international institutions (%)

International institutions	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Refusal of collaboration	0.0	15.6
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	14.8	35.3
Collaboration with restrictions	33.3	23.1
Collaboration	51.9	26.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(173)

[11] The overall "collaborative" attitude of the organizations under study here can be positively confronted with the results drawn from Pianta and Silva 2003. In this survey, based on a questionnaire submitted to 147 global civil society organizations (mainly South-based), it emerges that in more than half of cases the attitude toward official summits organized by international institutions (such as WB, IMF, WTO, UN) was of *active dialogue*, while only 7 per cent of respondents chose the *strong conflict* option.

National institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	0.0	13.6
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	18.5	21.6
Collaboration with restrictions	33.3	34.7
Collaboration	48.1	30.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (175)
Local institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	0.0	9.7
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	37.0	20.6
Collaboration with restrictions	25.9	30.3
Collaboration	37.0	39.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (175)

Crossing attitude toward public institutions with the different democratic models, we note that groups that adopt more recent models, such as deliberative representative and deliberative participative, tend to be more collaborative with national and international institutions. In any case, being our selection of organizations transnational, the primary focus on the international institutional level was expected.

Table 9a – Attitude towards public institutions by different democratic models (%)

Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels (dummy)	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
International	100.0	90.0	100.0	75.0	89.5
National	100.0	80.0	100.0	100.0	89.5
Local	100.0	50.0	100.0	25.0	57.9
Total **(N)**	15.8 (3)	52.6 (10)	10.5 (2)	21.1 (4)	100.0 (19)

NB - 8 missing cases

In addition to the general attitude toward institutions, we also focused on perceptions of experiments of public decision-making promoted by institutions to involve citizens in the political process. Transnational organizations, as already shown by several previous tables, have a more positive attitude towards participation and consensus, both in internal decision-making practices (see table 3) and in external experiments (see table 10 below). It comes then as no surprise their predominant recognition that the fact that deliberations are made in public improves the quality of political decisions. Their preference for publicness is markedly higher than for national cases, going beyond 80%. We have to notice, however, that many organizations have no definite position on this issue because of their predominantly transnational focus.

If we focus on the motivations behind such attitude we observe that privileged dimensions are the recognition of bottom-up politics, the affirmation of the principle of inclusiveness and the acknowledgement of the creative effect of participation. In particular, organizations stressing these

points include CIVICUS, European Left, Reclaim Our UN, The World Conservation Union, International Fair Trade Association, European Network on Debt and Development.

Table 10 – Attitudes towards public decision-making (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
No	3.7	21.5
Yes	44.4	37.6
No definite position	51.9	40.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(181)
Evaluation of public decision-making		
Negative	9.1	32.7
Both negative and positive	9.1	18.3
Positive	81.8	49.0
Total (N)	100.0 (11)	100.0 (104)
Motivation of the evaluation		
Instrumental	2.9	9.9
Artificial	0.0	7.9
Mixed positions	2.9	11.9
Exclusive	0.0	2.6
Placebo politics	2.9	15.2
Top-down politics	2.9	6.0
Bottom-up politics	11.8	14.6
Responsibility	5.9	4.0
Inclusive	23.5	17.9
Transparency/publicity of the decision-making	5.9	8.6
More consensual decision-making	5.9	2.6
Creative effect	11.8	3.3
Not an issue of discussion	23.5	28.5
Total (N)	100.0 (20)	100.0 (151)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Crossing attitudes toward public decision-making and different democratic models, we have a further confirmation of the general trend of transnational cases: experiments of participatory decision making are overall valued positively. Among the different models, organizations based on the deliberative representative models are the one that most support and recognize participation in public decision-making. Assembleary organizations are instead divided in their attitude.

Table 10a – Attitude towards public decision-making by democratic models (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
No	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	5.3
Yes	33.3	60.0	50.0	25.0	47.4
No definite position	66.7	40.0	0.0	75.0	47.4
Total	15.8	52.6	10.5	21.1	100.0
(N)	(3)	(10)	(2)	(4)	(19)
Evaluation of public decision-making					
Negative	0.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	12.5
Both negative and positive	0.0	20.0	0.0	0.0	12.5
Positive	100.0	80.0	50.0	0.0	75.0
Total	12.5	62.5	25.0	0.0	100.0
(N)	(1)	(5)	(2)	(0)	(8)

NB - 8 missing case (improvement); 19 missing cases (evaluation)

A further issue that was investigated in our questionnaires concerned the kinds of funding these organizations receive. A main observation applies to the transnational cases: sources of funding are very much differentiated. Organizations that are part of transnational networks, for instance, learn quickly how to apply for funds from different kind of bodies, be they governmental or non governmental. Such diverse range of funding is also possible because, as shown in tables 9, transnational organizations are ready to cooperate with public institutions and are therefore in a better position to receive funding from them. Governmental funds are in any case less present than members' and non-governmental support. Conversely, national cases rely much more, indeed predominantly, on members' support.

Table 11 – Type of funding (%)

Sources of funding	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Members	72.0	82.6
Governmental	60.0	35.1
Non governmental	72.0	28.7
Sales of goods/service/rent	36.0	40.6
Type of funding		
None	12.0	14.6
Only from members	28.0	51.1
Only from governments	16.0	2.8
Both from members and governments	44.0	31.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(25)	(178)

Crossing types of funding with different democratic models, we observe that governmental support is stable in organizations following all democratic models except for the deliberative participative ones, in which it declines to level that resemble the national cases. In addition, deliberative participative organizations are in half of the cases funded exclusively by members. Associational organizations, conversely, have a low percentage of funding, coming from members' support and a considerable rate of governmental-only funding.

Table 11a – Funding by different democratic models (%)

Sources of funding	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Members	33.3	66.7	100.0	75.0	66.7
Governmental	66.7	77.8	100.0	25.0	66.7
Non governmental	66.7	55.6	100.0	100.0	72.2
Sales of goods/service/rent	33.3	44.4	50.0	0.0	33.3
Type of funding					
None	0.0	11.1	0.0	25.0	11.1
Only from members	33.3	11.1	0.0	50.0	22.2
Only from governments	66.7	22.2	0.0	0.0	22.2
Both from members and governments	0.0	55.6	100.0	25.0	44.4
Total	16.7	50.0	11.1	22.2	100.0
(N)	(3)	(9)	(2)	(4)	(18)

NB - 9 missing cases

6. Organizational strategies

Moving our focus on organizational strategies, we first concentrate on the main issues of activity of our selected organizations. Given their transnational dimension, the predominance of international issues is no surprise. Social issues constitute a relevant second focus that is however in line with (though slight minor than in) national cases. What is diverging in relation to national cases is instead the attention to new social movement issues (gender, environment, etc.), democracy, and religion that are more than two times mentioned than in the national cases. International issues, new social movement issues, religion and democracy (intended as global democracy) clearly represent a new perspective that is more clearly visible at the transnational level than among national social movements that are still anchored to traditional social issues, often with a domestic scope.

Table 12 – Main issues of activity of the group (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Social issues	59.3	68.9
International issues	74.1	56.7
New social movement issues	40.7	27.2
Democracy	44.4	17.2
Religion	3.7	1.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(180)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Crossing main issues of activity with different models of democracy we find a number of interesting results. First of all, a confirmation that international issues constitute an interest that is widespread among different models, though more so in associational and assembleary organizations. Second, new social movement issues are more supported by associational and assembleary rather than the other types of organizations. Finally, data show that the more an organization addresses the issue of democracy, the more it is also interested in developing consensual and participatory decision-making method.

Table 12a – Main issues of activity of different democratic models (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	66.7	50.0	50.0	50.0	52.6
International issues	100.0	70.0	100.0	75.0	78.9
New social movement issues	66.7	30.0	100.0	50.0	47.4
Democracy	33.3	50.0	50.0	75.0	52.6
Religion	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	15.8	52.6	10.5	21.1	100.0
(N)	(3)	(10)	(2)	(4)	(19)

NB - 8 missing cases

For what concerns the main strategies of the organizations, we notice results that are in part divergent from the overall, national-based sample. While protest is less relevant for transnational organizations, lobbying is a major strategy, that resonates also with the aforementioned collaborative attitude toward public institutions. Building concrete alternatives is also more often mentioned than in national cases, too. But, most importantly for transnational organizations, political education and raising awareness remain key strategies. In terms of overlapping strategy, transnational organizations follow the pattern of the overall sample, and actually they accentuate it, i.e. almost one out of two organization declares to use four strategies whereas in the overall data the percentage is just one out of three. This is probably due to the more diversified and decentralized way of action of transnational actors.

Table 13 – Main strategies of the groups (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Protest	59.3	80.9
Building concrete alternatives	88.9	73.2
Lobbying	70.4	51.9
Political education/raising awareness	92.6	89.1
Number of overlapping strategies		
0-1	7.4	7.6
2	22.2	21.3
3	22.2	38.8
4	48.1	32.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(183)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Crossing main strategies with different democratic models, we notice an unexpected result. Those organizations that are more inclined to consensual decision-making (deliberative representative and deliberative participative) are those most use the strategy of lobbying to achieve their aims. Finally, we observed a clear trend in using simultaneously several strategies, i.e. transnational organizations do not conceive such strategies as mutually exclusive.

Table 13a – Main strategies of different democratic models (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Protest	66.7	70.0	50.0	50.0	63.2
Building concrete alternatives	66.7	100.0	100.0	75.0	89.5
Lobbying	66.7	90.0	50.0	100.0	84.2
Political education/raising awareness	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number of overlapping strategies					
0-1	33.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.3
2	0.0	10.0	50.0	25.0	15.8
3	0.0	20.0	0.0	25.0	15.8
4	66.7	70.0	50.0	50.0	63.2
Total	15.6	52.6	10.5	21.1	100.0
(N)	(3)	(10)	(2)	(4)	(19)

NB - 8 missing cases

Considering the specific repertoire of action of transnational organizations, we can observe that almost all (conventional and unconventional) forms of protest are less used than in national cases. Demonstration, strike, boycott, blockade, occupation of building, civil disobedience and cultural performance are less often mentioned. The only form of action that is used more intensively by

transnational organizations than by national ones is petition. This is interesting, but also force us to look at what is excluded from the main answers list. If we analyze the list of specifications for other forms of action, we find that many activities that are related to advocacy and lobbying such as seminars (European Global March Against Child Labour), conferences (International Fair Trade Association), media work (Oxfam International), publications (Seattle to Brussels Network), research projects (CRIS), policy proposals (CIVICUS), parliamentary initiatives (European Left), offer a better indication of the repertoire of actions of transnational organizations within the global justice movement/s. In this context, it is useful to stress the words of the representative of the "World Conservation Union" about the most significant actions carried out by his organization: "We use our unique network including states, government agencies, NGOs, scientists and experts, to develop a worldwide partnership in order to link both research and results to local, national, regional and global policy by convening dialogues between groups." To give another example of the complexity of the repertoire of actions expressed by our transnational organizations, it is interesting to quote the "EuropAfrica – Farmers Lands" campaign, which is explicitly involved in favoring "networking and promotion of partnerships among small farmers". It is also worthwhile to mention the specific action promoted by the "Euromayday" campaign, which tries to achieve an "auto-representation of the precarious subject".

Table 14 – Repertoire of action of the groups (%)

Forms of action	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Petition	88.9	73.8
Demonstration	66.7	81.4
Strike	7.4	26.8
Boycott of certain products	22.2	32.8
Blockade	11.1	30.1
Occupation of buildings	18.5	25.7
Civil disobedience	29.6	42.6
Artistic/cultural performance	40.7	62.8
Other	44.4	47.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(183)

Linked to strategies and forms of actions are campaigns, one of the main instruments of transnational social actors. Campaigns on international issues are obviously the main focus of the selected organizations, while those on national issues are not mentioned. Campaigns on social issues and on new social movement issues are equally important, but the second ones are much more developed than in national cases. Interesting enough, campaigns on democracy represent a small percentage. Moreover, the only campaigning level of transnational organizations is the international level. With regards to the thematic scope, it is worthwhile to mention that in more than 60% of the cases we have single-issue campaigns or networks. Finally, analyzing the fields of activity carried out by such campaigns, environment and trade are those in which most part of the transnational organizations engage: Via Campesina, ECA Watch, Friends of the Earth International are part of international environmental campaigns or networks, while EuroIFI, Seattle to Brusssels, Eurodad are examples of organizations involved in trade-related international campaigns or networks.

Table 15 – Characteristics of campaigns (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Transnational (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Social issues	33.3	55.6
International issues	100.0	82.1
National issues/political parties/think thanks	5.6	11.3
Democracy	5.6	11.9
New social movement issues	33.3	14.6
Territorial levels of campaigns		
Local	0.0	4.6
National	0.0	77.1
International	100.0	83.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(18)	(153)

The last theme we tackle in relation to strategy of transnational organizations concerns the evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet. On the overall, transnational organizations have a very positive assessment of the role of the Internet in public life. With regards to the relationship between the Internet and public administrators, transnational organizations have a much more positive judgment than national ones. With regards to the relationship between the Internet and the media they also have a positive evaluation, probably to be related to the increased importance of movements' own media. Finally also in relation to members, transnational organizations have an overwhelming positive attitude, being this the main way to communicate transnationally.

Table 16 – Evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Negative	22.2	56.8
Both negative and positive	5.6	2.9
Positive	72.2	40.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(18)	(139)
Internet and mass media		
Negative	16.7	22.2
Both negative and positive	11.1	6.5
Positive	72,.2	71.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(18)	(153)

Internet and members		
Negative	0.0	3.3
Both negative and positive	4.2	14.8
Positive	95.8	68.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (24)	100.0 (158)

7. Relationship with the movement

The last part of our questionnaires was devoted to the study of the relationship between our selected transnational organizations and the wider global justice movement. This relationship was expected to be intense due to the network structure of most of our organizations that are often at the core of the GJM. For what concerns participation in movement's events, our selected organizations do often participate in World, European, national and local Social Fora.[12] In such meetings, transnational cases are actually higher than the rest of national cases of *DEMOS*. In contrast, participation to counter-summits and global days of action, although however high, is slightly lower than in national cases. The lower turn out of transnational organizations at the global days of action is due to several factors including:

- the focus of such organizations on specific issues that do not include general issues such as peace;
- the fact that, in the case of European networks and campaign, the participation to global days of action is at times rather by individual members as such than by networks and campaigns;
- their propensity to lobbying rather than protesting (see table 13);

Center of Concern, Communication Rights and Information Society, European Network on Debt and Development, ECA-Watch are relevant examples here.

Table 17 – Participation in movement's events (%)

Participation in movement's events	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
World/European social forums	85.2	77.6
National/local social forums	63.0	56.8
Counter-summits	66.7	72.1
Global days of action	66.7	78.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (183)

Focusing on the sense of belonging to the movement, transnational cases offer a clear positive answer. Almost 90% of them state that they feel such a sense of belonging, and the remaining 11% also mention such feeling, though with reservations. The identity of the GJM is created in large

[12] For an history of the emergence of a global civil society – starting from the '70 – based on an empirical assessment of the sustained growth of international events (counter summits and independent events, such as Social Fora) organized by social movements which challenge neo-liberal globalization throughout the world, see Pianta and Zola forthcoming. For a previous assessment, see also Pianta 2003.

measure within these kinds of transnational organizations. Transnational organizations form the backbone of the GJM, for their capacity of creating the networking structure that allows for the interaction of different national movements, and of favoring the broadening of political and economic perspectives and issues, and of addressing global powers in the political and economic realm.[13]

Table 18 – Sense of belonging to the movement (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
No	0.0	8.7
The group doesn't have a shared view	0.0	3.8
Yes, but with reservations	11.1	9.3
Yes	88.9	78.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(143)

Turning to the perception of the movement, i.e. how our organizations perceive the GJM to be, we found a series of interesting results. Comparing the transnational cases with the overall sample with respect to what are considered to be the main aims of the movement, we expectedly find that international issues form the core of the beliefs of transnational organizations. Social issues, new social movements issues and democracy, as well, collect high percentages of responses, showing an attitude to open up and diversify the spectrum of possible answers when transnational organizations are taken in consideration. Then, first of all, we have a confirmation that these organizations see the GJM as mainly interested in social and international issues, favoring the latter rather than the former. They feel they belong to the GJM, but they preserve a certain degree of autonomy in prioritizing the international aspect over the social one. A second interesting result concerns the prevalence of positive claims: this means that these organizations tend to propose alternatives, rather than simply mentioning grievances.[14] In opposition to the media perception of the GJM as a movement that is mainly "against" (as in the often used "no global" labeling), our selected organizations frame their concerns through positive claims rather than through contra claims. Finally, a third point concerns the type of statement of the GJM. Our respondents perceive this to be focused on general statements rather than on specific proposals. Here again the distance between what social actors perceive the GJM to be and what conventional media and politicians think it is wide indeed.

[13] For a detailed account of this aspect, see R. Marchetti and M. Pianta (2006), "Transnational Networks in Global Social Movements", unpublished manuscript. See also H. Anheier and N. Themudo (2002), "Organisational Forms of Global Civil Society: Implications of Going Global", in H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor (eds.), *Global Civil Society 2002*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[14] This attitude to state positive claims and to give priority to the proposal of alternatives is in line with the aforementioned *Globi* survey. When asked about their attitude toward economic globalisation, one third of the 147 organizations interviewed, declared to carry out *alternative activities*, and equal shares demanded *radical change* or *reformative policies*; while only one per cent declared a *rejectionist* attitude.

Table 19 – Perception of the movement (%)

Main aims of the movement	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Social issues	83.3	64.6
International issues	70.8	32.9
New social movement issues	54.2	55.7
Democracy / free access to information	29.2	27.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(24)	(158)
Type of claim		
Negative/contra claim	12.5	45.9
Positive/pro claim	87.5	84.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(24)	(159)
Type of statement		
General statement	88.9	77.3
Specific proposal	44.4	29.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(24)	(181)

The following set of questions is related to participation in other networks or campaigns beyond their own. The responses are generally positive and mainly concentrating again on campaigns on international issues carried out at the transnational level only. These campaigns are in almost all of the cases single-issue campaigns, predominantly targeting international institutions such as the WTO (Our World Is Not for Sale, EuropAfrica Campaign–Farmers Land, European Global March Against Child Labor, International Fair Trade Association, International Fair Trade Movement are relevant examples of transnational GJMOs supporting the democratization of the WTO) and the UN (this is instead the case of Reclaim Our UN, CIVICUS, International Metalworkers' Federation, WIDE) and demanding democratic reforms for what concerns their internal structures – accused of not being accountable and transparent –, their way of addressing specific issues – such as the third world debt – and their way of implementing specific policies – such as structural adjustment programmes or trade policies. There are also campaigns demanding democratic reforms in the European Union which are promoted or supported by transnational actors such as Attac or European Left – both opposing the Bolkestein directive.

Table 20 – Issues of networks/campaigns of the movement (%)

Issues of networks/campaigns	**Transnational cases (%)**	**National cases (%)**
Social issues	30.0	43.8
International issues	95.0	79.2
National issues/political parties/think thanks	0.0	32.1
Democracy	0.0	28.5
New social movement issues	10.0	13.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(20)	(130)
Territorial levels of networks/campaigns		
Local	0.0	23.8
National	0.0	66.9
Transnational	100.0	71.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(20)	(130)

Crossing the issue of networks and campaigns with different democratic models we notice a constant interest in international issues pursued through networking or campaigning along all four kinds of democratic models. Then, it is interesting to notice that the democratic model is not influencing the kinds of issue that a transnational organization addresses through campaigning.

Table 20a – Issues of networks/campaigns of the GJM per democratic models (%)

Issues of networks/campaigns	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	33.0	42.9	0.0	25.0	33.3
International issues	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
National issues / political parties / think thanks	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Democracy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
New social movement issues	0.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	6.7
Total	20.0	46.7	6.7	26.7	100.0
(N)	(3)	(7)	(1)	(4)	(15)
Territorial levels of networks/campaigns					
Local	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
National	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Transnational	40.0	93.3	13.3	53.3	200.0 (15)
Total	3	7	1	4	100.0
(N)	(20.0)	(46.7)	(6.7)	(26.7)	(15)

NB - 12 missing cases

8. Conclusions

Through the analysis of our selected organizations we could depict a clear-cut image of transnational organizations active in the global justice movement/s. Being often more accentuated in their characteristics than national cases, they have the following peculiarities:

Internal decision-making practices of the organizations. They have a more informal internal decision-making structure that privileges participation and consensus over representation and majority voting.

Organizational characteristics. They have variable sources of funding and are more recently created. They represent the "new generation" of social movements. In their network and campaigns forms, transnational organizations offer interesting examples of how social movements can tackle a new political dimension (global interaction), a new political focus (global issues), and a new political challenge (global powers).

Relationship with institutional actors. They tend to pragmatically collaborate with different actors, including governmental and public institutions, depending on the issue and the political opportunity structure at stake, internationally speaking.

Organizational strategies. They concentrate on international and social issues, but employ strategies such as building concrete alternative and raising awareness rather then protesting in the street.

Relationship with the movement. They fully identify with the GJM and interact with the rest of the movement. In a way, they form the backbone of the global justice movement/s.

Bibliography

Anheier, Helmut and Nuno Themudo. 2002. "Organisational Forms of Global Civil Society: Implications of Going Global." Pp. 191-216 in Global Civil Society 2002, edited by H. Anheier, M. Glasius and M. Kaldor. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pianta, Mario and Federico Silva. 2003. Globalisers from Below. Roma: Globi Research Report.

Pianta, Mario. 2003. "Democracy vs. Globalization. The Growth of Parallel Summits and Global Movements.", Pp. 232-56 in Debating Cosmopolitics, edited by D. Archibugi. London: Verso.

Pianta, Mario and Raffaele Marchetti. 2006. "The Transnational Context of the Global Justice Movements." forthcoming in The Global Justice Movement/s: A Cross-national and Transnational Perspective, edited by D. della Porta. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Zola, Duccio and Raffaele Marchetti. 2006. "The Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy of Global Justice Movement: The Transnational GJMOs." DEMOS Project Report, Work package 3.

Marchetti, Raffaele and Mario Pianta. 2006. "Transnational Networks in Global Social Movements." Unpublished manuscript.

Pianta, Mario and Duccio Zola. 2007. "La montée en puissance des mouvements altermondialistes." Forthcoming in La génealogie des mouvements antimondialistes, edited by I. Sommier, O. Fillieule and E. Agrikolinasky. Paris : Karthala.

Democratic practices in the French Global Justice Movement

By Hélène Combes and Isabelle Sommier
(CRPS Paris I)
Translation : Francine Simon Ekovitch

1. Introduction

The main goal of this French report consists in explaining the peculiarities of the French case, which emerged in the cross-national analysis using quantitative and qualitative data collected with the WP4 questionnaire[15] and interpreting them in the light of case knowledge.

This report, which covers 28 organizations of the GJM nebula, explores the very different dimensions of the militant activities of these organizations. One part of the questionnaire focused on the internal functioning of the organizations and their vision of internal democracy, another part on the relationship of the organizations with the institutions and on their main forms of action. Finally, the last part concerns their relationship with the GJM. With this Work Package we tried to apply the same analytical model developed for other parts of our research (WP1 and WP3, the latter having given quite unsatisfying results in the French case because of source problems) to actual practices of democracy (as declared by our interviewees) of a broad range of SMOs belonging to the GJM.

The first part of this report will focus on the internal life of the organizations[16] (part 1). We will first stress the differences between the WP3 and the WP4 (§1). We will then focus on the internal decision-making practices (§2), and the organizational characteristics (§3). The second part will be centered on the external life of the organizations (Part 2). We will analyze the type of interactions with the institutions (§1) and the organizational strategies (§2). In the last part, we will focus in details on the type of relations the selected organizations establish with the GJM. On the base of the elaboration of a typology, we will look at the characteristics of the "alter generation" (§1), of the old organizations which identified with the GJM label (§2) and of the organizations which refuse to be identified with it.

2. The internal life of organizations

2.1 Differences between the WP3 and the WP4

Considering table 1, we notice a very important difference between the WP3 and the WP4 results in terms of models of democracy. We cannot interpret these differences as proof of a divorce between the written documents (analyzed in the WP3) and the practices of the organizations (analyzed through the interviews in the WP4), as this may be the case for other teams.

[15] For 23 organizations, we realized face-to-face interviews with members of the direction. For 5 organizations, the questionnaire was transmitted by e-mail. Isabelle Sommier and Francine Simon did 4 interviews each one; Hélène Combes realized the rest of the interviews. For a presentation of the organizations, see Crettiez and Sommier 2006.

[16] We will not present a methodological section at the beginning of the report. The methodological problems will be directly discussed during the analysis of the different aspects of the WP4 survey. More generally, we have given particular importance to the reflexive analysis upon our questions, and we have analyzed the various answers of the people interviewed according to the way in which they "received" the questions, on the basis of the organizational characteristics (militant traditions, context of the interviews, etc.) or the position of the organization or interviewee within the activist field. The precise methodological aspects, as well as the critical analysis of the interviews, seem to us impossible to be dissociated from the global analysis. These aspects will thus be presented within the different sections.

Table 1 – Sampling for the different Work Packages (%)

Democratic models	**WP3 (FRENCH SAMPLE)**	**WP4 (FRENCH SAMPLE)**	**WP4 (FULL SAMPLE)**
Associational	50.0	28.6	26.4
Deliberative representative	17.9	42.9	31.9
Assembleary	14.3	14.3	7.7
Deliberative participative	3.6	3.6	21.4
Not classified	--	--	12.6
Missing cases	14.3	10.7	--
Total WP2	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(28)	(182)

Considering the problems of access to the sources that the French team has faced, it is difficult to determine to which extent the variation of the results between the WP3 and the WP4 is due to a gap between the practices and the written texts, and to which extent it is due to methodological problems faced during the elaboration of the database of the WP3.[17] It is nevertheless very interesting to show the evolution of the classification and to develop our analysis on the basis of the classification coming from WP4.

Table 2 – Shifting classification of sampled groups on the dependent variable

Name of the group	DEPENDENT VARIABLE		
	WP3 CLASSIFICATION	WP4 CLASSIFICATION	%
LCR	Associational	Deliberative Representative	28.6
CRID	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Agir contre la guerre	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
CEDETIM	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
CGT	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Fondation Copernic	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Confédération paysanne	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Agir ici	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Espaces Marx	Assembleary	Deliberative representative	3.6
Co-errances	Assembleary	Associational	3.6
MJC	Associational	Assembleary	3.6
Ac !	Deliberative Representative	Deliberative Participative	3.6
ATTAC	Deliberative Representative	Associational	3.6

[17] In the French case few documents were available on the websites and we were not able to get them from the organizations on time for the coding.

Pajol	Deliberative participative	Missing case	21.1
Solidaires	Deliberative representative	Missing case	
Les intergalactiques	Deliberative representative	Missing case	
Samizdat	Missing case	Associational	
DAL-No Vox	Missing case	Assembleary	
Forum social d'Ivry	Missing case	Missing case	
All other cases (9)		*No changes*	32.1

According to the WP4 classification (figure 1), only one organization belongs to the deliberative participative model: *Agir contre le chomage*. There are also quite few organizations of the assembleary model: it is the case for *Act-up* (on this organization see Fillieule and Broqua 2001), CIP (*Coordination des intermittents et précaires*, seasonal employees in the culture and spectacles), DAL-No Vox, international network "against neo-liberalism", and the MJC (*Mouvement des Jeunes communistes* – Young communist movement).[18] The organizations belonging to the associational model represent almost one third of the cases: it is the case of Amnesty international,[19] ATTAC,[20] *CIMADE*[21] (organization helping refugees and migrants), *Co-errances* (culture cooperative),[22] FSU[23] (the bigger trade union in the sector of public education), LDH (*Ligue des Droits de l'Homme* - Human Rights League)[24], *les Verts* (Green party)[25] and *Samizdat*[26] (small alternative press agency). Finally, the organizations belonging to the deliberative representative model are the most numerous and constitute in the French sample, by far, the most important group. As a matter of fact, this model is more present in the French sample than in the whole sample (for an understanding of French social movement organizations see Sommier 2003, Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005).

[18] http://www.novox.ras.eu.org
[19] http://www.amnesty.asso.fr
[20] http://www.france.attac.org
[21] http://www.cimade.org
[22] http://www.co-errances.org
[23] http://www.fsu-fr.org
[24] http://www.ldh-france.org
[25] http://www.lesverts.fr
[26] http://infos.samizdat.net

Figure 1 - Models of Internal Democracy

Decision-making method: Consensus	*Decision-making body: delegation of power*	
	Low	**High**
Low	**Assembleary** 16.0% (9.8) Act-up, CIP, DAL-NoVox, MJC.	**Associational** 32.0% (30.4) Amnesty Internationale, Attac, Cimade, Co-errances, FSU, LDH, Les Verts, Samizdat.
High	**Deliberative participative** 4.0% (21.7) AC!	**Deliberative representative** 48.0% (38.0) Agir contre la guerre, Agir Ici, CCFD, Cedetim, CGT, Confédération Paysanne, CRID, Espaces Marx, Fondation Copernic, Greenpeace, LCR, Solidaires.

N=28, missing cases: Pajol, Forum social d'Ivry, Les intergalactiques

The importance of this dataset refers quite certainly to the specificity of the French sample, which is the presence in the *altermondialiste* space of organizations which hold concurrently the following characteristics : their longevity and consequently a set of topics that is very prior to the emergence of the altermondialiste cause (with the exception of the *Fondation Copernic*), an organizational model which orientates them toward a complex structure requiring the delegation of power, either because of the numerical importance of the group (unions) or because of the party structure (LCR), or because they are umbrella organizations. Thus, two thirds of the organizations related to the deliberative representative category came into existence between 1969 and 1989.

2.2 Internal decision-making practices

The table below presents some features of the internal decision-making and organizational structure of the selected French SMOs. As for the most important decision-making body, we found almost no differences between the French sample and the overall sample. First of all, the president does not appear as the central figure of the decision making process within the organizations, and even less than in the overall sample. In France, like in the overall sample, the assembly plays a slightly less important role. It is the executive committee that clearly appears as the central decision-making body. In the 60% of the cases, it is the most important decision-making body (versus 44% for the overall sample). Some organizations emphasize that this can also depend on short-term factors. As the respondent for LHD stressed, "What is the main decision-making body? It depends. In general, the board, but depending on the current events it may also be the president".[27]

A certain number of organizations claim that they function in a very informal way. One of the members of Samizdat stated: "Officially, we are an association subject to the 1901 law, but we actually do not function like an association. We don't have a general assembly. We don't care. We are a group of seven friends, and what matters for the decision-making is the length of service and

[27] Pierre Barge, executive committee LDH, May 2006.

the work done".[28] The *Intergalactiques* also declare that they have a 'very informal' way of functioning, "making decisions by phone among organizers most involved in some campaigns which require rapid decision-making".[29]

Table 3 – Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%) - (recoded variable)

Most important decision-making body	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
President / leader / secretary / director	3.6	11.5
Executive committee/management/staff/heads of division/secretariat/CDA	60.7	44.0
Assembly/open meeting	21.4	28.6
Thematic group	0.0	4.4
Other bodies[30]	14.3	11.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)
Decision-making method of the main decisional body		
Majority and others	79.2	50.3
Consensus	20.8	49.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(24)	(169)
Size of the main decisional body		
Less than 30	30.8	51.9
Between 30 and 100	26.9	25.9
More than 100	42.3	22.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(162)

NB – 0 (most important body), 4 (main body decisional method) and 2 (main body size) missing cases

The decisions of the main *decisional body* are mostly taken by a majority vote. However, in the majority of cases, we found a mixture of different procedures. A certain number of organizations, like the Greens (*Les Verts*), *CRID*, *JC* (*Jeunes communistes*), *Contre la guerre* (Against War), etc., make decisions by consensus but, if this consensus is not reached, they use the vote. One of the members of Verts claimed: "It depends on the decisions. The majority of our decisions are made with consensus but sometimes we recurred to the vote".[31] As the respondent for LHD stressed, "When there is a vote within the executive committee it means there is a crisis!".[32]

The organizations employing consensus are mainly groups whose main body is the executive committee. The recourse to pure and direct majority vote is actually quite rare. It is in general the

[28] Jean Pierre Masse, informal president of Samizdat, April 2006.
[29] Marie-Laure, Member of the staff of Intergalactiques, March 2006.
[30] The "other committees" refer to very different levels of structure, depending on the group, which may appear or not in the organizational chart. In other words, it may refer to a *de facto* but not statutory functioning, like bodies bringing together different working commissions in the CIP, the employees (for instance in the CCFD) or the different levels of the unions' structures.
[31] Patrick Farbiaz, International secretary of the *Verts*, May 2006.
[32] Christian Pilichowski, Metallurgist Federation Committee and Jean-Pierre Joubier, Confederation Committee and International Secretary, May 2006.

case with older organizations (created before the 1980s) having a quite important number of militants, like the *CIMADE*, the *LDH* or the *LCR*.

In one fifth of the cases, the decision-making procedure is only consensus. As the spokesperson of *No Vox* said "We have debates but do not vote. We don't want to find ourselves in a situation of vote. There is a certain degree of autonomy of each group. Those who want to go ahead on an action go and the others don't".[33] For the trade union *Solidaires*, "We have a very particular way of functioning. We adopt the rule of consensus and each category has a vote". One of the members of Cedetim (thirdworldists) claimed "In 30 years we have never voted. If there is no compromise, it is not a good thing. We discuss again the question until we find a compromise".[34] One must notice that the word respondents tend to use is "compromise" and not "consensus". The word "consensus" is actually not always mentioned, as in the following case: "it is very rare to have a vote. We try to build projects. Therefore we don't have a reason to vote".[35] The word consensus is even sometimes rejected. The person responsible for *Co-errances* prefers to talk about "unanimity", a word which seems to be "softer" and which would be a form of "consensus, but not flabby".[36] The vision, sometimes negative, of the consensus in the French activist landscape (even for the organizations which use it) was shown through these two examples. It is important to keep in mind that this negative connotation actually exists in the French language.

As table 4 illustrates in almost four fifths of the French cases, the organizations have an executive committee, which in turn in the 60% of the cases makes its decisions by consensus. Being most of the times composed by a limited number of members, the executive committee tends to functioning by consensus. In almost the 90% of the cases, the executive committee is elected by the assembly; this figure is close to the overall sample.

Table 4 – Characteristics of the executive committee (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Yes	78.6	65.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (181)
Decision-making method of the executive		
Majority + other	40.9	46.2
Consensus	59.1	53.8
Total **(N)**	100.0 (22)	100.0 (119)
Election of the executive committee		
By an assemblearian body	88.2	86.2
By other bodies	11.8	13.8
Total **(N)**	100.0 (17)	100.0 (94)

NB – 0 (executive presence), 6 (decisional method) and 11 (executive election) missing cases

[33] Annie Pourre, spokeperson of DAL No-Vox, May 2006.
[34] Monique Crinon, executive committee member of CEDETIM, May 2006.
[35] Elisabeth Gautier, vice-president of Espaces Marx, May 2006.
[36] Christopher Yggdre, coordinator of Co-errances, May 2006.

Let's now consider the functioning of the assemblies (table 5). In the 44% of the cases, the assembly's agenda is determined by the executive committee, which is the main management body. In the 16% of the cases the president determines the agenda, and only in the 8% of the cases the assembly does so. This latest figure is lower than for the European sample. In 20% of the cases, other types of bodies do so, a higher rate than for the overall sample. It is, for instance, the case of the "coordination" of the *Intermittents* in the Ile de France region. A specific body representing the different committees meets as a mediator of all the committees and prepares the general assembly on the basis of the work of the committees. The assembly's agenda can also be determined by enlarged bodies, mostly in the large union organizations like the trade unions CGT or FSU. In the case of large NGOs with an important number of employees, they are associated, as employees, with the preparation of the general assembly (for instance in the case of CCFD).

Table 5 – Potential sources of hidden power (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
President/leader/secretary/director	16.0	15.4
Executive committee/management/staff/heads of division/secretariat/CDA	44.0	48.5
Assembly/open meeting	8.0	17.8
Small committee representing different membership's groups	12.0	5.3
Other bodies	20.0	13.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (25)	100.0 (169)
Rules of discussion		
Not present	21.7	25.0
Traditional	47.8	52.1
Innovative	4.3	5.0
Both traditional and innovative	26.1	17.9
Total **(N)**	100.0 (23)	100.0 (140)

NB – 3 (body proposing the agenda) and 5 (discussion rules) missing cases

Sometimes, the existence of another type of body has more to do with the desire for a "semantic rupture" than with the effective existence of another kind of functioning. This is for instance the case of the Greens (*Les Verts*) (Faucher 1999). It is interesting to note that this party, which wants to "do politics differently" did not adopt the classical structures of political parties (executive committee, national council, etc.), but has invented a new terminology which reflects the federative origin of the organization (e.g. Interregional national council –CNIR). However, it should be noted that the semantic rupture ("executive college" rather than "committee") did not lead to a break with practices. According to Faucher's research, the meetings of the CNIR are defined by the very representatives of the *Verts* as part of a "liturgy". Party factions dominate the meetings: they meet in advance before their representatives step in. In a more general way, the role of the different factions in the participation of the discussion during the assemblies' meetings is fundamental to the largest union and party organizations in our sample. It is for instance also the case within the CGT; before the congress, the "bureau of the congress" gathers the requests to take the floor (summarized in a few lines), then it establishes a list of speakers based upon the different internal tendencies and federations so as to respect the ideological and sectoral composition of the CGT.

In the 48% of the cases the rules of discussion can be characterized as traditional. In about one fourth of the cases there is a mixture of tradition and innovation. Some rules recur regularly: the organization of the participation in the debate ("tour de parole") (with or without time limit according to the organizations and their history), the presence of an agenda, the presence of a moderator, allowing contributors to finish their statements, the presence of people drafting the minutes, gender quota. It should be noted that in organizations composed by young people there is a desire to integrate new militants with rules of procedure of the assembly that facilitate their participation (for example *Intergalactiques* and the *Jeunes Communistes*). Around one fifth of the organizations states that it doesn't have specific rules of discussion. This is for example the case of CRID, the LDH, Attac, the Cimade as well as *Espaces Marx*. For the rules of discussion the figures in the French sample are close to those of the overall sample with only a slight overrepresentation in the mix of methods.

2.3 Organizational characteristics

As table 6 shows, in the French sample the portion of individual members is slightly higher than in the overall sample (46% compared to 34%) and constitutes the first « membership ». In almost the 40% of the cases members are both individual and collective. This is the case with the networks (No Vox, AC!, Attac, Agir contre la guerre, etc.) or the union federations (Solidaires, the FSU, the CGT). In the 16% of the cases, the membership is only collective as in the cases of CRID, the Cedetim and the CCFD because these solidarity groups are federations of organizations.

Table 6 – Number of individual members (%)

Type of members	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Individual	46.2	33.8
Collective	15.4	24.3
Both individual and collective	38.5	41.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(26)	(136)
Number of individual members		
Between 1 and 100	6.3	24.2
Between 101 and 1,000	31.3	30.5
Between 1,001 and 10,000	18.8	20.0
More than 10,000	43.8	25.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(16)	(95)
Number of collective members		
Between 1 and 10	10.0	22.2
Between 11 and 100	70.0	44.4
More than 100	20.0	33.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(63)

NB – 2 (member type), 12 (individual members), 18 (collective members) missing cases

In terms of individual members, the French sample has different characteristics than the overall sample. There are significantly fewer small organizations (organizations that have between 1 and 100 members):[37] the 6% of the French organizations against almost one fifth of the overall sample. Furthermore, there are also large organizations having more than 10,000 members: 44% against 25% for the overall sample. The magnitude of this figure is explained by the presence in the French sample of a certain number of unions very active in the alter-mondialist movement like the CGT (700,000 members, 31 federations, and hundreds of regional and local committees); Solidaires (80,000 individuals, 80 local committees and 42 federations); FSU (185,000 members and 22 unions).

A lot of groups emphasize, however, the volatility of individual memberships clearly linked to the cycles of mobilization. The JC (*Jeunes Communistes*) experienced an increase in its membership during the CPE movement (student movement against a governmental project that extended the trial period for young employees – *Contrat première embauche* - , during the spring 2006). « Agir contre la guerre », five years after its birth, saw a sharp decline in the number of its members, similarly, the CIP (*Coordination des intermittents et précaires*) saw its greatest number of members during the mobilization of the precarious workers from the cultural sector in 2003).

The budgets of the organizations in the French sample contain several specificities in relation to the general sample (see table 7). Firstly, the budgets are, in a less important proportion, quite variable and fluctuating: only 5% of the organizations in the French sample declare having a variable budget, while 13% of the organizations in the overall sample declare so. This weakness is no doubt explained by the important role of public funds given to organizations under the 1901 law (Barthelemy 2000). The groups who have opted for this status accede quite easily (especially the bigger ones) to funding from municipal and other local institutions. This financial dependency from public money is very evident in the case of trade unions.

Secondly, the organizations that have a budget of more than 500,000 euros are more numerous in the French sample that in the overall sample: 36% against 30%. Here also the explanation is to be found in the presence of large unions but also political parties and large NGOs. Amnesty declares having a budget of 15 million euros and Greenpeace 6.5 million (including salaries). The CCFD has a budget of 37 million euros; *Agir ici* 1 million; *les Verts* more than one million; *Co-errances,* a cooperative of cultural distribution (journals, videos, etc.), 400,000 euros; Act-up 550,000 euros; the LDH about 150,000 euros.

Table 7 – Main resources of the groups (%)

Budget of the groups	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Highly variable	4.5	13.2
None	4.5	4.6
Less than 10,000	13.6	15.2
Between 10,000 and 500,000	40.9	37.1
More than 500,000	36.4	29.8
Total **(N)**	100.0 (22)	100.0 (151)

[37] It is interesting to note that among the very small organizations, several belong to the post-Seattle generation.

Paid staff		
None	28.6	30.5
Up to 15	42.9	44.6
Between 15 and 100	10.7	14.7
More than 100	17.9	10.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (177)
Number of volunteers		
Less than 16	23.8	33.5
Between 16 and 100	28.6	34.8
More than 100	47.6	31.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (21)	100.0 (158)

NB – 6 (budget), 0 (paid staff), 7 (volunteers) missing cases

It should be noted that the method used to calculate the budget varies according to the organization. As for the figures they gave us, some of them include the salaries, while others don't do so which implies a very important variation in the budget and suggests to handle these figures cautiously.

As far as the paid staff is concerned, the figures of the French sample are close to those of the whole sample. In the last twenty years several program of employment and types of contracts benefiting from state support have helped associations (*emplois jeunes*, job contracts created especially for the younger employees in the public and associative sector, or jobs created by the region, etc.). However, since the come into power of the right in 2002, a great number of associations, especially those in the popular neighbourhoods, who had been delegated certain public services or had substituted for their lack, have experienced the suppression of these jobs, and this created for certain municipalities critical situations in terms of health, assistance to immigrants (for example, among the associations in our sample, *la Cimade* manages a centre for immigrants), or sports activities for young people. The proportion of organizations that have more than 100 paid staff is slightly higher in the French sample: 18% against 11% for the overall sample.

However, where to draw the line regarding paid staffs poses a problem. Most notably in the confederations and the networks the coordinating bodies have fewer paid staff than the organizations that compose them. Thus, in a certain number of cases the indicated paid staffs concern only the national coordination or confederation and are therefore underestimated. As Gus Massiah of the network CRID said, "we cannot compete with our member-organizations (collectives, and therefore other groups). We have very few volunteers for historical reasons but our member-organizations have more salaried employees. We have three permanent staff that takes care of the functioning of the network, in addition there are those who work on specific programs".[38] These latter vary in number. Those who are considered paid staff vary according to the type of organizations as well as according to the interpretation given by the individual being interviewed. For example, *Les Verts* have 20 paid staff working at the national headquarters, but also benefit from the approximately 100 staff of the party members who hold elective office. For the Trotskyite party LCR, the elected officials – paid by the taxpayer – were counted among the permanent salaried staff: indicating a vision of the elected officials as serving the party (a part of their salary is turned over to the party).

[38] Gustave Massiah, president of CRID, May 2006.

For some organizations the number of permanent employees is not easy to determine because the employees are "loaned." The LCR for example has ten permanent technical workers at a print shop, but the print shop does not work only for the LCR and is, furthermore, a source of income for the party. *Solidaires* claimed that it is difficult to say how many employees they have as paid staff. At the national level there are no paid employees but paid public service officials are placed at its disposition. Furthermore, there are two part-timers paid by the federated unions. For the FSU, 40 persons benefit from paid time off (from 20% to 100% of their work time) but only six are permanent employees at the "confederation" level. It is, thus, difficult for the members at the national level to give a clear figure of the number of persons working full time for the entire union. This also poses a methodological problem for a few large organizations: for example the Peasant Confederation (*Confédération Paysanne*) declared 150 salaried workers (for 10,000 members); the FSU just 6 (for 185,000) "but many more at the level of the whole union".[39] Therefore there is an under-evaluation of paid staff for all the large organizations functioning in a confederation or network.

Furthermore, the Young Communists (JC) have 4-5 salaried employees at the national headquarters but "around 2,000 young people who work between 35 and 70 hours",[40] their salary depending on their needs since it is a means for the organization to help the young activists in the popular neighbourhoods to continue their studies. Besides, the JC want to show their independence from the Communist Party. It is the same for *Espaces Marx*: 3 permanent employees work for it but are paid by another organization,[41] i.e. the PCF. The organizations having more paid staff are the large NGOs: the Cimade has 110, and 300 persons work at the headquarters of Amnesty of whom 70 team members full-time and 65 permanent salaried employees.

Let us consider now volunteer workers. In the French case the term "volunteer", rather than the term "militant", was severely criticized by those interviewed and therefore raises a methodological problem. In France the term "volunteer" is clearly part of the world of NGOs and is not used by associations, unions and parties activists. Two methodological consequences follow: 1) certain organizations did not want to respond, marking their disagreement on the definition of "volunteer", and 2) the term gave place to varied interpretations. What is a volunteer? A militant? A sympathizer?

Thus the *Verts* and the Young Communists did not want to respond to the question about volunteers, signalling that this word did not have any meaning for a party or a political organization of young people. For example, the International coordinator of JC observed: "Volunteers? We know what a militant is but not a volunteer".[42] These two organizations did not therefore respond to this question; they did not provide the number of their militants and, consequently, the question was missing.

Furthermore, some organizations find it difficult to provide a figure because of the nature of their organization and the type of activism in which they engage. "Is it difficult to evaluate," explained Christopher Yggdre of Co-errances : "Distributors (bookstores, cinemas, etc.) for example, are participating indirectly on Co-errances activity. We do not do the accounting, we are on the border between work and engagement".[43] It is the same for the Coordination of the part-time entertainment and cultural workers (*intermittents*). One of the members of CIP claimed: "By definition we are wanderers. The number of persons who take part is quite variable and fluctuates a lot. Between 15 and 20 needed to keep the coordination running, but sometimes we are as many as 80".[44] There are also fluctuations related to the type of projects undertaken by the organizations, which attract more or less militants. For *Espaces Marx*, the number of volunteers is "variable depending on the project

[39] Sophie Zafari, FSU, April 2006.
[40] Denys Ostorun, International coordinator of JC, May 2006.
[41] Elisabeth Gautier, vice-president of Espaces Marx, May 2006.
[42] Denys Ostorun, International coordinator of JC, May 2006.
[43] Christopher Yggdre, coordinator of Co-errances, May 2006.
[44] Jérôme Tisserand, member of the direction of CIP, April 2006.

and the state of its development. Ranging between 50 and 200".[45] For LDH there is an implicit distinction between volunteers and militants. "A third of the members (7,000/8,000) are volunteers; 1,000 are militants and assure the everyday administration; two thirds of those go to demonstrations".[46] This answer shows the complexity of the circles of membership.

For the networks and confederations the same problem is encountered for the paid staffs. There exists a kind of competition between the organizations members of the networks of the confederations and the higher levels. For example, *Solidaires* evaluates at 300 the number of volunteers at the level of the confederation while there would be about 5,000 in the different sector-based and local component unions and 80,000 members in the confederation *Solidaires*. If a certain number of officials do not refer to the number of volunteers in the overall organization, but only to that of the confederation or network office, other organizations do the opposite and provide the larger figure of the entire network. The CCFD for example, composed of 28 groups, declares that it has 15,000 volunteers.

As we have already underlined the term "volunteer" is used essentially by NGOs and philanthropic organizations who feel comfortable with this terminology. In fact, they found it easy to respond to our question and did so without hesitation: Greenpeace and 300 by Amnesty declared 800 volunteers. The Cimade declared for example to have 1,000 to 1,500 volunteers while declaring only 300 individual militants. Another example that shows the extent to which the French term volunteer is interpreted in a very varied manner is the one of the Cimade. In this case the volunteers are considered not as members but rather persons helping the organization from time to time. According to the LDH the volunteers are a fringe group of members engaged in the activities of the organization and who are therefore somewhere between members and militants.

The figures are, thus, to be used with prudence because the term volunteer has provoked some hostile reactions or very diverse interpretations. At least in the French political lexicon it is a much fuzzier term than "militant" (activist). In the French sample there would seem to be fewer organizations with few volunteers than in the European sample (one forth versus one third) and more organizations with a considerable number of volunteers: almost half versus one third.

Table 7a – Budget of the groups for different democratic models (%)

Budget of the groups	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Less than 10,000	16.7	22.2	50.0	0.0	26.3
More than 10,000	83.3	77.8	50.0	0.0	73.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
(N)	(6)	(9)	(4)	(0)	(19)

NB - 9 missing cases

Not surprisingly, the organizations of associational et deliberative representative type are, in their very large majority (respectively 83.3 and 77.8 %) large organizations, which have the most important budgets (more than 10 000 Euros). The financial capacity of the assembleary types is fairly distributed : the CIP and No Vox, which regroup people with low resources, and which, on another hand, are small organizations, declare weak resources, whereas the MJC and Act up have a budget superior to 10 000 Euros, both because of their numerical importance and because of the public funds they get (see table 7a). All the groups, whatever the model they belong to, have

[45] Elisabeth Gautier, vice-president of Espaces Marx, May 2006.
[46] Pierre Barge, executive comittee of LDH, May 2006.

salaried employees (the result of 100% of deliberative participative organizations can be explained by the fact that only one group belongs to this model: AC!). These are often precarious jobs subsidized by the State (see table 7b).

Table 7b – Presence of paid staff for different democratic models (%)

Presence of paid staff (dummy)	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
No	12.5	25.0	25.0	0.0	20.0
Yes	87.5	75.0	75.0	100.0	80.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(8)	(12)	(4)	(1)	(25)

NB - 3 missing cases

Looking at the date of birth of the organizations and the respective generations of social movements to which they belong (table 8), it is worth underlining that the French sample is a little bit different from the overall one in that the majority of SMOs were created during the 1990s. In the case of the French sample 50% of the organizations were created before 1989 and 50% during the following decade. This balance shows the existence of a consolidated and sometimes quite old associative milieu (the LDH dates from 1898, the JC from 1920, the Cimade from 1938, the CCFD from 1961, etc.) and the emergence of new leading organizations during the 1990s (see WP1) in the framework of the "renewal of protest" (Sommier 2003) like Act-up in 1989, AC! in 1993, the FSU in 1994, the Fondation Copernic, Solidaires, Attac in 1998, etc. Only 21.4% of the organizations in the French sample belong to the post-Seattle generation (as compared to 32% of the overall sample). This shows the extent to which the "alter-mondialisation" movement has been taken over by older organizations (see below).

Table 8 – Generational belonging of selected organizations (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Before 1968	21.4	18.1
Between 1969 and 1989	28.6	18.1
Between 1989 and 1999	28.6	31.9
After 2000	21.4	31.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(144)

NB - no missing cases

In table 8a, we crossed generational belonging of French SMOs with their democratic models. In this case it is quite difficult to draw conclusions. In fact, other than the organizations that are situated in the model "deliberative representative" who in the majority date from the years 1969-1989, the number of cases is too small to provide significant results.

Table 8a – Generational belonging of different democratic models (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative participative**	
Before 1968	25.0	25.0	25.0	0.0	24.0
Between 1969 and 1989	25.0	41.7	25.0	0.0	32.0
Between 1989 and 1999	37.5	25.0	0.0	100.0	28.0
After 2000	12.5	8.3	50.0	0.0	16.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(8)	(12)	(4)	(1)	(25)

NB - 3 missing cases

3. External life of organizations

Another important aspect of our research project concerns the relationship with public institutions. As table 9 shows, we did not find important differences between the French and the overall sample. More generally, it can be said that the French organizations tend more than those in the overall sample to collaborate with institutions, but their collaboration is essentially critical.

Table 9 – Relationship with institutions (%)

International institutions	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Refusal of collaboration	8.7	14.1
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	30.4	32.8
Collaboration with restrictions	34.8	23.2
Collaboration	26.1	29.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(23)	(177)
National institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	12.5	12.8
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	4.2	22.3
Collaboration with restrictions	62.5	30.7
Collaboration	20.8	34.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(24)	(179)
Local institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	0.0	9.5
Indifference/no contacts/denial of collaboration by authorities	13.0	24.0
Collaboration with restrictions	56.5	26.3
Collaboration	30.4	40.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(23)	(179)

NB – 5 (international institutions), 4 (national institutions), 5 (local institutions) missing cases

3.1 Relationship with institutions

Before analyzing in detail the relationship with institutions, some methodological remarks are necessary in order to illustrate how our respondents perceived this aspect of the study. It should be noted first of all that the organizations in the French sample reacted in a very critical manner to this question. Certain found it schematic and simple and others did not wish to respond.

In general the criticisms were directed in two directions. Firstly, the term "collaboration" appeared too fuzzy and general. Many organizations pointed out that it is not possible to speak of all public institutions in the same way: they would not have the same attitude toward UNESCO and the World Bank (see below for the example of the CGT), the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. For a member of the executive committee of the Fondation Copernic:

"It depends on the closeness of the institutional actors to the association (the State is plural). It is impossible to give a general response: we have a positive relationship with some institutions (close to the ideas of the Fondation Copernic) and no relationship with liberal institutions".[47]

Furthermore, several organizations responded that their relationship with national or local institutions depended on the political colour of the city hall or the national government. All of this contributed to their difficulty in answering in a general fashion. Secondly, for a certain number of organizations the question of collaboration has no meaning by definition because it is a matter of representative organizations that, *de facto*, are among cooperative bodies (the unions[48]) or are themselves actors in these institutions (political parties). These two types of organizations represent the 21% of our sample and did not find the formulation of the question relevant according to their identity. The unions in our sample, for example, systematically rejected the response "collaboration" and instead spoke of "negotiation," or even "negotiation/confrontation" for the *Confédération paysanne* (Martin 2005). Furthermore, a certain number of organizations rejected the term collaboration and preferred to speak of dialogue, of interpellation and of attempts at influencing the public powers.[49]

a. Relationship with international institutions

Let's start the discussion considering the relationship with international institutions. In the 30% of the cases the organizations in the French sample had no contact with international organizations, but not by deliberate choice. There are several reasons to explain this lack of relationship. First, certain kinds of organizations do not fall into a category that would have any international cooperation. International secretary of *Les Verts* claimed: "We are a political party. The question of collaboration is not relevant",[50] the parties not having been invited to participate in any cooperation with the UN. This does not prevent *Les Verts*, however, from mobilizing for the reform of international bodies. For others, working with international organizations implies time, effort and finances that they are simply not able to provide. One of the members of the CIP claimed: "It's huge work!".[51] For others, finally, it is a matter of division of labour with the international network to which they belong. This is for example the case of the LDH: the FIDH (*Fédération Internationale des Droits de l'Homme*: International Federation for Human Rights) takes care of all the relations with international organizations.

[47] Lilian Mathieu, executive committee of Fondation Copernic, March 2006.
[48] Thus, for instance, considering that the question was irrelevant for a union, the CGT did not want to answer it.
[49] We must however remark that for reasons connected with the interpretation of the collaboration at the level of the overall sample, the answers « negotiation » or "dialogue" have been included in the category "collaboration with restriction". This answer was not initially proposed during the interviews and not all the organizations, in spite of the nuance, would recognize themselves in it.
[50] Patrick Farbiaz, International secretary of the *Verts*, May 2006.
[51] Jérôme Tisserand, member of the direction of CIP, April 2006.

In almost one tenth of the cases, the organizations in the French sample refuse contact with international organizations. This percentage is smaller than in the overall sample (14%). This is the case, for example, of *Agir contre la guerre* which severely criticizes the UN.

In about one fourth of the cases the organizations in the French sample collaborate; in around one third of the cases their collaboration is with restrictions. This collaboration is often thematic and specific. When the relations with international organizations are more systematic, they vary according to the international institutions, as the case of the CGT confirms. In the case of the ILO, the CGT participates in the tripartite bodies. There is a delegate for French workers, delegate who comes from one of the three major French unions: the CFDT, FO (Force ouvrière) and the CGT. The CGT has held the post three times. The work undertaken at the ILO is presented by the persons of the CGT who were interviewed as a very important international investment of effort. In the case of the WTO, as CGT leader declared "we try to understand, we put pressure on the French government. This is not collaboration but fight! (...) In the case of the OECD, we participate. We are members of the Union consultative committee (TUAC) but only in a consultative role. For the G8 there are no institutions. This depends on who is president: Chirac received the TUAC, Blair also did it, Bush refused it and Putin accepted it".[52] This example shows to which extent the question about collaboration acquires different meanings according to the different international organizations respondents refer to, the actors who compose them, but also the relations of power of the moment.

b. The relationship with national institutions

Let's now turn to national institutions. In only the 4% of the cases (versus the 22% in the overall sample) the organizations in the French sample did not have contact with national institutions, but such a situation is not intentional. The 13% of the groups refused collaboration, a higher percentage than for international organizations and local institutions, explained by the presence of the right in power since 2002. Other than the fact that the vast majority of the organizations are clearly situated on the left, even the far left, as we have already stated, the advent of the right led to a clear reduction in subsidies provided to the associative milieu.

In the 83% of cases, the organizations in the sample collaborated with national institutions and in the 63% of the cases this was a collaboration with restrictions. Let's consider a case of collaboration without restriction, that of the LDH. One of the members of LDH claimed: "For us, institutional work is very important (...) Our position is to participate in all negotiation bodies".[53] The person at the LDH insisted on the importance of the collaboration, a choice that appeared to him to display a difference between his organization and the majority of organizations of the alter-mondialist movement (GJM). The criticism of the positions of the alter-mondialist movement is directed at their non-recognition of the democratic character of institutions. For LDH executive committee member, "The institutions exist because they come out of the popular will, the democratic will. We are against the Sarkozy bill but Chirac came to the Congress of the LDH".[54] The recognition of the democratic character of institutions leads naturally, for the LDH, to its collaboration with them. This implicit criticism regarding the non-collaboration of the alter-mondialist movement with the institutions is not an isolated case. A member of the CIP claimed: "For the altermondialists (the GJM) there are the good guys on the one side and the bad guys on the other".[55] However, it appears that the pro-collaboration members of our sample over estimate the anti-collaboration attitude of the organizations of the GJM movement since we should recall that in our sample, in the case of national institutions, the refusal to collaborate concerned only the 13% of

[52] Christian Pilichowski, Representative of the metallurgic workers and Jean-Pierre Joubier, confederation committee and international secretary, May 2006.
[53] Pierre Barge, executive committee of LDH, May 2006.
[54] Pierre Barge, executive committee of LDH, May 2006.
[55] Jérôme Tisserand, member of the direction of CIP, April 2006.

the groups. However, there is the emblematic case of Attac. Attac, at every level, accepts meetings and discussions with different bodies but does not participate in any collaborative group with the institutions.

Furthermore, other than the problems connected to the use of the term "collaboration" already dealt with above, the notion cuts across a great variety of realities ranging from the very specific collaborations (organization of conferences in the case of *Espaces Marx*), to the establishment of partnerships with public institutions (*délégation de service public*) (in the case of the Cimade).

c. The relationship with local institutions

None of the organizations of the sample refuses to collaborate with the local institutions while it is the case of one tenth of the whole sample. Only 13% have no contact, against almost one fourth of the whole sample. The 30% collaborates and the 57% collaborates with restrictions. We must clearly emphasize that this collaboration is not systematic; it is not a collaboration of principle, but it depends largely on who is in charge of the municipality, or it focuses on very local actions: a twinning between Saint-Denis – communist municipality – and Ramallah for *Agir contre la guerre* (Act against War); common actions on the free software with the municipality of the 10th district of Paris (socialists with elected officials of *les Verts*) for Samizdat, etc.; a common effort with the municipality of Paris to help people who have Aids to have access to social housing, for Act-up, etc.

Let's consider now the result obtained by crossing the attitude of the organizations with our typology on democratic models (table 9a). The organizations classified as associational and deliberative representative tend to collaborate with all levels of power. However, since the sample is very small, it is impossible to draw strong conclusions for the organizations classified as assembleary and deliberative participative.

Table 9a – Attitude towards public institutions by different democratic models (%)

Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels (dummy)	**Democratic Models**				**Total % (N)**
	Associational	**Deliberative representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative participative**	
International	71.4	70.0	25.0	0.0	61.9 (13)
National	100.0	81.8	75.0	0.0	86.4 (19)
Local	85.7	100.0	75.0	0.0	90.5 (19)
Total (N)	7	11 (10 for national institutions)	4	1	22-23

NB – 7-6 missing cases

Besides the general attitude towards relationships with institutions, we also focused on perceptions of experiments of public decision-making promoted by the institutions (generally at the local level) to involve citizens in the political process. We asked our respondents their opinion on the capacity of these kinds of experiments to improve the quality of political decisions. The French organizations show a very similar attitude towards public decision-making, compared with the overall sample (table 10). In the 39% of the cases, the organizations of the French sample do not have an opinion on the question. In the 43% of the cases, they think it improves public decision-making.

Table 10 – Attitudes towards public decision-making (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
No	17.9	19.4
Yes	42.9	37.2
No definite position	39.3	43.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(180)
Evaluation of public decision-making		
Negative	23.5	31.6
Both negative and positive	17.6	17.3
Positive	58.8	51.0
Total (N)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (98)

NB – 0 (judgment of quality improvement) and 11 (evaluation) missing cases

There are two explanations for the positive answers. First of all, the positive answers come from post-Seattle organizations that refer in a recurrent way to Porto Alegre. However, it should be noted that sometimes the reference is made to Porto Alegre and not to concrete French experiences in which a procedure of participatory budget have been implemented. Secondly, the large NGOs, very integrated within the negotiation instances answered in a very positive way, too. This was the case of Greenpeace, Amnesty, CCFD, Agir Ici, as members of the different organizations declared.

"By definition, dialogue improves the quality of debates, the assessment of the needs and the real expectations".[56]

"These are spaces of interaction between participatory democracy and representative democracy".[57]

"This guarantees better information for the decision makers, a better appropriation by the citizens. Because we believe that representative democracy is inescapable but shows limits and must be combined with participatory democracy".[58]

"Because transparency and citizen control play a key role in democracy, and because an open and transparent decision-making process necessarily changes the decision".[59]

The creation of consultative authorities has allowed the more institutionalized organizations to have access to public powers and to assert or claim for a representativeness that they did not have previously. Very specific procedures linked with the sector-based activities of the organizations were also mentioned (in the case of Act up, the process of elaboration of the public health law).

For all the organizations who answer positively, the goal is clearly to improve representative democracy by combining it with forms of participatory democracy. It is thus not a matter of putting in question representative democracy, but to find ways to improve it.

The 18% of the organizations of the French sample think that these procedures do not improve public decision-making processes. The FSU mentioned for instance the debates on the reform of the

[56] Amnesty International, June 2006.
[57] Yannick Jadot, leader of campaign, Greenpeace, June 2006.
[58] Jean-Marie Fardeau, general secretary of the CCFD, May 2006.
[59] Agir Ici, July 2006.

UN and emphasized that the real question is: "What are the spaces for social movements in democracy?". For the *Confederation Paysanne*, "it is a mockery of democracy: we are listened to but we are not heard. The decisions taken do not take at all in account the opinion we have expressed".[60] The *Fondation Copernic* pointed out that "the devices are very heterogeneous and of differentiated impact, depending on the cases".[61] DAL and No Vox declared themselves "dubious" and claimed autonomy toward politics.

Finally, we asked our respondents what kind of funding their organizations receive. We present information related to the type of funds in the section regarding the relationship with institutions because we are especially interested in the sources of funding of the different groups and, more precisely, in assessing if they receive public money or not. In the French case, about one fifth of the organizations do not have any funding. This figure, higher than for the overall sample, concerns small organizations. For more than one third of the organizations, the funding comes only from members; this is a lower percentage than in the whole sample. This should be understood as a deliberate choice of the organizations that in this way hope to guarantee their independence. In only the 4% of the cases, the funds come only from the government. If we look in detail at the different sources of funding, we see that three quarters of the organizations receive money from their members; 43% from the government; 36% of the organizations also finance their activity though the selling of services or goods. Finally, the 14% receives funding from non-governmental sources. This figure is lower than in the rest of the sample (37%) and shows that, in the French case, the GJM is much less penetrated by the non-governmental funds than in the other countries where the research took place: there is in fact a weaker presence of the NGOs and/or a weaker collaboration of the organizations of the sample with the NGOs. A quite important number of organizations of the French sample declared to finance their activities thanks to donations (from non-members). A kind of militant patronage (sponsorship) coming from prominent individuals, has developed during the nineties. For instance, Agnès B, a worldwide well-known designer, who owns many shops all over the world, has very frequently financed during the past years protest-oriented organizations. Cultural organizations like Co-errances and the CIP or organizations like Act-up have benefited from this type of sponsorship in the past.

Do sources of funding matter in explaining the adoption of different democratic models? As table 11a illustrates, the funding by the membership is more important for the deliberative representative organizations. However, we must recall again that in the cases of assembleary and deliberative participative groups, the sample is really too small to be analyzed.

[60] Gérard Durand, inter national spokesman of Confederation Paysanne, June 2006.
[61] Lilian Mathieu, executive committee of Fondation Copernic, March 2006.

Table 11a – Funding by different democratic models (%)

Sources of funding	Democratic Models				Total % (N)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Members	62.5	91.7	50.0	100.0	76 (19)
Governmental	50.0	33.3	50.0	100.0	44 (11)
Non governmental	12.5	8.3	25.0	0.0	12 (3)
Sales of goods/service/rent	50.0	25.0	50.0	0.0	36 (9)
Type of funding					
None	25.0	8.3	50.0	0.0	20 (5)
Only from members	25.0	58.3	0.0	0.0	36 (9)
Only from governments	12.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	4 (1)
Both from members and governments	37.5	33.3	50.0	100.0	40 (10)
Total **(N)**	100.0 (8)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (1)	100 (25)

3.2 Organizational Strategies

Let us see now the main issues. Table 12 provides a very good illustration of the specificities of the French GJM in relation to the other European countries. If the differences regarding the social issues and the democracy issues are not significant, it is very different with the other issues. The religious groups are totally absent in the French sample, whereas they represent 2.2% of the cases in the other countries. The new social movement issues are significantly less important (19.2% against 30.4%), which is related to their lesser historical importance in France. The most spectacular difference regards international issues, on which the French are very recessed compared to the other GJM organizations (26.9% against 63.5%), which testifies the very nationally centered character of the French GJM and, more widely, of the weak implication of the French organizations in the international issues.

Table 12 – Main issues of activity of the group (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Social issues	65.4	68.0
International issues	26.9	63.5
New social movement issues	19.2	30.4
Democracy	19.2	21.0
Religion	0.0	2.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (26)	100.0 (181)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100 % because of the possibility of multiple responses

As table 13 illustrates, the construction of alternatives is the most frequent strategy adopted by French organizations: the 86% of the organizations declared that they are engaged in building concrete alternatives. The 79% of the groups declared to adopt protest, which is a figure very close to the whole sample. For the 79% of the organizations, also political education and raising

awareness are one of their main strategies. This figure is lower than the one of the whole sample (91%) and nuances the results of the analysis of the websites (WP2) that showed that the French sample was the one in which political education was the most present. Besides, the French sample is characterized by a lower recourse to lobbying (43% versus 56% of the overall sample): a result that can be explained by the negative vision of lobbying in France. Finally, the French sample is very close to the overall sample in terms of overlapping strategies.

Table 13 – Main strategies of the groups (%)

Main strategies of the group	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Protest	78.6	78.0
Building concrete alternatives	85.7	73.6
Lobbying	42.9	56.0
Political education/raising awareness	78.6	91.2
Number of overlapping strategies		
0-1	10.7	7.1
2	21.4	21.4
3	39.3	36.3
4	28.6	35.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100 % because of the possibility of multiple responses

As for use of different strategies by different democratic models (table 13a), we can notice that the organizations belonging to the associative model tend to make less recourse to political education, raising awareness and lobbying than the rest of the French sample.

Table 13a – Main strategies of different democratic models (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total % (N)**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Protest	75.0	83.3	100.0	100.0	84 (21)
Building concrete alternatives	87.5	83.3	100.0	100.0	88 (22)
Lobbying	37.5	50.0	75.0	0.0	48 (12)
Political education / raising awareness	50.0	91.7	75.0	100.0	76 (19)

Number of overlapping strategies					
1	12.5	8.3	0.0	0.0	8 (2)
2	37.5	16.7	0.0	0.0	20 (5)
3	37.5	33.3	50.0	100.0	40 (10)
4	12.5	41.7	50.0	0.0	32 (8)
Total **(N)**	100.0 (8)	100.0 (12)	100.0 (4)	100.0 (1)	100.0 (25)

Considering now specific forms of action, table 14 shows that the most used one is demonstration (93% of the sample). This means that only one organization of our sample did not recur to it. Thus, even the most institutionalized organizations use this method of action. This rate is actually higher in the French case than for the rest of the sample. This confirms the tendency of the French organizations to make a frequent recourse to this type of action. The second most used form is the petition (82%). The recourse to civil disobedience is also very important in the French case: the 71% versus the 36% of the whole sample. As a matter of fact, the recourse to civil disobedience developed in France under the influence of the *Confédération Paysanne*, an organization which is part of our sample. The dismantling of the McDonald's in Millau (south of France) and above all the mowing of GMO fields have been presented by this organization as actions of civil disobedience. These actions have even led to the creation of the organization *Les Faucheurs Volontaires*, composed by members of the *Confédération Paysanne, Les Verts*, etc.. In their charter, the *Faucheurs Volontaires* present themselves as a civil disobedience association.[62]

Table 14 – Repertoire of action of the groups (%)

Forms of action	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Petition	82.1	74.7
Demonstration	92.9	77.5
Strike	21.4	24.7
Boycott of certain products	32.1	31.3
Blockade	35.7	26.4
Occupation of buildings	50.0	20.9
Civil disobedience	71.4	36.3
Artistic/cultural performance	64.3	59.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (182)

NB – no missing cases

Les Verts have quite frequently developed actions of civil disobedience. For instance, in 2004, the mayor of Bègles, Noël Mamère, who is also a member of parliament, a national leader of *Les Verts*, and who has a significant media presence, officiated the marriage of a homosexual couple, whereas gay marriage is not legal in France. This ceremony was presented as an act of civil disobedience challenging an iniquitous law. Noël Mamère has also participated in mowing GMO fields and claims the recourse to civil disobedience as a legitimate repertory of a green activist and

[62] http://www.monde-solidaire.org/spip/article.php3?id_article=1342.

an elected official of *Les Verts*. On the website of *Les Verts*, the page devoted to him as a deputy actually includes a civil disobedience section.[63]

Even local sections of the CGT union, which is very institutionalized, had resort to some forms of civil disobedience. In order to protest against the risks of privatization of the electricity company EDF, CGT activists in the company, during operations called « Robin Hood », re-established the electricity in the buildings located in popular districts or reduced the electricity bills (Béroud 2005).

More generally, the importance of the recourse to civil disobedience in the French sample is connected with the current circumstances and with the mobilization against the policy of the interior minister on the subject of immigration. The network *Education sans frontières*[64] (Education without borders) was created to fight against the practice of repatriating immigrants' sons enrolled in school in France and their families. This network has invited the teachers and the parents to disobey the law, and hide children and adults who risk to be expelled. Elected representatives of the left, in collaboration with this network, took care children threatened with expulsion in their municipalities with French citizens, involving sometimes personalities who have significant media coverage or parents who have their children enrolled in the same school of a child under threat of expulsion. This is a strategy to show that the law can violate the principle of fraternity. A significant number of organizations of our sample –Attac, Cimade, Cedetim, Dal, LDH, FSU, Solidaires– have played a major role, in the network *Education sans frontières*, or have supported it (i.e. LCR and *Les Verts)*.

More generally, it is interesting to underline that in all these actions of civil disobedience, the elected representatives of the left – communists, *Verts* and sometimes socialists – are present and active. They often participate in these actions with their insignia of mayors with the colors of the French flag.

Another type of form of action employed by our organizations is the recourse to artistic activities. This recourse is frequent (almost two thirds of the cases). However, the survey shows that it is often a secondary (subordinate) form of action which is generally associated with another one (i.e. a concert at the end of a demonstration or in an occupied building). For the organizations of our sample, artistic activities are rarely a form of action on their own.

The occupation of buildings is also much more used in France (half of the organizations) than in the rest of the sample (one fifth of the groups). This form of action has been used in particular by the movement of the «sans» (i.e. without shelter, without home). On the contrary, the strike is in the French case a form of protest almost exclusively used by the unions.

As a conclusion, we can say that in France the repertoire of protest, if we borrow Charles Tilly's expression, consists mostly in demonstrating, petitioning and performing acts of civil disobedience.

Although the French groups are less interested in the international issues and give preference to national issues (see table 12), they are nonetheless very active in the international campaigns and are then comparable to the other GJM organizations (81% in both cases). This shows their good integration in the international networks, to which they take good care of, each in their own fields (international solidarity with for instance a campaign against the debt, campaigns against unemployment and precariousness, implication in the migrations issues, etc.). But the French GJM shows a difference if we consider the weak implication at the local scale, to the benefit of the national scale (81% against 54.3% in the other countries), in accordance with the French centralizing tradition.

Regarding the national issues/political parties/think tanks (9,5% against 21,7%) and the campaigns about democracy (4,8 against 27,9), the low results of the French GJM compared to the whole sample can perhaps be explained by a clearer sharing of the roles between political parties and associations, but also a stronger mistrust between the two spheres.

[63] http://noelmamere.org/rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=34.
[64] http://www.educationsansfrontieres.org/sommaire.php3.

Table 15 – Characteristics of campaigns (%)

Issues of campaigns	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Social issues	38.1	42.6
International issues	81.0	81.4
National issues/political parties/think thanks	9.5	21.7
Democracy	4.8	27.9
New social movement issues	23.8	11.6
Territorial levels of campaigns		
Local	9.5	22.5
National	81.0	54.3
International	81.0	74.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (21)	100.0 (129)

NB – 7 missing cases

We will now look at the evaluation of the role of Internet for the organizational communication strategy (table 16). Only one fourth of the organizations in the French sample consider that the Internet had a positive effect in their communication with public administration and, more widely, with the political system. For the 71% of them, the role of the Internet in the relation with public powers and political officials is negative. This actually means that for these organizations the Internet did not facilitate the access to public authorities. We must underline that this question has provoked some surprise and even some sarcasm among the people interviewed. This reaction, as well as the negative rate, which is much higher than in the rest of the sample, shows that the Internet is not yet used to facilitate the relation with the institutions. This tendency can also be found to some extent, although in a much less clear way, in the relation with the media. In the French sample, the 52% of the organizations think that the Internet has improved the relation with the media, a figure which is much lower than that of the rest of the sample (almost three quarters of the groups). These answers do not refer to a more direct contact with the journalists, but to the fact that the journalists go on the organization's website either to keep up to date with the current events of the protest movement, or to use information proposed by the organizations (i.e. expertise, or current events of the countries of the South).

Table 16 – Evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
Negative	70.8	49.6
Both negative and positive	4.2	3.0
Positive	25.0	47.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (24)	100.0 (133)
Internet and mass media		
Negative	42.9	18.7
Both negative and positive	4.8	7.3
Positive	52.4	74.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (21)	100.0 (150)
Internet and members		
Negative	7.7	2.6
Both negative and positive	26.9	13.5
Positive	65.4	84.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (26)	100.0 (156)

NB – 4 (public administrators), 7 (mass media), 2 (members) missing cases

As for internal communication with the members of the organizations, the positive answers amount to a total of almost two thirds of the groups. Here again, the result is lower than for the rest of the sample (84%). About a quarter of the respondents considers that the Internet has both positive and negative aspects in the relations with their members.

Some organizations underlined the difficulties of « governability » sometimes provoked by debates on the discussion lists. For instance, the crisis of ATTAC (see French WP3) has often been emphasized via forums and discussion lists by the rebellion of some members against a few founding members who were holding the organization with an iron hand. The leaders of the organizations underlined the sometimes very destabilizing effect of the intervention of « problematical individuals ». However, what shows through here is the difficulty of managing the « too much » democracy. Another part of the critics toward the Internet has to do with the fact that this instrument favors those most endowed with social and cultural capacities. In the discussion lists, the militants who have an easy relation with written culture succeed more easily in imposing their position than the militants who have a difficulty in participating in the debate. Furthermore, in the case of the movements of the "sans", as No Vox underlines, access to the Internet is very difficult for the poorest.

The positive answers touch mostly on the diffusion of information. As a matter of fact, the use of the Internet is appreciated mainly because of its use in the internal communication of the organization. It allows to avoid a lot of expenses (paper, stamps, personnel) and to diffuse information, statements, calls for demonstrations, and all kinds of initiatives, very fast and at a very low cost. However the Internet does not replace the face-to-face relations, which are of course necessary for organizations whose whole membership does not use the Internet (i.e. groups of "sans" and unions), and also for purposes of militant sociability.

4. Relationship with the "altermondialiste" movement

As table 17 illustrates, a very high 96% of the sampled organizations participated either in a world social forum, or in a European forum. This figure is clearly higher than for the rest of the sample (three quarters of the groups). This can be explained by the scheduling of the ESF in Paris in 2003, and by the very important involvement of a certain number of organizations in the very birth of the social forums and the role of Attac in the organization of the WSF. The participation in national social forums is also much higher in the French case than for the overall sample (82% against 54%) although the number of local forums is low in France. As a matter of fact, the desire of Attac to control the setting of the local forums (see WP3) has undoubtedly been a factor that explains that eventually, after several conflicts, few local forums survived.

Table 17 – Participation in movement's events (%)

Participation in movement's events	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
World/European social forums	96.4	75.8
National/local social forums	82.1	53.8
Counter-summits	85.7	69.2
Global days of action	89.3	75.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

NB – no missing cases

The organizations of the French sample also participated more often in global days of action and in counter-summits (86% against 69% for the whole sample) especially with the organization of the protest against the G8 in Evian (spring 2003). However, these figures clearly contrast with the sense of belonging to the alter-mondialist movement.

Table 18 shows that the 18% of the organizations of the sample consider not to belong to the *alter-mondialiste* movement against only the 6% of the whole sample. The 14% does not have a shared view (versus the 2% in the overall sample). As we will see, this configuration mostly appears in the case of plural organizations, in which some members are very involved especially in the organization of the forums, but whereas others are not at all. The 14% of the groups declared to belong to the alter-mondialiste movement but showing some reluctance. Only the 54% of the organizations fully identify with the *alter-mondialiste* movement against the 86% of the whole sample.

Table 18 – Sense of belonging to the movement (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**France**	**Rest of the sample (excluding France)**
No	17.9	6.0
The group doesn't have a shared view	14.3	1.6
Yes, but with reservations	14.3	8.9
Yes	53.6	83.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

NB – no missing cases

We will now look in details into this relation with the *alter-mondialiste* movement, illustrating how in the French case the sense of belonging to this movement is not always related with the degree of involvement of the organizations.

One can clearly distinguish three groups among the organizations which compose our sample: 1) the "GJM" o "*alter-mondialiste* generation; 2) the old organizations which use the *alter-mondialiste* label; 3) the organizations which reject the identification with the "*alter-mondialiste* movement.

4.1 Alter-mondialiste generation

In this case the identification is immediate. It is of course the case of Attac, of the Copernic foundation or of the "Intergalactiques" (name inspired from the meeting organized by the Zapatistas in Chiapas in 1996).The Intergalactiques defined the GJM movement as "a way to locate the debate on a global scale", a way "to link national issues with decision-making processes on a world scale and to denounce the lack of transparency and of democracy within decisions" and as "a struggle of ideas on a world scale which allows an exchange of experiences and practices".[65]

The intergalactic network was born just after the "illegal G8" campaign and the experience of the intergalactic village against the Evian G8 "during which real convergences appeared between different components of the movement, about our aspirations as well as our practices. Our groups find their way in the large movement of struggles which is being built since Seattle. Mobilized against capitalist globalization, its disastrous social and environmental effects, its un-egalitarian, sexist and racist characteristics. We participate in the resistances to the imperialist wars and occupations, too. Persuaded that other worlds are possible, we want to oppose to their globalization not a national and chilly withdrawal, but another globalization: a globalization of struggles and solidarities".[66] This network is mostly composed by young people under 30, most of whom became activists when the GJM emerged.[67]

The intergalactic network presents itself as a tool which enables to merge experiences and to coordinate the mobilization campaigns. They explained that: "By reinforcing the local deep rooting of the GJM and by diversifying the struggle strategies, we want to grope for concrete and emancipatory ways of transforming social relations".[68]

The Copernic foundation is another example of organization which can be, in a certain way, classified within the GJM generation. The Copernic foundation was created in 1998 in the context of a new thinking on "the consequences of neo-liberalism". It defines the GJM as "the protest against neo-liberalism on a world scale and the promotion of alternative policies" therefore fully identifies with the GJM.

4.2 The reappropriation of the "GJM" label

a. Methodological Remarks

In the case of organizations which do not belong to the "GJM generation", the relationship of our respondents with the GJM is not without consequence on how they position their organization in the GJM. We have mainly interviewed two types of people:

The chairmen or vice-chairmen of the organizations, who hold very varied and variable relations with the GJM, and who have sometimes represented its organization in the social forums, and

[65] Interview with Marie-Laure, *the Intergalactiques.*
[66] http://www.intergalactique.lautre.net/article.php3?id_article=1.
[67] Les intergalactiques, *Génération alter*, Paris, éditions Syllepse, 2003.
[68] http://www.intergalactique.lautre.net/article.php3?id_article=1.

sometimes not. We notice that these leaders who don't have a very sustained commitment to the GJM have a tendency to answer that their organization does not belong to the GJM.

Members of the leadership very involved in the GJM. Contacts with them were made during meetings in the WSF or even the ESF in Athens. There are several implications on the self perception or the discourse which is presented: either an internal critical vision or – this is more often the case – a tendency to over value the commitment of their organization in the movement or to present the commitment in the GJM as central, when sometimes some internal indicators (reference to the GJM in the documents of the organization for instance) don't seem to show the same orientation. We then suggest that the answer given in the interviews has more to do with the *personal* relation of the leader with the GJM rather than with the relation of the organization with the GJM. Furthermore, in some cases, the commitment in the GJM becomes a real resource for the leaders and has an effect on the evolution of their career as activists and their positioning in their organization.

We can refer to several examples concerning the second type of person. Sophie Zafari from the FSU is unquestionably one of the leading figures of the GJM in France. She answered that "the whole FSU considers itself as part of the GJM". Now, do the 185,000 members of this teacher's union really consider themselves as part of the GJM? Twenty documents on the website of the FSU (quite an equivalent proportion to the documents about the illegal immigrants) refer to the GJM, which is not much for a very well documented website. These documents are mostly reports upon ESF and WSF and a few texts of the FSU about the GJM, mostly defined through the participation of the union in Attac. The commitment of Sophie Zafari has an obvious impact on her general vision of the FSU as an organization being part of the GJM. Similarly, the representative of the *Verts* we interviewed, in charge of international and GJM issues, considers the *Verts* as part of the GJM because the GJM "is to fight against neo-liberal globalization".

As another example, the interview with the CGT was made with two people, Jean-Pierre Joubier, in charge, at the national level, of the international activities, and Christian Pilichowski from the steel workers federation of the CGT. The first of them was appointed more or less by chance at the department of international relations, worked for six years as a full time employee at the national level, on issues related to professional training. He thought he was going to "go back to work" when "a friend" of the union proposed him to represent his organization in the ILO (International Labor Organization), and this led him to deal with other international issues of the CGT. He claimed: "A young buddy who arrived as an expert, not a union member but very nice, has followed the organization process of Florence. (...) I went to Florence, I was interested (...), I immersed myself in the GJM".[69] In the case of Christian Pilichowski, it is his activism in the GJM and particularly his activism in Attac,[70] after having worked for twenty-five years in an American transnational corporation, which led him to hold a job as a full time employee in the federation of the steel workers. During the interview, he tended to stress activism of the CGT in the GJM, whereas Jean-Pierre Joubier tried to relativize it. Hence, the effects of the GJM activism on the activists' careers seem to have an impact on the way the leaders themselves perceive the commitment of their organization. The networking with GJM organizations sometimes becomes a real activist resource (like in the case of Jean-Pierre Joubier).

Another category of organizations can clearly be defined as part of the GJM, although being sometimes quite old, or at least not belonging to the GJM generation. One can divide this group in two components.

[69] Interview with Jean-Michel Joubier.
[70] http://www.france.attac.org/article.php3?id_article=3721.

b. New Deal for the Anti-colonialist and Third World Organizations

The organizations coming from anti-colonialism and Third World activism find in the GJM a new space of expression, involvement, and a new framing for their claims.

For Gus Massiah, president of the CRID and vice-president of Attac, the GJM "renovates" and extends the movement in favor of decolonization".[71] In order to explain this relation, Gus Massiah evoked some stages of the evolution of international politics. According to him, starting in 1979, the movements of resistance in the South marked the emergence of the GJM even if they were not defined with that label (i.e. struggles against the FMI, the debt, etc.). At the end of the eighties and at the beginning of the nineties, these struggles of the South converged, still according to him, with a renewal of the struggles of the North (because of the collapse of the Berlin wall). Within four-five years, the idea developed then that "another world is possible". For Gus Massiah, this convergence of the struggles of the North and of the South leaded to the GJM.

What is, then, the GJM for this area of organizations coming from the Third World activism? "It is a movement which inaugurates a new convergence between the social and citizen (civil rights) dimensions"[72]. For the Cedetim, "it is a movement which starts from the citizens and which leans on the social movements: it is an alternative to the neo-liberal order".[73]

It is also very interesting to understand how the GJM has sometimes deeply transformed the older organizations. We will take the example of the CRID.[74] The CRID was born in 1976 from the convergence of the "Third World" movement and the movement in favor of decolonization (i.e. CCFD and Cedetim). One must remind that it is a network made up of many organizations. This convergence took place in the frame of the arrival of a new activist generation and of the reconstruction of the solidarity movements on the international scale, which went through a crisis during the post-decolonization period and with the expansion of a large NGO like Oxfam. This period corresponded with the challenging of the notion of development and the spread of the idea of the necessity of decrease. From there a reorientation of the actions of the CRID emerged, especially around the idea of partnership (not help anymore) and education to development.

In 1997-1998, the CRID went through a very intense internal crisis which leaded to its quasi explosion. Following this crisis, the CRID went on an internal reorganization around two strategic axes:

first of all, it was rebuilt around leaders. Second, the working groups were not defined top-down but took into account the choice of commitment of those who really animate them. A total freedom was then given to the leaders especially to get involved in campaigns. Obviously, the leaders had to make sure that the principles of these campaigns fit well with those of the CRID. This type of functioning allowed increasing considerably the degree of mobilization.

The second axis was articulated around the social forums and the development of partnerships with organizations of the South and the East, thus providing for a "real worldwide vision to the CRID".[75] During the Bamako forum, for instance, 100 people belonging to the organizations of the CRID attended the forum together with 150 partners coming from countries of the South (a part of them received a support from the CRID). The CRID adopted the strategy to "develop within the GJM movement". This strategy had a strong influence on the group and became "the principal identity of the CRID". Indeed, 29 out of the 52 organizations which compose the CRID now have joined this structure within the last four years, and they did it on the basis of the GJM commitment of the CRID, according to Gus Massiah. This is also particularly clear in the case of the LDH

[71] Interview with Gus Massiah.
[72] Document provided by Gus Massiah.
[73] Interview with Monique Crinon, executive committee member of the Cedetim.
[74] Interview with Gus Massiah, CRID.
[75] Interview with Gus Massiah, CRID.

(Human Rights League), the Mouvement pour la Paix (Movement for Peace), the Amis de la Terre (Friends of the Earth), and Greenpeace.

Furthermore, the CRID is a member of the executive committee of Attac, and one of his leaders, Gus Massiah, is the vice-president of Attac. Being a member of the CRID becomes indirectly a way to influence the functioning of Attac or to be indirectly a member of Attac.

c. New Internationalism

For a new generation of critical unions, the GJM became a privileged space for an international commitment. As Annick Coupé underlined, "the main commitment of Solidaires in the GJM corresponds to a strong political choice which has to be placed in a context of convergence of other national and international social movements against neoliberalism, and this is not only the case in the business firms. [The other reason for our commitment in the GJM is that] we do not belong to any international union. Our international contacts go mostly through the GJM. The commitment in the GJM is a combination of these two reasons!".[76]

The lack of prior integration within international networks is then an explanatory element of the importance given to the GJM by some organizations. Thus the FSU as well as Solidaires position themselves in the GJM, whereas other unions – like the CGT – which is internationally very active as well, rejects the GJM label and underlines a very early international commitment (see below).

The FSU recognized: "The GJM occupies today a specific place (…) The social forums (world, continental, and local) are places where a synthesis of the reflections can be elaborated, where propositions can converge, where projects of action can be made on a large scale, beyond strictly sector-based or national issues". It considered that "The unions presence must be reinforced, so that they can bring their point of view, enrich their own thinking through the contact with other components, and reinforce the impact of the movement's proposals and mobilizations in order to built real alternatives to the neoliberal globalization".[77] In this context, "the FSU did not stay inactive; it has even been especially present in the WSF and ESF, trying constantly to establish a link between the trade union movement and the GJM".[78] It analyzed its short history as the sign of its commitment within the protest against neoliberalism: it was born at the beginning of the nineties and "was marked by the refusal to accept economic liberalism"; it is member of the college of the founders of Attac and "diffused the information on the association in the educational sector"; it noted that "a substantial part of the members and of the activists of Attac comes from the teaching sector".[79]

For Solidaires, the GJM corresponds to "pooling the different resistances in the world, and researching convergences in order to be stronger in the building of power relations. This means common meetings, slogans (...) It is a new internationalism based on solidarity with those who are the most exploited (...). It is an internationalism which relies on common interest".[80] So there is no doubt that they "are part of the GJM. (This is reflected) in the debates, the documents of the congress. For the FSU, the GJM is the aggregate of resistances of all types against neoliberalism. These are daily practices, (...) practices of resistance (...). Since the beginning we are very involved, we are one of the pillars of the GJM".[81]

In the case of the FSU as well as *Solidaires*, the GJM commitment is closely related to the participation in the activities of Attac, as many internal documents show.[82]

[76] Interview with Annick Coupé, *Solidaires.*
[77] http://congres.fsu.fr/~php2004/IMG/pdf/theme4-2.pdf.
[78] Ibid.
[79] http://actu.fsu.fr/article.php3?id_article=311.
[80] Entretien avec Annick Coupé, *Solidaires.*
[81] Interview with Sophie Zafari, *FSU*.
[82] See for instance: http://www.solidaires.org/article823.html?var_recherche=altermondialisme.

We can also mention the case of the Greens (*Les Verts*), which define themselves as part of the GJM. Nevertheless their leader underlined that their commitment is partly determined by the fields of interest of the individuals involved. The commitment in the GJM depends therefore on the choices of some leaders. However the commitment in the GJM of the *Verts* can also be understood by the weakness of their international networks. There is indeed an international network of the Greens but the *Verts*, clearly positioned on the left since the middle of the nineties, do not find there any support on many issues (i.e. the issue of the migrations).

d. "We Are not Part of the Global Justice Movement"

There are two main reasons given for not adopting the label "GJM": 1) the organization is too heterogeneous to be considered as part of the GJM and the engagement in the GJM is not central to the organization; 2) the organization is critical of the GJM.

The engagement in the GJM, an engagement like others

Espaces Marx, for example, refused to respond to the question concerning the feeling of belonging to the *altermondialiste* movement. In effect, they consider themselves as "a pillar of the ESF," notably through their *Transform* network. *Espaces Marx* was also one of the initiators, along with *Le Monde Diplomatique*, Attac, and *Témoignage Chrétien*, *Fondation Copernic*, etc., of what Elisabeth Gauthier presents as the first large citizen initiative in November 2000: «Pour une construction citoyenne du monde» ("For a citizen construction of the world"), at Saint-Denis -- much before Porto Alegre. A member of *Espaces Marx* declared; "The turning point of Seattle was immediately transformed into acts",[83] a form of *a posteriori* reading.

However, the members of the «conseil d'orientation» (orientation council) most certainly do not consider themselves as part of the GJM (for instance a member of the Socialist Party cited by Elisabeth Gauthier). Thus, even if *Espaces Marx* is one of the most active French organizations in the ESF, it cannot be said that it considers itself as a whole, as part of the GJM. Its nature as a counter-think tank and "zone of the confrontation of opinions" goes against a global and collective definition as an organization. It is interesting to note that participation in the ESF does not overlap with the consideration of being part of the GJM. The same can be said for the Cimade. Caroline Intrand explained: "We participate regularly [in the movement] but the Cimade does not have a global strategy toward the GJM… and there is not a debate inside Cimade on the subject".[84] The Cimade was present at all the ESFs (except Athens) and at several world social forums, notably that of Bamako.

On the one hand, holding a social forum in France had the effect of bringing into the GJM organizations that would not have ordinarily participated, some of which who maintained their presence and continued to go regularly to GJM meetings and others that no longer participated. On the other hand, a number of French organizations who had not attended other WSF before went to the WSF in Bamako. Both cultural proximity and the networks established with African organizations were elements that lead to talking about the Global Justice *Moment* rather than the Global Justice Movement.[85]

The "GJ Moment" is in many cases only one example among others of the transnational engagement; a transnational engagement sometimes rather old, sometimes concomitant, parallel or in competition with that in the GJ Movement. In this line, the Cimade evoked its participation in "The Christian Conferences on Globalization" (*Assises chrétiennes de la mondialisation*, ACM)[86]

[83] Interview with Elisabeth Gauthier, Espace Marx.
[84] Interview with Caroline Intrand, Cimade.
[85] Isabelle Sommier, forthcoming, 2007.
[86] http://www.acm2004.org

created in January 2003 as one of the main process of reflection on globalization. The ACM are mostly composed of French religious organizations.[87] Their goals are to "contribute to enlighten everyone on the globalization phenomenon", "help to become aware of European citizenship and the emergence of a worldwide citizenship", "make different people meet, some of them coming from the other end of the planet", "encourage exchanges with other cultures in order to change our look", "confront Christian hope to the realities of the world", "give media coverage to the national debate on the stakes of globalization", spread the belief that "humanization of globalization is everybody's concern".[88] The ACM, which meets every year since 2003, "wish to develop a capacity of engagement on the following issues: sustainable development, fair trade, ethical investments, food sovereignty, respect for keeping the living out private property, respect for environment, North-South solidarity: migrations, agriculture, restructuring, good governance". These claims are today quite often put in the same category as those of the GJM. Nevertheless, the ACM never consider themselves as part of this movement, and the Cimade considers the social forums as just one moment of transnational commitment among others.

Similarly, the CGT (General Confederation of Labor) does not consider itself as part of the GJM. It does not "feel as an actor of the GJM. But, without being defined so, many activities fit into the frame of the GJM (...) The internationalization of the CGT makes the declaration of being part of the GJM less necessary (...) The FSU and Solidaires did not have any internationalist commitment (...) The history of the CGT in the internationalist field and in the solidarity movement makes unnecessary for it to reposition in the GJM. Nevertheless, we participated from the beginning to the GJM with the struggle against the MAI (Multilateral Agreement on Investments) in 1997-1998 and the counter-summits of the G8".[89] The CGT participated in all the world (with an average of about 20 delegates) and European (with between 25 and 50 delegates) social forums.

What is then the definition of the GJM for the CGT? "Face to the one-way thinking, it is a matter of showing an alternative with the slogan 'another world is possible'. The goal is the convergence of analysis and propositions of action while respecting the diversity of the various components". The definition is broad. It allows indeed including all the unions' activities, which are part of the very general frame of the struggles against neoliberalism, but it also corresponds with a general vision of the trade-union struggle, which does not imply to define oneself as part of the GJM.

Furthermore, the "GJ moments" are only one aspect of the transnational commitment of the CGT (Beroud and Ubbiali 2005). For instance, the CGT is a member of the CES/ETUC (*Confédération Européenne des Syndicats*/European Trade Unions Confederation) since 1999, which is a central new commitment of the organization. The CGT emphasizes in particular its contribution in making the CES more anti-establishment. But this commitment in the CES is not at all considered as part of GJM activism. The identification with the GJM relies also upon the very definition one gives of the movement. This aspect clearly emerges from the answers of several organizations. A Pajol activist's claimed "If Pajol is part of the GJM? Broad question! What does it mean? Publicize the struggles? Provide critical analysis? Then the answer is yes".[90]

For some organizations of the sample, there is no identification at all with the GJM. Members of these organizations who participate in the events of the GJM do it on an individual basis. Hence, the participation in the social forums (except for the one of Saint-Denis) was a participation of members but not of the organization. An Act-up activist declared: "In Act Up, we have a reflection on the commitment on the international field, on the topic of the right to healthcare and to the treatment especially in the countries of the South (...) but there is no reflection on the nature of the

[87] Secours catholique, Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement (CCFD), Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens (le syndicat CFTC), Entrepreneurs et dirigeants chrétiens (EDC), Mouvement chrétien des cadres et dirigeants (MCC), Chrétiens dans le monde rural (CMR), Fédération protestante de France (FPF), Comité épiscopal pour la coopération missionnaire (CECM).
[88] http://www.acm2004.org/objectifs.htm.
[89] Interview with Jean-Michel Joubier and Christian Pilichowski, CGT.
[90] Interview with Isabelle Saint-Saëns.

GJM".[91] In that case, the forums or the counter-summits --the "moments" of the GJM -- are one of the spaces of the transnational commitment among a plurality of spaces.

Some organizations carrying issues in transnational networks reject the GJM label. In the case of these organizations which reject the GJM label as well as in the cases of Sud or Solidaires, these examples show to which extent the GJM activism is in fact carried on by social movements multi-positioned entrepreneurs, who get organizational and militant resources from their organization, without any collective discussion about the issue of the GJM.

The organizations which refuse the GJM label

Some organizations declared to refuse the GJM label: "We don't consider ourselves as part of the GJM, but the sociologists do! What makes us laugh is that we always have good media coverage when it is about the GJM. We must be perceived as such!".[92] To the question: "what are the main goals of the GJM?", the answer was: "Ah really, there are some! The question is not asked properly. The problem of the GJM is that it has a true capacity of critic but no proposition. The goal is built up in a negative way. One goal is to oppose globalization, with different people and for different reasons. The lowest common denominator is protestor critic".[93] "The CIP (Coordination of the Temporary Employees in the Cultural sector) is one of the main organizers of the Euro Mayday. "The newspapers present us as part of the GJM, but we are not!", explained an activist.[94] To the question "Do you consider yourself as part of the GJM?", a Co-errance activist answered : "Yes and no. Yes, if the GJM means moving particular, singular places. No if it is a matter of logics of apparatus. (For Co-errances, the GJM) is an extension of a field of social and political critic in front of the dominant rhetoric of liberalism. It is an extension of the alternatives".[95]

This refusal to identify with the GJM clearly stems from the most radical components, and from organizations active in the cultural sector or in the counter-information, and who perhaps want to distance themselves from a space they consider too reformist and/or too associated with Attac.

As a conclusion of this report, we can emphasize three distinctive characteristics of the French case if compared with the other European countries involved in the Demos project.

1) The importance, within the French GJM, of the large organizations which, on one hand, were created a long time ago and therefore are focused on issues preceding the struggle against neoliberal globalization, and on the other hand, who are quite dependent upon public powers, either directly (43% of them receive public funding) or indirectly (through subsidized jobs or, in the case of the unions, often having at their disposal state employees);

2) We notice the importance of a protest posture, stronger in France than in the other countries. Our interlocutors have manifested suspicion toward certain questions and some terms (like « voluntary work » or « collaboration with public powers »). The French organizations also show less recourse to lobbying, but more recourse to protest-oriented forms of action (petition, demonstration, civil disobedience but also occupations and blockades). This protest posture is strengthened in France by the importance of the right/left rift;

3) We found evidence of a smaller identification with the *altermondialiste* label (the 54% of the French organizations identifies with it, against the 84% in the rest of the Demos sample). We also observed a variety of engagements and uses of the *altermondialiste* space, for internal as well as international purposes.

[91] Interview with Eve Plenel, Act-up.
[92] Interview with Jean-Pierre Masse, Samizdat.
[93] Interview with Jean-Pierre Masse, Samizdat.
[94] Interview with Jérôme Tisserand, CIP.
[95] Interview with Christopher Yggdre.

Bibliography

Agrikoliansky, Eric and Isabelle Sommier (eds.). 2005. Radiographies du mouvement altermondialiste. Paris: La Dispute.

Barthelemy, Martine. 2000. Associations: un nouvel âge de la participation?. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.

Beroud, Sophie and Georges Ubbiali. 2005. "La CGT, entre soutien distancié et refondation de l'activité internationale." Pp. 265-90 in L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause edited by E. Agrikoliansky, O. Fillieule, N. Mayer. Paris: Flammarion.

Crettiez, Xavier and Isabelle Sommier (eds.). 2006. *La France rebelle*. Paris: Michalon.

Fillieule, Olivier and Christophe Broqua. 2001. *Trajectoires d'engagements. Aides et Act-up*. Paris: Textuel.

Martin, Jean-Philippe. 2005. "Du Larzac à la Confédération paysanne de José Bové." Pp. 107-42 in L'altermondialisme en France. La longue histoire d'une nouvelle cause, edited by E. Agrikoliansky, O. Fillieule and N. Mayer. Paris: Flammarion.

Sainsaulieu, Ivan. 1999. La contestation pragmatique dans le syndicalisme autonome. La question du modèle SUD-PTT. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Sommier, Isabelle. 2003. Le renouveau des mouvements contestataires à l'heure de la mondialisation. Paris: Flammarion.

Sommier, Isabelle. 2007. "Sur la généalogie du mouvement antiglobalisation français." Forthcoming in La généalogie des mouvements antiglobalisation en Europe. Une perspective comparée, edited by I. Sommier, O. Fillieule and E. Agrikoliansky. Paris: Karthala.

Democratic Organisation of German Global Justice Movement Organisations

By Simon Teune

(Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung)

1. Introduction

In Germany's trajectory from an authoritarian regime to a full-fledged democracy, individual experiences of democratic decision-making in social movement organisations have played an important role. Especially the new social movements that developed a participatory concept of self-organisation have been regarded as a driving power of a "Democracy from Below" (Koopmans 1995). In the student movement's discussions about democracy, the call for a "democracy of councils" played a central role. But when a revolutionary perspective dwindled by the end of the 1970s, the idea of grassroots organisation gained importance (Vandamme 2000: 34). The emphatic ideal of direct and equal participation was sought to be realised in countless assemblies of local movement groups and networks. Processes of professionalisation and institutionalisation, however, affected many new social movement groups. These gradually acquired a division of labour and rather hierarchical structures (Rucht et al. 1997).

The Global Justice Movements (GJMs) in Germany inherit both the ideal of grassroots democracy and of efficient, clearly structured organisation. As a mixture of trade unions, interest groups, and grassroots organisations, the GJMs assemble a wide range of organisational concepts. Groups within the GJMs have markedly different views on the relevance of an assembly, the delegation of power and the need of leaders or spokespersons. The report on work package 3 (wp3) showed that these models not only rely on different visions of self-organisation, but also coincide with varying notions of democracy on the domestic level (Teune and Yang 2006).

This wp4 report is based on interviews with 26 German organisations that are part of, or closely related to, the global justice movement (GJMOs). It integrates the results of questions on the issue of organisational structure and relates them to the written statutes that have been analysed in wp3. By complementing written data on rules of procedure with information about actual practices we hope to assess the situation of democratic organisation in the German GJMs. Additional questions allow us to reconstruct the GJMOs' engagement in networks, their relation to the state, and their use of action forms. This information refines our understanding of the actual configuration of the GJMs in Germany and helps us to identify both the core and marginal players of global justice activism.

2. Accessing the field

Telephone interviews, the preferred method of collecting data about the actual practices of democracy in the GJMOs, are obviously subject to different conditions than the method used in wp3 which relied on the analysis of written documents. For telephone interviews, representatives of the targeted GJMOs have to devote a considerable part of their time and, more importantly, they have to agree to collaborate with the research. Both conditions proved to be problematic for at least some of the organizations included in the German sample. Compared with previous work packages that took available media outlets and documents as a basis, this resulted in a lower number of cases (N=26 versus N=31 for wp3). Particularly two kinds of GJMOs, interestingly with antipodal characteristics, tended to refuse to be interviewed. On the one hand, representatives of some large, professionalized organisations were not responsive to our request for the plain fact of lacking time. Organisations that did not collaborate included the German branch of *Médecins sans Frontières*, the catholic charity *Misereor* and the *Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung* that is closely linked to the Green party. Especially the fact that these organisations were confronted with numerous inquiries for research interviews made it difficult to obtain the requested information. Because of the scarce time, one of

the interviews was not conducted as a telephone interviews but in a face-to-face meeting during the lunch break. In some other cases the interview questionnaire was filled and sent in by the organisations without an interview. On the other hand, most of the radical, horizontally organised GJMOs refused to accede to an interview (the antifascist *ALB*, the anti-racist *Kein Mensch ist illegal* campaign, the anarchist *FAU*, Indymedia and the internet platform *Nadir*). While some of them objected to the interview explicitly, others simply did not respond to requests that were sent by email or left on the answering machine. Two reasons might explain the low response rate for radical GJMOs: Firstly, in informal groups there are no well-defined responsibilities; consequentially, a request that does not address an individual tends to be overlooked. Secondly, radical groups might have political reasons to disapprove research being done about them. The usefulness of social movement research for state repression of radical groups is a common objection in the radical strand of social movements. Against this background, some mistrust towards our project might have been fuelled by the discussion about police informers in the *Berlin Social Forum.* An article in the news magazine *Der Spiegel* in June 2006 revealed that the social forum had been infiltrated by informers because the authorities suspected it to be controlled by "left-autonomist" groups. Given that the surveillance had been extended to unionist groups and even party politicians, this seems to have increased resistance to provide information on the internal life of organizations.

Missing cases that were due to the described failures could in part be compensated for by additional cases which did not always resemble the structure of the originally targeted case. For example, the federal fair trade network refused to collaborate because of a lack of time. We substituted the national umbrella group for a local group that sells fair trade products. Even though the objective of both GJMOs is the same, the way internal affairs are organised differs obviously between the local and the national level.

3. Patterns of Decision-Making in German GJMOs

3.1 Comparing documents and interviews

One of the objectives in developing telephone interviews was to integrate the data about internal decision-making structures that were gathered from written documents with assertions of group representatives about real day-to-day practices. The central interest in this comparison is, of course, to verify how decision-making in GJMOs is performed. In parallel with what we did in the wp3 report, table one shows the categorisation of the analysed groups with regard to the scheme of decision-making models within social movement organisations that was developed in wp3.

Table 1 - Distribution of cases among types of decision-making (n for wp4/wp3 classifications in brackets)

		Delegation of power	
		Yes	*No*
Decision-making method	*Majority*	**Associational** (12/10) BUND, Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung, taz, Erlassjahr.de, EED, IG Metall, erwerbslos.de, Pax Christi, SAV, Verdi, Solid, Weltfriedensdienst	**Assembleary** (4/4) Iz3W, Weed, Kampagne für saubere Kleidung, Kanak Attak
	Consensus	**Deliberative representation** (7/3) BUKO, FIAN, Netzwerk Friedenskooperative, Attac, Medico International, Dritte Welt Café, Friedens- und Zukunftswerkstatt	**Deliberative participation** (2/3) Berliner Sozialforum, Hamburger Sozialforum
		Missing cases: Sozialforum in Deutschland (1/6)	

The figures in brackets contrast the number of cases for both work packages (wp3 data include only those groups covered also in wp4). Almost half of the sampled organizations have chosen decision-making procedures that resemble the associational type. Even though the number of cases that were identified as deliberative representation is much higher than in wp3, the distribution among the other types of decision-making is more or less the same, because six of the cases were not associated with any of the categories or missing in wp3. When compared to the overall sample, the relevance of the associational decision-making model seems to be a German peculiarity. Less than 30 percent of the GJMOs in other countries follow this model (see table 2). On the one hand, this is due to the special legal opportunities in Germany. The foundation of an association is encouraged by a law on associations which is part of the German legislation since 1900 and privileges non-profit associations with regard to taxation. In addition, the law acknowledges associations as legal persons. Thus, they are capable of concluding a contract independent from individual persons. On the other hand, one has to keep in mind the special composition of the German sample. Most of the radical groups that do not tend to found an association to sustain their political work did not cooperate in the interviews. Thus, our picture of the German GJMOs might be distorted to a certain degree.

Table 2 - Distribution of decision-making models among the German and overall sample

	Germany		**Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)**		**All**	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Associational	12	48.0	44	27.7	56	30.4
Deliberative representation	7	28.0	63	39.6	70	38.0
Assembleary	4	16.0	14	8.8	18	9.8
Deliberative participation	2	8.0	38	23.9	40	21.7
Total	25	100.0	159	100.0	184	100.0

If we look at the data on an aggregate level, the number of cases in which the decision-making model as reconstructed from written documents had to be changed on the basis of the interviews is

rather large. Eight of them are now allotted to a different category. However, these aggregate figures do not tell us too much about the German case. For twenty cases data have been collected in both work packages so that they can eventually be compared. We will therefore have a look at the individual cases to explain the different categorisation that occurred on the basis of the additional information. Table three compares the classifications made in both wp3 and wp4. Not surprisingly, those organisations with a high degree of formalisation, i.e. mostly those with a formal statute, have been classified most accurately with reference to written documents. Nine of ten GJMOs that had been identified as associational in wp3 appear in the same category in wp4. Even though the number of cases is much smaller for the other categories, seemingly those organisations that implement the decision-making model of delegated deliberation have been portrayed most accurately in wp3. Two of three GJMOs that follow this model (*Attac* and *Medico International*) appear in the same category in the wp4 classification. It is this category that seems to be more attractive in the day-to-day practices of the GJMOs than suggested by the written documents. Seven organizations choose deliberation among representatives as a rule for decision-making. Some details have to be added to the case of *BUKO*. The network was classified as following the model of deliberative representation because working groups play a very important role in the daily routines. The assembly takes place only once a year so that day-to-day decisions are made by specialised group.

Table 3 - Comparison of classifications in wp3 and wp4

Group Name	**Wp4 classification**	**Wp3 classification**
Iz3w	assembleary	assembleary
World Economy, Ecology and Development	assembleary	associational
Kampagne für saubere Kleidung	assembleary	del. part.
Kanak Attak	assembleary	inf. network
Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung	associational	assembleary
Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz Deutschland	associational	associational
Die tageszeitung	associational	associational
Erlassjahr.de	associational	associational
Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst	associational	associational
IG Metall	associational	associational
Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftliche Arbeitslosengruppen	associational	associational
Pax Christi	associational	associational
Sozialistische Alternative Voran	associational	associational
Verdi	associational	associational
Solid	associational	del. repr.
Weltfriedensdienst	associational	not included
Initiative für ein Berliner Sozialforum	del. part.	del. part.
Hamburger Sozialforum	del. part.	inf. network
Bundeskoordination Internationalismus	del. repr.	assembleary
FIAN	del. repr.	assembleary
Netzwerk Friedenskooperative	del. repr.	del. part.
Attac	del. repr.	del. repr.
Medico International	del. repr.	del. repr.
Dritte Welt Laden Vicelin	del. repr.	not included

Friedens- und Zukunftswerkstatt	del. repr.	not included
Sozialforum in Deutschland	missing	inf. network
Aerzte ohne Grenzen	not included	assembleary
Misereor	not included	associational
Antifaschistische Linke Berlin	not included	del. part.
Frei Arbeiterinnen und Arbeiter Union	not included	del. part.
Indymedia	not included	inf. network
Kein Mensch ist illegal	not included	inf. network
Marsch 2000	not included	inf. network
Nadir Infosystem	not included	inf. network

The category of delegated deliberation is equivocal, however, since members of the working groups are not elected. On the contrary, everybody is free to participate so that the category participatory deliberation seems to be more precise. For two other cases in this category, the classification is more plausible than that found in wp3. Even though the classification as assembleary in wp3 suggested a high importance of the rank and file, *Fian* is a rather formal organisation in which decision-making is delegated to a small number of highly active activists and paid staff members. The aspect of delegation seems to occur even in a rather grassroots oriented environment as the *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative*. Activists that meet regularly in working groups are mostly de facto delegates of their local groups. So for both groups it makes sense to understand them as part of the category deliberative delegation. Information gathered in the interviews also helped to identify cases that have to be allotted to the associational category of decision-making while according to the documents they appeared to be assembleary. This is true for *Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung* and *Solid*, two very classical representatives of the "old left" style of organisation. In practise, the majority principle and delegation continue to be very important for them, even though their documents justified another categorisation in wp3. *Solid*, for instance, aims at consensus in their executive committee but the majority principle decides when a consensus is impossible to reach. On the contrary, the case of *Weed* was classified as associational in wp3 because it has a formal statute that suggests this form of decision-making. But in practise decisions are made by the whole group (which in effect is very small) and not devolved to the executive committee.

3.2 Structures and values in the decision-making process

Decisions in GJMOs are made on the basis of routines that go back to characteristic values or objectives. A group that needs to take decisions in a short time does usually delegate everyday decisions to an executive committee or a comparable body. This is particularly true for established, specialised organisations which are embedded in institutional arrangements and thus dependent on short term interventions. Grassroots initiatives, on the contrary, are usually not subject to comparable necessities or they deliberately choose not to engage in that way. They emphasise the individuals' autonomy and, consequentially, do not delegate decisions to a limited group of people. For grassroots GJMOs, a regular assembly is the prime organ to form an opinion and to take decisions. Comparing the decision-making organ interviewees considered most important in day-to-day decision-making, table four shows that more than half of the German sample relies on forms of delegation in their decision-making.

Table 4 - Most important organ in everyday decision-making (number of cases/percent)

	Germany		Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
President / leader / secretary	1	3.8	17	9.2	18	8.6
Executive committee or similar body	13	50.0	73	39.7	86	41.0
Assembly / open meeting	6	23.1	49	26.6	55	26.2
Thematic group	1	3.8	6	3.3	7	3.3
Other bodies (specify)	5	19.2	39	21.2	44	21.0
Total	26	100.0	184	100.0	210	100.0

The assembly, by contrast, was specified as the most important decision-making organ by a quarter of the organisations. The figures are similar for the overall sample. The relatively low importance of the assembly can be explained by different factors. Firstly, large organisations cannot involve the rank and file in decisions on a frequent basis because the costs are considerable. Nevertheless, fundamental decisions are still made by members or delegates in (mostly annual) assemblies. In addition, discussions emanate from the grassroots to the executive level in an informal way. Secondly, even small groups do usually meet only once a month. Between these meetings, there are arrangements to find solutions for current problems. Either decisions are made by all members on an ad-hoc basis via telephone, internet or special meetings or a group of very active members meets more regularly to take incidental decisions. Even if a working group or a preparatory group takes a decision for the whole group, it is usually discussed in another form (e.g. via mailing-lists) and confirmed in the next assembly. Obviously the result is dependent on the wording of the question that asked for the most important organ to take *everyday* decisions. In most cases, the assembly continues to be the most important forum to discuss fundamental questions and to take related decisions. But even if the perspective on decision-making in GJMOs is managing affairs, with the exception of one case, decisions are still made collectively and not by individuals. Reports on previous work packages showed that individual leadership is frowned upon in the German GJMs. In contrast to other countries there are no prominent speakers who promote the issue of global justice and even if individuals play a more important role in the public, they underline the idea that the GJMs do not have individual leaders.

While the question, who takes decisions, covers one dimension of our theoretical scheme (see table 1), the other dimension asks for the modes of decision-making. In a basic distinction between majority vote and consensus, we separate two traditions in the organisation of social movements. Stemming from the labour movement, majority vote, the first mode, aggregates the interests of individuals. Only those claims that are supported by a significant part of the group are considered important. According to this logic, every member is expected to follow decisions that have been made by a majority within the organisation. Consensus, by contrast emphasises the autonomy of the individual. Only those decisions that are supported by everyone involved in the decision-making process are binding for the group. Thus, individuals have to be persuaded to agree to a certain decision. When the German sample is compared to the other countries a high prevalence of the majority principle is visible (see table 5). At a closer look, those GJMOs that apply the majority principle are organised according to the law of associations. They are either groups from the old social movement sector, such as socialist youth groups and trade unions, or institutionalised actors from the context of new social movements, e.g. environmental and development organisations.

Table 5 - Prevalence of the majority principle in GJMOs (number of cases/percent)

	Germany		Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Decision-making method of the executive committee: majority vote	14	60.9	31	26.3	45	31.9
Total	23	100.0	118	100.0	141	100.0
Decision-making method of the assembly: majority vote	16	61.5	57	34.1	73	37.8
Total	26	100.0	167	100.0	193	100.0

Only a small number of groups, by contrast, practises the consensus principle in a universal way – that means in the assembly and (if existent) in a steering committee. Not surprisingly, these groups are, on the one hand, small, local groups, namely the *Friedens- und Zukunftswerkstatt* and *Weltladen Vicelin*. On the other hand, the intermediate networks that are characteristic for the global justice movement, *Attac* and social forums stick to the consensus principle. For them, this mode of decision-making is central in order to respect the diversity of activists. Adopting the majority principle would contradict the mission to find an overarching platform that integrates different world views, because minorities whose position is overruled would be likely to disembark the whole project. It has to be added, however, that consensus is not defined consistently among those groups that make use of it. For certain decisions, namely those that refer to the budget, *Attac* interprets consensus as a majority of 90 percent. This is to bypass minorities, such as the Trotskyite *Linksruck,* that have used the consensus principle as a way to push their particular demands. Other groups do not always use a formal procedure to ascertain a consensus decision, but they act according to an "intuitive consensus" (interview with *Kanak Attak*) until somebody disagrees. In some political groups much of the everyday work does not need to be fixed in the sense of an explicit consensus. Especially in those groups with highly autonomous subgroups, decisions are made with regard to an imagined shared understanding of the group as a whole.

Beyond the structural aspect of decision-making the quality of discussions plays an important role to assure an egalitarian participation in a GJMO. The most obvious way to guarantee this precondition of internal democracy is to fix rules for the discussion. Most of the associations, for instance, have rules of internal procedure that structure assemblies and the discussions taking place in that context. This applies to a third of the GJMOs in the German sample. But rules of discussions are not an exclusive characteristic of the moderate and formalised GJMOs: Compared to the overall sample, the number of German groups without any rule is smaller (n=3/12.5% vs. n=39/28.1%). Still, rules in the radical grassroots tend to be less explicit. They are referred to as "the usual conventions in the left" (Interview with *BUKO*), a normative code that is probably not-actionable in the procedural sense, but violations would be certainly sanctioned by the group, e.g. trough disregard or exclusion. To structure their discussions, half of the GJMOs identify a moderator. The German branch of *Pax Christi* even engaged an external moderator to deal with continuing internal quarrels. To rely on moderation is independent from the groups' ideological and organisational profile, but in the radical left the development of this role seems to be a quite recent phenomenon.

4. The GJMOs Relationship with Representative Institutions

Beyond the GJMOs' internal functioning the interviews targeted also the external relations and actions of a group. The first aspect that we will focus on is directly related to the issue of democracy. GJMOs were asked about their readiness to cooperate and their actual cooperation with representative state (and interstate) institutions. Compared to the overall sample, the German groups seem to be more reluctant to collaborating with state institutions (see table 6). In the interviews,

almost every GJMO that had contact with institutions underlined the distant nature of their relation. Additional specifications such as "critical collaboration", "a direct form of communication", or "critical vigilance" were common reactions to the German term for collaboration, *Zusammenarbeit*, that occurred in the question and suggests a rather close relation. Several groups also emphasised the limited impact a GJMO has when it collaborates with state institutions. It might be heard in hearings or counselling processes, but when the outcome is concerned, decisions are not influenced very strongly. Also the situational context for contacts was underlined. The *EED*, for instance, a Christian development organisation, stated that their readiness to collaboration is "dependent on the issue at stake". However, the *EED*, as other professionalized organisations in the sample, has established an office in Berlin to facilitate contacts if they are desired. Scepticism towards the state is also mirrored in the results on an aggregate level. Table 6 shows that German organisations are more likely to explicitly reject collaboration with state institutions independent from the territorial level. When readiness for cooperation is related to the models of decision-making, groups that emphasise direct participation tend to dislike contacts with state institutions whereas GJMOs that make use of representation are prone to collaboration. As indicated, most of the groups that interact with the authorities define their collaboration as a restricted form of communication. That means information is exchanged on a limited set of issues and authorities are keener to receive information than to distribute it.

Table 6 - Collaboration of GJMOs with representative institutions

		Germany		**Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)**		**All**	
		N	%	N	%	N	%
International institutions	indifference/denial by authorities	6	24.0	55	32.7	61	31.6
	refusal of collaboration	4	16.0	21	12.5	25	13.0
	collaboration with restrictions	11	44.0	37	22.0	48	24.9
	collaboration	4	16.0	55	32.7	59	30.6
	Total	25	100.0	168	100.0	193	100.0
National institutions	indifference/denial by authorities	5	20.0	38	21.5	43	21.3
	refusal of collaboration	4	16.0	19	10.7	23	11.4
	collaboration with restrictions	12	48.0	58	32.8	70	34.7
	collaboration	4	16.0	62	35.0	66	32.7
	Total	25	100.0	177	100.0	202	100.0
Local institutions	indifference/denial by authorities	6	24.0	57	32.8	63	31.7
	refusal of collaboration	4	16.0	13	7.5	17	8.5
	collaboration with restrictions	11	44.0	36	20.7	47	23.6
	collaboration	4	16.0	68	39.1	72	36.2
	Total	25	100.0	174	100.0	199	100.0

The distance vis-à-vis the state is certainly counterintuitive given the comparably favourable opportunities that social movement organisations have in the political system of German and the institutionalized, associational nature of a large part of the analysed groups, i.e. an organizational structure that should foster cooperative stance. One explanation for this might be the experience of having had only limited opportunities to influence actual decisions. In the context of a continuing economic crisis, German policies have been criticized for advantaging the corporate world at the neglect of those interests that are promoted by GJMOs. This was also true for the social democratic

and green government that came into power in 1998. Even though the coalition raised the hope of many activists it was only partially responsive to the claims of GJMOs.

Negative experiences in the past may also explain the rather negative evaluation of governmental initiatives to include stakeholders in decision-making processes. The UN conference on Environment and Development in Rio 1992, for instance, and its local successor the agenda 21 process have been supported by a large part of the environmental movement. But as decision-makers failed to implement large part of the suggestions that had been made, scepticism about this form of policy-making grew. This attitude is confirmed when we look at the quantitative data (see table 7). Almost one third of the German GJMOs does not think that participatory public decision-making processes improve the quality of decisions. In addition, in more than half of the organisations there is no shared perception of the issue. Obviously, there is still a relevant part of the movement that hopes for a positive performance of stake-holder inclusion promoted by the state. But this faction is not identifiable in a certain segment of the movement. Pro and con positions are rather cutting across the organisations. Especially large and formalised organisations such as *BUND*, *IG Metall* or the catholic *Weltfriedensdienst* specified either both positive and negative evaluations or they stated that supporters and critics of public decision-making are mixed in their membership. But the same applies also to networks such as the *Clean Clothes Campaign*, *Erlassjahr.de* and *Attac*.

Table 7 - "Do public decision-making processes set by political institutions improve the quality of political decisions?"

	Germany		**Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)**		**All**	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	8	30.8	32	17.6	40	19.2
Yes	3	11.5	77	42.3	80	38.5
No definite Position	15	57.7	73	40.1	88	42.3
Total	26	100.0	182	100.0	208	100.0

Whereas 56.7 percent of the GJMOs in the other countries evaluate the mentioned forms of decision-making as positive when they are asked to elaborate on the group's position, the trade union *Verdi* is the only case in the German sample. Scepticism seems to be larger in those groups that abstain from representation in their organisation. Whereas six GJMOs with representative structures refer positively or ambivalent to state controlled forms of participatory decision-making the two groups that emphasise direct participation hold a negative view. Positive aspects of public decision-making processes that were specified by the interviewees included the increased impact of civil society actors on generally binding decisions and the possibility to solve problems in solidarity. The widespread criticism toward state-induced participation within German GJMOs can be explained by various reasons. Terms as "participation trap" and "menace of corruption", express fear to be coopted in state centred politics. A representative of the metal workers union *IG Metall* states that in his organisation there are no big hopes attached to participatory decision-making, but that his organisation does not refuse to cooperate in it. Another type of comments that is related to the last assertion emphasises the artificial nature of dialogues between decision-makers and non-state actors. The fact that they are conceived of as "window-dressing", "politicistic" or "placebo-politics" shows that there is an urge for meaningful forms of inclusion that have a visible impact on actual decisions. A more radical position assumes that there is no way to mediate positions held by state representatives on the one side and GJMOs on the other. The Trotskyite *SAV*, for instance, holds that the state is an instrument of the capitalist class and that changes have to be brought on

their way in self organising processes of the working class. In a less ideologically determined way, the principle of keeping distant from the state proved to be a common feature of grassroots groups.

5. Strategies and Action Repertoires

As interaction with the state does not seem to be the preferred way to make a difference, we will now have a look at the strategies and action repertoires that GJMOs choose in order to reach political goals. Even though the GJMs are considered as protest movements, not all organisations in the sample mobilise by protest (see table 8). This is because the sample included also organisations with the primary objective of spreading information (*Die Tageszeitung* and *Iz3w*) and supporting development projects or protest events in Germany and abroad (*EED*, *Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation*, and the Catholic *Weltfriedensdienst*). Furthermore, the *Weltladen Vicelin* is part of an alternative trade structure and does not intervene publicly (or, as a young initiative, it has not done so yet). Interesting is the conception of a social forum. While the social forum on the national level does not define itself as a political actor and consequentially does not organise protest, the picture is more complicated on the local level. When social forums are organised locally and meet on a regular basis, activists cannot refrain from taking a position in local debates.

Table 8 - Preferred strategies of GJMOs (figures for affirmative answers)

	Germany		Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Protest	19	73.1	145	78.8	164	78.1
Promote Alternatives	16	61.5	142	77.2	158	75.2
Lobbying	15	57.7	99	53.8	114	54.3
Political education / raising awareness	26	100.0	162	88.0	188	89.5
Total	26	100.0	184	100.0	210	100.0

Even if the emphasis on providing an open space continues to be a central objective, both cases of local social forums in our sample use protest as a strategy to focus public attention on local problems (see also: Haug et al. 2005). But protest is obviously not the only way by which GJMOs aim at influencing the political process. The high figures for every strategy show that GJMOs make use of a variegated repertoire of action. Very obviously, GJMOs do not only oppose certain policies, they also develop alternatives and make a joint effort to spread information about global problems. To promote political, social and economic alternatives is a central concern for 16 out of 26 German GJMOs. When asked for the kind of alternatives, the interviewees specified both ongoing projects and concrete suggestions for other policies. The most visible example for the first category is the concept of fair trade. Starting from single shops (many of them in the context of Christian parishes) the idea has now reached retail and fair trade products are available in many German supermarkets. Other visions of “another world” have not been realised yet, partially because their implementation depends upon political decision-makers. In the context of the GJMs a solidary and simple tax model has been developed, activists promote the taxation of flight tickets to increase development programmes and the idea of a basic income. It is important to say that both institutionalised organisations and informal groups and networks cooperate in developing alternatives. A basic assumption of all GJMOs in the German sample seems to be that people need information to understand political problems and processes. All groups regard political education and raising awareness as a central task in their mission. This is true for fair trade initiatives that inform consumers about the repercussions of daily consume decisions, as well as for socialist

groups that consider the majority of the population to be manipulated by ruling elites. However, lobbying that used to be the central strategy of established GJMOs in the 1990 does still play a significant role. More than half of the interviewed groups try to influence decision-makers through direct contacts. Still, the position of institutionalised actors might be ambivalent as visible in information provided by the *BUND*. The environmental organisation was involved in both the UN conferences and counter activities that called attention to the limits of the summit. Among those who do not make use of lobbying strategies are groups without access to decision-makers or those who do not aim at reaching short term goals. But there are also political groups which do not choose lobbying as a strategy. Socialist and other radical groups do not conceive of the state as the addressee of their claims – either because it is presumably dominated by capitalist interests or because activists are convinced that changes have to emerge from below.

For a more detailed picture of the actions that GJMOs take in order to gain leverage, we now take a look at the action forms that the groups adopt. Compared to the international sample, German GJMOs seem to be less diverse in organising protest (see table 9). With the exception of one category (blockade) the percentage of GJMOs that declared having used the respective forms of action is smaller than in other countries. This might be due to the specificity of the German sample in which organisations which do not make use of protest have a larger impact than in other countries. Moreover, several of the more radical and informal groups that notoriously engage in protest activities were not part of the sample. However, as in the other countries, petitions and demonstrations are the most common way to express dissent. The internet has particularly facilitated the organisation of the former. Either signatures are collected in an electronic form or petition templates are made available for download. As argued in the German report for wp2 this opportunity is seized especially by moderate, institutionalised GJMOs.

Table 9 - Forms of action preferred among GJMOs (figures for affirmative answers)

	Germany		**Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)**		**All**	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Petition	20	76.9	139	75.5	159	75.7
Demonstration	16	61.5	151	82.1	167	79.5
Strike	3	11.5	48	26.1	51	24.3
Boycott	3	11.5	63	34.2	66	31.4
Blockade	9	34.6	49	26.6	58	27.6
Occupation	3	11.5	49	26.6	52	24.8
Artistic/cultural performance	15	57.7	111	60.3	126	60.0
Total	26	100.0	184	100.0	210	100.0

In contrast to the widespread tactics of launching a petition and organising a demonstration, calls for a boycott are obviously handled with care in Germany. For this category the difference between the national and the overall sample is most relevant. The reluctance vis-à-vis this form of protest was justified with reference to two reasons: On the one hand, the concept of boycott still resonates with the Nazi ban on Jewish business people. On the other hand, boycotts are not considered a powerful tactics because they presuppose an increased awareness of the consumers. Thus, a call for a boycott that is not acted on can be more harmful to the initiators (at least strategically) than to the targeted company. An organisation that calls for a boycott will loose reputation and potential influence on companies and decision-makers if nobody follows the call. Figures for artistic or cultural performances are impressive for both the German and the overall sample. This indicates

that protesters care about the way they communicate their messages. Certainly, the aim to attract media resonance is an important reason to design protest events in a visually attractive way. Still, reservations against aesthetic forms of protest are prevalent in traditional organisations. A trade union representative, for instance, traced back the rising number of this kind of protest events to the growing influence of women in his organisation. As a representative of a traditional strand of social movements who supposedly aims at mass demonstrations to be seen on a public stage, aesthetic aspects of protest were no more than folklore. The list of action forms that was presented to the interviewees is certainly not exhaustive. Some of the forms of action that were added to the list give an impression of the actual breadth of the protest repertoires in the GJMs. GJMO representatives named speeches at stockholders' meetings, alternative walking tours, protest camps, calls for ethical consumption, and street theatre among others.

6. The GJMOs as Part of Mobilising Networks

The content of the term "global justice movements", or "globalisierungskritische Bewegungen" in German, is a contested issue both in the community of activists and among social movement scholars. The main questions in the debate are: (1) What are the common characteristics of these movements? And (2) who is actually part of them? The second question can be split up in two further aspects: Which groups and individuals identify themselves with the GJMs? And which networks work actively on global justice issues, be it by mobilising for protest, promoting alternatives, influencing decision-makers, or spreading information?

To begin with the last question, we have argued elsewhere (Rucht et al. forthcoming), that the actors in the field of the GJMs in Germany follow different organisational and ideological logics that result in two rather detached affinity subfields. However, an intermediate field that is linked to both the radical and the moderate fields connects these camps. At least partly, the data we gathered in the interviews can help to reconstruct this field empirically. Links between GJMOs, for instance, can be reconstructed according to the interviewees' answer about allies of their organisation. However, it is important to consider the limits of this information. The question for allies was an open question, asking about with which partners GJMOs collaborate most intensely on global justice issues. First, given the open question, the identification of alliance partners is obviously very dependent on the subjective evaluation of the interviewee. Second, ties that are visible in the analysis connect actors on the national level. Those GJMOs that identified allies within the given sample were mostly moderate actors whereas more radical groups operate and network preferably on the local level. Third, the aforementioned problem of global justice being a diffuse matter comes into play. Since *Attac* was associated with the protests in Genoa 2001 the public image of the global justice movement is closely related to the name of the network (Kolb 2004). Against this associative background, many GJMO representatives might have thought of links with *Attac* in the first place even though there are tight links with organisations promoting global justice that are not originally associated with the term *Globalisierungskritik*.

The structure of the network that emerges when we look at the inter-organisational links (see fig. 1) seems to underline this impression. Attac is by far the most important node in this network. Out of 21 GJMOs that specified alliance partners, 15 referred to *Attac*. Even if we consider that *Attac* and the German GJMs are commonly identified with each other, the network seems to play a central role in connecting many of the actors in the sample. Socialist groups, Christian charity organisations, trade unions, peace and environmental groups – they all refer to *Attac* as a partner in global justice issues. With regard to density the gap to the next nodes is considerable. The trade unions *IG Metall* (5 incoming links) and *Verdi* (4) together with the think tank *Weed* (4) are interconnected with *Attac*. As resourceful actors the trade unions have supported demonstrations and congresses. The first national social forum, for instance, could be realised only because of considerable resources provided by trade unions. Weed and also Medico International (3 incoming links) are comparably small actors that nevertheless play a broker role in the German GJMs. They

are very active in organising campaigns and identifying issues to be focused on. The latter applies also to *BUKO* as the organiser of an annual conference. However, since *BUKO* is not a proper organisation, it is specified as an alliance partner by one GJMO only. Even though they might be very active in the GJMs, other groups such as the Trotskyite *SAV*, are not considered as an important alliance partner by GJMOs in the sample, because the ideological distance is considerable. Global justice campaigns are another type of node that links different kinds of organisations. The anti-WTO campaign *Gerechtigkeit Jetzt* (Justice Now, 4 links) was specified as a reference point by institutionalised actors with a Christian and environmental background. The same applies to the German branch of the Jubilee network (3).

Figure 1 - Network of GJMOs in the German sample[96]



The mobilisation against the G8 summit at the German site Heiligendamm does not play a relevant role in the network that is reproduced here. Only two organisations mentioned their involvement at this point of the questionnaire. In the course of the interviews many other GJMOs specified however that they would be part of the preparatory process. At least 15 organisations in the sample will be engaged in the Anti G8 mobilisations to certain extend.

However, the assumption of distinct moderate and radical fields can not be supported by the data. Radical actors such as *BUKO*, *Solid*, and *SAV* are more or less detached from the rest of the network. Because the differences between the three are significant in terms of ideology and inter-organisational competition, there are no mutual interconnections. While *Solid* and *SAV* are

[96] GJMOs without links within the sample are invisible. Other actors are considered if they receive more than one link from within the sample.

competing socialist organisations, one close to the *Linkspartei*, the other in a Trotskyite tradition, *BUKO* activists have a different vision of self organisation and politics in general so that they tend not to have contacts with the first two groups. By contrast, the central role of *Attac* as an intermediate actor seems to be confirmed. These nodes left aside, there are two sub-networks, the first linking GJMOs with a labour movement tradition (*Verdi*, *IG Metall*, *Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschftlicher Erwerbslosengruppen*) and the second combining Christian organisations and those with a new social movement background (*BUND*, *EED*, *Netzwerk Friedenskooperative*, *Pax Christi*, *Clean Clothes Campaign*, *BUKO*).

How intense the analysed organisations engage in global justice issues can be reconstructed with reference to their involvement in specific mobilisations. In the interview we asked for the organisations' engagement in (1) transnational social forums, (2) national and sub-national local forums, (3) parallel summits against international institutions and official summits, and (4) global action days. An open category was added. Transnational social forums attracted the support of most of the GJMOs. Nineteen of them joined these events, most of them since more than two years. This is telling evidence for the importance of transnational social forums in the networking of German GJMOs. Even though the first national social forum in Erfurt was not very successful in attracting many participants, 18 out of 26 organisations in the sample were actively involved in the event. By contrast, global days of action (11 GJMOs involved) and counter summits (9) received less attention. Among the events that were mentioned additionally the importance of congresses for the German GJMs is very obvious. The annual *BUKO* congress, the *Perspektivenkongress* that was organised in 2003 by thematically and organisationally diverse groups, and the protestant *Kirchentag* were mentioned as venues to promote global justice issues. The organisations that have been most active in the mentioned protest events resemble the core of the network that was identified above. *Attac*, active in all of the categories, has been at the centre of protest on global justice issues since its rise in 2001. Similarly, but certainly with a limited public visibility, *Medico International* and *Weed* are among the most active GJMOs. With a long tradition in transnational engagement, the *BUND* has organised global protests since the 1980s (e.g. Earth Day). Nevertheless, the conception of their engagement in the framework of global justice is quite recent. The Trade unions *Verdi* and *IG Metall*, and the socialist youth organisation *Solid* add to the group of active organisations.

Social movement scholars have emphasised the sense of belonging as a constitutive feature of protest movements. Beyond the involvement in protest mobilisations that might be very selective, the identification of an organisation with the GJMs tells us about the centrality of an actor in the field of global justice activism. In a cross-national comparison, the number of groups that identify with the GJMs is among the lowest in Germany (see table 10). Only in France (53.6 percent) the figures are lower.

Table 10 - Organisations' Identification with the global justice movement

	Germany		Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)		All	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
No	6	23.1	10	5.4	16	7.6
Group is too diverse	0	0	7	3.8	7	3.3
Yes, with reservations	4	15.4	16	8.7	20	9.5
Yes	16	61.5	151	82.1	167	79.5
Total	26	100.0	162	88.0	188	89.5

This result can be explained by several factors. In large organisations, global justice issues might be important for a specific group, but not for the bulk of members. This applies to the environmental *BUND*, the *Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung*, and the trade unions *Verdi* and *IG Metall* in which the leadership and a considerable share of the rank and file emphasise the global justice frame in general and the organisation's membership in the *Attac* network in particular. Relatively unaffected by the global justice frame, the specific concerns of these organisations continue to be their central field of activity. As the representative of a peace organisation puts it "the critique of globalisation is a side issue, but we are constantly linking it to antimilitarism and peace". The two media outlets in the sample, *Die Tageszeitung* and *Iz3W*, cover activities of the GJMs in a comparably positive way or they provide room for activists to publish their view on problems. But neither one considers itself to be an organ of social movements. This is particularly true for *Die Tageszeitung* which turned from a project of a counter-public into a professionalized, liberal paper. Even though some journalists sympathise with the GJMs, the idea of professionalism precludes the identification with a certain movement. In small groups that developed independent from the GJMs, a sense of belonging to these movements is about to develop (e.g. *Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Erwerbslosengruppen*) or it is simply inexistent (*Weltladen Vicelin*), even though we framed the group's activities that way.

It remains to say that the interviewed organisations themselves do not share a perception of the GJMs. By asking about the main aims of the GJMs, we wanted the interviewees to define their organisations' view of the movements. The reaction of some GJMO representatives was to reformulate the main objective of their organisation on a general level and to integrate it into a wider context. The BUND representative, for instance, framed the movement as "a counterweight against a fetishism of growth". Because of the thematic and ideological breadth of the GJMs definitions tend to be vague. According to the Attac spokesperson the GJMs "show faults in the system and alternatives", the migrant group Kanak Attack defines the GJMs' aim as "opposing negative effects of neo-liberalism." However, neo-liberalism does not seem to be the key concept to understand the GJMs. Out of 23 interviewees who defined the GJMs from their group's perspective only five referred to neo-liberalism. It has to be said, though, that compared to the other countries the anti-neoliberal frame is widespread in Germany. Following the idea of a just distribution of wealth it is the concept that was most common. In the other countries, the most prominent frame was searching for alternatives to the status quo. Among the interviewees' definition of the GJMs' aims there are different patterns. To fight for another world, one faction holds a general critique of the current system. In their view the GJMs should foster a "critique of capitalist ideology" (*Pax Christi*) and "show faults in the system" (*Attac*). Another group of GJMOs underlines the importance of regulations by national or international institutions. They should define international standards to which governments and, more importantly, transnational corporations should comply. This is claimed for different, fields such as "international law" (*FIAN*), the "ILO norms" (*IG Metall*), or the "regulation of international financial markets" (*WEED*). For some GJMO

representatives the movements' strategy is constitutive for their definition. According to these interviewees the GJMs aim at building "ample coalitions" (*Berlin Social Forum*), developing "strategies against neo-liberalism" (*Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Erwerbslosengruppen*) and "expanding critique to the majority of society" (*Solid*).

7. Communicating via the Internet

The evaluation of the internet as a factor in the mobilisation of social movements differs between an austere position defining the internet as just another medium and a more optimistic stance that sees a new universe of opportunities popping up. We asked the representatives of GJMOs about their evaluation of the internet regarding communication with (1) decision-makers, (2) journalists, and (3) the organisation's members and supporters. As far as interaction with the first group is concerned, half of the interviewees did not find a positive impact of the internet. Instead they underlined that personal contact is essential in order to be heard by politicians. If the internet was evaluated positively, this was due to an easier and denser communication made possible through email. While contacts with established decision-makers via the internet were valued rather negatively in the view of GJMO representatives, the impression is different for journalists (see table 11).

Table 11 - Evaluation of the internet influence on the relation with mass-media

	Germany		**Rest of the sample (excluding Germany)**		**All**	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Negative	2	9.1	35	23.5	37	21.6
Ambivalent	1	4.5	11	7.4	12	7.0
Positive	19	86.4	103	69.1	122	71.3
Total	22	100.0	149	88.0	171	100.0

Compared with other countries, the proportion of German GJMOs that acknowledge a positive impact of internet communication with journalists is higher. In part, this variance might be explained by the rather positive evaluation of the protesters in the media coverage of global justice protests. An analysis of German, Indian, Czech and South-African articles about protests in Seattle, Prague and Genoa showed that German newspapers tended to report on these events in a less negative way than mass media in the other countries (Rucht 2005). The comparably favourable image in the mass media could nourish the satisfaction with communication between GJMOs and journalists. In addition, most of the interviewed organisations know about the needs of journalists and, even more important, what they can expect from the mass media in general. They have adapted to the specific needs of mass media trying to use the opportunities and operational rules of mass communication. For instance, most of the analysed groups send their press releases via email. In addition, the websites of GJMOs seem to accommodate the research method of many journalists. Several interviewees had the impression that their organisation's website is accessed by journalists who use the internet for their enquiries. On the one hand -this can be positive, because this way 'alternative' knowledge diffuses to a mainstream public sphere. On the other hand, information provided on the internet is subject to the interpretation of the journalists. Thus, several GJMO representatives emphasised personal contacts as more important to get the position of the group published in an unaltered way.

As far as contacts with the organisation's members and supporters are concerned, the interviewees evaluated the internet very positively. In many organisations most of the communication takes place via internet. Email has made communication denser and easier.

Websites are an important source of information for members. They serve to distribute campaign material, to discuss certain issues, and to provide help. The trade union Verdi, for instance, provides legal assistance and helps members to save taxes. It has to be added though that, as described in the report for wp2, the interactive potential of the internet is used by a few organisations only. The websites of *Attac* and the *Berlin Social Forum* are two examples of a sophisticated and multidirectional use of the internet. The internet does not play a central role in organisations with a high proportion of elder members. In these contexts, communication via internet might also have a negative effect, for instance because members without an email address are excluded from information that is circulated electronically.

8. Conclusion

The interviews with members or representatives of German GJMOs have enriched our knowledge about these groups' internal structure and outbound activities. Not surprisingly, the comparison with wp3 showed that those organisations with a well-documented structure had been categorised more accurately on the basis of the available documents. The interviews were instead fundamental in order to learn more about rather informal groups which do not publicly supply information about their internal structure. However, many of the radical, informal groups refused to be interviewed so that information about them is still missing. The interviews showed that deliberation among representatives is a more common practice than it was visible in the documents. Even though statutes might prescribe a majority vote for decision-making, the consensus principle seems to be applied more often than expected. Nevertheless, the comparison with other countries also showed that majority vote is much more common in Germany than elsewhere.

The additional information gathered in the interviews also allowed assessing the centrality of actors in the global justice context. Attac, for instance was confirmed to be a central node in mobilisations and the most active organisation in the sample. It still remains to investigate to which extent the centrality of Attac is a discursive phenomenon that results in according evaluations by the other actors. In addition, the lacking of several radical groups and the prevalence of GJMOs on the national level are restrictions that have to be considered when the results are interpreted.

One of the unexpected results of the cross-national comparison is the sceptical attitude of German GJMOs with regard to the state. Even though there might be structural access to decision-makers, the actual influence on them is perceived to be very limited. The distance is not only visible in the evaluation of direct contacts with state representatives, but also in the scepticism vis-à-vis state-set dialogues with civil society actors. The fact that this distance from the state also applies to moderate institutionalised actors might be an expression of their frustration about waning opportunities to influence policies. It is this frustration that partially explains the variety of strategies that are used by GJMOs to gain leverage. Most organisations use a set of actions, in particular influence directly decision-makers, getting media coverage, raising knowledge and awareness of the populace.

Even though the interviews informed us about the constellation of different actors and their respective engagement on global justice issues, the very notion of global justice movements continues to be vague and is not agreed upon. The low figures for the organisations' identification with the GJMs and the paramount importance of *Attac* leave open the question what is the understanding of the GJMs among the actors themselves.

References

Haug, Christoph, Simon Teune and Mundo Yang. 2005. "Von Porto Alegre nach Berlin. Lokale Sozialforen in Deutschland." Forschungsjournal Neue Soziale Bewegungen 18 (3): 84-90.

Kolb, Felix. 2004. “The Impact of Transnational Protest on Social Movement Organisations: Mass Media and the Making of ATTAC Germany.” Pp. 95-120 in Transnational Movements and Global Activism, edited by D. della Porta and S. Tarrow. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Koopmans, Ruud. 1995. Democracy from Below. New Social Movements and the Political System in West Germany. Boulder: Westview Press.

Rucht, Dieter. 2005. Media Resonance on Global Justice Movements. Paper presented at the ACI meeting on "Les mobilisations contre la 'mondialisation néo-libérale'. Approches comparées", 1.-2.4.2005, Lausanne.

Rucht, Dieter, Barbara Blattert and Dieter Rink. 1997. Soziale Bewegungen auf dem Weg zur Institutionalisierung: zum Strukturwandel "alternativer" Gruppen in beiden Teilen Deutschlands. Frankfurt/Main u.a.: Campus.

Rucht, Dieter, Simon Teune and Mundo Yang. 2007. “Moving Together? Global Justice Movements in Germany.” Forthcoming in The Global Justice Movement: A Crossnational and Transnational Perspective, edited by D. della Porta. Boulder: Paradigm Press.

Teune, Simon and Mundo Yang. 2006. Visions of Democracy in German Global Justice Movement Organisations. WP 3 report of the Demos project.

Vandamme, Ralf. 2000. Basisdemokratie als zivile Intervention. Der Partizipationsanspruch der Neuen sozialen Bewegungen. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.

Democratic practices in British global justice movement organisations

By Clare Saunders
(University of Kent, Canterbury)

1. Introduction

This report explores data on decision-making and organisational practices within global justice movement organisations (GJMOs) in Britain derived from a structured questionnaire that was administered over the telephone. It seeks to compare and contrast the GJMOs in the British sample with the rest of the sample, and puts the quantitative data in context by the inclusion of qualitative material gathered from the interviews. It begins by outlining both the manner in which the questionnaire was administered, and some of the problems encountered with sampling. It then moves on to compare the classification of democratic types with the findings of discourse analysis on a similar sample (hereafter called WP3, with reference to the Demos Project's Work Package 3 on *Visions of Democracy*). After this, organisational characteristics are explored, including decision-making styles, membership profiles, relationships with institutions, and organisational resources. Then the paper discusses the issue foci of organisations, key campaign networks and demands for democratic reforms. It moves on to discuss GJMOs' sense of belonging to and interpretation of the global justice movement, and presents a network diagram of key campaigns. It ends with some reflections on the methodology and classifications that have been used.

2. Questionnaire administration, and constraints of sampling

Where possible, the questionnaire was administered to organisations that were part of the sample of organisations used in Work Packages 2 (on the democratic potential of GJMOs' websites – *Searching the Net*) and 3 (*Visions of Democracy*). The samples for these earlier Work Packages was derived using Diani's (1992) consensual definition of a movement as a guide; thus it was suggested that the British GJM consists of a network of formal and informally organised organisations and individuals that have a common concern to campaign or protest, in one way or another, against the global neo-liberal agenda. This definition is broad enough for us to include a variety of SMOs - from anarchists, socialists and communists, to those concerned with environmental, peace, religious, feminist, homeless, indigenous rights, migration, race and social justice issues, the labour movement, urban squatters and others. These organisations were selected on the basis of their key role within social movement families that we consider to be part of the broader GJM, or 'movement of movements' (Saunders and Rootes 2005), and their presence at key GJM protest events since 1998. The selected organisations work in the following movement sectors: debt relief, anti-war, religious inspiration, youth, the environment, trade unions, anarchist, antagonist, international solidarity, lesbian / gay, anti-racism / immigrants rights, political parties, human rights, fair trade, movement communication (journals, radio and internet communication) and social forums. The most important organisation from each of these sectors was chosen on the basis of the extent of its participation in global justice movement events and our own nominal judgements about its importance within the movement. Although 37 organisations were selected for WP2, and 38[97] were selected for WP3, this report is based on the analysis of the 29 GJMOs that consented to be interviewed.

The organisations that were resistant to answering the questionnaire tended either to be formal organisations, such as Oxfam, that, as a result of being frequently pestered by researchers, now make it their policy not to engage with academic research (see examples of email responses from

[97] Manchester Social Forum was included in WP3, but because its website was defunct, it was excluded from the WP2 sample.

the Fairtrade Foundation and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development [CAFOD] [Tables 1 and 2]), or those that, like London Social Forum, Urban 75 and the Wombles, lack a spokesperson and/or the organisational capacity to answer effectively and efficiently (see response from a LSF activist [Table 3]). Although every attempt was made to interview senior staff in formal organisations, and highly committed individuals in voluntary participatory networks, this was not always possible. In the case of CAFOD, for example, I followed the lead given to me by the senior campaigner (Table 2), and interviewed Alison Marshall instead. She used to be CAFOD's Campaign Coordinator, but is now working for British NGOs for Overseas Development (BOND), but is more knowledgeable about the decision-making structures and organisational practices of CAFOD than most other current staff members.

Table 1 - Response from the Fairtrade Foundation

Hi Clare

Thank you for your enquiry. While we are very pleased that so many students produce dissertations and projects on various aspects of fair trade, limited time and resources unfortunately make it impossible for us to supply the individual responses requested. Similarly, we are unable to arrange interviews, complete questionnaires or organise visits to producer groups.

As you may be aware the Fairtrade Foundation is the national independent verification initiative set up by the main development agencies (Oxfam, CAFOD, Christian Aid, WDM and Traidcraft Exchange) to license the use of the independent consumer label, the FAIRTRADE Mark, in the Britain.

We are a small team of 35 struggling to do a huge job on an extremely limited budget. With such restraints on time and resources we have reluctantly decided that it is necessary to focus all our efforts on the specific requirements of independent labelling. This includes monitoring, producer relations and awareness raising through communications.

As you probably realise, most people have never heard of the FAIRTRADE Mark and don't know what it stands for. In order to have a positive impact on the lives of thousands of workers and farmers throughout the world it is essential that we concentrate efforts here. We need to encourage more people to buy Fairtrade products, but without the advertising budget of the major brands this is a major challenge. Currently our communications work includes: writing articles for magazines, promoting media coverage, producing materials and co-ordinating campaigns to promote awareness of the need for the FAIRTRADE Mark. In our literature we have sought to answer the most common questions posed by campaigners and consumers.

In order to help students, we have put all our published information on our web site.

[a number of web links were given here]

I realise that you may not find the answers to all of your questions here and I am very sorry that we cannot be more helpful. I do hope you can appreciate the reasons we have been forced to adopt this rather unhelpful position and hope that you will accept my sincere apologies.

Regards

Best wishes

Table 2 - Response from the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development

Dear Clare

Thanks for your email. Unfortunately, I have to inform you that CAFOD receives a large amount of requests of this kind and it would not be an effective use of resources to reply to them all, although ideally we would like to. We therefore prioritise on the basis of those who are actively involved with CAFOD or have links to us. If you have such links please let me know and we can consider further. Otherwise, I'm afraid we will have to say no. You could also contact Alison Marshall at amarshall@bond.org. and she may be willing to help.

Table 3 - Response from a London Social Forum participant

Claire You are certainly welcome to come to our meetings, but we will not be able to answer the questionnaire because I, and certainly every other individual involved in the forum, cannot act as a spokesperson for it.

Other organisations that were in the WP3 sample, but are missing from the sample used for this report are: the Anarchist Federation, whose contact details are defunct; the National Assembly Against Racism and the Committee to Defend Asylum Seekers, both of which failed to respond to emails and are not directly contactable except via a telephone messaging service to which they fail to respond; the radical network Dissent! for which it was difficult to locate a willing activist, even via social centres where Dissent! nodes are active; Manchester Social Forum, which has now folded; The New Statesman, which failed to respond to repeated telephone and email requests for assistance with the research; and Friends of the Earth which, despite constructive contacts established during my previous voluntary work for the organisation, kept passing the questionnaire around the organisation until it reached the senior local campaigner, who was 'too busy' to assist within the time frame given for data collection.

Although it is not possible to find directly equivalent organisations to those missing from the sample, an attempt was made to find broadly equivalent ones. Thus, London Social Forum was replaced with East Anglian Social Forum, Manchester Social Forum with Liverpool Social Forum, and British Overseas NGOs for Development, whose director also chairs the Make Poverty History coalition, replaced Oxfam.

3. Democracy within: comparing written documents to interviewees statements of practices

Work package 3 (WP3) explored the organisational practices and decision-making structures of GJMOs on the basis of information expressed in formal organisational documents, such as constitutions or memoranda/articles of association where they existed, or in alternative documents such as annual strategies, and the 'about us' section of websites.[98] This work package, WP4, for which this is the national report for Britain, explores organisational practices and decision-making structures as expressed by key campaigners in response to a structured interview.

We concluded our quantitative analysis of British GJMOs' documents (WP3) with the following statement:

…it seems that many GJMOs have been misrepresented simply because their documents do not fit their organisational practice, or because they do not have the documents that were required for this analysis … The variability in the shape and form of information in the sample used for this work package casts doubt on the reliability of much of the data … (Saunders and Rootes 2005:267-8).

The WP4 data therefore provides us with the opportunity to check our assertions, and to assess and appraise the accuracy of the results of the WP3 analysis.

For WP3, the clear majority of organisations were assigned to the associational category. However, the proportion of associational organisations is much lower in the WP4 sample, with a considerable shift of organisations from the associational category into the deliberative representative one. The number of deliberative participative organisations in the British sample has remained constant, despite considerable shifting in the rest of the sample. As in the rest of the sample, the proportion of assembleary organisations is the same for WP4 as WP3 (Table 4).

[98] See Demos WP3 integrated report for more details on document selection.

Table 4 - Comparing samples (%)

Democratic models	**WP3 Britain sample (excluding cases not in WP4 sample)**	**WP3 Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**	**WP4 Britain Sample (excluding cases not in WP3 sample)**	**WP4 Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
Associational	64.0	41.4	40.0	24.3
Deliberative representative	12.0	12.2	36.0	33.7
Assembleary	4.0	9.4	4.0	9.4
Deliberative participative	12.0	7.7	12.0	19.9
Not classified	8.0	29.3	8.0	12.7
Total (N)	25	181	25	181

Globalise Resistance, Jubilee Debt Campaign (JDC), Christian Aid, People and Planet, the National Association of Women (NAW) and Stamp Out Poverty have moved from being classified as associational, according to their documents, to being deliberative representative, on the basis of interview data (Table 5). There are a number of possible explanations for the misleading categorisation derived from the WP3 data. The documents used for the discourse analysis for NAW, Globalise Resistance and the Tobin Tax Network (now called Stamp Out Poverty) were sketchy on decision-making strategies. For example, although NAW provided an 'about us' statement, and a series of policy documents, there was little information on organisational structure. For WP3, the Tobin Tax Network, which was analysed on the basis of its 'about us' section, the *Tobin Tax Declaration* and a list of its Global Partners, may have been misclassified either because of its lack of information, or because it relaunched itself as a different organisation (Stamp Out Poverty) in the interim period between WP3 and WP4. The Tobin Tax Network was broadly equivalent with the principal remit of ATTAC, initially a network concerned with taxation of financial speculation. In April 2005, the organisation changed its name to reflect its new focus on stamp duty on sterling currency transactions as a means of raising funds for development (Interview with Stamp Out Poverty Coordinator, April 2006).

Another explanation for the misclassification of organisations is due to the construction of the variables in WP3. Organisations that do not have an assembly, or for which the assembly is not an important decision making body, but which do have an executive committee were classified as associational even if no decision-making method was mentioned for the executive committee. Organisations in this category should not have been classified as a particular democratic type because we do not have information on the 'extent of consensus used in decision-making'- a vital axis in our four-fold classification of democratic types (see the left hand column of Table 6).

Missing variables upset the WP3 classification of Christian Aid, which had a full set of documents available including a mission statement, 'about us' and 'frequently asked questions' sections of its website, and a document on organisational structure, none of which gave information on its organisational structure. Thus, the absence of information led to a misclassification. In practice organisations with these characteristics could be either associational (if the executive committee makes decisions by voting), or deliberative participative (if the executive committee makes decisions by consensus). Even in cases in which the information about the decision-making method was mentioned in the documents, some of the classifications have shifted. For example, Jubilee Debt Campaign mentioned in its Articles and Memorandum of Association that its executive committee makes its decisions by 'qualified majority rule', and yet JDC's Co-Chair claimed in interview that the executive committee makes decisions by consensus. Executive

Committees that, in principle, make decisions by voting, may find that, in practice, they are able to make a decision by discussion and consensus instead. Of course, it is equally plausible that different activists have varying ideas of the meaning of 'consensus' – for some it could mean agreeing with a formal proposal that has been presented to them, but for others it could refer to a discussion in which preference transformation takes place by the sharing of rational arguments (Miller 1993:75-7). Despite the differences between the WP3 and WP4 data, it is important that we remember that information provided by informants is not necessarily more reliable than information presented in documents; informants do have a tendency to present themselves, and by implication the organisation they are speaking on behalf of, in the best possible light. Knowing that the project is about 'democracy from below' could skew their responses towards the consensus end of the spectrum as this is seen as more democratic than regimental voting procedures (*cf* Kahn and Cannel 1967).

Table 5 - Democratic types – comparing discourse analysis and questionnaire analysis

GJMO (n=25)	DEPENDENT VARIABLE		%
	Discourse	**Questionnaire**	
Globalise Resistance	Associational	Deliberative representative	32.0
Jubilee Debt Campaign	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Christian Aid	Associational	Deliberative representative	
People and Planet	Associational	Deliberative representative	
National Association of Women	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Stamp out Poverty (formally the Tobin Tax Network)	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Pax Christi	Associational	Deliberative representative	
World Development Movement	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Schnews	Associational	Deliberative participative	8.0
Red Pepper	Associational	Deliberative participative	
Sexual Freedom Coalition	Deliberative participative	Associational	4.0
Green Party	Deliberative representative	Associational	12.0
Indymedia Britain	Deliberative representative	Associational	
Socialist Workers' Party	Deliberative representative	Associational	
Make Poverty History	Not classified	Associational	4.0
All other valid cases (GJMOs present in both samples)	Cases which have not altered their classification		40.0

Nonetheless, the allocation to certain models of democracy in WP4 certainly seems more consistent with expectations based on previous knowledge of the organisations involved than did the allocation for WP3. In particular, the classification of the social forums, *Schnews* and Rising Tide as deliberative participative is consonant with previous research (Table 6).

Table 6 - Models of Democracy

Extent of consensus in decision-making	Extent of delegation of power	
	Low	**High**
Low	**Assembleary** **3.4% (9.4%)** Global Justice Movement	**Associational** **34.6% (24.3%)** War on Want, Make Poverty History, CAFOD, Green Party, Trade Justice Movement, Transport and General Workers' Union, Socialist Workers' Party, Sexual Freedom Coalition, Unison, Stop the War Coalition, Muslim Association of Britain (Youth Section),British Overseas NGOs for Development
High	**Deliberative participative** **15.4% (19.9%)** London Rising Tide, Liverpool Social Forum, Sheffield Social Forum, *Schnews*	**Deliberative representative** **27.8% (33.7%)** Globalise Resistance, Jubilee Debt Campaign, Christian Aid, People and Planet, National Association of Women, Stamp out Poverty, Pax Christi, World Development Movement, *Red Pepper*

N=26 (three missing cases, including organisations that were not in the WP3 sample). Percentages in brackets refer to the frequencies for the rest of the sample (i.e. the entire sample excluding British GJMOs)

4. Internal decision-making

The associational model is the most common democratic model for organisations in the British sample. Therefore it is not surprising to see that, for over one third of organisations, the most important decision-making body of the organisations is the president / leader or secretary. However, the frequency of associational organisations in the rest of the sample is even higher, but the proportion under the direction of a president / leader / secretary is much lower. Executive committees are responsible for making the every-day decisions in over one third of organisations in both the British and the rest of the sample, but assemblies are much less important in Britain, suggesting that decision-making in the sample of British GJMOs is much more centralised than in the rest of the sample.[99] This is confirmed by the fact that a much lower proportion of British organisations are assembleary compared to the rest of the sample (4% compared to 9.4%), and there are, proportionally speaking, also fewer deliberative representative organisations (12% compared to 19.9%). This is because the global justice movement in Britain is dominated by two distinct sectors: a highly established aid, trade, humanitarian and development lobby, which consists mostly of associational NGOs, and a radical / direct-action wing that tends to organise in a deliberative representative fashion (Rootes and Saunders 2007).

[99] In his study of 'associational memberships' and 'protest communities' of protesters in the anti-war march of 15 February 2003, Diani finds that protest in British tends to be based around associational memberships rather than protest communities (Diani 2006).

Table 7 - Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
President / leader / secretary / director	34.5	5.0
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	31.0	42.5
Assembly / open meeting	13.8	27.6
Thematic group	3.4	3.3
Other bodies	17.2	21.5
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (181)

'Majority and other' is by far the most common category for the decision making style of the executive committees of the sample of British GJMOs (Table 8): British Overseas NGOs for Development, the extensive development network that was selected as a 'replacement' for Oxfam (BOND); the 1970s radical movement for aid trade and development, World Development Movement (WDM); the Socialist Workers' Party (SWP); The Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD); and Make Poverty History (MPH). All of these use a mixture of consensus and voting to make executive decisions, whereas the Trade Justice Movement ensures that a quorum of voters agree with a resolution before it is passed. A mixture of decision-making methods is fairly common in the British sample, and makes the categorisation of organisations into democratic types (Table 6) even less water tight: should organisations that have an executive committee or equivalent as the main decision-making body and which use a mixture of consensus and voting be classified as associational or deliberative representative? Somewhere in between would be ideal. Quite randomly, it seems, all of the six organisations mentioned above, with the exception of WDM are classified as associational, whereas WDM is deliberative representative.

Because there are very small numbers of deliberative participative and assembleary organisations in the British sample, and because of the difficulty of classifying organisations that use a mix of consensus and voting in our four-fold classification, the British organisations have been recoded according to whether their decision making bodies (assembly / open meeting and/or executive committee) use consensus, voting or a mixture or both. A range of organisations fit into each category, with 35.7% relying totally on consensus for making decisions, 39.3% using a mix of consensus and voting, and 7% using voting only (Table 8).

Table 8 - Decision making method of decision-making bodies

All consensus (N=10)	**Mixture of consensus and voting (N=11)**	**Voting only (N=7)**
Christian Aid	British Overseas NGOs for Development (BOND)	Muslim Association of Britain (Youth Section)
Indymedia UK	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFOD)	Sexual Freedom Coalition
Liverpool Social Forum	Global Justice Movement	Stop the War Coalition
Sheffield Social Forum	Globalise Resistance	Trade Justice Movement
London Rising Tide	Green Party	Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU)
Pax Christi	Jubilee Debt Campaign	Unison
People and Planet	Make Poverty History (MPH)	War on Want
Radio Rampart	National Assembly of Women	
Schnews	*Red Pepper*	
Stamp Out Poverty	Socialist Workers' Party	
	World Development Movement	

East Anglian Social Forum is a missing case because the respondent from EASF claimed that the forum does not make decisions

Virtually all of the British organisations surveyed elect members of their executive committee via the assembly of the organisation. MPH has an exceptional and exclusive means for electing members of the executive committee, which reflects its structure as a network. The executive committee is purposefully drawn from senior members of staff of the core networks that organise it: BOND, TJM, JDC, Stop Aids, The Trade Unions Congress (TUC) and Action Aid Network. Similarly, People and Planet co-opts specialists onto its management committee, whereas the other half are voted for at the assembly. As a political party promoting democracy, the Green Party executive committee is voted in by a ballot of the entire membership. Stamp Out Poverty's executive committee is a result of the campaign coordinator head-hunting those with specialist skills, whilst ensuring that they effectively represent all of the sectors of the network.

Table 9 - Characteristics of the executive committee (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Yes	72.4	66.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(180)
Decision-making method of the executive		
Majority + other	57.1	43.3
Consensus	42.9	56.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(21)	(120)

Election of the executive committee		
By an assemblearian body	93.3	85.4
By other bodies	6.7	14.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (15)	100.0 (96)

Organisations may not have explicit sources of power, such as a director, or executive committee, but may have hidden sources of power that are not immediately obvious. For example, it may be that a hidden source of power proposes the agenda for meetings, or that there is insistence upon, or a lack of, formal rules for decision making within the assembly / open meeting. It could, for example, be the case that there is no specified body that makes decisions or proposes the agenda, leaving this to those with time and commitment who, as a consequence, develop ad hoc and hidden power relations.

As with the rest of the sample, the most popular body (over one third of cases) for proposing the agenda of open meetings or assemblies is the executive committee, followed by presidents / leaders (or equivalent), assemblies, and small committees. However, even in cases in which the agenda for assemblies / open meetings is prepared by an apparently hierarchical body, the result is often not a rigid proposal to be adhered to at all costs. Some organisations, such as Friends of the Earth (unfortunately not in the sample) allow for members to propose resolutions to conference, and although the Network Developers formalise the schedule for the conference, much of the actual content is dictated by local group members. Similarly, the Green Party allows every member to propose agenda items for its twice-yearly general meetings. And although the executive committee of the National Association of Women is responsible for proposing the agenda for its organisation's annual general meetings, members can input into the process.

Therefore, it is probably a mistake to view the presence of rules for discussion as a source of hidden power (Table 10), and is more accurate to see the absence of formal rules as a source of hidden power. This is because the rules are quite often designed in order to reduce power relations and encourage discussion, whereas the lack of formal rules may leave the decision-making structures open to the caveats of the tyranny of 'structurelessness', in which power is concentrated among those who are most committed or have the most time to devote to the cause (Freeman 1970). The direct action wing of the movement is most susceptible to this caveat, as Monbiot (2000) states:

The direct action movement insists that it is non-hierarchical, but this has never been true. Some people, inevitably, work harder than others, making things happen whether or not everyone else in the movement agrees. Consensus, often unwittingly, is manipulated or overridden, as people with a burning vision, with time and energy, drive the rest of the movement forward.

It is certainly the case that the deliberative representative organisations, which are exclusively direct-action organisations / networks or social forums, tend to compose their agendas in a considerably less formal and more ad hoc manner. For example, the Indymedia respondent claimed that the agenda was proposed by 'whoever takes the initiative'. 'Whoever turns up' decides the agenda at Rising Tide's weekly organisation meetings. Rising Tide formalises the agenda by passing a piece of paper round at the start of the meeting asking for attendees to write down each and every idea they wish to be discussed. Thus, the best attempts of the direct action movement to be open, inclusive and democratic may be compromised by a lack of formalised democratic input, realising the concerns of Freeman (1979) and Monbiot (2000).

In contrast, the presence of rules can help groups to function more democratically. For example, the rules of the World Development Movement's assembly are to ensure that there is enough time to adequately cover both all agenda items, and questions and discussions from the floor. The Global

Justice Movement's rules include displaying sensitivity to new arrivals, giving due attention to whatever subject the participants bring to the 'open table', and the posting of reflections on the internet afterwards. However, as with the rest of the sample, most of the rules used by British GJMOs are traditional, rather than innovative. Some, like Make Poverty History, simply follow the terms of reference (rather than 'rules') for the assembly as stressed in their constitution. Traditional rules include having a time limit to discussion points / agenda items, the presence of moderators or chairs, minute takers, lists of speakers, rules (as specified in constitutions / Memoranda and Articles of Association), the presence of Working Groups and transparency / accountability. Innovative rules include rotating moderation, gender quotas, circular seating arrangements, the protection of the views of minorities, use of hand signals and codes of conduct. With regard to codes of conduct, People and Planet stresses the importance of respect for the facilitator and the Global Justice Movement and Rising Tide emphasise listening to all voices without interruption.

However, the presence of working groups and the presence of moderators are as much, perhaps if not more, a feature of modern deliberative settings than they are of traditional assemblies. The G8 South East Assembly, an assembly for radical global justice movement protesters that met in April 2005 in order to prepare its response to the G8 summit in Gleneagles, for example, used all of these 'traditional' techniques. This assembly also made fairly extensive use of working groups in order to fine-tune plans for transport, medical emergencies and publicity.

The use of hand signals is much more difficult to classify as either innovative or traditional, because hand signals can be used in traditional decision-making settings as a simple show of support for a motion, or to indicate that an assembly participant wishes to speak. Those participating in the assemblies of Globalise Resistance, for example, use hand signals, but only as a tool for indicating a desire to contribute to the discussion. In contrast, more deliberative organisations make very different use of hand signals such as sparkling (waving fingers as a gesture of agreement with a statement made by another participant) or vetoing (holding a fist in the air to signal total disagreement with a proposals) is a fairly innovative means of communicating in assembly (Gordon 2003).

Table 10 - Potential sources of hidden power (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
President / leader / secretary / director	18.5	15.0
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	37.0	38.9
Assembly / open meeting	14.8	16.2
Small committee representing different membership's groups	7.4	5.4
Other bodies	22.2	24.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (167)
Rules of discussion		
Not present	25.9	24.3
Traditional	37.9	40.3
Innovative	3.4	3.9
Both traditional and innovative	27.6	13.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (136)

5. Organisational characteristics

Of the nineteen British GJMOs within the sample that have members, 42.1% have individual members, 21.1% collective members and 36.8% have both individual and collective members. This is very similar to the rest of the sample (Table 11). The organisations in the British sample tend to have larger numbers of individual members than the aggregate of the rest of the sample, with over two-thirds having 1,000 members. Also, the coalitions – those organisations with collective memberships – seem to be much larger in Britain. Classic examples of huge coalitions include Make Poverty History (over 400) affiliates, Jubilee Debt Campaign (over 60), the Trade Justice Network (150) and Stop the War Coalition (660, including local group affiliates). The interviewee from Christian Aid claimed that Christian Aid has over 2,000 collective members, by which she meant the number of churches officially affiliated to Christian Aid (excluding those that are not officially affiliated but which engage in Christian Aid Week – Christian Aid's door to door fundraising week, held annually in May).

Table 11 - Number of members (%)

Type of members	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Individual	42.1	35.0
Collective	21.1	23.1
Both individual and collective	36.8	42.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (19)	100.0 (141)
Number of individual members		
Between 1 and 100	7.7	23.5
Between 101 and 1,000	23.1	31.6
Between 1,001 and 10,000	38.5	17.3
More than 10,000	30.8	27.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (13)	100.0 (98)
Number of collective members		
Between 1 and 10	0.0	23.8
Between 11 and 100	40.0	49.2
More than 100	60.0	27.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (10)	100.0 (63)

A relatively high number of British GJMOs have a budget that is highly variable. This category includes organisations that claimed that the information on their budget was highly sensitive, and could not be publicly released. Organisations that claimed the latter include Rising Tide, the Socialist Workers' Party, the Muslim Association of Britain (Youth Section), and, surprisingly, the Green Party. As a democratic political party, one would have thought that disclosure of financial information was a routine administrative task as part of a quest for accountability. The category 'highly variable' also covers the direct action newssheet *Schnews*, whose respondent informed me that the annual operating budget was

ooo, I dunno, about £2,000, but that's totally off the top of my head. (*Schnews* respondent in interview, 14th May 2006).

Table 12 - Organisational resources (%)

Budget of the groups	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Highly variable	21.4	10.3
None	0.0	5.5
Less than 10,000	25.0	13.1
Between 10,000 and 500,000	21.4	40.7
More than 500,000	32.1	30.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (145)
Paid staff		
None	34.5	29.0
Up to 16	34.5	46.6
Between 16 and 100	13.8	14.2
More than 100	17.2	10.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (176)
Number of volunteers		
Less than 16	50.0	29.1
Between 16 and 100	14.3	37.7
More than 100	35.7	33.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (151)

Deliberative participative organisations tend to operate on much lower budgets than other types of organisations, because, unlike the more hierarchical forms of organisation, they do not need to pay the wages of professional staff, being mostly drawn from volunteer pools. As shown in Table 15, 75% of the deliberative participative organisations in the British sample do not have members of staff. Deliberative participative organisations also have a tendency to state that their budgets are unknown, highly variable or that information on their budgets is sensitive information. As unstructured organisations, they do not have to produce accounts by law, and therefore may be unaware of the exact budgets of their operations. In contrast, deliberative representative organisations, which frequently employ professionals (88.9% of the British deliberative representative GJMOs in the sample have members of staff, [Table 15]) that make up an exclusive cadre of decision-makers, tend to be relatively wealthy, with most of them operating on budgets over 10,000 Euros per annum. The only deliberative representative organisation with a budget of less than 10,000 Euros is the National Association of Women, whose approximate annual operating budget is 3,500 Euros. The associational GJMOs in this sample, tend also to be wealthy, ranging from Unison's annual operating budget of £140,000,000 (approximately 196,000,000 Euro) to £320 (448 Euro) for the less visible Sexual Freedom Coalition. Associational organisations also tend to have paid staff, perhaps explaining the need for such large budgets (over 80% of associational organisations in the British sample of GJMOs has staff [Table 15]). The only assembleary organisation, the Global Justice Movement, has a highly variable budget that is based entirely on voluntary cost bearing of its supporters, and no record or budget is kept of its finances (Table 13). Table 14 shows that GJMOs using a mixture of voting and consensus in order to reach decisions

tend to have budgets over 10,000 Euros, whereas poorer organisations, or those with variable budgets are much more prone to use either voting or consensus only.

Table 13 - Budget of the groups for different democratic models (%)

Budget of the groups	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Less than 10,000	8.3	11.1	0.0	66.6	16.0
More than 10,000	58.3	88.8	0.0	0.0	60.0
Variable	33.3	0.0	100.0	33.3	24.0
Total	46.2	34.6	3.8	15.4	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(3)	(25)

Table 14 - Budget of the group for different decision-making styles (%)

Budget of the groups	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Less than 10,000	44.4	9.1	14.3	22.2
More than 10,000	42.4	63.7	57.2	55.5
Variable	11.1	27.3	28.6	22.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(9)	(11)	(7)	(27)

Table 15 - Presence of paid staff for different democratic models (%)

Presence of paid staff (dummy)	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
No	16.7	11.1	100.0	75.0	26.9
Yes	83.3	88.9	0.0	25.0	73.1
Total	46.2	34.6	3.7	15.4	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(26)

Table 16 - Presence of paid staff for different decision-making styles (%)

Presence of paid staff (dummy)	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
No	60.0	18.2	28.6	28.6
Yes	40.0	81.8	71.4	71.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(11)	(7)	(26)

The GJMOs in the British sample that use a mixture of consensus and voting are most likely to be the professional organisations that have the presence of paid members of staff (Table 16). Examples that fit into this category include British Overseas NGOs for development, which has 20.5 full-time equivalent members of staff, the Green Party which has 6 members, and World Development Movement, which has 28 members of staff. These are fairly large organisations, which might struggle to achieve consensus within their executive committees, or assemblies, and therefore allow some voting in order to make decision-making more efficient. In contrast, most of the British GJMOs that use consensus only tend not to have paid staff. These are mostly small and radical organisations, including the social forums, *Schnews*, Indymedia UK, Rising Tide and Radio Rampart. Of course, it is much easier to reach consensus in smaller groups.

If it is true that associational and deliberative representative organisations are reliant on professional staff, it is equally true that deliberative participative and assembleary organisations, which devolve decision-making, are reliant on volunteers. Even so, it is associational organisations that claim the support of higher numbers of volunteers. Seventy-five percent of deliberative participative GJMOs in the British sample have fifteen or less volunteers, but these are probably much more committed and integral to the work of the GJMOs for which they volunteer than the more numerous, and less committed volunteer force of associational GJMOs (Table 17). Regardless of the contribution of volunteers to the work of GJMOs, the number of volunteers is a poor measure of an organisations resource base because of the difficulties of interpreting its meaning. Should, for example, a volunteers who spends one day per year collecting for Christian Aid's fundraising week be classified as a volunteer, or as a proportion of a volunteer to more accurately reflect the amount of time she spends volunteering? Are those who work for local branches of groups volunteers for the national organisation, or do they have to be volunteering for the national office to qualify as volunteers? It is likely that different organisations within Britain, and across the whole WP4 sample interpret the label 'volunteers' in different ways. In Italy, for example, commitment would need to be for at least several hours per week on a regular basis, whereas in Britain, the criteria for classification are probably less stringent. Perhaps it tells us something about the unreliability of the indicator that the number of volunteers varies little between groups that use different decision-making styles (Table 18). In practice, we would expect to find that groups using consensus only tend to rely almost exclusively on volunteers, given that less than half of these groups do not have any members of paid staff (Table 16).

Table 17 - Number of volunteers for different democratic models (%)

Number of volunteers (dummy)	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Up to 15	36.4	55.6	100.0	75.0	52.0
More than 15	63.6	44.4	0.0	25.0	48.0
Total	44.0	36.0	4.0	16.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(25)

Table 18 - Number of volunteers for different decision-making styles (%)

Number of volunteers (dummy)	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Up to 15	50	45.5	57.1	53.6
More than 15	50	54.5	42.9	46.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(11)	(7)	(28)

The British sample has a higher proportion of organisations that were founded prior to 1968 than the entire sample does (Table 19). These organisations are largely aid / trade / development organisations (including Christian Aid, Oxfam and the Catholic Agency for Overseas Development), most of which formed between 1942-1952, but also include the Transport and General Workers' Union (est. 1922), the National Assembly of Women (est. 1952) and the *New Statesman* magazine (est. 1913). People and Planet (the youth human rights / development / environmental organisation), Friends of the Earth, the Anarchist Federation, the World Development Movement, the Green Party and the Socialist Workers' Party are more overtly political organisations that were formed between 1969 and 1989. Organisations in the sample that formed in the 1990s are the public services trade union Unison, the Sexual Freedom Coalition, *Schnews*, and *Red Pepper*.

Half of the British GJMOs were established during the crucial, post-Seattle phase of the development of the global justice movement. This is a considerably higher proportion of organisations than in the rest of the sample (50% versus 26.4%). These modern organisations that evolved post-2000 include Make Poverty History, Stop the War, the Trade Justice Movement, Globalise Resistance, the Tobin Tax Network, the Global Justice Movement and the local social forums – all reflecting at least one of the movement's new millennium concerns of trade justice / poverty reduction, peace and deliberative debate (Table 19).

Table 19 - Year established (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Before 1968	25.0	17.4
Between 1969 and 1989	10.7	21.5
Between 1989 and 1999	14.3	34.7
After 2000	50.0	26.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(172)

The deliberative participative model of organisation – with inclusive participation and no delegation – certainly seems to be a more modern means of organising, with 75% of the British deliberative participative GJMOs being formed post 2000, and 25% formed after 1989. Deliberative representative organisations were established almost evenly across the generational categories, except for the 1989-99 period, and it may well be the case that these organisations have become more deliberative as a result of being influenced by the recent wave of deliberative decision-making

amongst the more participative organisations within the global justice movement (Table 20). Indeed, 60% of the organisations that use only consensus decision-making strategies, were formed post 2000 (Table 21).

Table 20 - Generational belonging of different democratic models (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Before 1968	33.3	37.5	0.0	0.0	28.0
Between 1969 and 1989	8.3	25.0	0.0	0.0	12.0
Between 1989 and 1999	25.0	0.0	0.0	25.0	16.0
After 2000	33.3	37.5	100.0	75.0	44.0
Total **(N)**	48.0 (12)	32.0 (8)	4.0 (1)	16.0 (4)	100.0 (25)

Table 21 - Generational belonging of GJMOs using different decision-making styles (%)

Generational belonging	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Before 1968	20.0	30.0	28.6	25.9
1969-1989	10.0	20.0	0.0	11.1
1990-1999	10.0	10.0	28.6	14.8
2000+	60.0	40.0	42.9	48.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (10)	100.0 (10)	100.0 (7)	100.0 (27)

6. Relationships with institutions

A relatively high proportion of the British GJMOs in the sample (24.1%) refuse any kind of collaboration with international institutions, but an even higher proportion engage in 'collaboration with restrictions' (34.5%). Most of the British responses that fit in the category of 'collaboration with restrictions' do so in the sense of 'critical engagement'. Many interviewees disliked the term 'collaboration' because it implies support for public institutions. 'Critical engagement' is interpreted as a form of collaboration that includes being critical of, and seeking to influence, the decision-making styles and agendas of international institutions. Organisations that engage in critical engagement with international institutions include the World Development Movement, Make Poverty History, British Overseas NGOs for Development and People and Planet. Just over one fifth of organisations claimed to collaborate (rather than critically engage) with international institutions, including War on Want, Christian Aid, TGWU, Unison and Pax Christi, and TWGU campaigns for the International Labor Organization to be part of the WTO decision-making process, and regards its involvement in the campaign as a form of collaboration with the WTO. In none of these cases should it be assumed that 'collaboration' is uncritical; had they been offered the choice of the term 'critical engagement' it is likely that most or all would have chosen it. In addition to critical engagement, the Green Party interviewee claimed that the Party also engages in democratic representation and direct participation in the democratic process at all levels of public institutions. Some organisations, like Globalise Resistance, refuse cooperation with public

institutions at all levels, except for occasionally liasing with the police about the routes of public marches. Radical organisations like Rising Tide and Radio Rampart also avoid collaboration with national institutions. Their reasons are numerous, but mostly amount to disdain for centralised governance structures and a firm belief in developing grass roots community solutions based in anarchistic principles (Walter 2002 [1969]). For several organisations, such as Stamp Out Poverty, War on Want and BOND, the local level of engagement was not applicable to the work that they do. The focus in sample selection was on GJMOs that are nationally significant in Britain, and the level of local engagement is therefore relatively trivial; the British groups were only half as likely to engage in collaboration with their local public institutions as were groups in the other countries (Table 22).

Table 22 - Relationship with public institutions (%)

International institutions	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Refusal of collaboration	24.1	11.7
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	20.7	34.5
Collaboration with restrictions	34.5	22.8
Collaboration	20.7	31.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(164)
National institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	17.2	10.9
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	6.9	23.6
Collaboration with restrictions	51.7	31.6
Collaboration	24.1	33.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(173)
Local institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	17.2	6.9
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	31.0	21.4
Collaboration with restrictions	27.6	30.1
Collaboration	24.1	41.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(170)

Deliberative participative organisations are most likely to eschew relationships with institutions at all levels (international to local), because they are trying to live the change they want to see. This may involve a change in lifestyle, and often involves meeting and living in temporary (as with Radio Rampart) or permanent (as with London Activist Resource Centre where Rising Tide meet) autonomous zones and squats as a means of eschewing all formal structures and enhancing freedom and creativity. The emphasis is on autonomy and self-creation in the present, rather than relying on the state to produce desired outcomes at some point in the unknown future (Bey 2003). The Rising Tide respondent, for example claimed that:

Society should be run by people, not by institutions. There are plenty of illustrations that show that public institutions don't work in the benefit of the community. Although local interaction is more likely to be successful, we do not interact with any public institutions for these reasons.

Overall, over two-thirds of British GJMOs engage in some form of collaboration (including critical engagement) with international institutions, but more (84.6%) collaborate with national institutions, perhaps seeing national governance as a more reachable actor than international institutions and thus more likely to be able to influence public policy on global agendas. Associational organisations are the most likely to attempt to influence national policy (91.6% of British associational organisations collaborate with national institutions), and perhaps their decision-making cadre and efficient decision-making strategies (by voting) help them to do this in good time and most effectively (Table 23). Indeed, all of the organisations that use only voting as a means of making decisions attempt engage in some form of collaboration with national institutions, and a greater proportion of them engage with international and local institutions than those that use at least some consensus (Table 24).

Table 23 - Attitude towards public institutions by different democratic models (%)

Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels (dummy)	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
International	66.7	77.7	100.0	0.0	61.6
National	91.6	88.9	100.0	50.0	84.6
Local	50.0	66.6	100.0	50.0	57.7
Total	46.1	36.6	3.8	15.4	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(26)

Table 24 - Attitude towards public institutions by different decision-making styles (%)

Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels (dummy)	**Decision-making styles**			**Total**
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
International	40.0	63.6	71.5	57.1
National	60.0	81.8	100.0	78.6
Local	50.0	54.6	57.2	53.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(10)	(7)	(27)

A clear majority of British GJMOs (55.2%) did not have a shared perception in their group on whether 'participatory decision-making processes set by political institutions (i.e. Agenda 21, participatory budgeting or ad hoc committees for the solution of local problems) improve the quality of public decisions'. Such public decision-making processes received both defamation and acclamation by interviewees from the 44.8% of British GJMOs that did have a shared perception of their efficacy (Table 25). On the positive side, the CAFOD representative stressed how CAFOD's work on economic literacy and budget maintenance in Zambia has helped to improve accountability of local decision-making there. The JDC representative believed that public decision-making processes are important because they ensure that the grassroots get the opportunity to input into decision-making. The Green Party interviewee stressed the democratic importance of wider

engagement beyond consultation with special interest groups. The main objective of BOND is to lobby for civil society participation in developing countries, and its representative strongly emphasized the important role that civil society participation plays in fair and transparent decision-making. For the Muslim Association of Britain Youth Section, such processes were seen as vitally important in the quest to integrate the Muslim community into British culture to prevent isolation, hostility and racism.

Sceptics of public participation generally believed that the effectiveness of public participation in decision-making is limited by conventional ways of thinking, attempts to uphold the status quo at all costs, or poor consultation experiments. The Rising Tide interviewee, for example believed that:

The current ways of making public decisions are limited. Even Agenda 21 was not really inspired by local people. Even when public decisions are made, they are often overthrown. A good example of a failed experiment at public participation is the government's current Energy Review. Consultation meetings are poorly advertised, and non-transparent …

These comments about Local Agenda 21 support the findings of previous research that stress Local Agenda 21's inability to effectively involve the public (Young 1994).

The Global Justice movement's view was that:

We fear that most conventional processes 'hack at the branches' and don't 'get at the roots' of challenging the laws governing property rights, corporate hegemony and the debt based interest bearing monetary system.

For Sheffield Social Forum's representative:

I am highly sceptical. I think that they are a step in the right direction, but they generally don't work.

He added the disclaimer: 'but it is hard to speak on behalf of the group'.

Table 25 - Attitudes towards public decision-making (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
No	20.7	19.0
Yes	24.1	40.8
No definite position	55.2	40.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(179)
Evaluation of public decision-making		
Negative	20.0	31.4
Both negative and positive	20.0	17.1
Positive	60.0	51.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(105)

British associational GJMOs seem to be the most favourable towards public decision-making, with one third believing that public decision-making processes help to improve the quality of public decisions, and all of them offering positive evaluations of public decision-making. Deliberative participative organisations seem mostly to have a negative appraisal of public decision-making processes (see Rising Tide and Sheffield Social Forum responses above). The number of

assembleary organisations is too small to make any judgement about the nature of British assembleary GJMOs views on the effect of public decision-making processes (Table 26). It is mostly organisations that make decisions by voting which tend to not have a view on public participation in decision-making (Table 27). This could be because public participation conflicts with their hierarchical models of decision-making. This was certainly the view of the formally organised top-down organisations that were part of the London European Social Forum organising process, whose delegates could not understand the demands for participation that were coming from the grassroots (Papadimitrou et al 2005). In contrast, 80% of the British GJMOs that use a mixture of consensus and voting give positive appraisals of public decision-making. Those using consensus only, which includes the social forums and radical GJMOs have a mixture of views on its value (Table 27).

Table 26 - Attitude towards public decision-making by democratic models (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
No	8.3	11.1	0.0	50.0	15.4
Yes	33.3	11.1	100.0	25.0	26.9
No definite position	58.3	77.8	0.0	25.0	57.7
Total	46.2	34.6	3.8	15.4	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(26)
Evaluation of public decision-making					
Negative	0.0	0.0	100.0	33.3	20.0
Both negative and positive	0.0	50.0	0.0	33.3	20.0
Positive	100.0	50.0	0.0	33.3	60.0
Total	40.0	20.0	10.0	30.0	100.0
(N)	(4)	(2)	(1)	(3)	(10)

Table 27 - Attitude towards public decision-making by different decision-making styles (%)

Evaluation of public decision-making	**Decision-making styles**			**Total**
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Negative	25.0	20.0	0.0	20.0
Both negative and positive	50.0	0.0	0.0	20.0
Positive	25.0	80.0	1.0	60.0
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(4)	(5)	(1)	(10)

As with the rest of the sample, ‘members’ are the most common source of funding in the British sample (92.9%), followed in Britain by the sales of goods / services and rent, and then by non-governmental and finally governmental funds. It may seem strange that 92.9% of the sample of British GJMOs claim to receive funding from members (Table 28) when only 65.5% of the organisations in the sample claim to have ‘members’. This is a symptom of the tendency of organisations to use the term ‘members’ as a generic term that merges the categories of

'membership dues' and 'individual contributions' under the heading of 'members'.[100] In some cases, for example Rising Tide, the interviewees interpreted the term "members' dues / contributions" to mean contributions from those who regularly attend meetings and/or are activists. Although they are not 'members' in the formal sense, they are active supporters and are, in some instances, regarded as equivalent to 'members'. A relatively high proportion (64.3%) of British GJMOs claim that 'membership' dues / contributions are their only source of funding (compared to 44.2% for the rest of the sample), and none of the organisations in the British sample rely solely on funding from the government.

Table 28 - Type of funding (%)

Sources of funding	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Members	92.9	79.4
Governmental	28.6	39.8
Non-governmental	31.0	34.5
Sales of goods / service / rent	46.4	39.0
Type of funding		
None	7.1	14.9
Only from members	64.3	44.2
Only from governments	0.0	5.0
From both members and governments	28.6	32.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(175)

Associational organisations seem, from the data presented in Table 29, to be the most likely to secure funding from the government, although none of them rely on governmental funding as their only source of income. BOND, for example, receives one-third of its income from 'members' dues and contributions, one-third from the Government's Department for International Development, and the rest from the Big Lottery Fund. CAFOD receives government funding, but also sources income from 'members' contributions, emergency appeals, the sale of goods, legacies and EU grants. Deliberative participative organisations, such as the social forums, Rising Tide and Radio Rampart, tend to be considerably smaller, less professional and more radical, lack the expertise and the reputation that some of the associational and deliberative representative organisations have, and are therefore considerably less likely to be allocated governmental funds, especially so considering that most of them overtly refuse to collaborate with national institutions (Table 22). Indeed, it is those organisations that rely on consensus decision-making styles that have the least tendency to apply for and reap government grants (22.2%) and those that rely on voting – those organisations that are the most formally organised and probably more likely to succeed in applying for grants – have the greatest tendency (42.9%).

[100] Bosso (2003:408), in his study that attempts to disentangle the meanings of 'membership' and 'supportership', notes that the eminent US environmental group the Sierra Club does not distinguish between membership dues and contributions from individual supporters. 'In some instances', he suggests,' this change may reflect actual declines in dues-paying membership that the organisation's leaders would just as soon gloss over. For others it reflects a more profound reality that they no longer make a conceptual or fiscal distinction between members and nonmembers'.

Table 29 - Funding by different democratic models (%)

Sources of funding	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Members	91.7	100.0	100.0	100.0	80.0
Governmental	41.7	33.3	0.0	0.0	32.0
Non governmental	25.0	55.6	0.0	33.3	36.0
Sales of goods/service/rent	41.7	55.6	0.0	66.7	48.0
Type of funding					
None	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0
Only from members	50	66.7	100	100	64.0
Only from governments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Both from members and governments	41.7	33.3	0.0	0.0	32.0
Total	48.0	36.0	4.0	12.0	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(3)	(25)

Table 30 - Funding by different decision-making styles

Sources of funding	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Members	88.9	100.0	85.7	92.6
Governmental	22.2	27.3	42.9	29.6
Non-governmental	33.3	36.4	28.6	33.3
Sales of goods / service/rent	55.6	45.5	42.9	48.1
Total	100	100	100	100
(N)	(9)	(11)	(7)	(27)

7. Issue foci

In order to ascertain the main issues which GJMOs within the sample work on, we asked interviewees 'which are the main issues that your group takes up'. We then coded the issues as social, international, national, democracy or New Social Movement (NSM) as indicated in Table 31. The categories are broadly meaningful, even though some of the issues appear misplaced, and there inconsistency between the coding of different questions. For example, youth problems is coded as an international issue in the questions on 'issues of top five campaign networks' and 'issues of demands for democratic reforms', but as a new social movement issue with regard to 'issues that groups take up'. The question of whether campaigns against poverty should be viewed as social issues or international issues is also worthy of debate. If the poverty is domestic, i.e. within the country where the campaign is being run, then perhaps it makes sense to view it as a social, or even national, issue. But if campaigns on poverty are directed primarily or exclusively towards developing countries, then it would have made more sense to view campaigns on poverty as focusing upon international issue(s). In order to do this properly, contextual or qualitative information about the nature of the campaigns would be required. The category 'national issues' was not used in the recoding of 'issues your group takes up', but it would have been sensible to include it in order to more adequately code 'for civil liberties (i.e. no to identity cards, against anti-social behaviour order, against repressive policing)', which, in the most part, are peculiar to domestic situations, and therefore ought to be classified as 'national'. It also seems rather odd that

the issue of 'agriculture' has found its way into the 'new social movement' category, and whilst it makes some sense to classify peace as an international issue, it is probably more widely known as a new social movement issue, and this could cause some confusion. Despite these oddities in the coding, the categories were left like this for this country report in order to avoid the cumbersome task of recoding and rerunning variables, and so that there is consistency with other chapters. As with any attempt at a classification, readers should be aware that the categories of issues are only broadly reflective of campaign types.

Table 31 - Recoding of issues

Category of Issues	Issues your group takes up	Issues of top 5 campaign networks and Issues of demands for democratic reforms
Social	For (individual, collective, global) civic / political / social rights and dignity. Anti-racist, immigrants rights or pro-immigrants groups. Common goods (water, energy etc.). Social justice, social inclusion, fighting poverty. Labour rights, unemployment. Job insecurity, precariousness. Social work, welfare, charity. For civil liberties (i.e. no to identity cards, against anti-social behaviour orders, against repressive policing). Education.	Campaigns on poverty. Immigration / citizenship. Against privatisation (for public schools) / for common goods / 'Defensive' campaigns. Unemployment / workers' rights. Precarity.
International	Peace, against war, anti-militarism, non-violence and conflict resolution. Food sovereignty. World trade / corporate accountability. AIDS / Health. International solidarity. Cooperation / development aid / humanitarian assistance. Fair trade, consumerism, ethical finance.	Campaigns on Europe. Youth problems. Networks and campaigns on taxes. Trade. Campaigns targeting international institutions. Fair trade / political consumerism. Debt. Development aid. Against war / peace / non-violence / anti-militarism. International solidarity (Palestine, Cuba etc.) Individual / collective / global (social, civic, political rights)
New Social Movement	Environment / antinuclear / animal rights / sustainability. Agriculture Youth issues / problems. Women's rights. Gay, lesbian, transgender issues, sexual freedom.	Environment. Gender / women's rights
Democracy	Democracy. Alternative knowledge, alternative communication, alternative media, alternative software.	Participative democracy promotion (i.e. participative budgeting) / building democracy / citizen consultation. Free information / free expression.
Religion	Religion	*(Category not used)*
National	*(Category not used)*	National / European political parties. National issues (campaign to reform national

Category of Issues	Issues your group takes up	Issues of top 5 campaign networks and Issues of demands for democratic reforms
		legislation on international cooperation, campaign for a new national law for the associations, alternative proposals for public spending of national budget, pro-independence campaign, against mafia). Think tanks.

As with the rest of the sample, social issues appear to be the most prevalent issue that the GJMOs in Britain take up. However, this is partly skewed by the inclusion of 'social justice / social inclusion / fighting poverty' as a social, rather than an international issue (Table 32). Over 42% of British organisations are concerned with social justice and poverty, but few of them are concerned about it domestically. For example, War on Want, Make Poverty History, CAFOD, JDC, Christian Aid, People and Planet, Stamp out Poverty, the Global Justice Movement and the World Development Movement have all been coded as taking up the issue of 'social justice / social inclusion / fighting poverty', which they all duly do, but the emphasis of these organisations is most certainly on social justice and poverty elimination in developing countries, making this category, in practice, as much of an international issue as campaigns for fair trade, or ethical finance. International issues appear popular, even with the absence of the 'poverty' category, largely because of the prevalence of humanitarian organisations in the sample. New social movement issues are more common in the British sample than in the rest of the sample, with the environment being mentioned by nearly a third of British GJMOs, including some which are not overtly environmental: *Red Pepper*, Globalise Resistance, Socialist Workers' Party and Radio Rampart. Democracy and religion are not regarded by interviewees as important fields of group activity, even for organisations, like Christian Aid, CAFOD and the Muslim Association of Britain, for which religion is a guiding principle. Only Pax Christi stresses that religion is one of the most important issues it works on. Indymedia UK and the East Anglian Social Forum are the only organisations to stress the importance that they place upon alternative knowledge and communication in their work. This confirms previous survey research on the global justice movement in Britain which suggests that democracy is not the most important issue for the movement (Saunders 2005).

Table 32 - Main issues of activity of the group (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
Social issues	72.4	64.3
International issues	65.5	56.9
New social movement issues	41.4	26.5
Democracy	6.9	22.7
Religion	3.4	1.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)

Deliberative representative GJMOs in Britain seem especially inclined to focus upon social and international issues. Deliberative participative organisations focus mostly on social issues, whereas associational organisations seem less likely to (Table 33). Those organisations that use consensus in their decision-making are likely to work on more than one set of issues in tandem (hence the higher percentages of organisations engaging in each set of issues in Table 34), whereas those that use voting only tend to focus on one set of issues over another. The organisations that make decisions

by voting are therefore not only more efficiently organised, but also more specialised. The Muslim Association of Britain, for example, focuses on the rights of Muslims in Britain, Stop the War is focused solely on peace / anti-war issues, the trade unions – TGWU and Unison are focused mostly on workers' rights and the Sexual Freedom has the specific remit of sexual freedom for all over the age of consent.

Table 33 - Main issues of activity of different democratic models (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	58.3	88.9	100.0	75.0	73.1
International issues	58.3	77.8	100.0	50.0	65.4
New social movement issues	33.3	44.4	0.0	50.0	38.5
Democracy	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Religion	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(8)	(30)

Table 34 - Main issues of activity by different decision-making styles

Main issues of activity of the group	**Decision-making styles**			**Total**
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Social issues	70.0	81.8	57.1	71.4
International issues	70.0	72.7	42.8	64.3
New social movement issues	40.0	45.5	28.6	39.3
Democracy	10.0	0.0	0.0	3.6
Religion	0.0	0.0	14.3	3.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(11)	(7)	(28)

As well as asking GJMO representatives for the most important issues that they work on, we also asked them to list up to five groups, networks or campaigns dealing with global justice issues with which their group most intensively interacts. These campaign networks were then coded according to the main issues that they work on as shown in Table 35. Besides some of the problematic recoding, it should also be noted that multi-issue organisations were coded according to their most prominent issue because the recoding only allowed us to select one type of issue. Thus, although Make Poverty History is a campaign against third world poverty that seeks for debt to be dropped, trade justice and more and better aid, it was only possible to code it under the category of 'campaigns against poverty' and not as a trade justice, debt or development aid organisation. Thus Make Poverty History ended up being recoded as a campaign with a social issue foci, despite its overarching aim as an international poverty reduction network. Ideally, this coding should be altered to allow for multi issues to be coded as working on *several themes* rather than just their most prominent ones. And, because just over one third of the interviewees listed Make Poverty History as one of the five most important networks / campaigns with which they interact, we find that social issues top the charts as the most popular theme of important campaigns / networks. The Global Call to Action Against Poverty was also a fairly important network for those working on the theme of

poverty in developing countries, notably for Make Poverty History itself, Christian Aid, the Trade Justice Movement, BOND and the Jubilee Debt Campaign. The highest territorial level of the majority (60.7%) of the top five important groups listed was national, followed by international (33.3%) and local (6.2%).

Table 35 - Issues of (top 5) campaign networks that GJMOs are a part of (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Social issues	75.9	37.6
International issues	79.3	63.0
National issues/political parties/think thanks	3.4	9.9
Democracy	6.9	8.8
New social movement issues	20.7	12.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)

Virtually all of the British GJMOs in the sample, regardless of the democratic model they use, have a preference for collaborating with networks and campaigns that focus upon social and international issues. New social movement networks and campaigns appear to be very much less common as galvanisers of shared concern except in the case of half of the deliberative participative organisations and one third of deliberative representative (Table 36). Those British GJMOs that make decisions by voting only, are members of networks on social and national issues only, whereas those that use at least some consensus decision-making work on a broader range of issues including national, democratic, NSM, social and international issues (Table 37).

Table 36 - Issues of top 5 networks/campaigns of the GJM per democratic models (%)

Issues of networks/campaigns	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	91.7	66.7	100.0	75.0	80.8
International issues	83.3	77.8	100.0	100.0	84.6
National issues / political parties / think thanks	8.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.8
Democracy	0.0	11.1	0.0	0.0	3.8
New social movement issues	8.3	33.3	0.0	50.0	23.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(26)

Table 37 - Issues of top 5 networks/campaigns of the GJM by different decision-making methods (%)

Issues of networks / campaigns	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	Mixture of consensus and voting	Voting only	
Social issues	70.0	63.6	85.7	78.5
International issues	80.0	63.6	85.7	82.1
National issues	0.0	9.1	0.0	3.6
Democracy	10.0	9.1	0.0	7.2
NSM issues	30.0	27.3	0.0	21.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(11)	(7)	(28)

A final related question on campaign issues asked respondents to list the five most important campaigns that involved policy proposals demanding democratic reform. These were recoded in the same manner as the top five campaign / networks as shown in Table 31. Here the profile of issues is very similar to the rest of the sample (Table 38), except that national and new social movement issues are less prevalent – perhaps surprising on the former account because of the peculiar first-past-the-post electoral system (Rose 1976) that has been a major national issue via the campaign for proportional representation.

Table 38 - Issues of demands for democratic reforms that are worked upon (%)

Issues of campaigns	Britain	Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)
Social issues	37.9	28.7
International issues	69.0	56.9
National issues/political parties/think thanks	6.9	14.9
Democracy	17.2	16.6
New social movement issues	3.4	10.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)

8. Movement strategies and repertoires

The range and frequency of movement strategies of the British GJMOs is remarkably similar to the rest of the sample, with the exception of the British GJMOs' higher tendency to engage in lobbying (69% versus 51.9%). By far the most common strategy is political education and awareness raising, in which nearly 90% of British, and European GJMOs claim to participate (Table 39). The main strategies of different groups do not vary much across the different democratic models (Table 40). The only striking cell in the crosstabulation of strategies by democratic models suggests that deliberative participative organisations tend not to lobby. This can be explained by deliberative participative organisations mistrust and avoidance of, collaboration or critical engagement with national and international institutions (see Table 24). Only 30% of the British GJMOs that use consensus only as a decision-making strategy engage in lobbying compared to 100% of those that use a mix of voting and consensus and 85.7% of those that use voting only

(Table 41). For organisations that use consensus, raising awareness is the most important strategy. Perhaps it is the case that their use of other strategies is geared towards raising public awareness.

Table 39 also indicates that British GJMOs tend to use a combination of strategies to a greater extent than their counterparts in other European countries. Over eighty percent use three or four strategies in tandem. Those using fewer strategies tend to be media organisations (*Schnews*, Indymedia and Radio Rampart all use two or fewer strategies). Thus, although associational organisations tend to dominate the GJM in Britain, they do, in addition to lobbying, have a tendency to engage in a broad range of strategies, including protest. Their tendency to engage in protest justifies their inclusion as part of a social movement working on global issues. Indeed, all of the organisations that use voting only as a decision-making strategy claim to engage in protest, compared to just over 70% of those that use consensus and voting, and less than 2/3 of those that use consensus (Table 41).

Table 39 - Main strategies of the groups (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding British cases)**
Protest	75.9	78.5
Building concrete alternatives	79.3	74.6
Lobbying	69.0	51.9
Political education/raising awareness	89.7	89.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)
Overlapping strategies		
1	10.3	6.6
2	6.9	23.8
3	41.4	35.9
4	41.4	33.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(180)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Table 40 - Main strategies of different democratic models (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Protest	91.7	77.8	0.0	75.0	80.8
Building concrete alternatives	91.7	77.8	100.0	50.0	80.8
Lobbying	91.7	88.9	100.0	0.0	76.9
Political education/raising awareness	91.7	77.8	100.0	100.0	88.5
Total	46.1	36.6	3.8	15.4	100.0
(N)	(12)	(9)	(1)	(4)	(26)

Table 41 - Main strategies by different decision-making styles

Issues of networks / campaigns	Decision-making styles			Total
	Consensus only	**Mixture of consensus and voting**	**Voting only**	
Protest	60.0	72.7	100.0	75.0
Building concrete alternatives	70.0	81.8	85.7	78.6
Lobbying	30.0	100.0	85.7	71.4
Political education/raising awareness	100.0	81.8	85.7	89.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(11)	(7)	(28)

The repertoires of action of British GJMOs differ slightly from the rest of the sample. In particular, British GJMOs have a lesser tendency to strike, but, at least in Britain, striking is a form of action limited to the field of trade unions. Because strike action is rare outside of trade unions in Britain, because it lacks radical trade unions like the Italian COBAS, and because there are only two trade unions in the British sample, strike action is under represented. In any case, strike action has been severely constrained in Britain by a series of employment relations laws brought in under the conservative government of Margaret Thatcher. According to Thatcher, the trade unions of the 1980s, which led some protracted industrial disputes, were too powerful and needed to be suppressed (Coates 1989:69-126, Sheldrake 1991:75-92).

Boycotting seems to be a more common strategy in Britain than elsewhere, with one recent and popular Boycott being *Stop Esso*. Blockades, occupations of buildings and civil disobedience are less common in Britain than elsewhere, but it could simply be the case that organisations did not want to admit culpability in law breaking. E-campaigning appears, on the basis of data presented in Table 42, to be relatively rare, but this data should not be taken seriously because it could be an artefact of the manner in which data for this variable was collected, and this is why it has not been presented in most other chapters of this report. The other forms of actions were listed on the questionnaire for respondents to reply to, whereas e-campaigning came under the category of 'other' and so could have easily been forgotten by interviewees, deemed by respondents to be unimportant, or out of the remit of our research. In actual fact, e-campaigning is becoming increasingly common amongst British GJMOs. After Italy, British GJMOs make the most extensive use of internet mobilization tools such as electronic petitions, electronic postcards, mailbombings and netstrikes, although the latter two are rare in all countries (Saunders and Rootes 2004:23).

Table 42 - Repertoire of action of the groups (%)

Forms of action	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
Petition	72.4	76.2
Demonstration	75.9	80.1
Strike	13.8	26.0
Boycott of certain products	41.4	29.8
Blockade	10.3	30.4
Occupation of buildings	17.2	26.0
Civil disobedience	24.1	43.6
Artistic/cultural performance	65.5	59.1
E-campaigning (as a specified 'other')	3.4	8.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)

Despite their enthusiasm for electronic forms of campaigning, a greater proportion of GJMOs in Britain, and elsewhere, are pessimistic about the role of the internet in improving their relations with policy-makers (Table 43). The World Development Movement respondent believed that the internet barely changed the manner in which it deals with policy-makers. The interviewee from the Muslim Association of Britain Youth Section claimed that it is difficult to get visions and aims across to policy-makers via electronic media. And although CAFOD now routinely encourages its supporters to send electronic postcards to Members of Parliament and Secretaries of State for its campaigns, it still produces traditional cardboard postcards because it is unsure of the efficacy of internet campaigning. On a positive note, the Global Justice Movement claims that the internet has helped a wider range of people to interact with the Movement by asking questions, making proposals and presenting studies, which are all eventually channelled through policy-makers.

The internet is much more acclaimed for improving the relationship between GJMOs and the media than for improving relations with policy-makers. Although some organisations, such as Globalise Resistance, still do much of their press work over the telephone, the internet and email in particular, has been useful for many organisations in the drafting, sending and checking of press releases. However, our Rising Tide respondent doubted whether emailed press releases were as effective as printed copies, and was concerned that increased access to journalists via email accounts was a bad thing because it increased competition for press space and reduced the chances of important stories reaching it into print.

The role of the internet in relations with members and supporters was viewed positively virtually unequivocally. For War on Want:

The internet has had an enormous impact on our communication with members and supporters. We mobilize our supporters through email, and send them a newsletter. How anyone ever campaigned without the internet, I do not know. I can't imagine it.

Contacting members and supporters without the internet would be like 'trying to rub stones together to make fire' for Globalise Resistance's campaign manager. *Schnews* used to send out its newsletter to supporters by hand and Royal Mail, and it used to take an entire day with the help of ten volunteers. Nowadays the paper mail out requires the labour of just one person, and takes about half an hour, because most supporters now happily receive an electronic version by email. The response from CAFOD was also positive, with the respondent stressing that its website receives lots of hits. She also emphasised that the internet facilitates e-actions, provides members and supporters with up-to-date information, and allows them to download campaign tool-kits and how-to guides.

Most supporter queries are directed to the email information service, which helps facilitate faster responses. And although the CAFOD respondent was mostly jubilant about the effects of the internet on relations with supporters and members, she was resistant to the idea of developing a e-newsletter because many supporters who do not have internet access would miss out on key information. The Jubilee Debt Campaign respondent also drew my attention to the negative side of heavy reliance on the internet for contacting members and supporters and stressed the need to take steps to support those without internet access - not only those in Britain, but also, and especially, those in the 'global South'. The Rising Tide interviewee noted how Rising Tide's electronic newssheet on climate change issues reaches 1,500 people, but he was aware of the 'digital divide' and that more might be reachable through non-electronic networks.

Table 43 - Evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and policy-makers	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
Negative	53.6	52.7
Both negative and positive	0.0	3.9
Positive	46.4	43.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (129)
Internet and mass media		
Negative	34.5	19.0
Both negative and positive	10.3	6.3
Positive	55.2	74.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (142)
Internet and members		
Negative	0.0	3.8
Both negative and positive	7.7	16.7
Positive	92.3	79.5
Total **(N)**	100.0 (26)	100.0 (156)

9. Sense of belonging to the movement

Representatives of the high majority of British GJMOs in the sample have attended at least one world or European social forum. Some organisations, like Red Pepper, Christian Aid, Globalise Resistance and the World Development Movement have attended virtually every World and European Social Forum since their inceptions. Others, including the Muslim Association for Britain (YS), Rising Tide and Radio Rampart attended only the London based European Social Forum. And some of the smaller GJMOs, like the Global Justice Movement and Rising Tide have not attended any World or European Social Forums. Rising Tide did, however, participate in the *Schnews* 10 Year Birthday Party, a fringe event of the European Social Forum autonomous events held in London in October 2004. Even though a great majority of British GJMOs are represented at European and World Social Forums, such forums are not popularly attended by rank-and-file activists and movement participants. National and local social forums, only attended by 17.2% of the GJMOs in the British sample, are much weaker in Britain than their counterparts in continental Europe (64.1% of the GJMOs in the rest of the sample had attended national or local social forums).

Local social forums have had a fairly jaded history in Britain, and few remain active today with the notable exceptions of Liverpool, London and East Anglia. The Sheffield and Manchester social forums that were established primarily in order to mobilize for the European Social Forum in London in 2004 have both now folded. National social forums occur annually at the most, and tend to attract small numbers of people drawn from the weak and already existing local social forums. Counter-summits have attracted the participation of just under two thirds of the British sample and global days of action considerably fewer. This is probably because the global days of action against the war in 2003 and 2004 were not routinely attended by organisations from the humanitarian, aid, trade and development lobby that dominate the sample of British groups (Table 44).

Table 44 - Participation in movement events (%)

Participation in movements events	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
World/European social forums	79.3	78.5
National/local social forums	17.2	64.1
Counter-summits	65.5	72.4
Global days of action	8.6	80.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)

On the whole, the British GJMOs in the sample consider themselves to be a part of the movement, although some expressed reservations (Table 45). When asked 'Does your group as a whole consider itself to be part of the global justice movement', the respondent from Rising Tide answered 'I'm not sure I've ever heard that term before'. Once I had explained that the 'global justice movement' is a politically correct way of referring to the 'anti-globalisation movement', he immediately answered the question in the affirmative. Perhaps it was also the terminology that confused the respondent from *Schnews*, who, after a substantial delay replied 'yes, definitely'.

Table 45 - Sense of belonging to the movement (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
No	0.0	8.8
The group doesn't have a shared view	0.0	3.9
Yes, but with reservations	10.3	9.4
Yes	89.7	77.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(181)

Social issues are much less prevalent as an issue that GJMO interviewees felt should be a main aim of the global justice movement as they are in issue foci of actual organisations and important campaign networks (Table 46). Democracy and NSM issues are noticeably more prevalent here. One possible explanation is that organisations already working on social issues believe that the focus of the movement should shift towards those issues that they currently do not work on. The Make Poverty History interviewee claimed that the global justice movement should aim for:

economic, social and environmental justice with a focus on the economic side of affairs without sidelining other important issues.

As an add-on, he stressed the importance of tackling climate change – clearly an issue that MPH does not currently focus on. The Trade Justice Movement respondent made a much more general claim for:

Fundamental change of the unjust global structural processes and rules that harm poor people and the environment.

In a similar vein, War on Want's Senior Campaign Officer called for:

Transformation of economic and political systems of the world in order to achieve a fairer, equal and more just distribution of wealth and power.

Unison's Head of Research believed that the global justice movement,

Quite simply, should aim to ensure that globalisation benefits everybody and not just the rich through a redistribution of global wealth.

The frequent mentioning of the environment, made NSM issues appear more important as an aim of the movement than an actual issue that organisations work on.

Table 46 - Perception of the movement (%)

Main aims of the movement	**Britain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Britain)**
Social issues	55.2	58.0
International issues	31.0	33.1
Democracy / free access to information	34.5	22.1
NSM issues	20.7	53.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (181)
Type of claim		
Negative/contra claim	13.8	49.2
Positive/pro claim	86.2	75.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (173)
Type of statement		
Made a statement	100.0 (n=29)	95.6 (n=181)
Has no view, or thinks it's impossible to say because the GJM has no single aim	13.8	8.1
General statement	69.0	81.5
Specific proposal	17.2	33.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (173 - 95.6% of 181 cases)

10. Movement networking

The network diagram displayed in Figure 1 is derived from analysis of the responses to a question which asked respondents to 'Please list up to five groups, networks or campaigns dealing with global justice issues with which your group acts most intensively'. The size of the nodes has been scaled to give an indication of the popularity of organisations, thus the largest node is Make Poverty History, which was listed by eleven of the other interviewees, followed by the Trade Justice Movement, listed by seven, and Stop the War, listed by five. Thus, unsurprisingly, it is the

campaign coalitions that are the most central nodes in the network that is the British global justice movement. The majority of the organisations in the British sample are connected to the main part of the network. Perhaps surprisingly, the local social forums are not connected to the main part of the network. As previously argued in this paper, social forums are underdeveloped in Britain and the network diagram provides some evidence that they are not extensive networks of GJMO representatives as in other European countries. The East Anglian Social Forum works almost entirely alone, Sheffield Social Forum is only linked to the UK Social Forum meetings, and Liverpool Social Forum has connections with just a few small radical networks, namely Dissent!, the Anarchist Federation and the Corporate Responsibility Network. Other relatively disconnected organisations are Indymedia, Rising Tide and Radio Rampart. It is likely that both Indymedia and Radio Rampart have extensive contacts with a number of campaigns that they routinely report on, but that few of these stand out as being amongst the 'five most important'. Rising Tide has a number of links with other radical organisations, which are not a part of the main network, including Radio Rampart. The connection between Radio Rampart and Rising Tide was expected, given that they are both in Whitechapel, just a stone's throw away from each other.

Figure 1 - Important campaigns and networks



Please see Appendix for full names of organisations.

Organisations that were listed by questionnaire respondents, but were not in the WP3 sample

Organisations that were part of the WP3 sample

11. Reflections on the method

As with previous work packages, the choice of the sample has influenced the conclusions we can draw from our analysis. To properly compare and contrast organisations belonging to different democratic models, it would have been necessary to select a comparable number of organisations from each of the categories: associational, assembleary, deliberative participative and deliberative representative. Although it is very difficult to select on a fairly complex dependent variable in advance, having done so would have made it easier to draw conclusions about assembleary and deliberative participative organisations. Unfortunately, it has been impossible to make, with any accuracy, statements about the characteristics of British GJMOs that use these democratic models. Perhaps we should have added additional organisations to the sample until we had reached a quota of at least five organisations fitting each democratic model.

Additionally, choosing organisations from particular movement sectors meant that some organisations that are fairly marginal to the movement were selected; the National Association for Women and the Sexual Freedom Coalition, for example, are not particularly well integrated into the movement network (Figure 1). Another problem is that some of the variables were directly

influenced by the choice of certain types of organisation in the sample. In particular, in the British sample, the number of trade unions affected the number of organisations claiming to have partaken in, or organised, strikes. In other countries, the effect of this is much less profound because strikes are a more diffused technique across a broader range of movement sectors. In Italy, for example, four trade unions, four political parties and their youth organizations, two immigrant organizations, two alternative media organisations, and two radical groups (anarchist federation and "noglobal network") participated in strikes.

There are also some peculiarities in the recoding and classifying of variables. In particular, the construction of the assembleary model presents some problems. An assembleary model assumes that organisations make decisions by voting within an assembly or open meeting, and by implication that the assembly is in a position of power to dictate the policy or strategy of an organisation. However, although the Global Justice Movement, which has been classified as assembleary for both WP3 and WP4, does have an assembly which votes, the assembly does not have *any power* to make decisions about the organisation's activities. In fact, the organisation is a forum for sharing ideas that does not make organisational decisions per se. Whilst it can still, relatively accurately, be classified as assembleary because the assembly is the main body, which engages in voting, it should be remembered that this assembly does *not* function in the same manner as a traditional assemblearian organisation, in which the assembly would have power to steer the organisation in a particular direction. Also the practical distinction between the deliberative representative and associational models seems a bit arbitrary. We need a more watertight means for classifying organisations that have an executive committee, but which make decisions by a mixture of voting and consensus.

As a compromise, organisations were recategorised according to their main decision-making strategies, regardless of the body making the decision as voting, voting and consensus, or voting only. It was useful to do this because it meant that there were larger numbers of organisations within each category – ten GJMOs using consensus only, eleven using consensus and voting, and seven using voting only. Unfortunately, information on the extent of delegation in decision-making was lost using this classification.

A further problem, and one that was explored in WP3 (Saunders and Rootes 2005), is applying the questionnaire to complex organisations. The difficulty of trying to classify Friends of the Earth was explored in Saunders and Rootes (2005), but *Red Pepper* was equally difficult to classify. In particular, it was difficult in the case of *Red Pepper* to work out which body was equivalent to an 'executive committee' because of the presence of various committees, each with power over organisational matters, and which body was equivalent to an assembly or open meeting. Although *Red Pepper* has an annual general meeting, it also has a monthly editorial meeting, which all volunteers and staff can attend, at which decisions are made by consensus. Although *Red Pepper* has been classified as deliberative representative, in practice it makes combined use of associational and deliberative participative models.

We should also bear in mind that, just as the WP3 results were influenced by the quality of the information used for the analysis, the WP4 results are heavily influenced by the subjectivities, knowledge and experience of the interviewees.

12. Conclusion

All caveats aside, this has been a valuable experience. Even though, in practice, organisations frequently tend to use a mixture of democratic models, the allocation of democratic models to GJMOs in the British sample seems much more consonant with reality than the results that were yielded from the discourse analysis undertaken for WP3. Another major and potentially important finding of this paper is that deliberative participative GJMOs tend, in Britain at least, to be smaller, have fewer resources, and to avoid collaboration with public institutions, and they especially

eschew lobbying. Associational organisations are mostly professional outfits that perhaps need more efficient decision-making styles, not least because of the complex relationships between different members of staff and volunteers, and because of their organisational size. Deliberative representation seems to be a relatively new mode of organising, and may well be a response of previously established GJMOs to the new, and more recent, wave of deliberative democracy that most truly lives out its ideal of 'democracy from below'. However, it is not 'democracy from below' that is the axial principle of the GJM in Britain; instead, it is campaigning on issues that are symptomatic of the neoliberal agenda (Saunders 2005). Indeed, even those organisations with complex and hierarchical decision-making structures tend to identify closely with the global justice movement.

Appendix

AI	Amnesty International
AMI	American Monetary Institute
BOND	British Overseas NGOs for Development
BritainAidNet	Britain Aid Network
Bromsgrove	Bromsgrove Monetary Reform Group
CAAT	Campaign Against the Arms Trade
CAFOD	Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
CAid	Christian Aid
CCC	Campaign Against Climate Change
CCMJ	Christian Council for Monetary Justice
CESJ	Centre for Economic and Social Justice
CRC	Corporate Responsibility Coalition
Dissent	Dissent!
EASF	East Anglia Social Forum
EC	European Catholic ….
ESF	European Social Forum
Eurodad	The European Network on Debt and Development
Eurotopia	Eurotopia
FAIR	Forum Against Islamaphobia and Racism
G8Alt	G8 Alternatives Coalition
GCAP	Global Call to Action on Poverty
Globalise	Globalise Resistance
Greens	Green Party
IAMSA	Small Arms Campaign
IHRC	Islamic Human Rights Committee
IMCBritain	Local groups that are part of Indymedia United Kollectives
IMCInt	Indymedia groups across the globle
Indymedia	Indymedia United Kollectives
J&P	Muslims for Justice and Peace (Just Peace)
JDC	Jubilee Debt Campaign
JSouth	Jubilee South
LARC	London Activist Resource Centre
LSF	Liverpool Social Forum
MAB	Muslim Association of Britain
MPH	Make Poverty History
NAW	National Association of Women
NoBorders	No Borders
NoID	No ID (cards campaign)
Oilwatch	Oil Watch
Oxfam	Oxfam
P&J	Peace and Justice
P&P	People and Planet
Palestine	Palestine Solidarity Campaign
PChristi	Pax Christi
PGA	Peoples' Global Action
Platform	Platform
Respect	Respect
Rosport	Rosport Solidarity Campaign
RP	Red Pepper
RT	Rising Tide
S2BN	Seattle to Brussels Network

SCC	Stop Climate Chaos
SFC	Sexual Freedom Coalition
SmashEDO	Smash EDO (Brighton based campaign against arms manufactuer)
SOP	Stamp Out Poverty (previously called the Tobin Tax Network)
SSF	Sheffield Social Forum
BritainSF	Britain Social Forum Network
StopAids	Stop Aids Campaign
STW	Stop the War Coalition
TJM	Trade Justice Movement
TJN	Tax Justice Network
TUC	Trade Unions' Congress
UAF	Unite Against Fascism
Unison	Unison, The Public Services Union
WDM	World Development Movement
WoW	War on Want

References

Bey, Hakim. 2003. T.A.Z: The Temporary Autonomous Zone. Ontological Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism, Autonomedia.

Bosso, Christopher. 2003. "Rethinking the Concept of Membership in Nature Advocacy Organizations." The Policy Studies Journal, 31(3):397-411.

Coates, David. 1989. The Crisis of Labour: Industrial Relations and the State in Contemporary Britain. Oxford and New Jersey: Philip Allan.

Diani, Mario. 2006. "The Structural Bases of Protest Events. Multiple Memberships and Networks in the February 15th Anti-war Demonstrations." Paper presented at research seminar at University of Kent, November 2006.

Freeman, Jo. 1973. "The Tiranny of Structurelessness." Pp. 285-99 in Radical Femminism, edited by A. Koedt, E. Levine and A. Raphone. New York: Quadrangle Books.

Gordon, Yuri. 2003. "Consensus Games: Towards a Democratic Theory of Consensus Decision-Making." Proceedings of the Ninth Alternative Futures and Popular Protest Conference, Manchester Metropolitan University, April 2003.

Kahn, Robert and Charles Cannel. 1967. The Dynamics of Interviewing. New York: Wiley.

Miller, David. 1993. "Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice." Pp.74-92 in Prospects for Democracy, edited by D. Held. Oxford: Polity Press.

Monbiot, George. 2000. "No Way to Run a Revolution." At http://www.monbiot.com/archives/2000/05/no-way-to-run-a-revolution, accessed 28th November 2006. (Published in the Guardian 10th May 2000).

Papadimitriou, Tasos Clare Saunders and Christopher Rootes. 2005. "Democracy and the London Social Forum." Centre for the Study of Social and Political Movements working paper, University of Kent, Canterbury.

Rootes, Christopher and Clare Saunders. 2007. "The Global Justice Movement in Britain." Forthcoming in The Global Justice Movement: A Cross-national and Transnational Perspective, edited by D. della Porta. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishers.

Rose, Richard. 1976. The Problem of Party Government. London: MacMillan.

Saunders, Clare and Christopher Rootes. 2005 "The British Global Justice Movement's Use of the Internet as a Tool for Democracy." Paper prepared for the Demos Project, WP2, and discussed at the Demos Consortium Meeting, Cordoba , 25-27 November 2005.

Saunders, Clare and Christopher Rootes. 2006. "The Organisational Ideology and Discourse of the Global Justice Movement in Britain." Paper prepared for the Demos Project, WP3, and discussed at the Demos Consortium Meeting, Athens, 7th May 2006.

Saunders, Clare. 2005. "The Configuration of the Global Justice Movement in Britain: Exploring Networks of Concern, Collective Action and Overlapping Memberships of Make Poverty History March participants." Paper presented to the ACI conference on 'Genealogies of the Global Justice Movement', Paris, 30 September - 1 October, 2005.

Sheldrake, John. 1991. Industrial Relations and Politics in Britain 1880-1989. London: Pinter Publishers.

Young, Stephen. 1994. "An Agenda 21 Strategy for the UK?" Environmental Politics, 3(3):325.

Democratic practices in the Italian Global Justice Movement

By Lorenzo Mosca

(European University Institute)

1. Introduction[101]

The main goal of this national report consists in explaining the peculiarities of the Italian case, in the cross-national analysis, using quantitative and qualitative data collected with the WP4 questionnaire[102] and interpreting them in the light of case knowledge.

This report explores and explains the peculiarities of a sample of 37 Italian Global Justice Movement Organizations (GJMOs) in relation with their democratic features. As argued elsewhere (della Porta *et al.* 2006; Reiter *et al.* 2006), within the main Italian organizational networks involved in the Global Justice Movement (GJM) we can find a significant variance for what concerns the organizational structure (formalization, specialization, main decision-making organism and its composition, centre-periphery relations) and the different models of decision-making (type of leadership and decision-making methods). With this Work Package we tried to apply the same analytical model developed for other parts of our research (WP1 and WP3) to actual practices of democracy of a broad range of GJMOs belonging to the GJM.

First of all (§ 2), we will focus on organizations' selections, exploring differences and similarities with the WP2 and WP3 samples. Afterwards (§ 3), we will present the classification of the different cases on our typology of democratic models generated crossing the two dimensions of participation and deliberation. We will assess if any difference exists between conceptions of democracy as expressed in written document (see WP3 Italian report: della Porta and Reiter 2006) and current democratic practices as declared by the organizations.

In the following paragraphs, data referring to organizational structure, relationship with the institutions, organizational strategies, and relationship with the GJM will be presented and their relations with conception of democracy will be assessed.

2. Questionnaire administration and sampling: constraints and limits

As we already stated, this national report concerns actual democratic practices of Italian GJMOs as declared by their activists, spokespersons, representatives, and leaders. The questionnaire had been administrated to people with different roles within the organization depending on the type of group. We focused on leader/spokesperson (when possible) for groups with middle-size format. For political parties, trade unions and large NGOs we generally interviewed the responsible for the department of international relations or (when present) the responsible for campaigns/demonstrations or for the relationship with social movements. Since most informal groups don't experience defined roles or the presence of a leader, in these cases most engaged and active members with a large stay within the organization have been selected for the interview.

We succeeded in interviewing as many as 37 out of the original 42 groups selected for the WP2 sample (41 for the WP3 sample). The survey on Italian GJMOs took place from January to June 2006. Some groups were contacted by email and then interviewed through telephone calls; often they had already received the questionnaire. Most of the groups were easy to contact and ready to be interviewed (even if sometimes it was difficult to arrange the interview because they had very crowded agendas). (Good) relationships already established during previous researches were of

[101] I wish to thank Donatella della Porta for useful comments to a previous version of this report and for important suggestions concerning data analysis.

[102] See appendix.

great importance to obtain the participation of the different organizations in our survey. In some cases, in order to establish relationships with new groups, it was very useful to participate in their assemblies, contacting them again later and finally asking for an interview. In only few cases, organizations previously selected for our research expressed no interest in it (i.e. the European Counter Network) or never replied to our request (Global Project, Stop the War committee --now inactive--, World March of Women and Chainworkers). Some groups preferred to fill in the questionnaire and send it back by email. However, all were contacted again by phone and asked to provide more information, especially for what concerns open questions.

3. Democracy within: some findings from the Italian case: Moving from written documents to actual practices

First of all, considering different democratic types, we can notice that no major differences can be found between the Italian sample and the rest of the sample[103] (table 1). Differences between WP3 results concerning written documents and WP4 results concerning actual democratic practices as declared by our interviewees are evident from the table below. However, we found much more consistency in the Italian case than in the rest of the sample. The correlation coefficient obtained crossing the two dependent variables is as high as 0.658** (Kendall's Tau B) in the Italian case while the rest of the sample shows a correlation coefficient of 0.371** (see also WP4 general introduction, p. 14).

Table 1 – Sampling for the different Work Packages – (%)

Democratic models	WP3 (ITALIAN SAMPLE)	WP4 (ITALIAN SAMPLE)	WP4 (REST OF THE SAMPLE EXCLUDING ITALIAN CASES)
Associational	66.7	26.2	26.0
Deliberative representative	7.1	30.9	32.9
Assembleary	14.3	9.5	8.1
Deliberative participative	7.1	19.1	18.5
Not classified	2.4	2.4	14.5
Missing cases	2.4	11.9	--
Total WP2	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(42)	(42)	(173)

The higher consistency in the Italian case could be explained by the fact that the sample is almost the same used for the WP3 research (for more information on it see Reiter 2006, pp. 291-2): just one group (EuroMayDay) has been substituted not because of the impossibility to reach it and to obtain an interview (that in fact was finally done) but because we realized that such campaign, even if promoted initially by Italian groups, was growing, evolving and functioning as a transnational networks. For this reason it was added to the transnational WP4 sample and substituted with another important organization dealing with fair trade and critical consumerism issues: the *Cooperazione Terzo Mondo* (CTM)-*Altromercato* (third world cooperation - alternative trade). This organization was created in 1998 and it was among the first of the Italian ones in establishing permanent networks between southern peasants and northern Italian cooperatives and starting to import fair trade products in Italy. The CTM-Altromercato is also strictly related to other

[103] The expression "rest of the sample" used in this chapter refers to the overall sample excluding Italian cases. The rest of the sample includes British, French, German, Spanish, Swiss, and transnational groups.

organizations included in the Italian sample: the *Associazione Botteghe del Mondo* (World Shops association) and the Rete Lilliput. The former represents an Italian network of shops selling fair trade products (imported, among other, by the CTM-Altromercato). As for the latter, it was promoted in the year 2000 by the intercampaign table, that is an Italian coordination of different campaigns with similar goals like nonviolence and economic justice (see Andretta *et al.* 2002; della Porta *et al.* 2006), to which the CTM-Altromercato belongs.

Comparing the WP4 sample with the WP2 sample (for more information on the latter see Mosca 2005), we had to exclude five organizations (four of them included in the WP3 sample): "Global Project", the Italian branch of the "World March of Women", "the European Counter Network", "the Stop the war committee" and "Chainworkers". Besides, it is worth noticing that in the Italian sample only Indymedia-Italy was not classified for what concerns its democratic model.

The table below shows that notwithstanding the consistency between the two samples on our classification, numerous changes have occurred in it. In general, more organizations tended to declare deliberative practices than it had emerged from the written documents. Almost one fourth of the organizations that were previously classified as associational are now listed in the category of deliberative representation while almost one tenth of the whole sample moved from the associative category to the assembleary one. Almost another one tenth previously classified as assembleary has been now coded as deliberative participative. One twentieth moved from the deliberative representative to the deliberative participative type. Almost one third of the cases was classified exactly as in WP3. As for the remaining cases, as we have already discussed, some of them have been excluded from the analysis because of their lack of response (the Italian branch of the World March of Women, the European Counter Network, the Stop the war committee and Chainworkers) or included *ex novo* (CTM-Altromercato) and so cannot be compared with previous results.

Table 2 – Shifting classification of sampled groups on the dependent variable

Name of the group	DEPENDENT VARIABLE		
	WP3 CLASSIFICATION	WP4 CLASSIFICATION	%
Arci	Associational	Deliberative Representative	23.8
Unimondo	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Pax Christi	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Un Ponte per	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Tavola della Pace	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Campagna Sdebitarsi	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Giovani Comunisti (GC)	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Rifondazione Comunista (RC)	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Associazione Botteghe del Mondo	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Confederazione Unitaria di Base (CUB)	Associational	Deliberative Representative	
Popolare Network	Associational	Assembleary	9.5
PeaceLink	Associational	Assembleary	
Federazione Anarchica Italiana (FAI)	Associational	Assembleary	
Il Manifesto	Associational	Assembleary	
Abruzzo social forum	Assembleary	Deliberative Partecipative	9.5
Comitato Immigrati	Assembleary	Deliberative Partecipative	
Rete Noglobal	Assembleary	Deliberative Partecipative	
Carta settimanale	Assembleary	Deliberative Partecipative	
Attac Italy	Deliberative Representative	Deliberative Partecipative	4.8

Torino social forum	Deliberative Representative	Deliberative Partecipative	
Campagna banche armate	Missing case	Deliberative Representative	4.8
CTM-Altromercato	Missing case (not included)	Deliberative Representative	
Global Project	Missing case (n.a.)	Missing case (n.a.)	9.5
Comitato "Fermiamo la Guerra"	Associational	Missing case (n.a.)	
Marcia Mondiale delle Donne	Associational	Missing case (n.a.)	
Chainworkers	Assembleary	Missing case (n.a.)	
EuroMayDay	Assembleary	Missing case (excluded)	--
Indymedia Italia	Deliberative Partecipative	Not classified	2.4
All other cases	*No changes*		35.7
Total WP2 (N)			42

Overall, no dramatic changes occur between the two classifications even if important differences were found that need to be explained. As mentioned, more organizations declared consensual decision making in the interviews than in written document (less so for the dimension of participation). This result could be interpreted from different perspectives. Respondents might emphasize consensus because they see it as a growingly legitimized procedure. Or organizations could have changed their decision-making methods because in practice they realized that consensual decision-making is more appreciated by their members and more likely to avoid confrontations and splits within the organizations. Their official documents could not have been adapted to their actual functioning (something that is clear in the case of ICS; see Reiter 2006, p. 329). Besides organizations could also have been convinced to use consensual decision-making methods because they experimented them (with good results) within the networks of the GJM. That is, a shift in decision-making methods could be the outcome of a learning process.

Going back to democratic models, the full sample of WP4 organizations has been collocated in the cells of our typology in the table below. What does this classification tell us when considering the cases in the different cells? The associational type limiting principles of participation and consensus concerns almost one third of the selected organizations. We found here traditional type of organizations such as political parties (Green federation, Young Socialists), trade unions (Cgil, Fiom, Cobas), associations belonging to the traditional left (Legambiente, Arcigay and *Associazione 3 Febbraio*) and large NGOs or NGOs coordination (Emergency and *Forum del terzo settore*). As a matter of fact, we found an interesting difference within larger organizations included in our sample: due to their size, all of them tend to follow the principle of delegation attributing important powers to an executive committee. However, decision-making methods tend to vary: some of these large organizations mix the principle of delegation with the principle of deliberation, employing consensual decision-making methods. Within the category of deliberative representative organizations (over one third of the sample) we found again political parties (*Rifondazione Comunista* and Young Communists), (rank-and-file) trade unions (CUB), large NGOs (ICS and Un Ponte per) but also networks/campaigns (Roundtable for Peace, Dropt the Debt-*Sdebitarsi* and the campaign against armed banks), associations (Arci, *Associazione Botteghe del Mondo*, Pax Christi, CTM-*Altromercato*) and alternative information media (*Unimondo*).

Figure 1 - Models of Democracy

Decision-making method: Consensus	*Decision-making body: delegation of power*	
	Low	**High**
Low	**Assembleary** 11.1% (9.5) Federazione Anarchica Italiana; Popolare network; Il Manifesto; Peacelink	**Associational** 30.6% (30.4) Confederazione dei Cobas; Associazione 3 Febbraio; Federazione dei Verdi; Forum del terzo settore; Sinistra Giovanile; Giovani Verdi; Legambiente; Emergency; Arcigay; Fiom; Cgil
High	**Deliberative participative** 22.2% (21.6) Abruzzo social forum; Venezia social forum; Torino social forum; Comitato Immigrati; Carta settimanale; Rete Noglobal; Rete Lilliput; Attac Italia	**Deliberative representative** 36.1% (38.5) Partito della Rifondazione Comunista; Confederazione Unitaria di Base; Consorzio Italiano di Solidarietà (ICS); Associazione Botteghe del Mondo; Campagna Banche Armate; Campagna Sdebitarsi; CTM – Altromercato; Giovani Comunisti; Tavola della Pace; Un Ponte per; Pax Christi; Unimondo; Arci

N=37; 1 missing case (Indymedia Italia). % specified in brackets refer to the rest of the sample (Italy excluded)

The organizations that assign a central role to the assembly are generally smaller than the previous groups. Just one tenth of our organizations have been classified as assembleary. This result is easy to understand in the sense that when an organization follows the principle of participation, it tends to adopt also the principle of deliberation. However, 4 groups adopt a democratic model mixing high participation with low deliberation. It is worth noticing that 3 out of 4 are alternative information media (Popolare network, Il Manifesto and Peacelink) where decisions have to be taken on a regular basis and cannot be postponed or slowed down by consensual decision-making methods. Besides, two of them (Popolare network and Il Manifesto) have a long history that is embedded in the Italian left tradition. The fourth organization employing an assembleary democratic model is the Italian anarchist federation. This organization was founded in the eighteenth century, adopting from the beginning a very positive attitude towards direct participation. As for the dimension concerning degree of consensus, the Italian anarchist federation did not employ traditional methods based on the majority rule but, as one interviewee explained, "decisions are made after a wide discussion aiming at unanimity. However, decisions are only cogent for those who accept them … practical relationships between adherents to the federation are ruled by the federal agreement embedded in the associative pact, which is oriented toward the most ample autonomy of the groups, the federations, and the individuals". In our classification this group has been considered as associational even if this is clearly a border-line case where innovative and traditional decision-making rules are mixed.

It is also important to notice that the Italian knot of Indymedia was not classified even if it resembles a deliberative participative democratic model since it consistently adopts the method of consensus and it lacks an executive committee. For the moment, it was not classified because all decisions are not taken in a physical assembly but on a national mailing-list.

As for the last group of organizations, about one fifth adopts a deliberative participative model. In this category we found the local social forums (of Venice, Turin and Abruzzo) and most

organizations flourished during the new cycle of protest started with the Battle of Seattle: Attac-Italy (national branch of the international movement for democratic control of financial markets and their institutions promoted by groups of the traditional left such as Il Manifesto, the rank-and-file union Cobas, the Arci, etc.), Rete Lilliput (ecopacifist network promoted by the intecampaign table), Rete Noglobal (network of social centers[104] and rank-and-file unions), the *Comitato Immigrati* (spawned from the local social forum of Rome), and the alternative magazine Carta (spawned from the communist newspaper Il Manifesto in 1999). As we can notice from this brief presentation most of the organizations belonging to the deliberative participative model have been created from within pre-existent networks, campaigns, forums and associations.

4. Internal decision-making practices

The table below presents the main democratic features of the selected Italian GJMOs. As for the most important decision-making body, we found some differences between the Italian sample and the other ones. About half of the Italian groups delegates power to an executive committee whereas this concerns less than 40% of the non-Italian groups. The role of monocratic bodies is instead less important in the Italian sample than in the rest of the cases. As for the decision-making method of the most important decision-making body, more than half of the Italian groups employ consensual decision-making methods while in the other countries majoritarian (and mixed) methods are more widespread. The more frequent use of consensual decision-making methods in the Italian case could be explained by the different format of the main decision-making body: most of the organizations (almost two thirds) declared in fact that such body is constituted by less than 30 individuals while almost one fifth declares more than 100 individuals and the rest an intermediate size. In a cross-national comparison, we can notice that in the other countries the size of the main decision-making body is larger: over one half of the groups (versus around one third in the Italian sample) declared that it is constituted by more than 30 people.

Table 3 – Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
President / leader / secretary / director	5.4	10.4
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	51.4	38.7
Assembly / open meeting	27.0	25.4
Thematic group	5.4	3.5
Other bodies	10.8	22.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (37)	100.0 (173)
Decision-making method of the main decision-making body		
Majority + other	48.6	55.1
Consensus	51.4	44.9
Total **(N)**	100.0 (37)	100.0 (156)

[104] Social centers are communities managed by young politically engaged people (mainly students and unemployed) who squat unused buildings where they organize social, political and cultural activities.

Size of the main decision-making body		
Less than 30	63.9	45.4
Between 30 and 100	16.7	28.3
More than 100	19.4	26.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (36)	100.0 (152)

NB – 0, 0, 1 missing case (Italian sample); 0, 17, 21 missing cases (rest of the sample).

As for the characteristics of the executive committee, we also found interesting differences and similarities comparing the two samples (table 4). First of all, the majority of Italian organizations declares the absence of an executive committee while in the rest of the sample it is foreseen by about two thirds of the organizations. Second, we didn't find any relevant difference on the decision-making method employed by the executive committee: consensus is adopted by the majority of the groups. Third, also for the election of the executive committee there are no national specificities: this organism is elected by assemblies in more than four fifths of the cases.

Table 4 – Characteristics of the executive committee (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Yes	40.0	65.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (37)	100.0 (172)
Decision-making method of the executive		
Majority + other	42.9	46.0
Consensus	57.1	54.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (113)
Election of the executive committee		
By an assemblearian body	85.0	86.8
By other bodies	15.0	13.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (20)	100.0 (91)

NB – 0, 9, 17 missing cases (Italian sample); 1, 60, 82 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Considering some potential sources of hidden power such as the management of the agenda and the rules for discussion, we can highlight interesting differences between the Italian and the rest of the sample (table 5). For the Italian case, the agenda is proposed by an executive body or by a monocratic body in four fifths of the cases while in the rest of the sample by around half of them. Consequently, the influence of the assembly on the drafting of the agenda is more limited for the Italian groups.

As for the rules for discussion, we didn't find relevant differences for what it concerns rules presence but when some rules are employed (in almost three quarters of the cases), the Italian groups usually adopt traditional types of rules (two thirds of the cases); innovative rules are

employed by two groups (the Youth Left and the leftist trade union CGIL):[105] the former adopts just innovative rules while the latter mixes traditional and innovative rules. In the Italian case a small number of groups experiment new rules of discussion while the great majority of the other ones tend to follow classical rules. The presence of groups mixing the two types of rules is instead more significant in the rest of the sample (around one fifth of the cases).

Table 5 – Potential sources of hidden power (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
President / leader / secretary / director	24.3	13.4
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	54.1	39.5
Assembly / open meeting	10.8	17.2
Small committee representing different membership's groups	0.0	7.0
Other bodies	10.8	22.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(37)	(157)
Rules of discussion		
Not present	26.1	24.3
Traditional	65.2	49.3
Innovative	4.3	5.0
Both traditional and innovative	4.3	21.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(23)	(140)

NB – 0, 14 missing cases (Italian sample); 16, 33 missing cases (rest of the sample)

5. Organizational characteristics

As we have seen in the introductory chapter of this report, organizational structure has proved to be an important factor in explaining the adoption of different democratic models within the selected organizations. We found an association between the type and the format of an organization and its decision-making practices. In table 6 we can observe that, in comparison with the rest of the sample, Italian GJMOs tend to characterize themselves for allowing both individual and collective membership (most than half of the sample versus less than the 40% in the rest of the sample). As for the size of the organization, the Italian sample includes larger organizations in terms of number of individual members,[106] while collective members are equally-distributed among the different categories. The smaller category (between one and ten collective members) is more present in the Italian sample[107] than in the overall one.

[105] The fact that, according to this classification, innovative rules are used exclusively by traditional leftist organizations raises some questions concerning the efficacy of this categorization.

[106] They are all the trade unions; all the political parties and their youth organizations (with the exception of the Young Greens); and the associations once collateral to the Italian Communist Party such as the environmentalist Legambiente, the leisure's Arci and the homosexual's Arcigay.

[107] We find here a local social forum (of Venice); the Italian branch of Pax Christi; a leftist newspaper ("Il Manifesto"); a national campaign against armed banks; and the Internet portal Unimondo.

Table 6 – Number of individual members (%)

Type of members	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Individual	31.0	36.8
Collective	13.8	24.8
Both individual and collective	55.2	38.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(133)
Number of individual members		
Between 1 and 100	16.0	23.3
Between 101 and 1,000	32.0	30.2
Between 1,001 and 10,000	8.0	23.3
More than 10,000	44.0	23.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(25)	(86)
Number of collective members		
Between 1 and 10	33.3	17.2
Between 11 and 100	33.3	51.8
More than 100	33.3	31.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(15)	(58)

NB – 8, 12, 22 missing cases (Italian sample); 40, 87, 115 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Another important factor predicting the adoption of democratic models based on different principles is the amount of resources available to an organization. Higher material resources are generally associated with organizational formalization and professionalization (presence of paid staff) that can have an impact both on strategies of action and democratic conceptions. When material resources are missing, they can be substituted (or even integrated) by human resources deriving from free (non paid) work devoted to the organization by its volunteers.

As table 7 illustrates, in the Italian case the relative majority of groups (over one third) declared a budget of over 500,000 euros (i.e. the associations Legambiente and Arci; the NGOs Emergency, Italian Consortium of Solidarity and "Un Ponte per"; the alternative media "Carta", "Il Manifesto" and "Popolare network"; the rank-and-file union Cub; the Green party; the third world cooperation group CTM) while another significant part of the groups (almost one third) is said to have a budget of less than 10,000 euros (no groups declare no budget).[108] Hence, the Italian sample appears to be polarized between resource-rich and resource-poor organizations. The Italian sample is similar to the overall one as far as paid staff as an indicator of professionalization of the organization is concerned: around one quarter of the organizations declared not to hire people to work for the organization while the remaining three quarters do. However, almost half of the organizations declares to employ less than 16 people to fulfill various organizational tasks while groups with more than 16 paid workers are around one fourth.

[108] Those are: the three local social forums; youth party organizations (Young Greens and Young Communists); campaigns (against third world debt and against armed banks); the Internet pacifist portal Peacelink; and an anti-racist association (associazione 3 febbraio).

Volunteers are an alternative (or additional) resource for an organization,. Only one Italian group (CTM-Altromercato) declared the total lack of volunteers while around one third has up to 15 volunteers. The relative majority of the Italian organizations declares however to have more than 100 volunteers. Hence, most Italian groups are rich in both material and human resources. In those cases, professionalization seems to coexist with the presence of voluntary members (while sometimes the two have been considered as opposed). A high number of volunteers seems to require a professional organization able to organize them.

Table 7 – Main resources of the groups (%)

Budget of the groups	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Highly variable	6.9	18.8
None	0.0	5.6
Less than 10,000	31.0	21.5
Between 10,000 and 500,000	24.1	30.6
More than 500,000	37.9	29.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(144)
Paid staff		
None	27.8	30.2
Up to 15	44.4	45.0
Between 16 and 100	16.7	13.6
More than 100	11.1	11.2
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(36)	(169)
Number of volunteers		
Less than 16	34.5	32.0
Between 16 and 100	27.6	35.3
More than 100	37.9	32.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(150)

NB – 8, 1, 8 missing cases (Italian sample); 29, 4, 23 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Below we cross information about main resources with the different democratic models adopted by the Italian GJMOs. As table 7a shows, three quarters of the groups belonging to the deliberative participative type declared a limited budget (less than 10,000 euros per year). Only two groups belonging to this category have higher budgets: the weekly magazine Carta --that is funded by public subsidies foreseen by the national law on publishing (*legge per l'editoria*)-- declared an annual budget of 1,5 millions of euros while Attac-Italy --funded from members and from public institutions on specific projects-- declared a budget of 70,000.

As for the groups adopting other democratic models, they generally have more material resources: most of them have a budget above 10,000 euros per year. Two groups (Associazione 3 Febbraio and Young Greens) adopting an associational democratic model declared a budget below 10,000 euros. However, one of them (Young Greens) stated that it generally asks for financing to the Green federation (the party to whom it is affiliated) that covers the costs of its initiatives. Four

groups (campagna Sdebitarsi, campagna Banche Armate, Young Communists and Roundtable for Peace) adopting a deliberative representative democratic model declared a budget below 10,000 euros. Two of these groups are small campaigns mostly based on the voluntary action of a few people. One is the juvenile section of a political party (Rifondazione Comunista) that, like the Young Greens, has not autonomous budget. The Roundtable for Peace being an informal network doesn't receive money and declared not to have a real budget. Only one, of the groups adopting an assembleary democratic model, Peacelink, declared a budget below 10,000 euros. The president of the small association declared to receive funds only from its supporters.

Table 7a – Budget of the groups for different democratic models (%)

Budget of the groups	Democratic Models				Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
Less than 10,000	28.6	36.4	33.3	75.0	44.8	40.3
More than 10,000	71.4	63.6	66.7	25.0	55.2	59.7
Total	24.1	37.9	10.3	27.6	100.0	100.0
(N)	(7)	(11)	(3)	(8)	(29)	(144)

NB - 8 missing cases (Italian sample); 29 missing cases (rest of the sample)

The trend concerning presence of paid staff and different democratic models is also interesting (table 7b). Only one third of the deliberative participative organizations declared to have paid staff. The assembleary organizations are in between while the overall majority of associational and deliberative representative groups appear as professionalized. As for the three deliberative participative groups (Carta, Attac-Italy and Rete Lilliput) that declared the presence of paid staff, Carta declared 15 paid people, Attac-Italy three paid people, while Lilliput just one paid person developing administrative and secretarial mansions for the network at the national level. Groups belonging to different democratic models that declared the absence of paid staff are the Associazione 3 Febbraio (associative), the Campagna Sdebitarsi (deliberative representative), Peacelink and the Italian anarchist federation (assembleary).

Table 7b – Presence of paid staff for different democratic models (%)

Presence of paid staff (dummy)	Democratic Models				Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
No	10.0	7.7	50.0	62.5	25.7	30.2
Yes	90.0	92.3	50.0	37.5	74.3	69.8
Total	28.6	37.9	11.4	22.9	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(35)	(169)

NB - 2 missing cases (Italian sample); 4 missing cases (rest of the sample)

As for the number of volunteers, we didn't find evidence of a clear distinction between groups adopting different democratic models (table 7c). Most groups declared more than 15 volunteers and this regards especially associational groups that, as we have just seen, are also the richer ones and among the most professionalized ones (together with the deliberative representative groups).

Presence of volunteers is also relevant for deliberative types of organizations (both representative and participative) while it is less prominent for the assembleary groups.

Table 7c – Number of volunteers for different democratic models (%)

Number of volunteers (dummy)	Democratic Models				Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
Up to 15	0.0	50.0	66.7	42.9	37.9	27.7
More than 15	100.0	50.0	33.3	57.1	62.1	72.3
Total	24.1	41.4	10.3	24.1	100.0	100.0
(N)	(7)	(12)	(3)	(7)	(29)	(125)

NB - 8 missing cases (Italian sample); 48 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Looking at the date of foundation of the different organizations and their belonging to different generations of social movements (table 8), it is worth underlining that the Italian sample is distinct from the overall one in that the absolute majority of GJMOs have been created during the 1990s (one fourth of the organization for the rest of the sample). Due to the corruption scandal at the beginning of the past decade, many associations related to the two main political sub-cultures (red and white) have in fact disappeared and sometime have been re-founded (see Reiter 2006).

The generational belonging of the organizations is associated with the adoption of different democratic models (Kendall's Tau B is 0.396**). This association is even stronger than in the rest of the sample (where Kendall's Tau B is 0.285**). The hypothesis of path-dependency mentioned in the introductory chapter is supported by our data: some fundamental principles that characterize different generations seem to have been strongly embedded within the organizations and to explain, at least partially, the adoption of specific models of democracy.

Table 8 – Generational belonging of selected organizations (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
Before 1968	10.8	20.7
Between 1969 and 1989	13.5	21.5
Between 1989 and 1999	54.1	25.2
After 2000	21.6	32.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(37)	(135)

NB - no missing cases (Italian sample); 38 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Crossing the generational belonging of Italian GJMOs with their democratic models we can notice very clearly that deliberative participative organizations have been created only recently: during the 1990s (one fourth) and after the year 2000 (all the rest). It is also worth underlining that all deliberative representative organizations belong to the decade of the 90s with the exception of the Italian branch of Pax Christi, founded before 1968. Also the majority of associational organizations have been created during the 1990s but this category presents more variation: almost one fifth existed already before 1968, about one fourth between 1969 and 1989 while just one

organization (Young Greens) was founded after 2000. As for the assembleary organizations, no one was created after the year 2000 while the majority was founded between 1969 and 1989 but one before 1968 (the Italian anarchist federation) and one between 1989 and 1999 (Peacelink).

Table 8a – Generational belonging of different democratic models (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	Democratic Models				Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
Before 1968	18.2	7.7	25.0	0.0	11.1	20.7
Between 1969 and 1989	27.3	0.0	50.0	0.0	13.9	21.5
Between 1989 and 1999	45.5	92.3	25.0	25.0	55.6	25.2
After 2000	9.1	0.0	0.0	75.0	19.4	32.6
Total	30.6	36.1	11.1	22.2	100.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(36)	(135)

NB - 1 missing case (Italian sample); 38 missing cases (rest of the sample)

6. Relationship with the institutions

Another important aspect of our research project concerns the relationship with public institutions. Do Italian organizations collaborate with them or do they refuse dialogue and collaboration? Are democratic practices related in some way with the conception of (and relations with) public institutions at different territorial levels? These questions are particularly relevant since, as we have seen in the WP3 report, the issue of relationship with institutions is rarely covered by written documents (Reiter 2005, 298).

As table 9 shows, we didn't find important differences between the Italian and the rest of the sample. In the two samples collaboration (both conditioned and unconditioned) with *international institutions* concerns the majority of selected organizations. However, it is important to underline that around one third of the groups is indifferent to such kind of relation especially because some of the selected organizations are not active at the international level (no one declares that the lack of contacts is due to a denial of collaboration by authorities). Besides, the following groups (more than one tenth) refuse explicitly any kind of collaboration: Attac-Italy, the Abruzzo social forum, the Italian anarchist federation, the Italian knot of the Indymedia network and the Young Communists (while the Communist Re-foundation party declared a critical collaboration).

If we consider the relationship with *national institutions*, it is worth highlighting that almost three quarters of the groups declare collaboration (both conditioned and unconditioned) with them. This result is even more interesting when compared to the rest of the sample where we found that this kind of relationship concerns about two thirds of the groups. Almost one fifth of the Italian groups have no contacts with national institutions because they are mostly active at the local level (no one declares that the lack of contacts is due to a denial of collaboration by authorities) while refusal of any collaboration is almost inexistent and concerns (again) only the Italian anarchist federation and the Italian knot of the Indymedia network. This result is not surprising in that these groups have ever publicly declared to refuse any kind of dialogue, collaboration and compromise with the institutions.

Considering the relationship with *local institutions*, we found that almost 90% of the groups declares collaboration (both conditioned and unconditioned) with them: much more than in the two thirds in the rest of the sample. About half of the Italian groups declared an unconditioned collaboration with local institutions while this kind of relation concerns just one third of the rest of the sample. Only the Italian anarchist federation declared its refuse to collaborate with local

institutions (while the Italian knot of Indymedia has a posture of critical collaboration). As one member of the anarchists' commission of correspondence declared "the anarchists' critics to power is radical. All institutions, at whatever territorial level, represent the negation of freedom and self-determination. We consider that also decision-making processes such as the participative budgeting are expedients of an institutional nature".

Table 9 - Relationship with international institutions (%)

International institutions	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Refusal of collaboration	13.9	13.4
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	33.3	32.3
Collaboration with restrictions	25.0	24.4
Collaboration	27.8	29.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(36)	(164)
National institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	5.6	13.2
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	19.4	21.6
Collaboration with restrictions	38.9	33.5
Collaboration	36.1	31.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(36)	(167)
Local institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	2.7	9.7
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	8.1	26.1
Collaboration with restrictions	37.8	27.9
Collaboration	51.4	36.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(37)	(165)

NB – 1, 1, none missing case (Italian sample); 9, 6, 8 missing cases (rest of the sample)

As we have seen in the introductory chapter of this report, different relationships with institutions are associated to different types of democratic models. Italian organizations adopting more innovative democratic models oriented towards participation and consensus are less likely to collaborate with international and national institutions (Kendall's Tau B is respectively -0.345* and -0.365*; coefficients are however lower than in the rest of the sample). More radical democratic practices within the organization seem to be associated with a more critical stance towards relationship with the institutions. This consideration does not hold for institutions at the local level that are perceived as more open, more close, and more responsive by GJMOs. This data seems consistent with WP3 results when it is claimed that "the organizations showing some collaboration are all of the associational and the deliberative representative type" (Reiter 2005, 299).

In table 9a we focused on the relationship between democratic models and attitudes towards public institutions at different territorial levels. For all the types we can underline a similar trend: the more public institutions are close to the level of intervention of a certain group, the more they tend to establish a collaborative relation. However, we can observe some differences between the

various democratic models. The pattern relating (physical) closeness and collaboration is especially clear for the deliberative types of organizations. As a matter of fact, only two deliberative participative groups (Rete Lilliput and Carta) declared to collaborate with international institutions while almost two thirds collaborates with national institutions and all of them with local ones. Some organizations claimed to adopt always selective forms of collaboration. A spokesperson of the Abruzzo social forum declared for instance: "we are always open to dialogue. However, collaboration depends on the political phase, the type of institution, and the issue under discussion". The associational type shows the higher degree of collaboration with public institutions at all territorial levels. As for the assembleary type, cases are too few to make possible underling a trend. Notwithstanding, we can notice that only one group (Peacelink) collaborates with international institutions. Representatives of political parties signaled some difficulties in answering this question since most of them are inside the institutions. Interestingly, we found different approaches among the organizations belonging to the NGOs sector: one of them (Emergency) declared to receive funding from the foreign minister, the Italian Consortium of Solidarity (ICS) refused funding from the same department in the war areas where the Italian army is present, while "Un Ponte per" repudiated collaboration with (and funding from) the ministry of foreign affairs because it was part of a (centre-right) government that supported the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Some groups (i.e. the armed bank campaign) stated their inactivity at the international level but they are evaluating the possibility to become active at the European level through their affiliation to European networks.

Table 9a – Attitude towards public institutions by different democratic models (%)

Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels (dummy)	**Democratic Models**				**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
International	81.8	58.3	25.0	25.0	54.3	54.3
National	90.9	83.3	50.0	62.5	77.1	65.3
Local	90.9	92.3	50.0	100.0	88.9	64.2
Total	31.4	34.3	11.4	22.9	100.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(12)	(4)	(8)	(35)	(164-7)

NB - 2 missing cases (Italian sample); 9-6 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Besides the general attitude towards relationship with institutions, we also focused on perceptions of experiments of public decision-making promoted by the institutions (generally at the local level) to involve citizens in the political process. We asked our respondents their opinion on the capacity of this kind of experiments to improve the quality of political decisions. The Italian organizations show a very different attitude towards experiments of public decision-making, compared with the rest of the sample (table 10). Only a small minority of the groups (about one tenth) doesn't have a clear position on this issue. 70% of them thinks that these kinds of experiments improve the quality of political decisions while the organizations of the rest of the sample are more skeptical: less than two fifths are optimistic about them. This difference could be due to the fact that the experiences of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre have become an important reference for the Italian groups during the past years. This notwithstanding, when asked to express their position on public decision-making, Italian organizations do not differ too much in their judgments from the rest of the sample. In both cases the absolute majority of GJMOs expresses a positive opinion while negative judgments concern just one fourth of the groups and mixed judgments (both positive and critical) are expressed by one fifth of the groups. As for the motivations offered for the different evaluation of such processes, when expressing a negative judgment the Italian GJMOs stress more than the other groups the fact that these experiments are artificial (in the sense that they are not real

experiments of a new democratic model) and not inclusive (citizens are excluded since these processes are monopolized mostly by experts). Positive evaluations are instead generally related to the perceived inclusiveness of such processes (almost half of the responses) that are conceived as bottom-up forms of politics embedding the real needs of citizens (by almost one fourth) as well as important efforts in increasing the transparency and the publicity of the decision-making (by almost one fifth).

Table 10 –Attitudes towards public decision-making (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
No	16.2	19.9
Yes	70.3	31.6
No definite position	13.5	48.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(37)	(171)
Evaluation of public decision-making		
Negative	25.8	32.1
Both negative and positive	19.4	16.7
Positive	54.8	51.2
Total (N)	27.0	100.0
	(31)	(84)
Motivation of the evaluation		
Instrumental	9.1	9.4
Artificial	12.1	5.8
Exclusive	9.1	0.7
Placebo politics	15.2	13.8
Top-down politics	6.1	5.8
Bottom-up politics	24.2	13.0
Responsibility	6.1	4.3
Inclusive	45.5	14.5
Transparency/publicity of the decision-making	18.2	6.5
More consensual decision-making	0.0	4.3
Creative effect	6.1	5.1
Total (N)	100.0	100.0
	(33)	(138)

NB – 4 missing cases (Italian sample); 35 missing cases (rest of the sample). Overall % of column can sum above 100 because of multiple responses

In table 10a, we consider how different types of Italian GJMOs perceive public decision-making. The idea that these types of experiments improve the quality of political decisions is rejected by half of the assembleary groups (two out of four –Peacelink and the Italian anarchist federation). This data could be considered as contradictory since this type of groups emphasizes the value of participation and the refuse of delegation, attributing a central role to the assembly. However, the anti-institutional stance of these organizations could explain such result. As for the other types of democratic models the result is opposite. In fact the overall majority of them (especially in the case

of deliberative organizations) considers that political decisions can improve through the involvement of citizens in public decision-making. As for the evaluation on experiments of public decision-making, we can stress a clear stance of associational and deliberative representative groups that tend to express a positive evaluation. The assembleary and the deliberative participative groups are the most critical towards such experiments. Some deliberative participative groups declared their participation in experiments of participatory budgeting but reported a negative experience. According to the spokesperson of the Abruzzo social forum: "these experiments become often places dominated by experts. This is because there is not a real promotion of them and when they don't emerge from below they are generally ineffective". However, negative judgments are more widespread among assembleary groups while deliberative participative groups are perfectly divided between those that have a negative opinion and those expressing a positive one. The weekly journal "Carta" was among the promoters of the network for new municipalities ("Rete Nuovo Municipio") that refers explicitly to the Porto Alegre experience of citizens' direct involvement in the decision-making.

Table 10a – Attitude towards public decision-making by democratic models (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Democratic Models**				**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
No	18.2	7.7	50.0	12.5	16.7	19.9
Yes	72.7	84.6	0.0	87.5	72.2	31.6
No definite position	9.1	7.7	50.0	0.0	11.1	48.5
Total	30.6	36.1	11.1	22.2	100.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(36)	(171)
Evaluation of public decision-making						
Negative	20.0	10.0	66.7	37.5	25.8	32.1
Both negative and positive	10.0	20.0	33.3	25.0	19.4	16.7
Positive	70.0	70.0	0.0	37.5	54.8	51.2
Total	32.3	32.3	9.7	25.8	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(10)	(3)	(8)	(31)	(84)

NB - Italian sample: 1 missing case (improvement); 6 missing cases (evaluation); rest of the sample: 2 missing cases (improvement); 79 missing cases (evaluation)

Finally, we asked our groups which kind of funding they receive. We present information related to the type of funds in this section concerning relationship with institutions because we are especially interested in the sources of funding of the different groups and, especially, in assessing if they receive public money or not. The access to institutional funds has been in fact seen as an indication of the integration of a SMO within a system of interests' intermediation that could influence the mobilization capacity of the organization and alienate parts of its constituencies (Kriesi 1996).

Sources of funding don't differ too much in the two samples (table 11). The most striking difference concerns however non-governmental funds. In the other cases most of these funds are generated by donations of foundations that in Italy are few and have spread only recently[109] and are

[109] Because of a recent law that obliges banks to create such institutions and to devolve them a certain sum to be invested in social/cultural projects; see Barbetta and Maggio 2002.

not yet so important as they are in other European countries and, especially, in the United States. In the Italian case, most of the funds come from members (around three quarters) while one thirds of the groups receives governmental funds and another third generate funds from self-financing (sales of goods, service, rent, etc.); just one fifth obtain financing from non-governmental sources (especially donations from private individuals).

Table 11 – Type of funding (%)

Sources of funding	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Members	77.8	82.0
Governmental	36.1	38.7
Non governmental	19.4	37.4
Sales of goods/service/rent	38.9	40.2
Type of funding		
None	22.2	12.6
Only from members	41.7	49.7
Only from governments	0.0	5.4
Both from members and governments	36.1	32.3
Total	17.7	100.0
(N)	(36)	(167)

NB - 2 missing cases (Italian sample); 6 missing cases (rest of the sample)

Does sources of funding matter in explaining the adoption of different democratic models? As table 11a illustrates, the role of governmental funds is higher for assembleary and associational organizations and lower for deliberative participative groups. Only two of latter (Carta and Abruzzo social forum) receive this type of funds. As already said, Carta is funded by public subsidies on publishing while the Abruzzo social forum received governmental funds for specific projects (e.g. funding for *La Comunidad*, a European project on participative budgeting involving young people and implemented by a local administration --one of the spokesperson declared however that they were not satisfied by this experience because it didn't succeed in involving common citizens but mostly experts). With the exception of the Young Greens, all assembleary and associational groups declared to receive funds from their members. This evidence could be explained by the fact that deliberative groups (especially the participative ones) are generally less formalized than the other ones and, thus, they don't request regular contributions from members. Non governmental funding refers especially to associational organizations (the ones with an organizational structure that fits the law requisites foreseen for this kind of contribution) but no any deliberative participative group. No interesting variations concern instead the sales of good (mostly spread among assembleary and deliberative representative groups). As for different types of funds, none of the selected groups receives them only from governments while half of the associational and the assembleary organizations receive them only from members. Above one third of deliberative participative groups don't receive funds from members nor from governments. The case of funding coming both from members and from government is quite spread and concerns especially the groups doing a low use of consensual decision-making.

Table 11a – Funding by different democratic models (%)

Sources of funding	Democratic Models				Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
	Associational	Deliberative Representative	Assembleary	Deliberative Participative		
Members	90.0	76.9	100.0	62.5	80.0	81.9
Governmental	40.0	38.5	50.0	25.0	37.1	39.3
Non governmental	40.0	15.4	25.0	0.0	20.0	37.9
Sales of goods/service/rent	30.0	46.2	50.0	37.5	40.0	41.1
Type of funding						
None	10.0	23.1	0.0	37.5	20.0	12.6
Only from members	50.0	38.5	50.0	35.5	42.9	49.7
Only from governments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.4
Both from members and governments	40.0	38.5	50.0	25.0	37.1	32.3
Total	28.6	37.1	11.4	22.9	100.0	100.0
(N)	(10)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(35)	(167)

NB - 2 missing cases (Italian sample); 6 missing cases (rest of the sample)

7. Organizational strategies

After focusing on the relationship with institutions, it is now important to devote attention to something that is in some ways complementary with it. In what follows, we will concentrate our attention on the main strategies employed by the different groups to reach their objectives.

7.1 Main issue of activity

First of all, we asked our interviewees about their main issues of activity. The open answer was re-coded and re-aggregated, obtaining five different categories (table 12). The absolute majority of the Italian groups focalizes its activity on social issues (around three quarters) and most of them are also active on international issues (around 70%). Interestingly, this engagement on international issue is more widespread among Italian organizations than in the rest of the sample. As for the other issues, there are no significant differences between the two samples: new social movement issues (gender, environment, etc.) are addressed by almost one third of the groups; democracy is one of the main issues of activity for around one fifth of the groups; and (in the Italian case) religious issues concern only a catholic organization like Pax Christi Italy that, however, specified its engagement for ecumenism and inter-religious dialogue. We found many cases of frame-bridging like in the case of the responsible of the international department of Legambiente that told us: "during the last years our work focused always more on stressing the link between environmental issues and social ones". As for the media included in the Italian sample, the director of the Radio Popolare network answered that their main aim consists in giving voice to people that cannot have access to the mainstream media. "Carta" and "Il Manifesto" are especially interested in covering networks and campaigns. An Indymedia activist pointed at the importance of freedom of information understood as "freedom to produce information (to build social spaces and to promote conflict), freedom to access it (open/free software) and liberation of technological instruments used in a libertarian perspective". Emphasis on participation was underlined by the Italian groups related to the traditional left (Arci, Attac, Carta and Youth Left).

Table 12 – Main issues of activity of the group (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Social issues	75.7	65.9
International issues	70.3	56.5
New social movement issues	29.7	28.8
Democracy	18.9	21.2
Religion	2.7	1.8
Total	17.9	100.0
(N)	(37)	(170)

NB – no missing cases (Italy); 3 missing cases (rest of the sample)
Overall % of column can sum above 100 because of multiple responses

Do the main aims of activity vary and change moving from a democratic model to another one? Table 12a shows that social issues are faced especially by deliberative participative groups while deliberative representative groups focus mainly on international issues. New social movement issues are particularly appraised by associational organizations. This finding is not surprising if we consider that all the environmental organizations selected in Italian sample --Legambiente, Young Greens and the Green federation-- and also the Arcigay (dealing with civil rights with a particular attention on rights of lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and transsexuals) were classified as associational. Democracy as a main issue of intervention is quoted mostly by deliberative participative (Attac-Italy and Carta) and assembleary (Popolare network) organizations.

Table 12a – Main issues of activity of different democratic models (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
Social issues	81.8	69.2	75.0	87.5	77.8	65.9
International issues	54.5	92.3	50.0	75.0	72.2	56.5
New social movement issues	45.5	15.4	25.0	37.5	30.6	28.8
Democracy	9.1	15.4	25.0	25.0	16.7	21.2
Religion	0.0	7.7	0.0	0.0	2.8	1.8
Total	30.6	36.1	11.1	22.2	100.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(36)	(170)

NB - 1 missing case (Italian sample); 3 missing cases (rest of the sample)

7.2 Strategies of action

The strategies employed by our organizations are shown in table 13. The Italian groups mirror the characteristics of the rest of the sample being mostly engaged on political education and raising awareness (almost 90%), followed by protest (over three quarters), building concrete alternatives (almost two thirds), and lobbying (around half of them). The latter is the less employed strategy but still more widespread than we could have expected. The most striking difference between the two samples concerns the engagement on alternatives-building that is less widespread among Italian GJMOs. However, as we already observed in the introductory chapter of this report, the selected organizations don't conceive the different strategies as mutually exclusive. This is clear also in the

Italian sample where less than one tenth of the groups focuses on just one strategy (the responsible of the international department of the metalworkers union Fiom declared to focus mostly on protest and the director of the Internet portal "Unimondo" stated to be especially interested in political education). Only one group out of 37 –the Italian knot of Indymedia– declared not to employ anyone of the listed strategies because "Indymedia is just an instrument for those who want to use it to produce information. It doesn't have clear goals and our work is specifically oriented towards the maintenance of the instrument. However, our main strategy is political mediactivism". The use of three different strategies prevails (around 40%) while the adoption of all strategies together is less diffuse than in the rest of the sample.[110]

Table 13 – Main strategies of the groups (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Protest	81.1	77.5
Building concrete alternatives	64.9	77.5
Lobbying	51.4	54.9
Political education/raising awareness	89.2	89.6
Number of overlapping strategies		
0-1	8.1	7.5
2	21.6	21.4
3	43.2	35.3
4	27.0	35.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(37)	(173)

NB – no missing cases; overall % of column can sum above 100 because of multiple responses

We could expect that organizations adopting different democratic models also employ diverse strategies in order to reach their objectives. This seems the case in table 13a. Political education is very important for different types of groups but especially for the deliberative ones, adopting also more than the others a strategy of lobbying, while protest and building concrete alternatives concern especially associational and assembleary organizations. Especially the data in the use of lobby strategy seems to reflect a generational divide. As we have seen in paragraph 5 the deliberative groups are the most recently born and this could explain a more positive attitude towards lobbying that, especially in the past, was stigmatized by social movements. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that none of the assembleary groups, that are the older ones in the Italian sample, declared to adopt this type of strategy. This first finding allows shedding light on another finding presented in the first chapter of this report. We stated there that "lobbying strategy is … associated with a central role of the executive, the employment of non consensual decision-making methods, and democratic models based on high delegation and low deliberation" (della Porta and Mosca 2006, p. 33). However, correlating lobbying strategy with democratic models but controlling for the influence of age variable, we found that the correlation coefficient loose its significance. Hence, the relationship between lobbying and democratic models could be spurious: both variables are associated to age and this produces an artificial association between them. Nonetheless, this

[110] Groups adopting all the four strategies are: associations (Arci, Arcigay and Legambiente) and campaigns (against the debt), local social forums (Venice and Turin), youth branch of political parties (Young Greens and Youth Left) and coordination such as Roundtable for Peace and the Noglobal network.

could also be the case for a constellation of characteristics related to the generational belonging of the organizations.

Our groups seem also to differ on the adoption of overlapping strategies. Deliberative participative groups are the ones employing more than the others all the strategies contemporarily (a data consistent with what argued above). A few groups belonging to associational and deliberative representative groups tend to adopt just one strategy but the majority of this type of groups uses at least three strategies. Assembleary groups are in between employing two or three strategy contemporarily.

Table 13a – Main strategies of different democratic models (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
Protest	100.0	61.5	100.0	87.5	83.3	77.5
Building concrete alternatives	72.7	61.5	75.0	62.5	66.7	77.5
Lobbying	54.5	61.5	0.0	62.5	52.8	54.9
Political education / raising awareness	81.8	100.0	75.0	100.0	91.7	89.6
Number of overlapping strategies						
0-1	9.1	7.7	0.0	0.0	5.6	7.5
2	9.1	23.1	50.0	25.0	22.2	21.4
3	45.5	46.2	50.0	37.5	44.4	35.3
4	36.4	23.1	0.0	37.5	27.8	35.8
Total	30.6	36.1	11.1	22.2	100.0	100.0
(N)	(11)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(36)	(173)

NB - 1 missing case (Italian sample); no missing cases (rest of the sample)

Considering now specific forms of action, we can observe some interesting differences between the two samples (table 14). A more conventional and moderate form of action like the petition -- even if quite widespread-- is less used by Italian organizations (two thirds) while marches resulted as more widespread (over 90%). Italian GJMOs are also more likely to adopt some traditional (strikes), innovative (boycott), and confrontational (blockade) forms of action than the rest of the sample. Artistic and cultural performances have been organized by two third of the Italian groups.

Quite surprisingly, occupations of buildings and civil disobedience resulted as less used by the Italian groups. This evidence can be explained by the fact that even if occupations are quite widespread and tolerated in Italy (a research counted around 200 squatted social centers in Italy at the end of the last decade; see Dines 1999), our sampling did not include much of this type of groups, although we have such groups as Young Communists, Anarchists, local social forums (some of them where hosted by squats or where based in an occupied building) and Rete Noglobal (initially linking mainly squats of South-Italy in a network called "Rebel South").

As for the result concerning civil disobedience, it is important to underline that from the beginning of the 2000s this term has been heavily linked to the experience of "White Overalls/Disobedients" that used it to designate their peculiar style to demonstrate --a style that has been criticized after the protest against the G8 in Genoa (see Andretta *et al.* 2002; Andretta and Mosca 2004; della Porta *et al.* 2006). For this reason, some groups specified that they use "civil disobedience" as it was originally proposed by Mahatma Gandhi as a violation of unfair laws but

not the specific type of action form that White Overalls/Disobedients call "civil/social disobedience".

Table 14 – Repertoire of action of the groups (%)

Forms of action	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Petition	67.6	77.5
Demonstration	91.9	76.9
Strike	37.8	21.4
Boycott of certain products	48.6	27.7
Blockade	32.4	26.6
Occupation of buildings	16.2	26.6
Civil disobedience	35.1	42.2
Artistic/cultural performance	67.6	58.4
Total	17.6	100.0
(N)	(37)	(173)

NB - no missing cases

Linked to the main strategies/functions and the repertoire of action are also the campaigns involving GJMOs. We asked our groups to provide information on the most important campaigns concerning democratic reforms promoted or sustained by our GJMOs in the last three years (table 15). Our interviewees provided a long list of campaigns on different issues. However, they generally limited themselves to quote the issue of the campaign and not the name of a specific campaign (with the exception of the campaign to reform the United Nations, the Control Arms campaign, and the campaign against Bolkestein directive and in defense of common goods).

Most of these campaigns refer to international issues (more than four fifths of the groups) but, especially in the Italian case, social issues appear to be as particularly important (more than half of the groups) as well as national issues and the participation in transnational political parties and in think thanks. Democracy is addressed by one fourth of the campaigns while new social movement issues concern around one tenth of them. Only one group (the Italian knot of Indymedia) declared not to be engaged in any kind of campaign. Overall, the Italian groups showed a tendency to quote very different campaigns. However some (broker) issues were raised more frequently: campaigns concerning the UN reform (31%) and the IMF, the WB, and the WTO (28%); different campaigns concerning the issue of immigration (28%); campaigns "for policies of peace" (28%); campaign against the Bolkestein directive and for the defense of common goods (19%); Control arms campaign (16%); campaigns for participatory democracy (14%); campaigns against foreign debt of poor countries (11%); campaigns opposing the European constitutional process (8%); and campaigns against the reform of the Italian constitution by the centre-right government (8%). As for the territorial level of campaigns, most of the groups considered them as linked with both the international and the national level. The national level is ticked more by the Italian groups (four fifths) than those in the rest of the sample (less than two thirds). Another difference between the two samples concerns the local level of campaigns that was less considered by the Italian groups.

Table 15 – Characteristics of campaigns (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Social issues	55.6	52.5
International issues	88.9	85.6
National issues/political parties/think thanks	47.2	8.6
Democracy	25.0	11.5
New social movement issues	13.9	19.4
Territorial levels of campaigns		
Local	13.9	5.0
National	80.6	71.6
International	88.9	84.4
Total	24.0	100.0
(N)	(36)	(139-141)

NB – 1 missing case (Italian sample); 34-32 missing cases (rest of the sample)

7.3 The use of the Internet: an excursus

The last point we considered in order to explore organizational strategies refers to the communicative strategies of GJMOs. For reasons of parsimony, we decided to narrow our investigation to communicative strategies as developed through the Internet. More precisely, we asked our groups an open question on the impact of the Internet in general and of their website in particular on different targets of their communication such as public administrators, mass media, and members/sympathizers. The answers were later re-coded just to catch their general evaluation on this impact.

As table 16 illustrates, most of the Italian organizations (almost two thirds) perceive as null the impact on public administrators showing more skepticism than in the rest of the sample on the Internet as a means facilitating relationships with these actors. As for the impact on mass media, the result is completely different. In fact, most of our GJMOs (three quarters) provided a positive evaluation of this impact on the traditional media. In this case no significant differences emerge considering the rest of the sample. Focusing on Internet's perceived impact on members and sympathizers, instead, only few groups express a negative evaluation. The Italian groups appear as more critical if compared with the rest of the sample even if two thirds of them express a positive evaluation (fourth fifth for all cases). One fourth of them nuances their positive judgments also mentioning negative aspects of Computer-Mediated Communication.

Table 16 – Evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Negative	65.0	51.1
Both negative and positive	5.0	2.9
Positive	44.4	46.0
Total	12.7	100.0
(N)	(20)	(137)
Internet and mass media		
Negative	17.2	22.5
Both negative and positive	6.9	7.0
Positive	75.9	70.4
Total	17.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(142)
Internet and members		
Negative	6.3	2.7
Both negative and positive	25.0	13.3
Positive	68.8	84.0
Total	17.6	100.0
(N)	(32)	(150)

NB – 17, 8, 5 missing cases (Italian sample); 36, 31, 23 missing cases (rest of the sample)

It is worth noticing that during our research the issue of Internet communication was framed as crucial by most of the interviewees. The idea of Internet's impact on different publics is notably synthesized by a spokesperson of the Abruzzo social forum. As he stated: "in general it doesn't seem to me that the Internet favoured more interactions with *public decision-makers*. On the contrary, they often ignore the actions made via the Internet that are frequently ineffective. This was the case of the netstrike that we directed against the website of the National Institute of Nuclear Physics within the framework of our campaign against the big infrastructures planned by the Berlusconi's government. We also organized a mailbombing at the European level using the email addresses of MPs during the discussion on directives concerning issues such as genetically modified food, water, and Bolkestein but it was also ineffective. This is because public decision-makers are not competent on these online actions. As for the relation with the *media*, I think that the Internet is fundamental because press releases, photos, and documents are published on our website and they are used by journalists as a source for their articles … However, I believe that the website served us mostly to attract people that are informed and already interested but it didn't prove to be very effective for the communication with the whole *public opinion* because TV and face-to-face interactions are more important for that. Hence, it is especially useful for specific sectors of public opinion that are already informed but not for the masses of people". However, as one spokesperson of Rete Lilliput notes, Computer-Mediated Communication can be effective in dealing with public administrators. In his words: "The Internet has a pivotal and strategic role for us; it is part of our strategy of communication and pressure. It has facilitated international exchange and the possibility to collect and to disseminate more information. It also helped our relation with traditional media. We are using it in a very interesting way to organize online pressure campaigns on national deputies and also on representatives at the local level. We have used the mail-bombing on political representatives and it has given interesting results".

A complex interpretation of the role of new technologies emerges from the interviews. First of all websites are considered as the place of memory, where social movements can narrate their history, keep track of their activities and store their documents and materials. As an activist of the Venice social forum puts it: "our website, has a specific function consisting in keeping memory of what we have done and of the documents we produced, working as an archive and a database. These materials would be much more difficult to find and to disseminate if the website wouldn't exist".

The Internet is also conceived as an important means favoring cross-references among different media. It is not exactly what has been called "the passage from the desktop to the television" (Bennett 2003) but a flow of communication from online to offline media and vice versa. According to the director of the weekly printed magazine Carta, close to the movement: "our magazine was born in 1998 and we defined ourselves as a 'medium for social communication' to underline the fact that we communicate in all possible ways: with books, with a monthly magazine, with a weekly magazine, with face-to-face meetings but also with the Internet and with our website. Thanks to the latter we act as the sound track of political events (like counter-summits and social forums) just when they happen. The Internet allows us to create linkages and cross-references among different media".

Our activists highlight that new technologies can facilitate the spreading and sharing of power in an organization. Interestingly, contemporary social movements stress the relevance of participation for democracy and they tend to shape new technologies according to these visions of democracy. That is, offline identity influences online presence of social movement organizations (see also Mosca 2004). Open publishing system is often employed in order to widen participation to organizational life and to democratize the organization. This is a distinctive characteristic of the Indymedia network. In fact, the Italian knot of Indymedia adopted both open publishing and the method of consensus. However, even Indymedia does not apply the open publishing to all parts of its website: the right column of the homepage is opened to everybody but messages with explicit fascist, racist and sexist contents can be removed. Decisions on the information to be uploaded in the central column of the homepage are taken through a discussion in an open mailing-list (to whom everybody can subscribe and participate) that adopts the method of consensus. As an activist of the Italian knot of Indymedia explains: "in Indymedia there neither hierarchy nor role assignment. Mechanisms of participation inform the different levels of the network … All the decision-making processes have to pass from the national mailing-list (Italy-list). This mechanism concerns also decisions made in face-to-face meetings: all information and decision have to pass through the mailing-list because anyone must have the possibility to express himself/herself on a specific decision".

Open publishing and open management system are then considered as antibodies to the monopoly of power in the hands of few technology-skilled individuals. This risk is greatly understood in GJMOs: technological skills can translate into inequalities of power. Other interviewees underline in fact that the Internet can create new inequalities because technical expertise gives power to a limited amount of people. Besides, restricted access limits online participation. Fear of excluding some activists led in some cases to limiting the use of new technology and valorizing face-to-face communication. The spokesperson of the Cobas confederation notes: "Most of our members are quite old and some are excluded from this technology. Moreover, those who manages the technology have a greater power. The same happened in the past with free radios and with movement's magazines… it's like in the case of Indymedia where there are 3 or 4 people that always write and you have the impression of thousands of people participating but it is just an impression… this is the reason why recently we decided to meet physically more frequently with the executive board, exactly to avoid the risk that in the electronic executive only a small number of people participate always but the other ones are excluded". Notwithstanding these risks, it is worth underlining that social movement organizations can play an important role in socializing their members to Internet use (see also della Porta and

Mosca 2005). This seems to be the case of Rete Lilliput that created a group of people specifically dealing with Internet issues, trying to spread knowledge on Internet use among its participants.

Another important aspect of Internet communication regards the support given by new technologies give to the work and action of the organization. Our interviewees distinguished different functions of diverse Internet tools. GJMOs use in fact different Internet tools for different aims. As a member of the Rete Lilliput stated: "we have carried out our activity for more than one year without a website relying almost exclusively on the mailing-lists … linkages between different knots and groups worked well but the lack of a website penalized us because you can recruit new people if you run a good website but you can't recruit them with the mailing-lists … if you have a good website it is a significant help to your work in the society. A public website is visited by journalists and by curious people".

If websites serve as places for self-presentation to the general public, other tools like forums and mailing-lists favor an ongoing communication and discussion among activists. Our interviewees recognize in fact the importance of some Internet tools such as, for example, the mailing-lists. Most of them define this kind of instruments as "permanent assemblies". One activist of the local social forum of Venice underlines however both strengths and weaknesses of interactive tools such as mailing-lists. As she argues: "On the one hand mailing-lists are selective and exclude those who don't have Internet access or an email address. On the other, they are very important because they permit faster communication that allows us to mobilize very quickly and they also enable including people that could not attend our physical meetings. In fact we use them to disseminate the minutes of our assemblies that can be read by all people with Internet access".

However, in some cases interactive tools are not used by GJMOs because they feel that they would require a great effort. This concerns especially more traditional organizations such as trade unions. In the words of the webmaster of the Italian left metalworkers union Fiom: "We have a newsletter with thousands of subscribers. What they ask us is to express their opinion and to open a forum on our website but we cannot satisfy their request because only a reduced number of people manage the website. We publish platforms concerning agreements on the workplace and results of agreements but we don't give users the possibility to express themselves directly and to publish their judgment on platforms and agreements even if this is what they ask us for more.… the opening of a forum would mean a different management of the website because it would imply to devote one person to the forum but we don't have such possibility".

A generational divide within and between "old" and traditional organizations/members and "new" and innovative groups/activists in conceiving and understanding the Internet is referred to by one journalist of Il Manifesto. According to him: "our newspaper had been the first Italian newspaper creating a website in 1995. At that time we were very innovative but then we didn't invest so much on it because we hadn't people that could manage it …. I think that a cultural attitude that doesn't conceive new media as something radically different from traditional one prevails and this conceptual difference seems to mirror a generation difference".

Face-to-face relationships are considered important also for the construction of virtual nets. The director of Peacelink, an Internet portal focusing on peace, defines the Internet as "an algid means of communication that cannot totally replace interpersonal relations: without frequent face-to-face meetings it risks to create chaos". One spokesperson of rete Lilliput underlines that the Internet is a necessary but not a sufficient conditions of GJMOs' activity. In particular, email communication lacks interactivity and other means are experimented to cover this gap. As he explains: "the Internet is very important for us but it is just an instrument and it cannot be a substitute for other forms of interaction that we consider fundamental. Therefore it cannot be the unique mean through which we build our network. For this reason we are starting to employ other means trying to go beyond emails because the email technology is not sufficient and we need more interactive instruments. We have also chosen to have a series of physical meetings like seminars and assemblies because we think that some events cannot be mediated or replaced by the Internet". A spokesperson of the Abruzzo

social forum also points to Internet's limits arguing: "I don't think that local level decisions can be made through the Internet because it is necessary a visual, a physical and an assemblearian contact. Sometimes activists work a lot on the web but too little on the street with the leaflets in their hands. We also need to practice militancy, to draw posters and write leaflets and to have physical contacts with the people otherwise we won't change the world! The Internet makes communication faster and it breaks down barriers, it allows an enduring discussion between one meeting and another and it is also more direct but our struggle need a visible and a physical presence".

On the other hand, some interviewees underline that the Internet is more than just an instrument. According to a member of the national executive of the Young Communists: "The Internet is of fundamental importance for our activity and web tools represent an amazing innovation in doing politics. The Internet is really a political space. It's not just an instrument. It's a place where, notwithstanding the great push towards privatization and control, millions of people cooperate to build critics and to attack the private idea that Microsoft and Windows propose of the Net. It is also a political space in that it represents a place of confrontation and discussion without precedents". Also a spokesperson of a local social forum points at Internet uses that go beyond its instrumental function: "since the regional social forum is not hosted by a fixed place the website became its virtual headquarter: I cannot imagine our activity without our website because it is a real virtual community, a virtual headquarter… it is one of the places where we can develop an identity and thus it is particularly important for us".

Summarizing, Internet is seen as a means widening participation to the organizational life, but it also raises the risk of exclusion for people without access to it and can generate power inequalities. It facilitates relationships with journalists and allows developing an historical memory of the organization. However, it serves to complement face-to-face relations, especially in the case of people belonging to the same organization but living in different places. None of our interviewees think that the Internet could replace face-to-face communication: it just multiplies possibilities and frequencies of communication among dispersed individuals.

8. Relationship with the movement

The analysis of written documents of our GJMOs signal that the Italian movement consists of organizations networking more with national than with transnational GJMOs (Reiter 2005, 303). Interviews however highlight also a significant number of transnational linkages of our organizations.

First of all, in order to evaluate the participation of our groups in the GJM, we asked for their involvement in the social forum process, in counter-summits and in global days of action (table 17). The Italian organizations emerge as much more involved in the social forum process at the transnational level (but not so at the national/local level). Only two (Arcigay and Italian anarchist federation) out of 37 organizations declared to have never participated in a World Social Forum (WSF) or in a European Social Forum (ESF). Considerable higher than in the rest of the sample, this participation might have been facilitated by the fact that the first ESF was organized in Florence in 2002 (although the same can be said for France and Britain). As for counter-summits, only three (Young Greens, Forum del terzo settore and Pax Christi) out of 37 organizations stated to have never participated in this kind of events. Also in this case, the anti-G8 countersummit in Genoa was an important experience. The Italian GJMOs are also very engaged in global days of action. This finding seems consistent with the huge mobilization against the war in Iraq that on the 15th of February 2003 mobilized about three millions of people in Rome (della Porta and Diani 2004).

The data on the participation on national and local social forums could appear as contradictory if we consider that Italy has been one of the countries with the higher number of this kind of network organizations working as local cells of the GJM intertwining international issues and framing with

local mobilizations. The lack of a national social forum as well as the transformations of many local ones into other types of networks (della Porta and Mosca 2006) might explain this result.

Table 17 – Participation in movement's events (%)

Participation in movement's events	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
World/European social forums	94.6	75.1
National/local social forums	54.1	58.4
Counter-summits	91.9	67.1
Global days of action	89.2	74.6
Total	17.6	100.0
(N)	(37)	(173)

NB - no missing cases

Another important question we asked refers to the sense of belonging of their group to the GJM. With this indicator we wanted to assess if the degree of closeness of our groups to the movement can help explaining some differences in their democratic practices. Our hypothesis is that the most identified and engaged groups could have known and experimented different democratic models through their participation in the movement, experiencing a process of "contamination in action" (della Porta and Mosca 2006). As table 18 shows, compared with the rest of the sample, in the Italian case we found more groups (Forum III Settore, Emergency, Associazione 3 Febbraio, and Popolare Network) that declared their non-belonging to the GJM. Only a few groups declared that they don't have a shared view or to feel part of the movement with reservations. Most of them (almost four fifths) express a full belonging to the movement.

Table 18 – Sense of belonging to the movement (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
No	13.5	6.4
The group doesn't have a shared view	2.7	3.5
Yes, but with reservations	5.4	10.4
Yes	78.4	79.8
Total	17.6	100.0
(N)	(37)	(173)

NB - no missing cases

When some groups declared not to belong to the GJM, they also offered different motivations for this. Two of these four groups are NGOs that interact with the movement but wants to appear as distinct from it in the eyes of public opinion and to show that they are more concrete and engaged in practical activities. This position is exemplified by a member of Emergency that stated: "we devote most of our engagement to concrete issues while the rest remains in the background. We are sensitive towards the issues raised by the movement but our basic idea consists in fighting the war, in claiming the right to health, and in creating alternatives of peace; no matter how we think that another world could exist. Our activity more than a political activity is an activity on the field". One

of the other groups that declared not to belong to the movement is a radical association (Associazione 3 Febbraio) active on the issue of immigration that considers the movement as too moderate and too linked with institutional politics and political parties. As one of the members of its national executive told us: "we don't feel part of this movement … we have never been convinced by the organizational and the political hypothesis that the movement proposed since the beginning". The last group declaring not to belong to the movement is an independent radio that covers movement's events and actions. As the director of the radio specified: "there are different positioning: many colleagues and founders think that the lack of a social class of reference and of a strong leadership makes the movement not very incisive; other ones support it; and other consider it as being too maximalist".

One group (Il Manifesto) declared instead not to have a shared view on this issue because --as the responsible for the foreign politics section of the communist newspaper explains-- "there is not a common position of the newspaper's collective towards the movement ... someone perceives this movement with some skepticism because of its reduced emphasis on class struggle and they do not catch the positive element deriving from the encounter of different cultures. Hence, someone of us find difficult to identify with it".

Finally, the federation of Greens and the Arcigay declared a conditioned belonging to the movement. The Greens stated that they share some values and work together with the movement on specific issues but --as the responsible for the international department of the party told us-- "we are not integrally part of the movement because our main object consist in acting within institutions. Hence we have a different goal from the one of the movement, still having a series of common objectives". The national president of the Arcigay stated: "our association focuses on alternative issues but it does not have a rigid political positioning on the left-right axis because we are an association of unionist type struggling for civil rights. Hence, when after Genoa the movement characterized itself as being at the extreme left many of us continued to be part of it individually but the association didn't".

A critical position was also expressed by a member of the correspondence's commission of the Italian anarchist federation. As he specified: "neoliberal globalization can't be reformed nor can be made more human because capitalism itself cannot be reformed. It is not possible to conceive a process of globalization with more democratic or participative features. We want the globalization of freedom and equality. We fight within the GJM but without giving up to reformist perspectives".

The remaining groups expressed their belonging to the GJM and they weren't asked to offer a motivation for this but to specify the main aims of the movement.

Finally, we asked to our interviewees which they consider as the main aims of the GJM (table 19). Interestingly, the movement is seen as more focused on social issues (especially in the Italian case) then on the so called "post-materialist" values raised by new social movements. Almost one third indicated international issues as being at the core of the movement while more than one third (in the Italian case) refers to issues of democracy (e.g. to strengthen citizen's participation; to give citizens the power to decide directly and to express themselves on their future; to democratize existing institutions; to build new institutions that involve citizens in the decision-making process; to create political spaces and public spheres where civil society could express freely; free access to information, etc.).

Movement's aims are generally presented in a proactive framework; that is, instead than framing them as opposition to something, most of our interviewees prefer to make reference to constructive claims and to positive statements. As for the type of statement, most of them prefer to make general statement rather than raising specific proposals. Answering the question, some groups quoted the well-know slogan of the Porto Alegre WSF, "another world is possible" (campaign against armed banks, Legambiente, Rete Lilliput). Some groups gave very general answers such as "building social and economic alternatives" (Fiom), "against neoliberalism" (Abruzzo social forum, Arci, Attac, Fiom, Un Ponte per), "anticapitalism" (Cobas, anarchist federation), justice (Arci, campaign

against armed banks, Cgil, Emergency, Peacelink, Roundtable for Peace), rights (Arci, Arcigay, Cgil, Cub, Emergency, Greens, Youth Left, Peacelink, Roundtable for Peace), democracy and participation (Attac, campaign against armed banks, Carta, Communist Refoundation Party, Greens, Noglobal network, Peacelink, Torino social forum, Venezia social forum, Wordshops association).

Table 19 – Perception of the movement (%)

Main aims of the movement	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Social issues	88.2	62.2
International issues	32.4	39.2
New social movement issues	52.9	56.1
Democracy / free access to information	38.2	25.7
Total	18.7	100.0
(N)	(34)	(148)
Type of claim		
Negative/contra claim	44.1	41.6
Positive/pro claim	85.3	85.9
Total	18.6	100.0
(N)	(34)	(149)
Type of statement		
General statement	83.8	79.2
Specific proposal	27.0	33.3
Total	18.0	100.0
(N)	(37)	(168)

NB - no missing cases (Italian sample); 5 missing cases (rest of the sample)

We also asked our interviewees if and how their groups are engaged in other networks/campaigns/umbrella organizations dealing with global justice issues (table 20). Only about one fifth answered negatively to this question. As for the remaining four fifths, the majority of them declared (unsurprisingly) that they are related with networks/campaigns focusing on international issues; almost half of them said they interact with networks/campaigns dealing with social issues while one fourth (in the Italian case) focus on national issues or on building transnational political parties or think thanks. One tenth of the groups refers to this engagement on democracy issues while just a few mentions new social movement issues.

Each group tended to quote international or European networks active on their specific issues: from alternative trade unionism to fair trade, from the foreign debt to environmentalism, from immigration to culture, from insecurity/precarity to poverty, from anarchism to labour issues, from international coordination of NGOs to networks of youth parties. Only a very limited number of groups quoted the same networks such as the Controlarms campaign (27%), the Word or the European social forum process/assembly (20%), campaign against privatization of (or for the re-publicization of) water (20%). As for specific groups/organizations quoted by our interviewees only two were quoted more frequently: the Rete Lilliput and the Roundtable for Peace (13% each one). The general impression is then one of a very significant international activity that often took place within very specific networks. That is, it does not emerge the presence of some broker campaigns involving the majority of our organizations. Nonetheless, we have to keep in mind that we asked to

indicate the organizations/networks/campaigns with whom our groups interact more frequently. Hence, the result is not surprising. As we have seen previously, most of the groups are involved in the social forum process but just some of them (the leisure/cultural association Arci, the metalworker union Fiom, the Forum del terzo settore, the Venice local social forum, the Rete Noglobal and the Roundtable for Peace) indicated it as being at the core of their networking activity. Interestingly, some of the sectoral campaigns quoted by our groups were initiated and promoted within the social forum process (i.e. the network for a charter of principles of another Europe and the European network on immigration).

As for the territorial levels of such campaigns, the large majority concerns the international level but also the national one (especially in the other samples) while the local level is rarely mentioned.

Table 20 – Issues of networks/campaigns of the movement (%)

Issues of networks / campaigns	**Italy (%)**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)**
Social issues	50.0	52.5
International issues	86.7	85.6
National issues / political parties / think thanks	26.7	8.6
Democracy	10.0	11.5
New social movement issues	6.7	19.4
Total	17.8	100.0
(N)	(30)	(139)
Territorial levels of networks / campaigns		
Local	0.0	5.0
National	56.7	71.6
Transnational	86.7	84.4
Total	17.5	100.0
(N)	(30)	(141)

NB - 7 missing cases (Italian sample); 32 missing cases (rest of the sample)

We found a clear consistency between the main issues of activity of one group (see p. 26) and the issues addressed by GJM networks/campaigns/umbrella organizations to whom such group belongs. Deliberative participative organizations are more engaged in networks/campaigns dealing with social issues while assembleary ones focus especially on international issues. Networks/campaigns/umbrella organizations dealing with democracy are a few; they are joined especially by associational groups that also focus more on new social movement issues (together with deliberative participative organizations). Associational and assembleary groups are also more engaged than the other ones in campaigns concerning national issues and in networks of political parties and think thanks. As for the territorial levels of the GJM networks/campaigns/umbrella organizations joined by our groups, none of them concerns the local level. Associational and deliberative representative groups devote most of their networking activity to networks/campaigns active at the transnational levels. The former are more engaged than the other ones in GJM networks/campaigns/umbrella organizations active at the national level, too.

Table 20a – Issues of networks/campaigns of the GJM per democratic models (%)

Issues of networks / campaigns	Democratic Models				Italy (%)	Rest of the sample (excluding Italian cases) (%)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**		
Social issues	71.4	23.1	0.0	87.5	50.0	52.5
International issues	85.7	92.3	100.0	75.0	86.7	85.6
National issues/political parties/think thanks	57.1	15.4	50.0	12.5	26.7	8.6
Democracy	28.6	7.7	0.0	0.0	10.0	11.5
New social movement issues	14.3	0.0	0.0	12.5	6.7	19.4
Territorial levels of networks / campaigns						
Local	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.0
National	71.4	53.8	50.0	50.0	56.7	71.6
Transnational	100.0	92.3	50.0	75.0	86.7	84.4
Total	23.3	43.3	6.7	26.7	100.0	100.0
(N)	(7)	(13)	(2)	(8)	(30)	(141)

NB - 7 missing cases (Italian sample); 32 missing cases (rest of the sample)

9. Conclusions

The Italian case presents several patterns consistent with what has been stated in the introductory chapter, but also some national peculiarities. First of all, we observed a shift in the internal democratic models from written documents (wp3) to interviews (wp4). The differences concerns especially the dimension of consensus (less so for participation). According to the interviews, this decision-making method is more widespread than had emerged from organizational documents.

As for internal decision-making practices, we can underline some peculiarities of the Italian groups. In particular, although the executive committees play a more important role than in the other cases, the main decision-making bodies are however generally smaller and more oriented toward consensus than in the other cases. The important role of the executive committees in the Italian case is also confirmed by questions concerning potential sources of hidden power.

For what concerns organizational characteristics, as the introductory chapter had pointed out, different kinds of internal democratic models are clearly related to specific organizational features such as the budget, the presence of paid staff, and the number of volunteers. Smaller and poorer groups are more likely to adopt principles of participation and consensus. As for the Italian specificities, we noticed that most of the Italian GJMOs were created or refunded during the 1990s, a decade characterized by dramatic changes in the national political system. We also noticed that orientation toward consensus concerns especially groups emerged from the 1990s on.

After focusing on the internal decision-making, we also considered the relationship of the selected organizations with institutions at different territorial levels. Here we found that in a cross-country comparison, the Italian groups are more likely to develop collaborative relations with the institutions especially at the national and at the local levels. However, organizations adopting deliberative participative democratic models tend to be less engaged in institutional collaborations.

The analysis of organizational strategies showed that Italian GJMOs are very active on social and international issues. Besides, Italian groups are also more oriented toward protest (employing both conventional and unconventional forms of action) than the groups in the rest of the sample. As for

the communicative strategies, the Italian organizations developed a critical reflection on the role of the Internet, underling both limits and opportunities of new technologies.

Finally, we considered the participation of our groups in the GJM. When compared with groups in the rest of the sample, Italian organizations emerged as highly mobilized in the GJM events. As for the identification with the movement, a few groups expressed critical stances toward the social forum process. Still, they feel important to take part in it adopting the formula "one foot in, one foot out" since "the forum has become a key organizational platform for broader movement and identity building, which is why so many radicals feel obliged to engage the process" (Juris 2005, 261).

References

Andretta, Massimiliano, Donatella della Porta, Lorenzo Mosca and Herbert Reiter. 2002. Global, noglobal, newglobal. La protesta di Genova contro il G8. Roma-Bari: Laterza.

Andretta, Massimiliano and Lorenzo Mosca. 2004. "Understanding the Genoa protest." Pp. 43-63 in Interpreting Global Civil Society, edited by R. Taylor. Bloomfield (CT): Kumarian press.

Barbetta, Gianpaolo and Francesco Maggio. 2002. Nonprofit. Bologna: Il Mulino.

Bennett, Lance W. 2003. "Communicating global activism: strengths and vulnerabilities of networked politics." Information, Communication & Society, 6, 2:143–68.

della Porta, Donatella, Massimiliano Andretta, Lorenzo Mosca and Herbert Reiter. 2006. Globalization from below. Transnational activists and protest networks. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

della Porta, Donatella and Mario Diani. 2004. "'No to the war with no ifs or buts'. Protest against the War in Iraq." Pp. 200-18 in Italian Politics, edited by V. Della Sala and S. Fabbrini. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

della Porta, Donatella and Lorenzo Mosca. 2005. "Global-net for global movements? A network of networks for a movement of movements." *Journal of Public Policy*, 25, 1:165-90.

della Porta, Donatella and Lorenzo Mosca. 2006. "*In Movimento.* Contamination in action and the Global Justice Movement." Forthcoming in Global Networks.

della Porta, Donatella and Herbert Reiter (eds.). 2006. WP3 report. Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy. Research report of the Demos project.

Dines, Nicola. 1999. "Centri sociali: occupazioni autogestite a Napoli negli anni novanta." Quaderni di Sociologia, 21:90-111.

Juris, Jeffrey S. 2005. "Social Forums and their Margins: Networking Logics and the Cultural Politics of Autonomous Space." Ephemera, 5(2): 253-72.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1996. "The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context." Pp. 152-184 in Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings, edited by D. McAdam, J. D. McCarthy and M. N. Zald. Cambridge-New York: Cambridge University Press,.

Micheletti, Michele. 2003. Political virtue and shopping. Individuals, consumerism, and collective action. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Mosca, Lorenzo. 2004. From the streets to the Net? The Impact of new Information and Communication Technologies on Social Movement Activists and Organizations. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Florence.

Mosca, Lorenzo. 2005. "The Italian Global Justice Movement Online." in WP2 report. Searching the Net, edited by D. della Porta and L. Mosca. Research report of the Demos project.

Reiter, Herbert. 2006. "Organizational ideology and visions of democracy of Italian GJMOs." Pp. 289-339 in WP3 report. Organizational Ideology and Visions of Democracy, edited by D. della Porta and H. Reiter. Research report of the Demos project.

Reiter, Herbert, Massimiliano Andretta, Donatella della Porta and Lorenzo Mosca. 2006. "The Global Justice Movement in Italy." Forthcoming in The Global Justice Movement: Cross-national and Transnational Perspectives, edited by D. della Porta. Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm.

Democratic practices in the Spanish Global Justice Movement

By Manuel Jiménez and Ángel Calle
(IESA-CSIC)

1. Introduction

The main goal of this report is to analyse organizational practices in Spain inside the so-called Global Justice Movement. For this purpose we have carried out an analysis of 35 organisations that have been very active in promoting campaigns or events that have the critique of the neoliberal globalisation as a key reference. We have sent to these organisations a questionnaire aiming to retrieve qualitative and quantitative information about objectives, activities and decision-making procedures. We will use a typology of internal democratic models already discussed in the introductory chapter of this report. We will compare these results with the findings obtained from the analysis of the available documentation of these organizations studied in the WP3.

We will link this part of the research with previous findings already stated in the WP2 and the WP3 reports. These findings point at a series of peculiar characteristics of the Spanish sample that become evident when compared to other national samples: presence of more informal and smaller groups, more loose and decentralized state networks, less stable alliances between parties and grassroots movements and presence of ideological roots oriented to autonomy and local protests (peripheral nationalisms, libertarian patterns, radical democracy frames in the new global movements).[111]

First of all, in paragraph 2 we will carry out a description of our sample. Then, we will analyse the classification of our groups in the typology of internal democratic models. Finally, we will assess organizational structures and strategies, relationships with institutions and other movements in relation with internal democratic practices.

2. Sampling: overview and constraints

The questionnaire was sent to 60 organizations from January to June 2006. 37 were already part of the Spanish sample used for the WP3. We decided to widen the sample in order to deal with the problem of missing cases. We had back 35 out of 60 (61%) of questionnaires we sent. This situation was not unexpected considering the already mentioned profile of Spanish social movements, where an important role is played by local and loose groups, which nevertheless maintain a shared identity at the state level (see the case of ATTAC or the pacifist movement).

The policy we adopted to select the interviewees consisted in selecting people that we consider having an appropriate profile in order to fill in the questionnaire. Whenever possible (57 out of 60 organisations), we maintained a first contact by telephone explaining the rational and the purposes of the research. For big organisations we asked for someone dealing with international issues or following GJMs campaigns. For small groups we attempted to get somebody with experience on the activities of the organization. Afterwards we sent him or her by e-mail a questionnaire. We called 2 or 3 times this person if the questionnaire was not sent back. Finally, if the answer was positive, we called them by telephone asking for more detailed answers on some parts of the questionnaire.

This sampling policy ends up with a sample that contains a high percentage of organisations that had not been included in the previous work packages. Only 16 (43% of the WP4 sample) were part of the WP3 sample. This fact affects the comparisons between WP3 and WP4 samples. However,

[111] See appendix 1.

despite the selection of new organisations in the WP4 sample, the overall picture and trends were maintained. In fact, we adopted a policy of "substitution by similar organisations" (in terms of issues, size and structure) when we realized that one organization was not willing to answer the questionnaire. Therefore, we do not count with Barcelona Indymedia but with EuskalHerria Indymedia (knot of the Indymedia network in the Basque country), nor with Justice and Peace (*Justicia y Paz*) but with a worker catholic organisation as HOAC (*Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica*), nor with a Zapatista supporter network based in Madrid (*RAZ*) but with one located in Barcelona, etc.[112]

We are, perhaps, more worried about the quality of the information retrieved and possible bias to be taken into account when analysing the available information. Some large organisations (such as Greenpeace, trade unions as UGT, and NGOs such as APDHA) did not accept to be interviewed because of over-surveying of these organisations by many other studies. Due to the scarce time that many activists had (generally non-paid staff with less time to devote to these tasks), some questionnaires present a high presence of missing answers. Finally, it is worth noticing that we deal, as qualitative illustrations will show, with (postmodern) movements not very eager in offering (or being capable to offer) a detailed and stable pattern in terms of decision making procedures.

3. Democracy within: Moving from written documents to declared actual practices

The sample of WP4 organizations has been classified according to our typology of organisational model in terms of internal democratic practices. We came across similar patterns to those observed when considering the full sample or countries like Italy quite close to Spain in terms of cultural and political patterns. Associational and assembleary models are less present when moving from what is stated in public documents produced by the organizations to practices as declared by their leaders (table 1).

The most relevant feature of the classification of the Spanish groups along the typology concerning democratic models is the high presence of deliberative participative groups in the WP4 sample, quite above the other national samples.[113] This result could be due to the fact that the new sampling may have included organizations more oriented towards this internal democratic model.

Table 1 – Sampling for the different Work Packages – (column %)

Democratic models	WP3 (SPANISH SAMPLE)	WP4 (SPANISH SAMPLE)	WP3 (FULL SAMPLE)	WP4 (FULL SAMPLE)
Associational	24.3	14.5	51.2	26.7
Deliberative representative	21.6	25.7	13.5	33.3
Assembleary	27.0	5.7	12.7	8.6
Deliberative participative	16.2	45.7	9.4	19.0
Not classified	10.8	8.6	13.1	7.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(35)	(35)	(210)	(210)

As table 2 shows, almost 80% of the selected organizations are characterised by the importance given to consensual practices. In comparison with the full sample, Spain appears as the country with

[112] Giving for grant a good performance of the substitutions, we can state that at least 70% of the WP4 sample has a similar profile to the one used for the WP3.
[113] See the introductory chapter of this report.

the highest adoption of consensual methods in internal decision-making (about 70% in the Swiss and the Transnational cases, and 60% in the Italian case).

Table 2 - Models of Internal Democracy

Decision-making method: Consensus	*Decision-making body: delegation of power*	
	Low	**High**
Low	**Assembleary** 6.3% (9.9%) Baladre, CNT	**Associational** 15.6% (30.9%) Co.bas, ISF, IU, IU-Jóvenes, Foro Social Palencia
High	**Deliberative participative** 50.0% (21.0%) Asamblea Feminista de Madrid, Assemblea per la Regularització sense Condicions, Bajo el Asfalto esta la Huerta, Col. Solidaridad con la Rebelión Zapatista-Barcelona, Comité Apoyo MST-Madrid, Consulta Social Europea, Derechos para Todos, Diagonal, Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra, Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel, Nodo50 Plataforma 0,7, RCADE, Rebelión, Vall de Can Masdeu, XMG	**Deliberative representative** 28.1% (38.1%) HOAC, Amnistía Inter., ATTAC-Madrid, Córdoba Solidaria, Ecologistas en Acción, ESK, Espacio Alternativo, OCSI, Red con Voz

N valid=32; Percentages specified in brackets refer to the overall WP4 sample

However, in a cross-national comparison, it is the low resort to representation (or delegation of power) what better characterizes the Spanish case in contrast with the overall sample: more than half of the selected organizations (56%) rely on direct participation methods (compared to one third in Italy or in the transnational networks). The limited resort to delegation of power may be partly explained by some "structural conditions" (small size and budgets, local orientation, etc.,) that can be interpreted as elements facilitating participatory models or, in other words, reducing the pressure to delegate power in everyday functioning of the groups. In order to account for the widespread presence of deliberation (the importance of consensus), however, a major emphasis should be put on the importance of cultural or ideological features of the GJM in Spain (already mentioned in the introduction) and in the experience of radical social movements in Spain.[114]

4. Internal decision making practices

In the following tables we analyze more detailed aspects of the internal decision-making process of the selected organizations. More specifically, we pay attention to the importance of the various decision-making bodies (the presidency, the executive committee or secretariat, the member's assembly, etc.), their decision-making method, and the number of persons taking part in those bodies (size).

[114] The importance of consensual methods among transnational networks highlights the importance of ideational factors, pointing to radical democracy frames versus mere material ones (see also Jiménez and Calle, 2006).

Consistency with the fact that deliberation is a pillar of the radical democracy frame in the Spanish GJMs, in more than half of the surveyed groups (54%) the assembly is said to be the most important decision-making organism (table 3). In this respect, Spain appears as an exception in an organizational panorama usually dominated by decisional bodies that concentrate power by delegation (executive committees, secretariat, etc. as in Germany, France, Italy or Switzerland and presidential figures as in the UK). In line with these results, the majority of the Spanish groups (62%) employ consensual decisional methods while in the overall sample majority (and mixed) methods are more widespread. The prevalence of consensual decisional methods in Spain could be related to the small size of main decision-making bodies. Most of the organizations (60%) declared in fact that such body is constituted by less than 30 individuals; in one forth of the groups the main decisional body is formed by between 30 and 100 individuals; while in just one fifth of the organizations it is formed by more than 100 individuals.

Table 3 – Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
President / leader / secretary / director	2.9	12.0
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	31.4	49.1
Assembly / open meeting	54.3	22.3
Thematic group	2.9	4.0
Other bodies	8.6	12.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(35)	(175)
Decision-making method of the main decisional body		
Majority + other	38.2	57.2
Consensus	61.8	42.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(34)	(159)
Size of the main decisional body		
Less than 30	60.0	46.8
Between 30 and 100	23.3	26.6
More than 100	16.7	26.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(30)	(158)

NB – 0 (most important body), 1 (main body decisional method) and 5 (body size) missing cases

Table 4 illustrates the characteristics of the executive committees. Spain appears as different from the rest of the analyzed cases for two aspects: (1) the limited importance of these bodies and the small number of organizations that declared their existence (40% while in the rest of the countries it is foreseen by about three quarters of the organizations); and also (2), in line with the prevailing decisional culture in Spain, consensual decision-making seems to be more widespread within these executive bodies than in the rest of the cases. However, as far as the election of the executive committee is concerned there are no significant national differences: this organism is elected by assemblies in more than four fifths of the cases.

Table 4 – Characteristics of the executive committee (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Yes	40.0	73.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (35)	100.0 (174)
Decision-making method of the executive		
Majority + other	35.7	46.5
Consensus	64.3	53.5
Total **(N)**	100.0 (14)	100.0 (127)
Election of the executive committee		
By an assemblearian body	90.9	86.0
By other bodies	9.1	14.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (20)	100.0 (100)

NB – 0 (presence of the executive), 21 (decisional method) and 15 (executive's election) missing cases

The importance of the assembly was confirmed when we asked about the main body in the process of agenda setting (table 5). With this question we aimed to go beyond formal procedures, addressing a key potential source of (hidden) power (such as the management of the agenda). We wanted to assess if in the Spanish GJMs a horizontal perspective determining how the issues at stake are established and trying to avoid that a minority could set the organizational agenda prevails. In contrast with table 3 results (main decision-making body), when asked specifically about bodies proposing the agenda, the declared importance of executives bodies or ad hoc selected representatives (thematic groups) increases. Nonetheless in almost half of the Spanish groups (44%, the highest percentage in cross-national comparison) assemblies or similar bodies are still identified as the main locus in the agenda setting processes. Consequently, it seems that the assembleary nature of decision-making in many groups goes beyond purely formal terms and permeates critical decisional moments in groups' life.

Associated with the deliberative nature of decision-making bodies is the type of rules usually adopted to manage the discussion leading to a decision. Only 20% of the surveyed groups declared not to have any of such a sort of rules. This percentage is slightly below the average in the rest of the cases. Also in line with the aggregated results, half of the groups follows traditional rules (such as time limits to interventions, lists of speakers, presence of moderators, recording of minutes), another 27% mix traditional and innovative rules while only few groups adopt exclusively innovative ones (such as rotating moderation, gender quota, etc.).

Table 5 – Potential sources of hidden power (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
President / leader / secretary / director	2.9	18.1
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	35.3	50.6
Assembly / open meeting	44.1	10.6
Small committee representing different membership's groups	8.8	5.6
Other bodies	8.8	15.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (34)	100.0 (160)
Rules of discussion		
Not present	20.0	25.6
Traditional	50.0	51.9
Innovative	3.3	5.3
Both traditional and innovative	26.7	17.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (30)	100.0 (133)

NB – 1 (body proposing the agenda) and 5 (rules of discussion) missing cases

5. Organizational characteristics

Some organizational features has been already pointed out as associated to (or relevant in explaining) the presence of the diverse democratic models within the selected organizations. In this section we describe the Spanish sample according to a set of organizational features as the type of members and size of memberships, budget, staff, number of volunteers, and the year of foundation.[115]

As table 6 shows, the Spanish groups are always characterized by individual membership even if 2 out of 5 groups also foresee collective membership. Besides, Spanish groups are smaller than the average. The reduced size of the groups and the adoption of deliberative participative democratic models (and consensual practices) seem to be related.

[115] We have to be aware of the low percentage of answers to questions related to organizational features, partially due to the reluctance of some organizations to facilitate "internal information" as expressed by one of the interviewees.

Table 6 – Number of individual members (%)

Type of members	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Individual	58.3	50.7
Collective	0.0	12.8
Both individual and collective	41.7	36.5
Total **(N)**	100.0 (12)	100.0 (148)
Number of individual members		
Between 1 and 100	58.3	17.2
Between 101 and 1,000	16.7	32.3
Between 1,001 and 10,000	25.0	19.2
More than 10,000	0.0	31.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (12)	100.0 (99)
Number of collective members		
Between 1 and 10	50.0	18.8
Between 11 and 100	50.0	47.8
More than 100	0.0	33.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (4)	100.0 (69)

NB – 23 (type of members), 23 (individual members) and 31 (collective members) missing cases

The nature of the budget (as an indicator of the amount of material resources available for the organization) seems also associated with the organizational model and, in some cases, with the size of the membership. The larger the material resources the greater the organizational pressure towards professionalization (paid staff) and the articulation of a management structures with increasing power in detriment of activists (leading to a process of decision-making hierarchization, based on democratic practices of delegation of power and majority voting rules). On the contrary, the greater the weight of volunteers-activists (non-paid work) in the groups' life, the greater the organizational pressure towards decision-making practices allowing their direct involvement (direct participation and deliberation).

As table 7 illustrates, in the Spanish sample more than one quarter of the groups (27%) declared not to have any budget, the higher percentage in this category; while very few (15%) declaring a budget of over 500,000 euros (the smaller percentage in this category among the studied countries). That is, in relative terms in Spain we find more groups without any financial resource as well as less resourceful groups than in other countries. However, almost half of the groups works with a budget between 10,000 and 500,000 euros. Limited financial resources have a clear translation in terms of the extension of paid staff: almost half of the selected groups have none (the highest percentage and well above the average for the rest of the countries). A similar number of groups have up to 15 employees, while just around 10 percent declared between 16 and 100 employees. In contrast, more than one third of the groups (38%) counts with between 16 and 100 volunteers and 28% with more than 100.

In sum, the Spanish results draw a general picture that reflects the relative importance of small groups (more frequent than in the overall sample) and the dominance of medium-size organizations

(with a number of large organizations below the average), where financial resources (and paid staff) are scarce. It is worth noticing that while the number of non-paid staff is lower than the average, we find very few organizations with large number of volunteers that usually require paid staff and professionalization to be managed.[116]

Table 7 – Main resources of the groups (%)

Budget of the groups	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Highly variable	0.0	14.3
None	26.9	0.7
Less than 10,000	11.5	15.6
Between 10,000 and 500,000	46.2	36.1
More than 500,000	15.4	33.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (26)	100.0 (147)
Paid staff		
None	44.1	18.8
Up to 16	44.1	52.1
Between 16 and 100	11.8	15.2
More than 100	0.0	13.9
Total **(N)**	100.0 (34)	100.0 (165)
Number of volunteers		
Less than 16	34.4	32.0
Between 16 and 100	37.6	33.3
More than 100	28.1	34.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (32)	100.0 (147)

In table 7a we examine the extent to which the organizational resources vary according to our classification of groups in terms of democratic model (of decision-making). Looking first at the financial resources (as indicated by the annual budget declared by the organizations) we can see how large budgets tend to be associated with delegation of power (either associational or deliberative representative) while less resourceful groups in this sense are more often categorized as deliberative participative.

Similarly, paid staff is more often associated with traditional democratic practices (delegation of power and majority vote). The amount of voluntary work (free resources) does follow a similar pattern, being the groups in the deliberative participative model those that more often count with a lower number of volunteers. Here one should take into account that the concept "volunteer" may involve diverse forms of engagement (a volunteer can identify very different level of commitment: from a core/full-time activist to a few hours per week collaborator in administrative task). In this sense, it is difficult to deduce much about the relationship between number of volunteers and

[116] Furthermore, the low mentioning of volunteering could be explained by the fact that this activity is generally identified by activists as voluntary services rather than getting involved in actions or internal coordination.

democratic functioning of the organizations. The Spanish data only allow us to say that deliberative participative models seems to be associated to small, but probably highly active, volunteers.[117]

Table 7a – Main resources of the groups for different democratic models (%)

Budget of the groups	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Less than 10,000	50.0	37.5	0.0	72.7	56.5
More than 10,000	50.0	62.5	0.0	25.0	43.5
Total	17.4	34.8	0.0	47.8	100.0
(N)	(4)	(8)	(0)	(11)	(23)
Presence of paid staff (dummy)					
No	40.0	0.0	100.0	66.7	45.2
Yes	60.0	100.0	0.0	33.3	54.8
Total	16.1	29.0	6.2	48.4	100.0
(N)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(15)	(31)
Number of volunteers (dummy)					
Up to 15	20.0	11.1	0.0	53.8	31.0
More than 15	80.0	88.9	100.0	46.2	69.0
Total	17.2	31.0	6.9	44.8	100.0
(N)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(13)	(29)

NB - 12 (budget), 4 (paid staff), and 6 (volunteers) missing cases

In sum, in terms of resources, associational models in Spain are associated to different types of organizations in terms of budget, which notwithstanding tend to count with paid staff and a relative large number of volunteers. Deliberative representative organizations are rather similar to the associational one: they have a relative large budget and a combination of paid staff and a large base of volunteers. The deliberative participative groups appear as "poorer" in terms of the three indicators of resources.

Table 8 presents data on the date of birth of the different organizations (and their belonging to different generations of social movements). The Spanish sample is different from the rest of the surveyed countries in terms of the relative youth of many organizations.[118] Almost half of the sample groups were created after 2000 (46% vs. 29% in the rest of the countries). Novelty can be associated to two interrelated and explanatory organizational trends: informality and groups' generational replacement. Informality is a traditional organizational feature in a significant part of the leftist Spanish social movements in which the GJM is rooted (see Jiménez and Calle 2006).

[117] According to the Spanish WP3 report, 83.3% of deliberative participative models are involved in protests, whereas only 44.4% of associational groups are involved in this kind of actions.

[118] The smaller percentage of groups funded before 1968 can be partly explained by the authoritarian context.

Table 8 – Generational belonging of selected organizations (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Before 1968	7.7	19.5
Between 1969 and 1989	15.4	20.1
Between 1989 and 1999	30.8	31.4
After 2000	46.2	28.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(13)	(159)

NB - 22 missing cases

From the point of view of the groups, temporal duration and informality can be associated with processes of emergence, dissolution and re-emergence.[119] The search for new organizational formulas and experiences of interaction of (heterogeneous) groups and persons may have reinforced this trend.

6. Patterns of interaction with the institutions

The nature of the internal democratic practices can also be connected to the experience of interactions with public institutions or the perception of the opportunities they offer to participate. Both the political contexts (i.e. actual opportunities at different territorial levels) and past experiences of interaction can influence the groups' attitudes towards institutions and, hence, the internal decision-making processes. For instance, the institutionalization of participation can (but not necessarily do) create pressure towards delegation of power and time-efficient decision-making practices as voting instead of consensus/deliberation.

We first examined the experience of the organizations surveyed in Spain in contrast to the overall sample in terms of perceived dominant pattern, their interaction with institutions (i.e. collaboration, indifference or rejection) and variations according to the territorial levels of these public institutions.

As table 9 shows, the Spanish sample deviates from the rest of the cases analyzed for the low number of organizations that describe their interaction with *international authorities* as one of collaboration (even with restrictions): 31% versus 60% in the rest of countries. Indifference, when not explicit refusal, is the most frequent attitude expressed by our respondents when describing the relationship of their organizations with public institutions. The often nonexistence of interactions with international institutions is related to the local nature (and orientation) of many of the selected organizations.

[119] For instance, most of GJM platforms created in the year 2000, and whose activity fade away in subsequent years, were involved in the constitution of anti-war platforms in different cities of Spain. Also, major networks that in the 90s were part of the Spanish GJMs dissolved or redefined their roles to pave the way for new (global) networks; this would be the case of *RCADE* (network against foreign debt constituted in 2000) boosted, among others, by *Plataforma 0,7%* (solidarity network originated in 1994).

Table 9 - Relationship with institutions at different territorial level (%)

International institutions	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Refusal of collaboration	21.9	11.2
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	46.9	28.6
Collaboration with restrictions	6.3	28.6
Collaboration	25.0	31.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(32)	(161)
National institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	26.5	8.3
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	38.2	17.9
Collaboration with restrictions	11.8	39.3
Collaboration	23.5	34.5
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(34)	(168)
Local institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	18.2	6.6
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	27.3	32.5
Collaboration with restrictions	21.2	24.1
Collaboration	33.3	36.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(33)	(166)

The percentage of the groups that define their interaction with authorities in terms of collaboration (especially in selective forms) increases if we refer to *national institutions*. However, the frequency is still relatively lower than in the rest of the countries. Besides, the cases of refusal of collaboration are higher than in the general sample. This seems to be a peculiar feature of the Spanish groups: a similar pattern can only be found in the Swiss sample (see introductory chapter). Although the number of cases where no significant interactions take place decreases (from 47% of the case when referring to international institution to 38%) for the national level, the local nature of many of these groups in a political context of strong decentralization may partially explain these results. In fact, as we may expect when referring to the relationship with *local institutions*, we found that only one fourth of the groups define it as absent, a percentage similar to the average in the rest of the countries. Refusal of collaboration is however still relatively high (the highest in a cross-national comparison), while responses defining the interaction in terms of collaboration come close (although still slightly below) the average in the rest of the countries.

To sum up, our sampled organizations support the pattern of a more widespread indifference or refusal of collaboration with institutions in comparison with the full sample. Prevalence of action and radical interpretation of democracy frames underline this position. As one of our interviewee claimed: “we never establish relationships as we are a non-violent direct-action group” (*Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra*, anti-war platform of Madrid). According to another interviewee, “our paramount goal is to get in touch with citizens” (Zapatista platform of Barcelona).

This differentiation decreases if we go down from the international to the national and the local levels. For instance, the political group *Espacio Alternativo* declares that collaboration depends on

profiles of political groups in local governments and also their attitude towards social movements. When carrying out the *Consulta Social Europea* to debate a Europe "from below", the respondent stated that links to local power could be contingent, depending on characteristics of the local groups, but never attempting to build up stable links.

This reluctance to collaborate with institutions could be explained by several factors: the nature of the sample (local, with loose international links); and the fact that at the national and especially at the local level, groups cannot avoid to interact with institutions when "competing" for a political and media agenda, and sometimes because of repression of security forces, as some respondents stated in the questionnaire.

In table 9a we focused on how organizations adopting diverse internal democratic models relate with public institutions at different territorial levels. Democratic models based on delegation and traditional decision-making methods are more likely to collaborate with the public institutions. The deliberative participative groups are the ones that present the lower values concerning institutional collaboration.

Table 9a – Attitude towards public institutions by different democratic models (%)

Collaboration with institutions at different territorial levels	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
International	80.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	8
National	80.0	50.0	0.0	6.3	10
Local	80.0	100.0	50.0	20.0	16
Total (N)	5	13	2	9	29

Besides the general attitude towards relationship with institutions, we also focused on perceptions of experiments of participatory public decision-making promoted by the institutions (generally at the local level such a Agenda 21, participatory budgeting, etc.) in order to involve citizens in the political process. We asked our respondents their opinion on the capacity of this kind of experiments to improve the quality of political decisions (table 10). The results obtained in the Spanish sample indicates the prevalence of unclear or ambivalent judgments (52% compared to the 41% in the rest of the countries), probably influenced by the lack of experience/knowledge (as we have already noticed most organizations do not interact with public authorities; besides these "experiments" are not yet very widespread).

When asked to express their positions on these forms of public decision-making, negative appraisals are expressed more often than in other countries: 35% mentioned at least some negative argument on this kind of experiments. In most cases this judgment was motivated underlining the instrumental orientation of these initiatives or their final goal of deviating attention (placebo politics). As one of the interviewee stated: "we do not think that these initiatives are real democratization processes as they only delegate minor issues to citizens in order to integrate them in the political system". According to other interviewees "they end up in co-optations" (CNT), and "they do not perform real changes" (Xarxa de Mobilitzaciò Global)

Among the positive judgments, references to their bottom-up nature or their creative dimension are very frequently mentioned. As one interviewed claimed: "it gives a role to the citizens [in politics]" (ATTAC-Madrid). According to another interviewee: "they encourage citizen's participation" (Espacio Alternativo).

Table 10 –Attitudes towards public decision-making (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
No	15.2	20.0
Yes	33.3	39.4
No definite position	51.5	40.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(34)	(175)
Evaluation of public decision-making		
Negative	35.3	29.6
Both negative and positive	17.6	17.3
Positive	47.1	53.1
Total (N)	100.0 (17)	100.0 (98)
Motivation of the evaluation		
Instrumental	26.7	11.3
Artificial	0.0	11.3
Exclusive	0.0	3.8
Placebo politics	33.3	17.9
Top-down politics	0.0	9.4
Bottom-up politics	46.7	17.9
Responsibility	0.0	7.5
Inclusive	0.0	33.0
Transparency/publicity of the decision-making	6.7	13.2
More consensual decision-making	0.0	5.7
Creative effect	13.3	6.6
Total	126.7	155.7
(N)	(15)	(106)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

In table 10a, we consider how different types of Spanish organizations perceive public decision-making. The idea that these types of experiments improve the quality of political decisions is generally supported by those groups implementing forms of delegation of power (probably because they themselves have experienced institutional participation). On the other hand, highly participative groups (mostly within the deliberative participative model) tend to be more cautious (probably because they are engaged in conflict with local authorities or coming from horizontal grassroots movements).[120]

[120] Among the first kind of organizations we found migrants networks as *Assemblea per la Regularització sense Condicions*; and among the second one organizations like the pacifist group *Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel* or the agro-ecological network *Bajo el Asfalto esta la Huerta*.

Table 10a – Attitude towards public decision-making by democratic models (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	Democratic Models				Total
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
No	0.0	0.0	50.0	26.7	16.7
Yes	80.0	62.5	0.0	13.3	36.7
No definite position	20.0	37.5	50.0	60.0	46.7
Total	16.7	26.7	6.7	50.0	100.0
(N)	(5)	(8)	(2)	(15)	(30)

NB - 5 missing cases

Finally, we completed the characterization of the organizations interaction with the political system by looking at the sources of their funding (table 11). High dependence on public funds can be interpreted as an indicator of political institutionalization (although not necessarily of political co-optation). Data for the Spanish groups indicate the relative low importance of public funds: only 28% of the groups declared to receive institutional support compared to the 40% of the organizations of other countries. Only the British sample offers a similar low percentage.[121] Scarce institutional links and refusal to re-propose co-optation processes of social movements by political parties in power like the socialdemocratic PSOE, could explain this situation.[122]

However, non-governmental sources of income (membership fees, donations) play an important role in the British case, while its reduced importance in the Spanish one seems to be compensated by a greater relevance of merchandising and similar forms of funding (53% versus 38% in the rest of the sample). In the Spanish case (as in the British one) the number of groups relying exclusively on their members for funding is relatively high (64% versus 45% for the rest of the sample).

Table 11 – Type of funding (%)

Sources of funding	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Members	87.9	80.0
Governmental	27.6	40.0
Non governmental	13.8	37.6
Sales of goods	53.3	37.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(33)	(170)
Type of funding		
None	12.1	14.7
Only from members	63.6	45.3
Only from governments	0.0	5.3
Both from members and governments	24.2	34.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(33)	(170)

NB - 2 missing cases

[121] In fact relative values (but not absolute ones since the British seem wealthier) of public funding is similar in both countries, (see della Porta and Mosca WP4 Report introductory chapter, table 10, p.22).
[122] See Jiménez y Calle (2006).

Are sources of funding related to the adoption of different democratic models? As table 11a illustrates, models based on delegation of power are characterized by diversification of sources, including governmental ones. Deliberation tends to be associated with less public funding and, apart from members contributions, self-financing (sales of services, organization of parties, etc…)

Table 11a – Funding by different democratic models (%)

Sources of funding	Democratic Models				Total (N)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Members	100.0	100.0	50.0	80.0	87.1 (31)
Governmental	60.0	37.5	0.0	0.0	22.2 (27)
Non governmental	20.0	14.3	0.0	14.0	14.8 (27)
Sales of goods/service/rent	20.0	62.5	0.0	64.3	53.6 (28)
Type of funding					
No	0.0	0.0	50.0	20.0	12.9
Only from members	40.0	66.7	50.0	80.0	67.7
Only from governments	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Both from members and governments	60.0	33.3	0.0	0.0	19.4
Total	16.1	29.0	6.5	48.4	100.0
(N)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(15)	(31)

NB – 4 missing cases

7. Organizational goals and strategies

Groups' goals as well as the strategies adopted in pursuing them could also be associated to the organizational model of decision making. First of all, we asked our interviewees to indicate the main issues of activity of their organizations. The open answer was re-coded and re-aggregated into five categories (see table 12). Half of the selected organizations declared to focus on international issues. Spanish groups are placed somehow below the average for the rest of the surveyed countries (60%). However, this result seems still too high if we consider other characteristics that we expect would limit the presence of international issues in the organizations' agenda: the local nature of these groups as well as limited interactions with international institutions. This situation could be explained in terms of the high adherence to the global cycle of protest that characterized the Spanish GJMs between 2000 and 2003, whereas in countries like Germany or France the national agenda (unemployment, privatizations under the neoliberal agenda) seems to have facilitated the development of the GJMs.[123]

The Spanish sample is also distinctively characterized by the lower attention to social and the so-called new social movement's issues than in the overall sample (showing in both categories the lowest percentages). However, the results also show that the GJM in Spain relies to a great deal on the radical or leftist social movement networks (the environmental, antimilitarist, women, etc.).[124] This situation can be better understood in the wake of the major impact of global issues and initiatives set up by GJMs protest at international level, a protest cycle that boosted the emergence

[123] See table 20 and compare GJMs roots as described in della Porta coord. (2006).
[124] As shown in WP1 report (or Jiménez and Calle 2006).

of new agendas and organizations in Spain in order to integrate or coordinate the new mobilization goals and practices.[125]

Nevertheless, we have to bear in mind that our sampling only partially covers groups involved in global campaigns (Debt, European Union, etc.) that were more likely to develop a critic of the neoliberal agenda in terms of democracy.[126] Besides, the local nature of many groups could explain why they do not consider as part of the GJMs agenda their thematic/local issues.[127]

Table 12 – Main issues of activity of the group (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Social issues	42.9	72.7
International issues	51.3	60.5
New social movement issues	17.1	31.4
Democracy	37.1	17.4
Religion	0.0	2.3
Total	148.4	184.3
(N)	(35)	(107)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Do the main issues of activity vary and change moving from a democratic model to another one? We cannot answer fully this question because some models (assemblearian ones) are under-represented. However, as table 12a illustrates, the associational type of organizations (with more resources and frequently more present at state level) seems more capable of combining multiple issues.

Table 12a – Main issues of activity of different democratic models (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	60.0	66.7	100.0	12.5	13.0
International issues	60.0	44.4	0.0	62.5	17.0
New social movement issues	0.0	33.3	0.0	12.5	5.0
Democracy	60.0	22.2	0.0	43.8	12.0
Religion	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Total	15.6	28.1	6.3	50.0	100.0
(N)	(5)	(9)	(2)	(16)	(32)

NB - 3 missing cases

[125] See Calle (2005) for a description of the convergence of new social movements inside GJMs through new campaigns during the nineties.

[126] The campaign RCADE set up a popular referendum to question the legitimacy of the foreign debt; most of the groups reluctant towards the EU project expressed their discontent on the European Constitution claiming the lack of democracy and legitimacy of the process itself.

[127] For instance, the anti-war platform *Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra* or the feminist group *Asamblea Feminista* have stated their participation on campaigns (referendum about war involvement or the European Union process) but not any involvement in new social movements issues.

If the issues (demands or discourse) are not easily reduced to traditional or previous issues dominating the agenda in the contentious field, we may also expect patterns of differentiation (or innovation) in terms of strategies. The strategies employed by our organizations are shown in table 13. The Spanish groups tend to adopt a protest profile more than the overall sample: almost all the selected organization resort to protest (97%, the highest among the cases studied, compare to the 74% average among the rest of the countries). Rising awareness/political education is the second most often mentioned strategy (83%, slightly below the total average), while lobbying and building concrete alternatives are, in comparative terms, distinctively less frequent in Spain than in any other of the cases covered in this research. These results are congruent with previous results concerning organizational structure and patterns of interaction with public authorities. The importance of protest as a strategy and the limited resort to lobbying can be associated to radicalness but also to political isolation (or marginality). The relative low level of groups working on concrete alternatives stresses the residual (re-active nature) of a good deal of the surveyed groups. This interpretation has to be contextualized taking into account at least two considerations: 1) although informal organizations prevail in our sample (and we may say) in the real movement' organizational landscape, they coexist with other (more formal) ones; 2) similarly, while the stress on the protest reactive nature of the Spanish sample help us to establish comparative difference, this should not lead to conclude that other strategies are not employed in the Spanish case: for instance 63% of the groups declare to work on alternatives.

However, as already observed in the introductory chapter of this report, the selected organizations don't conceive the different strategies as mutually exclusive. This is clear also in the Spanish sample where less than one tenth of the groups focuses on just one strategy. Here the use of three different strategies prevails (around 40%) while the adoption of all strategies together is less diffuse than in other countries.

Table 13 – Main strategies of the groups (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Protest	97.1	74.3
Building concrete alternatives	62.9	77.7
Lobbying	37.1	57.7
Political education/raising awareness	82.2	90.1
Number of overlapping strategies		
0-1	5.7	8.0
2	31.4	19.4
3	40.9	36.0
4	22.9	36.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(35)	(175)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

We could expect that organizations adopting different democratic models could be more likely to employ diverse strategies in order to reach their objectives. However, these differences are not evident in the Spanish sample. As we can notice in table 13a, the only clear variance is the lowest resort to lobby strategies by groups classified within the deliberative participative category and, in part as consequence of these, the use of a smaller number of strategies.

Table 13a – Main strategies of different democratic models (%)

Main strategies of the group	Democratic Models				Total (N)
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Protest	100.0	100.0	100.0	93.8	96.9 (31)
Building concrete alternatives	60.0	55.6	100.0	62.5	62.5 (20)
Lobbying	60.0	55.6	50.0	18.8	37.5 (12)
Political education/raising awareness	60.0	100.0	100.0	81.3	84.4 (27)
Number of overlapping strategies					
0-1	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.3	3.1 (1)
2	40.0	22.2	0.0	43.8	34.4 (11)
3	40.0	44.4	50.0	37.5	40.6 (7)
4	20.0	33.3	50.0	12.5	21.9 (7)
Total	30.6	36.1	11.1	22.2	100.0
(N)	(11)	(13)	(4)	(8)	(32)

NB - 3 missing cases

The protest profile of the Spanish sample is clearly visible when the specific forms of action are considered (table 14). The resort to all the protest forms mentioned in the questionnaire is clearly above the total average in the rest of the surveyed countries. Differences in percentages are especially large for forms with higher disruptive potential (strikes, civil disobedience, blockages or occupations of buildings). This could be explained by the growing radicalization of some social movements from the 1990s onwards, but also by the "re-definition" or "enlargement" of the concept of civil disobedience. GJMs seem to be moving from civil to social disobedience: not just as a protest repertoire (media-oriented or contingent actions, as used for instance by Greenpeace) but a set of tools that would attempt to question society from the citizens (in a daily/decentralized even anonymous basis), as some activists and organizations of (radical) social movements point out (see Calle 2005: 109). This would include new phenomena aiming to "retake" public spaces ("reclaim the streets"), democratic political agenda (non-authorized referendums about foreign debt cancellation, war or European issues), and "capital sabotage" by taking goods out of big stores ("Yo Mango").

Table 14 – Repertoire of action of the groups (%)

Forms of action	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Petition	88.6	73.1
Demonstration	85.7	78.3
Strike	45.7	20.0
Boycott of certain products	37.1	30.3
Blockade	40.0	25.1
Occupation of buildings	45.7	20.6
Civil disobedience	57.1	37.7
Artistic/cultural performance	71.4	57.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(35)	(175)

Goals and strategies crystallize in campaigns. We asked our groups to provide information on the most important campaigns concerning democratic reforms that they promoted or sustained in the last three years (table 15). The results, although congruent with those concerning the group agenda in general terms (see table 12), stress the importance of international issues (even though the number of Spanish groups involved in international campaigns is below the total average for other countries) and democracy. Although these results are consistent with those patterns already worked out in previous working papers (WP1, WP2, WP3), we have to be aware of possible bias derived by the attempt to sample the great heterogeneity of social movements that could conform the GJM environment and by the high rate of missing answers of local (and more informal) groups.

As for the territorial level of these campaigns (table 15), they are regarded as having a national scope in almost two thirds of the cases. In comparative terms the scope of these campaigns is relatively more domestic (both local and national) than in the overall sample. The fact of dealing with campaigns with a national scope does not imply that the campaign addresses only national issues. Protests against the European Union (counter summits during Spanish presidency in 2002) or mobilizations for foreign debt cancellation have not been developed under the frame of international appeals or Global Days of Actions, but they have been organized mainly by and within the Spanish networks.

Table 15 – Characteristics of campaigns (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Social issues	33.3	35.7
International issues	61.9	86.8
National issues / political parties / think thanks	9.5	22.5
Democracy	52.4	24.0
New social movement issues	4.8	8.5
Territorial levels of campaigns		
Local	33.3	18.6
National	71.4	55.8
International	38.1	81.4
Total **(N)**	24.0 (21)	100.0 (129)

NB – overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

8. The Internet as a communicative strategy

The questionnaire interrogates the different groups about the impact of the Internet in general and of their website in particular on different targets of their communication such as public administrators, mass media, and members/sympathizers. The answers were later re-coded in order to catch their general evaluation of this impact.

As table 16 shows, in the three cases, the majority of the Spanish organizations consider that the Internet has had a positive impact. Positive judgments concern especially the improvement in the relationship with the media (79% considered it positive compared to 71% in the overall sample). There is no doubt that the Internet has facilitated (and reduced the cost of) communication with the media. This may be especially appreciated by the (so abundant in Spain) informal groups lacking formal communication strategy and having little resources. According to one of the interviewees): "we have now a quite fluid relationship" (Rebelion, news site); as another interviewees noted: "the

Internet has favoured quick diffusion of campaigns" (RCADE), "diffusion of protests" (CNT, anarchist trade union; Vall de Can Masdeu, social center). One activist stated that "it is our basic tool for communication between meetings" (Ecologistas en Acción).

Again above the total average, the Spanish groups judge as positive in almost two thirds of the cases the contribution of the Internet in their interaction with policy makers. These results have however to be specified since the number of non-responses is very high (40%), corresponding to those groups that have no interaction with the public institutions.

As for the perception of Internet impacts on the interactions inside the organization, there is a global positive assessment but we also find, in comparative terms, a higher percentage of groups that perceive some negative impact. Some groups claimed that the Internet promotes "vertical interactions" since it could reproduce social inequalities in access to information or participation. And some respondents stressed the risk in using this technology as the main tool to sustain continuous social interactions. Above all, more informal/local groups seem to have observed this pattern: RCADE, Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel, and Córdoba Solidaria. In contrast, small development NGOs like OCSI underline how they gained support for their international activities by the Internet.

Table 16 – Evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Negative	33.3	55.9
Both negative and positive	4.8	2.9
Positive	61.9	41.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (21)	100.0 (136)
Internet and mass media		
Negative	8.3	23.8
Both negative and positive	12.5	6.1
Positive	79.2	70.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (24)	100.0 (147)
Internet and members		
Negative	6.7	2.6
Both negative and positive	25.0	13.8
Positive	68.8	83.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (30)	100.0 (152)

9. Relationship with the Global Justice Movement

In order to evaluate the participation of our groups in events promoted by the GJM, we asked about their involvement in the social forum process, in counter-summits and in global days of action. As it is shown in table 17, a majority of the surveyed groups took part in these events. However, in comparative terms Spanish organizations seem much more prone to engage in events with a clear protest profile. Only 54% of the selected groups declared to have participated in any of the meetings of the world or European social forums. This percentage is well below the total

average for the other countries (in fact it is the lowest among the national samples). Several (interrelated) reasons may explain this low percentage: the most obvious is that, contrary to other cases (1) none of these forums took place in Spain; additionally, (2) many groups have no resources to participate in such events; and (3) some groups do not consider this type of encounters as worthy assisting or do not share their philosophy.

Participation in counter-summits and global days of action is instead notably higher (74% and 83% respectively) and above the average in the other countries' sample. Again, a combination of at least two (interrelated) reasons can help us understanding these results. First, both type of events have taken place in Spain as the opposition to the 2001 World Bank meeting in Barcelona or the counter-summits organized during the Spanish presidency of the EU (first semester 2002) or the 15th February 2003 international day against the war in Iraq (see Jiménez and Calle 2006, Jiménez 2007) or the Mayday parades (see Mosca 2007). Second, as shown in previous sections, among the selected Spanish groups we often find a preference for strategies with a higher disturbing profile, in part due to the radical refusal of international institutions as central actors of globalization.

Table 17 – Participation in movement's events (%)

Participation in movement's events	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
World/European social forums	54.3	83.4
National/local social forums	48.6	59.4
Counter-summits	74.3	70.9
Global days of action	82.9	76.0
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(35)	(175)

A second indicator which is useful in order to examine the relationships of the sampled organizations with the GJM refers to the subjective sense of belonging of the groups to the movement. With this indicator we may assess the extent to which the degree of closeness of the groups to the movement varies according to the differences in terms of their democratic practices. Since democracy and the searching for alternative practices is central for the movement, we may expect that the most identified and engaged groups could have known and experimented with different democratic models through their participation in the movement, experiencing a process of "contamination in action" (della Porta and Mosca 2006). As table 18 shows, compared with the sample of the rest of the countries, in general terms the Spanish groups seem highly identified with the movement: 86% claimed a full feeling of belonging to the GJM and an additional 11% of the respondents declared that their organizations feel part of it, although with some reservations. None of the groups declared that they don't feel part of the movement and only one indicated the existence of diverse feelings within the group. Considering other protest events quoted by the organizations, we come across answers that emphasize the role played by the campaigns of the 1990s (such as Euromarches) in the emergence of a new cycle of mobilization.

Table 18 – Sense of belonging to the movement (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
No	0.0	9.1
The group doesn't have a shared view	2.9	3.4
Yes, but with reservations	11.4	9.1
Yes	85.7	78.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(35)	(175)

Finally, we asked our interviewees which they consider as the main aims of the GJM. As it can be observed in table 19, the Spanish groups' perception of the movement objectives is in line with the total averages for the rest of the countries. However, the category "social issues" was quoted less frequently while the issues associated to new social movements were quoted more than in the other countries' sample. If we compare this result with those concerning the groups own issue agenda (see tables 12), there are outstanding differences (for instance, in that occasions new social movements and social issues were selected in less cases than in average terms). These discrepancies between the Spanish groups' thematic agenda (which, as we have seen, differs from the average for the greater relevance of the democracy and international issues in detriment of social and new social movements issues) and their perception about the GJM agenda (more close to the average perception, although stressing the focus on new social movements issues) help us to confirm the interpretation given when commenting table 12 and 15. Although many of these organizational infrastructures hinge their roots in the new social movements sector, they don't reproduce their sectoral thematic agenda, but seem to pursue shared demands with a clear horizontal or transversal nature such as democracy or international issues. However, when they think about the global justice movement, with which they highly identify, they tend to stress those substantive (sectoral) aims that are present in both their pre-existing organizations (many of them linked to the new social movements sector) and in the global justice movement.

Movement's aims are generally presented in a proactive framework; that is, instead than framing them as opposition to something, most of our interviewees prefer to make reference to constructive claims and to positive statements. Additionally, most of them prefer to claim general statements rather than raising specific proposals. According to them the main goal of the GJM consists in: "defining and building up […] a more democratic socio-economic order" (*ATTAC-Madrid*), "internationalization of resistances" (*IU-youth*), "against neoliberal globalization" (*Nodo50*), "promotion of human and sustainable development" (*Oxfam-Intermon*), etc.

Table 19 – Perception of the movements' main goals (%)

Main aims of the movement	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Social issues	58.6	68.6
International issues	37.9	37.9
New social movement issues	65.5	53.6
Democracy / free access to information	27.6	28.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(29)	(153)

Type of claim		
Mixed	41.4	25.3
Negative/contra claim	10.3	14.9
Positive/pro claim	48.3	59.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (29)	100.0 (154)
Type of statement		
General statement	40.0	67.5
Specific proposal	46.7	10.4
Both	13.3	22.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (30)	100.0 (154)

We also asked our interviewees if and how their groups are engaged in other networks/campaigns dealing with global justice issues (table 20). Only about 14% answered negatively to this question. As for the remaining 86%, the majority of them declared (unsurprisingly) that they are related with networks/campaigns focusing on international issues; one third of them said that they interacted with networks/campaigns dealing with social issues while only 12% with those focusing on national issues or on building transnational political parties or think thanks. As in previous similar indicators the engagement with democracy issues is relatively high: almost one third of the groups raised it, while just a few mention new social movement issues. As for the territorial levels of such campaigns, the large majority concerns the international level but also the national one (especially in the other countries' sample) while the local level is rarely mentioned.

Table 20 – Issues of networks/campaigns of the movement (%)

Issues of networks / campaigns	**Spain**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Spain)**
Social issues	34.9	51.0
International issues	88.5	86.0
National issues / political parties / think thanks	11.5	14.7
Democracy	30.8	15.4
New social movement issues	7.7	11.9
Total **(N)**	15.4 (30)	100.0 (143)
Territorial levels of networks / campaigns		
Local	7.7	3.4
National	53.8	71.7
Transnational	88.5	84.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (26)	100.0 (145)

NB - 9 missing cases

As we can notice in table 20a, among international campaigns groups mention those related with the Stop the war coalitions (in general), concerning international institutions (against EU during the

Spanish presidency at 2002, Fifty years is enough, against the European Constitution), international pressures around issues like poverty (Make Poverty History), debt cancellation in connection with global powers as transnational and governmental structures like the G8 (Who owes who? As a Spanish network with loose international ties), and finally, the GJMs show an adherence to international protests considered to be part of the Global Days of Action against neoliberal institutions like the WTO. The lower presence of specific national issues in comparison with other countries is confirmed.

Table 20a – Issues of networks/campaigns of the GJM per democratic models (%)

Issues of networks / campaigns	**Democratic Models**				**Total**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	50.0	50.0	100.0	10.0	9
International issues	75.0	87.5	100.0	90.0	21
National issues / political parties / think thanks	0.0	12.5	50.0	0.0	3
Democracy	25.0	25.0	50.0	30.0	7
New social movement issues	0.0	25.0	0.0	0.0	2
Total	16.7	33.0	8.3	41.6	100.0
(N)	(4)	(8)	(2)	(10)	(24)

NB - 11 missing cases

As it could be expected considering WP2 and WP3 findings, (radical) democracy approaches are more present on assembleary and deliberative participative models, and scarcely mentioned by those organizations labeled as associational.

Bibliography

Calle Collado, Ángel, 2005. Nuevos movimientos globales ¿Hacia la radicalidad democrática? Madrid: Editorial Popular.

Calle Collado, Ángel. 2007. "Democracia Radical. La construcción de un ciclo de movilización global." Forthcoming in Revista de Estudios de Juventud.

Jiménez, Manuel. 2007. "The mobilizations against the Iraq war in Spain: antecedents, evolution and electoral implications." Forthcoming in South European Society & Politics.

Jiménez, Manuel and Ángel Calle Collado. 2006. "The Global Justice Movements in Spain." Forthcoming in The global justice movement: A cross-national and transnational perspective, edited by D. della Porta. New York: Paradigm.

Mosca, Lorenzo. 2007. "MayDay parade. Movilizaciones juveniles contra la precariedad laboral." Forthcoming in Revista de Estudios de Juventud.

della Porta, Donatella (ed.). 2007. The Global Justice Movement: Cross-national and Transnational Perspectives. New York: Paradigm.

della Porta, Donatella and Lorenzo Mosca. 2007. "In movimento. Contamination in action and the emergence of the Italian Global Justice Movement." Forthcoming in Global Networks.

Appendix 1

Table 21 – Characteristics of the organizations and intervention on the digital divide. Source: WP2 report

Type	Factors	General collective action expression	Internet expression and comparison with other 5 European countries	Feedback to other factors
Cultural and Political	Nationalisms, Regionalisms	Coordination: decentralised, networked, locally autonomous Discourse: anti-authoritarian, democracy	More informal, networked and local websites A tool for open debates Information on action is important	Radical democracy frame
Cultural and Political	Libertarian roots			Radical democracy frame and Protest profile GJM
Economical	Less income per capita, less access to the Internet	More informal and smaller groups	Less resources invested on the Internet: low scores in terms of usability, news sections, reachability, history	Less stable structures, more devoted to protest
Institutional and political opportunities	Poor or inexistent stable alliances at state level with parties or big trade unions			
Mobilisation Culture	Protest and Radical Democracy profile with multiple ideological references (autonomist, anarchist, Zapatist, PGA or Euromarches sectors)	More oriented to street mobilisation and participation; higher heterogeneity and decentralisation / horizontality; Less institutionalized actions and discourses	More oriented to mobilisation and participation	Radicalness

Democratic practices in the Swiss Global Justice Movement

By Marko Bandler, Marco Giugni, and Alessandro Nai
(University of Geneva)

1. Introduction

This report presents the main findings of an analysis of a sample of 28 organizations involved in the global justice movement (GJM) in Switzerland. The analysis is based on a structured questionnaire submitted to the selected organizations and focuses on the democratic practices within the movement.

We start from the general hypothesis that there is a relation between the democratic practices of organizations and certain organizational characteristics such as their internal structuring (their degree of formalization, specialization, and professionalization, their composition, their resources, etc.), their ideological position and political orientation, their political strategies, and the relationships their entertain with their environment (most notably, with the institutions and the movement as a whole). In other words, we assume that all these aspects impinge upon the modes of decision-making within the movement and we explore such linkages.

The findings are presented according to five main aspects: the internal decision-making practices of the selected organizations, their organizational characteristics, their relationship with the institutions, their organizational strategies, and their relationship with the GJM. Before doing so, however, we provide some information on the administration of the questionnaire and sampling procedure, and we compare the classification of democratic models (dependent variable) obtained through the analysis of written documents produced by organizations (WP3) with that resulting from the analysis of actual practices (as declared by our interviewees) within the movement (WP4).

2. Questionnaire administration and sampling

The data have been collected by means of a structured questionnaire submitted to the organizations selected for this workpackage among those studied in WP2 and WP3. The initial sample of 35 organizations was generated according to certain criteria such as the importance of the organizations, their involvement in the issues raised by the movement, and their distribution on different types of organizations (see report on WP2). Although we planned to include all the 35 organizations studied in the other two workpackages, we succeeded in interviewing only 28 of them. We had therefore to exclude 7 organizations (with respect to both the WP2 and WP3 samples): Anti-WTO Koordination, Pro Natura, Die Wochenzeitung, Antifa, Gipfelblockade, Indymedia Suisse, and Organisation Socialiste Libertaire. The missing cases were not replaced with new organizations in order to keep as matching samples as possible with the other two workpackages (which have the exact same sample).

The interviews took place between February and June 2006. They were conducted by two different interviewers because of the language: French and German. Some were made face-to-face, some other by phone. It was relatively difficult to find an agreement from several organizations and we could not interview 7 of them (because they did not accept or because we could not reach them). The person interviewed was generally the one with the better knowledge of the organization and its characteristics, but the specific role (leader, spokeperson, responsible for communication, etc.) varied depending on the type and size of the organization (small and informal SMO, larger and more formalized NGO, union, party).

3. Comparing visions and practices of democracy

Before we present the findings in more detail, we can put the Swiss case in comparative perspective with respect with the dependent variable (models of democracy). If we first compare the Swiss sample with the full sample including all countries, we can see important differences (table 1). In particular, associational organizations are underrepresented in the Swiss sample, while all other democratic models are slightly more frequent in the full sample. In Switzerland, more organizations have a deliberative decision-making method based on the search for consensus, either in its representative or participative form. This might be stem in part from the consensual character of the Swiss political system in general, which reflects on the internal functioning of the organizations of the GJM. In interpreting these findings, however, we should take into account the relatively high number of organizations that we could not classify due to lack of information as well as the missing cases.

The most interesting comparison, however, is perhaps that between the findings obtained through the analysis of written documents and dealing with visions of democracy (WP3) with those based on the questionnaire submitted to selected organizations and concerning actual practices of democracy (WP4). The differences between the two samples are very important, especially with regard to the association model, which drops from 63% on the basis of written documents to 14% on the basis of interviews. The deliberative representative model follows the reverse shift, rising from 9% in the WP3 sample to 29% in the WP4 sample.

Table 1 - Sampling for the different workpackages (%)

Democratic models	WP3 (Swiss sample)	WP4 (Swiss sample)	WP4 (full sample)
Associational	62.9	14.3	26.7
Deliberative representative	8.6	28.6	33.3
Assembleary	2.9	2.9	8.6
Deliberative participative	0.0	14.3	19.0
Not classified	25.7	20.0	7.6
Missing cases	0.0	20.0	-
Total WP2 (Swiss sample) (N)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (35)	100.0 (210)

A similar pattern is displayed by the deliberative participative model (from 0% to 14%), while the assembleary model remain stable at 3% (which corresponds to a single organization, although not the same in the two samples). Finally, we should remark that 40% of the organizations are either not classified or missing in the WP4 sample (with respect to the initial WP2 sample), which can explain part of the differences and in any event calls for some caution in the interpretation of findings.

The most striking among these results is the high number of organizations that were classified as associational on the basis of the written documents and that are no longer such when we look at their internal decision-making processes. A closer look at the specific organizations that show different democratic models according to the two classifications helps us in understanding these changes (table 2). Most of these organizations shift (the term, of course, should not be taken in a chronological sense) towards higher consensus in decision-making, that is, towards a deliberative democratic model. In particular, 7 of them (corresponding to 20% of the sample) display a deliberative representative model, attesting to mode consensus in decision making. Furthermore, 3 of organizations shift from an associational model to a deliberative participative model, hence changing both to a higher degree of consensus and a lower delegation of power (3 further organizations are deliberative participative in WP4, but are not classified in WP3). The other

organizations that follow an associational model according to written documents are now either not classified or missing and only 1 shifts to the assembleary model. No organization is more consensual in its vision of democracy than in its actual practices. The only potential candidate (the Forum Social Lémanique) cannot be assessed, as it is not classified in the WP4 sample. Finally, 26% of the organizations in the sample display the same democratic model based on written documents and the interviews.

Table 2 - Shifting classification of sampled groups on the dependent variable

Name of the group	***Dependent variable***		
	WP3 classification	**WP4 classification**	**%**
Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz	Associational	Deliberative representative	20.0
Alliance Sud (Swisscoalition)	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Les Communistes	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Lora	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Réalise	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Solidarité sans Frontières	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Syndicat Interprofessionel des Travailleuses et des Travailleurs	Associational	Deliberative representative	
Mouvement pour le Socialisme	Associational	Assembleary	2.9
Le Courrier	Associational	Deliberative participative	5.7
Forum Social Suisse	Associational	Deliberative participative	
Groupe pour une Suisse sans Armée	Assembleary	Deliberative representative	2.9
Augenauf	Not classified	Deliberative participative	8.6
Centre Europe-Tiers Monde	Not classified	Deliberative participative	
Solidarité avec le Chiapas	Not classified	Deliberative participative	
Attac-Suisse	Associational	Not classified	14.3
Magasins du Monde	Associational	Not classified	
Parti Suisse du Travail	Associational	Not classified	
Pax Christi Suisse	Associational	Not classified	
Forum Social Lémanique	Deliberative representative	Not classified	
Anti-WTO Koordination	Associational	Missing case	20.0
Pro Natura	Associational	Missing case	
WOZ	Associational	Missing case	
Antifa	Not classified	Missing case	
Gipfelblockade	Not classified	Missing case	
Indymedia Suisse	Not classified	Missing case	
Organisation Socialiste Libertaire	Not classified	Missing case	
All other cases		*No changes*	25.7
Total WP2 (N)			35

The fact that more organizations declared a consensual decision-making method and in part also a lower delegation of power in the decision-making body in the interviews than it appears from the written documents may be explained in several ways. It could be simply an artifact.

The respondents might tend to exaggerate the consensual and participatory character of their internal decision-making procedures because they want to provide a more "open" and democratic picture of their organization. Also, the written documents might understate consensus and participation, for example because the functioning of the organizations has changed and they have not been updated. Yet, the difference might well be real and could be interpreted as the result of a process of accommodation by certain organizations, most notably those displaying an associational model in their written documents and a more consensual model (either participative or representative) in practice, as they realize that the latter is an effective mode of decision-making.

The selected organizations can be placed in the typology of models of democracy in order to have a more accurate picture of the decision-making within the Swiss GJM (figure 1). The associational type, while less frequent than in the full sample including all the countries (figures between parentheses) and especially than in the Swiss WP3 sample, remains relatively frequent (24%). However, due to the missing cases (which are excluded from this analysis), this corresponds to only 5 organizations. Except for one (Déclaration de Berne), these are all unions or parties. Perhaps due to their size, organizational tradition (path dependency), and internal structuring, these organizations prefer to limit principles of participation and consensus which are not well adapted to their characteristics.

Figure 1 - Models of democracy

Decision-making method: consensus	*Decision-making body: delegation of power*	
	Low	**High**
Low	**Assembleary** **4.8% (9.8)** Mouvement pour le Socialisme	**Associational** **23.8% (30.4)** Déclaration de Berne; PSS (Genève); SSP-VPOD (Genève); Unia; Les Verts
High	**Deliberative participative** **23.8% (21.7)** Le Courrier; FSS; Augenauf; Cetim; Solidarité avec le Chiapas	**Deliberative representative** **47.6% (38.0)** Aktion Finanzplatz Schweiz; Alliance Sud (Swisscoalition); Les Communistes; Jeunesse Socialiste Suisse; Lora; Réalise; Solidarités; Solidarité sans Frontières; Sit; GSsA

N=28; 7 missing cases (Association des Magasins du Monde, Attac-Suisse, L'Autre Davos, FSL, Marche Mondiale des Femmes, Pax Christi, PdT). Percentages specified in brackets refer to the overall sample

The most frequent democratic model is by far the deliberative representative one (48%), with a share higher than the average (full sample). Solidarity movement organizations seem to take the lion's share within this type. However, this democratic model is quite heterogeneous. We find a union, although a very "movement-oriented one" (SIT), a youth branch of a party (Jeunesse Socialiste Suisse), a powerful peak organization of the solidarity movement (Alliance Sud, formerly Swisscoalition), a charity association (Réalise), an informal local media (Lora), as well as new social movement organizations (in particular, of the solidarity and peace movements). In general, they are less institutionalized (i.e. with weaker ties to the institutionalized political system) and more loosely structured than those in the associational type, which might explain why they are more

willing to adopt consensual methods of decision making, although they seem to remain attached to delegation of power in the decision-making body.

The deliberative participative model is as spread as the associational one in the Swiss sample (24%), which is more or less the same as in the full sample. Much like those following the previous one, the 5 organizations belonging to this democratic model cannot be subsumed under a specific type. However, here we have less institutionalized and more loosely structured organizations of the solidarity movement, a local social forum, and a leftist newspaper, which lie at the core of the to the GJM.

Finally, the assembleary model is the less frequent overall, but especially so among Swiss organizations. Only 1 organization (Mouvement pour le Socialisme) has adopted it. The combination of a majority and a participatory principle for decision making does not seem to be very attractive in Switzerland. Again, this might be a result of the more general tradition of consensus politics in the country.

We should also remark that most of the typical organizations of the GJM, those that have emerged in recent years, cannot be placed in this typology because we have no information on this variable or they are missing from the sample. This is all the more unfortunate insofar as we might expect them to be particularly inclined to embrace a model of democracy that stresses participation and consensus, as suggested by the presence of some of them in the deliberative participative model.

4. Internal decision-making practices

The following figures present in details the decision-making process in the selected organizations. With regard to the decision making body, there are no significant differences between the case of Switzerland and the overall sample, except for two aspects (table 3). First, one can see that the assembleary decision-making process is slightly less present in the Swiss GJM. Actually, almost a fifth of the Swiss organizations declare that decisions are taken by other bodies.

Table 3 - Characteristics of the most important decision-making body (%)

Most important decision-making body	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
President / leader / secretary / director	10.7	10.4
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	46.4	46.2
Assembly / open meeting	21.4	28.6
Thematic group	3.6	3.8
Other bodies	17.9	11.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (182)
Decision-making method of the main decisional body		
Majority + other	54.5	53.8
Consensus	45.5	46.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (22)	100.0 (171)

Size of the main decisional body		
Less than 30	59.1	47.6
Between 30 and 100	36.4	24.7
More than 100	4.5	27.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (22)	100.0 (166)

Looking more specifically at the executive committee, we see no significant differences between the Swiss context and the other countries of the sample (table 4). Most of the Swiss organizations have an executive board elected by an assembly that seems to decide more by mutual consensus than by majority vote. The kinds of groups working without an executive committee are mostly specific GJM groups[128] that base their action on campaigns and coordination (Marche Mondiale des Femmes, FSL, FSS).

Table 4 - Characteristics of the executive committee (%)

Presence of an executive committee	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Yes	63.0	68.1
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (182)
Decision-making method of the executive		
Majority + other	41.2	46.0
Consensus	58.8	54.0
Total **(N)**	100.0 (17)	100.0 (124)
Election of the executive committee		
By an assemblearian body	82.4	87.4
By other bodies	17.6	12.6
Total **(N)**	100.0 (17)	100.0 (95)

These bodies (not listed here) are “cantonal” or “local sections”, “commissions” or “national coordination”. They reflect the federalist structure of Switzerland, where social movements or important organizations can have three levels of decentralization (local, regional, national) (Kriesi 1998). The second differences stems from the size of the main decisional body. The organizational bodies of the Swiss GJM are smaller in terms of members than in the other countries. This result is probably in part related to both the federalist structure of Switzerland (that prioritizes the local level and favors decentralization) and the size of the country (which is the smaller in the overall sample in terms of population). Decisional assemblies with more than 100 attendants are therefore less frequent.

The agenda setting procedures points out some very peculiar differences between Switzerland and the overall sample (table 5). Leadership (presidential and/or managerial) is more widely spread

[128] Unlike other groups that have not been created during the GJM growth and exist prior to it.

in the Swiss case, although it does not seem that a leader structure is a characteristic of Switzerland (the percentages are similar to the rest of the sample; see table 3).

We should also remark that small committees do not exist in the Swiss case. On the other hand, the second part of the table points out the absence of discussion rules. In most of the organizations, there are no rules at all. When a rule is indeed present, it is still less traditional than for the rest of the sample, which means that despite a concentration of leadership in the setting up of the agenda, internal discussions are more or less free of formal constraints.

Table 5 - Potential sources of hidden power (%)

Body proposing the agenda	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
President / leader / secretary / director	22.7	14.5
Executive committee / management / staff / heads of division / secretariat / cda	59.1	46.5
Assembly / open meeting	13.6	16.9
Small committee representing different membership's groups	0.0	7.0
Other bodies	4.1	15.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(22)	(172)
Rules of discussion		
Not present	57.1	27.2
Traditional	39.3	49.7
Innovative	3.6	4.8
Both traditional and innovative	14.3	18.4
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(147)

5. Organizational characteristic

The type of membership in the Swiss organizations does not differ much from that in the overall sample. Almost half of the Swiss organizations have individual membership (table 6), while collective membership alone is rather marginal. Surprisingly, only one tenth of the organizations have less than 100 members, while only one fifth exceeds 10’000 members. The rest of the sample includes larger organizations than the Swiss one, in which more than 7 out of 10 cases more than 100 members. While one can expect that the organizations of the smallest country are smaller, it is important to stress that in general the Swiss sample does not really differ from the rest of the sample. As a result, the GJM sector in Switzerland gathers a significant formal membership, proportionally to the size of the overall population.

The largest organizations in the Swiss sample are the unions, the political parties, a solidarity movement organization (Déclaration de Berne), and two anti-neoliberal groups (Aktion Finanzplatz and Attac). Organizations welcoming collective members are mostly social forums (FSL, FSS) and campaign-based groups (Aktion Finanzplatz), while the institutionalized organizations such as political parties and unions usually only accept individual members.

Table 6 - Type and number of members (%)

Type of members	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Individual	46.4	33.6
Collective	14.3	24.6
Both individual and collective	39.3	41.8
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (134)
Number of individual members		
Between 1 and 100	9.1	24.7
Between 101 and 1,000	40.9	28.1
Between 1,001 and 10,000	31.8	16.9
More than 10,000	18.2	30.3
Total **(N)**	100.0 (22)	100.0 (89)
Number of collective members		
Between 1 and 10	38.5	16.7
Between 11 and 100	53.8	46.7
More than 100	7.7	36.7
Total **(N)**	100.0 (13)	100.0 (60)

Every Swiss organization has a formal budget (table 7). In absolute value (hence not taking into account the currency value), the Swiss organizations are richer than their European counterparts. Three quarter of them work with an operating budget above 10'000 euros. Most of them are unions (SSP, UNIA, SIT) or political parties such as Solidarités, the Parti Socialiste or Les Verts. Specific GJM organizations such as Attac, the FSL, or L'autre Davos work with a budget below 10'000 euros, which suggests that the GJM is Switzerland is not yet institutionalized and does not have important financial means.

Table 7 - Main resources of the groups (%)

Budget of the groups	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Highly variable	17.9	11.0
None	0.0	5.5
Less than 10,000	7.1	16.6
Between 10,000 and 500,000	53.6	34.5
More than 500,000	21.4	32.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (145)

Paid staff		
None	25.0	31.1
Up to 16	50.0	43.5
Between 16 and 100	21.4	13.0
More than 100	3.6	12.4
Total **(N)**	100.0 (28)	100.0 (177)
Number of volunteers		
Less than 16	22.2	34.2
Between 16 and 100	59.3	29.6
More than 100	18.5	36.2
Total **(N)**	100.0 (27)	100.0 (152)

The paid staff structure is almost the same for Switzerland than for the other cases. However, the rest of the sample is characterized by a higher number of organizations employing more than 100 people. We should remark that the GJM sector is in both samples fairly professionalized, as only one quarter of the selected organizations do not employ paid staff. The biggest employers (more than 15 peoples) are the main political parties and the unions, for which a certain degree of professionalism is mandatory. On the other hand, groups without paid staff are mostly small solidarity-oriented groups (Marche Mondiale des Femmes, Solidarité avec Chiapas). Surprisingly, none of the two main peak organizationsactors of the GJM coordination in Switzerland, the FSS and the FSL, has employees. This indicates a certain amateurism still prevailing in the Swiss GJM.

The number of volunteers of most of the Swiss organizations ranges between 16 and 100. Both small and large groups of volunteers are less frequent in the Swiss sample than in the rest of the sample. We should note that there is no correlation between the number of paid employees and the number of volunteers, which means that there is no significant negative relation between the number of professionals and the number of unpaid members.

Looking at the age of the GJM organizations, we can see that the majority of them in Switzerland have been created before 1989, which shows that the movement has it roots well before the fall of the soviet block (table 8). As hypothesized by some scholars (Bandler 2005; Giugni 2006; Giugni and Eggert, forthcoming; Passy and Bandler 2003), the Swiss GJM is the direct heir of the new social movements. Switzerland has indeed been in the past a very fertile ground for the new social movements, whose themes, actors, and action repertoires are present in the Swiss GJM. In other words, the Swiss GJM lies on an old established social movement sector which is mainly based on the new social movements. It is therefore not surprising that more than half of the Swiss GJM descends directly from this movement family. In a comparative perspective, we see that the opposite prevails in the rest of the sample, where the GJM sector is quite new (60% of the organizations were created after 1989). The older organizations are mainly the institutionalized ones such as unions and newspapers, while the newest ones are rather groups focusing on the fight against neoliberism and, of course, groups specifically linked to anti-globalization.

Table 8 - Generational belonging of selected organizations (%)

Generational belonging of selected organizations	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Before 1968	22.2	17.9
Between 1969 and 1989	33.3	17.2
Between 1989 and 1999	22.2	33.1
After 2000	22.2	31.7
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(27)	(145)

To summarize, the GJM in Switzerland is based on old and well established organizations. New actors are mainly loose networks that do not have important resources of infrastructures.

6. Relationship with the institutions

In a federalist political system operating with direct democracy such as Switzerland, social movements have traditionally been integrated into the political process and are sometimes part of the decision process, especially in the preliminary phases (Giugni 1995; Kriesi 1998). However, in international comparison, the Swiss social movement sector has been very active, especially after 1968 with the emergence of the new social movements (Kriesi et al. 1995; Giugni 1995). During that period, Swiss social movements have been quite peaceful and did not often use confrontational protest actions. However, the tendency seems to have changed since the appearance and growth of the GJM. A cycle of radicalization has begun since the anti-WTO protests events in Geneva in 1998. On both sides (the social movements and the authorities), confrontation has become more frequent. Such a radicalization and breaking of the dialogue has been particularly visible during the protest against the G8 summit in 2003 in Geneva and its surroundings, but also in the annual protests against the WEF in Davos (Bandler 2006). It is therefore important to look at the nature of the relationships between the GJM and the authorities in Switzerland.

When we look at the relationship between the selected organizations and the authorities, both external (international) and domestic (national and local), we first observe that, except for one single group at the national level (Marche Mondiale des Femmes), there have been no restrictions in collaborations (table 9). In fact, the Swiss organizations are less likely than their European counterparts to refuse to collaborate with the authorities in the three political arenas (Kriesi 1998). Furthermore, collaboration without restrictions is much more frequent than in the rest of the sample, especially at the national and the international level. These figures illustrate the involvement of Swiss social movements in the political process, especially at the local level (which is easily understandable given the federalist structure of the state). In fact, a more detailed analysis shows that over the 6 refusals of collaboration, 3 come from Mouvement pour le Socialisme, which is a quite marginal extremist group.

In Switzerland, the decision-making process is a result of a complex embedding of many actors and stakeholders. Social movements are sometimes among such actors. Nevertheless, it is quite surprising to see that in comparison to the rest of the sample, the Swiss organizations do not consider positively the public decision making, although most of them are involved in it (table 10). Yet the question splits the selected organizations in two groups: first, the skeptical ones about public decision making are mostly the less embedded in the institutional political process such as consultation procedures or state funding (Mouvement pour le Socialisme, L'Autre Davos, Magasins du Monde), while most of the institutionalized groups such as political parties (except for Les Verts) trust the improvements allowed by the process. The argument against this kind of decision-

making process is that it does not include all the actors concerned, such as foreigners (Les Verts), is a "smokescreen" (SSP), or simply does not fit with the overall goals of the organization (FSL, FSS). In contrast, supporters of the public decision making emphasize their democratic will and the mutual understanding of stakes. Finally, the majority of the selected organizations have no definite position. This can be explained by the fact that they do not feel concerned by public decision-making process (Attac, Centre Europe Tiers-Monde, Le Courrier) or they do not feel the need for that (Augenauf).

Table 9 - Relationship with international institutions (%)

International institutions	**Switzerland (%)**	**All countries (%)**
Refusal of collaboration	7.1	14.5
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	53.6	29.1
Collaboration with restrictions	0.0	28.5
Collaboration	39.3	27.9
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(172)
National institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	10.7	12.0
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	28.6	20.0
Collaboration with restrictions	3.6	39.4
Collaboration	57.1	28.6
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(175)
Local institutions		
Refusal of collaboration	3.6	9.2
Indifference / no contacts / denial of collaboration by authorities	21.4	23.0
Collaboration with restrictions	0.0	34.5
Collaboration	75.0	33.3
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(174)

Funding is one of the main issues within social movements. In Switzerland, due to the federalist structure, most of the institutional funding comes through decentralized sources such as regional or municipal bodies (table 11). The GJM is a beneficiary of such funding. In 2003, for example, the Lemanic Social Forum has received about 35'000 euros (i.e. 50'000 CHF) to set up the events related to the anti-G8 summit.

Table 10 - Attitudes towards public decision-making (%)

Public decision-making improves the quality of political decisions	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
No	32.1	17.2
Yes	28.6	40.0
No definite position	39.3	42.8
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(180)

All the selected organizations (except for Augenauf) are financed by members' contributions, while this applies only to four fifths of the rest of the sample. Another difference lies in non governmental funding, which is also higher in Switzerland than in the rest of the sample. The other percentages are quite similar.

Table 11 - Type of funding (%)

Sources of funding	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Members	96.4	78.9
Governmental	39.3	38.0
Non governmental	42.9	32.7
Sales of goods/service/rent	42.9	39.5
Type of funding		
No	3.6	16.0
Only from members	57.1	46.9
Only from governments	0.0	5.1
Both from members and governments	39.3	32.0
Total	13.7	100.0
(N)	(28)	(171-175)

Thus, almost every group has financial resources and the bulk of them come from members' contributions. None of the Swiss organizations is financed only by governments, as compared to a small amount in the in the rest of the sample.

7. Organizational strategies

The main goal of the present section is to determine, in a broad and somehow global way, the different operational strategies of the selected organizations by which they wish to achieve their main objectives. Therefore, we shall analyze their main issues of activity, their concrete strategic activities, their action repertoires, the characteristics of the campaigns promoted or supported by the organizations, and finally their use of new communication tools (mainly internet).

In order to empirically measure the main issues of the activities of the selected organizations, an open question has been proposed to each of them. Since we wish to propose most of all the main trends and to compare with the rest of the sample, our (string) data were aggregated to create a nominal variable composed by five categories (table 12).

Table 12 - Main issues of activity of the group (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Social issues	71.4	67.0
International issues	71.4	58.7
New social movement issues	25.0	28.5
Democracy	7.1	22.9
Religion	0.0	2.2
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(179)

Note: Overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Social[129] and international[130] issues are often mentioned by the representatives of the organizations as their main activities: almost three quarters of the organizations focus primarily on these two issues. Concerning international issues, our results are perfectly in line with the comparative analysis provided by Kriesi et al. (1995). Comparing Switzerland, Germany, France, and the Netherlands, they found a substantively higher level of mobilization in Switzerland on issues relating to international solidarity (Kriesi et al. 1995: 105). In our data, international issues are presented more often than social ones as first main issue (13 organisations have international problems as first main issue, while only 9 present social concerns as first main issue on the agenda), perhaps indicating a stronger qualitative importance of the international concerns on the operational agenda. This seems to be quite different with regard to the rest of the sample, in which the relative importance of international issues is certainly fairly strong (about 60%), but nevertheless weaker than the importance given to social concerns (about 70%). We should also remark that the relative importance of social and international issues is significantly higher in the Swiss case. Given these differences, we shall however say that both in the Swiss and the international sample we find quite strong evidence that social and international issues can be seen as key concerns in the activities of such organizations. In contrast, it is in the rest of the sample that we find a higher affinity with new social movement. In both samples, this type of issues is mentioned by up to a third of the organizations examined.

The stronger difference between the Swiss sample and the rest of the sample is related to democratic issues. In fact, while in the Swiss case only 7% of the organizations have democracy and its issues as a main concern, the share is much higher in the overall sample, close to 23%. Is this a signal that Swiss organizations are less concerned by democratic issues? Even if we cannot exclude this possibility, we should remind that the number of organizations is quite low in the Swiss case, which suggests to be wary in interpreting these findings. In this specific case, the share of Swiss organizations which have democratic issues as a main concern are based on two observations only (Jeunesse Socialiste Suisse[131] and Augenauf[132]), both mentioning democracy as first main issue[133].

We should finally remark the very low share, in both the Swiss and the rest of the sample, of organizations that mentioned religious issues as a main concern. In the Swiss case, no organization at all has religious issues as a main concern.

[129] Social inequalities, protection of working conditions, democratic rights, asylum, rights for foreigners, poverty, integration, and so on.
[130] Third world debt, relations between multinational companies and governments, global disarmament, fair trade, international organisations and their impact on democracy, and so on.
[131] Youth section of the social-democratic party.
[132] Association created to provide juridical help on different topics.
[133] Note that there is no explicit reference on the first main issue in the question.

We should also remark that in Switzerland the differences in the main issues are not related to the age of the organization. We can therefore exclude that international concerns are more attractive for freshly created organizations, as one may argue by looking at the development of the new social movements, most of all related to (or, better, against) the international order. In contrast, we find little evidence that this applies to the rest of the sample: since the beginning of the 1990s, the number of organizations that have international issues as a main concern is 50% higher that in the previous period (21 organizations created before 1968, 18 between 1969 and 1989, 30 between 1990 and 1999, and 29 since 2000 declared having international issues as main concern). This may indicate that international concerns are time-dependent or, in other words, related to the contextual situation of the mobilization; this is probably related to a higher internationalization of the political agendas as found in western countries since the nineties (Chevallier 2003).

We could expect a variation in the concerns of the organizations according to their democratic model (table 13). However, we should stress the limits of such an analysis based on only 28 observations distributed in 16 cells (2 variables with 4 categories each). With such a small N, it is clearly impossible to statistically test the relationship between the two variables. We therefore can only comment upon the overall trends, but even these have to be taken with caution.

Table 13 - Main issues of activity of different democratic models (%)

Main issues of activity of the group	**Democratic Models**				**Total (N)**
	Associational	**Deliberative Representative**	**Assembleary**	**Deliberative Participative**	
Social issues	20.0	53.3	6.7	20.0	100.0 (15)
International issues	18.2	36.4	9.1	36.4	100.0 (11)
New social movement issues	12.5	75.0	0.0	12.5	100.0 (8)
Democracy	0.0	50.0	0.0	50.0	100 (2)

Organizations whose main concerns are related to social issues (and partly new social movements) are more inclined to favor deliberative representation: more than a half of the socially concerned organizations follow such a democratic model. In contrast, only one organization which has an interest on social issues adopts the assembleary model (Mouvement pour le Socialisme). We shall stress here that the degree of consensus of the organization (one of the two dimensions on which democratic models are constructed) does not have any significant impact on the issue preferences.

Quite similarly, organizations with international concerns are more often based on deliberative (representative or participative) models, and less on models with little search for consensus in decision making (assembleary or associational). We should also remark that in the assembleary model no organization is concerned with new social movement or democratic issues.

Next we analyze the main strategies of the selected organizations (table 14). To begin with a specific question about this aspect, we can see that the results for the Swiss and the rest of the sample are quite similar. Only the strategy related to the building of concrete alternatives differs significantly in the Swiss case (about 20% more frequent). In contrast, and in line with the Swiss tradition of search for consensus, the only strategy that is more present in the rest of the sample are protest activities (about 3% more frequent than for the Swiss sample): building concrete alternatives, lobbying, and strategies related to political education and awareness are more often adopted by the Swiss organizations.

Table 14 - Main strategies of the groups (%)

Main strategies of the group	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Protest	75.0	78.6
Building concrete alternatives	89.3	73.1
Lobbying	57.1	58.3
Political education/raising awareness	96.4	89.7
Number of overlapping strategies		
0-1	3.6	8.2
2	10.7	23.1
3	50.0	34.6
4	35.7	34.1
Total	100.0	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

Note: Overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

The Swiss sample and the rest of the sample differ significantly with regard to multiple strategies. The Swiss organizations seem to focus on significantly more strategies at the same time (especially 3 or 4). In other words, Swiss organizations show a complementary rather than an exclusive use of strategies. However, this holds also for the rest of the sample, but to a lesser extent than in the Swiss case.

Given the limits of the results shown earlier, we do not expect to find conclusive ones related to the impact of the democratic models on the main strategies implemented by the selected organizations. As before, no real trend can be discerned from the relation between the two variables. Again, we find a distribution centered on the deliberative representative form of democracy, in which we find the highest number of organizations among those combining various strategies. This result (not shown) is probably due as before to the small sample size.

The democratic model (and the degree of consensus) of the organization has a weak impact also on the number of strategies present simultaneously. In the relationship between these two variables we can only observe a stronger presence of overlapping strategies for organizations following the deliberative representative model of democracy: over the 10 organizations that adopt this model, 6 (SIT, Alliance Sud, Solidarités, GSsA, Réalise; Solidarité sans Frontières) use all the four main strategies proposed (i.e. they have the most plural strategic repertoire). Similarly, the organizations following the associational model are more likely to have a relatively strong level of overlapping in their strategies: all the 5 organizations that adopt this model have three or more overlapping strategies. In a nutshell, a strong delegation of power with regard to the decision-making body (which characterizes the associational and the deliberative representative models of democracy) increases the chances of a strongly overlapping strategy by the organization.

We now look at the specific forms of action (repertoire of action). The findings are very clear (table 15): the overall level of action is lower (sometimes much lower) in the Swiss case as compared to the rest of the sample. For each form of action retained in the study, the Swiss organizations declare a systematically lower use. This is specially the case for the petition (almost 25% lower in the Swiss sample than in the overall sample), the boycott (15% lower), and the occupation of buildings (about 15% lower).

Table 15 - Repertoire of action of the groups (%)

Forms of action	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Petition	56.6	79.1
Demonstration	75.0	80.2
Strike	21.4	24.7
Boycott of certain products	17.9	33.5
Blockade	25.0	28.0
Occupation of buildings	10.7	26.9
Civil disobedience	35.7	41.8
Artistic/cultural performance	46.4	62.1
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

The reasons for this systematically lower level of engagement in the classical action repertoire can be found in the specific institutional shape of the Swiss political system, whose high level of consensus search and a strong culture of conflict-avoiding determine an overall weak level of political radicalization (Kriesi 1998). However, almost half of the forms of action retained in our research cannot really be considered as radical or even non-conventional. It is likely that the particular features of the Swiss political system have a dissuasive effect also on more conventional forms of action. Our results probably confirm the presence of a quite different form of culture of action than in the other countries included in the study. Yet, there also are some similarities between the two distributions, for example in the fact that for both samples the demonstration displays the highest score. In a nutshell, here we probably have two specific cultures of action, whose main differences can be traced back to the level of engagement in each action, and not in a use of different action repertoires.

With regards to the group's activities, the qualitative data shows also that a quite widespread action is to organize meetings, symposia or more simply standing points to "raise awareness"; this form of action was however not anticipated, and has since being classified as "other".

Interesting results can be found with regard to the characteristics of the campaign which the selected organizations consider as the most important promoted or supported by them in the last three years (table 16). Again, the Swiss score on participation in the selected campaigns is significantly lower than the rest of the sample. This is specially the case for campaigns related to national issues, political parties and/or think thanks (totally absent in the Swiss sample), and campaigns related to democracy (the Swiss score is less than one seventh of the overall score). Like before, in the Swiss case the most important issues in terms of campaign promotion are related to social and international concerns. This holds also for the rets of the sample (even more so in relative terms).

Table 16 - Characteristics of campaigns (%)

Issues of campaigns	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Social issues	25.0	55.3
International issues	64.3	82.7
National issues/political parties/think thanks	0.0	12.0
Democracy	3.6	12.0
New social movement issues	7.1	17.3
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(150)

Note: Overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

These findings are partly in line with the previous results related to the organizations' main issues and concerns. Apparently, institutional issues (in a broad sense, including national issues, political parties concerns, issues about democracy, and so on) are not main priorities in the strategic agenda of Swiss social movement organizations. This situation can probably be explained by the peculiar situation of the party system in Switzerland, which is very fragmented and multipolar (Kriesi 1998; Ladner 2002; Norris 2004). The great variety of parties occupies the space of the institutional political claims, leaving little room for social movements to intervene on such issues. Such a room is probably larger in political systems where the range of parties covers a more limited part of the spectrum of institutional demands (bipolar or quasi-bipolar party systems).

This interpretation is partly confirmed by the analysis of the relations between the organizations and public institutions at different levels (table 17). In the Swiss case, the organizations are more inclined to cooperate with institutional actors - especially at the local level, which is hardly surprising (only the Mouvement pour le Socialisme[134] refuses to cooperate with the authorities at all levels) - and less inclined to refuse such cooperation if compared to the rest of the sample.

Table 17 - Relations with public institutions at different levels (%)

Relations with public institutions	**Switzerland (%)**			**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**		
	international	national	local	international	national	local
Refusal	8.3	12.0	3.7	18.4	16.3	11.9
Indifference	45.8	20.0	18.5	30.5	18.4	15.6
Collaboration	45.8	68.0	77.8	51.1	65.2	72.6
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
(N)	(24)	(25)	(27)	(141)	(141)	(135)

Finally, before we examine the relationships between the selected organizations and the movement, we turn to the communicational strategies implemented by them. The survey focused basically on the use and perception of new electronic tools, in particular internet. An open question tried to measure the impact of this specific tool on different levels, first in general and than

[134] Movement whose main activities are related to social and international social movements issues, especially on working conditions and trade unions.

specifically by focusing on the website of the organizations. The open answers (string variable) were then recoded into categorical variables.

The Swiss situation is very close to the rest of the sample (table 18). In both cases, the organizations see the internet as having a mixed impact on their relations with the public administration (in fact, the Swiss results appear to be a little more skeptical than the rest of the sample), a strong positive impact on mass media, and a strong positive effect on sympathizers and members. Concerning the latter, in the Swiss case no organization see the impact other than positive. We should note, however, that this information is missing for one fourth of the observations (7 on 28).

Table 18 - Evaluation of the communicational role of the Internet per country (%)

Internet and public administrators	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Negative	64.3	50.4
Both negative and positive	0.0	3.9
Positive	35.7	45.7
Total **(N)**	13.5 (28)	100.0 (129)
Internet and mass media		
Negative	21.4	21.7
Both negative and positive	0.0	8.4
Positive	78.6	69.9
Total **(N)**	13.5 (28)	100.0 (143)
Internet and members		
Negative	0.0	3.7
Both negative and positive	0.0	17.4
Positive	100.0	78.9
Total **(N)**	10.1 (21)	100.0 (161)

The major difference with the rest of the sample is that in the Swiss case no organization sees a mixed impact (both positive and negative) on public administration, mass media, or members. In the rest of the sample, this score increases with the positive feeling (which is intuitively surprising): the more internet is seen as having a positive effect on the target (public administration, mass medias, or members), the higher the share of mixed feelings. This can be taken as a warning against simplistic conclusions about the perceived impact of internet. We should also remark that no effect of the democratic models can be found on the perceived impact of the internet (results not shown).

Summing up, the data show first a similar situation related to main issues of the organizations in the Swiss and the rest of the sample: in both cases, social and international concerns are the most often advanced. A similar conclusion can be drawn for the organizations' main strategies (even if in the Swiss case there is a stronger research of alternative strategies). We find next that the Swiss organizations present basically a complementary rather than an exclusive use of strategies (higher number of overlapping strategies). We also find a quite lower level of action repertoires proposed by Swiss organizations, which we interpreted as a result of the consensual culture of the country, coupled with a higher cooperation with public institutions. Finally, we observe a similar use of

communication strategies in the Swiss and the rest of the sample. We should also remark a generally weak impact of the democratic models in both samples and for the ensemble of the characteristics analyzed.

8. Relationship with the movement

This section deals with the relationships between the selected organizations and the GJM. We first examine the effective participation of the organizations in the movement's events (such as social forums, counter-summits, and so on), then two perception indicators (sense of belonging and general perception of the GJM), and finally the main issues of the campaigns/networks in which the members of the organizations are also engaged.

If we first look at the active participation of the organizations in the events of the movement (table 19), we see a strong presence of the Swiss organization, with a participation rate varying between 61% (counter-summits) and 75% (global days of action). Furthermore, only three organizations have never have attended such an event (Le Courrier[135], Augenauf[136], and Lora[137]) and about the half of them (46%) have been at least once in all four types of events.

Even if the overall level is quite similar in the Swiss and the rest of the sample, some differences should be stressed. To begin with, the participation in larger social forums (world or European level) seems to be sensibly lower (about 10%) in the Swiss case, as compared to the rest of the sample. Similarly, the participation of the Swiss organizations in counter-summits is sensibly weaker. This is however not the case for participation in smaller and closer social forums (national or local level), which is about a 20% higher for the Swiss organizations. It therefore seems that Swiss organizations are more ready to "think globally and act locally": they participate more in local events and are more open to collaborate with local institutions.

Table 19 - Participation in movement's events (%)

Participation in movement's events	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
World/European social forums	67.9	80.2
National/local social forums	71.4	55.5
Counter-summits	60.7	73.1
Global days of action	75.0	77.5
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

However, it should be noted that the variable measuring the active participation of the organizations in these events suffers from the absence of an indicator of the relative frequency of the events. One can easily imagine that a quite frequent event (such as a global day of action) is more likely to be attended at some point by various organizations. We should therefore be cautious when comparing these events.

Concerning the sense of belonging of the organizations to the GJM, we have a clear-cut situation (table 20): like in the rest of the sample, the near absolute majority of the Swiss organizations feel as being part of the movement. However, if in the rest of the sample about one fifth of the

[135] Journal with social-democratic orientation.
[136] Semi-juridical association.
[137] Association whose main aims are to promote a better understanding of global links, bring together critical proposals, increase parliamentary and extra-parliamentary pressure in order to achieve a fair distribution of material wealth and political power material wealth and political power.

organizations' feeling of belonging is between absence and some reservations, in the Swiss case only one organization has a sense of belonging other than whole adherence (Augenauf Basel, which declared not to share the same view to the overall justice movement, but mainly because no common position was found among the group members).

In general, therefore, we can say that the Swiss organizations have a very strong sense of belonging to the GJM. However, this finding, which is quite in line with that in the rest of the sample, goes perhaps counter the fact that, at least in the Swiss case, movement activists do not necessarily share the same priorities with the movement. This allows us to stress that a strong feeling of adherence to the GJM does not necessarily imply a strong degree of consensus about the movement's views and goals. Strong conclusions in this sense should therefore be avoided.

Table 20 - Sense of belonging to the movement (%)

The group feels part of the movement	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
No	0.0	8.8
The group doesn't have a shared view	3.6	3.3
Yes, but with reservations	0.0	11.0
Yes	96.4	76.9
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(182)

We can also look at the perception that the selected organizations have of the GJM, specifically concerning the main aims of the movement, the types of claim, and the type of statements (table 21).

Table 21 - Perception of the movement (%)

Main aims of the movement	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Social issues	21.4	74.8
International issues	28.6	39.4
New social movement issues	87.5	49.7
Democracy / free access to information	3.7	32.3
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(155)
Type of claim		
Negative/contra claim	53.8	41.7
Positive/pro claim	53.8	89.1
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(156)

Type of statement		
General statement	85.2	77.0
Specific proposal	0.0	34.8
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(178)

Note: For main aims of the movement and type of claim the overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

Firstly, we see a huge difference between the distribution of the main issues (and of the distribution of the issues in promoted/sustained campaigns) among Swiss organizations, in which we found a clear predominance of social and international issues (see above, tables 12 and 16) and their perception: while social and international issues each represent between 20% and 30% of the issues perceived, new social movement issues clearly are predominant with a score close to 90%. If we look more closely to the specific perceived GJM claims (i.e. not recoded into the four main categories presented in table 21 below), we see that about 70% of the organizations perceive the movement as basically focused on "another globalization/alternatives/another world", strongly stressing the need for a viable alternative[138]. In the rest of the sample, this focus is present in only about 15% of the cases. We should also remark that the NSM issues were the weakest ones in the supported campaign issues and the second weakest ones in the organizations' main issues. This can be taken as another indicator calling for caution when we find a strong degree of belonging to the GJM: the main issues of the organizations are drastically different from those perceived for the movement, to which they claim a very strong sense of belonging. This is a particularity of the Swiss configuration, while the rest of the sample seems more in line with the main issues (and sustained campaign issues) for the organizations themselves.

Secondly, in the Swiss case there is the same share of perceived claims as addressed by the GJM (the negative claims are a slightly predominant, as they are all mentioned in the first instance, while 20% of the positive claims are mentioned in the second instance[139]). This distribution is very different from that in the rest of the sample, in which positive claims largely prevail. In general, therefore, the GJM is seen by Swiss organizations as addressing more negative and less positive claims than in the rest of the sample. This contrasting view of the GJM in the Swiss case goes partly counter the stronger collaboration with institutional organizations of the Swiss organizations. The latter are in fact more inclined to cooperate, but their claims are seen in general as being more negative.

Finally, a similar distribution can be found in Swiss and the rest of the sample regarding the types of statements: in both samples the data suggest that the selected organizations see the GJM as addressing above all general statements. This is especially the case for the Swiss organizations, which do not consider at all the movement as making specific proposals (as compared to a score of one third in the rest of the sample).

In a nutshell, the Swiss organizations consider the GJM as focusing mainly on new social movement issues, addressing both negative and positive claims, and producing basically general statements. In contrast, in the rest of the sample, the selected organizations see the GJM as focusing

[138] "Offer political, social, economic, and cultural alternatives to globalisation and to international, regional or national policies" (Attac); "seek economic, political, social alternatives to the prevailing model, in a decentralised and non-hierarchic way" (Marche Mondiale des Femmes); "offer an alternative to the capitalist model and achieve this alternative" (Les Communistes); "promote an alternative to the prevailing discourse, support and promote a social economy" (Alliance Sud); and so on.

[139] As before, note that there is no explicit reference on the first main issue in the question.

on social issues (and partly on new social movements issues), addressing mainly positive claims, and producing general statements.

We also asked our respondants about the issues characterizing the campaigns and/or networks in which they are *also* engaged, other than their own organization (table 22). Quite surprisingly, the Swiss results are particularly different from the rest of the sample (first half of table 22). In both cases, the main issue in which organizations do also engage is related to international concerns, followed by social concerns. The main difference lies in the relative frequencies of the issues: if in the rest of the sample the international concerns are also integrated by about 80% of the organizations, this score is only 32% in the Swiss case. Similarly, the frequency of social issues is about 40% in the rest of the sample and only 25% in the Swiss sample, and the democracy issue is 25% among all organizations and 7% among Swiss organizations (the only two Swiss organizations that have been engaged also in campaigns or networks related to democratic issues are the Parti du Travail and Les Verts). Only new social movement and national/political parties/think thank issues have similar distributions in both samples.

International issues therefore seem to be a much less central concern for Swiss organizations. In the rest of the sample, international concerns in campaigns promoted or sustained by the organizations and in the overall perception of the GJM are more important (sometimes strongly). This is also reflected in a higher participation in larger social forums (world or European level). In contrast, the Swiss organizations have a stronger direct engagement in international concerns: this is in fact the primary main issue in the Swiss case (see above, table 12). In a nutshell, the Swiss organizations “act” internationally, while the overall trend is more to "think" internationally. Again, this is in line with the results of Kriesi et al. (1995): a higher level of mobilization exists in Switzerland on issues relating to international solidarity.

Table 22 - Issues of networks/campaigns of the movement (%)

Issues of networks / campaigns	**Switzerland**	**Rest of the sample (excluding Switzerland)**
Social issues	25.0	40.9
International issues	32.1	82.5
National issues / political parties / think thanks	14.3	19.0
Democracy	7.1	25.5
New social movement issues	14.3	11.7
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(137)
Territorial levels of networks / campaigns		
Local	7.1	15.3
National	42.9	58.4
Transnational	60.7	78.1
Total	13.5	100.0
(N)	(28)	(137)

Note: Overall % of column can sum above 100% because of the possibility of multiple responses

We should also remark that the issues of networks/campaigns in which the organizations were also engaged display a distribution very similar to the GJM perceived main issues for social and international issues, but radically different for new social movement issues: if the organizations consider the latter issue as the GJM key concern (see above, table 21), they do not translate this into a stronger engagement in this specific issue.

We also asked the territorial level of the campaigns or networks in which the organizations are (or were) also engaged. The findings are partly in line with the rest of the sample (second half of table 22): in both cases, the larger the territorial level of campaigns and/or networks, the stronger the engagement of the organizations. Again, however, the results for the rest pf the sample are more clear-cut, in line with our previous conclusions.

Summing up, the data show a strong presence of the organizations in GJM events (in the Swiss sample, especially for specific days of action, while in the rest of the sample especially for larger social forums), which goes along with a very strong feeling of belonging to the GJM in both the Swiss and the rest of the sample. Next, we found that the Swiss organizations see the movement as mainly concerned with new social movement issues, while in the rest pf the sample social issues are the most important ones. The main difference between the two samples, however, is related to the importance given to international concerns: if, in general, international concerns in promoted campaigns and in the overall perception of the GJM are more important, the Swiss organizations show a stronger direct engagement in international concerns (this is in fact the most important issue in the Swiss case). International issues seem therefore a much less central GJM concern for Swiss organizations.

9. Conclusion

The main aim of this report was to give an overall view of the characteristics of organizational networks within the Swiss GJM, in particular with regard to internal democracy. Given the relatively small sample (28 organizations), the findings should be taken with some caution. However, the analysis gave some interesting insights, especially when compared with the rest of the sample (i.e. compared to all five countries and the transnational level, that were included in the research).

Firstly, we found a very different configuration with regard to the four democratic models, especially for the assembleary model. Only one organization works according to this model. Quite interestingly, furthermore, this is not the same that was classified as following this model on the basis of the analysis of the fundamental documents of the organizations (WP3). The deliberative representative model of democracy seems to be dominant within the Swiss GJM.

Secondly, we found evidence of an institutional impact on the organizational network. The analysis shows that the peculiar configuration of the Swiss political system determines a specific behavior of the selected organizations, when compared with the rest of the sample. This is specially the case for the size of the organizations' decisional body (smaller in the Swiss case, given the strong institutional decentralization), their involvement in the political process (especially at the local level), the main strategies they implement (new concrete alternatives are more frequent in Switzerland, while protest activities are less frequent, which is in line with the consensual culture of the country), their level of the engagement in the action repertoires (systematically lower in Switzerland), their campaign main issues (institutional issues are less important in Switzerland and little room exists for social movements to intervene in such issues, given the highly fragmented partisan system), and participation in GJM events (the Swiss organizations seem to "think globally but act locally", which is in line with the federalist structure of the country).

Finally, the analysis has shown that international issues are clearly a less central concern for the Swiss organizations, which are in contrast more inclined to promote activities related to social issues. Even if they are ready to be involved in international activities in a direct way ("act" internationally), they are generally not much concerned with such issues ("think" internationally); this being, we found consistent support of a high identification of the Swiss SMOs to the GJM which is a quite unexpected result, given the moderation of many of the Swiss organizations.

References

Bandler, Marko. 2005. "Qui sont les altermondialistes? Réseaux de mobilisation et enjeux articulés autour des évènements protestataires contre le sommet du G8 d'Evian en 2003." In Nature, Société, Technologies, edited by S. Hauger. Paris: Vuibert.

Bandler, Marko. 2006. "Challenging Whom? Global Justice Movements and the transnational Contention in Switzerland." Paper prepared for the 1st ECPR Graduate Conference, Essex, 7-9 November.

Chevallier, Jacques. 2003. L'État post-moderne. Paris: L.G.D.J. Montchrestien.

Eggert, Nina and Marco Giugni. 2007. "The Global Justice Movement in Switzerland: The Heritage of the New Social Movements." Forthcoming in The Global Justice Movement: Cross-national and Transnational Perspectives, edited by D. della Porta. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Giugni, Marco. 1995. Entre Structure et Opportunités: les Nouveaux Mouvements Sociaux en Suisse. Zurich: Seismo.

Kriesi Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willem Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni. 1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Kriesi, Hanspeter. 1998. Le système Politique Suisse. Paris: Economica.

Kriesi, Hanspeter, Ruud Koopmans, Jan Willelm Duyvendak, and Marco Giugni. 1995. New Social Movements in Western Europe. London: Routledge.

Ladner, Andreas. 2002. "Das Schweizer Parteiensystem und seine Parteien." Pp. 211-58 in Handbuch der Schweizer Politik, edited by U. Klöti, P. Knoepfler, H. Kriesi, W. Linder, and Yannis Papadopoulos. Zürich: Verlag NZZ.

Norris, Pippa. 2004. Electoral Engineering: Voting rules and political behaviour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Passy, Florence and Marko Bandler. 2003. "Protestation altermondialiste: une nouvelle vague de contestation? Une analyse des cadres narratifs et des réseaux d'action." Paper prepared for the annual congress of the Swiss, German and Austrian political science associations, Bern, 14-15 November.

Appendix - lists of organizations selected for WP4 interviews

Transnational sample

1) Seattle to Brussels Network
2) European Left
3) Reclaim our UN
4) International Metalworkers' Federation
5) Friends of the Earth International
6) World Social Forum
7) Euromarches
8) Caritas Internationalis
9) La Via Campesina
10) Attac International
11) Center of Concern
12) Oxfam International
13) Our World Is Not For Sale
14) European Global March Against Child Labour
15) Euro IFI
16) Euromovement
17) International Fair Trade Association (IFAT)
18) The World Conservationist Union (IUCN)
19) ECA Watch - International NGO campaign on export credit agencies
20) International Fair Trade Movement - Fair Trade Advocacy Office
21) Campagna EuropAfrica - Terre Contadine
22) Euromayday
23) Comitati di appoggio europei al Movimento Sem Terra brasiliano
24) European Network on Debt and Development - Eurodad
25) Communication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS)
26) Wide
27) Civicus

French sample

1) Les verts
2) Pajol
3) Forum social local d'Ivry
4) Coordination des intermittents d'Ile de France
5) Lcr
6) Co-errances
7) Crid
8) Dal - No Vox
9) Ldh
10) Solidaires
11) Mouvement des Jeunes Communistes
12) Ac!
13) Attac France
14) Cimade
15) Agir contre la guerre
16) Cedetim
17) Confédération Général de Travaille (Cgt)
18) Samizdat
19) Act-up
20) Fondation Copernic
21) Les intergalactiques
22) Fsu
23) Espace Marx
24) Confédération paysanne
25) Amnesty Internationale
26) Greenpeace
27) Ccfd
28) Agir Ici

German sample

1) Erlassjahr.de
2) Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftliche Arbeitslosengruppen
3) Attac Deutschland
4) Pax Christi
5) Netzwerk Friedenskooperative
6) Friedens- und Zukunftswerkstatt
7) Bund für Umwelt- und Naturschutz Deutschland
8) IG Metall
9) Verdi
10) Bundeskoordination Internationalismus
11) Dritte Welt Laden Vicelin
12) Initiative für ein Berliner Sozialforum
13) Hamburger Sozialforum
14) Kampagne für saubere Kleidung
15) Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung
16) FIAN
17) Iz3w
18) Die tageszeitung
19) Sozialforum in Deutschland
20) Sozialistische Alternative Voran
21) World Economy, Ecology and Development
22) Medico International
23) Solid
24) Weltfriedensdienst
25) Kanak Attak
26) Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst

Great Britain sample

1) War on Want
2) Make Poverty History
3) Catholic Agency for Overseas Development
4) Globalise Resistance
5) Jubillee Debt Campaign
6) London Rising Tide
7) Trade Justice Movement
8) Transport and General Workers' Union
9) Green Party
10) Christian Aid
11) Indymedia UK
12) People and Planet
13) Socialist Workers' Party
14) National Association of Women
15) Stamp Out Poverty (previously called Tobin Tax Network)
16) Sexual Freedom Coalition
17) Global Justice Movement
18) Pax Christi
19) Schnews
20) Unison
21) Radio Rampart
22) Sheffield Social Forum
23) World Development Movement
24) Stop the War Coalition
25) Muslim Association of Britain (Youth Section)
26) British Overseas NGOs for Development
27) Liverpool Social Forum
28) East Anglian Social Forum
29) Red Pepper

Italian sample

1) Confederazione Generale Italiana dei Lavoratori (Cgil)
2) Federazione Impiegati e Operai Metalmeccanici (Fiom)- Cgil
3) Legambiente
4) Associazione Ricreativa Culturale Italiana (Arci)
5) Forum del III settore
6) Un Ponte Per
7) Pax Christi - movimento cattolico internazionale per la pace
8) Sinistra Giovanile
9) Campagna Sdebitarsi
10) Popolare network
11) Arcigay
12) Confederazione dei Cobas
13) Associazione per la Tassazione delle Transazioni finanziare e l'Aiuto ai Cittadini (Attac Italia)
14) Campagna Banche Armate
15) Consorzio Italiano di Solidarietà – Italian Consortium of Solidarity (Ics)
16) Unimondo
17) Associazione Botteghe del Mondo
18) Rete Lilliput
19) Carta settimanale
20) Peacelink
21) Venezia Social Forum
22) Abruzzo Social Forum
23) Giovani Verdi
24) Comitato Immigrati
25) Giovani Comunisti
26) Confederazione Unitaria di Base (Cub)
27) Tavola della Pace
28) Rifondazione Comunista
29) Il Manifesto
30) Torino Social Forum
31) Emergency
32) Federazione Anarchica Italiana (Fai)
33) Federazione dei Verdi
34) Indymedia Italia
35) Associazione 3 Febbraio
36) Rete Noglobal
37) Cooperazione Terzo Mondo (CTM)-Altromercato (not included in the original wp2/wp3 sample)

Spanish sample

1) Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel
2) ATTAC-Madrid
3) Rebelión Digital media
4) Red con Voz
5) Red para la Cancelación de la Deuda Externa (RCADE)
6) Plataforma 0,7
7) Organización de Cooperación y Solidaridad Internacional (OCSI)
8) Assemblea per la Regularització sense Condicions
9) Jóvenes de Izquierda Unida (IU)
10) Izquierda Unida (IU)
11) Indymedia Euskal Herria
12) Hermandad Obrera de Acción Católica (HOAC)
13) Espacio Horizontal contra la Guerra
14) Espacio Alternativo
15) ESK (Ezker Sindikalaren Koordinakundea-Convergencia de la Izquierda Sindical)
16) Ecologistas en Acción
17) Diagonal
18) Consulta Social Europea
19) Confederación Nacional de los Trabajadores (CNT)
20) Colectivo de Solidaridad con la Rebelión Zapatista de Barcelona
21) Comité Apoyo al MST (Movimiento De Los Sin Tierra) Madrid
22) Centre Internacional Escarré per a les Minories Ètqniques i les Nacions (CIEMEN)
23) Vall de Can Masdeu
24) Amnistia Internacional
25) Asamblea Feminista de Madrid
26) STES (Confederación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores y Trabajadores de la Enseñanza)
27) Derechos para Todos
28) Foro Social de Palencia
29) Nodo50
30) Bajo el Asfalto esta la Huerta
31) Xarxa de Mobilitzaciò Global (XMG)
32) Co.bas
33) Federacion Española de Ingenierías sin Fronteras (ISF)
34) Baladre
35) Cordoba Solidaria

Swiss sample

1) Centre Europe Tiers Monde
2) Les Communistes
3) Jeunesse Socialiste Suisse
4) Déclaration de Berne
5) Syndicat Interprofessionnel des travailleurs et travailleuses (SIT)
6) Parti du Travail
7) Attac Switzerland
8) Pax Christi
9) Forum Social Lémanique
10) Magasins du Monde
11) Alliance Sud
12) L' Autre Davos
13) Solidarités
14) Forum Social Suisse
15) Le Courrier
16) Marche Mondiale des Femmes
17) Groupe pour une Suisse sans Armée (GSsA)
18) Les Verts
19) Augenauf Basel
20) Syndicat de l'Industrie et du Bâtiment (UNIA)
21) Solidarität mit Chiapas
22) Aktion Finanzplatz
23) LoRa
24) Bewegung für den Sozialismus
25) Réalise
26) Syndicat des Services Publics (SSP-VPOD) - Section genevoise
27) Solidarité sans Frontières
28) Parti socialiste suisse - section genevoise

WP4 questionnaire: Democracy and global activism

This research is part of the project *Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society* (Demos), which is being carried out by scholars from six European countries. The Demos project focuses upon the global justice movement that developed in opposition to neo-liberal globalisation, and in favour of more democratic political practices. The goal of this questionnaire is to understand how the internal decision making works in groups of the global justice movement and which are their relationships towards other political actors. If you want to learn more about the research, please visit the project website at: http://demos.iue.it and / or write to us at demos@iue.it.

a) Name of the group / organization _____

b) Phone contact _____

c) Email contact _____

d) Organizational role and name of the interviewee _____

e) Country _____

For reasons of convenience, in all following questions we use the term "group", regardless of whether you represent / answer for an informal group / network or a formal organization.

1. Which are the main issues your group takes up?

_____

_____

2. Which are the main strategies your group uses in order to reach its aims?

a) Protest, demonstrations and direct actions □
b) Promote social, political, and economic alternatives □
c) Lobbying □
d) Political education of citizens / rising awareness □
e) Other (2e_S. *please* ***specify***)_____ □

3. In the last five years, which of the following forms of action has your group engaged in repeatedly?

a) Petition □
b) Demonstration □
c) Strike □
d) Boycott of certain products □
e) Blockade □
f) Occupation of buildings □
g) Civil disobedience □
h) Artistic/Cultural performance □
i) Other (3i_S. *please* ***specify***)_____

4. Does your group as a whole consider itself to be part of the global justice movement?

1 □ Yes 2 □ No

5. What does your group consider the main aims of the global justice movement to be?

_____

_____

_____

6. Did your group (not you personally) participate in one of the following events? If so, please specify the first year your group participated and the following years.

	YEARS
a) World / European Social Forums	
b) National / Local Social Forums	
c) Parallel Summit at EU, UN, G7 / G8, IMF / WB / WTO meetings	
d) Global Days of action (i.e. against war)	
e) Other events of the Global Justice Movement, *please* ***specify***	

7. Does your group take part in any networks or campaigns dealing with global justice issues?

1 □ Yes
0 □ No (go to question 9)

8. Please list up to five groups, networks or campaigns dealing with global justice issues with which your group interacts most intensively.

a. _____
b. _____
c. _____
d. _____
e. _____

Let's consider now the way the decision-making process is organized in your group.

9. Who takes the most important decisions in the every-day practice of your group?
(If more than one category applies, please tick the one reflecting the <u>most</u> common practice)

1 □ president / leader / secretary
2 □ *executive* committee or similar body
3 □ *assembly / open meeting*
4 □ *thematic* groups
9 □ *other* bodies (9_S. *please* ***specify***) _____

10a. Do members of your group regularly meet in an assembly / open meeting in order to make decisions? ***(If No, please go to question 11a)***

0 □ No 1 □ Yes

10b. How frequently are such assemblies held? _____

10c. Who takes decisions in these assemblies?

1 □ only delegates
2 □ *members* of the group
3 □ *whoever* wants to participate
9 □ *other* (10c_S. *please* ***specify***) _____

10d. How many people generally participate in these assemblies? _____

10e. Who proposes the agenda?
(*If more than one category applies, please tick the one reflecting the most common practice*)
1 □ president / leader / secretary
2 □ the executive committee or similar body
3 □ the assembly / open meeting
4 □ a small committee which represents different groups of the membership
9 □ other (10e_S. *please **specify***) _____

10f. If there are rules for the discussion in the assembly, what are they (time limits, protection of minority positions, facilitator presence, etc.)?
_____
_____

10g. How does the assembly usually make decisions?

1 □ by a majority vote
2 □ by consensus
9 □ other (10g_S. *please **specify***) _____

11a. Does your group have an executive committee? *(If No, please go to question 12)*

0 □ No 1 □ Yes

11b. Who elects / appoints members of the executive committee?
(please tick all relevant options)
1 □ the general assembly / congress
2 □executive bodies of local groups / affiliates
3 □ assemblies of local groups / affiliates
9 □ other (11b_S. *please **specify***) _____

11c. How are decisions usually taken within the executive committee?
1 □ by a majority vote
2 □ by consensus
9 □ other (11c_S. *please **specify***) _____

Let's focus now on the way your group relates with public institutions.

12. How does your group relate to public institutions at different territorial levels?

	It collaborates	It is indifferent	It refuses any collaboration	Other
a) International level	1 □	0 □	-1 □	9 □
b) National level	1 □	0 □	-1 □	9 □
c) Local level	1 □	0 □	-1 □	9 □
If other (12_s please **specify**)				

13a. Is there a shared perception in your group that public decision-making processes set by political institutions (i.e. Agenda 21, participatory budgeting or ad hoc committees for the solution of local problems) improve the quality of political decisions?
0 □ No 1 □ Yes 9 □ No definite position

13b. Why?
_____
_____

14. Several campaigns / policy proposals have been supported by civil society groups and networks demanding democratic reforms. If your group advanced or endorsed any during the last three years, could you tell us the FIVE most important ones and indicate whether they were at the local, national or international level?



15. How has the Internet in general and your website in particular changed the way in which you communicate…

a) …with policy-makers?

_____
_____

b) …with the mass media?

_____
_____

c) …with your members / supporters?

_____
_____

Now we will focus on some characteristics of your group.

16. How many members do voluntary (unpaid) work for your group on a regular basis?

_____

17. How many paid staff members does your group have? _____

18. What was the approximately operating budget of your group last year? _____

19. Which of the following are sources of funds for your group?

1 □ Members' dues / contributions
2 □ Funds and financing of specific projects from governments
3 □ Non governmental funds
4 □ Sale of goods / services / rents
9 □ Other (19_S. *please **specify***)

ADDENDUM (only for groups not covered by wp3 analysis)

20. Is your group

1 □ a "single" group

2 □ a network or federation

3 □ an ad-hoc campaign organization

An organization which is not a network/federation or ad hoc umbrella organization.

A stable, long term organization that is formed by other organizations (e.g. Etuc, or Attac).

An organization that is formed by other organizations with the purpose of organizing a specific protest event or a protest campaign.

21. Which are the territorial levels of your group?

a) local	0 □ no	1 □yes
b) regional	□ no	□yes
c) national	□ no	□yes
d) international	□ no	□yes

For the UK team: you should answer "yes" to this question only when local branches in Wales, Britain, Scotland and / or Northern Ireland are present.

22. In which year was your group founded? (yyyy) _____

23. Is it possible to become a member of your group? 1 □ Yes 0 □ No
(if No, there are no further questions)

24. Which kind of members does your group have?
1 □ individual
2 □ collective
3 □ both individual and collective

25. Is individual membership formalized with membership cards?
1 □ Yes 0 □ No

26. Does your group have fee-paying membership?
0 □ No
1 □ Yes for individuals
2 □ Yes for groups
3 □ Yes for both individuals and groups

27. Please specify how many individual members your group has _____

28. Please specify how many collective members the group has _____

We thank you for your cooperation

If you want to add something on this questionnaire, please go ahead!

_____

_____