WP5 – Integrated Report.

GLOBAL ACTIVISTS.
CONCEPTIONS AND PRACTICES OF DEMOCRACY IN THE EUROPEAN SOCIAL FORUMS

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Florence, March 2007

WP5 Report for "Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of Society", a project funded by the European Commission, Contract n. CIT2-CT2004-506026, and (for the Swiss case) by the Swiss Federal Office for Education and Science, Contract no. 03.0482.

Chapter 1

Why a research on democracy and the European Social Forum? An Introduction

by Donatella della Porta

"We, women and men from social movements across Europe, came to Athens after years of common experiences, fighting against war, neoliberalism, all forms of imperialism, colonialism, racism, discrimination and exploitation, against all the risks of an ecological catastrophe" (Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European Social Forum, Athens 7th May 2006).

With these words, the activists who participated in the Assembly of the Movements of the European Social Forum (ESF) in Athens presented themselves, remembering "years of common experiences". The ESF in Athens is the fourth social forum held at the European scale, with the aim of providing a space for the encounter of hundreds of social movement organizations and thousands of activists. In this document, the activists claim to have been part of a successful fight against neoliberalism—"This year—they state--has been significant in that a number of social struggles and campaigns have been successful in stopping neoliberal projects suck as the proposed European Constitution Treaty, the EU Ports Directive, and the CPE in France". The targets of this struggle are singled out in a number of international governmental organizations (IGOs), including the EU: "Movements of opposition to neoliberalism are growing and are clashing against the power of trans-national corporations, the G8 and organizations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank, as well the neo-liberal policies of the states and the European Union" (ibid.). This discourse resonates with the one put forward already at the first ESF in Florence, in 2002, where the Call of the European Social Movements had stated: "We have come together from the social and citizens movements from all the regions of Europe, East and West, North and South. We have come together through a long process: the demonstrations of Amsterdam, Seattle, Prague, Nice, Gothenburg, Genoa, Brussels, Barcelona, the big mobilisations against neoliberalism as well as the general strikes for the defence of social rights and all the mobilisations against war, show the will to build another Europe". In a similar way, stressing the internal diversity as an enriching characteristic of their movement, the Declaration of the assembly of the movements at the third ESF, held in London in 2004, had claimed: "We come from all the campaigns and social movements, 'no vox' organisations, trade unions, human rights organisations, international solidarity organisations, anti-war and peace and feminist movements. We come from every region in Europe to gather in London for the third European Social Forum. We are many, and our strength is our diversity".

This introductory chapter will discuss the reasons for analysing conceptions and practices of democracy within the European Social Forum. It addresses the following main issues: a) why and how is the issue of democracy relevant in research on contemporary social movements; b) why is the European Social Forum a significant (and "critical") case study; c) which are the implications and consequences of the methods we used for our research; d) how do we proceed in this report.

1. Democracy and/in contemporary social movements: where is the challenge

The basic assumption of our research is that the reflection about democracy plays an important role in social movement organizations and that, conversely, social movements are important actors in contemporary democracies. Although their activities are not limited to the political system, social movement organizations often interact with it: by protesting, they present claims to various levels of governance; they encounter "street level bureaucrats" such as the police officers; they lobby various

branches of the public administration; (more and more often) public services addressed to specific constituencies (women, migrants etc.) are contracted out to them.

Beyond addressing demands to decision makers, social movements express a fundamental critique of conventional politics, thus shifting their endeavours from politics itself to meta-politics (Offe 1985). Since the 1970s, the "new social movements" have been said to present important innovations also vis-à-vis with dominant conceptions in the workers' movement; among them are decentralised and participatory organisational structures; defence of interpersonal solidarity against state and corporate bureaucracies; and the reclamation of autonomous spaces, rather than material advantages (ibid.). In doing this, social movement organizations develop proposals—ranging from limited reforms to ambitious utopias—for alternative democratic practices. The dimension of internal democracy is all the more important for collective actors that have little material incentives to distribute and must therefore gain and keep the commitment of their members on the bases of shared beliefs. This is especially challenging for a basis of activists that appear as very exigent, critical and auto-critical when issues of internal democracy are at stake.

Social movement organisations are also self-reflexive insofar as they tend to debate the issue of democracy as it applies to their internal lives (Melucci 1989). Recent research confirmed the high degree of critical debate on democracy presents in social movements: internal democracy emerges as an important topic of discussion for the activists (della Porta 2005). Past experiences are reflected upon, showing important learning processes, although no satisfactory solution seemed ready yet to address the main organizational dilemma (between e.g. participation versus efficacy, equality versus specialization, etc.). As a sociologist who has studied the evolution of participatory democratic practices in American movements notes, "a 60s activist would be surprised by the procedural machinery that today accompanies the democratic deciding process. There are formal roles – timekeepers, facilitators, observers of feelings – and a sophisticated range of gestures. Raising moving fingers as if playing a piano indicates support for a point; making a triangle in the air with fore-finger and thumb of both hands indicates concern with respect for rules of the deliberative process; a raised fist indicates an intention to veto the decision" (Polletta 2002, 190-91).

On both the external and the internal dimensions of democracy social movements have been said to affirm the legitimacy (if not the primacy) of alternatives to representative democracy, criticising both liberal democracy and the 'organised democracy' of political parties. Their ideas resonate with 'an ancient element of democratic theory that calls for an organisation of collective decision making referred to in varying ways as classical, populist, communitarian, strong, grass-roots, or direct democracy against a democratic practice in contemporary democracies labelled as realist, liberal, elite, republican, or representative democracy' (Kitschelt 1993, 15).

To these (more traditional) participatory values, some emerging ones have been linked, such as attention to communication, practices of consensus building, the emphasis on the inclusion of diverse groups and, especially, the respect for this diversity (della Porta 2004; della Porta and Reiter 2005 and 2006). These aspects resonate with the emerging debate in political theory and social sciences in general on the so-called discursive or deliberative democracy, especially with the approaches locating democratic deliberation in voluntary groups (Cohen 1989), social movements (Dryzek 2000), protest arenas (Young 2003, 119) or, more in general, enclaves free from institutional power (Mansbridge 1996). Investigating recent movements, Francesca Polletta stressed in fact the use by activists of deliberative talk: "they expected each other to provide legitimate reasons for preferring one option to another. They strove to recognize the merits of each other's reasons for favoring a particular option… the goal was not unanimity, so much as discourse. But it was a particular kind of discourse, governed by norms of openness and mutual respect" (Polletta 2002, 7).

In our research we address in particular the conceptions and practices of democracy that have developed in the global justice movement (GJM) mobilising transnationally and demanding social

justice and participatory and/or deliberative democracy. We have defined the GJM as the loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality, and even including political parties) and other actors, engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe. This means that we focus on an empirical form of transnational activism, without implying that this covers all the existing manifestations of that abstract concept. We operationalized our definition by looking at collective identities, non-conventional action repertoires, and organizational networks (see della Porta 2006). While we focus here on surveys of movement activists, the Democracy in Europe and the Mobilization of the Society (Demos) research — covering six European countries (France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Switzerland), and the transnational level —includes an analysis of documents and websites of organizations of the GJM (della Porta and Mosca 2005; della Porta and Reiter 2006), semi-structured interviews with nongovernmental organisations (della Porta and Mosca 2006), participant observation of movement groups and their experiences with participatory and/or deliberative decision making.

We assume that the issue of democracy is particularly relevant for the GJM given external and internal challenges. First of all, the GJM reacts to deep transformations in representative systems that include power shifts from the national to the international level as well as from the state to the market (della Porta 2005). Internal democracy is particularly relevant for a multifaceted, heterogeneous movement (which has significantly defined itself a "movement of movements") that incorporates many social, generational and ideological groups as well as movement organizations from different countries. As the first studies on this subject are pointing out, this movement has a more pluralistic identity, loosely connected organizational structure, and more multiform action repertoire than those characteristic of previous movements (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002 and 2003; della Porta and Mosca 2003). Moreover, the global justice activists develop "tolerant" identities as opposed to the "totalitarian", or at least organizational, identities of the past (della Porta 2004).

Other parts of the Demos project confirmed that the issue of democracy continues to be a very relevant one for social movements. To give just an example, our analysis of organizational documents of 244 social movement organizations showed that most of them mention democratic values in their main documents (see della Porta and Reiter 2006). Looking at the values concerning internal democracy (table 1), participation is still a main reference in social movement organizations (SMOs)' visions of democracy, mentioned by one third of the organisations as an internal value. It is a founding principle not only for the 'purest' forms of SMOs, but also for trade unions and left-wing political parties. However, additional values emerge specifying (and differentiating) the conceptions of participatory democracy. References to the limits of delegation, the rotation principle, mandated delegation, criticism of delegation, or deliberative democracy as internal organisational values are present although not very widespread (between 6% and 11%). References to consensual and non-hierarchical decision making are more significant (17.2%; 16%) and even more frequently mentioned are inclusiveness and the autonomy of local chapters or member organisations (between and 21% and 29%). Looking at the general democratic values, it is remarkable that the documents of as much as half of our sample refer to plurality, diversity, and heterogeneity as important democratic values, at a level very near to that of (more traditional) participation. Equality is mentioned in the analysed documents of about one third of our sample and values such as transparency, inclusiveness, and individual freedom in about one fourth. Significantly, representative values are mentioned by only 6% of our organisations.

Table 1 - Internal and general democratic values explicitly mentioned in the selected documents*

Internal democratic values	%	General democratic values	%
Autonomy of the territorial levels***	38.5	Participation	51.2
Autonomy of member organisations**	33.1	Difference/plurality/heterogeneity	47.1
Participatory democracy	27.9	Equality	34.0
Inclusiveness	20.9	Dialogue/communication	31.6
Consensual method	17.2	Inclusiveness	25.8
Non-hierarchical decision-making	16.0	Transparency	23.8
Criticism of delegation and/or representation	11.1	Individual liberty/autonomy	21.7
Deliberative democracy	7.0	Autonomy (group; cultural)	18.9
Limitation of delegation	6.6	Representation	6.1
Rotation principle	6.6		
Mandate delegation	6.1		

* N=244, with the exception of ** not applicable for 114 (46.7%) groups, because they do not mention organisations as members; and *** not applicable for 62 (25.4%) groups, because they do not mention territorial levels of organisation.
Source: della Porta and Reiter 2006.

The research on democracy and movements

Recognizing the importance of social movements in and for democracy, social movement research has traditionally focused more on the external than on the internal dimension, and more on the effects of representative democracy on social movement characteristics than vice-versa. Especially since the 1980s, with the increasing interest in social movement by political scientists, European scholars started to use the concept of political opportunities, central in the so-called political process approach developed by American scholars, in cross-country research projects. Alexis de Tocqueville's famous contrast between a 'weak' American government and a 'strong' French one is usually an implicit or explicit starting point for analyses linking institutional factors—or 'regimes' in Tilly's definition (1978)—with social movement development (Kriesi 2004: 71). The idea that states' strength or weakness influences social movement strategies remains central to the literature on collective action in general, and on revolutions in particular. These and other similar concepts have been used within several cross-national comparative projects that have facilitated interaction among European scholars. One of the reasons for the spread of the political opportunity approach in Europe may have been the interest, well developed in European political science and sociology, in cross-European comparison. Especially in the nineties, this interest produced large comparative research projects, singling out and exploiting different dimensions of comparison among European countries such as centralisation versus decentralisation of power (Rucht 1994: 303-12; Kriesi et al. 1995) and relatively stable characteristics of national political cultures (Kitschelt 1985; Kriesi et al. 1995); the influence of a country's democratic history (Flam 1994; della Porta and Reiter 1998); the prevailing model of industrial relations (Joppke 1993, Tarrow 1989, della Porta 1996) and the alliance of the parties of the Left (della Porta, Valiente and Kousis forthcoming). Only few attempts were made in addressing instead the effects of social movements on representative democracies, and these attempts mainly focused on macro-dimensions (see Giugni et al. 1998; Giugni et al. 1999; Giugni 2004).

With few remarkable exceptions (in particular, Lichterman 1996; Polletta 2002) the issue of internal democracy remained marginal, and was mainly addressed within the debate on organizational forms of movements, often returning to the traditional cleavage between those who praised organizations as effective instruments of mobilization (Gamson 1990; McCarthy and Zald 1987) and those who feared an iron law of bureaucratization (Piven and Cloward 1979). Although different forms and trends of organizational structures and developments have been singled out (for instance, Kriesi 1996, Rucht 1996, della Porta 2003), and the typical network forms of movements has been stressed (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Diani 1995; see Della Porta and Diani 2006 for a review), an instrumental vision tended to prevail. As Clemens and Minkoff (2003, 156) have recently noticed, with the development of a resource mobilization perspective "Attention to organization appeared antithetical to analysis of culture and interaction. As organizations were understood instrumentally, the cultural content of organizing and the meanings signaled by organizational forms were marginalized as topic for inquiry". Moreover, empirical research often singled out the limits of direct forms of democracy, in particular the "tyranny of the majority", the closedness of small groups to newcomers, the risks of a "hidden" leadership (among others, Freeman 1974; Breines 1989).

The main (although not the only) questions asked in the last decades have therefore focused on macro-causes for movements, and the instrumental role of movement organizations in mobilizing environmental resources. These are relevant questions that will remain central also for contemporary movements. However, contemporary movements also brought about the perceived need to re-focus our attention from social movements as dependent variables to social movements as independent and conscious actors, producing changes not only outside, but also inside them. Internal communication and democratic practices are all relevant angles for addressing a movement that is innovative and plural. In this sense, we want to move attention towards what we can define as the emergent properties of protest. In his call for an "eventful temporality", Sewell (1996) suggests to consider the capacity of some events to interrupt or challenge the existing structures. Research on the GJM started in fact to pay attention to a sort of cross-fertilization ("contamination" in the Italian neologism) in action recognizing some of the emerging characteristics of collective action. Action-campaigns and the networking structure of the globalization movement produce a situation of intense interaction between various individuals and organizations. This creates a process of contamination in action through mechanisms of multiplication of individual belonging and organizational networking, which in turn facilitates frame-bridging, the transformation of identities and the creation of informal links (della Porta and Mosca 2006).

The research on individual activists

With its focus on conceptions and practices of democracy within social movements, our research aims at an innovative contribution to a long-lasting and important debate. Summarizing, we look at social movements as spaces for the elaboration of conceptions of democracy and first experimentation with them. If our concern with democracy within the GJM remains stable in all the work packages, a specificity of this part of our research is the focus on the micro-dimension. While in fact in the other parts of our research the unit of analysis are the social movement organizations, in this part we focus (although not exclusively) on individual conceptions and experiences.

Research on activists has addressed both social background and political attitudes and behaviour. Social science research on political participation has traditionally stressed a class divide in political participation: political participation emerges in fact as limited and selective, since it increases with social status (Lagroye 1993, 312). Higher level of participation were singled out, ceteris paribus, among the better educated, middle class, men, medium age cohort, married people, city residents, ethnic majority, and citizens' involved in voluntary associations (Milbrath and Goel 1977). Usually, higher social status implies in fact more material resources (but also free-time) to invest in political participation, but also a higher probability of being successful (via personal relationships with powerful individuals) and especially a higher sense of personal achievement. Psychological

disadvantages overlap with social disadvantages, reducing the perception of one's own "droit de parole" (Bourdieu 1979, 180).

Also research on social movements has looked at the social characteristics of activists, reaching some similar conclusions. First of all, it has often been observed that the new social movements recruit in a specific social base, mainly made of some components of the middle-class (Kriesi 1993). Second, in order to account for the overrepresentation of young and student activists, the concept of biographical availability was used to point at the circumstances that increase free-time and limit family responsibilities, reducing constraints against participation in movement actions (see McAdam 1988). The increase in unconventional forms of participation had only a limited equalizing effect as far as gender, age and education are considered (Topf 1995, 78).

Questions about support for protest have re-emerged in the social science discussion of contemporary global social movements, prompted by the apparent heterogeneity in the social background of activists of protest campaigns on issues of debt relief, international trade rules and barriers, global taxation, fair trade, peace etc.. Research on the GJM contributed some useful information on the social background of activists. The prediction of the hypothesis on the "social centrality" that individual resources increase propension to mobilize is only partially useful to explain the social background of our activists, that emerged as well-educated and predominantly middle-class, but also with a high component of workers and no overrepresentation of male and middle-aged groups of the population. Additionally, for a "movement of movements" the inclusivity towards the social groups the movement aims at representing is a relevant issue (Doerr 2006a and 2006b; Haug 2006).

A second important set of questions refer to the political background of participants, their values and previous experiences. Especially with the growth of political participation and the enlargement of the research on unconventional forms of action, the debate about the degree and sources of selectivity re-emerged, with however a new focus on the role of collective identities in overcoming individual lack of resources. Alessandro Pizzorno (1966) had already noted that the characteristic of politics is to refer to systems of solidarity that are at the basis of the very definition of interest: interests can in fact be singled out only with reference to a specific value system, and values push individuals to identify with wider groups in the society, providing a sense of belonging to them and the willingness to mobilize for them. In this perspective, participation is an action in solidarity with others that aims at protecting or transforming the dominant values and interest systems (ibid.). The process of participation requires therefore the construction of solidarity communities within which individuals perceive themselves and are recognized as equals. Identification as awareness of being part of a collective facilitates political participation. In this sense, it is not the "social centrality" mentioned by Milbrath, but the centrality with respect to a class (or a group) that defines an individual's propensity to political participation. And this explains why some groups, composed of individuals that are endowed with low status, under some conditions are able to mobilize more than other groups. Additionally, research on participation in protest events has stressed the role of social networks in mobilizing activists (Klandermans 1997). Participation is therefore explained not only by individual resources, but also by collective and relational resources.

If the construction of a collective identity is a precondition for action, it is however also a consequence of it. In fact, participation itself changes individual identity, increasing the sense of belonging to some groups and weakening instead other potential identifications. In collective action, identity is produced and reproduced (della Porta and Diani 2006). Barricades for revolutionaries, strikes for workers, occupations for students are actions oriented to influence public authorities, but also have an internal effects in so far as they strengthen "class consciousness"—or, in more modern words, collective identification. Participation therefore, in a sort of virtuous circle, increases the sense of belonging that pushes for more participation. During action, participants tend to identify not only the "self" (the "us", they identify with), but also the "other" (the oppositors, considered as responsible for an unjust situation). It is indeed "in action" that the process of

"cognitive liberation", i.e. of the attribution of a social, and addressable cause to an individual problem (McAdam 1988) develops.

In this direction, research on the activists of the GJM has already contributed important knowledge on the role of multiple memberships, previous experiences of mobilization as well as individual networks in the paths towards and within political activism. In fact, the social background of our activists was linked to their participation in previous waves of protest and the civil society groups that developed from these protests: students had often experiences in student groups, women in feminist collectives, workers in trade unions. The social bases of the "global" protest seem, indeed, to reflect the range of political cleavages already mobilized, without the clear emergence of a "new cleavage"—e.g. between "winners" and "loosers" of globalization. Indeed, the dominant identification with the "left" of the political spectrum seems to testify for the reemergence of conflicts on social inequalities, that were considered as mainly pacified (della Porta for UN). Also here, more research is needed in order to compare these patterns in time and space.

Contributing to these debates, our research aims however to go beyond these sets of questions focusing on the role that these different dimensions of participation have on conceptions and practices of democracy. As for the social basis of our protest, we aim at discussing to which extent new generations, women, middle classes or precarious workers are carriers of specific visions of democracy. In terms of political careers, we will observe to which extent different paths of political socialization, multiple belongings, degree of identification and commitment to the movements as well as the judgments upon representative institutions are linked to the democratic conceptions of the activists. As with the other work packages, a main assumption of our research is indeed that the general principles of democracy such as power (kratos) by/from/for the people (demos) can be combined in different forms and with different balances: representative versus participatory, majority versus deliberative, etc..

The general analytic model is the following (number in parentheses refers to questions included in the questionnaire, see appendix:


b) Political attitudes and behavior
Identification with the movement (1, 2, 3)
Degrees of commitment (9)
Forms of protest (5)
Use of Internet (20)
Organization and network (6, 7, 8)
Political position: Left/right (29, 30, 31, 32)
c) Country, city and political opportunities (23, 24)
d) Sociodemography:
Gender (21)
Age (22)
Education (28)
employment (25, 26)
a) Conceptions of democracy
Satisfaction with democracy (10)
Decision making in group (11)
Decision making in movement (12)
Normative conception of democracy (13)
Trust in institutions (14)
Strategies to improve democracy (15; 16; 18, 19)
Decision making in national politics (17)

2. Democracy in the European Social Forum: a Critical Case Study

This volume will focus on the European Social Forum, using as far as possible a cross-time perspective that takes into account the evolution and transformations along the four forums. In this part of the introductory chapter, we shall discuss the rationale for choosing the 4th ESF in Athens as a central space for our research.

The Social Forums have been an innovative experiment promoted by the global justice movement. Counter-summits against the official summits of International Governmental Organizations (especially the G8, World Bank and IMF, WTO, and the EU) represented the more conflictual forms of protest at the transnational level. Differently from a countersummit, that is mainly oriented to public protest, the Social Forum is set up as a space of debate among activists. Although originally indirectly oriented to "counter" another summit—the World Social Forum (WSF) was organized on the same date and in alternative to the World Economic Forum (WEF) held in Davos (Switzerland)--the WSF presented itself as an independent space for encounters among civil society organizations and citizens. The first WSF in Porto Alegre in January 2001 was attended by about 20,000 participants from over 100 countries, among them thousands of delegates of NGOs and social movement organizations. Its main aim was the discussion of "Another possible globalization" (Schoenleitner 2003). Since then the number of organizers and participants as well as the organizational efforts of the following WSFs (in Porto Alegre in 2002 and 2003, than in Mumbay in 2004, and again in Porto Alegre in 2005) increased exponentially (see Table 2). The WSF also gained a large media attention. According to the organizers, the WSF in 2002 attracted 3,000 journalists (from 467 newspapers and 304 radio or TV-stations), a figure which doubled to more than 6,800 in 2005 (Rucht 2005, 294-5). As Dieter Rucht (2005, 291) observed,

"During its relatively short existence, the WSF has become an institution in its own right and can be seen as a kind of huge showcase for a large number of issues, groups, and claims. It can also be interpreted as a barometer that signals both strengths and weaknesses of global justice movements, general trends, learning processes, potential and actual cleavages, etc… Within their short period of their existence, WSFs have become a trademark that has begun to overshadow its competitor, the World Economic Forum, in respect to public attention. It is also a structure that, according to its slogan 'Another world is possible', raises many hopes, energizes many participants, links large numbers of issues and groups, and – last but not least – contributes to the creation of an overarching identity and community as expressed in the vision of a meeting place for the global civil society."

Table 2 - Basic figures on the World Social Forums

	Estimated number of Participants	Delegates from NGOs and movements groups	Number of countries	Budget
Porto Alegre 2001	20,000	4,700	117	?
Porto Alegre 2002	50,000	12,274 from 4,009 groups	123	1,55 Mio. Euros from official sources
Porto Alegre 2003	120,000	20,763 from 5.171 groups	123	4 Mio. Euros
Mumbai 2004	111,000	1,653 groups	117	2,9 Mio. Euros
Porto Alegre 2005	155,000	6,588 groups	135	?

Source: Rucht 2005, 292 (from "FSM em números", press release of the WSF, January 2005).

The common basic feature of the social forum is the conception of an open and inclusive public space. Participation is open to all civil society groups, with the exception of those advocating racist ideas and those using terrorist means, as well as political parties as such. The charter of the WSF defines it as an "open meeting place". Its functioning, with hundreds of workshops and dozens of conferences (with invited experts), testifies for the importance given (at least in principle) to knowledge. In fact, the WSF has been defined as "a market place for (sometime competing) causes and an 'ideas fair' for exchanging information, ideas and experiences horizontally" (Schoenleitner 2003, 140). In the words of one of its organizers, the WSFs promote exchanges in order "to think more broadly and to construct together a more ample perspective" (ibid., 141). Notwithstanding some tensions about the decision making process as well as the financing of the initiatives (Rucht 2005), the idea of open arenas for discussion, not immediately oriented to action and decisions, has spread in the global justice movement.

Since 2001, social forums developed also at macro-regional, national and local level. Panamazzonean Social Forums were held in Brasil and Venezuela in 2004; African Social Forums in Mali and Ethiopia, Asiatic Social Forums in India (Sommier 2005, 21). Among them, the European Social Forum (ESF) played a most important role in the elaboration of activists' attitudes towards the European Union, as well as the formation of a European identity.

The first ESF took place in Florence on November 6-9, 2002. Notwithstanding the tensions before the meeting,[1] the ESF in Florence was a success. Not only was there not a single act of violence, but participation went beyond the most optimistic expectations. Sixty thousand participants – more than three times the expected number – attended the 30 plenary conferences, 160 seminars, and 180 workshops organized at the Fortezza da Basso; even more attend the 75 cultural events in various parts of the city. About one million participated in the march that closed the forum. The international nature of the event is not disputable. More than 20,000 delegates of 426 associations arrived from 105 countries – among others, 24 buses from Barcelona; a special train from France and another one from Austria; a special ship from Greece. Up to four hundred interpreters worked without charge in order to ensure simultaneous translations. A year later, as many as a thousand Florentines (300 went to London in 2004) and 3000 Italians went to Paris for the second ESF.

Since 2002, activists have met yearly in European Social Forums to debate Europeanisation and its limits. The second ESF has been held in Paris in 2003, involving up to 60.000 individual participants, 1.800 groups, 270 seminars, 260 working groups and 55 plenary sessions (with about 1500 participants in each), and 300 organizations signing the call, among which 70 unions, 3000 volunteers, 1000 interpreters. According to the organizers, 150 000 participated in the final march. The third ESF, in London in 2004, involved about 25,000 participants and 2,500 speakers in 150 seminars, 220 working groups and 30 plenary sessions, as well as up to 100 000 participants at the final march). The third one in Athens in 2006 included 278 betweens seminars and workshops, and 104 cultural activities listed in the official program, 35,000 registered participants and up to 80,000 at the final march[2].

Our choice of the ESF as a case study is related exactly to its peculiar nature of an experiment with alternative practices of democracy. In this sense, we are not selecting an average protest event, but a critical moment when participants are aware that democracy is a central stake in the internal life of the movement as well as in the society at large. Not by chance, the ESF is presented in the press as "an exchange on concrete experiences" ("La Stampa, 10/11/2003), "an agora" ("Liberazione", 14/11/2003), a kermesse ("Europa" 3/11/2003), a "tour-de-force of debates,

[1] With center-right politicians, but also many opinion leaders expressing a strong fear of violence in a city considered particularly fragile because of its artistic value (to the point of suggesting limitations to the right of demonstration in the "città d'arte").

[2] Data on participation are from the entry European social forum in Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European _social_forum, accessed December 24, 2006).

seminars and demonstrations by the new global" ("L'Espresso" 13/11/2003), "a sort of university, where you learn, discuss and exchange ideas" ("La Repubblica" 17/10/2004), "a supranational public space, a real popular university, but especially the place where to build European nets" (in "Liberazione" 12/10/2004). The spoke-person of the Genoa Social Forum (that organized the anti-G8 protest in 2001), Vittorio Agnoletto, writes of the ESF as a "non-place": "it is not an academic conference, even though there are professors. It is not a party international, even though there are party militants and party leaders among the delegates. It is not a federation of NGOs and unions, although they have been the main material organizers of the meetings. The utopian dimension of the forum is in the active and pragmatic testimony that another globalization is possible" ("Il manifesto" 12/11/2003). References to "academic seminars" are also present in the activists' comments to single meetings published online (see e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=12, accessed 20/12/2006). Writing on the ESF in Paris, the sociologists Agrikoliansky and Cardon (2005, 47) stressed its plural nature:

"even if it re-articulates traditional formats of mobilizations, the form of the 'forum' has properties that are innovative enough to consider it as a new entry in the repertoire of collective action. … An event like the ESF in Paris does not indeed resemble anything already clearly identified. It is not really a conference, even if we find a program, debates and paper-givers. It is not a congress, even if there are tribunes, militants and mots d'ordre. It is not just a demonstration, even if there are marches, occupations and actions in the street. It is neither a political festival, even if we find stands, leaflets and recreational activities. The social forums concentrate in a unit of time and space such a large diversity of forms of commitment that exhaustive participation to all of them is impossible".

What unifies these different activities is the aim of providing a meeting space for the loosely coupled, huge number of groups that form the archipelagos of the GJM. Its aims include enlarging the number of individuals and groups involved but also providing a ground for a broader mutual understanding. Far from aiming at eliminating differences, the open debates should help increasing awareness of each other concerns and beliefs. The purpose of networking (through debating) was in fact openly stated already in the first ESF in Florence, where the Declaration of the European social movements reads:

"We have come together to strengthen and enlarge our alliances because the construction of another Europe and another world is now urgent. We seek to create a world of equality, social rights and respect for diversity, a world in which education, fair jobs, healthcare and housing are rights for all, with the right to consume safe food products produced by farmers and peasants, a world without poverty, without sexism and oppression of women, without racism, and without homophobia. A world that puts people before profits. A world without war. We have come together to discuss alternatives but we must continue to enlarge our networks and to plan the campaigns and struggles that together can make this different future possible. Great movements and struggles have begun across Europe: the European social movements are representing a new and concrete possibility to build up another Europe for another world".

Democracy in the forum is an important issues of discussion, with tensions between different models (horizontal versus vertical, but also as oriented to action or discussion) testified for by the different structures present within the forums. Again in Agrikoliansky and Cardon's words, "in order to avoid the destructuration typical of these types of reticular spaces, the 'central' organizational structures try to give coherence and a meaning to the alter-mondialist movement. This effort at coordination is implemented on different terrains and especially in the architecture of the places of debates and exchanges, that constitute the very body of the ESF" (ibid. 48). Similar to scientific conferences or party congresses, the plenary conferences offer a central focus, but also choreographically confirm the division between a stage for the few and the stalls for the crowds.

Very differently structured, the seminars and the ateliers—with people mostly seated in circles and intervening in a more informal way and as individuals more than as representatives of an

organization—should instead allow for the development of European networks from below on specific issues, an aim testified for by the exchange of addresses at the end of each session (ibid. 70). The openness towards "the others" is considered in some activists' comments as a most relevant attitude in order to "build nets from the local, to the national to the supranational" (see e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=62, accessed 20/12/2006). In this sense, social forums belong to emerging forms of action that stress, by their very nature, plurality and inclusion. Similar forms of protest that favours networking and successively "contamination" (or cross-fertilization) are the "solidarity assemblies", a series of assemblies where multiple and heterogeneous organizations active on similar issues are called to participate with their particular experiences[3] or the "fairs on concrete alternatives" whose aim is to link together various groups presenting alternatives to market economy ranging from fair trade to environmental protection (della Porta and Mosca 2006). Degrees of structuration, inclusivity and representation are always at the center of the discussion.

Keeping this function of encounter of many and heterogeneous groups and activists, the ESF is however a dynamic process. The focus of the initiatives in part changed, in part expanded from one ESF edition to the next. In the second edition, in Paris, there was an increasing attention to define a position towards the European Union, with the call for a "Europe of the citizens and the peoples" and the criticism of the form and the result of the European Convention and the EU policies on agriculture, migration and social issues. More attention focused on gender issues, unemployment and precarious work, housing and the rights of the most excluded (Sommier 2005, 25). The choice of London for the third edition was justified, among others, by the peculiarity of the British movements "struggling at the heart of the neo-liberal power" vis-à-vis the continental ones. The third ESF saw a growing focus on the issue of the war in Iraq and the position towards migrants and Muslim citizens in Europe and in the world—an issue already emerged in Paris with the debate around the speech of Tarik Ramadan, accused of "anti-semitism" for an open letter criticizing some French intellectuals published in the website of the ESF. In Athens, the large presence of Turkish activists and Eastern Europeans reflects an emerging attention towards the people and movements at the EU "periphery".

Also the organizational formula and practices changed. In the history of the ESF, the internal debate between those who supported "verticals" versus "horizontal" conceptions of democracy developed already since the first edition in Florence. There the representatives of local social forums called for a root-ness in the territory, the creation of open assemblies and a fluid structure, stressing the importance of the non-organized, (see, e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=12, accessed 20/12/2006). In Paris, the ESF had been accompanied by the Forum of the European trade unions and the Forum of the local authorities (with more than 200 participants). Institutional actors had become very visible (including the unions, even their European federation), especially in the press. The event had resonance in the national press--much more than the next two editions. In Italy, the daily "La Repubblica" wrote of the "big gathering", after the triumph of the anti-G8 protest, "Corriere della sera" reported on "a moment of important discussion for the civil society", "Europa" on "a crisis of growth", "L'Unità" on the "reaffirmation of the strength and the root-ness of the 'alter-globalist' movement", and "Il Messagero" covered the request of a "different globalization" by the former prime minister Alan Juppé. Although many articles stressed the plurality of the movement, voice was given especially to the mayors that hosted the forum, as well as to the representatives of political parties, unions and local governments, that were present at the ESF. The organization of the second forum is criticized not only for the fragmentation of the events in five distant places, but also for the decisions of the municipality to rent for the forum buildings from private firms, and hiring private policemen that prohibited entrance once the seats were taken. Already in this period, also the criticism of a tendency of the participants in the organizational process to ally along

[3] An Italian activist defined these solidarity assemblies as "a 'logistical pot' in which everyone puts their ingredients" (int. 20, p. 3, in Della Porta and Mosca 2006).

national lines emerged (see for instance the criticism by Bernard Cassen in "Le Monde diplomatique" of the Italian pressures to have the first ESF in Florence).

The tensions between "horizontals" and "verticals" increased in London, where the former openly contested the final plenary session, accusing the organizers to be dominated by "an oligarchy of parties and unions" and denounce the aggressive attitudes of the organizers' marshal body and the police at the final march ("La Repubblica", Bologna, 19/10/2004). A press release of the Italian radical union Cobas criticises the attitudes of the Britain Organizing committee (in particular the Socialist Worker Party, Socialist Action and some unions) accused of having monopolized the speech after the final march and repressed internal contestation. Another radical union, Sin Cobas, criticized the "traditional closure of the British politics, that involve also the radical left" as responsible for the incapacity to involve in the forum the "multitudes of the less-well structured groups". Widely discussed is the "problem of democracy and efficacy": some activists lament that only a few people decide and "those who speak in the assemblies are always male, white and 50 years old" ("Liberazione" 19/10/2004).

As we are going o see in more details in othe chapters of this report, the criticism to the organization of the ESF produced some structural change. In particular, the plenary sessions are reduced in London, and then abolished in Athens, in order to leave more space for "bottom up" networking, with specific assemblies (of women, of precarious workers, of migrants, of young people) oriented to build common initiatives. Additionally, "parallel" spaces for the critical groups are semi-institutionalized (although with different agreements) in the organization of the forum.

These transformations also interacted with some apparent change in the participants to the various events. Surveys of the first, second and fourth ESFs[4] indicate first of all a large presence of participants with previous experience of participation in events promoted by the GJM—with a clear growth of this category between Paris (slightly more than half) and Athens (almost four-fifths; although the growth is not so significant in comparison with the Florentine event) (see table 3). Looking at the frequency of participation in this type of events, in Athens there is a dramatic growth of the veterans of GJM events, with about 40% of people who have participated often (10 times and more). These data reflect the longer history of the GJM in 2006, but also indicate the increasing number of strongly committed activists in the ESF in general, and in our sample in particular. It is also coherent with the trend in degrees of identification in the GJM (see table 5), where we notice an important increase in the percent of those who declare to be strongly identified (from 24% in Florence to 39% in Athens, although the peak here is in Paris) and a parallel decline in those who are not at all or only a little identified (from 23% in Florence to 16% in Paris and then 13% in Athens).

Table 3 - Previous participation at events of the global social movement of ESF participants in Florence, Paris, Athens, valid cases only

	Florence 2002		Paris 2003		Athens 2006	
Participation*	**%**	**N**	**%**	**N**	**%**	**N**
Yes	71.3	1767	58.0	1274	79.7	952
No	28.7	710	42.0	924	20.3	243
Total	100	2477	100	2198	99.2	1195

NB - Missing: Florence N = 102; Paris N = 0; Athens N = 10

*All questionnaires ask for the frequency of previous participation, apart form the Foreign version of the Florence-Questionnaire. The dichotomous variable was calculated by coding the value 'never' as 'no'.

[4] See below for a methodological presentation of the surveys.

Table 4 - Frequency of previous participation at events of the global social movement of ESF Participants in Florence, Paris, Athens, valid cases only

	Florence 2002**		Paris 2003		Athens 2006	
Frequency of Participation*	%	N	%	N	%	N
Never	36.5	622	42.0	924	20.3	243
Seldom	16.0	272	17.5	385	11.2	134
Sometimes	27.5	468	28.5	627	28.6	342
Often	20.0	340	11.9	262	39.8	476
Total	100	1702	100	2198	100	1195

N B - Missing: Florence not available; Paris N = 0; Athens N = 10
* The more specific questions of Athens-Questionnaire and Paris-Questionnaire have been translated in the following way: 'once' → 'seldom'; '2-5 times' → 'sometimes';' 5-10 times' and '10 and more times'→ 'often' ** Only Italian respondents of the Italian version of the Questionnaire.

Table 5 - Level of identification with the global social movement of ESF participants in Florence, Paris, and Athens, valid cases only

Level of identification	**Florence 2002***		**Paris 2003**		**Athens 2006**	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
None	3.8	91	2.7	56	0.9	10
Little	19.0	452	13.7	282	12.4	146
Quite a lot	53.3	1270	41.0	846	47.4	557
Very much	24.0	571	42.6	879	39.4	463
Total	100	2384	100	2063	100	1176

NB - Missing: Florence N = 195; Paris N = 135; Athens N = 29

3. The research: methods and caveats

Although not exclusively (see below), this Work Package mainly relies upon a survey of the participants at the 4th European Social Forum in Athens, when possible compared with the data collected at similar endeavors at the 1st ESF in Florence (della Porta et al. 2006) and the 2nd one in Paris (Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005). Some methodological reflections on the advantages and disadvantages of this specific technique are therefore in order.

Research on social movements has considered the individual dimension through interviews oriented to assess paths into participation in protest events (Klandermans and Oegema 1987), patterns of activists' radicalization (della Porta 1995), long-term effects of socialization in social movements (McAdam 1988). If research on these issues employed mainly semi-structured or in-depth interviews and life histories, surveys have been more rare. Although sometimes used for discussing the characteristics of "protest-oriented" citizens (Barnes and Kaase 1979, Dalton 1996; Norris 2002), surveys on the whole population have been usually considered as not very useful for an analysis of social movements since the number of their members is in general too small to allow for statistically significant analyses. Logistical and epistemological concerns specific to research with questionnaires to activists have to be added to those related to surveys in general.

In the few cases in which structured questionnaires have been used, social movement activists have been surveyed in particular during demonstrations. A recent assessment of the social science

literature in the field mentions only three surveys of protest events before the late nineties: a comparison of four rallies that were held in 1970 and 1973 in the US (Seidler et al. 1976; Meyer, Seidler and MacGilivray 1977; Meyer and Seidler 1978); a survey of demonstrators at a national antinuclear rally held in Washington D.C. in 1979 (Ladd et al. 1983); a survey at a demonstration in Sheffield against the visit of the then Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher (Waddington et al. 1988). It was instead in the 1990s that surveys at demonstrations begun to spread, with three surveys at protest marches in France conducted in 1994 (see Favre, Fillieule and Meyer 1997; Fillieule 1997), four at marches in Belgium in 1998 (va Aelst and Walgrave, 2001). It is however in the years 2000 that surveys at protest events have been used more and more often in the wave of the global cycle of protest that became visible in Seattle in 1999. Among others, the Gruppo di Ricerca sull'Azione Collettiva in Europa (Grace) at the university of Florence surveyed participants at the anti-G8 protest in Genoa and the Peace March Perugia-Assisi in 2001, and the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 (Andretta et al, 2002; Della Porta et al 2003, della Porta et al 2006); The Groupe de recherches sur l'activisme altermondialiste (GRAAL, University of Paris Sorbonne) and the Centre de Recherche sur l'Action Politique (CRAPUL, University of Lausanne Suisse) have covered the anti-G8 protest in the French-Swiss region of Evian-Lausanne-Geneva and the 2nd European Social Forum in Paris, both in 2003 (Fillieule, Blanchard et al. 2005; Fillieule and Blanchard 2005; Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005). A survey has been conducted in 8 countries during the 15 February Global Day of Action in 2003 against the war in Iraq (Walgrave and Rucht forthcoming). Additionally, Bedoyan and Van Aelst (2003) surveyed a protest march in Brussels on December 14th 2001, Roth and Rucht protests against unemployment in four German cities, Eggert and Giugni on protest events in Zurich and Davos in 2004. Beyond providing data on the sociographic and political background of the activists as well as individual attitudes and behaviors, the mentioned research helped raising some main methodological caveats in this specific use of survey.

We shall start by acknowledging the general limits of surveys as heuristic devices. In terms of represntativeness, the surveys have to address problems related to the sampling error (not all members of the population have the same chances of being included in the sample); drop-out errors (related with the specific characteristics of those who refuse to be interviewed); understanding errors (respondents answer without understanding the questions); missing errors (a certain percent does not respond to specific questions). For well-known reasons, surveys focus on individuals: they are indeed not the best way to analyze either concrete organizational praxis or organizational values (Dryzek 2004). Additionally, they have to be used with care (and possibly triangulated with other, more qualitative techniques), when we want to study values or motivations in-depth. In fact, the very instrument of the survey discourages the active participation of interviewee and interviewer, reducing creativity and flexifility in the search for homogeneity and standardization. Besides the difficulty of assessing the influence of the interviewees attempts to provide "socially desiderable answers or rationalization", surveys tend to produce superficial or very standardized responses: "feelings and emotions, people's uncertainties, doubts, and fears, all the inconsistencies and the complexities of social interactions and belief systems are matters that are not easily rapped with survey questionnaires" (Klandermans and Smith 2002, 27). We tried to take into accounts these limits by triangulating the information collected through the survey with those coming from other methods (among which in depth interviews and participant observation, see below).

Another question, with implications for the representativity of the sample, concerns the status of the specific surveyed demonstrations vis-à-vis the social movement to be investigated. While in fact social movements are complex networks of networks, characterized by a changing degree of density, social movement events rarely involve all components equally. Additionally, given the high material and psychological cost of traveling, national and, especially, local activists are largely over-represented: at the first ESF, for instance, the largest component of participants was from Tuscany, and Italians were also of course more numerous than non-Italians. Samples that fairly well respect the composition of a certain event do not therefore reflect the characteristics of national and

(even less) transnational movements. The counter-summits targeting the EU are expected to reflect the characteristics of the national movements that organized and hosted them: a demonstration targeting the EU in pro-EU Belgium will have different social and political bases than a similar one in Euro-skeptic Sweden (see, e.g., Bédoyan and van Aelst 2003 on the EU countersummit in Brussels at the end of 2001 and Peterson 2006 on the EU countersummit in Gothenburg in 2002).

Additionally, especially among the locals, protest events attract also first-comers as well as people who are only marginally involved in a movement. Surveys at protest events address situations in which "Participation is generally not submitted to any condition. People do not need to be a member of an organization, they usually do not have to register (apart from the case of Social fora where you have to pay fees), etc. That means that the reference population, the crowd itself, can be composed of core militants, sympathisers, bystanders, sight-seers, lost people, tourists and sometimes opponents! A crowd can't be considered as equal to a social movement constituency. Its heterogeneity is far more important and different in nature" (Blanchard and Filleiule 2006). The sample therefore represented the specific characteristics of these subsamples of the movement population. The variety in terms of degree of commitment, identification and previous experience is actually enriching the possibility of analysis, but one should be cautious in generalizing results to the smaller circles of the most-committed activists.

In our research, we shall address these concerns by comparing the Athens ESF with other protest events that have been previously surveyed. Additionally, we shall compare subsample of the population with different degrees of commitment to the GJM.

An additional problem addresses the representativity of the sample. Pierre Favre, Olivier Fillieule and Nonna Mayer (Favre et al 1997) have been among the first scholars to devise a method to randomly sample demonstrators. As Blanchard and Fillieule (2006) recently summarized, "Since it is not possible to use a sampling strategy based on quotas, one has to use a probabilistic method, that is to say, to guarantee that all possible participants would have equal opportunity of being interviewed". In order to device a technique that would implement this aim the researcher has to take into account the symbolic allocation of spaces in a demonstration, as well as demonstrators' habits. As Fillieule pointed out, at demonstrations: "people do assemble at a meeting point, march under a banner, depending on multiple belongings, following a march order that is predetermined by organizers. Others are more erratic, travelling from one group to another, from the very heart of the demonstration to its margins. These numerous spatial and temporal distributions have a clear consequence: one must use two different methods, depending on which stage of a demonstration is concerned, the assembling phase or the march itself" (Fillieule, 1997, methodological appendix).

Taking into account this participants' "use" of the marches, a two steps sampling procedures has been proposed. A first step involves the distributions of questionnaires at the gathering space:

"The gathering space (generally a square and its adjacent streets) is divided in advance into sectors clearly identified by some spatial distinguishing marks. One generally knows in advance where the different groups are due to assemble under their banners, carts etc. For big events, the press will even publish maps indicating the different meeting points. It is also sometimes possible to have in advance an idea of the rough number of people per group or cluster of groups. In each cell, interviewers (the number of which is defined depending on the expected density of demonstrators per cells) must randomly select interviewees. As usually in probabilistic methods, the only criterion for the selection of the respondents is randomness. This can best be achieved by relying on a counting system always taking, for example, the Xth person in a group. Two persons who stand alongside may not be interviewed both. In case of refusal, on the contrary, one should try to interview the nearest person in the group" (Blanchard and Fillieule 2006; see also Fillieule and Sainte-Marie 1996).

In a second phase, questionnaires are administered during the protest march itself. Here, according to Blanchard and Fillieule,

"the best solution is to divide the interviewers in two squads. One is placed at the front of the demonstration and the other at the end of it. The first group starts its interviews at the head of the march and gradually comes down the demonstration to the end of it. The second group starts at the end (and must then wait for the end of the procession to leave the gathering place) and walk up to the head of the demonstration. Depending on the available resources, it is always possible to multiply the number of squads as long as they are intervening in a symmetrical way in the procession. Each squad of interviewers is ruled by two head persons whose mission is to offer spatial points of reference on each side of the demonstration and to decide who will be interviewed by whom and in what row (that rule could be of an utmost importance, especially if the interviewers are not professional staff or specifically trained personnel)" (ibidem).

In order to offer all participants equal chances to be interviewed, also further surveys at demonstrations have usually sampled the Nth person in every Nth row of a march (e.g. Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). This sampling method proved however difficult to implement at very large demonstrations. At the Global Days of Action against the war on Iraq, activists interviewed during a cross national research project were mainly selected at the beginning and the end of the marches (in some cases involving between half a million and two millions participants), paying attention to select randomly in different sectors of the squares or parks where demonstrators converged (see Rucht and Walgrave forthcoming). Still different criteria were used in order to select interview partners at social forum, e.g. static events. The sample for a survey conducted during the days of the anti-G8 protest in Genoa in 2001 included people selected randomly over the various initiatives ("theme-based piazzas", debates, campsites etc.), so as to be able to construct a representative sample of the various "souls" of the movement (Andretta et al 2002). Similarly constructed was the sample for a survey of the first European Social Forum in Florence in 2002 (della Porta et al 2006), and the one on a countersummit against the G8 meeting at Evian that involved a cross-border demonstration between France and Switzerland (Fillieule et al 2004). This was also the strategy we have used at the Athens ESF, trying to exploit the nature of the event as a long-lasting meeting, during which it was possible to find time to complete and return the questionnaire.

In all these cases, since purely random sampling was impossible given the lack of knowledge on the universe of participants, the representativeness of the sampled interviewees is a critical issue, to be monitored in relation to the known dimensions of the universe. For the GSF survey, the composition of the surveyed sample by organizational areas was compared with the estimates of number of participants from the different networks provided by the organizers on the eve of the protests.[5] For the 1st ESF survey, the distribution of the sample according to nationality was compared with that of those enrolled at the Forum (della Porta et al 2006). For our survey, we are trying to gain similar information on the country distribution as collected at registration.

Especially for transnational protest events, basic decisions affecting the representativity of the sample refer to the language used in the questionnaires. Since activists may be expected to be more willing to respond to a questionnaire in their mother tongue the decision if and in how many and which languages to translate the questionnaire has an effect on the final sample. For instance, although using more or less the same techniques for sampling, the choice of distributing questionnaires only in Italian at an anti-G8 survey was reflected in a sample almost entirely composed of Italians, while the translation in English, French, Spanish and German of the questionnaire distributed at the first ESF produced a multinational sample (della Porta et al. 2006). In our case, we have translated our questionnaire in all the languages of the countries involved in the Demos project and, additionally, in Greek.

A fourth element affecting representativeness is, as for other surveys, return rates. Due to logistic difficulties, interviews can rarely be done face-to-face. Respondents are in fact either asked to give back the questionnaire at a collecting point, or often asked to fill in the questionnaires and mail

[5] Since the figures were used for logistical purposes (such as finding lodging for the incoming activists), they were expected to be quite reliable.

them back. The return rate of questionnaires distributed at the February 15th global day of action varied for instance between the 37% of the questionnaires distributed at the Spanish march and the 54% of those distributed in the Netherlands (Walgrave and Verlhulst 2004). Other questionnaires have given similar results (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). The peculiarities of the respondents in terms of age, gender and education can of course bias the results. Two possible ways to address this issue have been suggested. First, a comparison between results of interviews run face-to-face and returned questionnaires in postal surveys (della Porta forthcoming). Second, the recording of some information on those who refuse taking the questionnaire. As Blanchard and Fillieule (2006) summarized, "By doing that, the researcher can at a minimum determine whether the pool of respondents over-represents particular organizational affiliations, demographics, or any other pertinent categories. This knowledge can improve the validity of one's conclusions from an imperfect sample by allowing a more accurate interpretation of survey results".

Specific to surveys at demonstration is moreover the highly emotionally charged environments where they are distributed (and, possibly, collected): the march. As Blanchard and Fillieule (2006) noted, "People attending a protest event or a political rally are by nature in an expressive situation. They do actually express their feelings and their opinions, if only by being there, by chanting and shouting slogans, by raising their fists, by wearing masks or costumes, by holding banners or placards. Two consequences follow. One is that people's willingness to participate is generally optimal, apart for those groups and individuals who reject as a whole poll techniques and sociological surveys as being part of the 'dominant order'. The other is that in case of face-to-face interviews, people will certainly pay little attention to the questions since they are engaged at the same time in a collective action, surrounded by colleagues, friends, relatives and the whole crowd". Additionally, the filling in of questionnaires can become a collective action, and the pressure to adhere to the group values is strong. This problems of validity can be considered in designing the questionnaire (avoiding long and complex questions, keeping the completion time low, focusing on actual behaviors) as well as, of course, in the interpretation of the data.

We tried to take into account these caveats in the preparation of our research, distribution of the questionnaires and interpretation of the results.

First of all, we devoted time and energies to designing a questionnaire which was short enough to avoid drop outs, and with clear questions (valid indicators). In particular, taking into account previous experiences with surveys, we used some already tested questions focused on the socio-demographic characteristics, trust in institutions and previous experiences of participation of the activists—that is, variables that we expext would affect decision making processes and the development of deliberative processes. We had instead to develop questions on the much less studied dimensions of democracy inside and outside movements.

Our interest in the micro-dimension of conceptions and practices of democracy is reflected in the activists' survey we carried out during the 4th European Social Forum in Athens on May 3-6, 2006. The idea was to design a questionnaire focusing on respondents' normative conceptions and actual perceptions of democratic practices, at three levels of the group, the movement and the political institutions in general. Since ours was the first attempt to develop a questionnaire on conceptions and practices of democracy, we devoted a long and intense time to questionnaire testing and redrafting. First, the German team in collaboration with the EUI team developed a draft questionnaire containing questions on activism, group affiliation and concepts of democracy. Different versions of the questionnaires were tested in the UK and Germany in 2005, and twice in Italy in 2006. In Britain, a pre-test was run at the anti-G8 protest at Gleneagles in July 2005, where the British team undertook short face-to-face interviews with 493 participants in the Make Poverty History march, and distributed 2,000 longer self-completion questionnaires to marchers (with a response rate of 28%). In Germany, a revised questionnaire was used to survey participants at the first national Social Forum in Erfurt, 21 – 24 July 2005, where 785 questionnaires were handed out in the registration area and 310 returned (response rate of app. 40%). A still different version of the questionnaire was tested by the EUI team during the march against the Bolkestein directive, which,

in parallel with marches in other European cities, was held in Rome on October 15th 2005. During this event we distributed 723 questionnaires, 475 (65.6%) of which were fully completed and returned.

We analysed these questionnaires, paying especially attention to missing values and variation in responses. These tests indicated that the questionnaire had to be shortened and that some variables/values needed to be rephrased, cut or substituted. After this meeting, a working committee started a long deliberation process that was concluded with a "fair consensus" on the final draft, which was once again tested in Italy in April 2006 with satisfying results: about 30 participants in a seminar organized by Italian NGOs (a conference by Serge Latouche in Florence) filled the questionnaire in a complete way.

Most members of the Demos team plus some additional collaborators (for a total of 19 researchers) participated in the distribution and collection of the questionnaires that took place as planned at the 4th European Social Forum in Athens on May 3-6 2006. The questionnaires (translated in English, Italian, Spanish, German, French and Greek) were distributed at the main entrance of the Forum, in the common spaces and during the workshops. We used a double sampling strategy, the main one being random, the second one over-sampling the activists coming from the countries selected for the Demos project. About 1200 questionnaires (with a return rate of more than 30%) were returned at our Demos-desk at the entrance of the ESF premises. Given the logistical challenges of our survey, this return rate—similar to those obtained in previous research--can be considered as satisfactory (Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001).

Considering that the number of filled questionnaires for several countries is too low to analyze them as separate national cases, we decided to use only the whole data set for the WP5 report. This report will aim however at analyzing the ESFs under different angles. Although keeping a special focus on the 4th ESF in Athens, the report will also consider information on the other European Social Forums. We will in fact use surveys conducted at the other ESFs (in Florence and Paris). Moreover, when possible, we compare those data with those coming from other surveys on protest events (like the 15th of February 2003) or the whole population (European value survey, European social survey, Eurobarometer). Taking into account the methodological limitations of the survey, we also triangulated survey results with additional materials such as the programs of the Forums; the press coverage of the Forums; interviews with organizers. Accounts from participant observation at the 2nd, 3rd and 4th ESF are also used. In all chapters, the conceptions of democracy in the European Social Forums are treated as the dependent variable and we shall look at their interactions with the sociodemographic, relational, and ideological characteristics of the activists.

The next chapter, on The Forum in context, will locate the European Social Forums within their national contexts as well as tracing a short history of the ESF. Chapter 3 will focus upon Conceptions of democracy, presenting the various dimensions of our main dependent variables as they emerge from the analysis of the batteries of questions 11, 12 and 13. Internal debates/documents are used as illustrations.

Looking at How to reform existing institutions, chapter 4 addresses the activists' attitudes towards democracy, as they emerge from the analysis of questions 15, 16, 18, 19. Internal debates/documents are also analysed.

Chapter 5 focuses on The sociodemography of activism, covering the gender (question 21), age (22), educational (28), and employment (25, 26) background of the activists, and looking at the way in which these dimensions influence the conception of democracy. The debate on the inclusivity (and exclusion) of the ESF is also addressed.

Chapter 6 is devoted to The organizational dimension that addresses the organizational background of the activists and the Forum, as well as their (different?) democratic visions. It includes data from the survey on individual membership (questions 6, 7, 8, 9) as well as data on the organizers of the various sessions of the Forum.

Chapter 7 on Networking in/and the movement apply network analysis to the survey data, focusing on the multiple and multilevel memberships of the activists.

Protest and the Forum is analysed in Chapter 8 which addresses the repertoire of protest of the activists (Question 5) and their effects on conceptions of democracy. It will also look at the ESF as a form of protest and at the protests that take place within the forum (e.g. the marches by the SWP) and are organized by the ESF (final march) or around the Forum (e.g. direct action etc.).

Chapter 9, Communicating the Forum, analyses the communication within/by the forum. It uses the data on the use of Internet by the activists (Q. 20) and their relations with conceptions of democracy, and also on the communicative strategies used by the networks involved in the Forum as well as the (lack of) resonance of the Forum in the press.

Finally, chapter 10, on The Forum and the Left, addresses the political alignments of the activists (Q. 29, 30, 31, 32) as well as the attitudes towards political institutions (Q. 10; 14; 17), and their effects on visions of democracy. Internal debates/documents on the issue of institutional alliances are used as illustrations and the way in which institutions/the institutional left interacts with the Forum at the local, national and supranational level is also looked at.

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Chapter 2

The ESF organizational process in a diachronic perspective

by Lorenzo Mosca and Isabelle Sommier[6]

1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the European process of regionalization of the World Social Forum presenting it in a diachronic perspective. The social forum process is a complex one since it involves different territorial levels, groups with heterogeneous cultural backgrounds, languages, ideological tendencies etc. The ESF organizational process can be seen as the outcome of multi-level interactions going from the International level (International Council of the World Social Forum and European Preparatory Assemblies) to the national level and to the local one and vice-versa. However, it seems that such a process works mainly as a top-down process than a bottom-up one. This multi-level process implies a series of tensions both of a vertical type (between different territorial levels) and of horizontal nature (within the same territorial level).

This chapter is based on literature review, analysis of minutes and documents of the ESF preparatory process, and in-depth interviews with some of the forum organizers. We will firstly examine similarities and differences between the World Social Forum and the European social forum, highlighting the peculiarities of the organizational process in the European context (§ 1.1). We will then focus on the organizational process of the Florence ESF (§ 2.1) presenting the rationale for the choice of the city of Florence and the work of the different working groups organizing the forum (logistics, contents and network enlargement). The following paragraph will illustrate the main aspects of the Paris ESF (§ 2.2). Finally, we will underline the main findings of our research (§ 3).

1.1 The invention of the forum form: its stakes and rules and its process of dissemination

The forum form was founded in January 2000 during a meeting between the president of Attac, Bernard Cassen, Chico Whitaker (the secretary of the Peace and Justice Commission of the National Conference of the Brasilian bishops), and Oded Grajew (in charge of several associations militating in favor of corporate ethics [7] . The Porto Alegre Charter defines the Social Forum in the following words: "A space of open meetings, aiming at deepening reflection, the democratic debate of ideas, the formulation of propositions, the exchange of experiences in complete freedom, and the articulation of effective actions of groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to the domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and who apply themselves to building a planetary society based on the human being" (point 1). As Agrikoliansky and Cardon underline, "it is not exactly a conference, even if one can find a program, debates and contributors. It is not a congress either, even if we can see amphitheaters, militants and slogans. It is not just a demonstration, even if one can observe processions, occupations and actions in the streets. It is not a political fair either, even if one encounters stands, leaflets and festive activities" (2005, 47). It is all of each of these at once.

The first WSF took place at Porto Alegre in January the following year. During the Second WSF in January 2002, it was decided to hold a European Forum. Two countries were in competition,

[6] The part of the this chapter concerning the French case is largely inspired by Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005 and, in particular, by chapter 1 (written by Isabelle Sommier).

[7] In his book, Bernard Cassen presents himself as the spiritual father of the initiative, unlike Francisco (Chico) Whitaker who, in a Brazilian article (published in *Correio da Cidadania* dated January 22, 2001) attributes it to Oded Grajew. They would have submitted together the idea to the director of *Le Monde Diplomatique*.

France and Italy. France considered itself the natural candidate because of the extensive influcence of Attac and because of the founding role played by Bernard Cassen in the invention of the forum form. It could also rely on the successful experience of the *Rencontres internationales de Paris* organized in June 1999 by the same group under the promising slogan: "The dictatorship of markets? Another world is possible!", a Social Forum in miniature ahead of its time, as B. Cassen (2003, 33) says, they brought together 1200 persons from 80 different countries. The French candidacy could also advance itself because it had the support of the municipalities of Paris and Saint-Denis, and thus the necessary institutional support. But the Paris candidacy came up against that of the Italians, who wanted the opportunity to recover from the traumatism of Genoa [8] a few months previously before. The decision to organize the first ESF in Italy was a mark in support of the solidarity of the diffuse Global Justice Movement (GJM) of the peninsula, in the political context of the government of Silvio Berlusconi. It is already through consensus (or through compromise?) that the choice was made and Italy was given the first ESF in November 2002, and France the second the following year. The Italians had only a few months to prepare, from March to November 2002.

Inspired by Porto Alegre and respecting the Charter, the Organization of the ESF differs slightly from that of the WSF, as described in an essential article by Christophe Aguiton and Dominique Cardon (2005) "The construction of the forum form on the base of a reticular structure can be described as realizing a dual project sharing two objectives (P1 – Producing a common space and P2 – favoring the emergence of collective actions) and subject to three horizontal constraints common to the network form: extending connections to new actors (C1), refusing delegation (C2) and adopting consensus as a decision-making procedure (C3)." These principles are summarized in the following schema:

P1. Producing a common space Socializing goal	P2. Favoring the emergence of collective actions Mobilizing goal	
C1. Extend the network of participants Principle of diversity (articles 1[9] and 9[10] of the Charter)	C2. Refusing delegation and spokesperson (article 6 of the Charter)	C3. Decision by consensus

The interpretation of these principles and above all the balance between them allows three "types of government for the social forums ": 1) The co-optive model, the original (The Brazilian organizing committee is composed of 8 organizations), which characterized the organization of the WSFs from 2001 to 2003; 2) The assembly model adopted by the ESF; 3) The agglutination model

[8] The protest, in July 2001, against the G8 in Genoa had been a great success in terms of number of participants, but had been marked by violence and a severe police repression, which had provoked the death of one demonstrator, Carlo Giuliani (Andretta *et al.* 2002 and Samizdat.net 2002).

[9] "The World Social Forum is an open space or meeting (…) of bodies and movements of civil society which oppose neo liberalism and domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and which apply themselves to building a planetary society based on the human being" (article 1 of the Charter of the Principles of the World Social Forum).

[10] "The World Social Forum will always be an opened space for pluralism and diversity of the commitments and actions of bodies and movements that decide to participate in it, as to the plurality of genders, ethnic groups, cultures, generations and psychical capacities, as long as they respect the Charter of the Principles (…) The representatives of parties or military organizations, as such, will not be allowed to participate in the Forum. It will be possible to invite to participate, as individuals, those in charge of government offices and parliamentary representatives who accept the commitments of the present Charter".

chosen by the International Board at Perugia in April 2004 with the view of preparing the following WSF of Porto Alegre, in response to the criticisms expressed during the Fourth WSF in Mumbai in January 2004: the removal of plenary sessions and the mechanism of self-organization via the Internet.

Unlike the closed structure of the first WSFs, the ESF "proposes a reformulation of the tension between discussion space and collective mobilization by placing at the center of the definition of the organizational structures of forums the 'social movements,' rather than the heterogeneous coalition of NGOs, unions, and think tanks which had brought to the fore the polyphonic space of the WSFs." (Aguiton and Cardon 2005) Thus the choice of an inclusive structure: The European Preparatory Assembly bringing together all the "social movements" who wanted to participate, and the role given to the Call for social movements that, however, is still the source of debates, as we will see later.

In effect, two conceptions of forum form are in opposition. In the spirit of the Brazilian founders, consecrated the Porto Alegre Charter, the forum was decidedly not a deliberative space and consequently does not have the goal of arriving at taking positions, nor an appeal fixing the mobilizations to come. "The WSF does not take positions as such, there is not a 'final communiqué' of its meetings; there are simply texts adopted *during* the WSF, but not texts *of* the WSF" (Cassen 2003, 81). As is stated in Article 6 of the Charter: "The meetings of the World Social Forum do not deliberate on behalf of the World Social Forum as a body. No-one, therefore, will be authorized, in any kind of edition, to express on behalf of the forum, positions claiming to be those of all its participants. The participants in the Forum shall not be called on to take decisions as a body, whether by vote or acclamation, on declarations or proposals for action that would commit all, or the majority, of them and that propose to be taken as establishing positions of the Forum as a body. It thus does not constitute a locus of power to be disputed by the participants in its meetings, nor does it intend to constitute the only option for interrelation and action by the organizations and movements that participate in it." Or also according to Article 5: "The World Social Forum brings together and interlinks only organizations and movements of civil society from all the countries in the world, but it does not intend to be a body representing world civil society." This is the conception of the forum as a *space* (encounters, exchanges and debates).

Opposed to this vision is that of the forum as a *movement*, of a decision-making assembly that after the event, will make a synthesis of the discussions, draw out propositions and launch future campaigns. It also responds to the desire of certain organizations calling for a more offensive "movementist" nature of the GJM, but also doubtless to the desire of certain militants (and journalists), to benefit from a sort of programmatic conclusion of the social forums. Without this, the Forums risk becoming gigantic conferences or solemn social gatherings. However, it is doubtful that the ensemble of the groups participating in this kind of event could agree on a single text, which brings us back to the nagging question of the representativeness of the signatories.[11] This is the reason why the Assemblies of *the* social movements (and not, more modestly, *of* social movements, as B. Cassen acidly remarks), while following the process of the forums, meet outside the official dates of them (following them).

The organizational process of the Florence ESF was characterized on the one side by some tensions and disagreements between the local and the national level (see also chapter 9) and on the other side by an effort to demonstrate to the International Council (IC) of the World Social Forum the coherence of the ESF process with the Charter of Principles of Porto Alegre.

As for the first tension, some activists living in the city regretted the fact that the decision to organize the first European social forum in Florence was taken in distant places without consulting them. Indeed, during the second world social forum (January 2002) a discussion took place on the

[11] Bernard Cassen claims that the Call of the Social movements of Porto Alegre 3 was signed only by 192 organizations among the 2000 or 3000 attending the WSF (*ibidem*, 117).

organization of the first ESF. As we have already underlined, the French committee proposed its candidature to host it but the social movements assembly finally agreed that the first forum would have been held in Italy while the following one in France (interview 3). The European organizers had to stay in contact with the IC of the WSF in order to grant the integration of the Florence ESF in the world social forum process (interview 4). Indeed the ESF has been the outcome of a tense dialectic between European organizers and the ones organizing the WSF.

The organizational formula of the two forums is different. In the case of the WSF, the local organizing committee in Brasil is formed by just eight organizations while most important decisions (such as the place where the forum is held and how it has to be organized) are made by a (closed) International Council.

As it has been already pointed out in the introductory chapter, in the case of the ESF the European Preparatory Assembly (EPA) is the main decisional body of the organizational process. First of all it is interesting to reflect on the labeling of such body and underlying the difference with the WSF process. The EPA is not presented as a (closed) council made of delegates, like in the case of the WSF's International Council. Its labeling recalls immediately participatory principle and open space logic. As a matter of fact, everyone can participate in this kind of meetings that are held in different European cities in order to facilitate the participation of people from different countries.[12]

If the organizational process of the ESF had already initiated in Porto Alegre where it was agreed to have a continental forum in Europe, the organizational process of the European forum as such started with a EPA hold in Bruxelles in March 2002. Other European assemblies were convened about every two months in different European countries: Vienna (May), Thessalonica (July) and, finally, Barcelona (October).

Tensions between the IC and the EPA were present especially when the ESF process started. In the Vienna EPA (May 2002) one of the issue that was discussed concerned the status of the European social forum process and the search for people to be sent to talk with the WSF organizers in Porto Alegre and to convince them that the intention of the European organizers consisted in establishing a continuity with the Charter of Principles of Porto Alegre (interview 11). Along the Florence ESF organizing process three international meetings (two in San Paolo and one in Bangkok) took place between a delegation of the EPA and the WSF IC with the aim to persuade them that the Florence ESF was internal to the forum process of Porto Alegre (interview 4).

A document presenting the ESF clearly stressed the difference with the Porto Alegre forum and the attempt of the IC to guide the process of regionalization of the WSF: "The International council of the WSF discussed the structures of the continental forum preparatory processes and proposes that Continental Organizing Committees should be given this task, each of these should form 'Executive Secretariats'" (document 1). The choice made by European organizers was however different. As they wrote in a document presenting the ESF: "We can't simply use the WSF example. We have, by force, to find another way. Porto Alegre has been prepared by an International Council formed by the ones who initiated the process with the addition --in a cooptative way-- of individuals, representatives of movement and networks, intellectuals … [in Europe] it's impossible to establish an International Preparatory Committee formed by formal representatives of movements at the national level … the European movements, starting from the ones who signed the social movement call of Porto Alegre 2002, have the responsibility to start, to engage and to build up the preparatory process, in an *inclusive* and *participatory* way" (document 2, emphasis added).

[12] However, like the IC, EPA is criticized by grassroots activists as raising a *de facto* barrier to participation since only people with time and resources to travel can take active part in the organizational process at the European level. Moreover, information on these meetings is not always easily accessible and the transparency of the agenda formation and of the decisions made there is not always granted (Doerr 2005: 19; Mosca 2005).

The European preparatory process is then based on a participative working method relying on open working groups in contrast with the WSF IC which is considered as a "committee of professionals" (document 3). The Europeans marked their difference and autonomy from the WSF IC stating that "the European movements have their own history, identity and an already existing process of networking that we want to emphasize and to take into account: we were not born in Porto Alegre, we have very long experience of mobilizations and struggles" (document 4).

However, the European preparatory process maintains a clear linkage with the WSF being based on a common framework provided by the Porto Alegre principles. The specific aim of the ESF organizers consisted in including other experiences "which until now don't have had a dialogue with the Porto Alegre process, even if they are part of the movement against neoliberism" (document 2; see also interview 11).

The relationship between the EPA and the WSF IC was (and is still) surrounded by a latent tension concerning the degree of autonomy that the Europeans can exercise towards the WSF. One of the main issues at stake concerned the status of political parties that is clearly stated in the Porto Alegre Charter of Principles: "Neither party representations nor military organizations shall participate in the Forum. Government leaders and members of legislatures who accept the commitments of this Charter may be invited to participate in a personal capacity" (document 5).

Hence, the EPA had to find a way out to, on the one side, grant the respect of the principles of Porto Alegre and, on the other side, create more room for political parties that in some national European contexts are fully part of the movement. An EPA hold in Vienna (May 2002) drew up several guidelines that made the ESF quite accessible to political parties. Specifically, party representatives are allowed to be part of national delegations representing national social movements. Besides, party leaders, cadres, and members can directly register to the forums as delegates while the WSF only allowed collective subscriptions and party members could not subscribe to the forum but only participate as observers. Limits to political parties concerned only "visible moments" (such as plenary conferences) that after the third European Social Forum were abolished since they rapidly became loci of power struggles between bigger, resourceful, and vertical organizations. Notwithstanding, the EPA hold in Tessalonika (July 2002) made the decision that political parties, not allowed to organize and speak at conferences and seminars, could organize workshops, providing that they were not simply promoting themselves (document 6). This decision was however opposed by a WSF IC hold in Bangkok (August) issuing a reminder of the charter of principles and expressing doubts about the possibility of allowing political parties to organize workshops. A European preparatory meeting organized in Brussels (September) restated the coherence with the Charter stating that if workshops were organized by political parties this would in no way means that they were co-organizers of the ESF and therefore the opinion was that the Charter of Principles would be respected (document 7).

Another difference between the WSF and the ESF is that the latter did not foreseen separated forums for parliamentarians and local authorities as in Porto Alegre. The two are invited to confront with social movements in special sessions of the official program.

2. An analysis of the specificities of the three ESFs

2.1 The Florence ESF

The program of the Florence European social forum enumerates 18 plenary conferences (in rooms with a capacity of 2,000 sits and simultaneous translations in five languages), 160 seminars (simultaneously translated in three languages) and 180 self-organized workshops. The forum was hence based on three different types of discursive events: very huge (and media) events, small self-organized workshops and in between seminars with some thousands of participants. In the forum participated 426 organizations, 60,000 individual participants coming from 105 countries, 1,000 volunteers, 300 translators (both professionals and volunteers), and 1,300 accredited journalists

from all over the world. During the forum 75 cultural events were organized: 20 theatre performances, 20 cinematographic events, 15 exhibitions, and the involvement of 20 music bands. 15,000 meals per day were prepared by four bars selling biological and fair trade food (document 8). The final outdoor rally saw the participation of between 500,000 (according to the police) and 1,000,000 (according to the organizers) demonstrators.

While the official data on people subscribed to the ESF refers of 60,000 individuals, one of the organizers explained "in the end we printed 60,000 coupons but between the evening of the first day and the morning of the second one they were already finished. Hence, the figure of 60,000 participants was an appraisal" (interview 2).

2.1.1 The choice of the city hosting the forum

Differently from the following ESF that took place in capital cities, for the first one an evaluation was made in order to weight pros and cons of different places and to choose the most suitable one for an event like this. Other Italian cities in the North and in the South proposed in fact their candidature. Information on the different candidatures was gathered by "a contact group with local administrations" and organized in a report focusing on three different aspects: political-institutional, economical-financiary, available human resources (document 9).

The choice to host the forum in the city of Florence was made by the Italian national committee in charge of organizing the forum and confirmed by a European preparatory meeting held in Vienna (May). The final discussion was focusing around three different cities: Florence (centre), Naples (south) and Venice (north-east). According to our interviewees two different criteria were considered by the Italian committee to make the final choice: the availability of strong support by local institutions and the configuration of the multi-organizational field at the local level. As for the first criterion, all candidate cities were administered by centre-left coalitions willing to support the forum. However, the case of Tuscany region was quite problematic from this point of view since the regional government was guided by a centre-left coalition excluding the Communist Refoundation Party, one of the active members of the national organizing committee. This is the reason why this group was against the hypothesis to organize the forum in Florence and pressed to have it in Naples.

As for the second criterion, the cities of Naples and Venice were perceived by some movement sectors as challenging a principle of pluralism since the multi-organizational field in those cities was characterized by the presence of very strong organizational networks threatening the equilibrium among different groups. Naples was characterized by the presence of strong rank-and-file groups agglutinated in the "noglobal network" originally created to oppose the Global forum on digital divide held in March 2001. The "noglobal network" was a coalition of local social centers, rank-and-file unions, unemployed organizations and local cadres of the Communist Refoundation Party etc. Venice was instead considered as being the stronghold of the Disobedients (former White Overalls movement), a network of social centers mostly based in the centre-north characterizing their action for a rethinking of the concept of civil disobedience (see della Porta *et al.* 2006). Differently from Naples and Venice, Florence was not characterized by the presence of strong organizational sectors and the local social forum was very active and very heterogeneous granting to provide space and support to different organizational sectors (interview 2).

It is worth explaining for non-Italian readers that the region of Tuscany is part of a group of four regions (Umbria, Emilia-Romagna, Marche) Italian political scientists have defined as belonging to the "red subculture". This area is characterized by a socialist/communist subculture and, though evolving, a positive attitude towards left-oriented participation (Partridge 1998). Besides, a peculiar civic infrastructure made of hundreds of people's houses (*case del popolo*) could be activated in this region to provide logistic support to the forum. As a matter of fact, many delegations coming from

Eastern Europe were hosted in municipalities not far from Florence (most of them governed by centre-left coalitions) and many initiatives were organized in people's houses.

2.1.2 The organizational process

As we have already stressed in the introduction of this chapter, the ESF was the outcome of a multilevel organizational process (see figure 1). While the EPA was considered as the main decisional body, an important role was played by a national organizing committee called "continuity group of the ESF". The EPA met in fact only bimonthly and the work between one assembly and the following one was mainly carried out by this national organizing committee. The group was presented as open and characterized by a certain turnover of people. It was formed by between 30 and 40 people. The core of the group was formed by members of some organizations: Roundtable for Peace, rete Lilliput (nonviolent network), Pax Christi (catholic organization), Legambiente (environmental organization), Cgil, Fiom, Cobas confederation, Sin.Cobas (trade unions), Giovani Comunisti (youth party), Rifondazione Comunista (party), Arci (left association), Attac-Italy and Disobedients.

Figure 1 – Multi-level organizational structure in the first European social forum



The national organizing committee in charge of organizing the forum set up three working groups that mirrored the ones working at the European level within the EPA: a working group on program and methodology, a working group on organization and structure of the ESF (communication, finance, logistic, travels, interpretation) and a working group called "building and enlarging the net". The first one was in charge of defining the official program of the forum, mainly plenary assemblies and seminars (while workshops were instead self-organized). The second one had to plan the budget, raise funds, find accommodation, and take care of translation and communication aspects. The third one was supposed to engage in the forum as many diverse groups as possible, with a special attention to Eastern Europeans, scarcely involved in the preparatory process.

2.1.3 Defining the program

Many interviewees reported that arranging the name of the panelists for the plenary conferences was not an easy task but still easier than as it was in the following forums. As one of the national organizers remembered "defining the political program in Florence was much easier than in Paris where the Cencelli's Manual[13] was fully applied… I remember that in the last months before the Paris forum there were meetings taking place every Monday before agreeing on the official program and there was an allotment like 'this yes, this no, we can put that there etc.'. This is something that did not happen in Florence because the level of sharing was really much higher and it was higher also at the European level… this was clearly related to the fact that you have done a common route from Genoa on" (interview 4).

The choice of thematic axes was quite easy and consensual since it was inspired by the Genoa Public Forum (July 2001) and the second World Social Forum (January 2002). Considering the reports of the EPAs it emerges however the difficulty to reach an agreement on the final program. First of all, the number of proposed seminars was higher then the available rooms in the Fortress. Thus, some had to be fused together. Another difficult issue at stake concerned the decision on the names of the key speakers of the plenary conferences (18). During the Thessalonica EPA (July 2002) it was agreed to define a series of criteria for the final choice concerning just 65-70 speakers. The criteria were the following: gender (balance between men and women), presence of young people, specific competencies (related to the specific issues), presence of activists (significant experience in the movement), well known people at the international level. Besides, "The general balance has to reflect the plural movements in term of awareness, nationalities, diversity of the actors committed in the forum preparation (personalities, activists, intellectuals…)" (document 10). However, the criteria were very numerous and not too strict in fact at the beginning of October 180 requests were received by the EPA program working group and the organizers estimated to end up with between 220 and 250 requests.

While the process of formation of the program for the Florence ESF is generally referred by interviewees as consensual but not simple, more problematic seems to have been the drafting of the part of the program concerning self-organized workshops. The compilation of the self-organized events became also a political issue since it implied choices concerning the location, the availability of translators and the timetable. All these issues at stake were decisive to assess the visibility of one event. Besides, it was decided that the official program would have been printed in 30,000 copies and distributed for free by *Liberazione*, the newspaper of the Communist Refoundation Party. Then the final program of self-organized events was drafted by a member of the national organizing committee trying to mediate between different movement sectors, by a member of the administrative staff in charge of the compilation of the program and by a member of the editorial board of Liberazione in charge of paginating and printing the program. According to one member of the administrative staff "the difficult thing of an event like this is that it is not a commercial event with clear parameters but it is an amalgam of different will, visibility, needs, etc. there was a sort of detachment between the political group and the organizational one and this means to mediate until the very last second on everything and thus to put back hundred of times the hands on the program and it is a miracle that the morning when the forum opened we had it printed" (interview 10).

2.1.4 Funds and organization

In order to solve budget problems, during the preparatory phase of the forum, the European assembly discussed the possibility to cover expenses through private sponsors but several members

[13] This expression refers to the surname of an officer of the Italian Christian Democratic party (*Democrazia Cristiana*) theorizing that public offices should be divided on the basis of the proportional vote won by the single parties and by the fractions within each of them. In a nutshell, it refers to a practice of occupation of all public offices by political parties following a criterion of proportionality.

of the working group declared themselves on principle against all sponsoring (private or otherwise). Even "ethical sponsorship" was opposed by some members of the working group (interview 6). An estimation of costs and income was provided by the Italian organizing committee one month before the official start of the forum (see table 1). The most important expenditure concerned room rental (covered by a subsidy of Tuscany region) and the translations of plenary conferences with the equipments supposed to be partially covered by enrolment fees. Other costs were related to equipment for the media center and the administrative staff, printing of propaganda materials, organization of cultural events and speakers' accommodation and mobility. It was estimated to cover partially such expenditures through spin-off sales. However, money supposed to be gathered through merchandising was overestimated since materials (t-shirt, bags, etc.) arrived too late and most of them remained unsold (interview 2). Other income was supposed to come from subsidies of local authorities. Notwithstanding, the optimistic estimation of income made one month before the official start of the forum already revealed the presence of a hole in the budget that would have fluctuated between 50,000 and 200,000 euros.

Table 1 – Provisional budget of the Florence ESF (in euros)

Costs		**Income**	
Meeting room rental	400,000	Subsidy form the Tuscany region (covering all room rental)	400,000
Translations (equipment and translator for 6 conference rooms)	370,000	Enrolment fees	300,000
Supplies, miscellaneous equipment (media room, server, connectivity etc.)	100,000	Spin-off sales (drinks, merchandise etc.)	100,000
Printing (poster, programme etc)	50,000	Subsidy from the city of Florence (not guaranteed)	70,000
Cultural events	50,000	Subsidy from local and regional Florentine authorities (not guaranteed)	100,000
Transport costs and speakers' accommodation	50,000	--	--
Total	**1,020,000**	**Total**	**800,000 / 970,000**

Source: document 7.

The great part of the income came from fees paid to access the Fortress where the forum was held. The organizing committee foresaw different costs for registration: groups would have paid 50 euros for the first delegate and 25 for the following ones while for individuals the registration cost was supposed to vary according to income: 10 euros for people with a monthly income below 1,000 euros; 25 euros for those with a monthly income between 1,000 and 3,000 euros; 50 euros for those with a monthly income above 3,000 euros. In order to involve the city in the social forum the local organizers decided to let students from the high schools to have free access to the forum.

However, some interviewees reported on a conflict concerning entrance costs. As one of them stated "there was a never-ending discussion on the cost of the pass to access the forum. There was a tough discussion concerning the fact that we should grant even to those who cannot afford the entrance fee to the forum. This was to maintain the principle of the forum as an open space … an escamotage was foreseen consisting in a one-day visitor pass that was free … the matter of granting access to everybody was solved in the Italian style with the idea of a temporary pass" (interview 2).

As a matter of fact, the Florence ESF ended making a loss of 70,000/80,000 euros. To cover the debt after the forum the organizations being part of the Italian organizational committee have contributed according to their dimensions and availability. Contributions to extinguish the debt

varied between 1,000 and 20,000 euros (interview 6). It is worth considering that the most important cost to be covered by the organizers concerned translations. These costs would have been significantly reduced in the following forums because of the structuration of the volunteer group of Babels and the improvement of technologies (see chapter 8 for more details).

The administrative office was set up in September 2002 with three part-time people hired. Within the administrative staff many people referred to the active role of a Brazilian woman that had helped in organizing the world social forum. She came to Florence three months before the forum and helped in coordinating the volunteers and with the reception. She was considered very effective since she could bring in the organizational process of Florence the organizational experience of the WSF.

As for the logistics, a conflict arose concerning spaces management and allocation. The Disobedients wanted in fact to have a very central space in the city. As one of the organizers remembered: "We had a series of places that were granted from the municipality and it was a infinite negotiation because the Disobedients wanted to have a visible and big space. They said 'now you swindle us, you want to isolate us in a far and little space'. They wanted the Palasport but we did not give up on it because it was used as a dormitory" (interview 2).

2.1.5 Enlarging the net

The enlargement strategy was two-fold: on the one side each national delegation had to work on the national level trying to be as more inclusive as possible, on the other side it was decided to set up a solidarity found for delegations coming from poor countries. However, the national delegations did not contribute and the fund remained almost empty. Thus, a decision was made to sponsor delegations following a criterion of geographical proximity. Among the stronger ones, each Western national delegation would have been in charge of a sort of twinning with a Eastern European country (or area), trying to involve it in the process and to bring delegates to Florence covering their travel expenses.[14] Bed and board were instead granted by the widespread system of people's houses and municipalities of the region were Eastern delegations were hosted (interview 6).

The focus on the national level in this strategy of enlargement was also very relevant. As one of the Italian organizers stated: "The enlargement of the nets was very important for us in Italy since it was meant to overcome the difficulties we faced in Genoa … our aim consisted in involving a series of more moderate groups and hence to involve associations in a wider sense … the Roundtable for Peace and other networks that partially distrusted the forum because they perceived it as the place of maximalists … the European forum allowed also the enlargement to the Cgil [the most important Italian trade union] … the involvement of the Left Democrats and their youth organization" (interview 2).

2.2 The Paris ESF

The second ESF, held in France from 12 to 15 November 2003, brought together 51,000 participants from more than 60 countries (4,000 Italians, 4,000 British, 3,000 Spanish, 1,000 East Europeans, 500 Germans), and 80,000 participants (according to the organizers) took part in the final demonstration.

The preparation for such an event implies a very heavy organizational task that several "working groups" took care of – the placing of those mandated by the Comité d'Initiatives Français: finance

[14] The Italians took care of the Balkans countries organizing a caravan that collected all the delegations along the route. The other twinning were: Scandinavia with Baltic states, Germany with Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia, Austria and Switzerland with Hungary, Greece with Turkey and neighborhood areas, UK with Middle East, France with Russia, Belgium and the Netherlands with the (few) sub-Saharan African, Asian and Latin America delegations (document 11).

commission, transportation commission, culture commission, communication commission charged with sending out a daily press release to a thousand journalists, report commission charged with the minutes of the debates and conferences. The heaviest task involved the "organization" working group which had to find 12,000 collective lodgings, 1,700 "individual solidary" lodgings and 5,000 daily meals at each site; and the working group that dealt with the assembling of the program under the guiding principle of "enlargement," spread across three levels: "social and citizen enlargement"; "enlargement to the East"; "enlargement to the South."

55 plenary sessions bringing together 444 speakers, 271 seminars (with 1322 participants) and 280 workshops were in effect proposed. The most difficult task was the organization of the first level, the plenary sessions, which were presented as a sort of official program. It consequently conformed to a delicate political and geographic balancing act in order to guarantee to the largest organizations a representation reflecting their ambitions; leading to an exhausting process of considering quotas by nationality and gender, the titles of programs extremely vast (and vague) in order to satisfy the greatest number[15]. The difficulty of the exercise, and above all its length of the procedure lead to the later elimination of plenary sessions as a result of the post facto critiques of the experience by the protagonists.

Of the 700 propositions for seminars (that were supposed to "deepen the themes of the ESF") only 250 actually took place because of the limited physical capacity. As Agrikoliansky and Cardon correctly note, "The architecture of the three levels of plenary sessions, seminars and workshops contributed, imputed in its own manner this dichotomy by opposing situations of 'closed' and 'open' speech" (2005, 73). The participants preferred the seminars and workshops, which were more participatory, to the plenary sessions which were later no longer continued. The ensemble of the conferences mobilized a thousand volunteer translators from the Babel network who undertook the simultaneous translation into six official languages (French, English, Spanish, German, Italian, sign language) and 15 other languages. Moreover, 2,000 volunteers were needed for the reception and orientation of the participants, the catering, the management of the sites, the distribution of translation headphones, etc.

As it can be seen, the organization of an ESF requires heavy logistics and a complex architecture as witnessed by the first ESF and which was undertaken at the third ESF (London 2004). Three decision levels can be distinguished:

a) The European Preparatory Assembly is the decision-making organ. It met five times (Saint-Denis in December 2002, Brussels in February 2003, Berlin in April, Genoa in July and Bobigny in September) in order to prepare the second ESF as well as the Women's and the social movements Assembly. There are on average 200 to 250 participating organizations. ;
b)The Comité d'initiative français (CIF, the equivalent of what became the following year the UK Organising Committee, UKOC) met together every month starting in October 2002 the signatory organizations of a very broad appeal with little at stake. This explains why their imposing number grew during the year needed to prepare the event: There were 19 at the creation of the CIF on 19 September 2002, 115 in February 2003, and 300 by the end of the preparation. This included 70 unions, associations of all kinds (migrants, ecologists, humanitarians, peoples' education), clubs and journals.

c) The decisions taken by these two organs are implemented by the Secretariat of the Organization (SO whose British equivalent is the UKCC – UK Coordinating Committee) "charged with the ensemble of preparatory tasks, of coordination tasks (notably with municipalities) and the material organization of the ESF". Put into place on 16 September 2002, it is composed by about twenty organizations [16],the only conditions necessary to be part are adherence to the principles of

[15] For the program of these plenary sessions, see Agrikoliansky and Cardon 2005.

[16] According to the meetings, The friends of Le Monde diplomatique, The Collectif des musulmans de France, the LDH, the Collectif Saint-Denis, the Gamins de l'art-rue, Mouvement Economie Solidaire, 4D, Marches européennes, Espaces Marx, CGT, Attac, Fondation Copernic, Marche mondiale des femmes, CRID, CADTM (Comité d'annulation

the Charter of Porto Alegre, and membership in the CIF with a pledge to delegate one person per week to its functioning [17]. It meets every week.

In contradistinction to their Italian counterparts who had only a few months to prepare themselves, the French anticipated the 2003 ESF event by meeting as early as July 2002 in the offices of the CCFD (Comité catholique contre la faim et pour le développement) with representatives of the municipalities of Paris and Saint-Denis. The organizations attending this first meeting take a length ahead the others. One can find Attac and the CRID (Centre de recherché et d'information pour le développement) which took the initiative, the CCFD, the G10-Solidaires, the FSU (Fédération syndicale unitaire), Espaces Marx and the DAL (Droit au logement). The large organizations (FSU, Ligue des droits de l'homme and CGT – Confédération générale du travail - which makes its entry in the GJM) gain a central role. This place of the unions is confirmed by the fact that for the first time, the European Confederation of Unions -Confédération européenne des syndicats (CES)- has accepted do be really part of a forum; it will also be a source of critics that make it responsible for a too « institutional » functioning of the preparatory bodies. The union organizations will be represented in 77 seminars (29.4 % of the total) et 16 workshops (5.5 % of the total) (Yon and Giraud 2005).

In contradistinction to Florence, the feminist organizations made their real entry into the preparation of the ESF, via the World March of Women that joined the organization's secretariat. The same for the humanitarian and environmental associations. The second ESF gave itself the objective of enlarging the social dimension in order "to counter the opaque and intellectual image of the ESF," [18] and thus included several organizations whose populations have meager resources ("sans" and popular categories from the suburbs). These were integrated into the secretariat, as well as European Marches against unemployment, job insecurity and exclusions, No-Vox, the MIB, Moslem Presence, the Collective of Moslems of France and the associations stemming from immigration.

A document of the EPA defines in the following terms what the ESF should be: "The social Forum reposes on a political base that, even broad, is nonetheless precise: opposition to neo-liberalism, to the domination of the world by capital, by all forms of imperialism (…) In this framework, the Forum must carry out three functions: the democratic debate of ideas, the formulation of alternative propositions that oppose capitalist globalization under the command of large multinational corporations and the governments and institutions who serve their interests'(point 4), the articulation aiming at effective actions. The Social Forum is therefore not simply a conference on the state of the world, it is a militant moment in a larger process."[19] We can find here the effort to reconcile the two conceptions of the Forum that were mentioned above.

But the opposition between "space-forum" and "space-movement" persists and focuses on the respective place of the ESF and the Assembly of the social movements; which was at the root of the quarrel during the February 2003 EPA in Brussels opposing, in rather schematic terms, the English and Italians on one side who drew their swords in order that the Assembly be integrated into the ESF, conferring upon it the role of impulsion, coordination and mobilization, and the French on the other side who wanted the guarantees of the Charter of Porto Alegre. The creation following the

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pour la dette du Tiers-monde), Babels, FSU, G10-Solidaires, DRD (Démocratiser radicalement la démocratie), Associations issues de l'immigration, CRID, FGTE (Fédération générale des techniciens et employés)-CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du travail), MIB (Mouvement immigration banlieue), DAL.

[17] Au 14 février 2003, the secretariat of the organization is composed by the Friends of Le Monde diplomatique, Attac, Babel, CGT, Collectif des musulmans de France, CRID, DRD, Espace Marx, FGTE-CFDT, Fondation Copernic, FSU, FTCR (Fédération des Tunisiens pour une citoyenneté des deux rives), Les Gamins de l'Art-rue, G10-Solidaires, LDH, Marche mondiale des femmes, Mouvement de l'économie solidaire (MES), MIB, Mouvement des marches européennes contre le chômage, No-Vox, Présence musulmane.

[18] Document "Social Widening" from the French Initiative Committee stemmed from the meeting of July 8, 2003.

[19] Document of the European Assembly of preparation of the Berlin ESF "Articulation ESF/process of the ESF" (April 9, 2003). The references come from the Charter of Porto Alegre.

EPA of Genoa of a “Rapporteur” group led by Bernard Pinaud of the CRID is partly a continuation of this conflict since it aims at furnishing a “memoire” of the ESF and thus at responding the frustrations stirred up by the absence of traces of what had been said, debated, proposed and done during the forums.

The process also led to a number of critiques denouncing in particular the “participative bureaucracy” (Callinicos 2004). Thus, a part of the GJM nebula did not completely recognize itself, even recognize itself at all, in the social forums et preferred to profit from the windfall of the forums to organize their own parallel initiatives, that we have called the “off.” (Sommier 2005).

The ESF costed 3 millions euros. Public institutions paid a part. One million euros came from the city of Paris, 50,000 from the city of Saint-Denis, 350,000 from the general council of Val-de-Marne, 250,000 from the Prime minister and the Foreign ministry, 80,000 from the general council of Essonne. The NGO Oxfam and the Agency for French-speaking world also contributed with 82,000 euros. Organizations affiliated to the Comité d’initiatives français paid 18,000 euros while 450,000 euros was expected from the registration fees.

3. Conclusion

The process of elaboration of the ESF is an opportunity for national organizations to collaborate. It sheds light on the balance of power between them and contributes to changing it. It is the reason why every ESF is always different, as the GJM differs from one country to another (della Porta 2007; Sommier et al. 2007). Organizing such an event is a challenge for the member groups: it implies bringing together different activist cultures, overcoming their rivalries and, sometimes, their animosity. Several mechanisms have been founded to respect this diversity. The opening of the organizational structures allows every group to participate. Decision making through consensus avoids the “tyranny of the majority”. Despite these rules the organization can’t be an exception to the rule of the “iron law of oligarchy” (Michels 1971) and bureaucracy. This tendency confirms McCarthy and Zald’s (1977) theory on the importance of “professional activists” who master the activists’ know-how like keeping an assembly under control. Therefore we can notice an increasing tendency for the minorities and the more radical sectors of GJM to organize other events or separated spaces during the “official” ESF. Another effect of such a process is perhaps the decreasing enthusiasm that characterizes ESF with the passing years.

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Interviewees

1 – Cristiano Lucchi, rete Lilliput (ESF press officer).
2 – Gregorio Malavolti, Arci/DS, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum and administrative staff, national organizational committee.
3 – Tommaso Fattori, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum and national organizing committee.
4 – Bruno Paladini, Cobas/Mat, national organizing committee (Working Group on organization, logistics and finance).
5– Sara Nocentini, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum and national organizing committee.
6 – Stefano Kovac, ICS/Arci, national organizational committee (Working Group on organization, logistics and finance).
7 – Massimo Torelli, Florence local social forum, inventor of the awareness campaign “Firenze Città Aperta”.
8 – Raffaele Palumbo, director of ControRadio/Popolare network.
9 – Graziella Bertozzo, Arcilesbica, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum.
10 – Jason Nardi, director of OneWorld Italy, administrative staff, Working Group on communication.
11 – Mayo Fuster i Morell, Movimiento de Resistencia Global de Catalunya, ESF Memory Project.

Chapter 3

Models of democracy: how activists see democracy in the movement

by Massimiliano Andretta and Donatella della Porta

1. Democracy as a multidimensional concept

The ESF has been an arena of debate and networking, but also a space where different conceptions of democracy have emerged. Calls for a fluid, open and inclusive organizational structure had emerged already in the first ESF in Florence (see, e.g. http://www.lokabass.com/scriba/eventi.php?id_eve=12, accessed 20/12/2006; see also chap. 1). The first ESF was prepared by four assemblies and, between the first and the second ESF, the preparatory assembly met five times, in meetings open to those who wanted (and could) attend. Among the 213 delegates present at one of this meeting, in Brussels, the largest number was French (91), followed by 26 Belgians and a dozen each Italians, Greeks, Brits, Spaniards and Germans (Sommier 2005, 27). At this meeting, as in the other ones, the role of the French activists (for the next ESFs, it would be the role of the British and then the Greek ones) in decisions referring to the speakers at plenary sessions and final encounters was discussed. Already for the second ESF, a main criticism addresses the role of the more "institutional" organizations, accused of imposing a hierarchical and non-transparent structure on what is supposed to be an open and consensual process (ibid., 29 ff.). A "top down" approach, going from the national to the local, is criticized in particular by the local social forums. Autonomous spaces also emerged. During the Parisian ESF, but not inside it, a self-managed village, organized by the No vox and the Réseau Intergalactique and visited by about 6,000 activists (ibid., 38), as well as a libertarian and anarchist social forum testify for search for alternative, horizontal forms of action.

The internal debate in the GJM between "horizontal" and "vertical" conceptions of democracy took more dramatic forms in the third ESF in London, where the local London Social Forum together with other informal groupings accused the main organizers (among which the Socialist Workers Party, Globalize Resistance, Socialist Action, and some unions) of having imposed "top down" main organizational decisions. The tensions at the London ESF developed in an open contestation of the final events as well as some arrests among the autonomous activists. They represented in fact a turning point in the evolution of the ESF process. Already before the London ESF, one of the prominent speakers of the GJM, Susan George, praising the decision of the WSF to abolish plenaries, had written:

"I was disappointed, on the other hand, that the 2004 European Social Forum in London still clings to the supposed necessity of plenaries even though there will be fewer than in previous years. Sorting out who gets to speak on what platform on what subject and with whom; how many speakers are allotted to each country and to each organisation; mixing them carefully according to gender, hue, hemispheric origin and I suppose religious profession, sexual orientation, height, weight and God knows what else; requiring each year long and multiple meetings all over Europe- all this has proven, as far as I can tell, a colossal waste of everyone's time and money. Let's get serious, people… in future Social Forums I would hope we could stop the silly jockeying for speech slots, refrain from endless repetition and ceremonial condemnation, determine what issues we really need to talk about, get organised beforehand to do so, then hit the ground running" (*Taking the Movement forward*, in *Anti-capitalism: Where now?* Bookmarks publications, October 2004).

In a forum open on line to discuss the event, the London ESF was in fact judged as a success, but "with many internal problems, with difficulties, delays", characterized by "many young people, a lot of desire to participate - not always fulfilled - a great desire not to throw away the most interesting political novelty of the first few years of this century" (Salvatore Cannavò of the Italian

daily "Liberazione"[20]) but also by "a lack of curiosity of the organizers to look beyond Blair and ones' own ideological borders, beyond the opposition to the war", and by the "feeling that the great majority of the alter-mondialist peoples are fed up with the call for 'bringing politics back at the first place', of the war between organizations, of the tricks to have the last word" (Anna Pizzo, of the Italian weekly "Carta"). There was specific criticism of the centralization of the preparatory process, in the hands of "a dictatorship–-the idea that those who have a say are the ones who can afford the air of the Easyjetters' fare to international meetings", as well as the fact that "Local social forums had an inadequate part in the official programme. Unlike in the Paris ESF, the costs of setting up networking 'spaces' for them were not covered by the London ESF ticket price or venue-finding arrangements. Local social forums had to make their own arrangements in the `alternative' spaces apart from one seminar at Alexandra Palace" (according to a collective assessment published by the London Social Forum). The document "A Different ESF is Possible", issued by people participating in the UK Local Social Forum Network declared that "The British process to build for the ESF has been, from the proposal to have it in London onwards, organized without an open, democratic, inclusive process". Especially, the involvement of the Greater London Authority (GLA) in the process is considered by the British activist and editor of Red Pepper, Hilary Wainwright, as a challenge for the democratic quality of the process since "they are led by a small group of people from Socialist Action, one of the somewhat conservative factions of the Fourth International. They work according to an explicit managerial philosophy and an interpretation of democracy which is in many ways quite the opposite of the participatory democracy of Porto Alegre. This small group - no more than around 12 - of political managers has disproportionate power because, although Livingstone is formally a member of the Labour Party, he is not under any live democratic party pressure like the mayors of Florence, Paris and Porto Alegre… for the political managers of the GLA the way to implement the will of the democratically elected mayor is through tough professional management and a minimisation of the layers of mediation between the mayor's senior management and the delivery of the service" . Praising the "Florentine miracle" of harmonious collaboration between different groups, also the Italian alternative union Cobas stigmatizes the "authoritarian, hegemonic, and exclusive practices" of several British groups (from SWP to the unions), that had created strong tensions with the "horizontal" groups.

Even more fundamental was the criticism of the lack of transparency of the whole decision making process. In the words of a young unionist from Attac Danemark, Lars Bohn, "on democratic terms, I will have to say we failed. And that is serious. We claim to want to create another world, and even that this is possible. But if we can't even create a trustworthy democratic alternative within our own ranks, how can we expect people from the outside to trust us to create the conditions for a more democratic world?". This activist, who had participated in the European Preparatory Assembly criticizes the lack of transparency of the process (from the lack of information on the agenda and of minutes on the decision taken), but also what he calls a breach of trust by the British organizers about the decision to call the final march under the slogan "No to Bush, no to war" while "it was a clear decision of the ESF preparatory assembly that the main slogans of the demo should be some that covered the whole ESF: war, privatization, racism". He sadly concludes, "Maybe that's how democracy works in England. But seen from at least a Scandinavian point of view this is a major break of trust. If this had happened here, the group behind it would surely be excluded from further participation in any kind of common cooperation. Not by an authoritarian body, but just because nobody would have enough trust to cooperate with them anymore". Similarly, Attac Austria, Bulgaria, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Norway, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Wallonie-Bruxelles, Denmark and Flanders, rethinking the working method within the process, stressed that "the guiding principle has to be striving for a process building from below, in the sense that it has to start from the considerations of different movements and

[20] This and the following quotes are taken from documents published online in "ESF: Debating the challenges for its future", Newsletter collecting articles and reflections on the third ESF (http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/index.htm, accessed December 24 2006).

organisations, including the many who are currently not following the process, but nevertheless consider it most important". The European Preparatory Assembly (EPA) is said to have struggled for "openness and inclusivity, while transparency and accountability for decision-making has been neglected".

The challenge of building up a common model of democracy for diverse groups and people is recognized in the movement. Defending the organization of the London ESF, one of the organizers from the SWP, Alex Callinicos, states that "One difficulty in this process has certainly been that participants have very different conceptions of democracy and often showed little tolerance of definitions different from their own". While in Italy and France the activists of these various areas of the GJM had already come together in common struggles, building links of reciprocal trust, in the UK they had started their collaboration with the organization of the ESF.[21]

Without plenaries, the Athens ESF has been considered in general an improvement upon the previous edition—as an Italian activist stressed in a mailing list, "less ideological and more concrete", with more capacity to build up transnational networks on specific issues. Here as well, it was however recognized that the quality of the debate in the (well participated) final Assembly of the social movements was not very deliberative, with "all those who intervene who think they have something fundamental to say, even though they almost never succeeded, or were interested, in following up the line of reasoning and of the previous intervention" (ibid.), while the launching of common initiatives derived especially from the informal meetings in the previous days.

Along with criticism of what does not work in the ESF decision making and proposals for improving it, different conceptions of democracy emerge within the ESFs. During the seminar "A la recherché de la démocratie perdue" at the second ESF, politics is defined as "a common good, as air, water, or peace", which "does not have to be delegated only to professional politicians". In parallel, democracy is considered as "a concrete practice, not a theory" and the need to building counter-expertise through the common work of experts and citizens stressed. In the debate on "La politique: bien commun?", there is a stigmatization of the ideology of the expertise, but also of the conception of the party as vanguard. A tension emerges however between a more traditionally political approach and one stressing more the autonomy of social instances. Although the existing (present and past) left-wing governments are criticized for their support to privatization of public services and destruction of social rights, the role of the parties is discussed, with some participants stressing the link between the old labour movement and contemporary alter-globalists (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2340/doc407). Also the seminar on "Comment gagner les majorités aux idées du mouvement altermondialiste?" discusses relationship between movements and parties in a moment of "crisis of political representation". In the debate on "Quelles perspectives pour le movement altermondialiste", participants praise the mobilization capacity of the GJM in activating protest and convincing the public, but also discuss its failure in influencing institutional decisions. If influencing power seems most important to some activists, others insist on the necessity to avoid power. At the seminar on "Résister est crèer l'utopie, ici et maintenant" the role of spiritual and utopian bases (humanization of work, limits to consumption, sharing of knowledge) for the development of individual imagination and freedom is emphasized. In several meetings, testimonies of religious people, engaged in social movements, address the articulation between political commitment and spiritual beliefs, proposing inter-religious dialogue, the refusal

[21] According to Callinicos, "At different stages this process embraced a very wide range of forces - stretching from the Trade Union Congress and mainstream NGOs to autonomist groups with a history of intermittent violence such as the Wombles. Holding this coalition together would have been difficult in any circumstances. Of course, the Italian and French comrades also have developed very broad coalitions, but it was probably an advantage that these had been constructed well in advance of actually organizing the ESF, so that people had an experience of working together. In Britain, by contrast, the altermondialiste networks that had participated in the earlier Forums were relatively weak. A coalition had to be created from scratch to organize the London ESF. This involved bringing together very diverse organizations with no history of working together and huge differences in political culture. Working together would have been hard in any circumstances" (see note 1 on source).

of the use of religion as instrument of power and domination and spiritual resistance to liberal globalization.

The debates on power also address inequalities within the ESF itself—for instance in the debate "Tous les citoyens pour une Europe qui refuse la misére" that criticizes the lack of space left to very poor people in the movement or in the one on "Democratie partecipative et exclusion" that discusses the preconditions for a real participation of people "in conditions of exclusions". In the presentation of the seminar titled "Le movement altermondialiste réfléchit à ses mots, à ses symbols et aux problème de langue" we read:

"The alter-mondialist movement developed gradually as a full actor. This undeniable force depends on its capacity to aggregate the most different cultures and streams, stating diversity as intrinsic richness. Yes, but… coexistence and cooperation in the largest diversity (of cultures and practices, codes and references, or even values) easily implies the return to logics of power, and can develop into the practical inability to manage diversity… The movement has to face a dialectique between the will to preserve and promote diversity and the desire (and need) to build alternatives to the dominant system, and therefore to adopt a profile to a certain extent 'unitary'".

A reflection on communication is suggested as a way to produce "a fertile diversity", departing from a debate on the very way in which the movement is called in the different countries: from altermondialist or counterglobalist in France to "movement of movements", "against liberal globalization" or for another possible world in Italy; anti- or alter-globalization in Spain. Different conceptions of democracy are linked to different protest strategies, including judicial cases, conferences, exemplary action, lobbying, observatory, local street festivals, free universities and encyclopedias from below, laboratories, theatres, movies, and alternative experiments (such as social enterprises, fair trade).

Reflecting on these different conceptions (and dimensions) of democracy within the ESF (and the global justice movement more in general), a main purpose of our research is the analysis of models of democracy as they are elaborated "from below" and implemented both in the internal organization of social movements and in experiments of participatory and deliberative decision-making at the movement level.

A first assumption is that, although representative models of democracy remain dominant, they are challenged from a point of view of legitimacy as well as efficiency: declining participation in conventional forms of political participation is accompanied by the perception of poor performances of representative democratic government. Other models of democracy (re)emerge as possible correctives of the malfunctioning of representative democracy; in fact, experiments in participatory and deliberative forms of democracy are underway within political institutions as well as political and social actors. In this context, various conceptions of democracy coexist, stressing different indicators of democratic quality (see chapter 1).

A second assumption is that general principles of democracy can be combined in different forms and with different balances. In fact, in our work, we did not aim at measuring degrees of (quality of) democracy, but instead at constructing a typology of the different models of democracy that are present, in a more or less 'pure' form, in GJM organizations and processes. In this sense, we aim at analyzing in detail the plurality of conceptions and practices of democracy expressed by GJM organizations.

In particular, debates tend to develop within the movements on two main dimensions. On a first one, participatory conceptions that stress inclusiveness of equals (high participation) are contrasted with those based upon delegation of power to representatives (low participation). In this sense, we studied to which extent direct forms of democracy that put a strong emphasis on the assembly are still present, and to which extent the processes of institutionalization of social movement organizations (often stressed in social movement research in the last two decades) have instead spread a principle of delegation of power. A second dimension refers to *consensus/deliberation* and

look at the emphasis on decision-making methods that assign a special role to public discussion, common good, rational arguments and transformation of preferences. These aspects are particularly embedded and valorized by the *method of consensus* that poses even a stronger emphasis on the decision-making process *per se* than on the outcome of such process. In the various parts of our research, we have used a typology of democratic forms of internal decision-making (see della Porta and Reiter 2006; della Porta and Mosca 2006) that crosses the two dimensions of participation (referring to the degree of delegation of power, inclusiveness, and equality) and deliberation (referring to the decision making model and to the quality of communication). In is important to keep in mind, however, that the variables used to construct the typology were different in the different parts of our research, reflecting the differences in the research instruments used and the types of sources.

Analyzing the main documents of GJM organizations, with the aim of singling out the visions of democracy, inside and outside the movement, we singled four conceptions of internal democracy (or models of internal democracy) In the *associational model,* the assembly is composed by delegates and, even in those cases in which the assembly is defined as main decision-making organ, and it consists of all members, everyday politics is managed by an executive committee; decisions are taken by majority vote. When, according to the selected documents, delegates make decisions on a consensual basis, we speak of *deliberative representation*. When decision are made by an assembly which includes all members, and no executive committee exists, we have an *assembleary* model, when decisions are taken by majority, and *deliberative participation*, if consensus and communicative processes based on reason together with participation are mentioned as important values in the documents.

Table 1 - Typology of democratic internal decision-making*

		Delegation of power	
		High	Low
Consensus	Low	Associational model (59.0%)	Assembleary model (14.6%)
	High	Deliberative representation (15.6%)	Deliberative participation (10.8%)

* N = 212

As we can see in table 1, half of the organisations in our sample support an associational conception of internal decision-making. This means that – at least formally – a model based upon delegation and majority principle is quite widespread. Here, the typical form of internal accountability is the representative one: the assembly consists of delegates and executive committees have an important role in organisational decisions, and the decision-making system stresses majority principles: preferences are aggregated either by pure majority or by bargaining, and the balance of aggregated preferences determines the group line. To a certain extent, this is an expected result: the presence of well established, large, and resourceful organisations such as parties, unions, and third sector associations in the global justice movement has often been noted. In this sense, our results push for a (not yet developed) reflection on the conditions for and consequences of the presence of large numbers of associations in common campaigns and networks. However, this is only part of the picture. We classified 14.6% of the organisations as assembleary, since in the documents we analysed they stressed the role of the assembly in a decision making process that remains tied to aggregative methods of decision making such as voting or bargaining. The participatory elements are emphasised via the important role attributed to the assembly and its inclusiveness, but consensus is not mentioned as a principle, nor used as a decision making method. The attempts to build direct models of democracy are therefore well alive. In an additional one fourth (23%) of the organisations, the deliberative element comes to the fore.

In particular, these organisations stress the importance of deliberation and/or consensus over majoritarian decision making. In these groups, consensus and/or deliberative democracy are explicitly mentioned as organisational values, and/or consensus is used in the decision making process in the assembly or in the executive committee. We can distinguish between the 15.6 percent of organisations that apply consensus within an associational type (deliberative representation) and the 10.8 percent applying it within an assembleary model (deliberative participation). This stress on elements of discursive quality is a most innovative contribution to conceptions of democracy in social movements.

In another part of our research, we moved towards the analysis of movement practices as they are described by representatives of the GJM organizations. Acknowledging that constitutions and written documents are not always followed in everyday activities, and that praxes are often different from norms, we have complemented the information obtained on the organizational ideology with interviews on the organizational functioning, as perceived and reported by their speakers. In this part we have operationalized the dimension of *participation/delegation* by distinguishing groups characterized by a central role of the assembly in the decision-making process of the organization from all other types of organizations (executive-centered, leader-centered, mixed models, etc.). On the dimension *deliberation/majority voting* we have separated groups employing the method of consensus from all other organizations employing different decisional methods (simple majority, qualified majority, mixed methods, etc.).

Crossing the two mentioned dimensions (see Table 2), our typology distinguishes four democratic types: a purely assembleary model (where the refusal to delegate power is mixed with majoritarian methods of decision-making), a deliberative participative model (where the refusal to delegate power is mixed with consensual methods of decision-making), an associational model (where the delegation of power is mixed with majoritarian methods of decision-making), and a deliberative representative model (where the delegation of power is mixed with consensual methods of decision-making).

Table 2 - Models of Democracy on the basis of interviews

Decision-making method: Consensus	**Decision-making body: delegation of power**	
	High	Low
Low	Associational (30.4%)	Assembleary (9.8%)
High	Deliberative representative (38.0%)	Deliberative participative (21.7%)

Here as well our research testifies for the presence in the GJM of various types of organizational decision-making, confirming that social movements are characterized by "considerable variation in organizational strength within and between movements" (Klandermans 1989, 4). Of the 184 out of the overall 210 cases that we could classify (in 13 percent of the cases it was not possible to collect enough information on the main decision-making body or on the method of decision-making), almost two fifths of the selected organizations fall in the deliberative representative category where the principle of consensus is mixed with the principle of delegation. Almost one third of the groups adopt an associational model that is based on majoritarian vote and delegation. Around one fifth of the groups bridge a consensual decision-making method with the principle of participation (refusal of delegation to an executive committee) while almost 10% of the selected organizations mix the principle of delegation with the majoritarian principle (assembleary model).

Comparing the results in these two parts of our research, we can notice that interviewees tend to stress consensus more than the organizational documents do. This can be explained in different

ways: respondents might be more updated and accurate in describing the actual decision making in their groups, or want to give a better image of decision making in their organization. Whatever the explanation, norms of consensus appear indeed as very much supported by the movement organizations.

This emerges also from an analysis of the normative models of democracy proposed by the activists we interviewed in WP5 (see table 3). The rate of support for associational models of democracy further declines to one fifth of our population (N=1,055), and the percent of deliberative representative reaches only 8.2%. From the normative point of view, indeed, the ESF participants are instead attracted by either an assembleary or deliberative-participative models (about one third each). Participation and deliberation are considered therefore as main values for another-democracy:

Table 3 – Normative democratic models of the activists

Decision-making method: Consensus	**Decision-making body: delegation of power**	
	High	Low
Low	Associational (19.1%)	Assembleary (35.9%)
High	Deliberative representative (8.2%)	Deliberative participative (36.7%)

In order to locate these results on the normative models of democracy in a broader picture of the activists' appreciation of how democracy works in different contexts, we have to consider first of all if the activists perceive these models as implemented in their own group and the GJM in general. When norms have to meet practices, the activists emerge as quite critical of their own group and especially of the movement in general. Participation in decision making is in fact considered as limited to a small number of activists, at least for 40% of respondents regarding meetings of their own groups and 60% of respondents regarding the meetings of the GJM in general (see table 4).

Table 4 - Participation in decision making in own group and in the GJM

	Who decide in…	
	In the meeting of the group	In the meetings of the GJM
Few participants	13.1	21.4
Enough participants	27.9	38.1
Almost all participants	30.3	26.1
All participants	28.6	14.3
Total N	**857**	**970**
Missing values	28.8	19.5

As for decision making procedures, however, activists see the meetings of the GJM as more consensual than those of their own groups, while recognizing in both a tendency towards either decisively privileging consensus (in about a quarter for their own group and about one fifth for the GJM in general) or mix voting and consensus (in slightly less than half of responses for group meetings and bout two thirds of responses on GJM).

Table 5 - Decision making procedures in decision making in own group and in the GJM

	Who decide in…	
	In the meeting of the group	In the meetings of the GJM
Voting	30.1	17.3
Sometimes voting	20.5	31.3
Sometimes consensus	24.5	32.2
Consensus	24.9	19.4
Total N	**854**	**1205**
Missing values	29.1	22.9

Notwithstanding this incongruence between norms and practices, the activists express high degrees of satisfaction with the way in which democracy works in the movement, especially if compared with the very critical judgment on the democratic practices in other types of institutions (see table 6). Satisfaction with the way in which democracy works in the groups is indeed very high, with a tiny minority of either very unsatisfied or moderately unsatisfied--although (confirming the self-reflexive nature of activism) about half of the sample express moderate satisfaction, as much as one third is totally satisfied. All in all, activists express satisfaction also with decision making within the GJM, although in this case moderate satisfaction prevails (in about two thirds of respondents) and about one forth is moderately unsatisfied. Degrees of satisfaction are instead very low when we move to attitudes towards public institutions: here dissatisfaction is virtually unanimous (with about two third very unsatisfied and one fourth of moderately unsatisfied) and addresses equally the national, EU and UN institutions.

Table 6 - Degree of satisfaction with decision making in selected institutions

Degree of satisfaction	**Satisfied with decision making process in**				
	Your group	GJM	National political system	EU	UN
Very unsatisfied	2.6	5.2	65.0	65.0	66.2
Moderately unsatisfied	12.7	24.6	24.9	25.4	26.5
Moderately satisfied	54.1	64.0	8.3	8.7	6.1
Very satisfied	30.6	6.2	1.7	0.9	1.2
Total	**937**	**1031**	**1107**	**1105**	**1096**
Missing	22.2	15.9	8.1	8.3	9.0

We can expect that models of democracy interact with the degree of previous participation in movement's event: the more a person believes in participation and consensus building the more likely s/he should be to make his/her voice heard. We had asked our respondents to which extent they had taken part in previous events organized by the GJM. The sample had high variance on this: only about one fifth was a first-timer, and another 11% had participated only once, while about one third had participated between 2 and 5 times and as many as 40% more than 5 times. First timers are indeed less likely to emphasize consensus, while those with more previous experiences of participation stress both consensus and participation (see table 7). Although statistically significant, the correlation coefficient is however not very high, indicating that consensus and deliberation are indeed values that spread beyond the most active participants.

Table 7 - Participation in GJM events by activists' normative models of democracy

Normative models of democracy	Participation in other GJM events before Athens			Total (100%)	Dichotomy [22]	Mean [23]
	Never before	2-5 times	More than 5			
Associational	25.2	36.6	38.1	202	74.8	5.16
Deliberative representative	15.1	43.0	41.9	86	84.9	5.98
Assembleary	21.3	45.6	33.1	375	78.7	4.78
Deliberative participative	14.6	37.8	47.7	384	85.4	6.20
Total row %	**19.1**	**40.8**	**40.1**	**1,047**	**80.9**	**5.47**
Measures of association	Cramer's V= .11***				Cr.'s V=.11**	ETA= .14 ***

We might also imagine that cosmopolitanism, as indicated by experiences in protest and demonstrations in other countries, could increase trust in consensus building and participation, as values that have emerged as particularly widespread in transnational events (see e.g. Doerr and Haug 2006). Our sample, where participant are equally divided between those who did and those who did not participate in protest events abroad, confirms in fact that "cosmopolititan" activists are more attracted by deliberative and participative models of democracy. Here as well the correlation coefficient indicates a statistically significant but not particularly strong relation between the two variables (see table 8). If cosmopolitans are more supportive of consensus and participation, also the other activists tend however to join them on very similar values.

Table 8 - Participation outside one's own country by activists' normative models of democracy

Normative models of democracy	Participation in other GJM events outside one's own country	Total
	Yes	
Associational	47.3	201
Deliberative representative	49.4	85
Assembleary	43.7	375
Deliberative participative	57.9	385
Total (of positive answers)	**50.1**	**1,046**
Cramer's V	.12***	

Together with experiences of participation in protest events, at home and abroad, also subjective degree of identification with the global justice movement might be expected to influence attitudes towards democracy. In particular, those who identify more with the movement can be expected to express more support for those values that emerged as particularly relevant for the GJM organizations—inclusiveness, participation, consensus are among them (della Porta and Reiter 2006). Our data from the ESF in Athens indicate, first of all, a very high degree of identification

[22] Percentage of participants in at least one event before Athens.

[23] The mean of the participation in GJM events before Athens has been calculated by assigning to each original category of the question the mean of its range. Thus, while the categories "never before" and "only 1 times" have been recoded as respectively "0" and "1", the third category "between 2 and 5 times" was recoded as "3.5", the fourth category "between 6 and 10 times", as "8", and the last category "more than 10 times", as "12".

with the GJM among our respondents. Only less than 1% declared that they did not identify, and a very low 12.4% identified only a little. The remaining part identified either quite a lot (47.4%) or very much (39.4). Crossing degree of identification with normative conceptions of democracy, our analysis indicate a statistically significant correlation: with the growth of identification support for consensual and participatory decision making increases (see table 9). Here as well, however, the correlation is not particularly strong, indicating quite widespread support for the more participatory and consensual values.

Table 9 - Identification with GJM by activists' normative models of democracy

Normative models of democracy	**Identification with GJM**			**Total 100%**	**Dichotomy**[24]	**Mean (0-3)**
	No or little	Enough	Much			
Associational	21.0	43.0	36.0	200	79.0	2.13
Deliberative representative	12.8	57.0	30.2	86	87.2	2.16
Assembleary	13.7	48.8	37.5	371	86.3	2.23
Deliberative participative	9.1	49.1	41.8	383	90.9	2.32
Total row %	**13.4**	**48.5**	**38.2**	**1,040**	**86.6**	**2.24**
Measures of association	Cramer's V= .10**				Cr.'s V= .12 ***	ETA= .11**

2. Satisfaction with GJM democracy: what for and how it is achieved

Satisfaction with democracy within social movements is a crucial question, because SMOs have relatively few resources to convince members to participate in costly actions such as protest. To be sure, the symbolic incentives, as group solidarity, the identification with a larger collective and mutual recognition, together with the material resources, make non conventional collective participation possible (della Porta, Diani 2006). However, it is difficult to imagine that activists would bear the costs of participation if they did not feel satisfied with the way decisions on actions to perform, and AIMS to pursue, are taken. Moreover, if a movement openly declares to fight for the political power to be democratized, it must try to implement coherent internal decisional practices. It seems reasonable that activists would refrain from getting politically involved in a movement which to a large extent does not practice what it preaches. As Coy has recently suggested: "Decision making is the oil that greases the wheel of social movement organizing. Done poorly, it can bring a social movement organization to a rather abrupt halt, disrupt movement coalitions, or eventually contribute to the abeyance or even a demise of entire movements. On the other hand, when decision making is done well, it serves to advance the movement toward achievement of its organizing and programmatic goals. And when social movement decision making is done especially well, it may even stand as both a symbol and a concrete manifestation of the kind of social and political relations the movement is trying to organize in the wider world beyond the movement itself" (2003, vii).

The GJM network of networks, made of flexible and heterogeneous coalitions, is a critical case for studying the implications of how internal decision making works, not only because it openly challenges the functioning of external (representative) democracy, by criticizing its exclusionary logic, and its poor performances, but above all because its very existence depends on the management of internal controversies on what to do and how, and on the direct participation of activists coming from different parts of the world. Should internal democracy be perceived as

[24] Percentage of enough or much identification.

"badly done", the coalition would collapse and activists' participation would not be maintained in the long run.

When we refer to the GJM internal democracy, we mean decision making settings such as the preparatory assemblies for the organizations of the ESFs, the campaigns organized at the transnational levels such as the Stop Bolkestein campaign or the anti-war campaign and other types of networks.

The data from our survey, as indicated in table 6, show a very high degree of satisfaction with democracy working at the GJM level: as much as 70% of the activists interviewed declared to be at least "moderately" satisfied. Yet, about 30% are not.

If empirical evidence supports the claim that satisfaction with internal democracy matters for the GJM organizing, it would be even more worthwhile investigating the factors which facilitate it. According to our data, satisfaction with internal democracy significantly correlates with the degree of identification in GJM: if as much as 79% of dissatisfied (not at all or little satisfied) activists declare to identify (enough or much) with the movement, the percentage increases to 93% for the (moderately or much) satisfied (Pearson Coefficient = .275, significant at .001 level). Identification is in turn correlated with participation in GJM events: the means of participation is 2.3 for those with little or no identification with GJM democracy and about 6 for more highly identified activists (ETA= .265, significant at .001 level). Put in another way, only 54% of the non identified, but as many as 84% of the identified, activists declared to have participated in GJM events at least once before the ESF in Athens and 27.3% of the former against 54% of the latter have done it at the transnational level (outside their own country).

Thus, satisfaction with internal democracy seems to be an important "resource" for identification with the GJM and, then, for participation. Why activists are satisfied with democracy in the GJM is then the question we will try to answer in this section.

Obviously, only those who participates directly in GJM decision making settings can directly verify how democracy works there. The others may express their satisfaction by trusting involved people who tell them their story of the decisional processes or simply by judging the results of the decisions. After all, activists may simply think that if the movement is able to bring together so many organizations and activists coming from different countries and from different political backgrounds there must be an open and democratic decision making process which allows this. In a different perspective, however, activists who do not directly participate in the decision making settings of the movement may express dissatisfaction with democracy because they feel excluded.

This nonetheless, there are no relevant differences with regard to satisfaction between actual participants in the GJM decision making settings and activists involved in GJM events but not directly involved in the decision making: 68% of activists not directly involved in GJM decision making settings and 69% of those involved are moderately or much satisfied!

Another factor that can influence the degree of satisfaction is the normative idea of democracy that activists bear. The hypothesis may be that the higher the standard of democracy one ideally supports the more difficult is for her to be satisfied with real and concrete decision making. For instance, if it is true, as Mansbridge contends (2003, 229), that a deliberative normative model of democracy meets the ideals of many social movement activists, it is also true that such model is difficult to implement in concrete decisional processes. This may lead to some dissatisfaction.

We can test this hypothesis by correlating satisfaction with GJM democracy with the activists' degree of agreement with 4 statements on "how political decision should be taken". The first statement opposes those who think that it should be primarily the *quality of arguments* that makes a difference (when a decision is to be taken) regardless of who produce them against those who think that *resourceful* and active groups/individuals should have more weight; the second distinguishes between those who think that it is always important that the opponents accept each other as *equal discussants* and those who rather believe that in political conflict, there are situations in which

mutual acceptance is not important; the third statement separates those whose normative idea of democracy is compatible with *delegation of power* from those who think that the *participation of all* interested persons should always be a priority; and finally the last statement opposes those who believe that decisions should be taken by *voting* to those who are convinced that they should be taken by *consensus*. Each of these statements were presented in a polarised form and activists could position themselves in a scale ranging from 0 (argument, equal discussants, delegation, and voting) to 3 (resources, no mutual acceptance, full participation, and consensus).

If we correlate those statements with the satisfaction scale (from 0 to 3) no statistically significant differences can be found except with the last item (voting versus consensus) (Pearson correlation= -.09, significant at .01 level). This means that a normative idea of democracy based on consensus is (weakly) correlated with dissatisfaction with democracy in GJM. Nonetheless, the correlation is too low, and too limited (only consensus), for this hypothesis to be accepted. To be sure, if we correlate an additive index of deliberativeness of the normative view of democracy with satisfaction the hypothesis is statistically and substantially rejected (Pearson correlation= -.03, not significant).[25]

Eventually, we can ask whether the activists perceptions of how democracy works at the GJM level influence their satisfaction. This is what most scholars supporting deliberative democracy would imply: according to them, in fact, satisfaction should be higher when the decisional process is perceived as more participative and deliberative, that is when they feel that the decision making is open to the contribution of all, that their opinions, if expressed, would be listened and judged on the basis of the quality of the arguments, and that in any case the minorities' rights are protected by the consensus method.

According to many deliberative scholars, in fact, deliberative decision making is the most favorable condition for gaining legitimacy. For instance, Bernard Manin (1987, 345) describes deliberation as "the process by which everyone's will is formed" in such a way that the outcome is legitimate; Joshua Cohen (1989, 21) claims that "free deliberation among equals is the basis of legitimacy"; Seyla Benhabib (1996, 69) sees deliberation as "a necessary condition for attaining legitimacy", and Amy Gutmann (1996, 344) suggests that "the legitimate exercise of political authority requires (…) decision-making by deliberation among free and equal citizens". If this is true we should find that activists who perceive the GJM democratic settings as deliberative are more satisfied with internal democracy than the others.

However, some scholars have questioned the legitimizing effect of deliberation by arguing that it can carry "conservative or antidemocratic connotations usually overlooked by well-intentioned theorists" (Sanders 1997, 348). Under this light, some authors have argued that deliberation has also its "cons": it may support the status quo when consensus hides covert conflicts; it takes a lot of time, favoring who can spend more of it; it creates incentives to use veto power as a bargaining chip (Mansbridge 2003); it implies the need of skills – such as the ability to make rational or reasonable arguments – which are unequally distributed (Sanders 1997); and it can lead to a transformation of preferences which align with those who are more able to promote "good" arguments, rather than with the common good (Stokes 1998). Many of these statements will be controlled in other chapters where the type of the organization activists belong to and their socio-graphic features (gender, education, age, etc.) will be at the centre of the analysis. In this section we can only see if the perception of deliberative settings leads to more or less satisfaction toward democracy within GJM.

If we apply the typology for the normative democratic models showed in table 1 to the perceptions of how democracy works in the GJM, we can notice that about 31% of activists perceive it as "associational", 28% as "deliberative representative", about 18% as "assembleary" and, finally, about 24% as "deliberative participative".

[25] For the operationalization of the index, we first dichotomized the four items by assigning the value 1 when "arguments", "equality", "participation" and "consensus" are considered important and the value 0 when the opposite ("resource", "non acceptance", "delegation", "vote") is true. Eventually we summed the four dichotomies in our index which then varies from "0" (no deliberativeness) to "4" (full deliberativeness).

The cross-tabulation of this typology with satisfaction shows that activists who perceive democracy at the GJM level as "assembleary" and "deliberative participative" are more satisfied than those who perceive it as "associational" or "deliberative representative" (see table 10). Out of the four items measuring the perceived model of GJM democracy, only the voting vs. consensus one is not correlated with satisfaction, while the additive index of perceived deliberativeness shows a significant and high correlation (see Pearson correlations in table 10)

Table 10 - Perceived models of democracy in GJM and activists' satisfaction

Perceptions of democracy in GJM	Degree of Satisfaction (0-3)	
Item 1 (arguments/resources)	-.275*** (arguments)	
Item 2 (equals/non acceptance)	-.272*** (equals)	
Item 3 (delegation/participation)	.225*** (participation)	
Item 4 (voting/consensus)	n.s.	
Index of deliberativeness[26]	.249***	
Typology of perceived models	**Means**	**% of satisfied**
Associational	1.7	66.8
Deliberative representative	1.6	60.4
Assembleary	1.8	78.6
Deliberative participative	1.9	79.3
Total	**1.7**	**69.9**
Measures of associations	ETA: .184***	Cr.'s V: .172***

The most likely explanation of why the perception of deliberation should bring about legitimacy, or at least satisfaction, is that "consensus decision making processes interact with the emotional life of movement participants, particularly when dealing with internal movement conflicts" (Coy 2003, viii), and this is particularly important in an heterogeneous transnational movement such as the GJM.

The last factor that we can take into account in this section is the level of congruence between activists' normative ideals of democracy and their perception of how democracy actually works within the GJM. The hypothesis in this case is that the less congruent normative ideals and actual perception of democracy are, the less satisfied the activists. In order to operationalize the degree of congruency we can calculate the differences between the activists scores on the normative ideals' items and those on the GJM democracy's perceptions. This is rather simple to do, since activists were asked to show their degree of agreement with the same kind of statements for both normative and actual models. The differences for each couple of items can vary from – 3 to 3, 0 representing the value for a perfect congruence between normative ideals and perception of actual decision making. Consequently, the farer the value is from 0 the less the congruence between perceived practices and ideal models of decision making. To calculate an index that measures the level of "incongruence" regardless its direction, we transformed the negative values in positive ones: that means that for each item we get an index which varies from 0 (full congruence) to 3 (full incongruence). We also calculated a synthetic additive index which sums the four indexes and divides the sum by 4.[27] According to the latter, activists showing full congruence (0) and full incongruence (3) are both only about 5%, 50% show a relatively high degree of congruence (1) and about 40% a relatively high degree of incongruence (2).

[26] We operationalized the index of perceived deliberation in GJM in same way as the index of activists' normative deliberativeness (see note 1).
[27] This means that the synthetic index will also vary from 0 to 3.

Table 11 - Pearson's correlations between indexes of congruent models of democracy and satisfaction (N= 792-839).

Indexes of degree of incongruence *(0-3) between perceived GJM democracy and Democratic Ideals in…*	**Degree of Satisfaction (0-3)**
Item 1 (arguments/resources)	-.252***
Item 2 (equals/non acceptance)	-.210***
Item 3 (delegation/participation)	-.092**
Item 4 (voting/consensus)	-.114***
Synthetic additive index	-.240***

As we can see in table 11, all indexes of (in)congruence correlate with (dis)satisfaction with democracy within the GJM: the more the models are incongruent the less the activists are satisfied. If we recode the synthetic additive index of congruency in two categories, 77% of the (more or less) "congruent" activists are satisfied against only 61% of the (more or less) "incongruent" ones.

Thus, according to our findings, satisfaction with democracy within the GJM is a function of two main factors: how democracy is perceived at that level and the congruence between this perception and the normative ideals of democracy activists bear.

Interestingly the two hypotheses point to two different directions: while the first finding confirms what "deliberative" scholars have so far being arguing, that is deliberation has a legitimizing effect for decision making, the second one would limit this only to individuals who bear a deliberative normative model of democracy. If they instead support a different normative model (associational, assembleary and so on) what counts is the distance between their ideals and their perception of the actual democratic practices: the higher this distance, the lower the satisfaction, whatever the model is.

This is why it is important to understand which of those competing hypotheses works better. If we compare the binary correlations between the two indexes (perceived deliberativeness at the GJM level and congruence between ideals and practices) with satisfaction we notice only a slight difference in favour of the deliberation hypothesis (.249 against -.240 in terms of Pearson coefficients). Partial correlations do not work any better: if we control the degree of perceived deliberativeness for the index of incongruence, the coefficient gets down to .150, but the same is true if we control incongruence for deliberativeness (- .132). The fact is that the two independent variables highly correlate with each other (the Pearson coefficient is -.520, significant at .001 level). However, this means that the more deliberative the GJM setting of democracy is perceived, the higher is the congruence with the normative democratic values of the activists. We can get a better ideas of what this means by looking at the data showed in table 12.

Table 12 - Degree of normative-actual models' incongruence by types of perceived models of democracy within GJM.

Typology of perceived models	Incongruence	
	Means	Incongruent activists (%)
Associational	1.3	58.6
Deliberative representative	1.3	58.4
Assembleary	0.8	23.7
Deliberative participative	0.9	27.2
Total	**1.1**	**44.9**
Measures of associations	Eta: .370***	Cr.'s V: .326***

Indeed, the level of incongruence is a function of the models of democracy perceived at GJM level: about 58% of activists who perceive the GJM as "associational" or "deliberative representative" find those models far from their democratic ideals, while this percentage get down to 24% and 27% when activists perceive an "assembleary" or a "deliberative participative" setting.

Finally, we can have a more accurate view of the relevant factors which explain the (dis)satisfaction with democracy, if we use a regression analysis with satisfaction as dependent variable and the indicators of perceived democratic models and incongruence as independent. Such analysis will allow us not only to see which factor better explains satisfaction, but also which dimension matters more.

Table 13 - Linear regression analysis with "satisfaction with GJM democracy" (0-3) as dependent variable.

Independent variables	Model 1		Model 2	
	Standardized b	Sig.	Standardized b	Sig.
Degree of incongruence in…				
Item 1 (arguments/resources)	-.183	.000	-.070	N.s.
Item 2 (equals/non acceptance)	-.109	.004	-.037	N.s.
Item 3 (delegation/participation)	-.056	N.s.	-.043	N.s.
Item 4 (voting/consensus)	-.021	N.s.	.018	N.s.
Perceived dimensions of democracy in GJM				
Item 1 (arguments/resources)	--	--	-.099	N.s.
Item 2 (equals/non acceptance)	--	--	-.106 (equals)	.037
Item 3 (delegation/participation)	--	--	.113 (participation)	.007
Item 4 (voting/consensus)	--	--	-.007	N.s.
R	.266		.320	Sig. F change, .000

As it can be seen in table 13, if we only test the impact of the dimensions of incongruence, the most important explanatory variables refer to the argument/resources and the equals/non acceptance

dimensions: the more the activists' ideals are dissonant with their perceptions of democratic settings in the GJM on those dimensions the less are satisfied with democracy at that level. On the argument/resource item, 76.4% of "more or less" congruent activists are (moderately or much satisfied) against 55.6% of the "more or less" incongruent ones; on the equals/non acceptance dimension, the finding is similar (74.4% against 58%). On the contrary, the incongruence on the other two dimensions (delegation/participation and vote/consensus) is not relevant for satisfaction.

However, if we now introduce the dimensions of the perceived GJM democratic settings in the regression, the picture changes a lot. In Model 2, in fact, no dimension related to incongruence has an impact on the dependent variable, while two dimensions of the perceived GJM democracy significantly explains part of the variation. Those are the "equals/non equals" and the "delegation/participation" dimensions. To report this in another way, 58% of the activists believing that in the GJM democratic settings participants are not treated as equals and 62% of those perceiving a mechanism of delegation declare to be satisfied, while the percentage of satisfied increases to 77% and 79% respectively for those who perceive equal treatment of participants and the openness of decision-making settings to whoever wants to participate. Once full participation and equality are perceived, satisfaction increases whatever the method of decision making (vote or consensus), and whatever the level of incongruence between the democratic ideals and the way in which GJM democracy is perceived.

To conclude both incongruence and perception of how democracy works within the GJM contribute to explain satisfaction, the latter offers a more powerful explanation (see figure 1).

Figure 1 - Test results of the hypotheses related to satisfaction with GJM democracy.

Hypotheses	Test results
H1: who do not participate in decision making is not satisfied with democracy because s/he feel excluded	Rejected
H2: the higher the standard of democracy, the lower the satisfaction with perceived democracy, because higher standards are more difficult to implement in the real world	Rejected
H3: the higher the incongruence between normative democratic standards and perceived democracy, the lower the satisfaction with democracy	Partially confirmed
H4: the more democracy is perceived as deliberative, the higher the satisfaction with democracy	Fully confirmed (participation and equality)

All the findings reported in this section allow us to build a model of explanation of participation in GJM events and activities which emphasizes the role of the internal decision making or, told in another way, an explanation of how collective action is built through norms. Participation is in fact a function of identification which in turns depends (also) on the degree of activists' satisfaction with how democracy works in GJM, the latter being higher when an open and equal decision-making setting is perceived (see figure 2).

Figure 2 - Democracy, identification and collective action in GJM (Pearson's correlations and regression analysis' R.



3. Conclusions

In this chapter we addressed the democratic normative dimension of GJM' activism. We underlined that although the GJM has promoted a normative idea of democracy which values both full participation and consensus, the ESF process has often been criticized because of its democratic practices. An internal conflict between vertical and horizontal organizations has created dissatisfaction with the way decisions are taken when an European Social Forum is to be organized. Referring to the data of previous reports, we show that in fact the organizations which participate in the GJM activities in our selected European countries are characterized by different views of democracy. The organizational statutes, stating (as the constitution of a state) their fundamental values (though it may be difficult to translate them in real practices), confirm tensions between delegation and participation, majority vote and consensus. The activists themselves report that in their group, and similarly in GJM, the normatively supported principles of full participation of all members and consensual decision-making are not always met. This nonetheless, activists participating at the ESF in Athens seem to be very satisfied with democracy working at the group level and in the GJM meetings. We also found that participation to the GJM strengthen participative and deliberative visions of democracy.

The fact that many activists stress full participation of anybody interested and consensus when they are asked to judge what makes a decision making fully democratic reveals an incongruence between their values and practices which has been worth analyzing. Incongruence between activists' democratic values and their perception of how decisions are taken during the GJM's meetings seems in fact to explain part of the variation of satisfaction with democracy in the GJM. Moreover, we found that activists' satisfaction is higher when they perceive that in the GJM meetings those who defend different and conflicting opinions treat each other as equals, and especially when the full participation of anybody interested is promoted. This is an interesting result per se, but is even more interesting if we think that satisfaction with democracy is highly correlated with identification with, and participation in the movement.

[28] The R is the result of a regression analysis with participation in GJM events (collective action) as dependent variable and the Identification, Satisfaction, and the two items, full participation and equality, of the perception of GJM internal democracy as independent.

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Chapter 4

Democracy from below: activists and institutions

by Donatella della Porta and Marco Giugni

"Although the EU is one of the richest areas of the world, tens of millions of people are living in poverty, either because of mass unemployment or the casualization of labour. The policies of the EU based on the unending extension of competition within and outside Europe constitute an attack on employment, workers and welfare rights, public services, education, the health system and so on. The EU is planning the reduction of workers' wages and employment benefits as well as the generalization of casualization. We reject this neo-liberal Europe and any efforts to re-launch the rejected Constitutional Treaty; we are fighting for another Europe, a feminist, ecological, open Europe, a Europe of peace, social justice, sustainable life, food sovereignty and solidarity, respecting minorities' right and the self-determination of peoples".

The Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European Social Forum, Athens 7th May 2006 so addresses the European Union. It does not reject the need neither for a European level of governance, nor for a European identity (that goes beyond the borders of the EU), but criticizes the EU policies asking for "another Europe": a feminist, ecological, open, solidaristic, just Europe. Similarly, the previous Assembly of the Movements, held at the third ESF, had stated:

"We are fighting for another Europe. Our mobilisations bring hope of a Europe where job insecurity and unemployment are not part of the agenda. We are fighting for a viable agriculture controlled by the farmers themselves, an agriculture that preserves jobs, and defends the quality of environment and food products as public assets. We want to open Europe to the world, with the right to asylum, free movement of people and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in. We demand real social equality between men and women, and equal pay. Our Europe will respect and promote cultural and linguistic diversity and respect the right of peoples to self-determination and allow all the different peoples of Europe to decide upon their futures democratically. We are struggling for another Europe, which is respectful of workers' rights and guarantees a decent salary and a high level of social protection. We are struggling against any laws that establish insecurity through new ways of subcontracting work".

In these statements, as in many others, the GJM confirms attention to interactions (although challenging ones) with the institutions of global, multilevel governance. It is on these positions that this chapter focuses.

Research on social movements has often stressed the relationship between "conventional" and "unconventional" politics—or challengers and polity members, to use Tilly's (1978) expression. A main contribution of the "political process" approach to social movements has been indeed his stress on the continuities in various forms of political participation in general, and between the characteristics of democratic regimes and the forms of protest in particular. Not only democracy rises from "disorder" (Tarrow 1989), but institutions shape social movements, their strength and strategies. In fact, studies on social movements have often highlighted the role of political opportunities in facilitating participation, the underlying assumption being that it increases as access to public decision-making becomes at least in part more open, the administrative units more decentralised and the legislative, executive and judiciary powers more distinct. Furthermore, the availability of allies, divisions within the government, or institutional reforms making bottom-up access easier are said to facilitate collective mobilisation (Tarrow 1994; della Porta and Diani 2006).

The attention to the "external dimension" is also linked to the strategic need to address some challenges to democracy, as has traditionally been implemented in representative, liberal

democracies. The movement for a globalization from below grew at a time of dramatic changes in the political process that have in fact affected the protest. First of all, the growth of international governmental institutions challenges the principles and institutions of representative democracy that have been built up around the nation state (Held and McGrew, 1999). Second, neoliberal economic policies, by increasing the power of multinational corporations, have reduced the capacity of traditional state institution to control the market (Pizzorno 2001; Crouch 2004).

Beyond suggesting policy changes, in a more reformist or radical fashion, the GJM is addressing these challenges through a critique of representative forms of democracy. In this endeavour, the movement is redrawing the boundaries of politics, broadening them in a participatory direction (della Porta et al. 2006). The self-definition as "a movement for a globalization from below" stresses the fundamental criticism of "top-down" representative democracy. The GJM has criticized supranational institutions not only because of the specific policies they adopt, but also for their deficit in terms of democratic accountability. Also national representative democracy are however stigmatized for being powerless or at best inadequate to guide globalization, and for the growing insufficiency of mechanisms of electoral accountability face to the greater power of the executive vis-à-vis parliament as well as the personalization of politics through manipulative use of the mass-media (della Porta and Tarrow 2005)

In this chapter, we are going to address the “external” dimension of democratic conceptions by focusing on two main dimensions: a) trust in different types of institutions; b) linked to this, solutions envisioned for “another democracy”, with particular attention to the territorial level of governance; and, finally, c) preferences for a strategy of political mobilization, with interactions with the various public institutions, or focus upon more autonomy and the construction of free space. We address these issues in two steps. In the first and the second part, we discuss attitudes towards institutions located at different levels of governance as well as more general views of democracy and politics by participants in the GJM on the basis of descriptive analyses of our data. In looking at difference overtime, we shall however keep in mind the different composition of the three ESF, related in particular with their location and, therefore, the large presence of activists from the host country. Here we stress in particular changes over time by comparing the data on the fourth ESF in Athens with evidence from previous ESFs. In the third part, focusing exclusively on the data from the ESF in Athens, we adopt a more explanatory approach in order to see what factors are associated with differences in the trust GJM participants have in different types of institutions, in the solutions they envisage to strengthen governance and democracy, and in their strategies of political mobilization.

1. Multilevel governance and trust in institutions: localist, nationalist or cosmopolitan?

Previous surveys have confirmed the activists’ criticism of representative democracy. Among the demonstrators against the G8 in Genoa in 2001, trust in representative institutions tended to be low with however significant differences regarding the single institutions (Andretta, della Porta, Mosca and Reiter 2002). In general, some international organizations (especially the EU and the United Nations) were seen by activists as more worthy of respect than their national government but less so than local bodies. Research on the first ESF confirmed that diffidence by activists in the institutions of representative democracy is cross-nationally spread, although particularly pronounced where national governments are either right-wing (Italy and Spain at the time), or perceived as hostile to the GJM’s claims (as in the UK). Not even national parliaments, supposedly the main instrument of representative democracy, were trusted while there was markedly greater trust in local bodies (especially in Italy and France), and, albeit somewhat lower, in the United Nations. The EU scored a trust level among activists barely higher than national governments (except, in this case, for the more trustful Italians). The data on the second ESF and the fourth ESF confirm the general mistrust in representative democratic institutions, although with some specification (see table 1). The higher trust in national governments in Paris and Athens compared

to Florence can be explained by the peculiar state of the Berlusconi government, which the Italian activists strongly stigmatized in 2002. The declining trust in the EU reflects the growing criticism of EU policy and institutions, with a politicization and polarization of positions during and after the French referendum on the European constitutional treaty (della Porta 2006; della Porta and Caiani 2006, 2007). Similarly, the decline of trust in the UN between Florence (similar in Paris) and Athens seems to indicate a growing dismay also among more moderate GJMOs that had once trusted that institution.

Among other actors and institutions, we might notice a strongly declining trust in the church and mass media, as well as in the unions in general and a stable (low) trust in the judiciary and (even lower) in political parties (see chapter 10). Activists continue to trust instead social movements (and less, NGOs) as actors of a democracy from below.

Table 1 - Trust in institutions of ESF participants in Florence, Paris, and Athens, valid cases only

Type of institution*	Florence 2002		Paris 2003		Athens 2006	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Local institutions	46.1	2365	43.1	2034	26.6	1122
National government	6.1	2451	11.6	1997	11.5	1126
National parliament	14.9	2428	-	-	20.5	1130
European Union	26.9	2444	17.3	2002	14.5	1141
United Nations	29.6	2444	31.7	1985	18.1	1136
Political parties	20.4	2423	23.0	2007	21.2	1120
Unions	16.1**	**	57.5	2025	49.0	1122
Social movements	-	-	90.0	2067	85.7	1139
NGOs	-	-	77.3	2002	66.8	1132
Both	89.4	2464	-	-	-	-
Church	17.2	2441	15.5	1987	9.1	1135
Mass media	12.4	2449	9.3	2010	3.9	1142
Judiciary	36.7	2429	-	-	33.8	1136
Police	7.3	2454	-	-	10.7	1132

*The degree of trust was translated into a dichotomous variable in the following way: 'not at all' and 'little' = 'no'; 'a fair amount' and 'a lot' = 'yes'

** The data refers to respondent to the non-Italian version N = 417. In the Italian version respondents were asked about their trust in specific unions, with the following results: trust in Cisl/ Uil: N = 229; 8.9%; trust in Cgil: N = 1104, 42.8%; trust in grass-root trade union N = 990, 38.4%.

As far as national institutions are concerned, there is first of all widespread belief that they are ineffective in combating neoliberal globalization. As one Italian activist stated during a focus group, "for better or worse, many of us who believed we were living in a democracy have woken up. We've realized we were not even valued properly, we were not even really electors, we were no use to anything or anyone, since these agreements did without government bodies or especially parliaments" (cit. in della Porta 2005, 194). Moreover, they are considered as more and more distant from the concerns of the people.

Local institutions are instead perceived as closer and therefore more approachable. In particular, left-wing local governments (especially those characterized by a stronger presence of the Communist parties in Italy, France and Spain) have offered logistic support and symbolic legitimation to the ESFs. At various levels (World Social Forums, European Social Forums), the parallel forums held by representatives of local institutions attest to this greater trust.

As particularly dangerous for democracy is considered, instead, the greater delegation of power at supranational level to institutions with no democratic accountability. The GJM emerged in fact from campaigns against international institutions, like the World Trade Organization (WTO) but also the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accused of imposing their will on national governments by "conditioning" loans to the implementation of neoliberal policies or imposing sanctions against protectionist policies. If in Seattle in 1999 the GJM became globally visible with the contestation of the Millennium Round of negotiations in the WTO, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of Bretton Woods the "Fifty Years is enough" campaign denounced the worldwide failure of the IMF and the WB, demanding not only a radical reform of their policies but also a democratisation of their structure.

If international financial institutions are perceived as the main promoters of neoliberal globalization, and therefore a main target for the GJM, trust in other IGOs is also low. The United Nations, whose summits on environment, development and human rights acted as a coral reef for the formation of the GJM in the 1980s and 1990s, are perceived as inefficient and un-accountable. In fact, main campaigns demands for a deep reform of the UN. In May 2000, the INGOs Millennium Forum urged the United Nations: "To reform and democratize all levels of decision-making in the Bretton Woods institutions and WTO and integrate them fully into the United Nations system, making these institutions accountable to the Economic and Social Council", as well as "to ensure greater transparency and democracy and to support the establishment of a consultative mechanism with civil society" (INGO Millennium Forum, May 2000). In order to develop a "more humane, just, fair, solidary and democratic international order", the UN Assembly of Peoples demands that "conditions appropriate for the exercise of international democracy are created via the institution of a parliamentary assembly of the United Nations, the formation of a congress of local powers of the United Nations, the strengthening of the status of the NGOs and the tripartite composition (government, parliament, non-governmental associations) of the national delegations to the various organs of the United Nations, the strengthening of the systems of guarantees, starting with the international court of justice, as well as the reform of the security council in order to make it really democratic and representative" (UN Assembly of the People, appeal of the first assembly, 141). In order to democratize the economy and reclaim "political control over companies, finance and international institutions", the third assembly of the United Nations of Peoples held at Perugia in 1999 proposed entrusting "to a reformed United Nations – instead of to groupings of wealthy countries like the G7 – the task of administering interdependence with an eye to the 'common good' so that it may intervene in economic decisions which are at the root of world problems" (in Pianta 2001, 152). Setting up a permanent forum of global civil society, monitoring the legitimacy of acts of the Security Council by the International Court of Justice, broadening the Security Council itself and doing away with permanent membership for the major powers, and the gradual phasing out of the power of veto are further proposals for reforming the United Nations frequently put forward in manifestos and appeals at counter-summits.

The activists also mistrust the EU accused of using competences on market competition and free trade (the so-called "negative integration") to impose neoliberal economic policy while the restrictive budgetary policies set by the Maastricht parameters are stigmatized as jeopardizing welfare policies. In the first ESF, already, EU policies are criticised for being essentially neoliberal with privatisation of public services and flexibility of labour worsening job security and welfare provisions. Under the slogan 'another Europe is possible' various proposals were tabled including 'taxation of capital' and, again, the Tobin Tax. Demands were also made for cuts in indirect taxation and assistance for weaker social groups, as well as for strengthening of public services such as education and health care. At the second ESF, the European social consult stated "we have learnt to recognize the strength of coordinated action and the vulnerability of the 'untouchable' organizations of capitalism. We need to deepen our contact and communication with society, decentralizing our struggle and working in local and regional context in a coordinated way with common objectives… the European Union is being shaped under the neoliberal politics. The

European constitution comes to reinforce it and next year it will be our main goal to fight it". Beyond policy choices, also criticized is the institutional structure if the EU, in particular weakness of the parliament *vis-à-vis* the commission and the council, and the lack of transparency in the *modus operandi* of the so-called "Eurocracies". In particular, the lack of democratic accountability is criticized: "at the local level we have very low influence in the decision making process, but our influence becomes null in questions as the European constitution or the directives of the WTO or the IMF. We are even criminalized when we attempt it…". During the ESFs of Florence and Paris proposals were tabled for a democratization of EU institutions—in order to make hem not only electorally accountable but also more open to participation "from below".

Social issues and democracy are strictly linked. Among others, the WIDE-European NGO Network together with the Rosa Luxemburg foundations ask for basic services and goods, such as education, health and water, subordinated to democratic decisions, involving the local community, stating that public service are the bases of fundamental rights, and stressing also the need to democratize the provision of public services. The constitutional treaty is feared as "constitutionalization of neoliberalism". A participant at the seminar "Pour une Europe démocratique, des droits et de la citoyenneté", referring to the constitutional treaty, claims that "The first part of the text is similar to a constitution. But the third one, which focuses on the implementation of concrete policies, goes beyond the normal frame of a constitution. It constitutionalizes competition rights. Making rigid the policies to be followed, it takes away from the citizens all possibilities to change the rules. It is an unacceptable practice because it is anti-democratic. Anyway, all changes are made impossible by the need to obtain an unanimous vote by 25 states". In the third part, "everything is subordinated to competition, including public services, the relations with the DOM-TOM, and the capital flow (something that, by the way, make any Tobin Tax impossible)".

Criticism of conceptions of democracy at EU level is also addressed towards security policies, with a call for a Europe of freedoms and justice against a Europe "sécuritaire et policière". In the first ESF, EU stances in foreign policies are considered as subordinated to the US, or environmental issues as dominated by the environmental-unfriendly demands of corporations, in migration policy as oriented to build a xenophobic "Fortress Europe". In the Paris ESF, the construction of a European judicial space is considered as a way to control police power. In particular, EU legislation on terrorism is criticized as criminalizing such categories as young, refugees, Muslims. EU immigration policies are defined as obsessed with issues of security and demographic needs (with a semantic shift from Muslim to young, and from young to potential terrorist). The official lists of "terrorist organizations" are considered as arbitrary (including groups that had already been funded by European institutions). Repressive measures are also criticized as ineffective, and the need for political solutions stressed. While terrorism is stigmatized, there is a call to "take a clear stand for international law, including the right of people's to fight occupation", but also to "defend national sovereignty". As for the EU foreign policy, there is criticism of the subordination of humanitarian politics and developmental help to commercial and security aims, recognizing the important role of the local population. Solidarity groups denounce the role or European states and corporations in Haiti, Latin America, Africa, aggressive EU trade policies, asymmetric negotiations of commercial treaty. In terms of defence policies, proposal ranges from "a Europe without Nato, EU-army ad US bases" to the multilateralism and refusal of a nuclear Europe, more resources to the UN and the introduction of an art. 1 "Europe refuses war as an instrument of conflict resolution.

2. Multilevel governance. Which solutions?

Activists present at the various ESFs share these criticisms of EU politics and policies. Respondents at the first ESF in Florence were convinced that the EU favours neoliberal globalisation, and that it is unable to mitigate the negative effects of globalisation and safeguard a different social model of welfare. While Italians expressed greater trust in the EU, and British

activists were more euro-sceptic (followed by French and Spanish activists), the differences were however altogether small. Respondents in Athens confirmed a widely shared scepticism that strengthening the national governments would help achieving the goals of the movement (only about one fifth of the activists responded positively). Confirming the trends already observed on the battery of questions on trust in institutions, between the first and the fourth ESF there is a decline in those who support a strengthening of the EU (from 43% to 35%) and/or the UN (from 57% to 48%) (see table 2).

In general, the GJM activists seems however aware of the need for supranational (macroregional and/or global) institutions of governance. At one of the plenary assemblies of the second edition of the ESF, Italian activist Franco Russo asked: "There is a real desire of Europe… but not of any Europe. The European citizens ask for a Europe of rights: social, environmental, of peace. But does this Constitution responds to our desire for Europe?". And the French representative of the French union federation G10 Solidaires, Pierre Khalfa, declared that the Constitutional treaty "is a document to be rejected… the discussion of the project is the occasion for a Europe-wide mobilization" (in "Liberazione" 14/11/2003). In a comment on the second ESF, the Italian daily (near to the "post-communist" Democratici di sinistra) "L'Unità" (17/11/2003) praised the definition of a common line on Europe as "an innovation that put the movement in a advantageous position vis-à-vis the majority of the traditional political forces".

The image of "another Europe" (instead than "no Europe") is often stressed in the debates. During the second ESF, the Assembly of the unemployed and precarious workers in struggle states "For the European union, Europe is only large free-exchange area. We want a Europe based upon democracy, citizenship, equality, peace, a job and a revenue to live. Another Europe for another World". And also, "In order to build another Europe we must put the democratic transformation of institutions at the centre of elaboration and mobilization. We can, we should have great political ambition for Europe… Cessons de subir l'Europe: prenons la en mains" (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2223, accessed 20/12/2006). Unions and other groups active on public services proclaim "the European level as the pertinent level of resistance", among others against national decisions. The "No to the Constitutional draft" is combined with demands for a legitimate European constitution, produced through a public consultation, "a European constitution constructed from below". The demands for "more Europe" are linked not only to a reduction of the "democratic deficit", but to a different democracy A participant in the seminar "Pour une Europe démocratique, des droits et de la citoyenneté" states "The Europe we have to build is the Europe of rights and of participatory democracy which must be its engine. A constitutional project is tabled. Is it a text for 'the Europe we want'? … For building a democratic Europe, we have to discuss of its construction and make the ESF an actor for a new constitution » In this vision, "the European social forum constitutes the peoples as constitutional power, the only legitimate power". The challenge is to "dare" imagining a more ambitious future for Europe. In a report on the seminar "Our vision for the future of Europe", we read "Lacking a clear and far reaching vision the EU-governments are stumbling from conference to conference. In this manner the EU will not survive the challenges of the upcoming decades! Too many basic problems have been avoided for lack of a profound strategic position. In our vision we outlined an alternative model for the future of Europe. It contains a clear long range positioning for Europe making a clear choice for the improvement of the quality of life for all and for responsible and peaceful development" (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2106/doc295).

The activists of the first ESF already expressed strong interest in the building of new institutions of world governance: 70% of the respondents are quite or very much in favour of this, including strengthening the United Nations, an option supported by about half our sample. Furthermore, about one third of activists agreed that in order to achieve the goals of the movement, a stronger EU and/or other regional institutions is necessary (with higher support for the EU among Italian activists, and very low support among the British activists). In Athens, the believe in the need of building (alternative) institutions of world governance became unanimous (93% of the

respondents), and instead the confidence in strengthening the EU went from almost half (43%) to about one third, and that in strengthening the UN from more than half (57%) to less than half (48%) of the respondents.

Table 2 - Opinion of ESF participants in Florence and Athens which institutions should be strengthen to achieve global social movement's goals, valid cases only*

Type of institution**	Florence 2002		Athens 2006	
	%	N	%	N
Strengthen national governments	22.0	2362	25.6	1066
Strengthen European Union***	43.2	2383	34.9	1073
Strengthen United Nations	56.6	2405	48.4	1056
Building institutions of world governance****	64.6	2400	92.5	1127

***** Question of the Florence questionnaire: "In your opinion,, to achieve the goals of the movement it would be necessary to strengthen …. "; question of the Athens questionnaire: "In your opinion, what should be done to tame neo-liberal globalization? Strengthen …"

****** The level of disagreement/ agreement was translated into a dichotomous variable in the following way: 'strongly disagree' and 'disagree'= 'no'; 'agree' and 'strongly agree' = 'yes'

******* The Florence questionnaire asked for the strengthening of EU or other international super-national institutions.

********The Athens questionnaire asks about the building new institutions that involve the civil society on the international level; the Florence questionnaire asks about the building of new institutions of world governance

In the survey at the first ESF, activists from different countries stated that the European Union strengthens neoliberal globalisation and a shared mistrust in the capacity of the EU to mitigate the negative effects of globalisation and safeguard a different social model of welfare (see table 3). If the Italians (in particular those from Tuscany and therefore also including less "committed" militants) had a higher trust in the EU, and the British activists confirm their euro-scepticism (followed by French and Spanish activists), the differences are however altogether small. The data from the survey at the demonstration in Rome in 2005 called by the GJM for protesting against the Bolkestein directive confirm this image (with even stronger disagreement on the capacity of the EU to mitigate the negative consequences of economic globalisation).

Table 3 - How much do you agree with the following statements? (equilibrated sample)

	Italy	France	Germany	Spain	UK	Total ESF	Rome 2005
a) The European Union attempts to safeguard a social model that is different from the neo-liberal one							
not at all	46.7	50.7	47.4	51.4	68.3	53.7	42.4
a little	43.7	35.8	43.6	38.5	26.1	36.8	37.7
some	8.9	8.2	7.7	6.4	4.2	7.0	11.7
very much	0.7	5.2	1.3	3.7	1.4	2.5	4.0
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**135**	**134**	**78**	**109**	**142**	**598**	**410**
b) The European Union mitigates the most negative effects of neo-liberal globalization							
not at all	31.7	50.0	29.7	44.0	59.4	44.4	41.8
a little	51.1	27.9	48.6	40.4	21.7	36.6	40.5
some	15.1	13.2	14.9	10.1	5.6	11.5	11.7
very much	2.2	8.8	6.8	5.5	13.3	7.5	1.5
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**139**	**136**	**74**	**109**	**143**	**601**	**410**
c) The European Union strengthens neo-liberal globalisation							
not at all	3.6	3.0	2.4	1.5	6.1	3.6	4.6
a little	18.7	6.0	4.9	6.3	5.4	8.6	11.8
some	43.2	32.8	35.4	38.7	15.0	32.3	31.7
very much	34.5	58.2	57.3	53.2	73.5	55.5	48.2
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**139**	**134**	**82**	**111**	**147**	**613**	**410**

However, the activists of the first European Social Forum expressed quite a high level of affective identification with Europe: about half of the activists feel enough or strong attachment to Europe, with also in this case less support from British and Spanish activists and more from French, Germans, and Italians (see table 4).

Table 4 - To what extent do you feel attached to Europe?

	Italy	France	Germany	Spain	Great Britain	Total ESF
not at all	17.9	9.1	12.8	20.7	27.8	18.2
a little	29.3	31.8	29.5	49.5	31.9	34.2
enough	45.7	43.9	37.2	28.8	26.4	36.5
very much	7.1	15.2	20.5	0.9	13.9	11.1
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**140**	**132**	**78**	**111**	**144**	**605**

The activists of the global justice movement therefore do not seem to be euro-sceptics, wanting to return to an almighty nation state, but "critical Europeanists" or "critical globalist", convinced that transnational institution of governance are necessary, but that they should be built from below.

These positions are in line with the debates in the ESFs, that do not usually question Europe as a relevant polity, but aim at developing "another Europe". Already in the first ESF in Florence, concrete proposals to improve the quality of the democratic outcome went from the establishment of an annual day of action devoted to media democracy to the building of alternative media (workshop on "Reclaim the channels of information: media campaigns and media protest"), from the reduction of import taxes on medicines to the increase in the use of nonconventional medicine (seminar on "Health in Europe: Equity and Access"), from the introduction of the right to asylum in the European constitution to the regularization of all "undocumented" migrants (workshop on Right to migrate, right to asylum); from a European social charter that recognises the right to decent housing to the occupation of empty buildings (workshop on "Housing rights in Europe: towards a trans-European network of struggles and alternatives"); from the dialogue with local authorities to participation of the people in the development of international experiences of cooperation (workshop on "Decentralized cooperation: a dialogue between territories as a response to global challenges"); from the quality control on hard drogues to liberalization of light ones (Workshop on "Perfect enemies: the penal governance of poverty and differences") Specific proposals for changes in EU policies come from networks of social movement organizations and NGOs, often already active on specific issues. So the European Assembly of the unemployed and precarious workers in struggle stress the importance of developing claims at the EU level (e.g. a minimal salary of 50% of the average revenue); a network of unions of cadres proposes a Charte de responsabilité des cadres à l'échelle européenne; groups involved in the promotion of Esperanto as well as associations from ethnic minorities put forward linguistic and cultural rights, the European social consult states asks to "strengthen and widen the European social fabric in a network that should be participatory, horizontal and decentralized, as much in the taking of the decisions as in the realizations of actions" (http://workspace.fse-esf.org/mem/Act2303/doc448). Proposals for economic reform are developed by European Union for research in Economic democracy. Humanitarian NGOs debate measures against religious and ethnic discrimination, including the potentials of EU directives and national legislations.

Many debates focused upon specific issues such as the EU policies on commercial agreements; youth rights in Europe; Christianity, Islam and Ebraism in Europe; national extremism in Europe; financialization and workfare; the contribution of the Churches to the construction of a new Europe; European policy on employment; Europe seen by African eyes; Ecological crises in Europe; the place of Islam in Europe and islamophobia. Europe remains similarly central at the fourth edition of the Forum where seminars (that in large majority have "Europe" in the title) discuss at the European level issues as diverse as the fight against poverty and institutional racism, the Charter of common principle of another Europe and the restriction of liberties, health systems and Nato, camps for migrants and the Ocalan case, education and relations with Southern Mediterranean countries, corporate politics and labour rights, relations with Latin America and with the UN, the populist Right and new oppositional actors, left-wing journalisms and housing problems, the Bolkestein directive and precarious workers, the Lisbon and Bologna strategy and constitution building, local governance and the WTO, taxation and Islamophobia, violence against women and students' mobility, linguistic equality and basic income, Roma's rights and the US military bases, agricultural policy and madhouses, human trafficking and sanctions against Israel, monotheistic religions and position towards Cuba.

These themes are however bridged within a common discourse. In the Call of the European Social Movements in Florence these various issues were all framed under the label of a struggle against neoliberism: "We have gathered in Florence to express our opposition to a European order based on corporate power and neoliberalism. This market model leads to constant attacks on the conditions and rights of workers, social inequalities, and oppression of ethnic minorities, and social exclusion of the unemployed and migrants. It leads to environmental degradation, privatisation and job insecurity. It drives powerful countries to try and dominate the economies of weaker countries, often to deny them real self determination. Once more it is leading to war".

Substantive policy proposals are linked within a vision of a multiterritorial democracy. The discourse on public good (such as water) is framed as oriented to overcome the culture of merchandizing, but also of a national sovereignty that refuses solidarity with the external world. At the same time, there is the attempt to enlarge the notion of Europe beyond the European Union and the fear of an exclusive European identity as representing the "civilized" culture against the non-European civilization. Criticizing "the arbitrary decision of the EU to cut funds to the National Palestinian Authority is unacceptable and exacerbates the whole situation". The Declaration of the Assembly of the Movements of the 4th European Social Forum stigmatizes the dangers of a polarization of the global citizens along the line of a "clash of civilization", which would justify a further discrimination against the people of the South. It stated in fact that: "Conservative forces in the north and the south are encouraging a "clash of civilization" aimed at dividing oppressed people, which is in turn producing unacceptable violence, barbarism and additional attacks on the rights and dignity of migrants and minorities.

Beyond the concrete policy choices, demands are elaborated for participatory democracy. The Assembly of the third ESF asked, among others, for more participation "from below" in the construction of "another Europe":

"At a time when the draft for the European Constitutional treaty is about to be ratified, we must state that the peoples of Europe need to be consulted directly. The draft does not meet our aspirations. This constitutional treaty consecrates neo-liberalism as the official doctrine of the EU; it makes competition the basis for European community law, and indeed for all human activity; it completely ignores the objectives of ecologically sustainable society. This constitutional treaty does not grant equal rights, the free movement of people and citizenship for everyone in the country they live in, whatever their nationality; it gives NATO a role in European foreign policy and defence, and pushes for the militarization of the EU. Finally it puts the market first by marginalising the social sphere, and hence accelerating the destruction of public services".

3. Politics, antipolitics, alterpolitics: how to change the world?

Beyond discussing the territorial dimension of power, the data on trust/mistrust in different political and social actors also help addressing another relevant issue. Social movements have been traditionally classified in political versus culturally oriented, or seeking power versus personal change. The GJM is at the same time pragmatic in the development of proposals for policy changes, but also expresses a lack of interest in "taking power" and instead a search for the construction of alternative, free spaces.

Movement politics is in fact conceived as alternative to the institutional one and based on interaction between society and politics. As an Italian activist declared during a focus group, "I never went in for politics, but before I always did voluntary stuff … according to me there's now this merger between voluntary work and politics in the strict sense … and this is maybe the novelty that gives the impetus, the fuel that makes the forces of two worlds that were perhaps a bit separate before come together" (in della Porta 2005, 193).

In general, we have to consider that our activists are well endowed with experiences of political participation in various forms. In particular, activism or previous activism in political parties increased from Florence to Athens, attesting to the growing interest of more institutional actors (see table 5). Experiences with direct forms of action such as occupations and blockage decrease instead, a trend that can be linked to both the higher participation in these forms of direct action in Italy (della Porta et al 2006) as well as the progressive detachment from the forum of the more radical and "horizontal" groups, that in Athens attended parallel events.

Table 5 – Previous political activities of ESF participants in Athens, Florence, and Paris, valid cases only

Type of activity	Florence 2002		Paris 2003		Athens 2006	
	%	N	%	N	%	N
Persuaded so. to vote for a political party	51.8	2494	-	-	54.1	1193
Active for a political party	33.5	2496	-	-	41.2	1193
Signed a petition/ public letter/ referendum*	88.8	2509	96.3	2102	84.2	1194
Distribution of leaflets	73.4	2498	74.0	1970	70.9	1194
Assembly/ discussion group**	91.3	2512	83.3	2010	-	-
Symbolic action	-	-	64.9	1885	-	-
Non-violent direct action	-	-			54.7	1193
Cultural	-	-			58.2	1194
Demonstration march	-	-	95.5	2080	92.6	1194
Strike	86.0	2507	71.2	1950	56.7	1194
Boycott of products	65.8	2494	74.7	2003	68.8	1194
Blockade/ Sit-in	67.9	2480	47.7	1865	31.2	1193
Occupation of a public building	68.0	2509	39.2	1904	33.5	1193
Occupation of abandoned homes/ land	25.9	2488	-	-	12.1	1193
Violent attack on property	8.4	2494	6.0	1830	6.3	1193

*Florence questionnaire asks for signature of petition/ public letter/ referendum; Paris questionnaire asks for signature of a petition; Athens questionnaire asks for a signature of a petition/ public letter.

** Paris questionnaire asks for participation in a reflection or discussion group; Florence questionnaire asks for participation in an assembly or congress.

In order to better understand the conceptions of politics in the GJM, we have asked participants of the Athens ESF to rank strategies oriented to enhance democracy according to their perceived importance (see table 6).

Table 6 - Strategies the Global Movement has to use in order to enhance democracy

	Practice democracy in group life	Take to the streets	Spread information to public	Promote alternative models	Contact political leaders
Most important	27.6	15.8	26.7	35.7	7.4
Second most important	18.1	15.3	31.5	27.1	10.6
Third most important	21.5	22.1	24.9	18.4	9.3
Fourth most Important	22.7	30.2	13.9	13.5	13.9
Fifth most important	10.2	16.6	3.0	5.2	58.9
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	1072	1064	1073	1080	1060

These data attest to the activists' search for alternative conceptions of politics and democracy. The most traditional form of political participation, contacting political leaders, has the lowest level of support. This reflects the mentioned mistrust of parties and the belief that representative institutions are further and further detached from citizens. The critique of parties – especially those potentially closest – concerns the conception of politics as an activity for professionals, even more than opposition to specific policy choices. The movement is said by an activist to stress "a completely different model of self-representation, etc., that doesn't fit, doesn't gel with a party's way of selection from above" (in della Porta 2005, 196). The demand for politics coincides with a demand for participation face to parties that have become bureaucracies founded upon delegation, stressing the (wrong) idea of politics as done by professionals, interested at most in electorally exploiting the movement, while still denying its political nature.

Although significantly more supported, also the participatory option of reliance upon protest as a main means to put pressure upon decision-making is considered as a priority but (first or second option) by less than one third of the activists. The movement's objective is in fact to "make the world aware": it "does not have the objective of taking power, but of changing society in its relationships, in feelings, in relations with people, of building a different world; and a different world is built from below" (ibid.).

Respondents in fact consider as more relevant than contacting politicians the spreading of information of the public—which has indeed emerged in the previous parts of our research as a privileged strategy also for the GJMOs (see Demos reports: della Porta and Mosca 2006; della Porta and Reiter 2006). If the New Left in the 1970s was fascinated by a possible revolutionary seizure of power, activists of the GJM tend instead to present their action as oriented to a slow and gradual change. In this sense, an activist compared the movement to a river, and "the broader the river, the slower it flows … sometimes it even seems as if it flows underground, just because it's so broad … the movement is like water permeating and flowing everywhere, so that when it knocks the wall down it already owns the field …" (in della Porta 2005, 196).

Even more, the activists stress the relevance of building alternative spheres of political engagement and discussion. They most often rank in top position the importance of practicing democracy in group life and, even more, of promoting alternative political and social models. In the activists' perception, politics involves the search, through debates, for an emerging conception of the common good. In fact, the construction of "convergence spaces", "that facilitate the forging of an associational politics that constitutes a diverse, contested coalition of place-specific social movements", has been noticed (Routledge 2003, 345). For the global justice movement, particularly relevant is the "forum" quality of some arena, that is the presence of places where "critically collective discussion about members' interests and collective identities" develops (Lichterman 1999, 104). The importance of forming open spaces and concrete alternatives is in fact stressed also in organizational documents. The coordination of the European Social Forum presents itself as having the task of constructing "a wider public space in which the nets, associations, movements, social forums, the different social actors, can debate with each other and intertwine their contents, practices and campaigns. A space that belongs to all" (quoted in Fruci 2003, 187). The Italian local Social Forums define themselves as open, public arenas for permanent discussion: a forum is, in this interpretation, "a tribune for the local civil society" (ibid., 174).

This criticism of institutional politics is confirmed by the attitudes towards and the experiences of participation in experiments of participatory democracy promoted especially at the local level. In the last decade, there developed, especially at the local level, so-called deliberative arenas, based on the principle of participation of "normal citizens" in public arenas for debates, empowered by information and rules for high quality communication. Deliberative arenas have been promoted in the forms of Citizens' Juries in Great Britain and Spain; Plannunszelle in Germany; Consensus Conference in Denmark, Conferences de citoyens in France, as well as Agenda 21 and various experiments in strategic urban planning. Experiments as diverse as the participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, the Chicago inner-city neighbourhood governance councils for policing & public

schools, joint labour-management efforts to manage industrial labour markets, stakeholder development of ecosystem governance arrangements under the US Endangered Species Act, village governance in West Bengal India are presented as part of an "Empowered Deliberative Democracy" model centered on participation, quality of discourse, and citizens' empowerment (Fung and Wright 2001). The focus of these experiments is the solution of specific problems by involving ordinary, affected people. It implies creation of new institutions and devolution of decision-making power, with however a coordination with representative institutions. The institutional objectives of these institutions include effective problem-solving; equitable solutions; broad, deep and sustained participation. Actors associated with social movements intervened in the development of some of these processes, sometimes as critical participants, sometimes as external opponents. In particular, the participatory budget has been credited to create a positive context for the development of associations, fostering greater activism, greater interconnectedness of associations, and a city-wide orientation (Baiocchi 2002). Various groups involved in the GJM have in particular sponsored the participative budgeting that allows citizens to decide upon part of the city expenditures. Notwithstanding this basis for legitimation, only one third of our activists (30.7%) strongly believe that these experiments will improve the quality of decision-making, while 42.5 are moderately optimist, and 14.3 disagree (of which, 2.6% strongly). Additionally, only 30% have ever participated in such a process.

4. Explaining democratic views: trust, solutions, and strategies

So far we have addressed the "external" dimension of democratic conception in a rather descriptive way, comparing in particular the findings from the survey we conducted at the 2006 ESF with those stemming from previous studies. In this part we give a more explanatory turn to our analysis. To do so we have conducted a series of multivariate regression analyses taking as dependent variables, respectively, the level of trust ESF participants have with regard to various representative institutions (specifically, local governments, national governments, the EU, and the UN), solutions to improve democracy (specifically, strengthening national governments, strengthening the EU, strengthening the UN, and building new institutions at the EU level and at the international level), and strategies of political mobilization (specifically, contacting political leaders, practice democracy, considering that participating in decision making processes improves democracy, and participating in such processes).

We are interested in particular in assessing whether and to what extent commitment to the GJM and previous participation in political activities influence the democratic views of movement participants. Social scientists are in fact split upon the consideration of the GJM as a social movement, although internally diverse ("a movement of movements" in the definition of the Italian activists), or a coalition of different actors that occasionally come together around single campaigns (see della Porta and Diani 2006, chap. 1, on the differences between social movement and coalitions). In Europe, the internal cleavages in the GJM emerged indeed with more or less disruptive consequences in different countries (della Porta 2007; see also chap. 3 in this report). Not only in Europe, different positions towards public institutions have characterized the debate within the World Social Forum with a "reformist wing" open to negotiations with public institutions and a more "radical wing" developing a more confrontational attitude (Smith et al. 2007). Different positions have emerged not only on the degree of cooperation with public institutions at different levels, but also on the very focus upon the traditional concern of "seizing political power" versus an emergence consent upon the building of alternative, free space.

Within a "coalitional" approach, we should expect these positions to align along pre-existing memberships in different types of organizations. Activists coming from different paths would keep their own political imprinting and follow specific agendas. If the GJM is instead a "movement of movements", cross-fertilization should occur between the different areas towards common positions. In parallel, degrees of commitment to the movement (both behavioural, such as

participation in GJM initiatives and symbolic, such as identification with the movement) could explain the support for different strategies of interaction with the institution. In the social science literature on political participation, in fact, core activists have been defined as sort of "vestals of the ideological purity") and contrasted with the leaders and a broader base of reference more open to compromise (Pizzorno 1978). Research on political participation has moreover linked, in various way, gender, age and social belongings to political attitudes, with e.g. more radical strategies receiving more support by male, young and student activists (see della Porta 2007b).

In order to discuss potential explanations, we have included among the independent variables a selection of indicators concerning the respondents' level of commitment to the movement and their political attitudes and participation, in addition to some indicators of social position which we consider mainly as control variables.

In general, the results are not very strong, to say the least. The explained variance is very low, never going beyond 15% and sometimes being well below 10% (adjusted R^2). Furthermore, the number of statistically significant coefficients is often quite low, especially in the case of strategies. However, our aim is not to provide a complete explanation of the dependent variables, but rather to see whether certain variables pertaining to commitment to the movement, political participation and attitudes, and social position have impact on democratic views.

To begin with the first aspect, we can see that institutional trust does not seem to depend on the level of commitment to the GJM (see table 7). Apart from one exception, none of the indicators of commitment to the movement are associated with the level of trust ESF participants give to various institutions. Thus, neither having participated in protests carried by the movement, identifying with the movement, or holding a leadership position within the movement help raising the trust that people have local governments, national governments, the EU, or the UN. The only significant coefficient is the one referring to the impact of identification with the movement on trust for the UN, but the effect is very weak at best.

Table 7 - Estimates of effects of selected independent variables on level of trust (standardized regression coefficients)

	Trust local governments	Trust national governments	Trust EU	Trust UN
Commitment to the movement				
Participation in protests of the movement	-.03	-.03	-.08	.03
Identification with the movement	-.03	-.02	-.06	n.s.
Position in the group (leader=1)	.05	.07	.04	.08*
Political attitudes and participation				
Self-placement on the left/right scale	.18***	.20***	.29***	.24***
Voted in last election	.16***	.15***	.12***	.12**
Worked in a political party	.01	.04	-.02	.01
Practiced civil disobedience	-.13***	-.15***	-.06	-.12**
Used violence against property	-.09*	-.10**	-.09*	-.08*
Social position				
Gender (woman=1)	-.07	.01	.01	.03
Age	.06	-.10*	-.03	.10*
Education	.07	.05	.10*	.08*
Employment (student=1)	.04	.03	.11*	.11*
R2	.12	.13	.17	.13

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

In contrast, most of the variables concerning political attitudes and participation have a statistically significant effect. Here we have included an indicator of political orientation (a left/right scale), an indicator of electoral participation (has voted in last election), an indicator of conventional participation (has worked in a political party), and two indicators of unconventional participation with different degrees of radicalism (has practiced civil disobedience and has used violence against property). The only indicator that is not significant is the one concerning conventional political action, as having worked in a political party does not impact on the trust ESF participants have on the four institutional levels. The other four variables are all consistently significant across the four institutions considered (local governments, national governments, the EU, and the UN). First, trust is related to the self-placement on the left/right scale. People who place themselves strongly on the left side of the political spectrum are more sceptical towards representative institutions (quite understandably, there are virtually no rightists among the respondents). This variable displays the strongest effect overall. Second, trust is also positively associated with the fact of having voted in the last election, suggesting a link between conventional political participation and attitudes towards multilevel governance. Third, the practice of civil disobedience – a form of action that is often used by the GJM (more than 40% of respondents have used it in the past) – is negatively associated with the level of trust (except in the case of the EU). Fourth, a similar relationship can be observed for the use of violent forms of action, although the effects are a bit weaker than in the case of civil disobedience.

Thus, movement participants that make use of unconventional forms of political mobilization – in particular, disruptive and even violent forms – tend to mistrust the representative institutions at all levels. It should be noted, however, that analyzing the relationship between trust and political participation is quite tricky. Here we assume that the latter influences the former, but the causality in fact might well go the other way around. In other words, the trust in the institutions encourages

political participation rather than being a consequence of it, for example by producing social capital, as many studies have shown (e.g. Fennema and Tillie 1999; Putnam 1993, 2000). In our case, it could be that, when one has little trust towards the existing institutions of representative democracy, he or she tends to adopt alternative (unconventional) forms of political mobilization rather than using the institutional channels for participation. This is confirmed by the positive association between trust and voting: those who have more trust are more likely to vote.

The social position of respondents is in general not a strong predictor of trust in representative institutions, at least not in a systematic fashion. Age is negatively associated with trust in national governments, but positively with trust in the UN. Apparently, younger participants believe more in national institutions, while older ones trust more the international institutions, a finding that is difficult to interpret. Finally, being a student increases the likelihood that one trusts the EU and the UN (but not the local or national governments).

The second set of regressions refer to the solutions envisaged by ESF participants to improve democracy at various levels of governance (see table 8). The findings are consistent with the ones concerning trust. The strongest effects are again those for political attitudes and participation, specifically the impact of the self-placement on the left/right axis and the fact of having voted in the last election. Both aspects positively affect the solutions to improve democracy. The previous use of violence against property is also associated, but negatively, with the solutions envisaged. In contrast, the use of civil disobedience displays only one statistically significant coefficient (strengthening national governments) and having worked in a political party is never significant.

Table 8 - Estimates of selected independent variables on solutions to improve democracy (standardized regression coefficients)

	Strengthen national governments	Strengthen EU	Strengthen UN	New institutions to involve civil society (EU level)	New institutions to involve civil society (int. level)
Commitment to the movement					
Participation in protests of the movement	-.03	-.12**	.02	-.08	-.05
Identification with the movement	-.02	-.05	.03	.16***	.17***
Position in the group (leader=1)	.03	.10**	.09*	.06	.01
Political attitudes and participation					
Self-placement on the left/right scale	.19***	.24***	.22***	.08	.05
Voted in last election	.09*	.14***	.17***	.10**	.06
Worked in a political party	.01	.00	.00	-.05	-.03
Practiced civil disobedience	-.13**	-.07	-.06	.04	.02
Used violence against property	-.12**	-.10**	-.14***	-.12**	-.04
Social position					
Gender (woman=1)	.06	.00	-.01	-.04	-.02
Age	-.00	.04	.11*	.12**	.05
Education	-.02	.10**	.09*	.02	.03
Employment (student=1)	-.03	-.03	.07	-.01	-.02
R2	.10	.16	.15	.10	.05

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

Here, however, we should distinguish between two types of solutions: strengthening existing institutions (national or supranational) and building new institutions to involve the civil society (at the EU level and at the international level). With regard to first type of solution, participants who place themselves only moderately on the left, who have voted in the last election, and who have never used violence against property give more importance to strengthening existing institutions, be it national governments, the EU, or the UN (there is also a negatively significant coefficient for the indicator concerning the practice of civil disobedience, but only on strengthening national governments). Thus, conventional political participation (i.e. voting) seems to instil in people not only trust towards the representative institutions, but also the view that the latter can be improved in some way, while unconventional political participation points in the opposite direction.

This results hold in part also for the second type of solution. However, the view that democracy needs the building of new institutions at the supranational level depends above all on the identification with the movement. Participants that identify strongly with the movement are more open to solutions aiming to create new institutions that involve the civil society rather than strengthening the existing ones. If this applies to all the categories of participants in general, movement leaders seem to be more open to strengthening supranational institutions, both the EU and the UN. Concerning the identification with the movement, we should note that this variable is positively correlated with most of the indicators of trust, solutions, and strategies in bivariate analyses, but that these effects disappear when controlled in multivariate analyses, except for the two indicators we have just mentioned.

Finally, among the social position variables, only age and education have some statistically significant effect, but not consistently across the five indicators of solutions to improve democracy. Age has a positive effect on views about strengthening the UN and building new institutions to involve the civil society. Education is positively associated with strengthening the EU and the UN.

The findings for the third aspect we are dealing with, the strategies of political mobilization used to improve democracy, are weaker than those concerning trust and solutions, both in terms of variance explained and of number of statistically significant coefficients (see table 9). We therefore can be quite brief and comment on each dependent variable separately. Contacting political leaders only depends on the self-placement on the left/right scale. The coefficient is negative, suggesting that more leftist-oriented participants are more willing to use this strategy. Practicing democracy in group life is only influenced by the fact of having worked in a political party. Thinking that the involvement of citizens in decision-making processes improves democracy is affected by four factors: movement leaders, participants who are less strongly left-oriented, those who have voted in the last election, and those who have not used violent forms of participation tend to evaluate positively the involvement of citizens in decision making as a strategy to improve democracy.

Table 9 - Estimates of effects of selected independent variables on strategies of political mobilization (standardized regression coefficients)

	Contact political leaders	Practice democracy	Citizens in decision making improve democracy
Commitment to the movement			
Participation in protests of the movement	.02	.03	-.02
Identification with the movement	.05	.00	.05
Position in the group (leader=1)	-.07	.02	.09*
Political attitudes and participation			
Self-placement on the left/right scale	-.25***	-.04	.11*
Voted in last election	-.03	.04	.10*
Worked in a political party	.02	.10**	.01
Practiced civil disobedience	.02	-.06	-.04
Used violence against property	.06	-.05	-.14**
Social position			
Gender (woman=1)	-.06	-.03	-.02
Age	.01	-.05	.07
Education	.04	.02	.05
Employment (student=1)	-.02	.02	.06
R2	.10	.03	.07

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

The results for the latter aspect are somewhat stronger than for the previous two, although not easy to interpret. It seems that two types of cleavages emerge among activists: one is around the degree of radicalism" measured on the traditional left/right axis (where "more radical" means "more to the left"), but the other is a division about how much the movement should invest in addressing existing political institutions and how much should instead focus on the construction of alternative arenas. This debate is not totally new, being reflected in the research on new social movement in the differentiation between "political" versus "cultural" strategies (Rucht 1994), or "political" versus "countercultural" (Kriesi et al 1995). In the GJM, however, the construction of alternative space is presented as an openly political strategy (della Porta 2005).

But what about actual involvement in such decision-making processes? To examine that we had to perform a logistic regression, as we measured this aspect through a dummy variable (see table 10). Again, most of the independent variables are not statistically significant. The only significant coefficients are those referring to having worked in a political party and, among the social position variables, age. Thus, participants who have worked in a political party and older ones are more likely to having been involved in decision-making processes. However, the odds ratios indicate that only the first variable increases the likelihood of participation in such processes, while the second one basically leaves things unchanged.

Table 10 - Estimates of effects of selected independent variables on participation in decision-making processes (odds ratios)

	EXP(B)
Commitment to the movement	
Participation in protests of the movement	.1.06
Identification with the movement	.87
Position in the group (ref: not actively involved)	
Ordinary member	.86
Voluntary activist / campaigner	1.05
Paid staff member	2.14
Member of leadership	1.80
Other	.97
Political attitudes and participation	
Self-placement on the left/right scale	1.03
Voted in last election	1.37
Worked in a political party	1.48*
Practiced civil disobedience	1.19
Used violence against property	1.76
Social position	
Gender (woman=1)	1.19
Age	1.03**
Education	.92
Employment (ref: manual worker)	
Non-manual worker	1.82
Employer / manager	3.35
Professional	3.34
Teacher	1.49
Unemployed	2.11
Retired	1.31
Homemaker, no paid work / caring work	2.17
Student	1.58
Other	1.91
Nagelkerke R2	.13
-2 log likelihood	787.515
Degrees of freedom	24

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

What can we conclude from these analyses of the relationship between certain characteristics of GJM participants and their views concerning representative institutions and, more generally, concerning democracy and how to improve it in the context of multilevel governance? First, in general, democratic views are influenced by the political orientation of participants. Indeed, the left/right scale has quite consistently the strongest effect among those we have included in our analyses (especially for trust and solutions). The more left-oriented one is, the less he or she tends

to trust representative institutions and to envisage that democracy can be improved by strengthening the existing institutions. Second, democratic views also depend on the participants' political behaviour, both conventional and unconventional, but in the opposite direction. On one hand, electoral participation raises the level of trust movement participants have in representative institutions. On the other hand, the use of disruptive and even violent forms of action diminishes their trust and their conviction that democracy can be improved by straightening the existing institutions. Third, commitment to the movement does not appear to be a strong predictor of conceptions of democracy, at least as far as trust and strategies are concerned. However, participants who strongly identify with the movement tend to think that improving democracy is best obtained by building new institutions to involve the civil society. Finally, social position variables such as gender, age, education, or employment status are only weakly associated to democratic views. Age and education play some role, but the findings are not very consistent across the indicators of trust, solutions, and strategies.

4. Conclusion

In this chapter we examined the trust GJM participants have in different types of institutions, the solutions they envisage to strengthen governance and democracy, and their strategies of political mobilization. We have done so in two ways: a more descriptive analysis that compared democratic views of participants in the Athens ESF to evidence from previous ESFs and more explanatory analysis aimed above all to assess the impact of commitment to the GJM and previous participation in political activities upon the democratic views of movement participants in terms of trust, solutions, and strategies.

We have stressed that participants in the 2006 ESF display strong criticisms and mistrust of representative institutions at various territorial levels, which are seen as entailing a democratic deficit and not capable to act effectively against the social injustices brought about by neo-liberal globalization. As compared to what revealed by previous surveys of ESF participants, they also are quite sceptical about strengthening those institutions as a solution to such a democratic deficit and lack of effectiveness, while they stress the need of building new institutions of world governance. The activists share however a strong cosmopolitan orientations with an homogeneous belief in the need to build alternative institutions of global governance. Refusing a "return to the nation-state", the activists of the social forum presents instead a challenge for European institutions to which they ask alternative policies and a participatory politics, demanding, a "Europe of rights" which is a "social Europe" but also a "Europe from Below". Finally, we have seen that their general views of democracy and politics reflect in the search for alternative strategies of political mobilization.

The multivariate analyses carried in the second part have provided at best little leverage on the relationship between commitment to and participation in the movement, on one hand, and democratic views, on the other. To begin with, the variables we included in our models explain only a small part of the variance in the dependent variable, be it trust, solutions, or strategies (a bit better for trust). Furthermore, most of the variables do not have a significant effect. Among those that do play a role, the most important are by far the self-placement on the left/right scale and the fact of having voted in the last election. Both variables are consistently associated with most, if not all the indicators of trust, solutions, and strategies we have used in our analyses. Thus, the democratic views of participants in the GJM in terms of political stance towards the existing institutions (local or national governments, the EU, the UN) or towards new institutions as well as democracy more broadly speaking seems to depend more on traditional attitudinal aspects (such as the position on the political spectrum) and conventional behavioural aspects (such as participating in elections) than on movement-related aspects such as participation in protests of the movement, the identification with the movement, or the position within the movement. This holds especially for the trust in the existing institutions and for solutions in terms of strengthening such institutions, but less for solutions in terms of building new institutions to involve the civil society and for the

strategies of political mobilization. This is perhaps an indication that the most left-leaning activists and those that participate in conventional politics (elections) still believe that long-lasting institutions such as local or national governments as well as supranational institutions such the EU or the UN can be made more democratic in a more effective way and that, in contrast, they see the building of new institutions as a more difficult path to improve democracy. The research indicated therefore tensions between different visions of "external democracy" and main strategies to implement them, but no structured generational or ideological cleavages.

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Chapter 5

The socio-demography of global activism

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Introduction[29]

This chapter examines the socio-demographic background of participants in the European Social Forum of Athens (ESF-2006). In the first section, they are characterised in terms of gender, age, educational, and employment attributes, as well as in terms of country of residence. In order to interpret our results we follow a twofold comparative approach. First we compare the socio-demographic profile of participants in the ESF-2006 with the results obtained in similar surveys conducted during the first and second ESF (that took place in Florence in 2002 and in Paris in 2003). This comparison across time offers us some clues about the evolving nature of the ESF from the perspective of the socio-demographic composition of their constituencies. Second, we also compare the socio-demographic profile of participants with the results obtained in general population surveys. This comparison will enable us to stress the peculiarities of participants in this type of events in contrast with the average European citizen.

As we will see, although participants in this type of events, as political activists in general, constitute a rather well differentiated sector of the population, it is reasonable to expect also internal socio-demographic variations according to different level of commitment or type of activism. In the second section we address more specifically this issue, analysing the evolution of the presence of professional activists across diverse ESF. This analysis will provide us with some preliminary evidence so as to assess the extent of the process of professionalization (or institutionalisation) of these social forums.

In the third section we focus on the way in which socio-demographic variables appears related to variations in political attitudes and behaviours. More particularly we explore differences in terms of level of identification with the Global Justice Movements, GJM, as well as in terms of previous experiences both in events of the GJM and in decision-making process within the movement. Then we analyse socio-demographic differences of participants in terms of their level of satisfaction with decision making process in diverse settings and levels (from their own organizations to the decision-making processes at the United Nations). Finally, in the last part of this section we analyse differences according to participant's level of trust on a wide-ranging set of institutions and social and political actors.

In section 4 we explore the relationships between different normative ideals about democracy held by participants and their socio-demographic characteristics. Here, we will test the impact of a set of socio-demographic variable separately on the activists' degree of agreement with four statements on "how political decision should be taken" and will test the impact of the socio-demographic factors on the distribution of participants among the types of normative ideals of democracy built in chapter 3.

[29] Sections 5.1 and 5.2 have been elaborated by Isabelle Sommier, Ilhame Hajji, Nicolas Haeringer, except for the comparisons with data from general population surveys done by Marco Bandler. Section 5.3 has been elaborated by Manuel Jiménez and Section 5.4 by Massimiliano Andretta.

1. General demographic data

We will first present the general demographic data of the participants in the three ESF: gender, age, educational qualification and employment status. It is interesting to see if they have notably changed from 2002 to 2006 and if they are closed to the general European population. In this objective we will compare when it is possible sociological surveys realized for the first (2002), the second (2003) and the forth ESF (2006) [30] and we will confront these results with the data of European Eurobarometers.

Table 1 - Evolution of the gender composition of participants in the ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Male	52.6	48.9	54.9
Female	47.4	51.1	45.1
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	2570	2139	1175

The gender ratio of the ESF participants is relatively balanced, particularly during the second one (48.9% of men, 51.1% of women) with the exception of the fourth ESF where we can see an overrepresentation of men: 54.9% versus 45.1% of women (see table 1). However this difference in the whole sample is related to the overrepresentation of men in some specific countries. We can observe two patterns: countries with balanced gender participation (France, Spain) or even with a more feminized participation (Germany) and others with a male overrepresentation, especially Italy and Belgium (see table 1a).

Table 1a - Evolution of the gender composition of participants by country in the Forth ESF (column percentage)

Country of permanent residence	Male	Female	Total
Belgium	58.7	41.3	100.0
Germany	46.1	53.9	100.0
France	52.6	47.4	100.0
Greece	54.6	45.4	100.0
Italia	62.4	37.6	100.0
Spain	52.9	47.1	100.0
UK	53.6	46.4	100.0
Others31	54.7	45.3	100.0
Valid cases	645	530	1175

[30] This analysis compares the results of three surveys: the survey conducted by the group Grace coordinated by Donatella della Porta, during the first ESF in Florence (N = 2579); the survey conducted by Isabelle Sommier (Centre de recherches politiques de la Sorbonne Paris I) during the second ESF in Paris (N = 2198) ; the survey conducted by the DEMOS project Demos during the fourth ESF in Athens (N = 1058). For the results of the first ESF, see della Porta *et al.* 2006; for those of the second ESF, see Agrikoliansky and Sommier (2005).

[31] The category « Others » represents 159 persons, among whom 29 Danishes and 20 Turks.

Table 2 - Evolution of the age of participants in the ESF (column percentage)

Age	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006	Europeans (Eurobarometer 64 :2 – oct nov. 2005)
< 18 years-old	8.6	1.5	0.9	3.5
18-24 years	38.9	23	28.4	10.2
25-39	35.4	30.8	33.7	24.7
40-59	17.1	32.9	30.2	33.6
>= 60 years	0	11.8	6.9	28.0
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	2564	2125	1176	

As far as the average age is concerned, the profile of ESF 2002 participants contrasts with the profile of ESF 2003 and ESF 2006. It is clearly younger: those under 25 represent respectively 47.5%, versus only 24.5% of the 2003 sample and 29.3% of the sample; those under 40 represent respectively 82.9%, 71% and 63%. The 2002 exception is even more striking if we consider the average age (28.8 years-old versus 38.6 years-old in 2003 and 35.9 years-old in 2006) and the median that is set at 25 years-old at Florence, 35 years-old at Paris and 31 at Athens (see table 2). It is then not a surprise to note that in the three ESF, the average age is predominantly younger than in the overall population[32]. Most of the ESF activists are less than 40 years old, as these kinds of rallies do usually not mobilize the elderly. Thus, while the over 40 have reached about 45% during the 2003 ESF, this proportion get at more than 60% in the overall population.

Table 3 - Evolution of the highest educational qualification of participants in the ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006	Europeans (ESS 2002/2003)
None/ primary school	19.0	2.9	3.1	17.4
Completed secondary school	34.1	11.9	12.0	22.9
Technical/ professional qualification	14.5	15.9	4.6	41.1
First degree of university	25.7	17.8	53.6	13.0
Higher degree	6.8	51.6	26.7	5.8
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	2458	2131	1157	

The level of education is high and grows from one forum to the other. There were 32.5% participants with a college or university degree at the first ESF, 69.4% at the second, and 80.3% at the fourth. The ratio of technical or professional qualification was stable during the two first forums: around 15%; but it drops considerably at Athens (4.6% of the sample). This may be due to the fact that in the questionnaire translated in Italian there was not such distinction and in the

[32] Our data on the general population stem from three different database: the European Social Survey, the World Values Surveys (WVS, but only the European sample) and finally the last available Eurobarometer. Because of the lack of compatibility between the ESF variables and those of the main surveys on the population, we had to choose three of them in order to ensure comparability.

German version the distinction was used only at the University level, while the technical secondary school was in the same category as the other kind of Diploma.

The high proportion of persons without diploma (19%) or with only a high school degree (34%) at the first ESF can be easily explained by the particularity of the sample that was composed for more than half by students (see table 3 and 5). On the contrary the clearly higher qualification of the participants in the ESF 2003 sample (half had a graduate degree) must be related to its older profile (see table 2) and to its high social position: among those who have an occupation, 42% of them were executive managers or held a high level intellectual profession, 44.1% held a middle level profession. There were only 2.2% workers and 8.4% employees. (Agrikoliansky-Sommier, 2005: 182).

The comparison between the general population and the ESF samples points out in general a huge difference in the educational level. Except for the first ESF, most of the activists have a college education while the European average is much lower. Intermediate profiles such as technical/ professional are on the opposite much more present in the overall population.

Table 4 - Employment status of participants of the forth ESF (2006) (column percentage)

	Number	**%**	**Europeans (WVS - European data 1999-2004) %**
Manual worker	26	2.2	22.3
Non-manual worker	208	17.3	19.4
Employer/manager	33	2.7	4.7
Professional (doctor, lawyer)	110	9.1	7.6
Teacher	91	7.6	3.8
Unemployed	54	4.5	5.5
Retired	61	5.1	21.5
Homemaker	7	0.6	2.4
Student	362	30.0	6.6
Other	192	15.9	6.2
Missing	61	5.1	
Total	**1205**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Unfortunately the items used by the three surveys in order analyze the social position of the participants are too different to be compared accurately. At the first ESF, employees represented 39.4% of the sample, professionals 22.1, teachers 14.6%, workers 13.2%, and managers/employers 10.7%. During the latest one in 2006, students were the most important group (30% of the sample). 17.3% declared to be “non manual worker”, 9% to be professionals and 7.6% teachers (see table 4). But it is necessary to note that we have 5% “missing” and 16% “other” that could not be categorized.

Manual workers are much more present in the overall population than in the last ESF, while teachers are more represented in the ESF. The main differences between the two samples can be related to the age and the education level. As the overall population is quite older than our ESF sample, the proportion of retired people is bigger, while on the opposite side, the part of student is less significant because of the younger average age of activists.

The precariousness at work was tested differently in the three ESF. In 2002, 6.1% of the sample declared to be precarious. In 2003, 1.8% declared to be precarious and 8.8% to work part-time or to

be seasonal. 18.7% of the participants had a temporary job in 2006. Cautiously we can suppose that the precariousness had increased between the first and the fourth forum even if, considering the different types of questions, we can question whether we are facing the same reality. We can only compare the current social situation and the sector of the working population.

Table 5 - Evolution of the current labour situation of participants in the ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Student	54.8	23.7	31.6
Homemaker	0.5	0.9	0.6
Unemployed, looking for a job	5.1	10.0	4.7
Retired / early retired	2.0	12.2	5.3
Working population	37.5	53.2	57.7
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	2429	2120	1144

Regarding the current situation of the participants in the three events, we can notice a growing proportion of working population and a decreasing percentage of students. The "working population" represented 37.5% of the sample in 2002, 53.2% in 2003 and 57.7% in 2006 (but this last percentage must be interpreted carefully because it adds 40.9% "working population" and 16.8% "others"). In the category "working population", we aggregated all kinds of occupations: precarious, seasonal, part-time and full-time; wage-earning or professional. The second ESF shows two specificities (see table 5). First, the percentage of retired people (12.2%) that has to be connected with the presence of old people (11.8% were more than sixty years-old). Second, the high percentage of unemployed (10%), twice more than in Florence and Athens. We can explain it by the high level of unemployment in France and by the historical presence of "have not" associations in the French GJM (Sommier and Combes 2007).

Table 6 - Evolution of the professional sector of participants in the ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Private sector	47.9	22.6	26.3
Public sector	48.1	47.8	41.3
Associative sector (charities, parties, NGOs)	1.2	18.6	22.0
Other sector	2.8	11.0	10.4,
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	1029	1633	704

The associative sector has spectacularly and continuously increased between Florence (1.2%) and Athens (22%). It is the sign of the professionalization of the GJM, of the forums at least. Such a high percentage in the second ESF goes along with the strong decrease of the private sector: it represented 48% in 2002, versus 22.6% the year after and 26.3% in 2006. Public sector is relatively stable (see table 6). "Other sector" can be explained by some bad responses that we couldn't

classify because the occupation of the respondent could belong either to the private or to the public one.

2. Activists and others

After this general introduction, it seems interesting to compare the different commitments within the GJM. In order to do so, we will first classify the activists according to their involvement in their group: are they simple activists or "professional activists"? Secondly, we will focus on the Athens sample in order to see if there are socio-demographic differences between the activists and the participants who declared not to belong to any organization.

2.1 Position within the group (2003-06)

When we analyzed the category of the "working population", we have noted an increase of the associative sector and we have interpreted it as a sign of professionalization. Another sign of professionalization of the protest has to do with the fact that "professional activists" are more present in Athens than in Paris (unfortunately, we don't have comparable data for the first ESF). We call "professional activists" those who are part of the leadership or are paid staff members. They were 38% of the fourth ESF sample (324 persons) versus 21% of the second ESF sample (420 persons), therefore an increase of 17%. "Simple" activists without responsibilities or mandates represented respectively 62% and 79% of the sample.

Are professional activists different from ordinary activists in terms of socio-demografic characteristics? According to the results of some logistic regressions, we concluded that these two kinds of people are not so different from a socio-demographic point of view. They are divided up in the same way according to the different variables. However, some links could be identified.

Table 6a - Links between position in the group and some socio-demographic variables (Cramer's V)

	2003	2006
Gender	0.018	0.082*
Diploma	0.020	0.100
Age group	0.153***	0.144**
Sector	0.387***	0.353 ***
Current social situation	0.216***	0.197***

p-value : * <0.05, ** <0 .01, *** < 0.001

In 2006, the gender which Cramer's V associated is significant (p-value = 0.018) and is linked to 8% to the position in the group. The other variables have a more important strength of dependency, which furthermore is significant for 2003 and 2006. There is only the diploma of which the link is not significant. Three variables are significant in a decreasing order: the sector (around 37% according Cramer's V), the current social position of the activist (around 20%), and his age (around 14%). We will analyze them one after the other.

Table 7 - Evolution of the professional sector of the "professional activists" in two ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Private sector	11.8	15.0
Public sector	35.0	36.5
Associative sector (charities, parties, NGOs)	45.6	42.1
Other sector	7.6	6.4
Total	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	363	233

Without surprise, the professional activists, when they work, work predominantly in the associative sector, about half of them. They are followed by those who work in the public sector. These two categories represent four fifth of the 2003 sample (80.6%) and of the 2006 sample (78.6%). These results show that in the context of economic crisis, commitment is difficult for employees of the private sector and consequently has a tendency to be mostly represented by the protected sector (the public one) and by the associative one. The spread of this associative sector is the effect of the professionalization of contention. We can think that it is probably also linked to the economic crisis because much of these associations deal with humanitarian or social help issues.

Table 8 - Evolution of the current social position of the "professional activists" in two ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Student	9.5	19.7
Homemaker	0.0	0.6
Unemployed, looking for a job	7.0	2.9
Retired / early retired	10.0	4.1
Working population	73.5	55.2
Other	-	17.5
Total	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	409	315

The most notable evolution concerning the social position of the professional activists is the clear decline of people who have a job (55.2% in 2006 versus 73.5% in 2003) while the proportion of students has doubled: they represent one fifth of the Athens sample versus one tenth of the Paris sample (see table 8). On the contrary the proportion of retired people has decreased by more than a half. Such an evolution is related to the different age's structure of the two samples (see tables 2 and 9). The same can be said for the unemployed (see table 5). We can put forward the hypothesis that the presence of unemployed within the professional activists in Paris testifies the importance of "without" associations ("sans") in the French GJM (Sommier, 2003, Sommier and Combes, 2007).

Table 9 - Evolution of the age of the "professional activists" in two ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
< 18 years-old	0.0	0.3
18-24 years	11.8	18.9
25-39	35.7	33.3
40-59	40.6	41.5
>= 60 years	11.8	6.0
Total	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	413	318

The average age of the professional activists in the two ESF is relatively stable. In 2006, those under 25 represent 19.20% of the professional activists; they were 11.8% in 2003. In the second ESF, 11.8% were sixty years-old or more (versus 6% in 2006), but no one under eighteen was professional. In both cases and without surprise, professional activists are older than ordinary activists. In 2006, their average age is 38.9 years-old (versus 35.9 for the whole sample of this ESF) and the median is 38 years-old (versus 31 for the whole sample). In 2003, their average age was 41.2 years-old (versus 38.6 for the whole sample of this ESF) and the median was 41 years-old (versus 35 for the whole sample).

Table 10 - Evolution of the gender composition of the "professional activists" in two ESF (column percentage)

	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Male	48.9	60.3
Female	51.1	39.7
Total	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	414	320

If we compare the gender balance of the general sample and the gender balance of the professional activists, we do not see any difference in 2003: they are perfectly identical. On the other hand, male are overrepresented within the direction or staff in 2006: 60.3% versus 39.7% women (see table 6) in a more important proportion than their overrepresentation within the whole sample (see table 1). If we consider the country of permanent residence of the professional activists, we can notice a great disparity between countries, between 48.5% of male in Greece (the only country where professional activists are predominantly feminine) and 71% in Italy or 63.6% in Germany where the proportion of males was lower than females in its whole sample. Belgium, France and Spain are in the average, whereas Great Britain shows a more balanced gender proportion (see table 10a).

Table 10a - Evolution of the gender composition of the "professional activists" by country in the Forth ESF (row percentages)

Country of permanent residence	Male	Female	Valid cases	Total
Belgium	57.7	42.3	26	100.0
Germany	63.6	36.4	22	100.0
France	58.5	41.5	65	100.0
Greece	48.5	51.5	33	100.0
Italia	71.0	29.0	62	100.0
Spain	58.1	41.9	31	100.0
UK	52.4	47.6	21	100.0
Others	61.7	38.3	60	100.0
Total	**60.3**	**39.7**	**320**	**100.0**

2.2 The loners in 2006

We will then focus on the loners, that is to say participants in the fourth ESF who declared not to belong to any organization. They are 147 persons on a total sample of 1205 persons in the Athens sample. 68.8% of them are under 25 years-old versus 49.3% of the whole sample (see table 2), so clearly younger. Women are 47.5% of them, against 45.1% in the whole sample (see table 1). The percentage of women regularly decreases along with the commitment: the ratio is higher in the "lonely sample", then lower in the whole sample (45.1%), and even lower in the "professional sample" where they represent only 39.7% (see tables 1 and 10).

Table 11 - Professional sector of the participants in the fourth ESF according to the commitment (column percentage)

	Whole sample	Professional activists sample	Loners sample
Private	26.3	15.0	39.2
Public	41.3	36.5	35.3
Associative	22.0	42.1	5.9
Other	10.4,	6.4	19.6
Total	**100**	**100**	**100**
Valid cases	704	233	51

As the table 11 shows, "loners" who declared to work are both in private and public sectors (respectively 15.5% and 14%), and only 5.9% in the associative sector. If we compare them with the global sample and the professional activists sample, we can see how the involvement in the GJM is connected with the sector: the closer you are to the associative sector, the better you can be professional. Loners are clearly closer to the private sector (39.2%) than the whole sample (26.3%) and a fortiori than the professional (15%). It is a confirmation of what we said before: commitment seems to be difficult for people who work in the private sector. Finally, loners are less in the working life, probably as an effect of ages. Those results are in line with the literature that shows links between commitment and social networks (Diani and McAdam 2003, Snow and al. 1980).

Table 12 - Country of residence of the "loners" in the fourth ESF (column percentage)

Country	%
Belgium	2.0
Germany	8.2
France	11.6
Greece	44.9
Italia	10.2
Spain	7.5
UK	0.7
Other	15.0
Total	**100.0**
Valid cases	147

The loners are predominantly Greek (45%). The organization of an ESF is an event, which draws activists, and people who are just curious, who do not have any organizational belonging. There are very few foreigners who are "loners". Only French and Italian "loners" represent one tenth of their sample; perhaps because these two nationalities are historically important in the European GJM, and perhaps because of the tourist attractiveness of Greece (one may combine activist and tourist journeys). In the other nationalities, the ratio of "loners" is even fewer (see table 12). The fact that loners are much less among activists coming from abroad confirms two things. First: transnational collective action is more costly than national collective action. Second: organization is one of the devices to overcome those costs.

3. Socio-demographic profiles, experience in the global justice movement and attitudes towards democracy

In this section we analyse socio-demographic differences among participants in the ESF of Athens according to three set of variables. First (tables 13 to 15), we explore differences in terms of level of identification with the GJM as well as in terms of previous experiences both in events of the movement and in decision-making process within the movement. Second (table 16), we analyse socio-demographic differences of participants in terms of their level of satisfaction with decision making process in diverse settings and levels (from their own organizations to the decision-making processes at the United Nations). Finally, we examine socio-demographic variations according to participant's level of trust on a wide-ranging set of institutions and social and political actors (table 17).

Table 13 - Level of experience in similar events and identification with the Global Justice Movement according to gender and age groups

	Participation in previous GJM events (protest, for a…)			Have participated in decision-marking process within the GJM (% of yes)	(3) Level of identification with the GJM (average)
	(1) Level of participation in GM events (average)	(2) Have participated in 6 or more events (%)	Have participated in events abroad (% of yes)		
Sex					
Men	2.2	42.8	51.4	65.0	2.3
Women	2.1	35.7*	48.4	60.2	2.2
Total (N)	2.2 (1163)	39.6 (1163)	50.0 (1147)	62.9 (952)	2.3 (1147)
Age groups					
Up to 24 years old	1.8*	31.8*	30.1*	55.6*	2.1*
25-39	2.2	38.3	52.4	59.2	2.2*
40-59	2.4*	48.3*	62.5*	72.9*	2.4*
60 or more	2.3	42.5	70.0*	75.0*	2.6*
Total (N)	**2.2 (1166)**	**39.7 (1163)**	**50.1 (1164)**	**63.1 (952)**	**2.2 (1148)**

* An asterisk next to the value indicates means contrast (t-test for independent samples) significant at the .05 level.

(1) Average values in a 0-4 scale, where 0 stands for "no previous participation", 1 "once", 2 "between 2 and 5 times", 3 "between 6 and 10 times", and 4 "more than 10 times".

(2) Dummy variable where 0 stands for none or little previous participation (less than 6 events) and 1 "6 or more events"

(3) Average values in a 0-3 scale, where 0 stands for "not at all", 1 "a little", 2 "quite a lot" and 3 "very much".

Source: DEMOS-AthensESF2006 Survey.

In general terms, interviewed participants are moderately experienced activists in the GJM: four fifth of them have previously participated in at least one event of the movement previous to the ESF-2006, half of which (40% of the total) declared to have participated in six or more of these events, and 63% (50% of the total) to have participated in events abroad. Furthermore, 63% declared that this previous participation entailed also some kind of participation in decision-making processes. In consonance, interviewed participant's level of identification with the GJM is very high: only 13% declared to be scantly identified with the movement (moreover, this percentage increases among those with lower level of previous participation in the GJM).

Considering first gender, although values are a little bit higher for men, differences are not significant but for the indicator of previous participation in events of the GJM. In fact, 43% of the male participants and 36% of the women can be considered experienced activists. Differences in terms of participation in other countries or in the decision-making process within the movement are not statistically significant.

We found greater variance when participants are classified by age groups. In this sense, the youngest (up to 24 years old) which represents 30% of the total sample, appear as significantly different from other age groups due to their relatively lower level of experience in events (and

decision-making process) of the movement and of identification with it. In contrast the older generations (from 40 years old onwards) appear as the most experienced and showing greater degree of identification, especially the '68 generation.

Table 14 - Level of experience in similar events and identification with the Global Justice Movement according to level of (formal) education

Level of education	Participation in previous GM events (protest, for a..)			Have participated in decision-marking process within the GJM (% of yes)	(3) Level of identification with the GJM (average)
	(1) Level of participation in GM events (average)	(2) Have participated in 6 or more events (%)	Have participated in events abroad (% of yes)		
None/primary school	2.6	58.3*	42.9	78.3*	2.2
Completed secondary school	2.4*	49.6*	60.1*	69.8	2.8
Technical or professional qualification	1.5*	20.8*	44.2	67.5	2.2
First degree of university	2.1	38.7	43.9*	60.6	2.4
Higher degree	2.2	38.8	60.5*	64.0	2.3
Total	2.2	39.8	50.3	63.3	2,3
(N)	(1148)	(1163)	(1146)	(934)	(1129)

* An asterisk next to the value indicates means contrast (t-test for independent samples) significant at the .05 level.

(1) Average values in a 0-4 scale, where 0 stands for "no previous participation", 1 "once", 2 "between 2 and 5 times", 3 "between 6 and 10 times", and 4 "more than 10 times".

(2) Dummy variable where 0 stands for none or little previous participation (less than 6 events) and 1 "6 or more events"

(3) Average values in a 0-3 scale, where 0 stands for "not at all", 1 "a little", 2 "quite a lot" and 3 "very much".

Source: DEMOS-AthensESF2006 Survey.

Several more (statistically significant) differences are observed when participants are grouped according to their level of education (table 14). Since those with university degree are majority, either with a graduate (54%) or a postgraduate (27%) diploma, differences are established as deviances from the values in these categories. In fact both graduate and postgraduate groups show similar results but for the higher percentage of postgraduates that declared to have taken part in events abroad.

Having this in mind, it can be observed that the (minority) sector with only primary studies or without formal education (3% of the sample) appears, however, as the more experience group (both in terms of events and participation in decision-making process within the movement). Similarly feature of "experienced" seem to apply to the somehow larger sector of those with secondary school (12% of the total). In fact, within this category, and in contrast with the group with the lowest level of studies, we find the highest levels of participation abroad as well as of identification with the global justice movement (although in the latter case differences are not statistically significant). In contrast, the group with technical qualification or professional diploma appears as the less experienced sector, (more significantly in terms of previous participation in movement' events).

Table 15 depicts differences concerning the level of identification and the extent of previous involvement in the movement' activities according to the situation in the labour market and the working sector for those currently employed.

Table 15 - Level of experience in similar events and identification with the Global Justice Movement according to labour market related variables

	Participation in previous GM events (protest, fora..)			Have participated in decision-marking process within the GM (% of yes)	(3) Level of identification with the GJM (average)
	(1) Level of participation in GM events (average)	(2) Have participated in 6 or more events (%)	Have participated in events abroad (% of yes)		
Situation in the labour market					
Student	1.9*	33.0	36.2*	56.2*	2.1*
Homemaker	1.6	14.3	28.6	60.0	2.7*
Unemployed	2.0	33.0	48.1	66.0	2.4
Retired / early retired	2.5	48.3	70.0*	71.7	2.6*
Working population	2.3*	44.4	58.5*	69.7*	2.3
Other	2.3	44.2	54.0	58.0	2.3
Total (N)	2.2 (1135)	40.2 (1135)	50.6 (1133)	63.2 (927)	2.3 (1117)
Working with a temporary job?					
No	2.4	46.5	62.8	71.8	2.3
Yes	2.3	43.7	51.1*	68	2.2
N	464	464	463	373	453
Working sector					
Private sector	1.9*	31.5	39.8*	58.8*	2.3
Public sector	2.5*	48.6	64.7*	68.5	2.4*
Associative sector charities, parties, NGOs	2.5	49.7	62.8	76.5*	2.2
Other sector	2.2	42.0	55.1	61.0	2.3
Total **(N)**	2.3 (693)	43.8 (693)	56.8 (690)	66.8 (563)	2.3 (680)

* An asterisk next to the value indicates means contrast (t-test for independent samples) significant at the .05 level.

(1) Average values in a 0-4 scale, where 0 stands for "no previous participation", 1 "once", 2 "between 2 and 5 times", 3 "between 6 and 10 times", and 4 "more than 10 times".

(2) Dummy variable where 0 stands for none or little previous participation (less than 6 events) and 1 "6 or more events"

(3) Average values in a 0-3 scale, where 0 stands for "not at all", 1 "a little", 2 "quite a lot" and 3 "very much".

Source: DEMOS-AthensESF2006 Survey.

As we have seen in previous section, most participants are either workers (58%) or students (32%). Consequently most of the (statistically relevant) differences found refer to deviations from the average values found in these two larger groups. In these sense, the students (mostly young people) can be characterised as relatively less experienced and to a certain extent less identified with the GJM. While the working population reflects higher level of involvement in the movement,

the unemployed do not differ (statistically) from the rest of participants; also values tend to indicate high levels of identification (above the average). These results suggest that, although group of the unemployed is probably (slightly) underrepresented in this type of movements' events, their level of identification is relatively high. Similar differences are found if we compare within the working population, those with a temporary job with those other with a stable job. Although differences do not tend to be (statistically) significant (except for participation abroad), those with a temporary job show somehow lower level of involvement in the Global Justice Movement. In contrast, workers, especially non-manual workers (with a average value of 2.7 in the level of participation indicator) not only were overrepresented but also show higher level of experience in the movement.

As can be observed in Table 15, among participant currently working we find also some differences according to the sector of activity. Those participants working in the private sector reflects the lowest values in terms of involvement in movement's activities and subjective identification. In contrast those in the associative sector and those working for the public sector seem much experienced participants, being those linked to the associative sector the most frequently involved in decision-making processes. However, their subjective identification with the GJM (although being very high) is inferior to the level declared by the people working in the public and the private sector. These results can be interpreted as an indicator of the weight of professional activists (working for NGOs, parties, etc.) within the decision-making process. This presence in decision-making process is not combined with the highest level of identification probably due to either their strong identification with their own group or the moderation in their personal commitment with the movement beyond their professional responsibilities.

Beyond these differences in terms of attitudes and behaviour referred to the GJM, in this section we explore two more general set of political attitudes: satisfaction with decision-making process in diverse settings and territorial levels and trust in a wide set of social and political institutions.

Table 16 shows the results concerning satisfaction with decision-making processes in two social movement's contexts (the group of the main affiliation of participants and the broader movement's networks (associated to campaigns or movement's meetings) as well as three institutional settings: the national, the European Union and United Nations. The table offers two very similar indicators on this respect: average level of dissatisfaction (where the greater the value the greater the level of dissatisfaction) and the percentage of interviewed participants that declared to be very unsatisfied. The five settings have been ordered decreasingly according to the level of "dissatisfaction".

As can be seen, participants' levels of satisfaction vary remarkably from the social movement settings (both in their own groups and in inter-organizational decision-making contexts). In their own group context, 31% and 54% of the participants declared to be, respectively, moderately or totally satisfied with the processes of decision-making in their own groups. Women and younger participants tend to be even more satisfied while postgraduates and those not working show (significantly) lower levels of satisfaction. Although positive, level of satisfaction is more moderate when judging decision-making process in movements' inter-organizational context: here 6% and 64% of the participants declared to be, respectively, moderately or totally satisfied. Dissatisfaction is relatively higher (but always limited) among those working in the associative sector (it may be worthy to remember that this category also showed lowest level of identification with the movement), and above the average among unemployed, homemaker and those working in the public sector.

Table 16 - Level of satisfaction with decision-making processes and (statistically significant) variances according to socio-demographic variables.

(Ordered by increasing level of dissatisfaction)

Level of dissatisfaction with decision-making process in:	N	Percentage of very unsatisfied	Average (mean)*	Categories significantly different from the average**	
				Below the average (more satisfied):	Above the average (more unsatisfied):
Participants' own group	937	2.6	0.9	Women; Up to 24 years; Homemaker	Postgraduate
Groups and networks taking part in the GM	1013	5.2	1.3	Homemaker; Unemployed	Associative sector
Your national political system	1107	65.0	2.5	Associative sector	Unemployed; Other working sector;
The European Union	1105	65.0	2.5	Associative sector	Secondary school; Unemployed; Public and other working sector
The United Nations	1096	66.2	2.6	60 or more; Postgraduate; Retired; Associative sector	

* Average values in a 0-3 scale, where 0 stands for "very satisfied", 1 "moderately satisfied", 2 "moderately unsatisfied" and 3 "very unsatisfied".

** An asterisk next to the value indicates means contrast (t-test for independent samples) significant at the .05 level.

Source: DEMOS-AthensESF2006 Survey.

No matter the territorial level we refer to, dissatisfaction is a general feeling when participants are asked their opinion about decision-making process in institutionalised settings. However, in the three instances considered, those working in the associative sector manifested (part of which may be, if not institutionalised, more close to these institutions) levels of dissatisfaction below the average (about 10 percent points in the "totally unsatisfied" response category). In the case of the United Nations, the level of dissatisfaction is somehow more moderate among the eldest participants as well as among those with a postgraduate diploma. On the other hand, unemployed tend to be more radical in their negative judgments.

Finally, we analyse variations in the declared level of trust on a wide set of social and political institutions according to the socio-demographic features of the participants. As can be seen in table 17, churches, the police and the mass media generate the highest feelings of distrust among participants (with more than 60% not trusting them at all). National (government and parliament) as well as international institutions (the EU and the United Nations) also are subject of common mistrust among the participants. Local governments, the judiciary and political parties generated more mixed feelings, while trade unions and, almost unanimously, NGOs and social movements are trusted the most. The levels of trust on the diverse institutions or actors vary (significantly) according to some of the explored socio-demographic attributes of the interviewed participants. The most outstanding variation is the more moderate judgments among those working in the associative level (and hence their relative higher levels of trust on most of the institutions). Working population, the elder and those with postgraduate studies show somehow lowest level of

dissatisfaction concerning the United Nations, Local governments and the Judiciary. On the other side, unemployed and the youngest participants tend to show level of distrust above the average in most of the cases.

Table 17 - Level of trust on social and political institutions and (statistically significant) variances according to socio-demographic variables. (Ordered by increasing level of trust)

Level of institutions' trusts:	N	Percentage of "total distrust"	Average (mean)*	Categories significantly different from the average**	
				Bellow de average (more distrustful):	Above the average (less distrustful):
Churches	1135	65.6	0.4	Up to 24; Graduate; Other working sector	Postgraduate Working; Associative sector
The Police	1132	60.9	0.5	Unemployed	Associative sector
Mass Media	1142	60.9	0.4		
National Government	1126	55.3	0.6	Tech. qualification Unemployed; Private sector	Associative sector
The European Union	1141	42.9	0.7	Unemployed; Public sector	Associative sector
National Parliament	1130	39.6	0.8	Up to 24; Tech. qualification; Unemployed; Homemaker; Other working sector	Associative sector
The United Nations	1136	39.4	0.8	Up to 24; Graduate; Unemployed	60 ore more; postgraduate; Working; Homemakers; Associative sector
Local Government	1122	28.5	1.0	Up to 24 Unemployed & students; Private sector	40-59 years & 60 ore more; Postgraduate Working; Associative sector
The Judiciary	1136	28.3	1.1	up to 24 Unemployed Homemaker Private sector	60 ore more; Postgraduate; Associative sector
Political Parties	1120	27.0	1.0	Unemployed Private sector Other working sector	Tech qualification; No studies/primary; Retired; Associative sector
Trade Unions	1122	8.9	1.5	Unemployed Other working sector	Working Associative sector
NGOs	1132	6.3	1.8	Public sector	Associative sector
Social Movements	1139	2.3	2.1		

* Average values in a 0-3 scale, where 0 stands for "not at all", 1 "a little", 2 "quite a lot" and 3 "very much".

** n asterisk next to the value indicates means contrast (t-test for independent samples) significant at the .05 level.

Source: DEMOS-AthensESF2006 Survey.

Summarizing, our analysis shows that interviewed participants have in general terms a notable experience both in the GJM's events and in related decision-making processes. Within this general pattern, involvement seems even greater among men and in the older age groups (from 40 onwards). In this sense, the influence of these variables becomes more important to explain the level of intensity of the participation. Similarly, those well integrated in the labour market show higher percentage of involvement on the movement (decreasing among those with a temporary job or the unemployed). From the perspective of the sector of activity those working in the public sector or the associative sector have also greater levels of involvement in movement's activities.

Variations in terms of subjective identification with the GJM follow a similar pattern (in fact, as expected both participation and identification variables are correlated). An interesting deviation is found in the case of those working in the associative sector. Despite that participants working in this sector take part above the average in decision-making process of the movement, this involvement is not coupled with the highest level of identification probably due to either their strong identification with their own group or the moderation in their personal commitment with the movement beyond their professional responsibilities. In fact, their level of satisfaction with decision-making process taking place in this scenario, although generally positive, is below the average value. In contrast, this category shows level of dissatisfaction with institutionalised decision-making settings (national political system, the EU and the United Nations) below the average. Consistently, this greater moderation is also reflected in terms of trust on institutional and political actors: with category values systematically above the average (i.e. indicating less distrustful attitudes). On the opposite side, the unemployed (and, to a lesser extent) the youngest groups tend to show higher levels of distrust towards institutional actors. Results concerning the level of trust also indicate an (unanimously expressed) positive attitude towards the actors of social movements.

In brief, we could speak of two sectors that within a context of homogeneity reflect two attitudinal leanings or moods. Those participants that could be situate in a more peripheral social position (especially in terms of age and labour market situation) tend to show lower levels of involvements in movement activities (in same cases despite their high level of identification and trust concerning the movement) and higher negative opinion about established political and institutional actors. On the other hand, we find a sector that could be portray as occupying a more central social positions (especially highly educated people working for the associative sector), that also take parts to a greater extent in the movement's activities, especially in movement decision-making process, but that, in relative terms, reflect a more moderate attitude towards established institutions and lower level of subjective identification with the GJM.

4. The socio-demographic basis of activist's democratic views

There are many good reasons to believe that socio-demographic individual features would affect the ideal models of democracy held by activists. The deliberative theorists do not deny the importance of certain (social) conditions for deliberation, hence for deliberative attitudes, the level of education being the most often quoted. To be sure the authors that criticize the deliberative theory points to the social inequality that such practices would imply: they take a lot of time, favouring who can spend more of it (basically young people and students) (Mansbridge 2003); and they imply the need of skills – such as the ability to make rational or reasonable arguments – which are unequally distributed (Sanders 1997). If this was true we should find more educated and younger people which emphasize deliberation as an ideal model for democratic decision-making. Students should be keener to deliberation, since they have generally more time than full-time workers, and temporary workers, following the same logic should be more deliberative than the others. At the same time, according to Inglehart (1990), the post-materialist value of direct participation should be emphasized more by people who have already satisfied their economic

needs and are more educated. Thus, we should find more emphasis on direct participation among middle class and educated activists.

We can also add that activists' ideals of democracy can depend on the period in which they were socialized to political activities. The wave of protests of the late sixties has been in fact interpreted as a call for a democracy of the ancients, based on direct involvement in political decision, against the democracy of the moderns based on delegation of power and representation. At the same time, no movement before has put so much emphasis on consensual and deliberative practices as the GJM. We can, then classify the age of GJM activists by distinguishing between generations which politically socialized in different periods of mobilization, to test those hypotheses. Thus, we have the "old" sixty-eight generation (those who were at least 16 year old during the '68) that at the moment of the survey was 54 years old or more; two middle generations socialized in the late seventies (between 45 and 53 years old); and in the eighties and the early nineties (they were in Athens between 30 and 44 years old); and the new generation who got politically involved during this last cycle of global protests (they are between 14 and 29 years old).

The last variable which we want to test here is the country of permanent residence. This variable is particularly important from a theoretical point of view when the aim is to explain the different democratic views of the activists. From a path dependency point of view, or even from a sociological institutionalist perspective, norms and preferences can be explained by the institutional context in which they emerge. According to this kind of reasoning one may expect that democratic views are shaped, or anyway influenced, by the democratic institutional setting of the domestic political system. If this was correct, we would find a sort of isomorphism between activists' democratic views and institutionalized norms of democracy in the different countries. However, it is also reasonable to expect that social movements' activists, traditionally challengers of the political system, interiorize norms that are just the opposite, or in anyway different, from those institutionalized.

To test these hypotheses we will then compare activists ideas, by classifying their countries of residence in consensual and majoritarian regimes: in consensual regimes in fact political elites are used to compromise, the rule is to find a common agreement among the different participants, on the contrary in the majoritarian regime the right to decide of the "aggregated" majority is not disputed. We will use two indicators majoritarian/consensual regimes both elaborated by Lijphart (1999): 1. the scores of the executive-parties dimensions, which classifies the countries on the basis of whether decisions are taken by the majority or by compromise; 2. the interest groups pluralism index, which classifies the countries on the basis of the type of interest representation, that is in the continuum between pluralist systems/corporatism. We will use the scores attributed by Lijphart for each country present both in his research and in our sample: those are Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. Those countries cover 1,104 activists included in our sample, that is the 91.6%.

Summarizing, the socio-demographic variables which will be tested in this section are gender, age (according to political generation), education, employment status, sector of work and the type of contract (by isolating those who work with temporary contracts), and the country of residence.

We will test the impact of these variables separately on the activists' degree of agreement with four statements on "how political decision should be taken". The first statement opposes those who think that it should be primarily the *quality of arguments* that makes a difference (when a decision is to be taken) regardless of who produce them against those who think that *resourceful* and active groups/individuals should have more weight; the second distinguishes between those who think that it is always important that the opponents accept each other as *equal discussants* and those who rather believe that in political conflict, there are situations in which *mutual acceptance is not important*; the third statement separates those whose normative idea of democracy is compatible with *delegation of power* from those who think that the *participation of all* interested persons

should always be a priority; and finally the last statement opposes those who believe that decisions should be taken by *voting* to those who are convinced that they should be taken by *consensus*. Each of these statements were presented in a polarised form and activists could position themselves in a scale ranging from 0 (argument, equal discussants, delegation, and voting) to 3 (resources, no mutual acceptance, full participation, and consensus). In order to give a clearer idea on the opinions of the activists according to their socio-graphic features, we dichotomized each item.

Finally we will test the impact of the socio-graphic factors on the distribution of activists among the types of normative ideals of democracy built in chapter 3, by crossing the third and the fourth items: associative model (delegation + voting); deliberative representative model (delegation + consensus), assembleary models (participation + voting) and deliberative participative model (participation + consensus).

Table 18 - Socio-demographic features and item 1 of normative democratic ideals

Socio-graphic indicators	**(Item 1) In decision-making…**			
	Resourceful and active people/orgs should have more weight	Quality of arguments should make a difference	Total	Cr.'s V
Gender (Female)	8.6	90.4	465	n.s.
Age				
Till 29 year old	10.6	89.4	511	.09*
30-44	11.1	88.9	244	
45-53	8.3	91.7	157	
54+	3.3	96.7	150	
Education				
None or compulsory	10.5	89.5	76	n.s.
Post-compulsory	9.7	90.3	393	
University/post grad	8.9	91.1	576	
Employment status				
Manual workers	30.4	69.6	23	.13*
Non-manual works	8.0	92.0	188	
Employer/manager	11.1	88.9	27	
Professional	8.1	91.9	99	
Teacher	8.4	91.6	83	
Unemployed	8.3	91.7	48	
Retired	4.3	95.7	47	
Student	8.8	91.2	342	
Temporary job (yes)	12.7	87.3	204	n.s.
Sector of work				
Private	13.6	86.4	154	n.s.
Public	8.6	91.4	255	
Associative	9.4	90.6	128	
Other	7.1	92.9	84	

Country of permanent residence				
Greece (majoritarian/pluralist)	9.0	91.0	321	n.s.
Italy (consensual/pluralist)	9.4	90.6	181	
France (majoritarian/pluralist)	7.6	92.4	158	
Germany (consensual/corporatist)	6.1	93.9	82	
Spain (majoritarian/pluralist)	8.4	91.6	83	
UK (majoritarian/pluralist)	8.3	91.7	48	
Western Europe (consensual/corporatist)	12.5	87.5	72	
Scandinavia (consensual/corporatist)	7.7	92.3	52	
Turkey and CEE33	22.0	78.0	59	
Maj. Vs. Cons. (Cons.)	9.0	91.0	390	n.s.
Plur. Vs. Corp. (Corp.)	9.1	90.9	198	n.s.
Total Sample Row	**9.4**	**90.6**	**1079**	

Table 18 shows the correlations between the socio-graphic factors and item 1. If about 91% of the full sample believe that the quality of arguments should always prevail on resources when a political decision is to be taken, surprisingly younger people are a little less prone to accept this, while the oldest '68 activists (54+) are in absolute the most "argumentative". Manual workers are, as expected, more inclined to accept the idea that more resourceful and skilful individuals or organizations should have more weight. Workers in industry and in the private sectors, as well as temporary workers are more argumentative than manual workers in general, but still less than the average.

Table 19 - Socio-demographic features and item 2 of normative democratic ideals

Socio-graphic indicators	**(Item 2) In political conflict it is important that the opponents accept each other as equal**			
	Acceptance not always important	Acceptance always important	Total	Cr.'s V
Gender (Female)	10.9	89.1	460	n.s.
Age-generations				
Till 29 year old	12.3	87.7	511	n.s.
30-44	13.6	86.4	242	
45-53	11.5	88.5	156	
54+	10.5	89.5	152	

[33] Central and Eastern Europe

Education				
None or compulsory	14.1	85.9	78	n.s.
Post-compulsory	12.2	87.8	393	
University/post grad	11.7	88.3	574	
Employment status				
Manual workers	26.1	73.9	23	n.s.
Non-manual works	14.4	85.6	187	
Employer/manager	7.1	92.9	28	
Professional	10.3	89.7	97	
Teacher	10.7	89.3	84	
Unemployed	10.2	89.8	49	
Retired	2.1	97.9	47	
Student	11.4	88.6	342	
Temporary job (yes)	11.4	88.6	202	n.s.
Sector of work				
Private	14.7	85.3	156	n.s.
Public	13.0	87.0	254	
Associative	11.8	88.2	127	
Other	10.8	89.2	83	
Country of permanent residence				
Greece (majoritarian/pluralist)	10.2	89.8	324	n.s.
Italy (consensual/pluralist)	13.3	86.7	181	
France (majoritarian/pluralist)	13.8	86.2	159	
Germany (consensual/corporatist)	8.5	91.5	82	
Spain (majoritarian/pluralist)	11.1	88.9	81	
UK (majoritarian/pluralist)	20.8	79.2	48	
Western Europe (consensual/corporatist)	19.4	80.6	72	
Scandinavia (consensual/corporatist)	5.8	94.2	52	
Turkey and CEE	14.0	86.0	57	
Maj. Vs. Cons. (Cons.)	12.6	87.4	390	n.s.
Plur. Vs. Corp. (Corp.)	11.6	88.4	198	n.s.
Total Sample Row	**12.2**	**87.8**	**1079**	

There are not statistical differences between countries, even when classified in consensual and majoritarian democracies or according to a pluralist vs. corporatist model of interests' representation. This nonetheless, activists coming from "developing" democracies, such as Turkey, and Polonia, Hungary and other Eastern countries show a little less prone to indicate the quality of the arguments as a decisive factor in ideal decision making.

As far as the second item is considered, no socio-demographic variable is found statistically significant. The only visible results (although not statistically relevant) are the manual workers and workers of the private service sector thinking more than the average that in case of political conflict the acceptance of the opponents is not always a priority and the employer/managers thinking this a little less (Table 19). Also German and Scandinavian activists seem to be a little more "tolerant" or "respectful" than the others.

When we consider the delegation/participation opposition, instead (Table 20), age and sector of work show a significant correlation. Activists between 45 and 53 years old are in fact more participative than the others, while if workers in the private sector are (surprisingly?) more participative, professionals of the associative sector are more prone (surprisingly?) to accept delegation. Though not statistically significant, less educated activists, manual and non manual workers are a little more pro-delegation than the average. However, the highest variation seems to be explained by the country of residence: with French and Greek activists being more participative and German, Spanish, Scandinavian, English, and other Western European activists being more delegative. According to Lijphart, delegation is one important component of the consensual democracy, since activists should be loyal toward leaders if they want to have the necessary credibility to reach agreements among them. This is especially important for the interest representation circuit, because the agreements between leaders must be accepted by the constituencies. Although with some exceptions (namely English and Spanish activists) this seems to be confirmed in general: about 38% of corporatist countries' activists (against 23% of pluralist countries activists, and 27% of the full sample) seem to share the idea that in some case it is right to delegate decisional power.

Table 20 - Socio-graphic features and item 3 of normative democratic ideals

Socio-graphic indicators	**(Item 3) In many case it is right to delegate….or the participation of all interested people should always be a priority?**			
	Delegation sometimes important	Always full participation	Total	Cr.'s V
Gender (Female)	26.5	73.5	461	n.s.
Age-generations				
Till 29 year old	30.1	69.9	508	.10**
30-44	25.8	74.2	244	
45-53	17.3	82.7	156	
54+	30.3	69.7	152	
Education				
None or compulsory	32.1	67.9	78	n.s.
Post-compulsory	25.3	74.7	391	
University/post grad	27.6	72.4	415	

Employment status				
Manual workers	43.5	56.5	23	n.s.
Non-manual works	33.7	66.3	190	
Employer/manager	25.9	74.1	27	
Professional	27.8	72.2	97	
Teacher	22.9	77.1	83	
Unemployed	18.4	81.6	49	
Retired	19.1	80.9	47	
Student	28.0	72.0	339	
Temporary job (yes)	32.8	67.2	201	n.s.
Sector of work				
Private	21.9	78.1	155	.13**
Public	25.6	74.4	254	
Associative	37.5	62.5	128	
Other	22.9	77.1	83	
Country of permanent residence				
Greece (majoritarian/pluralist)	16.3	83.8	320	.25***
Italy (consensual/pluralist)	22.1	77.9	181	
France (majoritarian/pluralist)	19.9	80.1	161	
Germany (consensual/corporatist)	32.9	67.1	82	
Spain (majoritarian/pluralist)	37.8	62.2	82	
UK (majoritarian/pluralist)	50.0	50.0	48	
Western Europe (consensual/corporatist)	37.5	62.5	72	
Scandinavia (consensual/corporatist)	50.0	50.0	50	
Turkey and CEE	41.4	58.6	58	
Maj. Vs. Cons. (Cons.)	31.4	68.6	388	.10***
Plur. Vs. Corp. (Corp.)	38.3	61.7	198	.14***
Total Sample Row	**27.4**	**72.6**	**1077**	

As for the last item which opposes those preferring voting to those preferring consensus as method of decision making, less consensual appear to be older activists (54+), manual workers and professionals, while more consensual, teachers, and temporary workers. In none of these cases, however, are the differences statistically significant, except for the temporary workers. Far more powerful seems again to be the country of residence variable: with Germans and Italians being more pro-consensus, and English, Scandinavian and other Western European activists being more pro-voting. In general activists of consensual democracies agree more than their majoritarian countries' colleagues with political decisions to be taken by consensus: 52% of the former against about 40% of the latter, and 45% on average.

Table 21 - Socio-graphic features and item 4 of normative democratic ideals

Socio-graphic indicators	**(Item 4) Political decision should be taken by…**			
	Voting	Consensus	Total	Cr.'s V
Gender (Female)	52.6	47.4	454	n.s.
Age-generations				
Till 29 year old	54.8	45.2	507	n.s.
30-44	53.3	46.7	240	
45-53	50.6	49.4	154	
54+	60.5	39.5	147	
Education				
None or compulsory	57.3	42.7	75	n.s.
Post-compulsory	54.0	46.0	391	
University/post grad	55.2	44.8	565	
Employment status				
Manual workers	65.2	34.8	23	n.s.
Non-manual works	50.5	49.5	184	
Employer/manager	51.9	48.1	27	
Professional	61.2	38.8	98	
Teacher	46.9	53.1	81	
Unemployed	58.3	41.7	48	
Retired	56.5	43.5	46	
Student	53.4	46.6	339	
Temporary job (yes)	50.7	49.3	201	.08*
Sector of work				
Private	56.6	43.4	152	n.s.
Public	54.8	45.2	250	
Associative	54.8	45.2	126	
Other	51.8	48.2	83	
Country of permanent residence				
Greece (majoritarian/pluralist)	67.9	32.1	315	.22***
Italy (consensual/pluralist)	42.2	57.8	180	
France (majoritarian/pluralist)	55.1	44.9	158	
Germany (consensual/corporatist)	42.0	58.0	81	
Spain (majoritarian/pluralist)	39.5	60.5	81	
UK (majoritarian/pluralist)	61.7	38.3	47	
Western Europe (consensual/corporatist)	56.3	43.7	71	
Scandinavia (consensual/corporatist)	63.3	36.7	49	
Turkey and CEE	45.9	54.1	61	
Maj. Vs. Cons. (Cons.)	48.2	51.8	384	.12***
Plur. Vs. Corp. (Corp.)	52.6	47.4	194	n.s.
Total Sample Row	**55.1**	**44.7**	**1079**	

Finally, if we use the typology of democratic models built in chapter 3 to summarize the results, it seems that younger activists surprisingly support more than the average an associative model of democracy, while activists socialized in the old '68 cycle of protest seem to prefer (not surprisingly) an "assembleary model", though they also mention more often than the average also a deliberative representative model. The most participative-deliberative, instead, seem to be people between 45 and 53 years old. Besides, if manual and non manual workers are more supportive of an associational model, professionals would prefer an assembleary model and teachers (and retired) a deliberative participative model. Less assemblearian, and a little more deliberative representative are temporary workers. Besides, workers in both the private and public sector are supporters of an assembleary or a deliberative participative model, while workers in the associative sector prefer more than the average the older associational model. Only with age and temporary workers the differences are statistically significant, however, while the country of residence variable shows the highest explanatory power again. Germans, Italians and Spaniards like more a deliberative participative model of democracy; French and Greeks, an assembleary model; and English and Scandinavian activists a traditional associational model. Again with exceptions, in general consensual democracies' activists share the most deliberative model of democratic views, while, for reasons that needs to be explored in the future, corporatist countries' activists polarize between an associational and a deliberative participative model: 31% of "corporatist" activists against only 18% of the "pluralist" ones are in favour of the traditional associational model, but at the same time 39%, against 36%, are in favour the deliberative participative type. To be sure, if we classified the country in majoritarian/ pluralist, consensual/pluralist, and consensual/corporatist[34], we would find a "U" reversed relations between the three regimes and the activists share of a deliberative participative model of democracy: 33% in the first type, 45% in the second type and 38% in the third type, while only 16% in majoritarian countries, 13% in consensual pluralist, but as much as 31% in the consensual/corporatist, opt for an associational model. We can speculate that when activists face a consensual democracy but a pluralist model of interest representation, they wish consensus to spread for the executive-parties arena to the societal level (many trade unionists in Italy for instance would approve the method of concertation) while those who confront already a consensual/corporatist regime may feel frustrated with a concertation which bring about neoliberal reforms of the welfare state. But this is only a speculation which needs further empirical investigation to be confirmed.

[34] The majoritarian /corporatist type, which would be logically possible, is an empty category. None of the 36 democracies studied by Lijphart, would fall in this category.

Table 22 - Socio-graphic features and normative democratic models

	Typology if normative democratic models				Total	Cr. 's V
	Associational Model	Deliberative Representation	Assembleary	Deliberative Participation		
Gender (Female)	17.7	8.7	34.8	38.8	446	n.s.
Age-generations						
Till 29 year old	21.4	8.8	33.3	36.5	501	.07*
30-44	17.6	8.4	36.0	38.1	239	
45-53	13.2	4.6	36.8	45.4	152	
54+	18.5	11.0	42.5	28.1	146	
Education						
None or compulsory	26.7	5.3	30.7	37.3	75	n.s.
Post-compulsory	16.1	9.1	37.7	37.1	385	
University/post grad	19.6	8.0	35.7	36.7	561	
Employment status						
Manual workers	34.8	8.7	30.4	26.1	23	n.s.
Non-manual works	22.4	12.0	28.4	37.2	183	
Employer/manager	14.8	11.1	37.0	37.0	27	
Professional	17.9	9.5	43.2	29.5	95	
Teacher	12.3	11.1	34.6	42.0	81	
Unemployed	10.4	6.3	47.9	35.4	48	
Retired	15.2	2.2	41.3	41.3	46	
Student	20.0	7.8	33.1	39.1	335	
Temporary job (yes)	20.2	12.6	30.3	36.9	198	.11*
Sector of work						
Private	15.1	6.6	41.4	36.8	152	n.s.
Public	17.1	8.9	37.8	36.2	246	
Associative	25.6	12.8	29.6	32.0	125	
Other	13.4	8.5	37.8	40.2	82	
Country of permanent residence						
Greece (majoritarian/pluralist)	12.8	3.8	55.0	28.4	313	.22***
Italy (consensual/pluralist)	10.6	11.1	31.7	46.7	180	
France (majoritarian/pluralist)	14.6	4.5	40.8	40.1	157	
Germany (consensual/corporatist)	27.5	6.3	15.0	51.3	80	
Spain (majoritarian/pluralist)	22.5	16.3	16.3	45.0	80	
UK (majoritarian/pluralist)	36.2	12.8	25.5	25.5	47	
Western Europe (consensual/corporatist)	27.1	10.0	30.0	32.9	70	
Scandinavia (consensual/corporatist)	41.7	10.4	20.8	27.1	48	
Turkey and CEE35	22.4	19.0	22.4	36.2	58	
Maj. Vs. Cons. (Cons.)	21.8	9.7	26.5	42.0	381	.18***
Plur. Vs. Corp. (Corp.)	30.9	8.4	22.0	38.7	191	.19***
Total Sample Row	**19.1**	**8.2**	**35.9**	**36.7**	**1055**	

[35] Central and Eastern Europe

Summarizing, only few socio-demographic features seem to be correlated with activists views of democracy, in some items (such as the argument/resource and the acceptance/non acceptance ones) the variation is simply too low, while in others which show significant variations, the country of residence seems to have a better explanatory power. In order to check for spurious correlations, and to confirm the general findings, we have performed a binary logistic regression with a dichotomised deliberative index as dependent variable. The index was built by dichotomising the four items of democratic views (which then gets the value 1 when arguments are perceived as more important than resources, acceptance and participation are considered as priorities and consensus is preferred to voting) a by summing them. The index scores from 0 (minimum deliberation) to 4 (maximum deliberation). As in the other cases we transformed the index in a dummy which assumes value 1 when the index would get value 3 or 4. In table 23 we show the Wald coefficients of the binary logistic for each considered variable. We can notice that if we exclude the Lijphart's indexes for the executive-parties dimension and for the interest group pluralism, none of the other variables show a significant probability to increment the number of cases falling in the deliberative category of the dependent variable. On the contrary, when we include those variables, the explanatory power of the model improves considerably and although some socio-graphic variables such as age and employment status get some (but low) statistical significance, since younger activists and manual workers are less deliberative, the two Lijphart indicators are far more significant. Indeed, the more consensual is the country of residence of the activists the higher the probability for them to fall in the deliberative category. At the same time, however, the more pluralist is the interest representation model in the country of residence the lower is this probability. Those results confirm the tendency of activists living in consensual democracy with a pluralist model of interest representation to bear a deliberative view of democracy more than other activists, including those living in more congruent consensual/corporatist regimes.

Table 23 - Wald coefficients, causality direction and significance of binomial logistic regression (Method= enter)

Dependent Variable	**Deliberative index dichotomised**			
	Block 1	Sig.	Block 2	Sig.
Gender (Women)	1,192 (+)	n.s.	2,462 (+)	n.s.
Education (ordinal)	1,719 (-)	n.s.	1,312 (-)	n.s.
Age (till 29 years)	1,937 (-)	n.s.	2,949 (-)	.086
Employment Status (nominal=manual workers)	3,050 (-)		2,674 (-)	.102
Temporary Job (yes)	0,643 (+)	n.s.	0,619 (+)	n.s.
Sector of work (nominal=private)	1,019	n.s.	0,707 (+)	n.s.
Consensual democracies (cardinal)	____	____	5,273 (+)	.022
Pluralist model of interest representation (cardinal)	_____	____	10,109 (+)	.001
Pseudo R square (Nagelkerke)	.087		.133	

5. Conclusions

From the socio-demographic perspective participants in the European Social Forum are characterised by the relative high presence of the youngest generation. These results support the description of the global justice movement as involving also a new generation of activists, although it seems that their level of involvement in decision-making is lower than in the older age groups. The gender ratio is rather balanced suggesting that it is precisely in this type of events where the normalisation of protests in terms of the participation of women can be more clearly observed. Again, gender gap re-emerges when we look at the level of involvement in movement activities. The comparison between the general population and the ESF samples points out in general a huge difference in the educational level. As in other studies on political participation, education continues to be the best predictor for political involvement (see Topf 1995, Norris 2002 and Van Aelst and Walgrave 2001). Consequently, non-manual workers are clearly over-represented among participants, especially those working either for the public or the associative sectors. Our analysis has also detected, probably as the most relevant trend along the different European Social Forums, an increasing presence of professional activists (half of them working in the associative sector). This result can be interpreted as an indicator of professionalization or institutionalisation of the ESF. It also may suggest that sustained activism in a declining cycle of protest is supported by organizations and professionals (movement basic organizational infra-structures). The low presence of loners among activists coming from abroad, suggest also that transnational collective action is more costly than national collective action and that the organization is one of the device to overcome those costs.

In general terms, the analyses of previous experience in the GJM depict participants as experienced activists in GJM's events as well as in related decision-making processes. The influence of socio-demographic variables seems more important to explain differences in terms of the intensity of the participation. Similarly, those well integrated in the labour market (show higher percentage of involvement on the movement (decreasing among those with a temporary job or the unemployed). Variations in terms of subjective identification with the GJM follow a similar pattern (in fact, as expected both participation and identification variables are correlated). An interesting deviation is found in the case of those working in the associative sector. Despite their higher level of involvement in decision-making process of the movement, their level of identification is not above the average probably due to either their strong identification with their own group or the moderation in their personal commitment with the movement beyond their professional responsibilities. In fact, their level of satisfaction with decision-making process in the GJM, although generally positive, is below the average value.

Considering also political attitudes, it is possible to identify two types of participants with different attitudinal profile. Those participants that could be situate in a more peripheral social position (especially in terms of age and labour market situation) tend to show lower levels of involvements in movement activities (in same cases despite their high level of identification and trust concerning the movement) and higher negative opinion about established political and institutional actors. On the other hand, we find a second type of participant that could be portray as occupying a more central social positions (especially highly educated people working for the associative sector), that also take parts to a greater extent in the movement's activities, especially in movement decision-making process, but that reflect a more moderate attitude towards established institutions .

Finally, in terms of different normative views of democracy, our analysis suggests the importance of other variables than purely socio-demographic features. Some variable such as age, and sector of work, as well as the fact that activists have a temporary job affect some of the normative variables, but in general the country of residence seem to be the most promising predictor, especially when the country of residence is re-classified according to its kind of democratic regime, consensual versus majoritarian, or to its model of interest representation, corporatist versus pluralist. The neo-institutionalist expectation that the norms embedded in institutional settings affect the ideas, the

preferences (not only the behaviour and the strategy) of the actors seems to be proved also in the "critical case" of social movements, which should be less prone to accept and interiorize the "dominant" values. Actually, we found that a deliberative/consensual view is more widespread among activists that face at the national scale a consensual democracy which nevertheless does not foresee a corporatist model of interest representation., though activists coming from countries with a consensual democracy and a corporatist kind of interest representation seem to show the highest polarization between an ideal of democracy based on delegation and voting and a deliberative participative model.

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Chapter 6

The European Social Forum and the Organizational Dimension

by Clare Saunders, Massimiliano Andretta, Nicolas Haeringer, Ilhame Hajji, and Isabelle Sommier[36]

1. Introduction

'The *global justice movement* is the loose network of organizations (with varying degrees of formality, and even including political parties) and other actors, engaged in collective action of various kinds, on the basis of the shared goal of advancing the cause of justice (economic, social, political and environmental) among and between peoples across the globe' (della Porta 2007). It thus incorporates a broad range of organizations, including those campaigning specifically against the neo-liberal agenda (such as ATTAC), on environmental issues (Friends of the Earth), for socialism (League of the Fifth International), against human rights abuses (Amnesty International), for freedom of information (Indymedia) and more. Just as the GJM itself consists of a broad range of organizations, so too do the European Social Forums, which are generally regarded as manifestations of global justice movement politics.

As stated in their Charter of Principles, social forums aim to bring together groups and organizations involved in struggles for 'another world' (Fórum Social Mundial, 2002). Clause one of the Charter, for example, states that:

The World Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking *for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society* that are opposed to neoliberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society directed towards fruitful relationships among Humankind and between it and the Earth (emphasis added).

Social forum participants are members of a variety of social movement organizations with a range of views. Some of these participants represent specific organizations. Nevertheless, because they cannot be forced to endorse any final document, participants memberships often evolve within the space of social forums on an individual basis: they organize or participate in activities of their choice, based on their affinities and interest.

Although badges for the first WSF officially distinguished between participants representing organizations and ordinary delegates, organizers of the different ESFs chose not to reproduce this distinction on the basis that 'membership' was sometimes too loose and too fluid to be especially meaningful. Indeed, memberships are also plural - one activist doesn't necessary belong to a single organization, but often to 'families of movements' (Della Porta and Rucht, 1995); neither do participants always stay in the same organizations. In fact, organizational backgrounds vary between participants, and the organizational profiles of individuals vary between ESFs. They also influence the way in which ESF participants view democracy within their own organization (if they are a member of any), the GJM in general, their country, the European Union and the UN.

Therefore, this chapter discusses how GJM activists' organizational affiliations can impact upon their normative and actual conceptions of democracy. The chapter begins with a discussion of the evolution of membership profiles at three ESFs for which we have roughly comparable data - Paris

[36] Note on authorship: Clare Saunders and Nicholas Haeringer wrote sections 1 and 6. Nicolas Haeringer, Ilhame Hajji and Isabelle Sommier authored sections 2 and 3. Clare Saunders wrote sections 4 and 5.4.2, Massimiliano Andretta was the author of the rest of section 5.

in 2002, Florence 2003 and Athens in 2006. It stresses the importance of national and international contexts and the design of the forum in explaining the differences between membership profiles. It then focuses more specifically on the participants in the Athens ESF, beginning with a comparison of their past and present membership profiles, before moving on to discuss social movement families that have been derived on the basis of the overlapping memberships of participants to the ESF. After this introduction to the organizational field, the paper turns more specifically to conceptualize and explore the differences between broad types of movement organizations to which ESF activists are affiliated. It looks at how activists' 'most important organization' influences their proclivity to become involved in GJM protest activity, their identification with the GJM and the role they have in this organization. The effect of the organizational affiliation – again based on activists' nominated 'most important group' – upon activists' conceptions of democratic norms and practices is then explored in some depth. The question of whether activist's perceptions are filtered by their democratic practices is also addressed. Finally, we see whether the type of decision-making that is carried out in activists' most important organization determines their levels of satisfaction with democracy.

2. Evolution of membership in the different ESF

2.1 Loners and members

Table 1 - Participants belonging to an organization – evolution through the ESFs

Belonging to a group	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Yes	41.5%	97.1%	87.6%
No	58.5%	2.9%	12.4%
Total	**100.0%**	**100.0%**	**100.0%**

Between the first ESF (2002) and the fourth one (2006), organizational membership of ESF participants has increased significantly. At the first ESF, less than half the participants surveyed claimed to belong to at least one organization, whereas only 12.4% of the Athens ESF participants were loners. However, there is a slight reduction between this last ESF and the former one . In the 2003 edition, only one participant among fifty was not member of any organization. These variations can be explained by the following factors: the research protocol for the first ESF, the 'maturity' of the GJM in Europe, and the impact of local participation.

Due to the way the research was undertaken, the sample for the 2002 ESF is much younger than the other ones : the research team didn't pay much attention to the representativity of the sample they built, and consequently handed the questionnaire mostly to young people. Young people might have a lower organizational socialization than their elders. The team in charge of the Florence survey concentrated a lot on young participants. Hence, young participants are overrepresented in the whole sample. Moreover, at its beginning, the social forum dynamic was not yet stabilized, which can have an impact on memberships. ESF participants, for example, could have been in the search of engagement during the first ESF much more than for the following ones. Indeed, they could have become engaged with social movement organizations through their participation in previous ESFs.

Local participation probably also has a strong impact on the organizational membership of participants. It is certainly the case that the Florence and Athens ESFs had a stronger local participation than the 2003 one. Additionally, the 2003 ESF took place during the week, whereas the other two covered a weekend and/or public holidays. Moreover, the second ESF was not organized in a single place, but in four different cities. In these cities, activities were distributed by

issue. This might have increased the feeling that this ESF was a meeting of informed and aware activists. Hence, it may have reduced participation from local inhabitants without membership, that came to the forum because it was held in their neighborhood, and gathered only representatives of organizations that came to the forum because they were interested in the issues that were addressed.

2.2 Evolution of membership profiles

Because the questions on organizational membership were slightly different in each of the three surveys, we have elaborated two different tables. The first one lists 12 types of organizations that were asked in at least two questionnaires (table 2). The second table (table 3) lists all the other types of organizations (those who have been in only one of the three questionnaires).

Table 2 - Evolution of membership profile

Group	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Political party	34.6%	18.0%	36.7%
Ecologist	43.1%	18.8%	23.4% (including antinuclear)
Peace – pacifist		18.0%	35.5%
Charity	51.3%	12.7%	12.7%
Feminist	21.8%	8.8%	21.6%
Gay, lesbian, transgender		4%	8.7%
Antiracism, migrants	33.7%	12.8%	35.8%
Autonomous, squats, social centers	32.1%	2.9%	9.3%
Consumers, fair trade		5.0%	20.5%
Students	57.5%	7.1%	22.8%
Trade-unions	31.8%	25.5%	29.5%
Unemployed, ‘ have nots’		6.2%	9.1%
Peasant		3.4%	4.2%
Religious group	19.3%	6.7%	4.0%
Alternative medias		7.1%	15.3%

The different membership profiles of the three ESFs surveyed are shown in Table 2. This illustrates that the three ESFs have different shapes and forms, which can be attributed to three factors - the different national and international contexts, and the choices made by organizers.

2.2.1 National context and its impact on membership profiles

The evolution of membership profiles of ESF participants can clearly be explained by the national context of the host country, despite ESFs being European – if not global – events.

This is illustrated by the fact that one participant in two declared to belong to a charity organization or to a social / voluntary one in the Florence ESF, compared to only 12.7% in 2003 and in 2006. The same tendency is to be stressed regarding the participation of religious groups- Catholic groups, for example, are an important part of the GJM in Italy (Reiter 2007). Hence, they mobilized greater numbers of their members for the Florence ESF: 19.3% of the participants belonged to a religious group in the 2002 event in Florence, compared to only 6.7% for the Paris based ESF in 2003 and for the Athens based event in 2006.

Participation of autonomous activists was much higher in the Athens and especially in the Florence ESFs than in the Paris ESF. This can be explained by the fact that Italian activism, and, to a lesser extent, Greek activism, is strongly impregnated with the autonomous political culture, mostly through social centers and groups like the *Tute Bianche,* which accounted for 32.1% of the participants to the Italian ESF. However, the low rate of autonomous activists in Paris (2.9%) can be viewed as a consequence of the choice made by members of anarchist and autonomous organizations to gather in alternative autonomous spaces, quite far away from the ESF main venues. Autonomous activists made the same decision for the Athens forums. This explains why their numbers are so few (9.3%) in the Athens ESF, despite the fact that autonomous activists in Greece are an important part of the GJM. Indeed, in Paris, as in Athens, questionnaires were circulated only in the main venues of the forum, excluding *de facto* participants to autonomous spaces from the sample. In Florence, part of the autonomist movement also met elsewhere – but they also participated in the main venue.

The structural weakness of 'new social movements' in France explains the differences in the rate of feminist activists in the three different forums covered by the survey. Whereas a little more than one fifth of the participants in the Florence and Athens forums declared to belong to a feminist group, only 8.8% of the ESF 2003 participants declared the same.

Variations regarding political parties can also be explained by the national context. Indeed, the strength of the political party *Rifondazione Comunista* in Italy, as with leftist Greek parties, within the national scene of the GJM explains why political party activists were present in larger numbers in Florence and Athens. Moreover, French organizers were probably following the principles of the Porto Alegre Charter – which stresses that political parties should not participate – in a stricter way than Italians and Greeks. Indeed, the presence of political parties in the 2003 ESF was strong during the closing march, but much weaker during the forum itself. This analysis shows that, even if ESFs are 'European' events, they are rooted in and influenced by the context of the country where they do occur.

2.2.2 International context and its impact

However, the membership of ESF participants is also linked to the European and global context.

The increasing of the number of participants belonging to an organization directly identified as being part of the GJM is proof that the GJM has emerged as a new frame for engagement and political participation. Organizations linked to the issue of consumption and fair trade were almost absent from the ESF 2003 (5.0% - they were not included in the 2002 research protocol - but represent 20.5% of the participants in 2006). However, the research questionnaire can also be part of the explanation: the 2006 questionnaire mentions fair trade and consumption, whereas the 2003 questionnaire only mentions "fair trade".

The stronger presence of pacifist activists (from around one fifth in 2003, to over one third in 2006) is a consequence of the anti-war movement's emergence and reinforcement after 2003. Indeed, the low rate for 2003 can be explained by the structural weakness of new social movement organizations, and by the fact that France is not involved in the Iraq war.

The importance of anti-racism organizations in Athens (35.8%) is probably related to the establishment of migration as a central issue for social forums – even if this proportion was already high in Florence. Indeed, migration has been one of the main issues addressed during the European Preparatory Assembly for a few years: a thematic network was created a few months between the Athens forums, and migrants organizations set up a "migrations space" in front of the ESF venue.

2.2.3 The design of the forum

Finally, the general design of the ESF itself has an impact on the organizational profiles of ESF participants. The increasing importance of alternative media between ESF 2003 and ESF 2006 can be a consequence of the choice made by ESF 2006 organizers not to distinguish alternative and mainstream medias, giving both of them the same facilities (access to the media center, press accreditations, etc.). Media activists then chose to be in the main venue of the forum, whereas they gathered in a alternative space in 2003.

Overall though, it is difficult to make a clear comparison in the rates of other components of the GJM movements, due to slight differences in the three questionnaires (see Table 3 below and its analysis).

Table 3 - Evolution of the membership profile – groups for which comparison is difficult due to the research protocols

Group	ESF 2002	ESF 2003	ESF 2006
Development and humanitarian aid		23.0%	
Development aid			19.2%
International solidarity			15.5%
NGO	41.5%		
Global Justice Movement		41.6%	
Local Social Forum			30.6%
Against neo-liberal agenda			25.9%
Socialist			18.0%
Trotskyst			11.6%
Communist			17.1%
Anarchist			3.3%
Political movement/network	52.7%		
Leisure – sport	50.9%		
Citizens' Committee	21.8%		
Youth, popular education		7.8%	
Neighborhood		8.5%	
Aids		5.3%	

Table 3 shows the groups for which comparison is more difficult due to the differences in the three research protocols. The three questionnaires were not constructed identically, because they did not originally aim to be comparative research instruments, and because of attempts to improve the reliability questionnaire from one survey to the next. Nevertheless, it seems quite clear that organizations directly linked to the core issues of the GJM have become more prominent over time – this is an even stronger tendency if consumers and fair trade organizations are added to groups working on issues such as development aid, international solidarity, the neo-liberal agenda so as local social forums.

The importance of NGOs in Florence (in comparison to international solidarity and aid and development organizations) can be explained by the fact that the category 'NGO' is much wider than other categories. This category was split into several smaller ones in the following questionnaires, making comparisons difficult. In Paris, development and aid organizations (which partially match NGOs) had a membership rate of 23.0% and organizations of the GJM 41.6%. In

2006, development aid and international solidarity organizations where respectively gathering 19.2% and 15.5% of the whole sample. Organizations fighting against the neo-liberal agenda (25.9% of the sample) and fair trade ones, already mentioned, could also be included under the umbrella if NGOs.

3. Exploring membership profiles of the participants in the Athens ESF, 2006

This section of the chapter turns to specifically address the membership profiles of those who participated in the 2006 ESF in Athens. It begins by comparing their past and present membership profiles, and then moves on to a discussion of social movement families.

3.1 Comparing past and present membership profiles

Social Forums were invented while some forms of mobilization were emerging as new referents and new frames for political participation. Trade unions and political parties were, at least at first, quite wary of this form of activism, believing that they could lead to reduced levels of mobilization. Some researchers have worked out the specificities of individual activism (Ion, 2005), as opposed to a very integrated one. However, looking at the evolution to the membership of participants to the ESF shows that mobilization is getting stronger.

Table 4 - Past and present membership of ESF 2006 participants

Group	Past	Present	% of variation*
Against neo-liberal agenda	6.4%	25.9%	304.7%
Socialist	5.0%	18.0%	260.0%
Trade Union	8.9%	29.5%	231.5%
Anti-racist, immigrants rights	12.1%	35.8%	195.9%
Local Social Forum	10.8%	30.6%	183.3%
Political Party	13.0%	36.7%	182.3%
International solidarity	13.2%	36.0%	172.7%
Consumerism, fair trade	8.0%	20.5%	156.2%
Alternativ media	6.0%	15.3%	155.0%
Trotskyst	4.6%	11.6%	152.2%
Development aid	8.4%	19.2%	128.6%
Human rights	15.5%	34.5%	122.6%
Peasant	1.9%	4.2%	121.1%
Peace	17.5%	35.5%	102.9%
Unemployed	4.7%	9.1%	93.6%
Women's rights	13.3%	21.6%	62.4%
Gay, lesbian, transgender	5.4%	8.7%	61.1%
Communist	10.8%	17.1%	58.3%
Charity	8.3%	12.7%	53.0%
Environmental/antinuclear	16.3%	23.4%	43.6%
Autonomist, social center	7.1%	9.3%	31.0%
Religious	3.6%	4.0%	11.1%
Student	21.2%	22.8%	7.5%
Anarchist	3.5%	3.3%	-6.1%

* : [(present – past)/past] x 100

ESF 2006 participants are definitely more involved in movements in the present than they were in the past. Indeed, only membership to anarchist groups was stronger in the past than in the present among ESF participants. However, the development of participation is not the same for every movement. These figures show the affirmation of the anti-war movement, human rights organizations, international solidarity organizations and anti-racism / immigrants rights ones. Moreover, they highlight the emergence of entities directly connected to the issues of the GJM, such as organizations fighting against the neo-liberal agenda, local social forums and, to a lesser extent, consumerism or fair-trade groups. These organizations are quite new, which can explain why most people have current rather than past membership affiliations. Nevertheless, already 10.8% of the Athens ESF participants declare that they *used* to be part of a local social forum (LSF), a quite high rate considering that these forums did not exist at all before 2002 or 2003. This is probably a consequence of the fact that many local social forums are a 'one shot' experience, not all of them being permanent bodies, and many exist only for a short period. This can also be related to the fact that 'being a member' of a LSF can simply mean 'having participated once in a LSF'. This does not mean to imply that traditional organizations are being shunned. Participation in political parties, as in trade unions, follows the same tendency as the formerly mentioned organizations.

3.2 From multiple memberships to families of movements

The aim of this part is to analyze multiple memberships, and to draw a map of families of movements that is based on them. At first, movements are classified in decreasing order, based on the rate at which ESF 2006 participants claim to belong to them. Then, using the methodology of logistic regression, it explains these rates in correlations to the other ones – i.e. explaining single memberships by multiple ones. Thus, this will help us to draw a map of the ESF 'movement families'.

At this stage, we will be able to analyze the nature and profile of those multiple memberships, knowing that these are not the exceptions. Only 6% of the sample does not declare any membership to any specific type of social movement organization, and 19% claim to be a member of only one type of organization. This can be compared to the fact that 50% declare to belong to less than four organizations, meaning that half of the sample claim to belong to more than four memberships, and as many as one quarter declare seven.

The second column of Table 4 shows the proportion of ESF participants who claim to be members of each of the 24 types of organizations that were proposed in the questionnaire. Five of them actually concern more than one third of the sample. More than one participant among five declare to belong to (at least) one of the seven following ones. Six groups cover in the range of 10% to 20% of the forum's participants, while the six last ones only gather less than one participant among ten – three of them even less than 5% (peasants, religious groups and anarchists).

Participants were asked if they have ever been involved in the actions or campaigns of 24 different types of groups – they could potentially answer yes to each of these, and could also add a 25th category. Thus, it is important not to stick to the analysis of single memberships but to move on to multiple ones or crossed ones. The following analysis is built in two steps. The first one (Table 5) used a statistic indicator of link (R^2 of Nagelkerke = part of explained information), which is calculated using the methodology of logistic regression. Then, based on these regressions, a sociogram was constructed, which emphasizes important links[37].

The higher the R^2, the stronger the relationship between memberships between movement sectors. In other words, a high R^2 indicates that the movement is well linked to some others. Furthermore, the strongest connections define families of movements. The human rights group, that

[37] We decided to not take account the links lower than 5 % of part of explained variance.

gathers 34.5% of activists, is explained by membership in other groups in 51.4% of the cases. This means that 51.4% of the people declaring being member of the Human Rights group also belong to at least one other type of organization. The international solidarity group is associated to equivalent indicators, predictive to a similar family for the activists who belongs to those two movements, as shown in Figure 1.

Table 5 - Rate of explained information of the various movements

Movements	**Nagelkerke's R^2 (%)**
Involved in Human rights group	51.40
Involved in International solidarity group	47.90
Involved in Peace group	39.80
Involved in Development aid group	38.70
Involved in Anti-racist, immigrants rights group	33.70
Involved in Consumerism/fair trade group	32.60
Involved in Gay/Lesbian/Transgender group	30.80
Involved in Against neo-liberal ec. Agenda group	29.70
Involved in Peasant/farmer group	28.20
Involved in Political Party	28.00
Involved in Environmental/Anti-nuclear group	27.20
Involved in Local social forum group	25.00
Involved in Women's rights group	23.70
Involved in Trotskyist group	23.10
Involved in Socialist group	22.10
Involved in Charity organization/social vol. group	21.30
Involved in Anarchist group	20.70
Involved in Communist group	18.70
Involved in Religious group/community	17.70
Involved in Trade Union	15.80
Involved in Autonomist/social centre group	15.20
Involved in Student group	11.80
Involved in Alternative media group	11.80
Involved in Unemployed group	8.3

Figure 1 - Links between the different groups



To make it more explicit we will comment one of the logistic regressions.

Table 6 - Explaining the International Solidarity Movement

Coding variable	
no	0
yes	1
Nagelkerke's R^2	47.9%

Variables	B	Signif.	Nagelkerke's R^2
Hum. Rights (1)	0.980	0.000	26.6%
Dev (1)	1.481	0.000	34.5%
Peace (1)	0.951	0.000	39.1%
AntiRa (1)	0.877	0.000	42.8%
Cons (1)	1.022	0.000	44.8%
Trade U (1)	0.560	0.002	46.1%
Trotkist (1)	0.642	0.010	46.9%
Agenda Neo (1)	0.483	0.011	47.5%
Communist (1)	0.496	0.023	47.9%
Intercept	-2.676	0.000	

(1) the value assigned to each movement is « yes »

This model (Table 6), which helps to explain 47.9% of variation on the dependent variable, shows the probability that an activist will be a member of an international solidarity group knowing that the activist is not a member of other types of organization. All the coefficients of the independent variables are positive. Thus, being member of one of those movements increases the chances to be part of the international solidarity movement. With the set of logistic regressions, particularly with the Nagelkerke's R^2, it is possible to identify the proximity between movements.

Figure 2 - Families of movements



Figure 2 shows 22 of types of organizations that Athens social forum activists were questioned about, which means that two of them are missing. Those are students and unemployed groups, which have been excluded because they only have low-level links to other movements, possibly because they are specialist issue areas with their own narrow ideologies. Among the 22 movements, if we consider the people they collect and the strength of their links (that is to say the proportion of people belonging to the same different types of organizations), some of them come to the fore. Hence, it is interesting to identify the various families.

The most important family of movements is at first composed of the international solidarity groups, to which 36% of the ESF participants declare to belong. Together with the human rights groups we come to a co-membership of 23% (i.e. 23% of the participants belong to both of these groups). Then, merging the development movement, which is well linked to the international solidarity too, the ratio comes to 12% of the sample. If we add the peace group we stay with 9.5%. Finally, adding the anti-racism activists, we come to a rate of 7.1%. Thus, 7.1% of the activists belong to those five movements at the same time. The second family basically consists of environmental and peace groups. Such groups represent 14.9% of the sample. Combining them with consumerism and fair trade activists, we come to a rate of 7.8% - 7.8% of the Athens ESF participants belong to the three groups at the same time. The third family is based on groups fighting against the neo-liberal agenda and local social forum activists, who represent 14.6% of the sample. Next, and close to them, are peace groups, with 9.2% of the whole sample belonging to these three movement types. From the human rights group onwards, we can draw the fourth family,

which is obtained by the combination of the women's movement (13.7% of the sample), then the gay and lesbian groups, which leads us to a ratio of 4.6%.

A fifth family, which is not connected to any other, and is in fact far from the other because of the lack of links, is made of political parties and groups combined with communists (11.5% of the sample), socialists (3%), and finally Trotskyists (1.4%) The sixth family is composed by consumerism and development groups, which contain 11.5% of the sample. Connected to them, are the environmental members, with the ratio ending up at 4.8%. The seventh family include autonomist and anarchist activists, who jointly represent 1.4% of the sample.

4. 'Important' organizations and democratic norms and practices

Besides asking Athens ESF participants to indicate their past and present involvement in a range of voluntary and campaigning organizations, our questionnaire also asked participants at the ESF in Athens to name 'the social movement group or organization which is most important to them'. Using this variable, we were able to explore the extent to which participation in an organization impacts upon degrees of participation in global justice movement protests / demonstrations, identification with the global justice movement, engagement in social movement activities, and to explore the role of ESF participants within their most favoured organization.

4.1 Operationalizing and aggregating new movement categories

The individual organizations most frequently listed as the most important organization for questionnaire respondents were left-wing political parties, notably the Greek SYN (mentioned 37 times), the Italian PRC (mentioned 21 times) and the French LCR and PC parties. The only other two organizations mentioned by more than 10 respondents were the Italian leftist group ARCI[38] (12 mentions), and the anti-neoliberal ATTAC, which was mentioned a total 39 times from respondents from various different countries. Because a large number of different organizations were listed (over 300) as 'the one [group] that is the most important to you', they were classified as one of twenty-four types of social movement organization: women's rights, environmental / anti-nuclear, peace, gay / lesbian / transgender, development aid, human rights, international solidarity, anti-racist / immigrants rights / pro-immigrants, consumerism / fair trade, students, socialist, trotskyist, communist, anarchist, autonomist / social centre, against neo-liberal agenda, local social forum, alternative media, peasant / farmer, charity organization / social voluntary, religious group / religious community, trade union, unemployed, political party or other.

The twenty-five categories were further collapsed in order to look at the differences between broad types of organization (Table 1). Before discussion of these proceeds, it is important to note that some compromises were made in the classification of the most important group into both the twenty-five categories shown above and the new six aggregated categories. These compromises involve the relatively high proportion of missing data, dilemmas over classification of organizations that work on more than one of the twenty-five broad issue fields and in cases in which more than one organization was mentioned, and the difficulty of tailoring the new categories so that they represent organizational types rather than organizational ideologies.

With reference to the first compromise, a total of 12% of questionnaire respondents claimed to have never been a member of any groups or organizations, and over one fifth of those who were part of such a group failed to provide the name of the group that is most important to them.

[38] The Italian mass organization ARCI (Italian Recreational Cultural Association) was traditionally linked with the Italian Communist Party. After the PCI transformed in a Leftist Demcoratic Party (today DS), the mass organization has progressively become autonomous from the party. Today, it is a leftist organization which avoids to define itself as communist. Due to the historical link with the communist party we nevertheless classified ARCI as a communist organization.

Additionally, twenty-nine (2.4%) of the organizations that were listed by respondents were impossible to classify according to our twenty-four types of social movement organizations. This left us with 772 valid cases (or 60.5% of the sample) in which respondents had provided us with a named organization that was classifiable. Even though 29.5% of the sample did not provide us with any useful data on this variable, 772 cases is still a sufficient number of organizations upon which to carry out robust statistical tests, and should allow us to effectively explore the relationship between organizational types to which activists closely identify and their levels of involvement in the GJM and views on democratic practices.

In order to solve the dilemma raised by those cases (around one-quarter of valid organizations) in which respondents named more than one organization, we always selected the first organization listed, making the assumption that respondents would, by default, list the most important group first. For those organizations that work on more than one theme, we tried to select the most prevalent theme. The organization Christian Aid, for example, is a Christian-inspired British aid trade and development organization. However, most of Christian Aid's work is focused on development, and the organization does not involve itself in overtly religious or missionary pursuits beyond fundraising and mobilization via the churches. Therefore it was classified as development aid rather than religious. Political parties were always classified as 'political parties' regardless of whether they were left wing, centre-left or green. Even though they may have vastly differing ideologies, political parties are organizationally similar in that they seek to win, or at least to influence, elections for representative institutions.

The aggregation of the twenty-five types of organization was collapsed into six new categories, covering different organizational types: *new social movement organizations* (working on NSM themes, mostly established post-1960), *non-governmental organizations* (NGOs, generally working in more formal organizations on longer-standing themes such as development aid and human rights), *political parties* (regardless of ideology), *trade unions* (whether traditional or radical), *non-party political left wing groups* (such as socialists and anarchists), and the *newest innovative movement organizations* (those campaigning against the neo-liberal agenda, and social forums etc.). Although many of the political parties may share the ideology with a number of the trade unions and non-party political left wing groups, it was considered necessary to separate them out not by virtue of their ideological differences, but because they organize in different manners.

New social movements organizations are said to have developed in the 1960s, amidst an unprecedented sweeping tide of unconventional political participation in the majority of Western democracies. These 'new' manifestations of protest were initially visible in the student movement, and succeeded by the peace, civil rights, feminist, ecologist and other self-help movements. Set in the climate of the 1960s, it was noted that these movements had various facets in common, namely: an anti-bureaucratic / anti-technocratic ideology, decentralized participatory organizational structures, solidarism in identity and strategy, an air of emancipation, a sense of fluidity and a cross-class base (Offe 1985; Diani & della Porta 1999; Pakulski 1991, Habermas 1981:33). As Habermas (1981:33) suggests, 'in short, the new conflicts are not sparked by problems of [labour and product] distribution, but concern for the grammar of forms of life'. The characteristic ideology, form and purpose of archetypal NSMs are shown in Table 7. They were termed 'new' mostly because previous theoretical models for the analysis of social movements (collective behaviour and class structuralism) could not explain their occurrence.

Table 7 - The Ideology, Form and Purpose of NSMs

Ideology

- Post modern, post materialist (Inglehart 1977)

Form

- Decentralised non-hierarchical participatory structure (and in theory inclusive)
- Not defined in relation to class
- A sense of fluidity - amorphous
- Direct participation and spontaneity

Purpose

- Resist colonisation of the life-world or manipulation of identity and needs
- Freedom of expression, communication and cultural reproduction
- Symbolic resistance
- Seek emancipation
- Have solidarity and autonomy as objectives in themselves

Although it is true that movements that have formed since the 1960s reflect the characteristics of NSMs to varying degrees (see, in particular, Rucht 1988), it generally makes sense to conceive of environmental, women's rights, peace, gay / lesbian / transgender, international solidarity, anti-racist / immigrants rights / pro-immigrants and student groups as NSM organizations. Peasant and farmer's groups are also classified as NSM organizations because of their relationship with the environmental movement, despite the fact that they represent a much older strain of resistance and rebellion. Examples of organizations classed as NSM organizations are the French women's rights organization, Collectif dros des femmes, the Italian peace organization Rete Artisti per la Pace, the international environmental organization, the World Wide Fund for Nature, the Lesbian Group of Athens as a lesbian rights organization, Via Campesina as a peasant / farmers group, and various university student unions and student groups.

The operationalisation of the category of NGOs is even more complicated, not least because many commentators include a broad swathe of different types of organizations, including new social movement organizations, within it. Doyle and McEachern (1998:87), for example, include formalised and non-formalised environmental movement organizations under its banner. And the World Bank define NGOs as 'private organizations that pursue activities to relieve suffering, promote the interests of the poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community development' (Operational Directive 14.70[39]). Although he does not specify the organizational form that NGOs take, DeMars (2005:1) takes the viewpoint that NGOs are omnipresent:

international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) seem to be everywhere, and they often work in mysterious ways. If omnipotence remains yet out of reach, it is not for lack of effort, since NGOs cumulatively claim to be able to do almost anything in world politics, from feeding famine victims and protecting endangered species, to eliminating nuclear weapons and AIDS, to democratizing Russia and the Arab world.

[39] World Bank, 2001, Categorising NGOs, at http://docs.lib.duke.edu/igo/guides/ngo/define.htm. Accessed 13/02/07.

According to Doyle and McEachern (1998), DeMars (2005) and the World Bank, we should view all GJMOs as NGOs. However, this is not how activists view the term, or how it is implied in other literature. For direct activists in Britain, at least, an NGO is a formal organization that tends to work through more conventional political channels than NSM organizations, and often on themes that preceded the 1960s wave of NSM protest. Thus, humanitarian, aid, trade and human rights organizations, which tend to organize formally and have roots in First World War humanitarian efforts can be viewed as NGOs, as distinct from their NSM counterparts. Indeed, much of the scholarly work on NGOs has tended to focus on humanitarian, relief and development concerns (e.g. Aaal et al 2000, Edwards 1997, Duben 1994). In addition, we have added fair trade and consumerist groups to the NGO category because they are related to, and often spawned from aid, trade and humanitarian NGOs. Religious groups, which are historically precedent to NSMs, and voluntary / charity groups, which also follow conventional action repertoires are also added to the NGO category (*cf* Kendall 2003). NGOs in the sample include the human rights organization Amnesty International, organizations espousing international solidarity, such as Monden por Cuba, and the development / aid organization ACRA Italia.If NSM organizations and political parties have been difficult to delineate, political parties and trade unions are much simpler to demark. Political parties generally have a much broader focus than NSM organizations, NGOs, trade unions and other left-wing organizations (Baggot 1995). Despite the differing political systems within the nations that they represent, political parties are those political organizations that participate in electoral campaigns in an attempt to obtain political power or rights of governance at the federal or state level. As Rose (1974:3) suggests:

A political party is an organization concerned with the expression of popular preferences in contesting control of the chief policy-making offices of government … Parties are concerned with the expression of popular preferences; their activities are thus related to the mass of society as well as government. Parties are concerned with controlling policy-making office in government. Thus they differ from pressure groups such as trade unions and industrial associations, which seek to influence policies without taking official responsibility.

Thus, although the British Socialist Worker's Party calls itself a Party, it does not participate in elections, or attempt to take government power for itself. Therefore it is classified as a non-party political organization instead. The majority of political parties listed by respondents as their favored organization are overtly left-wing, often communist, socialist or social democrat. In Italy and France, the historically significant communist parties are the PCF (France) and the PCI (Italy). However, the PCF has recently decreased in electoral importance, and the PCI has been reformed as the PDS, and, more recently as the DS. Rifondazione Comunista emerged as a critic of this transformation. Nevertheless, the checkered historical electoral success of the Italian and French communist parties can be contrasted with the nearly complete electoral failure of their British counterpart (Allum 1995:201-3). Socialist and social democrat parties predominate, reflecting the fact that these groupings currently dominate European party politics.

Trade unions, simply put, are organizations that seek to support the rights of workers, usually via formal membership. However, they incorporate a range of organizational forms, from conventional trade unions like the British UNISON, to the much less conventional Italian COBAS which emphasizes the defence of the "dignity" of the workers, and criticises conventional unions for being overly bureaucratised, calling for more direct democracy in the election of workers' representatives (della Porta 2005). Despite the fact that trade unions, especially in France and Italy where they are strongly politicised (Allum 1995:203), may share ideologies and personnel with labour and communist parties, and may be ideologically distinct from one another they are classified together, and as distinct from political parties because of their different organizational characteristics rather than their ideology. Indeed, the most common French and Italian trade union organizations have ideological similarities with political parties. The French CGT (Confédéreation Générale du Travail), for example, which accounts for approximately 40% of union membership in France, and which six of our survey respondents listed as their most important organization, is overtly

communist in its ideology (Allum 1995:264). But it is the organizational dimension, rather than the ideological one which is of concern to us in this chapter. Other trade unions in the sample are the British RMT (National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers), and the French Union Syndicale Solidaires.

The category 'left-wing non-party political groups' includes a host of left-wing organizations that do not fit the party political model, or other categories. Broadly speaking, the organizations within this category can be viewed as components of the revolutionary left: anarchists, socialists, trotskyists, communists and marxists. In Britain, if not elsewhere in Europe, previous factious socialist and trotskyist organizations have, at least to some extent, created alliances with one another, and with left reformists – especially disillusioned renegades of the Labour Party (Callinicos 2001) – in an attempt to help the left reach its goals against all odds at 'the end of history' (Fukuyama 1992). Unemployed groups have been added to this category because they tend to align themselves with the radical left, and despise formally organized trade unions and political parties. Examples of 'left-wing non-party political groups include the Che Guevara Youth Movement, The League for the Fifth International, Les Communists and Alternative Libertaire.

The final category of organizations to introduce is 'new and innovative movements'. The organizations within this category have mostly been formed in the wake of the 'Battle of Seattle', and are usually concerned with 'globalization from below'; developing an alternative vision of globalization via opposition to neo-liberalism, social forums, and alternative media outlets. Often lacking formal organization, these organizations challenge contemporary 'democracy' and seek to foster more deliberative alternatives (see della Porta and Reiter, 2006). Probably the most prominent organization in this category is ATTAC, which was mentioned by respondents from several different countries. Other examples of new innovative movement organizations are Florence Social Forum, the Free Radio of Thessaloniki and the Progressive Journalist Association.

4.2 Exploring the data for important organizational types

Environmental / anti-nuclear organizations account for almost one third (27.6%) of the NSM organizations in the sample, followed in popularity by student (17.9% of NSM organizations) women's rights (14.3% of NSM organizations), peace (15.3%), international solidarity (11.2%) and anti-racist (10.7%) organizations. Only a very small minority of the NSM organizations listed by questionnaire respondents work in the fields of gay / lesbian / transgender and peasant / farmer's rights. This is despite the high visibility of peasant and farmer protest in the GJM in France (Sommier and Combes 2007). The NGO field is (both theoretically and empirically) dominated by human rights and development / aid organizations, together accounting for three quarters of it. Charity organizations (10.2% of NGOs), consumer / fair trade organizations (6.8%) and religious groups (8.5%) are much less prevalent. Within the non-party political group category, trotskyist and communist groups are the most popular, each accounting for almost one third of non-party political groups. Socialists, anarchists, autonomists and unemployed organizations each account for less than 10%. Just under half of the newest innovative movement organizations are organizations campaigning against the neoliberal agenda, and a third of them are social forums. Alternative media outlets account for 16.1% (Table 8).

Table 8 - Types and frequency of organizations within new aggregated organizational types

Type of organization	% Within aggregated category	N
NSM organizations		
Women's rights	14.3	28
Environmental	27.6	54
Peace	15.3	30
Gay / lesbian / transgender	2.0	4
International solidarity	11.2	22
Anti-racist / immigrants rights / pro-immigrants	10.7	21
Student group	17.9	35
Peasant / farmer	1.0	2
NSM organizations (% of total)	100 (16.3)	196
NGOs		
Development aid	28.8	17
Human rights	45.8	27
Consumerism / fair trade	6.8	4
Charity organization	10.2	6
Religious group	8.5	5
NGOs (% of total)	100 (4.9)	59
Political parties		
Political parties	100	223
Political parties (% of total)	100 (18.5)	223
Trade unions		
Trade unions	100	99
Trade unions (% of total)	100 (8.2)	99
Other left-wing non-party political groups		
Socialist	13.6	14
Trotskyist	31.1	32
Communist	30.1	31
Anarchist	4.9	5
Autonomist / social centre	8.7	9
Unemployed	11.7	12
Other left-wing non-party political groups (% of total)	100 (8.5)	103
Newest innovative movement organizations		
Against neo-liberal agenda	49.5	46
Local social forum	33.3	31.0??
Alternative media	16.1	15
Other	1.1	1
Newest innovative movement organizations	100 (7.7)	93
Not a member of an organization (%	100 (12.0)	145

Type of organization	% Within aggregated category	N
of total)		
Uncategorised, unknown or other		
Other	9.8	28
No group specified	90.2	259
Uncategorised, unknown or other (% of total)	100 (23.8)	287

Figure 3 - Types of the 'most important' organizations



Figure 3 shows the proportion of different types of organizations, excluding both the missing data (those cases in which no organization was mentioned) and the organizations that were impossible to classify. It shows that the largest type of important organizational membership amongst respondents is political parties (28.9%), followed by NSM organizations (25.4%). The question of whether political parties can be considered to be a part of the global justice movement seems to be settled in the affirmative by the prevalence of their activists at the ESF. Non party political left-wing organizations, trade unions and new innovative movements each account for approximately 12% of important organizations listed, and NGOs lag behind, accounting for 7.6% of respondents. Certainly the forum's most avid supporters are overtly left-wing (over 85% claimed to be left of centre in a question on their political position), but the high number of NSM type organizations (dominated by environmental groups) suggests that the Athens social forum was more diverse than the left-wing road shows that European Social Forums are often portrayed to be (see Kingsnorth 2004a on the London European Social Forum). That said, it is clear that the 'left wing movement' or as Jamieson (2001:148) puts it, 'the "old crap" from the 1960s' has been reinvigorated by the rise of the global justice movement, thus reducing the struggle against globalization to 'old fashioned ideology, even

when it is obvious that far more than the old class of national or material interests are at stake'. This is supported by the fact that over 55% of our Athens questionnaire respondents listed a left wing organization, political party or trade union as their most important organization (see Chapter on the left).

4.3 Important organizational membership and participation in GJM events and identification with the global movement

4.3.1 Participation in GJM protests / demonstrations

Those activists who are most active in GJM protests and demonstrations tend to most closely identify with organizations that are 'new and innovative', such as those campaigning against neo-liberalism, or within social forums. Slightly fewer than half of those respondents who listed a 'new and innovative' movement organization as their most important organization claim to have participated in more than ten GJM protests or demonstrations, and only 4.3% of them, by far the lowest proportion, had never participated in one. Amongst the least active are those that had listed an NGO as their most important organization. Nearly one fifth of these respondents had never engaged in protest, and only 15.3% had participated in excess of ten times. This is consonant with general expectations about NGO membership, which frequently involves becoming a 'cheque book [more accurately today to call this direct debit] supporter' (Jordan and Maloney 1997). This type of membership is especially common within the environmental movement, which dominates the NGO organizational type in this sample (Bosso 2005) (Table 9).

These findings run contrary to what would be expected on the basis of Klandermans' (1993) research, which compares participation in three Dutch social movements. He found that the participation-oriented loose network of the women's movement, which is broadly comparable to the organizational structure of many NSM organizations and new innovative movement organizations under study here, was the least effective at mobilizing activists to attend the forum. The particular trade union that he studied, which was centralized, federal and power-oriented, fulfilled its mobilization potential much more significantly. Perhaps it is the internet that has helped modern, relative resource poor global justice movement organizations to better reach their mobilization potential. Of course, Diani is correct to claim that the internet helps:

To transform an aggregate of individuals with similar problems [and interests], but geographically and/or socially far, into a densely connected and integrated population, resolving one of the fundamental problems of mobilization (Diani 2000: 32). In this chapter we will also see that this depends on the type of internal decision making, since direct participation and consensus seem better equipped to motivate people for collective action.

The substantial differences between the NGO and newest innovative movement organizational types account for the statistically different frequencies for participation in GJM protests by organizational type, which yield a Cramer's V of 0.110***.

Table 9 - Types of organizations and previous participation in GJM protests and demonstrations

	Previous participation in GJM protests / demonstrations (% for rows)				
	Never (n=108)	Once (n=82)	2-5 times (n=216)	6-10 times (n=101)	More than 10 times (n=260)
NSM organizations (n=196)	16.3	12.8	29.1	13.8	28.8
NGOs (n=59)	16.9	20.3	39.0	8.5	15.3
Political parties (n=220)	15.9	9.1	24.1	12.3	38.2
Trade unions (n=98)	14.3	13.3	31.6	11.2	29.6
Non-party political left organizations (n=102)	12.7	4.9	30.4	15.7	36.3
Newest innovative movements (n=93)	4.3	7.5	22.6	16.1	49.5
Totals	**14.1**	**10.7**	**28.1**	**13.2**	**33.9**

Those activists willing to travel to other countries in order to participate in GJM protests can be viewed as displaying higher levels of commitment to the movement. Thus, it is perhaps not surprising that those organizational types in which a high proportion of activists have participated in GJM protests at least ten times appear also to have a tendency to travel abroad for protest events. It is those involved in newest innovative movement organizations that have the greatest tendency to commit to GJM protests – even when these are in other countries from their home town (nearly 70% of activists who list a new innovative movement organization as their preferred organization). Non-party political left wing activists are also fairly avid GJM protest travellers, with 66% of them have engaged in a GJM protest abroad. This compares to approximately half of those listing political parties, NGOs and NSM organizations having travelled abroad, and contrasts with the 22.2% of respondents who claimed not to be part of an organization having travelling abroad for GJM protests. Organizations are, indeed, crucial for galvanising, organizing and mobilising activists to take part in demonstrations abroad. Direct activists in Britain were envious, for example, of the organizational ability of Globalise Resistance, which managed to successfully organize transport and plans for action at the Genoa anti-G8 demonstrations in 2001. To the dismay of direct activists, who call the organization 'Monopolise Resistance', it was able to organize and pay for coaches to ship hundreds of protesters to the demonstration and to stage public meetings and a large follow up conference (*Schnews* 2001). In the light of *Schnews*' envy and critique of Globalise Resistance, it is perhaps surprising that newest and innovative movement organizations do so well at organizing protests in other countries (Table 10).

Table 10 - Participation in GJM protests in other countries from home country

	Participation in GJM protests in other countries from home country (% in rows)	
	%	n
Not a member of an organization	22.2	32
NSM organizations	52.6	103
NGOs	45.8	27
Political parties	53.4	118
Trade Unions	60.6	60
Non-party political left organizations	66.0	66
Newest innovative movements	69.9	65
Total valid cases %	**48.4**	**471**

4.3.2 Engagement in social movement activities

Besides differences in the extent of protest activity between activists who identify with different movement organization types, there are also significant differences in the types of social movement activity in which activists engage. It is hardly surprising that activists who closely identify with political parties have the greatest tendency to engage in political party work, or persuading others to vote for a political party. On the other hand, almost half of the rest of the sample *have not* engaged in either of these activities. There is clearly a relationship between party political work and left-wing activism, but in the other types of organizations, less than one third of activists have engaged in political party work. Of course, there is more than an ideological link between left-wing political parties and left-wing activism more generally, as Darlington (2000) notes in his paper on left-wing activism, trade unions and political parties in Britain.

Involvement in political parties is lowest for NSM organizations (24.5%) and the newest innovative movements (29.0%). This is unsurprising because these two organizational types share two similar explanatory characteristics: disdain for hierarchical forms of organizing, and a tendency organize from the bottom-up. Local social forums, especially, tend to espouse 'horizontal' organizational principles. The 'horizontal' network that was established in the wake of the plans for the third social forum to take place in London, for example, stressed its belief in:

Grassroots self-organization, horizontality, … diversity and inclusion, … direct democracy, collective decision making based upon consensus, and [was] against the false consensus in which power is used to silence others (Horizontal network 'Call out', 2004)

- the antithesis of top-down party politics. It is largely the huge difference between the numbers of activists from political parties and left wing organizations who have worked in party politics compared to the rest of the sample that has yielded a highly significant Cramer's V score of 0.530***. The signing of petitions and attendance at demonstrations, forms of easily accessible low-risk activism (McAdam 1986), are virtually ubiquitous across all types of movement organization types, having been undertaken by over 90% of activists. Trade unionists appear to be the most vociferous leafleters (over 90%), and NGO members the least so (less than two thirds). Unsurprisingly, it is committed trade unionists who most frequently use the tactic of strikes, yet those closely identifying with other types of organization also use this tactic (perhaps because they have overlapping affiliations with the labour types of organization – see network chapter), including approximately two thirds of those who closely identify with new innovative movement

organizations and with political parties. Forms of direct action are most common amongst the non-party political left wing organization members, but the contrast with other movement organization types is not staggering. Boycotts are a strategy favoured especially by activists who strongly identify with new innovative movement organizations and NGOs. However, NGO activists are less inclined to participate in cultural performances, or other forms of direct action. Only 10% of those closely identifying with an NGO have taken part in a blockade, perhaps suggesting that Rootes and Saunders (2007) thesis on the divide between NGO and direct action activists in Britain can be applied more generally. This compares to over 50% of those closely identifying with political parties having taken place in blockades, probably on industrial issues. Although violent action against property is rare, it is most common amongst non-party political left-wing activists (14.7% of those closely identifying with this type of organization), compared to just 2% of trade unionists (Table 11).

Table 11 - Engagement in various social movement activities by organizational type.

	Engagement in social movement activity (% in rows)							
	Persuaded to vote for political party	Worked in political party	Signed petition / public letter	Attended demonstration	Handed out leaflets	Took part in strike	Practiced civil disobedience	Took part in non-violent direct action
NSM organizations (n=196)	51.0	24.5	88.8	92.9	74.0	53.1	42.3	63.3
NGOs (n=59)	54.2	37.3	86.4	89.8	64.4	42.4	32.2	47.5
Political parties (n=220)	87.9	87.9	91.5	97.3	88.3	68.6	52.0	64.1
Trade unions (n=98)	52.5	33.3	94.9	99.0	90.9	90.9	37.4	53.5
Non-party political left organizations (n=102)	52.4	55.3	86.4	97.1	87.4	47.6	56.3	66.0
Newest innovative movements (n=93)	44.8	29.0	91.4	96.8	83.9	65.6	46.2	58.1
Totals **(n)**	**62.0** **479**	**49.5** **383**	**90.2** **697**	**95.7** **740**	**82.5** **636**	**62.4** **482**	**46.1** **356**	**60.8** **470**
Cramer's V	0.248***	0.530***	0.78	0.159*	0.229***	0.211***	0.115*	0.094

	Engagement in social movement activity (continued) (% in rows)					
	Boycotted products	Participated in cultural performances	Occupied public building	Occupied abandoned homes or land	Took part in blockade	Used violent forms of action against property
NSM organizations (n=196)	73.5	66.3	31.1	8.7	32.7	4.1
NGOs (n=59)	79.7	45.8	22.0	10.2	10.2	5.1
Political parties (n=220)	67.7	63.5	46.4	13.5	38.3	8.1
Trade unions (n=98)	67.7	58.6	46.5	9.1	51.5	2.0
Non-party political left organizations (n=102)	67.0	56.9	43.1	22.5	42.2	14.7
Newest innovative movements (n=93)	82.8	63.4	37.6	15.1	35.5	5.4
Totals (n)	**71.7 (555)**	**61.3 (473)**	**39.2 (302)**	**12.8 (99)**	**36.6 (282)**	**6.6 (51)**
Cramer's V	0.119	0.113	0.163**	0.134*	0.198***	0.151**

4.3.3 Identification with the GJM

Perhaps it is a peculiarity of the GJM in Britain that activists claim to be unclear of the meaning of the term 'global justice movement' and therefore refuse to comment on their extent of identification with it (Rootes and Saunders 2007). In contrast with the British experience, an overwhelming proportion of activists at the Athens ESF claim to identify with the 'global movement'[40] quite a lot or very much (91.3%). However, most of those who do *not* identify with the movement, or do so only *a little* are activists who closely identify with NGOs and trade unions (Table 12). Waterman (2001:215) provides an explanation for the lack of identification that traditional trade unionists have with the global movement, which could also apply to long-standing NGOs that may have become subjects of organizational inertia. 'The new global solidarity movements are,' he suggests, 'in large part communication internationalisms', and the labour movement has been slow to take up multilateral IT based communication. Waterman's thesis can also explains why those who closely identify with new and innovative movements, which have much more readily adapted to the use digital democracy (Saunders and Rootes 2005), tend to more closely identify with the movement. Indeed, the weak but significant measure of association (Cramers V = 0.112*) between organizational types and levels of identification with the GJM is most probably accounted for by the significantly higher numbers of new innovative movement activists that strongly identify with the movement. Nevertheless, a clear majority of activists from all organizational types do identify with the movement 'quite a lot' or 'very much', including 88% of trade unionists, and 86.4% of NGO activists.

[40] This was the term used in the questionnaire.

Table 12 - Identification with the global justice movement by organizational type

	Identification with the global justice movement (% for rows)			
	Not at all (n=3)	A little (n=63)	Quite a lot (n=338)	Very much (n=355)
NSM organizations (n=196)	0.0	8.3	45.8	45.8
NGOs (n=59)	0.0	13.6	47.5	39.0
Political parties (n=220)	0.5	8.3	43.8	47.5
Trade unions (n=98)	0.0	12.2	52.0	35.7
Non-party political left organizations (n=102)	1.9	7.8	41.7	48.5
Newest innovative movements (n=93)	0.0	1.1	36.7	62.2
Totals	**0.4**	**8.3**	**44.5**	**46.8**

Despite their having lower levels of identification with the movement than activists who strongly identify with both NSM organizations and newest innovative movements, the sympathisers of non-party political left organizations have had the highest level of participation in network / campaign meetings of the GJM (81.1% of those who listed a left wing non party political organization have participated in at least one such meeting). Again, NGO supporters have been the least active, and two thirds of NSM supporters have participated, along with approximately three quarters of respondents from all other organizational types (Table 13).

Table 13 - Participation in network / campaign meetings of the GJM by organizational type

	Participation in network / campaign meetings of GJM (% in rows)	
	%	n
NSM organizations	67.1	110
NGOs	58.7	27
Political parties	76.8	136
Trade Unions	74.4	58
Non-party political left organizations	81.1	73
Newest innovative movements	75.9	60
Total valid cases %	**66.0**	**496**

Cramer's V: 0.140*

4.3.4 Role of activists within their most important organization

In the light of the tendency, as discussed earlier, for NGO activists to be less engaged in GJM events and in certain forms of social movement activity, such as leafleting, than activists from other organizational types, it is perhaps surprising to note that over 80% of them are active as voluntary campaigners, members of paid staff, or group leaders. Perhaps it is the case that NGO activists have less proclivity to attend global justice oriented demonstrations than their counterparts, viewing such events as too radical or even too dangerous to attend. NGOs associated with Jubilee Debt 2000 in Britain, for example, have been wary of attending street parties or summit protests which are, often rightly, viewed as invitations to riots (Rootes and Saunders 2007). Quite possibly, they view the

ESF as a moderate event, with little chance of violence, and so they use their often-vast organizational resources to promote their organizations. NGOs are generally engaged in more conventional forms of political participation, such as negotiating with decision-makers, petitioning, using legislation and producing research reports than the other organizational types we are studying. The others may be inclined, in the absence of the 'insider' status that many NGOs have, to engage with the public instead (Grant 1989). Our survey finds that only trade unions had a higher proportion of active respondents (84.4%) than NGOs. Just over half of those who listed a political party as their most important organization were actually active in it, demonstrating the fairly exclusive nature of party politics – political parties generally not being recognised as participatory bodies, but rather representational ones. The number of new innovative movement organizations is notably low, but this is a reflection of the organizational nature of such organizations, which tend to be informal, and to be run on a voluntary rather than staffed basis (Table 14).

Table 14 - Role of ESF participants within their 'important' organization by organizational type

	Involvement in organization (% in rows)					
	Not active	Ordinary member	Volunteer campaigner / activist	Paid staff	Leader	Other
NSM organizations (n=191)	3.7	20.9	34.0	9.4	24.6	7.3
NGOs (n=59)	6.8	11.9	42.4	8.5	27.1	3.4
Political parties (n=219)	2.3	33.8	19.6	5.5	31.5	7.3
Trade unions (n=98)	1.0	12.2	19.4	26.5	38.8	2.6
Non-party political left organizations (n=101)	0.0	27.7	29.7	5.9	31.7	5.0
Newest innovative movements (n=90)	8.9	17.8	41.1	2.2	27.8	2.2
Totals	**3.3**	**23.4**	**28.9**	**9.1**	**29.9**	**5.4**
n	**25**	**177**	**219**	**69**	**227**	**41**

NB. n for types of organization differs from other tables because cases for which data on organizational role is missing were excluded.

5. Important organizations and democratic norms and practices

5.1 Expected democratic models of important organizations

As far as democracy within one group is concerned, there are several expectations that can be investigated. First, we should expect that activists whose primary involvement is within political parties and trade unions perceive of democracy according to the "associational model". Delegation and voting are in fact the traditional tools through which mass organizations have historically implemented their internal democracy. The same could apply for the left-wing (non party organizations or trade unions) organizations whose democratic model is traditionally linked to party organizations (such as socialist or communist organizations). However, though political parties have hardily modified this institutional democratic design, some trade unions, emerged after the wave of protest of the sixties, started trying to implement a more participative model. In the same vein, some left-wing (non parties or trade unions) organizations such as Trotskyists, autonomist or anarchist groups have historically rejected delegation as democratic principle, and valued the assembleary model as the only legitimate decisional body. Also, NSM organizations that emerged since the sixties within western liberal democracies have radically criticized the associational model of internal democracy. Not only did they challenge liberal democracies by criticizing the principle

of delegation, they also tried to apply direct participation - a basic element of the democracy of the "ancients" (Kitchelt 1993), - in their internal decision-making, thus considering the assembly to be the only legitimate "space" for decision-making. Eventually, the myth of the "assembly" was overcome by the need to institutionalize important components of NSMs. NGOs had to centralize many decisions to become effective and to implement projects generally funded by governments, but also by members. Delegation was the only way to solve their collective action problems, though the executive bodies of such organizations, whose members are usually experts, could probably take decision through deliberation, since the probability that experts choose among different options on the basis of rational arguments is considered relatively high (Majone 1989).

Table 15 - Expectations on the perceived democratic models implemented within different types of organizations

Type of most important group	**Expectations on how democracy is perceived at the group level**				
	Item 1 (arguments/ individuals)	Item 2 (acceptance)	Item 3 (decision makers)	Item 4 (voting/ consensus)	Typology of democratic model
Political Parties	Individuals	Non acceptance	Few people	voting	Associational
Trade unions	Both	both	Few people	voting	Assoc./Assemble.
Left wing non-party political organizations	Individuals	Non acceptance	Few people	voting	Assoc./Assemble.
NGOs	arguments	acceptance	Few people	consensus	Deliberative repres.
New social movement organizations	??	??	All members	voting	Assembleary
Newest innovative movement organizations	arguments	acceptance	All members	consensus	Deliberative participative

It is then to be expected that NGOs rely upon either an "associational model", or a "deliberative representative" one. In any case, respect between opponents, and quality of the arguments should be positively evaluated and actually perceived as prevailing practices among activists whose primary involvement is within NGOs. Finally, the newest and innovative social movement organizations' activists, being largely organizations born with the GJM itself, should perceive their group's prevailing practices as more deliberative and participative, since "consensus" and "direct participation" are two of the most important keywords of the movement wanting "another world". See Table 15 for a summary of the expectations.

5.2 Actual democratic models of important organizations

As already mentioned in previous chapters, in order to grasp the relevant dimensions of internal democracy that characterizes organizations involved in GJM mobilization, we asked activists to describe the way in which decisions are taken in their most important group of affiliation according to four items: the first statement opposes those who perceive that in their most important group of affiliation the *quality of arguments* makes a difference (when a decision is to be taken) regardless of who produce them against those who think that skilful and more active *individuals* have more weight; the second distinguishes between those who declare that participants in the internal decision making accept each other as "equal discussants" when they disagree, and those who rather perceive that in case of disagreement, *mutual acceptance is not respected*; the third statement separates those who describe their groups' internal decision making as a matter of few people, from those declare that almost all members participate; and finally the last statement opposes those who declare they

take decision by *voting* (raising hands or similar) to those claim their groups take decisions by *consensus*.

In Table 16 we summarize the results on each of these items according to the type of the most important group of the activists. Political parties and trade unions' members describe the internal decision making as less sensitive to the quality of the arguments than leftist non party political organizations, NSM organizations, NGOs and new innovative movements organizations which are much more sensitive to the quality of the arguments. Leftist groups' and NGOs' activists say a little more often than the others that "acceptance" of opposite views is the rule in case of disagreement in their organization, while NGOs activists tend to describe their internal decision making as less open to full participation than the others, the most inclusive settings being those represented by NSM organizations and newest innovative movement organizations' members. But the item on which the differences are clearer and statistically significant is the one opposing voting procedures to consensus methods of decision making, with activists primary involved in NGOs (surprisingly), political parties and trade unions (as expected) describing the internal decision making as characterized mostly by voting procedures (respectively 58%, 67% and 54%) and activists of NSM organizations (surprisingly), and newest innovative movements organizations (as expected) declaring that consensus is in most of the cases the rule (67% and 61%).

Table 16 - Perceptions of democracy working within the group

Types of Most Important Group	**Perceptions of how internal democracy works within one's group**							
	Item 1 Quality of arguments		Item 2 Acceptance bet. Opp.		Item 3 Participation		Item 4 Consensus	
	%	Cr.' s V	%	Cr.' s V	%	Cr.' s V	%	Cr.' S V
NSM orgs.	75.5	N.s.	81.8	N.s.	63.1	N.s.	67.1	.27***
NGOs	75.5		84.3		51.1		41.7	
Political Parties	65.4		78.2		57.4		32.7	
Trade Unions	61.7		74.2		59.1		45.7	
Left orgs.	72.7		85.7		57.3		51.5	
Newest Movem.	73.2		82.7		69.5		61.0	
Total valid cases %	**69.9**		**80.5**		**59.9**		**49.0**	

If we now crosstabulate item 3 and item 4 we get the typology of democratic models elaborated in chapter 3 for the normative ideas of democracy. As summarized in Table 12, NSM organization activists describe their group mostly as characterized by a deliberative participative model of democracy (45% of them say that both consensus and full participations characterize them), while the second prevailing model in the perception of these activists is deliberative representative (22% say that though consensus is the rule, decisions are mainly taken by few people); NGOs are mostly described either as "associational" (30% say both few people and voting) or as "assembleary" (28% both full participation and voting); surprisingly 36% of political parties activists perceive an assembleary model, though as much as 31% of them confirm the traditional associational setting. Some trade unionists are convinced that their organizations are characterized either by a deliberative participative model (33%), or by the associational one (about 33%); left-wing non-party political organizations are described as deliberative participative by 35% of their members, while 25% maintain that their groups are purely associational. Finally the newest and innovative movement organizations, as expected, are perceived to be deliberative participative by as many as 46% of their members, and as "assembleary" by 23% (see Table 17 for a summary).

Finally, we can operationalize, as in chapter 3 for the index of deliberative attitudes, the index of deliberativeness perceived within the types of group, by dichotomizing each of the four items and summing them up. The index varies from 0 deliberation, when activists perceive that individuals are more important than arguments, in case of disagreements there is no acceptance, only few people decide and voting is the main decision making procedure, and 4, when they see that the quality of arguments prevails, opponents treat each other as equals, full participation is more or less guaranteed and consensus is the method). The results shown in Table 13 confirm that political parties and trade unions are perceived significantly less deliberative than newest innovative social movements, and NSMs, but also left wing non-party political organizations and NGOs (see means and medians in Table 18).

Table 17 - Perceived models of democracy within the most important group

Types of Most Important Group	**Perceived democratic models within one's group**				
	Associative	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Total
NSM orgs.	15.6	22.1	17.5	44.8	154
NGOs	29.8	19.1	27.7	23.4	47
Political Parties	31.2	11.2	35.6	22.0	205
Trade Unions	29.0	11.8	25.8	33.3	93
Left orgs.	25.0	17.7	22.9	34.3	96
Newest Movem.	15.9	14.6	23.2	46.3	82
Total valid cases	**24.5**	**15.7**	**26.3**	**33.5**	**677**

Cramer's V: .16. significant at .001 level

Table 18 - Ranking of the perceived models of the most important group's internal democracy and index of perceived deliberativeness.

Types of Most Important Group	**Perceived democratic models**		**Perceived deliberativeness**	
	The most perceived model	The second most perceived model	ETA: . 20***	
			Mean	Median
NSM orgs.	Deliberative participative (45%)	Deliberative representative (22%)	2.9	3.0
NGOs	Associational (30%)	Assembleary (28%)	2.6	3.0
Political Parties	Assembleary (36%)	Associational (31%)	2.3	2.0
Trade Unions	Deliberative participative (33%)	Associational (33%)	2.4	2.5
Left orgs.	Deliberative participative (35%)	Associational (25%)	2.7	3.0
Newest Movem.	Deliberative participative (46%)	Assembelary (23%)	2.9	3.0
Total valid cases %	**Deliberative participative (34%)**	**Assembleary (26%)**	**2.6**	

Thus, in general, it is true that the newest movements, which emerged with the GJM, are perceived as mostly deliberative participative, and that political parties, trade unions and leftist non political party organizations are (also) perceived as "associational" by most of their members. The latter started considering either an assembleary model (parties) or even a deliberative participative one (trade unions and non party political left wing organizations.). There are two possible explanations: firstly, activists may have described the decision making process within the local level in which they are actively involved, and at which full participation and even consensus may be experimented. Secondly, in this chapter we do not distinguish between types of parties and trade unions, and, as anticipated for the latter, the different ideological traditions (e.g. traditional leftist,

radical leftist, green, centralized or grassroots, etc.), which may have a role in explaining the variation in the perceptions of the activists. For the leftist organizations this is visible by the inclusion of Autonomist /Anarchist and especially Trotskyist organizations, which traditionally emphasize direct participation, and socialist and communist organizations within the same category.[41] Similar considerations, especially the territorial level considered by the activists, may apply for the NGOs, that appear to be less "deliberative", but also more participative, than expected. Finally, if the NSM organizations seem to have mostly abandoned the traditional "assembleary" model, they are as deliberative as the newest innovative movement organizations, though relatively more inclined to centralize decisions.

In any case, there are signs that more participative and deliberative practices are diffusing beyond the boundaries that path-dependent theory would draw.

5.3 Are activists' perceptions filtered by their organizational democratic practices?

As we already mentioned many times, the GJM has been seen as a promoter of a democratization from below (Della Porta et al. 2006). Consensus practices are reported to be widely diffused in the meetings of the networks which support it (della Porta 2004, Andretta 2005, and forthcoming), and most of the World Social Forums have been organized in a city, Porto Alegre, which started experimenting new democratic practices, such as the famous participatory budget, and taken as a symbol of how democracy should work by the whole GJM (Allegretti 2001, Baiocchi 2005).

In chapter 3, we noticed that most of the activists perceive democracy in the GJM as associational (31%) or deliberative representative (28%), though about 24% perceive a deliberative participative model. Those differences may depend on the fact that many activists have not participated in the decisional meetings of the GJM networks, such as the ESF preparatory assemblies, or other meetings for specific campaigns, such as the No War or Stop Bolkestein ones[42]. The differences on the perceptions can be partly explained by the fact that activists could refer to different types of meeting, and also to different levels (local, national, transanational). For instance, Nicole Doerr (2006) by participating at different GJM meetings in Europe, contends that meetings at transnational level are more deliberative than at national levels. If we filter out those activists who declared they did not participate in GJM decision making (357, 37% of the valid cases), however the heterogeneity of the perceptions does not decrease at all: 32% see a deliberative representative model, 26% either an associational or a deliberative participative model and 16% an assembleary model. The heterogeneity of views surely depends on the concrete decisional settings those activists are thinking about: the transnational ESF assemblies, or the WSF, the national and local forums or the issue campaigns meetings, etc. In this chapter we wonder if the different perceptions can be explained by the organizational lens activists may wear when they try to assess how decisions are taken within the GJM networks, forums etc.

As we can see in Table 19, activists who are not members of any organization, but still participate in GJM decision-making, tend to perceive it as mostly "associative" (40%), that is they see decisions taken by few people and by adopting a voting procedure, while only 20% of them see a deliberative participative setting, 23% perceive a combination of delegation and consensus (deliberative representative) and 16% an assembleary model. NSM's members are instead more inclined to perceive a deliberative participative setting (33%), though many (34%) agree that if consensus is the rule, decisions are manly taken by few people (deliberative representative). The perceptions of NGO organizations' and newest innovative movement organizations' activists' are the most heterogeneous - they describe GJM democracy by referring almost equally to the four

[41] The differences between traditional and radical leftist organizations will be explored in a separate chapter (chapter 10).
[42] We asked activists to refer to decision-making within networks and campaigns of the global movement.

models, while members of trade unions, political parties, and non-party political left-wing organizations see mostly (33%, 40%, 39%) a deliberative representative model.

Table 19 - Activists' perceptions of democracy within GJM according to their most important group.

Types of Most Important Group	Perceived democratic models within GJM				
	Associative	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Total
Non members	40.0	23.3	16.2	20.0	30
NSM orgs.	19.8	34.4	12.5	33.3	96
NGOs	28.0	28.0	28.0	16.0	25
Political Parties	24.6	33.1	19.2	23.1	130
Trade Unions	27.3	40.0	7.3	25.5	55
Left orgs.	24.6	38.5	10.8	26.2	65
Newest Movem.	22.8	29.8	22.8	24.6	57
Total valid cases	**24.9**	**33.6**	**15.9**	**25.5**	**458**

Cramer's V: .16***

These findings do not allow us to discern any plausible pattern that explains the variation in the perception of democracy within the GJM by the types of organization activists are primary involved in. The reason is that activists perceive their groups in different ways too. One may then think that what matters is not the type of organization per se, but the way in which they perceive them.

Social psychologists would suggest in fact that activists could believe to see what they are used to, or in other words, they may frame different contexts in a similar way. Another hypothesis could be that activists assess democracy within the GJM according to what they practice in another context. In this case, for an activist who is used to participating in a fully participative group, decisions in GJM may appear to be taken by few people, while on the contrary to activists used to participate in a delegative group, the participation within the GJM decision-making may appear high. The same would apply for the other items. Notice that the two hypotheses point to opposite directions. That means that if we find a positive correlation between items describing the group and items describing the GJM, this would suggest that the first hypothesis is plausible, while if we find a negative correlation the second one is more plausible.

If we test these hypotheses by sorting out activists who declared they did not participated in GJM decisional settings, we notice that the first one appears to be empirically plausible. Table 20 shows in fact that the way in which activists perceive democracy working in GJM is strongly correlated with the way they perceive democracy within their group.

Table 20 - Binary correlations between group perceived democratic practices and perceptions of democratic practices within GJM (Kendall's tau-b)

Gr. perceived democracy	Perceived democracy in GJM			
	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item4
Item 1	.212***			
Item 2		.202***		
Item 3			.279***	
Item 4				.249***

5.4 Democratic ideals: organizational patterns or diffusion?

One thing is to describe the procedures or the process through which decisions are taken within one's group or within GJM and another thing is to judge them as the best way to proceed. Activists, as any individual, bear democratic ideals, and values against which they contrast the actual democratic practices they happen to see in social movement contexts (but also in the broader political system). These normative ideals have already been investigated in Chapter 3, where it has been noticed that although deliberative democracy is one of the most preferred normative ideals - about 37% consider those decisions that are taken by everyone interested and through consensus to be democratic – it is by no means the only one: as many as 36% would prefer an assembleary model, 19% an associational model and 8% a deliberative representative one.

In this chapter we want to see if such divergence of democratic ideals can be explained by activists organizational experiences. Here, we can contrast two hypotheses: the first one would take the path dependency argument that activists' ideals depend on the democratic organizational settings they experience in their everyday activism. The second one, would instead take the argument of sociological isomorphism that legitimised norms are diffused from one organizational site to another through organizational interactions[43]. In this case we should find an equal diffusion of deliberative participative ideals among all activists whatever their organizational affiliation.

Table 21 shows that some norms are widely accepted by all activists. Almost nobody believes that resourceful or even more representative groups or individuals should have more weight than the quality of the arguments. Equally, almost everybody thinks that in case of disagreement opponents should treat each other as "equals". However, some differences can be singled out, when the procedures are concerned: is delegation a legitimate device to solve decision-making problems, or should the inclusion of everyone interested always be a priority? And should decisions be taken by voting or consensus? Data reported in Table 21 show that the proportion of members who support full participation is higher within Newest Movement organizations, and lower within leftist non parties groups; and the proportion of members supporting consensus (rather than voting) is higher within New social movements and (again) within Newest and innovative organizations, lower within trade unions, political parties and leftist organizations and lowest within NGOs.

[43] According to Powell and Di Maggio (1991) organizations are embedded in a complex interorganizational system which pushes toward a sort of homogenization. Each relational system generates mith which legitimate organizational models: for instance the "bureaucratic rationality" or in other contexts the myth of the "assembly" (Meyer and Rowman 1977). In our case the GJM is supposed to have generated the "myth" of consensus in for democratic practices.

Table 21 - Normative conceptions of democracy by types of most important group

Types of Most Important Group	Normative conceptions of democracy							
	Item 1 Quality of arguments		Item 2 Acceptance bet. Opp.		Item 3 Full participation		Item 4 Consensus	
	%	Cr.' s V	%	Cr.' s V	%	Cr.' s V	%	Cr.' S V
Non Members	87.2		82.7		68.1		33.8	
NSM orgs.	92.6		86.3		75.6		58.9	
NGOs	81.5		92.7		64.2		21.6	
Political Parties	90.9	n.s	89.5	n.s.	73.7	.17***	37.2	.22***
Trade Unions	94.5		84.1		77.2		45.6	
Left orgs.	91.6		91.7		57.3		45.7	
Newest Movem.	91.5		90.2		85.2		55.7	
Total valid cases %	**90.6**		**87.7**		**72.3**		**43.9**	

If we consider the four models of democratic ideals, by crossing the third and the fourth items (see typology of normative democratic models presented in Chapter 3), and we isolate the two most popular options within each type of most important organization (Table 22), we see that deliberative participative democracy is either the first or the second option everywhere with the only exception of NGOs, though the assembleary model (based on the participative democracy principles) is the most opted model in the case of NGOs, Parties, and Unions, and the associational model (based on the representative democracy principles) is the second most popular model within leftist non parties (nor unions) organizations.

Those findings would suggest the need to accept the diffusion argument over the path-dependency hypotheses. This is also confirmed by the high degree of deliberativeness, calculated with the same kind of index we used in the previous section to measure the deliberativeness perceived at the group level, for the members of each type of the most important group considered here. Though, again, the most deliberative seem to be new social movement organizations and newest innovative movement organizations' activists (see means in Table 22).

Table 22 - Normative models of democracy and degree of deliberativeness by type of most important group mentioned

Types of Most Important Group	Normative models		
	Most Opted Models		Degree of deliberativeness (means)
Non Members	Participative democracy (40%)	Deliberative democracy (29%)	2.7
NSM orgs.	Deliberative democracy (49%)	Participative democracy (27%)	3.1
NGOs	Participative democracy (49%)	Representative democracy (29%)	2.6
Political Parties	Participative democracy (44%)	Deliberative democracy (30%)	2.9
Trade Unions	Participative democracy (40%)	Deliberative democracy (37%)	3.0
Left orgs.	Deliberative democracy (35%)	Representative democracy (32%)	2.8
Newest Movem.	Deliberative democracy (48%)	Participative democracy (37%)	3.2
Total valid cases %	**Participative democracy (36%)**	**Deliberative democracy (36%)**	**2.9**
Measures of association	Cramer's V: .16***		ETA: .20***

However, for the path-dependency argument to be rejected, and consequently for the diffusion hypothesis to be fully accepted, we should find no correlation at all between activists' descriptions of democracy working within their own group and their ideals of democracy. This can be checked by correlating the four items which describe democracy at the group level with the four items that discriminate between democratic ideals. In addition to this, we can also correlate the degree of deliberativeness attributed by the activists to their most important group with the degree of deliberativeness of their democratic ideals.

Table 23 shows that there are strong correlations between each couple of items and between the two indexes of deliberativeness. This means that activists who declare to be active in groups which they perceive deliberative (quality of arguments is considered more than resources, acceptance between opponents is the rule, full participation is assured, and consensus is the main decision making method) bear a congruent democratic ideal. The same is true for those declaring to participate in associational groups, meaning that they tend to positively value a representative model of democracy. Particularly evident is the correlation between the voting/consensus items, suggesting that a real democratic procedural cleavage exists between activists used to counting preferences, and consequently believing that this is the most democratic way to decide, and those used to integrating the preferences consensually, and consequently valuing consensus as the best way to decide This relates well to the conflict between 'horizontals' and 'verticals' in the preparation for the London Social Forum – both 'sides' thought that the other was undemocratic, but that they themselves were exemplars of democracy.

Table 23 - Binary correlations between group perceived democratic practices and democratic ideals (Kendall's tau-b

Gr. perceived democracy	**Democratic ideals**				
	Item 1	Item 2	Item 3	Item4	Deliberativeness
Item 1	.207***				
Item 2		.181***			
Item 3			.131***		
Item 4				.401***	
Gr. deliberativeness					.265***

However, if we refer to the models of democracy elaborated in this report, the level of congruence between perceived group democracy and democratic ideals is different depending on which model we focus on. For instance only 24% of activists describing their group as associational bear a congruent democratic ideal, even fewer (12%) are those who declare to be active in a deliberative representative group, but as many as 53% and 65% of those who describe their group as respectively assembleary or deliberative participative.

This data confirms once more that there are legitimate normative ideas of democracy, based on the principles of direct participation and consensus that are diffused beyond the sites in which they seem to be applied.

5.4.1 Satisfaction with democracy: confronting norms and practices

So far we have focused on the way activists describe democracy in the group they are primary active and in the GJM as a whole. We also tried to understand activists' democratic ideals by comparing different organizational affiliations. In this section we raise the question of how much

activists are satisfied with democracy in their group and in the GJM. After all, satisfaction with democracy should favour a sustained involvement in collective action, be it within one particular group or in the GJM mobilization. Our data indicates that satisfaction with democracy within one's group (the one considered most important) is very high: about 85% on average declare to be moderately or very satisfied with group. The percentage declines a bit when democracy in the network or campaign meetings of the GJM is concerned, though as many as 70% declare to be satisfied. The difference becomes more evident, however, when we isolate only those activists declaring to be "very" satisfied: 30% at the group level against only 7% at the GJM level.

In both cases there is enough variation to permit further investigation. In which type of group do members declare to be more satisfied, and in which less? We can suppose that if the most legitimate ideals of democracy are based on full participation and consensus, activists should be less satisfied with democracy in the group when they perceive a democratic setting which is neither participative nor consensual. As shown in a previous section, this would more likely apply within NGOs, political parties, trade unions and left-wing non-party political organizations. Our findings indicate however that satisfaction with democracy is high within each type of organization, though a bit higher in new social movement organizations and NGOs (about 90%). If we isolate only the "very" satisfied (see table 19), trade union activists show less satisfaction (24%), political party activists are a little under the average, while left wing non-party political organizations and NGOs are significantly higher (about 45%).

If we apply the same kind of reasoning for democracy in the GJM, we should find that activists who are not members of any organization, members of parties, trade unions, and left wing non party political organizations are less satisfied, since they perceive the GJM either less open to full participation or less inclined to use consensus as decision making method. But, actually, members of parties and unions are more satisfied than the average, though, as expected, newest innovative movement organization members are even more so (see Table 24).

Nonetheless, there may be a relationship between the congruence of norms and practices within the group, which can explain better the variation in satisfaction. This does not imply a deviation from deliberative or participative norms, but instead a deviation between perceived practices and ideal standards. As already done in chapter 3, we can calculate this deviation by computing an index of congruence. This index varies from 0 (full congruence of norms and practices) to 3 (full incongruence) and take into account each couple of items (within group or GJM and for democratic ideals). As it can be read in table 19, the incongruence is higher among political parties and trade unions members, where, actually, satisfaction with democracy is less, and it is lower among NGOs', left wing non-party political organizations', and newest innovative movement organization members, that are relatively more satisfied.

If we calculate the same index of congruence for democracy for GJM network meetings and campaigns – basically democratic ideals minus perception of GJM democracy – the results are less clear. Non-members have in general less congruent perceptions and ideals, yet express more satisfaction, while on the contrary NGOs members show more congruence but less satisfaction. The trend is however confirmed by the contrast between new social movement organizations and left wing non political party organizations' activists whose perceptions are less congruent, who are less satisfied, and political parties', unions' and new innovative movement organizations' members, whose perceptions are more congruent, who are more satisfied.

Table 24 - Satisfaction and incongruence at the group and at GJM levels.

Types	Group				Global Justice Movement			
	Incongruence[44]		Satisfaction[45]		Incongruence[46]		Satisfaction[47]	
	Means	%	%	Means	Means	%	%	Means
Non Members					1.15	51.7	75.0	1.71
NSM orgs.	0.86	42.2	30.5	2.20	1.15	51.1	62.2	1.61
NGOs	0.77	32.6	44.8	2.33	1.08	29.2	56.0	1.60
Political Parties	0.87	47.3	27.8	2.08	0.99	35.2	72.1	1.77
Trade Unions	0.92	50.0	23.7	2.01	1.04	38.5	79.6	1.80
Left orgs.	0.83	41.9	44.0	2.29	1.26	56.9	62.9	1.59
Newest Movem.	0.77	38.0	36.8	2.24	1.04	31.5	78.0	1.80
Total	**0.85**	**43.6**	**32.5**	**2.17**	**1.09**	**42.2**	**69.5**	**1.70**
Measures[48]	n.s.	n.s.	.15**	.14**	.17*	.19**	.16*	n.s.

In chapter 3 we saw that in general incongruence between descriptions of GJM democracy and democratic ideals is negatively correlated with satisfaction. However, the type of perceptions per se were found to be a bit more significant. We saw that the more participative activists perceive the network meetings and campaigns of the GJM, the more they are satisfied with democracy, whatever the level of congruence. If this was true also at the group level, the hypothesis that more participative and deliberative settings bring about more legitimacy would be confirmed again.

Table 25 - Binary correlations between group perceived democratic practices and democratic ideals (Kendall's tau-b).

	Satisfaction with democracy in the group
Simple correlations	
Incongruence	-.295***
Deliberativeness	.316***
Partial correlations	
Incongruence, controlled by deliberativeness	-.191***
Deliberativeness, controlled by incongruence	.243***

[44] The index of incongruence varies from 0 (fully congruent) to 3 (fully incongruent). Percentages refers to activists who score at least 0.75 on the index.
[45] The degree of satisfaction varies from 0 (very unsatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied), percentages refer to activists who declare to be very satisfied.
[46] The index of incongruence varies from 0 (fully congruent) to 3 (fully incongruent). Percentages refers to activists who score at least 0.75 on the index.
[47] The degree of satisfaction varies from 0 (very unsatisfied) to 3 (very satisfied), percentages refer to activists who declare to be moderately (2) or very satisfied (3).
[48] The measures of associations are Cramer's V when % are shown, and ETA when means are reported.

Simple correlations show that the lower the incongruence between perceived practices at the group level and democratic ideals the higher activists' satisfaction with democracy in their most important group. On the other hand, the higher the degree of deliberativeness attributed by the activists to their most important group, the higher is their satisfaction. Partial correlations show that though the degree of deliberativeness performs a bit better, the two indicators explain different parts of the variation in satisfaction with democracy at the group level (Table 21).

If we want to check the explanatory role of each item, both in terms of incongruence and in terms of perceived practices, a linear regression with democracy at the group level shows that the most important incongruence which significantly explains part of the variation is on the voting/consensus item: the more perceived practices deviate from normative standards on that specific point the less is satisfaction with democracy, while incongruence on the other items is not relevant. On the other hand, perceived practices are relevant per se: the more activists are convinced that in their group the quality of the arguments matters more than individuals, opponents accept each other in case of disagreement, full participation of all members is guaranteed, and decisions are taken by consensus, the more they are satisfied with democracy. The most important item is however the degree to which they perceive full participation of all members in the internal decision making.

Table 26 - Linear regression analysis with "satisfaction with GROUP democracy" (0-3) as dependent variable.

	Satisfaction with democracy in the group	
	Standardized Beta	Sig.
Incongruence between perceived practices and ideals		
Arguments/Resources	---	n.s.
Acceptance/Non acceptance	---	n.s.
Delegation/Participation	---	n.s.
Voting/Consensus	-.108	.001
Perception of democracy at the group level		
Arguments/Resources	-.137	.005
Acceptance/Non acceptance	-.095	.035
Delegation/Participation	.254	.000
Voting/Consensus	.060	.071
R square	.22	

These findings confirm that decisions are more legitimate when they are perceived to be taken in a fair way (congruence with norms), and by that activists seem to mean that decisions are fairly taken when participation of all members is guaranteed, arguments are seriously considered and participants are tolerant. In such a democratic setting, consensus as a procedure seem to be less important, at least to satisfy the democratic needs of the activists.

5.4.2 Dichotomising the variables

For the purpose of the analysis here, data on these variables (Arguments/Resources , Acceptance/Non acceptance, Delegation/Participation, Voting/Consensus) were dichotomised. To illustrate, this meant that, using the Arguments/Resources variable as an example, if activists ticked a box that was closest to the left pole, 'arguments important', this was classified as such. If activists

answered one of the two right pole options, their answer was classified as 'resources are important'. Responses were then crosstabulated against degree of satisfaction with decision-making.

At both the group and movement level, activists were generally more satisfied with meetings that cohered with the deliberative democratic ideal, with the exception of the use of consensus at the movement level. Therefore, in order to achieve high levels of satisfaction with decision-making amongst activists, arguments should be regarded as more important than individuals, decisions should be delegated to a majority or not delegated at all, and discussants should be viewed as equals – regardless of positions or personalities. At the group level, over 85% of those who were very satisfied with decision-making believed that arguments were put before individuals in their group, compared to 40% of those who were very unsatisfied, yielding a Cramer's V measure of association between the variables of 0.262***. Nearly 80% of those who were very satisfied had decision-making styles that involved the majority of participants, whereas only 15% of those who were very unsatisfied did so (Cramer's V 0.318***). Equality of discussants was an important feature of decision-making for those who were very satisfied (89.7%), compared to only half of those who were very unsatisfied (Cramer's V =0.239***). The use of consensus was generally much less widespread (approximately half claimed their group used consensus more than voting), but there is still a significant difference by levels of satisfaction with decision-making (Cramers V =0.131**) (Table 27).

Table 27 - Description of group meetings against satisfaction with decision-making within organizational types

Satisfaction with decision-making within organization	**Description of decision-making in group meetings (% of positive answers for rows)**			
	Arguments are more important than individuals	Decisions are delegated to the majority	Decisions are made mostly by consensus	Discussants are viewed as equals
Very satisfied	85.3	78.1	56.7	89.7
Moderately satisfied	67.8	57.0	49.5	79.3
Moderately unsatisfied	50.5	33.3	35.2	61.5
Very unsatisfied	40.0	15.0	44.4	50.0
Total **n**	**70.3** **590**	**59.4** **488**	**49.8** **408**	**79.5** **657**
Cramer's V	0.262***	0.318***	0.131**	0.239***

In order to properly study satisfaction with decision-making in the networks and campaigns of the GJM, the cases of respondents who claimed to have never taken part in such a meeting were filtered out of the sample, because they do not have enough knowledge to properly judge. The patterns in the data are similar to the group level, resulting in measures of association of similar strength and significance with the exception of levels of satisfaction with the making of decisions by consensus (Table 28). The proportion of activists satisfied and unsatisfied with consensus decision-making is virtually equal. The likely explanation is that consensus decision-making is much harder to bring to fruition with large numbers of people, or when individuals have clashing political ideologies; both of which can be characteristics of global justice movement network meetings. Of course, consensus also tends to be unsuccessful in large groups because issues of inequality of participation and unrepresentativity may occur (Beetham 2005:133).

Table 28 - Description of global movement network / campaign meetings against satisfaction with decision-making within organizational types

Satisfaction with decision-making within networks and campaigns of global movement	Description of decision-making in networks and campaigns of global movement (% of positive answers for rows)			
	Arguments are more important than individuals	Decisions are delegated to the majority	Decisions are made mostly by consensus	Discussants are viewed as equals
Very satisfied	75.0	71.4	60.7	75.0
Moderately satisfied	63.2	44.7	56.8	67.1
Moderately unsatisfied	32.3	26.2	61.8	43.4
Very unsatisfied	18.2	27.3	56.5	22.7
Total **n**	**54.0** **275**	**40.7** **208**	**58.3** **300**	**59.6** **302**
Cramer's V	0.320***	0.226***	0.046	0.269***

6. Conclusion

In this chapter it was found that the organizational profiles of activists at the three ESFs for which we have broadly comparative data differs quite dramatically. By the time of the second ESF, a significantly higher proportion of activists were claiming to be members of an organization, perhaps through their socialization into the GJM through the previous ESF. The types of organizations that individuals were members of also varied. We explained these differences by considering the national and international contexts of the forums and their design and layout.

Our exploration of social movement families, based on current memberships of Athens ESF participants showed that participation has multiple facets, is plural and fluid. Only two groups have very few connections to other types of organizations: students and unemployed. Other organizations are connected to one another by multiple memberships. Among them, human rights, development, peace, environment and international solidarity organizations appear as nodes. They can even be considered as spaces for a global engagement, that is a basis for a more distributed one – or the contrary: a space for sharing the experience and results from distributed engagements.

Indeed, we were able to build 7 families of movement, gathering altogether 17 of the organizations proposed in the questionnaire. Only 2 of them are autonomous and have no real connections to the other families: political parties on side, and, on the other, anarchists and autonomous activists. The 5 other families are organized around at least one of these nodes and overlap considerably. Families of movements and those trajectories draw a image of the GJM as a network of constellations of coherence – a coherence that is given by the multiple and plastic engagements and memberships: fluidity and looseness does not necessary mean that the involvement is weak and fragile but is also a source for coherence and addressing complexity.

We then proceeded to identify organizational types with the movement, making some quite clear distinctions between SMOs, NGOs, political parties, trade unions and left wing non-party political organizations that we hope will be useful to others studying types of movement organizations. In particular, we clarified the often blurred distinction between SMOs and NGOs. We proceeded to demonstrate that political parties and SMOs are the preferred organizational form by a majority of Athens activists.

With regard to participation in GJM events, we found that activists who strongly identify with NGOs are less likely to participate, even though a clear majority of them are either staff or voluntary activists within their organizations. Activists that strongly identify with new innovative

movement organizations are the most committed to GJM protests both at home and abroad. In terms of the types of activity undertaken, those closely identifying with political parties and left-wing politics have tended to engage in party political work, whereas NSM organization and NGO identifiers have avoided this form of action. Unsurprisingly, low-risk activism is fairly ubiquitous. Most of the activists that answered the questionnaire identify strongly with the GJM (91%), but this is noticeably lower for NGO activists and trade unionists.

Our expectations of the democratic models of the organizations listed as 'the most important group' were proven quite incorrect by the data. For example, whilst we expected NGOs to use a deliberative representative model of decision-making, their members indicated instead that they had associational or assembleary tendencies. And NSMs, which we expected to be assembleary, actually tended to be perceived by activists to be deliberative participative or deliberative representative. We explained this discrepancy by the fact that the organization which activists listed may actually be a local branch (of an NGO, NSM organization, political party etc.) whereas our model assumed reference to decision-making practices at the national level. Of course, the local level is better able to undertake deliberative decisions because of the smaller numbers of activists present in local group meetings. The differences could also be explained by the fact that our categorization of organizational types was based on organizational rather than ideological differences between groups. In practice, the category left wing non-party political groups incorporates a range of groups with different ideological characteristics and organizational tendencies (see chapter on 'the Left').

We found that activists categorized the decision-making procedures of the GJM in a broad variety of manners. This is an indication of the fact that the movement is diverse and includes a range of types of decision-making bodies – thus activists may have different views because of their differential involvement in types of GJM decision-making settings. Or, it could be the case that activists views are shaped by their experiences in their own organizations, and thus that they make comparative and subjective judgements of democratic principles rather than isolated and reliable ones.

Activists that most strongly identify with the GJM tend to be the least satisfied with democracy at the group and GJM level, but members of organizations are generally happy with decision-making within their own organization than those who are not members. This was explained using the concept of 'proximity', which also explains why staff, who have a greater degree of commitment to their organization, tend to be even happier with in-group democracy. Our final finding was that activists generally share conceptions of an ideal democratic setting – rational arguments, equality of participation, involvement of the majority in decision-making and consensus. However, consensus is less important than we had previously assumed, with a high proportion of activists being fairly dissatisfied with consensus decision-making procedures – perhaps finding it inefficient or time consuming.

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Chapter 7

How deliberative democracy networks

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1. Latent networks in the fourth ESF: an introduction

Transnational meetings of activists have a long tradition that dates back to times, when attendants had to arrive with horse-drawn carriages (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Most of these meetings were held in order to organize collective action across borders: against slavery, for women's right or for banning landmines. In this regard, what distinguishes the Social Forums generally and the ESF in Athens particularly is the strong normative claim about being transnational spaces for democratic discursive processes by a diverse population of activists rather than a working area for one political actor (Whitaker 2004).

In this regard, the Charter of Porto Alegre is clear when it states that "Social Forum is an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society¨ To be a discursive space (not an actor) means that Social Forums are fundamentally non-representative, they speak neither for a global civil society nor for their participants as a whole. The Charter urges not to make collectively binding decisions and not to vote in the name of the Forums. Instead, it defines social forums as an anti-hierarchical, decentralized, plural, and inclusive "context for interrelations". So, in terms of normative theory, what the Charter proposes is what we can call the conception of an horizontally and egalitarian networked space for deliberative and/or participative democratic practices. Indeed, deliberative and participative values and practices are quite popular among the participants of the ESF in Athens (see Chapter 3). But as contrasts between verticals and horizontals show (see chapters 2 and 3), this normative claim is not undisputed by all participants. Additionally, we may doubt that such a normative enterprise fully succeeded, since the outright claim for inclusiveness also entails including political currents which tend to oppose the idea of a discursive open non-decisional forum. We can also assume that a normative claim, like the one stated in the Charter, does not necessarily have to materialize at the 4th ESF in Athens, simply because in practice, it is difficult to mobilize such a diverse, well networked and democratically oriented mass. Actually, the question to what degree such a claim meets reality is difficult to answer.

According to our experience as participant observers, most meetings indeed showed a pattern of exchanging arguments from different social points of views. Others rather had the form of one or a few participants proposing more or less the same positions, while a passive mass audience listened. Of course, some professional activists used the ESF as a market place and widened their professional networks by circulating business cards. But one should also consider that discourses involving diverse activists took place inside, but probably even more outside, that means between and after seminars and events. Thus, we can estimate that, indeed, the forum mainly performed as it was expected, but still no definite answer seems possible. Despite these limitations, we will elucidate which potential for realizing the normative claim for a "context for interrelations" was present at Athens by using data from the questionnaire circulated among participants of the ESF. This way we will approach the question from an additional perspective by going one step beyond: While the questionnaire data can not inform us about the actual materialization of discourses and networking, it opens up the possibility to look at the kind of mobilized potential for both. In this perspective, we looked at the multiple memberships of respondents in different political types of organization, which also imply a reflection on multiple experiences in different ideological context or currents(trade unionism, environmentalism, feminism and so on). At the ESF we asked

respondents to give information about which organizational context they were at that time actively involved in. Thus, we gained access to the micro-level of individual participation in different organizational contexts and to the networking practices that very likely occur if one respondent is active in two or more different organizational (and thus ideological) contexts. This way, patterns of multiple memberships open up an alternative view on organizational structure: Single organizations and the formal and official networks and structures are not in the centre of analysis but can rather be seen as part of loose currents and traditions, such as trade unionism, anarchism or socialism that built up spaces for activists with different values and practices of democracy to join. Moreover, what this perspective implies is that we can discover "latent" networks – built more or less unconsciously by members of decide to participate in different types of organization, while the actual relationship between the formal organizations which are behind the types (for instance ATTAC as well as Amnesty International) cannot be addressed. In this perspective each activist with multiple memberships connects different types of organization, and we can apply methods of network analysis to elucidate patterns of these multiple affiliations. Hereby we can rely on existing methods for this kind of data (Cornwell and Harrison 2004, Gulati and Gargiulo 1999).

Thus, rather than focusing on the visible relations that can be found between organizations, we decided to apply a new perspective on the organizational relations which puts emphasis on activists contribution and agency. Activists in fact build a latent network of relations between different organizations via multiple membership. As Cornwell and Harrison write in their study on the US trade unions embeddedness which applies the same methodology: "By maintaining voluntary associations, individuals link the organizations in their lives … to community and, ultimately, to organizational culture", they build "organizational connectivity" which can be considered a "latent embeddedness" (2004, 863).

One important limitation of these methods IS that the understanding of organizational and ideological contexts like environmentalism or trade unionism is quite context specific and we thus decided to look at the network patterns country wise: for instance a socialist type reflects a very moderate organizational context in Italy, while quite radical in UK. In addition, when an activist declare to be member of two types of organization, it is likely that she refers to her country's organizations. To partially solve those problems we will conduct this type of analysis at the country level.

For our purpose these patterns of multiple memberships are used as an indicator for the potential diversity present at the forum. Just one example to explain this argument: If two activists meet and discuss at the end of a seminar and both are active in three different political groups, they can nine times compare different experiences from their groups, respectively. On the other extreme, if both activists belong to the same political current, the quality of the discussion may sound good in theory, but the possibility to exchange different political perspectives would be limited. Thus, we elucidate something invisible to most participants: Which types of organizational experience have been present and how equally have they been distributed? How many memberships have been shared between these given types of organization and which latent structures have they built? We then will analyze how this relates to deliberative and participative attitudes. Our main questions thus are whether the claim for being a diverse, interrelated space is actually mirrored in the participants' characteristics and whether this contradicts/supports deliberative and participative attitudes.

We will try to investigate the different patterns of networking, by comparing four national "organizational communities" – that is members of different types of organization connected through multiple membership - participating at the fourth ESF in Athens: this will be done by looking at the multiple affiliation patterns of Italian French, German and Greek activists.

The first empirical section (7.4) of this chapter will then focus on the description of the different national organizational communities, by underlining and contrasting embedded and not embedded types of organizations in the multiple affiliation structure of the activists interviewed. By means of

comparative analysis we will try to investigate if similar types of organization occupy the same position (or not) in the four national networks.

A further step (section 7.5) will be to investigate to what extent embeddedness in an organizational community predict a high degree of involvement (of the members of the embedded types of organizations) in the GJM activities and mobilizations If this is the case, then we can argue that latent centrality in a network is translated in collective action functions.

But the most important contribute that this chapter aims, is relating the multiple affiliation patterns with the discourses on democracy activists do (section 7.6).

Before getting into the empirical investigation, we will briefly introduce the readers to a theoretical perspective which link networks to democratic ideals (section 7.2), and to the methodology we are using in this chapter (section 7.3).

2. Network structures and deliberative democracy

Deliberative democrats use quite a different vocabulary. Because Social Forums are defined as a deliberative/participatory space, we can investigate possible patterns between democratic attitudes and network structures from the normative theory. In this regard, we can distinguish several assumptions about the relation between network structures and democratic values.

In order to reconstruct these assumptions, we will start with Habermas' thinking which, with no doubt, is one of the most influential sources of deliberative democracy. In Habermas' writings there is an antithetical relation between organisational structure and deliberative values. Deliberation as an important democratic practice is seen to be approximated better if organizational structure is absent or irrelevant. Frequently Habermas (1989: 475; 1999: 291) and his followers (for example Benhabib 1996: 74) have repeated the idea of an anonymous communication, free from the necessity of decision making, voting and the use of power. Deliberation is what takes place outside or between formal associations. Habermas uses the network as a metaphor which refers to an unrestrained flow of political communication that is neither controlled nor owned by any authority. As an ideal materialization of this idea, the internet was praised for its capacity to enable discourse between strangers and without formal organization (Habermas 1990: 48). This emphasis on non-organization may sound like a theoretical experiment. But one has to keep in mind that political participation in post-industrial countries undergoes a gradual shift from traditional membership in formal political organizations to more loose and sporadic interventions in the context social movements (Norris 2002). According to this view, we would await high degrees of deliberativeness not among organized or well networked but rather among the unorganized, nonetheless active respondents. We hereby have to keep in mind that the Social Forums generally and the one in Athens particularly already offer an open infrastructure for such political discourse. The absence of any authorship of the forum as a whole and the openness for individual participants (regardless their organizational affinity) is again a specific feature of the ESF similar to the deliberative concepts and different from more traditional conferences by state and non-state actors. Obviously, a minimum of organizational structure for a Social Forum and even in the internet is inevitable to make deliberative discourses possible. Whoever took a look into the preparation process for the European Social Forum or managed an online discussion forum is aware of this. Habermas himself thus warned critics not to misinterpret his concept of discourse as a tendency to anarchism, understood as dissolution of any formal institutions (1994: 10). Rather the notion of unorganized association of citizens is founded in the strong critique of the existing models of bureaucratic organizations dominated by economic and political power.

This leads us to what is called the "two-tiered view of democratic politics" in Habermas conception of deliberative democracy (Chambers 2003: 311). As Fraser (1990) summarized it, "weak" publics are opposed to "strong" publics. The former build a network of small autonomous publics which rely upon a multifaceted structure of "free associations" (Habermas 1989: 472). Here,

citizens organize egalitarian, unrestrained discourses on their own in order to identify problems, work out arguments and engage in the formation of public opinion, but they do not organize in the sense that they make collectively binding decisions. “Strong” publics instead consist of the crusted, power driven state organizations. Unable to generate deliberative discourse on their own, they (at least to a minimum degree) have to extract and skim deliberative results from weak publics in order to maintain mass loyalty.

Habermas (1990) identified his earlier conceptions of free associations with the theoretical concept of civil society, understood as a self-organized political sphere independent from political and economic powers. In this regard he made reference to the work of Cohen and Arato (1992), who link civil society to contemporary social movements. This academic discourse of civil society seems to resonate with the Charter of Porto Alegre, where civil society is quite similarly understood as being distanced from military, political system, economics, but also from religion . The civil society description of Cohen and Arato directly provides us with assumptions about the patterns of networking and democratic values at Athens: Although they admit that, theoretically, deliberation is not bound to one model of inner-organisational democracy (1992: 411), they nonetheless assume that the New Social Movements provide the associational substrate for deliberative politics (they use the term “discourse ethics”), because of their emphasis on self-organization, self-reflection, their egalitarian inner-organizational practice and their plural, horizontally and nonetheless densely interconnected structures. In contrast to the New Social Movements, Cohen and Arato describe the elder political organizations like parties, trade unions or churches as quasi oligarchic corporatist organizations, which structurally lack opportunities for deliberation (1992: 417). Also Cohen and Arato (1992: 20) mainly connect deliberative values to a self-restraining civil society. That means: to non-revolutionary social movements. They simply expect that revolutionary movements do not to restrict politics to the use of arguments. Thus, civil society abstains overthrowing and conquering the political or the economic system. In this regard we can assume that revolutionary socialist currents, for example, more likely distance from the deliberative ideal. Connecting contemporary social movements with Habermas, too, Fraser develops a more detailed picture about how networking between progressive movements should be structured. Fraser discusses the “intra-public relations” (1990: 65) and develops a conception of relative “subaltern counter publics”. Subordinated social groups, like women, workers, peoples of color, and gays and lesbians (Ibid.: 67) should have the right to build relative autonomous spaces that protect them from external domination. Since real-world communication in wider publics is distorted by power use, deliberation among sub-ordinates can only take place within counterpublics, in which egalitarian inner-organizational practices prevail. Besides, subordinates’ arguments sometimes can only be brought to the fore using “agitational activities” (1990: 68), like protest. Relative autonomy thereby means that discourse is made independent from external domination, but still speakers reflect their stance in society and are open to other social perspectives. Referring to the feminist movements in the U.S., she counterfactually argues that without such relative autonomous female publics freed from male interference, problems like “marital, date, and acquaintance rape” (Fraser 1990 :67) would had never reached the public agenda. As a result, Fraser conceptualizes such autonomous counterpublics as part of a general, egalitarian and multicultural public sphere: the concept of a public presupposes a plurality of perspectives among those who participate within it, thereby allowing for internal differences and antagonisms, and likewise discouraging reified blocs. In addition, the unbounded character and publicist orientation of publics allows for the fact that people participate in more than one public, and that the memberships of different publics may partially overlap.

For our analysis we can expect two types of outcomes. On the one hand one can expect similarities between the ideas of members of the different types of organizations and the Social Forum democratic norms. According to Fraser’s description of a multicultural public we would await a dense multiple membership pattern among all respondents neither leading to power inequalities in the network nor to clearly separated segments or even enclaves. In this case

deliberative values would then spread through multiple membership in different types of organizations. Moreover the same fact that members experiment diversity of opinions by participating in different types' activities may lead to deliberative attitudes.

On the other hand, if we accept Fraser's assumption that deliberativeness is more likely to characterize "counter publics" or "weak publics", we may expect the deliberative values are more diffused in the most peripheral types. In fact centrality in a network may also be related with an exercise of power which in this conception will impede the emergence of a deliberative democracy, and thus, also of deliberative conceptions.

The deliberative values should go along with networking that is not oriented towards accumulating power within a given field of political currents, but rather open and inclusive to alternative social perspectives. Besides the conception of civil society, Habermas (1994: 429ff) also refers to an integrationist view on the relation between organizational structures and deliberative politics, namely to the description of political centres and peripheries by Peters (1993). According to this view, the concept of civil society as an autonomous associational sphere inevitably collides with the reality of mutual dependency in the political process and the use of arguments is something spread throughout the whole political process but on rather low levels (Peters 1993: 325). In this description corporatist structures mediate between the state institutions at the centre and informal associations at the periphery.

3. Method: a non relational analysis

As we mentioned, we will base our network analysis on activists multiple membership.

Operatively, in the Athens ESF questionnaire data, each respondent declares affiliation with one or more among 24 types of organizations. This results a 24-by-24 affiliation matrix (for each one of the respondents' countries). Any cell in this affiliation matrix contains the number of respondents, who declare that they are affiliated with both types of organizations in the intersecting row and column that corresponds to this cell. Apparently, such an affiliation matrix (as a symmetric and valued adjacency matrix) gives rise to a 'social network' among 24 actors (the types of organizations), which are related to each other by overlaps in their organizational affiliations (or co-affiliations). Of course, we measure just an indirect or latent kind of multi-organizational relationship. Nonetheless, the social network analysis of such affiliation relationships is often used in structural multi-organizational studies (Cornwell and Harrison 2004).

As it is well known (Breiger 1974), such 2-mode data create an 1-mode network among types, whose adjacency matrix is an N-by-N matrix. The value any cell in this adjacency matrix represents the number of respondents, who declare that they are affiliated within both types in the intersecting row and column that corresponds to this cell. Apparently, such an adjacency matrix (as symmetric and valued) gives rise to a 'social network' among N actors (types), which are related to each other by overlaps in their organizational affiliations (or co-affiliations). Nonetheless, the social network analysis of such affiliation data is often used in structural multi-organizational studies (Cornwell and Harrison 2004).

For this purpose, one could compute a number of indicators, which measure different relational (network) properties of the types in the induced 1-mode network from the affiliation data. Among the most important of these network indicators are the two indicators of embeddedness that measure the degree to which a type in the induced 1-mode network is tied and bound with all the other types, together with whom they compose a given multi-organizational community (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999, Cornwell and Harrison 2004).

The first of these indicators of embeddedness is the *structural embeddedness*, which evaluates the similarity or commonness among members of types. The underlying idea is that the more common members two or more types share, the more prone they are to form strategic alliances and

to become institutionally isomorphic (DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). What does it mean that a type has a high (low) structural embeddedness? Roughly speaking, it means that this type has many (a few) co-memberships with many (a few) other types.

A way to operationalize the computation of the structural embeddedness for type *i* is first by measuring the co-memberships between it and any other type *j*. Then, dividing by the number of members in the smaller of the two types *i* and *j*, we obtain the number of co-memberships between the two types as a proportion of all the individuals who could have been possibly in both. Finally, taking the average value of the latter proportion for all other types *j* gives the indicator of structural embeddedness for type *i*. Finally, after computing the positional embeddedness for each one of the N types, one usually normalizes this indicator by dividing with its maximum value, so that its range might be from 0 to 1.

The second of these embeddedness indicators is the *positional embeddedness*, which is calculated through Bonacich's power centrality index for each type. What this indicator measures is how much central a type happens to be or how advantageous its connections with other more central types are (Bonacich 1987, Borgatti and Everett 1997). Roughly speaking, when a type has a high (low) positional embeddedness, this means that this type has many (a few) co-memberships with many (a few) other types, which in their turn have a few (many) co-memberships with a few (many) other types (Hanneman 1988). This is because positional embeddedness, as measured by Bonacich's power index, is based upon the intuitive idea that a powerful actor is the one connected with other weak actors (or "my strength is your weakness and the other way around").

To compute positional embeddedness, one might use the UCInet software, after having first normalized the induced 1-mode network adjacency matrix by both rows and columns in order to get rid of marginals (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman 2002), so that the computed indicator might become independent of membership rates. As before, normalizing over the maximum indicator among the N types restricts the range of structural embeddedness in the interval from 0 to 1.

Apparently, the above definitions suggest that both structural and positional embeddedness depend increasingly on membership rate. This is because the more members a type has, the more shared co-members it might have with other types. In fact, Cornwell and Harrison (2004) have presented a positive statistical evidence for this to happen (at least with respect to high membership rates). Furthermore, from concrete computations, one might observe that for a given type its positional embeddedness tends to be higher than its structural embeddedness, unless the type's membership rate is low. Why is this happening and how could such a tendency be interpreted? The underlying idea is that a powerful type is not necessarily equally highly central – it only has to possess co-memberships with other less power (i.e., weak) types. But, in low membership rates, power seems to wither (together with co-memberships), although centrality can still sustain (necessarily in moderate levels).

Moreover, for each type of organization we have considered the following four indicators (Cornwell and Harrison 2004):

Membership rate: This is just the proportion of a type's members (i.e., respondents who have answered that they are affiliated with that type) over the whole number of respondents who have completed the questionnaire. Obviously, this indicator (ranging from 0 to 1) describes how popular is a certain type of organization among all respondents.

Members' average number of memberships in other organizations (AverNo): To compute this indicator for type *i*, we have added the number of co-memberships between this type and any other type *j* and divided the result by the number of type's *i* members. Thus, if this indicator is more (or less) than 1, then membership in an type is lower (or higher) than co-memberships in other types.

This/Other: The proportion of members of a certain type who are in other types too (with respect to all co-memberships). To calculate this indicator for each type, first we count the number of its members, who are also affiliated with other types, and then we divide by the total number of

respondents, who are affiliated with at least two types. Apparently, this number is at most 1 and the higher it is, the more multi-affiliated members belong to the given type.

Other/This: The proportion of members of other types who are members of a certain type. To calculate this indicator for a type, first we count the number of its members, who are also affiliated with other types, and then we divide the result by the total number of its members. Again, this number is at most 1 and the higher it is, the more members of a type are affiliated with other types too.

Let us restate that with this type of analysis we won't say anything on the real concrete organizations that actually participate in the making of the GJM in Europe; organizations will appear as types (unions, parties, Environmental NGO, Anarchist and so on), and the types will be our main units of analysis.

The network measures of the different types will be calculated on a country base by comparing 4 national organizational communities created by activists multiple membership: the German, the Greek, the Italian and the French ones.

In each country, types with less than 10 members were excluded from the analysis. Those are Women groups, Gay/lesbian, Development aid, Human rights, International solidarity, Consumerist, Trotskyites, Communist, Anarchist, Autonomist, Peasants, Charity and Unemployed in Germany; Gay/lesbians and Anarchist in France; Peasants and Unemployed in Greece; and Socialist, Trotskyites, Anarchists, Peasants and Trade unions in Italy. Religious groups are excluded in all selected countries.

4. Latent networks in the four countries

In this part, we shall describe the network structure of the different national organizational communities built by activists multiple affiliation within each country delegation which participated at the Fourth ESF of Athens.

We can visualize the networks in different way, the most meaningful being by means of scatter grams which cross the two dimensions of embeddedness: positional and structural.

To give an idea of how a type is structurally or positionally embedded in our four cases, we can correlate the positional and the structural indicators with the other indicators we presented in the previous section for each selected country. The results in table 1 show that in each country a type is both structurally and positionally embedded when they have a relatively higher number of members (rate), who are also members of other types of organizations (this/other). Embeddedness is not always correlated with the members' average number of memberships in other organizations, that means that members of an embedded type do not have necessarily to be also members of as many other types as possible, though in the German and the Greek cases this is also true. Finally in each country positional and structural embeddedness are highly correlated.

Table 1 -Bivariate correlaitions between Network indicators in each country network.

Net indicators	Italy		Germany		France		Greece	
	Posit.	Structur.	Posit.	Structur.	Posit.	Struct.	Posit.	Struct.
Rate	.586**	.703***	.713**	.893***	.834***	.857***	.775***	.857***
AverNO			.827***		n.s.	n.s.	.442*	
This/Other	.645***	.752***	.736**	.881***	.841***	.864***	.785***	.874***
Other/This					n.s.	n.s.		
Positional		.952***		.919***		.869***		.866***

* significant at .05 level; ** significant at .01 level, *** significant at .001 level

In general, logically, if we compare structural with positional embeddedness for types with variable membership rates (note that both indices of embeddedness are normalized), we can have one of the following four results:

(1) Both structural embeddedness and positional embeddedness are high.

(2) Positional embeddedness is much higher than structural embeddedness.

(3) Structural embeddedness is much higher than positional embeddedness.

(4) Both structural and positional embeddedness are low.

Roughly speaking, in case (1) a type would be both central and powerful (in the relational sense), in case (2) it would be more powerful than central, in case (3) it would be more central than powerful, and in case (4) it would be very weak and marginal.

In our four cases we have examples of the cases 1, 2 and 4, while case 3 is an empty category (see figure 1).

We then classified the types of organizations in each country in three categories: 2. both central and powerful; 1. powerful but not central, and 0. weak and marginal.

Table 2 summarizes the results by classifying each type of organizations in each country accordingly.

Table 2 - Level of embeddedness for each type in each country[49].

Level of embeddedness	Italy	Germany	France	Greece
High structural and positional	Peace, Develop. aid, Human rights, Intern.Solidarity, Anti-racist, Consumerism, Communist, Antineoliberal, Alternat. media, Political party	Environment, Peace, Antineoliberal, LSF, Socialist, Trade Unions, Political Party	Women, Peace, Develop. Aid, Human rights, Intern.Solidarity, Anti-racist, Consumerism, Antineoliberal, LSF, Peasant-farmers, Trade Union, Political Party	Women, Environment, Peace, Develop. aid, Human rights, Intern.Solidarity, Anti-racist, Antineoliberal, LSF, Political Party
High positional And low structural	Women, Environment, Student, Autonomist, LSF, Charity, Unemployed	Anti-racist, Student	Environment	Gay-Lesbian, Student, Socialist, Communist, Autonomist, Trade Unions
Low structural and positional	_____	Alternat. Media	Student, Socialist, Trotskyite, Communist, Autonomist, Alternat. Media, Charity, Unemployed	Trotskyite, Anarchist, Alternat. Media, Charity, Consumerist

Starting form the Italian types of organizations, we can then distinguish between very embedded types: such as International Solidarity, Human rights, Anti-Racists, Consumerism, Political Parties; less structurally embedded but positionally well integrated, such as Student, Charity, Unemployed, Antineoliberal, Autonomist, Communist and Local Social Forums, while marginal types, such as Trotskyite, Peasant, Anarchists, Socialist, Religious, Gay and Lesbian and to a less extent Trade Unions all have less than 10 members.

As we can see, the embeddedness of the different types of organizations do not depend on the organizational structure. In the GJM, at least when Italian activists are considered, very formal and structured organizations such as Political Parties are as well integrated as other less formal types, such as Peace, International Solidarity, Consumerist and Human rights types, but also very informal types, such as the groups belonging to Anti-racist movements. On the contrary, formal and large organizations such as Trade unions are marginal just as Anarchist and Trotskyist types. Unemployed, LSF, Student and Anti-neoliberal and Charity types , which are only half integrated, also differ in terms of formalization.

In Germany the situation is slightly different, the most embedded types being Trade Unions, Political Parties, the Anti-neoliberal org., LSF (Local social forums), Peace Movements, the most marginal, Alternative media.

The French organizational community is still different. Political parties and trade unions are very well integrated as in the German case, while for the Italians this is true only for political parties, but they are less embedded than the Antiracist groups, which are very active in French contemporary

[49] The classification is made by dichotomizing both structural and positional embeddedness according to the means in each country. We reported in bold the types which result in a similar position in at least three countries

mobilizations. The most marginal are Students, Socialist, Trotskyites, Communist, Autonomist, Alternative media, and Unemployed.

Finally in Greece, as in the other countries, political parties are very well embedded, but trade unions are less so. Women, Anti-neoliberal, Environmental, Peace, International solidarity and other Non Governmental Organizations are very embedded, while together with trade unions, socialist, communist, autonomist, student and gay/lesbian groups are only positionally embedded. The most marginal types are Trotskyites, Anarchists, as well as consumerist, charity, and alternative media.

Notwithstanding cross-national differences some similarities can also be underlined: Peace, development aids, human rights, International solidarity, Anti-neoliberal groups, Local social forums and Anti-racists perform similar functions of network integration in at least three of the selected countries; while Alternative media, Trotskyites, Anarchist, Religious, Charity are either excluded from the analysis or very marginal in at least three countries.

Interesting differences are the positional embeddedness of autonomist groups in Italy and Greece, while in France and Germany they are marginal or excluded from the analysis.

In general we can say that at the core of the organizational populations in each of the considered country, there is the "strange alliance" between old and new social movements which has been already underlined by other scholars (Levi and Murphy 2006, della Porta et al. 2006). Besides that, the groups born with the rise of the GJM, especially Local Social Forums, and Anti-neoliberal groups (basically ATTAC), are at the core too. The radical, anti-capitalist groups are instead at the periphery of the movement in each country, with the exception of the Autonomist groups in Italy and Greece, where they have a long tradition of mobilization.

5. Leaders versus simple members embeddedness

Now, let us consider that the different types of organizations are differently integrated if we consider only leaders and staff multiple affiliations, or only ordinary and voluntary members.

The distinction is important for two reasons. First, if leaders connect different types of organizations through their multiple affiliation, this would lead to a much more "concrete" embeddedness, which would overcome the simple "latentness": if a leader of a trade union is also a member of, say, a charity type she will be more able than a simple member to reinforce and reproduce the cooperation between the two types of organization, and for what we are concerned here, maybe more able to facilitate the spreading of similar democratic values.

If we calculate the same kind of measures of embeddedness separately for each country, we would have two networks for each country: network of leaders and network of simple members. Thus we built a two-dimensional space/plot were every type can be place according to the positional embeddednes, showing the different degrees of importance of each type within the respective network of leaders and members. Figure 1 synthesizes the possible outcome of such two-dimensional space.

Figure 1 - Possible outcome for SPSS plot with ucinet-information of integration-measures done for networks of leaders and networks of simple members countrywise.



In order to operationalize this typology we constructed two indexes of ordinary and voluntary members and leaders and staff embeddedness. For both leader and simple members embeddedness we use only the structural embeddedness.

Figure 2- shows the visualizations for the different countries.

Figure 2. Latent networks according to leaders and simple members (structural) embeddedness.[1]

taly



b. Germany

rance



d. Greece



[1] The lines show the means points on leaders and simple members' strctural embeddedness.

Figure 3.Crossing structural embeddedness and deliberative participative values.[1]

Italy



b. Germany



France



d. Greece



[1] The lines show the means points on positional embeddedness and the % of members valuing both participation and consensus.

We can distinguish between:

- Types embedded trough both leaders and simple members, where both leaders and ordinary members create different indirect links through multiple membership.

- Types embedded only through leaders, where leaders (more than simple members) create indirect links with other types.

- Types embedded only through simple members, where ordinary members overlap their membership with other types more than leaders.

- The true periphery: where neither leaders nor members create indirect links, isolating their types of organizations from the broader organizational community.

Table 2 summarizes the finding for each type of organization in each considered country, according to the previous typology.

Table 2 - Type Leaders and simple members' embeddedness for each type in each country.

Level of embeddedness	**Italy**	**Germany**	**France**	**Greece**
Both leaders and simple members	Peace, Human rights, Intern. Solidarity, Antiracist, Consumerism, Political Party	Peace, Anti-neoliberal LSF,	Peace, Dev. Aid, Human rights, Int. solidarity, Antiracist, Antineoliberal, LSF, Trade Unions, Political party,	Environment, Peace, Dev. Aid, Human rights, Intern. Solidarity, Anti racist, , LSF, Political Party
Only leaders	Student, Dev. Aid,	Environmental, Anti-racist, Socialist Political Party	Consumerism	_____
Only members	Women, Environmental	Trade unions	_____	Antineoliberal
Periphery	Antineoliberal, Autonomist LSF Alternative media, Charity, Communist, Unemployed	Alternative media, Student	Women, Environment Charity, Student, Trotskyites, Socialist, Autonomist, Alternative media, Unemployed Peasant, Communist	Women, Consumerism Autonomist, Anarchist, Gay/lesbian, Student, Trotskyites, Communist Socialist Alternative media, Charity Trade unions

Despite some differences in degree of embeddedness between types of organizations in each country some similarities are worth noticing, In table 2 we show in bold types which at least in three countries share the same type of embeddedness and underlined the types which deviate in particular countries. Thus, it can be noticed that SMOs active in Peace, Human rights, International Solidarity and Anti-racism are very well embedded trough both leaders and ordinary members in almost all countries. The same applies for political parties and for types of organization of the GJM, such as Local Social Forum. In Italy, Attac and the local social forums are marginal, with respect to

both leaders and simple members. Attac has never gained in Italy the political visibility that the association has in France, where it was born, or in Germany where it met an unexpected success (Kolb 2005). Local social forums had initially mushroomed in Italy just after the Genoa protest, in 2001, but after some years, especially because of internal conflicts, they substantially disappeared from the political scene (Andretta 2005). It is to be noticed, that Antineoliberal types are more embedded in French and in German networks. Also in the marginal categories we found some similarities: Gay/lesbian, Socialist, Trotskyites, Anarchist, Peasants, Religious groups and Alternative media are not embedded in the relative organizational communities in almost all countries.

If we compare the data with the expected outcome showed in Figure 2, we can say that Antineoliberal organizations such Attac, but also Local Social forums, are in the foreseen position in almost all countries. Political parties, as well as most types that usually take the form of NGOs (like Development aid types, Human rights and Environmental groups) are contrary to what we expected fully integrated via both leaders and members, while trade unions are basically absent in the Italian network (less than 10 members), marginal in the Greek one, well integrated in the French organizational community (participating at the ESF), and embedded only through simple members Germany. Anarchist, Autonomist or Trotskyites are more often than expected marginal. Finally Peasant groups seem to be very detached from the organizational communities in basically all countries.

6. Are embedded types really central for GJM mobilization?

In order to check if power and centrality in the organizational communities of GJM' activists are really central in the GJM in se, we can see whether embeddedness is correlated with the degree of participation in GJM activities, and the degree of identification with it. We take the former as indicators of types of organizations' involvement in GJM. As indicators of the different types of organizations' involvement in GJM, we then take four variables: the degree of participation in GJM protest events before Athens (means)[50] , the proportion of members who participated in a country different from their own before Athens[51], the degree of identification with GJM[52]. Members of our types of organizations participated on average more than 7 times (7.4) in other GJM's events before Athens, the means varying from 5.9 in Greece, to 5.8 in France to more than 8 in Italy and Germany (8.9 and 8.3 respectively). About 64% of members on average did participate transnationally, 43% in Greece, 62% in Italy, 71% in Germany and 79% in France. Finally, the identification with the GJM is on average very high, always being more than "enough" (that is between 2 and 3) in each country.

In table 3 we shows the results of the linear regression analyses with the former variables as dependent and the network measures as independent factors. As it can be noticed the measures of embeddedness work quite well in explaining the variance especially for participation abroad and identification with the GJM. Controlled by the rate, that is the proportion of members one type of organization has, as well as by average number, this/other and other/this, which explain part of the variance, the more a type is embedded the more its members have participated abroad and the more they identify with GJM. It is however interesting noticing that the rate of a type's members plays an important function especially for transnational participation, confirming that structured

[50] The original variable varies from 0 to 4: 0=never before; 1=once; 2= 2-5 times; 3= 6-10 times; 4= more than 10 times. We recoded the variable by assigning to each value the median of the attached range (for instance we attached to value 2, the value 3.5). We then measures the means for each type of organization country wise.

[51] The original variable was a dichotomy: 0= NO, I did not participate in a country other than my own; 1= Yes, I did. We calculated the means for each type of organization country wise, the means reflect the proportion of members participating at transnational level (i.e. a mean of 0.50 for the type X means that 50% of activists declaring to be member of type X participated at transnational level).

[52] The original variable varies from 0 (no identification) to 3 (much identification). We calculated the means for each type of organization country wise.

organizations (parties, unions and NGOs) are more able than others to overcome their costs of transnational collective action for their members. In any case, the embeddedness in each country/network explains part of the variation on the participation in and the identification with GJM, even when it is controlled for by rate.

Table 3 - Standardized beta coefficients and level of significance of linear regression analyses (testing Horizontal and Vertical embeddedness)

Independent variables	Dependent Variables		
	Participation in GJM events	Participation in GJM events abroad	Identification with GJM
Rate	n.s.	.2.216***	n.s.
AVerNO	-.728***	-.555***	.523***
This/other	-1.046*	-2.694***	n.s.
Other/this	n.s.	.291*	n.s.
Positional	.471*	n.s.	.599**
Structural	N.s.	.598**	n.s.
Cases	69	69	69
Adj. R squared	.28	.37	.28

Our findings, then suggest that embeddedness in GJM's organizational communities reflects also a higher degree of involvement in it. If we take the Identification with the GJM as dependent variable, and we control the partial correlations with members' average number of memberships in other types (AverNO) and positional embeddedness, the AverNo's correlation is .44 (significant at .001 level), while positional embeddedness' s correlation is .21 (and not statistically significant). This is particular important, because it means that the more members of type participate in other types, the more they identify with GJM. This is also true at the individual level, since the number of ties an activist declare to have is positively correlated with her degree of identification with the GJM (.29, significant at .001 level).

7. Democratic values: is deliberation central for GJM?

In chapter 3, it has been noticed that activists share different normative ideas on how democracy should work in general. Although a participative and deliberative normative model clearly prevail, there are many activists which still think that delegation and voting are legitimate principles upon which democracy should be organized.

It has nevertheless been stressed that one important novelty of the GJM is its activists emphasis on consensus practices and ideas (Ceri 2003, della Porta 2005, della Porta et al. 2006). If this is true, we should find a positive relations between embeddedness in the GJM organizational communities and deliberativeness in activists' democratic ideals.

In order to measure the degree of deliberativeness of activists' ideas, in this section we use only two of the four items included into the questionnaire: the statement which separates those whose normative idea of democracy is compatible with *delegation of power* from those who think that the *participation of all* interested persons should always be a priority; and the statement which opposes those who believe that decisions should be taken by *voting* against those who are convinced that should be taken by *consensus*.

The other two statements - which distinguishes those who think that it should be primarily the *quality of arguments* that makes a difference (when a decision is to be taken) regardless of who

produce them from those who think that *resourceful* and active groups/individuals should have more weight; and those who think that it is always important than the opponents accept each other as *equal discussants* from those who rather believe that in political conflict, there are situations in which *mutual acceptance is not important*- produced little variation and we can fairly say that about 90% of the activists interviewed agree that the quality of the arguments and acceptance of the opponents should always be the rule in decision making.

We then calculated the percent of members of each type (countrywise) who value both full participation and consensus method in ideal decision-making, that is those who favour deliberative participation as a model (see chapter 3).

The percentage of deliberative participative activists is on average 24% in Greece, 42% in France, 45% in Germany and 49% in Italy.

We look at the relation between embeddedness and deliberative values within each national network.

Figure 3 shows those relationships by means of scatter plots. If we look at the Italian network, we see that with the exception of consumerism, none of the structurally embedded organizations have a percent of members above the average, while this happens in 5 out of the 10 not embedded types: Autonomist, Anti-neoliberal, Women movements, Students and Alternative media. Surprisingly the Local social Forums' members are less deliberative than average. The Peace, Human rights, and International solidarity types, which are fully embedded in the Italian network, have a percent of members valuing both full participation and consensus a little below the average (always more than 40%), while with no surprise political parties' members are the least deliberative.

In Germany the picture is different: 4 out of the 6 embedded types have many deliberative members (more than the average), though also 3 out of the 4 marginal types. Especially interesting is the high deliberativeness of trade unions' members, and on the other side the fact that the local social forums have the lowest percentage of deliberative members, while it comes with no surprise that also among the German participants, those associated with political parties are less deliberative than average.

Also, within the French network, the degree of the embeddedness is not associated with deliberativeness: 4 out of 9 marginal types have many deliberative members, as well as 6 out of 12 embedded types. Here members of political parties, trade unions, Women, Peasants and Peace organizations, but also Local social forums, though very embedded in the network are less deliberative than average, while the members of the other embedded types such as Antineoliberal, Consumerist, Development aid, International Solidarity, Anti-racist and Human rights, are more deliberative. Among the marginal types, members of Unemployed, Autonomist, Alternative media and Student are deliberative, while members of Environment, Charity, Trotskyite, Socialist and Communist are less so.

Finally for the Greek network, among the embedded types, only Antineoliberal, Women, and differently than in the other networks Local social forums members are more deliberative than the average- but the proportion of deliberative members is always less than 30%, while the only types which have a proportion of deliberative members higher than 40% are the Anarchist and the Autonomist, which are not embedded in structural terms. Other marginal types with a percentage of deliberative members above the average (which is very about 24%) are Communist, consumerist, Alternative media, trade unions and students.

In general we can say that in the Italian and in the Greek networks the members of marginal types are more oriented to deliberative views, while in the French and in the German networks, the (low) embbeddedness is not a predictor of deliberative attitudes, but deliberation is diffused among both marginal and embedded types' members.

8. Network and deliberation? Partial conclusions

The aim of this chapter was to introduce an innovative method to investigate network structures by using survey data. By analysing the multiple affiliation of activists participating in the fourth ESF we were able to single out latent networks in four national organizational communities. We derived our indicators of embeddedness from a 2-mode network method, and we used them to contrast different patterns of embeddedness in the four national delegations.

The simple description of the latent network structures revealed that many similar types of organizations are embedded in a similar way in the different national networks: among them the most powerful and resourceful political parties and trade unions, many NGOs but also the newest GJM organizations such as Anti-neoliberal organizations or the Local social Forums. Despite the national differences it is interesting to notice that the alliance between Old, New and Very New social movements are at the core, if not of the GJM in Europe, at least of the fourth ESF in Athens. It comes without surprise that at the margin of those networks we find, similarly countrywise, Anarchist, Autonomist, Trotskyite and other grassroots types of organization. If it is true that more embedded organizations are also able to pool resources for transnational collective action, deliberative democratic ideas seems to be more widespread within what Fraser referred to as "counter publics", or "week publics". The members of those types that are at the margins of the latent networks, are in fact more deliberative, in terms of democratic ideals, than the others. This is especially true in the Italian and the Greek organizational communities, while for the German and the French ones, deliberative ideals seem equally characterize the members of both marginal and embedded types of organization.

Those findings suggest that the relationship between networks and deliberative ideas, and between network and ideas in general, should be investigated further.

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Chapter 8

Protest and the Forum

by Marco Giugni, Alessandro Nai, and Herbert Reiter

The forms taken by protest are certainly among the most often studied aspects in the scholarly literature on social movements and contentious politics. Political opportunity theorists have paid special attention to this aspect. Factors such as the closedness of the institutions and the degree of repression exerted by the state have been shown as having a decisive impact on the forms of actions of movements, at times setting in motion processes of radicalization of the protest (della Porta 1995; Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1989).

This chapter discusses the relationship between the forms of protest used by participants in the European Social Forum (ESF) held in Athens in 2006 and their conceptions of democracy. We do so at two different levels. On the one hand, we discuss this relationship at the level of the ESF itself, looking at the forum as a form of protest, at the protests promoted by the forum or agreed upon during the forum (both those occurring at the forum and those occurring beyond the forum), and at the forum as a target of protest (including alternatives spaces). On the other hand, we analyze the relationship between the forms of protest and the conceptions of democracy held by participants in the 2006 ESF in Athens using the survey we conducted there. Here we take the forms of action first as the independent variable, in an attempt to single out their individual-level determinants, and then as a dependent variable, with the aim of assessing their impacts on conceptions of democracy.

To analyze the relationship between action repertoires and conceptions of democracy we use a typology of activism inspired by the classical work on political participation (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Dalton 2002; Milbrath 1981; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba et al. 1978). We follow in particular the political action approach of Barnes and Kaase (1979), who have created a typology of activism by crossing a conventional political participation scale and a protest potential scale that distinguishes between five types of citizens: inactive (very little participation), conformist (conventional participation only), reformist (conventional participation, legal protest), activist (conventional participation, legal and illegal protest), and protesters (protest activities only).

We have asked participants in the Athens ESF which forms of actions they have already made use of. Some of these forms are conventional (e.g. having worked in a political party, being member of some kind of organization, signing a petition), others are unconventional (e.g. attending a demonstration, handing out leaflets, practicing civil disobedience). Using this question, we proceeded in two steps to build our typology. We first created a scale of conventional forms of action and a scale of unconventional forms of action, of increasing degree of commitment or radicalism, by attributing a score each time an individual had used a specific form of action (8 different forms for the conventional dimension and 12 for the unconventional dimension). Then we crossed these two dimensions and thus obtained a typology of activism that include the following types: occasional activism (has never used any form or the first conventional form and the first unconventional form), conformist activism (use of conventional forms 0 to1 and unconventional forms 3 to 5 or conventional forms 2 to 4 and unconventional forms 0 to 5), conventional reformist activism (use of conventional forms 5 to 8 and unconventional forms 0 to 5), unconventional reformist activism (use of conventional forms 0 to 4 and unconventional forms 6 to 12), protesting activism (use of conventional forms 5 to 8 and unconventional forms 6 and 7 or conventional form 5 and unconventional forms 6 to 12), and full activism (use of conventional forms 6 to 8 and unconventional forms 8 to 12). In the analyses we will consider this typology as an ordinal variable going from the less committed and moderate activism to the most committed and radical activism. The distribution of respondents across the six types shows that most of them are characterized by what we call conformist activism. Only a very small share are occasional activists (i.e. participating

for the first time), while the rest of the sample is more or less homogeneously distributed across the four other categories (table 1).

Table 1 - Distribution of ESF participants on the typology of activism (percentages)

Type of activism	
Occasional activism	1.7
Conformist activism	34.4
Reformist activism	20.2
Protesting activism	12.5
Full activism	31.1
Total **N**	**100%** **1205**

When relevant, our analysis will also make a distinction between two main groups: those activists who declared that they had been or were planning to go to the alternative spaces in the Athens city centre, and those who had remained within the general venue of the ESF.[53] In addition, we will analyze whether there is a difference in the use of protest forms and in conceptions of democracy depending on the political orientation of the organization of which they are member.[54]

1. The ESF: form, catalyst and target of protest

1.1 The ESF as a form of protest

The organization and holding of the first World Social Forum (WSF), as of subsequent forums at the global, regional and local level, can be considered as a form of protest in its own right. The first edition of the WSF was in fact conceived as a counter event to the World Economic Forum in Davos. It was meant to intercept media attention, but also to propose a counter model to the dominant ways of discussing and practicing global governance.

In occasion of the first ESF in Florence in November 2002, its character as a protest event found expression in the slogan "Against war, racism and neo-liberalism". The "Call of the European Social Movements" published in that occasion explicitly states: "We have gathered in Florence to express our opposition to a European order based on corporate power and neoliberism." In addition, the call locates the ESF in a series of protest events: "We have come together through a long process: the demonstrations of Amsterdam, Seattle, Prague, Nice, Genoa, Brusselles, Barcellona".[55] Similar statements also characterized the subsequent editions of the ESF.[56]

[53] In the questionnaire, a specific question asked if the activist had planned to go to the autonomous space during the ESF (yes/no).

[54] To do so, a new variable was created which, for those who are member of an organization, distinguishes between respondents who are close to the traditional left, the radical left, or non-leftist organizations.

[55] Available at http://www.resist.org.uk/reports/archive/esf/esfcall.html, accessed February 2007.

[56] The "about" section of the Athens 2006 website affirms: "The European Social Forum is, alongside Genoa and Seattle, one of the major events of the movement against neoliberal globalization and war, deregulation of labor and poverty, climate change and environmental destruction, violation of democratic rights and sexism, racism and the threat of the far right. … We have marched together against the G8, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in Prague, in Genoa, in Evian. We took part, all together, in the siege of the European Union Summits in Thessalonica, Nice, Seville, Brussels. We met during the huge antiwar rallies on the 15th of February 2003, in the mass demonstrations against racism, in working class mobilizations defending pensions, public health and education, in rallies against the destruction of the environment, the "anti"terrorist laws and repression" (http://athens.fse-esf.org/4th-european-social-forum-athens-may-2006, accessed February 2007).

The WSF charter of principles adopted in 2001, to which also the ESF refers, defines the social forum as "an open meeting place for reflective thinking, democratic debate of ideas, formulation of proposals, free exchange of experiences and interlinking for effective action, by groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism …".[57] At the same time the charter underlines that the WSF does not intend to be a body representing world civil society. In fact, the meetings of the WSF do not deliberate on behalf of the WSF as a body and no one is authorized to express positions claiming to be those of all its participants. Therefore, more than a clearly defined form of protest the forum is a space were different forms and conceptions of protest may be practiced.

Repeated surveys conducted in occasion of ESFs have in fact confirmed that global justice movement (GJM) activists have variegated past and present action repertoires, combining more conventional forms (like working in a political party or signing a petition) with more unconventional ones (like participating in non-violent direct action or in cultural performances as a form of protest). It seems however significant, that in our activist survey conducted at the Athens ESF 'attending a demonstration' emerges as the most frequent form of action (table 2) and that, in general, unconventional forms of action seem at least as widespread as conventional ones.[58] At the same time, a clear rejection of violence emerges: only 6.3% of the activists surveyed at the Athens ESF declare to have used violent forms of action against property.[59]

Table 2 - Past and present action repertoires of ESF participants in Athens, Paris, and Florence, valid percent only

Form of action	Athens (2006)	Paris (2003)	Florence (2002)
Attended a demonstration	92.6	95.5	-
Signed a petition/public letter/call for referendum	84.2	96.3	88.8
Participated in an assembly/congress/discussion group	-	83.3	91.3
Handed out leaflets	70.9	74.0	73.4
Boycotted products	68.8	74.7	65.8
Participated in cultural performances as a form of protest	58.2	-	-
Symbolic action	-	64.9	-
Took part in a strike	56.7	71.2	86.0
Took part in non-violent direct actions	54.7	-	-
Tried to persuade someone to vote for a political party	54.1	-	51.8
Practiced civil disobedience	42.5	-	-
Worked in a political party	41.2	-	33.5
Took part in an occupation of a public building	33.5	39.2	68.0
Took part in a blockade	31.2	47.7	67.9
Took part in an occupation of abandoned homes and/or land	12.1	-	25.9
Used violent forms of action against property	6.3	6.0	8.4

[57] Available at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2, accessed February 2007.
[58] For the survey conducted at Paris see Agrikolianski and Sommier 2005; for the survey conducted at Florence see della Porta et al. 2006. A first survey of GJM activists had been conducted at the Genoa G8 counter summit in 2001 (see Andretta et al. 2002).
[59] According to the Paris survey (Agrikoliansky and Sommier 2005, 139) only 2.8% declared having exercised physical pressure on a person, whereas 25.8% declared having resisted police forces. 29.2% of the Florence activists declared violence as self-defence necessary in the event of repression of a protest demonstration, another 46% as justifiable. Experiences like the participation in the Genoa anti-G8 demonstrations significantly strengthen this response (della Porta et al. 2006, 170f.).

The variegated action repertoires of the activists are not only tolerated within the social forum framework, but seen positively as part of the diversity which the GJM considers one of its strengths and not a weakness. The WSF and the ESF in fact encourage the acceptance of diversity in forms of action, with the one discriminant of non-violence. The WSF charter speaks of openness to "the diversity of activities and ways of engaging of the organizations and movements that decide to participate in it". In this context, it stresses transparency, the exchange of experiences, and the encouragement of "understanding and mutual recognition amongst its participant organizations and movements", strengthening and creating new national and international links with the aim of increasing "the capacity for non-violent social resistance to the process of dehumanization the world is undergoing and to the violence used by the State".

1.2 Specific Protest Events at the Forum

Not only can the ESF as such be considered a form of protest in its own right, but during the days of the forum specific protest events are organized. The main event, the big concluding demonstration, is part of the official forum program and directly organized by the ESF. In addition, single components of the forum stage specific protest events as part of or continuation of their forum activities. Some of these events led to friction not only with state authorities, but also within the ESF. Concentrating on the latter, tension has been provoked by the presence of groups considered external by the ESF or by components of the ESF, but also by divergences about appropriate action forms or by dissatisfaction with the decision-making process in the preparation of the event.[60]

The principles contained in the WSF charter – in particular the acceptance of diversity in the forms of action with the discriminant of non-violence – found a first European expression in the protests against the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001, i.e. more than a year before the first ESF. Agreed upon at the WSF, the counter summit was organized by a light ad-hoc structure, the Genoa Social Forum (GSF), which stipulated a "work agreement" which (echoing the WSF charter elaborated roughly at the same time) bound the signatories to "respect all forms of direct, peaceful, nonviolent expression and action declared publicly and transparently".[61]

As became evident in the preparatory phase of the Genoa counter summit, the acceptance of diversity in the forms of action was a straining factor between the GSF and potential allies. Preoccupation with violent action repertoires was an argument in the refusal to participate not only of moderate catholic groups, but also of the traditional left trade union confederation CGIL. In the aftermath of Genoa, self-critical reflection within the movement saw a more fundamental opposition to violence gaining ground and brought a commitment to contribute to the peaceful holding of demonstrations with a stewardship service, which in occasion of the anti-G8 counter summit had been rejected on grounds of principle. At the same time, however, preoccupation emerged about the tendency to call violent certain effective, high-profile forms of direct action internally accepted as legitimate (della Porta et al. 2006, 142ff.; 191ff.).

At the Florence ESF, a work agreement similar to the one in Genoa was not formally signed, but informally applied.[62] In addition, at the mass demonstration concluding the forum the self critical reflection in consequence of the Genoa events found expression in a partial revision of the movement's attitudes (della Porta and Reiter 2004; 2006). The organizers paid closer attention to the self-policing of the demonstration, introducing a steward service. In addition, the autonomous

[60] On the particular question of the policing of transnational protest see della Porta et al. 2006, chap. 5; della Porta, Petersen and Reiter 2006.
[61] Available at http://spazioinwind.libero.it/rfiorib/genova/manifesto_gsf.htm, accessed February 2007.
[62] Interview with a spokesperson of the Florence ESF, conducted 24 April 2004.

sector downgraded its action repertoires, with the "disobedients" for instance abandoning their traditional habit of wearing protective gear.

The enormous success of the demonstration concluding the Florence ESF (between 500.000 and 1.000.000 participants, according to the police) made any tension remaining after the Genoa anti-G8 protests evaporate. However, in occasion of protest events organized by single sectors of the movement during the days of the Forum – e.g. at the US military base Camp Derby – preoccupation about possibly escalating forms of action had signaled the persistence of differences between more moderate and more radical sectors of the movement.[63] In fact, the WSF and the ESF increasingly have been recognized as plural and contested and not simply as open spaces (Osterweil 2004, 187). Processes both of dialogue and collaboration, and of criticism and competition develop not only between the forum and external groups and forces, but also within the forum itself. These processes find expression, among others, in the forms of action (the setting up of organizational stalls, leafleting, internal marches like the ones conducted by the Socialist Workers Party, etc.) aimed at the participants of the forum.

At subsequent editions of the ESF, in fact, tension and difficulties (re)emerged in occasion of the concluding demonstrations, on the one hand connected with the boundaries of the movement, on the other hand with internal decision making. In Paris the participation of a block of French Socialists led to tension, because some participants saw this as an intrusion of outside forces. In Athens the provocations of radical groups external to the ESF, using the demonstrators as human shields for attacks on the police, led to incidents, partly involving also the official march. In this occasion a lack of debate within the ESF on the modalities of the demonstration, and in consequence a lack of decision-making, was lamented.[64]

The decision making process in connection with the concluding demonstration had come under particular attack at the London ESF. The European preparatory assembly (EPA) in Brussels (4-5 September 2004) had turned down the UK proposal to aim the march against war and (US president) Bush.[65] It had been stressed, instead, that the demonstration needed to refer to the spirit of the ESF, e.g. for lasting peace and a Europe of progressive social development. The slogans, therefore, were to be against social cuts and war and for a Europe of social justice, with the "No to Bush" slogan used as part of the British delegation only. The UK coordinating committee was accused of not having implemented the EPA's decision, the result being a demonstration primarily against Bush. This was seen as a structural problem inherent in the ESF decision-making structure: without a system of accountability for ensuring that the decisions taken at the EPA are carried out, the local organizers end up with de facto power over most decisions.[66]

1.3 Protest Events beyond the ESF

The very fact that protest events, especially those occurring beyond the forum, were perceived as being promoted by the WSF or the ESF jars with a strict definition of the forum as an open space, i.e. limited to providing an opportunity for organizations, groups and networks to meet, exchange ideas and discuss and coordinate future common action (Whitaker 2004). If the forum is not an actor in its own right, it cannot promote protest events. In fact, the assembly of social movements,

[63] The only moment of tension with the police was caused by an unannounced protest event.

[64] Marco Bersani (Attac Italia), "L'altra Europa c'è", available at http://www.carta.org/cantieri/forumAtene2006/060518Bersani.htm, accessed February 2007.

[65] The minutes of the Brussels EPA are available at http://www.ukesf.net/downloads/9ddec3f280478d6f93933eaff10149d5/mins_brussels_preparatory_assembly_4_5_Sept.rtf, accessed February 2007.

[66] See, among others, Marianne Maeckelbergh, "Perhaps we should just flip a coin;", available at http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/flipacoin.htm, accessed February 2007; Cobas, "Il Forum sociale europeo a Londra", available at http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/cobas.htm, accessed February 2007; Lars Bohn, "ESF: Addressing the democratic deficit", available at http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/lars.htm, accessed February 2007.

which in its calls does promote specific protest events, is convened after the official end of the WSF or the ESF, albeit implicitly part of these events. Strictly speaking, the role of the assembly is limited to being an instigator or catalyst of protest events, and any concrete planning is conducted by those networks and organizations willing to collaborate for that task.

Considering this tenuous connection between the ESF (and even the assembly of social movements) and protest events beyond the forum, it has to be underlined how successful the forum has been as an instigator or catalyst of protest events. This is particularly true for the first of these events, the 15 February 2003 demonstrations against the imminent war in Iraq. They are considered to have been the largest mobilization ever of the peace movement, and the demonstration held in Rome, said to have involved 3 million people, is listed in the 2004 Guinness Book of World Records as the biggest anti-war rally in history.

The February 15th protests were promoted by the assembly of social movements at the Florence ESF in November 2002. The assembly called on the movements and citizens of Europe to organize "massive opposition to an attack on Iraq starting now" and "to start organizing enormous anti-war demonstrations in every capital on February 15". One month later, this call was confirmed by the EPA in Copenhagen, which also saw the presence of the newly founded US umbrella peace organization United for Peace. In January 2003, a specific February 15th preparatory workshop was conducted at the third WSF in Porto Alegre. Temporary national coalitions were set up containing a whole range of organizations and national social movements. Although the originally planned worldwide website never materialized, the websites of the national coalitions were linked to each other. An intensive e-mail circuit was set up, connecting all European, and eventually also the US peace movements. A worldwide symbol of the protests (a missile crossed out by the words 'Stop the War') and identical slogans to be used at all demonstration sites ('No war in Iraq', 'Not in my name', and 'No blood for oil') were agreed upon.[67]

As an instigator and catalyst of protest events, the ESF was successful not only as far as the number of participants in these events is concerned, but also in permeating them with its spirit. As mentioned above, the principles defined in the WSF charter – acceptance of diversity in the forms of action with the discriminant of non-violence – were taken up in the "work agreement" of the GSF which bound the signatories to "respect all forms of direct, peaceful, nonviolent expression and action declared publicly and transparently". Notwithstanding the fact that criticism and competition within the ESF process among others centre on action repertoires, similar formulas in general characterize the demonstrations promoted by the ESF, and also by the national movements promoting the ESF.[68]

In spite of the successful February 15th demonstrations, the ESF's capacity to build a frame for mobilizations was however judged problematic by parts of the GJM. Attac France for instance criticized that decision making on common actions had largely been reduced to setting the dates of common global events, underlining that the setting of dates was obviously important but clearly insufficient.[69] Specific criticism has been raised in connection with the politically ambitious common mobilization of the movement and the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) on 19 March 2005, called for by the assembly of social movements at the London ESF. In particular, it was lamented that after the setting of the date nothing happened, and no European team was put

[67] See Joris Verhulst, 'February 15, 2003: The World Says No to War', in: Stefaan Walgrave and Dieter Rucht (eds.), *Protest Politics. Anti-war mobilization in Western Democracies*, 2007 (forthcoming).

[68] A press release of the Italian movements promoting the ESF, published in occasion of mobilizations against the war in Iraq in 2003, talks of "valorising and respecting the many and different practices of the movement", underlining specifically nonviolence and civil disobedience. Available at http://www.fiom.cgil.it/internazionale/forum/cs_forum.htm, accessed February 2007.

[69] Attac France, "The European Social Forum: Appraisal and Future Perspectives", available at http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/attac-en.htm, accessed February 2007; see also the collective appraisal of the French Initiative Committee for the ESF, available at http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/french_comittee.htm, accessed February 2007.

together to build a mobilization campaign, but also to establish contacts with ETUC.[70] Especially in those countries with closer connections between the GJM and trade unions, the common character of the mobilization was in fact far more visible than at the European level.[71]

1.4 The ESF as a target of protest

As underlined above, the WSF and the ESF increasingly have been recognized as plural and contested spaces (Osterweil 2004, 187). In fact, with antagonisms, differences, and tensions developing within the social forum process, the ESF itself became the target of protest, directed in particular against decision making processes criticized as top-down and dominated by traditional established organizations (horizontals vs. verticals).

Protest against the official forums, or certain of their aspects, has been present from early on and has continued to be present up to the latest editions. For example, at the 2002 WSF, a group of radical grassroots activists marched to the official forum site and occupied the VIP room, chanting "We are all VIPS, we are all VIPS!" As a result of the protest, no VIP room was provided the following year. The last WSF in Nairobi saw protests against the high prices for food.

As Jeff Juris remarked, the success of the protests against the WSF VIP room made activists realize that they "could have a positive effect by creatively engaging the forum from outside".[72] In the preparatory phase of the first ESF in Florence, many autonomous and radical groups remained ambivalent towards the forum, criticizing the support given by local authorities, as well as the prevalence of large and bureaucratic organizations. This protest potential found an outlet in the autonomous spaces, permitting the pursuance of a "one foot in, one foot out" strategy by being independent from the official forum but present on the official program, by maintaining at the same time a critical attitude towards the forum process and close contacts with in.

In Italy, however, shared experiences of protest (especially the Genoa G8 counter summit) had generated mutual trust between "verticals" and "horizontals". Already at the second ESF this relationship had become more strained. Reflecting a particularly conflictual preparatory phase, with a number of more horizontal groups initially involved withdrawing from the official forum, autonomous spaces reached their fullest expression during the 2004 London ESF. In this occasion the accumulated tension also erupted in several protest events specifically targeting the ESF: at the Iraqi plenary the representative of the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions, in favour of the Anglo-American occupation but invited because of strong support from many British trade unions, was shouted down; at the anti-racism plenary, autonomous horizontal groups rushed the stage where London mayor Ken Livingston was supposed to speak in order to protest against the "verticals", in particular the Socialist Workers Party and Livingston's Socialist Action, as well as against the influence of the Greater London Authority on ESF decision making; finally, at the concluding demonstration, tension erupted over several arrests made by the police and the fact that instead of the agreed concert, speeches were given, monopolized by the English to the exclusion of all other European delegations.

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[70] Frank Slegers (Belgium Social Forum), "A balance about the Euro-demonstration held in Brussels the 19th of March 2005 and promoted by the CES and the European Movements and Networks participating in the ESF, 23 March 2005", available at http://www.openelibrary.info/autorsview.php?id_autore=180&PHPSESSID=e7376fa2abe0365b50539e38132b16d4, accessed February 2007.

[71] Whereas the press release of the joint campaign for the March 19 demonstration of the Italian trade unions and movements (available at: http://www.fiom.cgil.it/uff_inter/europa/bolkestein/appello.htm, accessed February 2007) speaks of "the anti-neoliberal movement, in all its associative and trade union components", the ETUC call for participation in the demonstration (available at: www.etuc.org/a/485, accessed February 2007) does not mention the social movements nor the ESF.

[72] Jeff Juris, "The London ESF and the Politics of Autonomous Space", available at http://www.euromovements.info/newsletter/jeff.htm?SectionID=41&ItemID=6552, accessed February 2007.

By and large, the attempts of horizontal groups to "have a positive effect by creatively engaging the forum from outside" were successful, e.g. achieving the discontinuation of the VIP room at the WSF. In general, they were able to organize their own horizontal projects, while at the same time challenging commonly accepted ideas and making conflicts visible at the official Forum. In addition, their actions had long term effects. The conflicts at the London ESF, for instance, contributed to the elimination of plenary sessions privileging VIP luminaries at the Athens ESF (2006) in an attempt to reduce internal struggle between horizontals and verticals and to leave more space for more horizontal activities such as workshops and seminars.

2. Determinants of activism

Before we analyze the impact of types of activism on conceptions of democracy in the next section, we look at the determinants of such forms. We will therefore propose two main analyses, the first searching for such determinants with a bivariate approach, and the latter by introducing the most central independent variables in multiple regression models. Remember that we consider the main dependent variable (i.e. the type of activism as presented before) as an ordinal variable, where each modality presents a higher level of activism than the previous one. Only the more interesting results (strongest or unexpected relationships) will be explicitly presented in what follows.

Concerning in the first place the sociodemographic variables (results not shown), in general we note a scarce effect on the types of activism, with at the best weak relationships: sex has a significant but weak effect, and so does age, level of education[73], the size of the town of residence (only one not significant) and employment status.

The only sociodemographic factor we found as having an interesting interaction with the type of activism is the militant's work condition: an unemployment situation (both past and present) has a significant and sufficiently strong[74] positive effect on the type of activism; individuals who are (or have been) unemployed, are more inclined to committed and radical activism. Even if this is not really a surprise, the fact that this is the only individual factor – at the sociodemographic level – having a clear-cut effect on the type of activism signals that the work condition can be considered as a strong determinant at the individual level.

Note also that there is no difference in the impact of sociodemographic factors (sex, age, education level, size of residence town or employment status) between activists who had been or were planning to go to the alternative spaces at the ESF and those who remained within the general venue . For these factors, all relationships with the type of activism are weak and (sometimes strongly) not significant. A slightly different picture exists only as far as the work condition is concerned: if the radicalizing effect of not having a job on the forms of activism is unquestionably strong for the activists who attended the alternative spaces, the same relationship is weaker and not significant for those who remained within the general venue at the ESF. We have the same results when analyzing those who did have an unemployment situation in the past: globally, therefore, the interest for the alternative scene acts as a stimulator for the radical activism as a reaction to a difficult job position (past or present). Alternatively, one could also argue that unemployment stimulates radicalism which leads to interest in the alternative spaces.

The situation is less clear-cut for political factors and predispositions. First, we note an interestingly strong and significant effect of the identification with the GJM[75] on the type of activism (table 3): the more the activist declares to identify with the overall movement, the more he or she will be inclined to embrace a more radical militant behavior[76]; the identification with the movement acts therefore as impulsion for more radical forms of activism, maybe through an

[73] Synthetic and general variable created on the country-specific level of education.
[74] Gamma = .328 (present unemployment) and Gamma = .376 (past unemployment), both significant at the 1% level.
[75] Ordinal variable going from "not at all" to "very much".
[76] Gamma = .399 (Chi-square test = .000).

impression of legitimization created by a shared sense of belonging to "something higher". Of course, we only postulate a direction of causality; statistically, in fact, we only measure the existence of a covariation of the factors in the analysis.

Table 3 - Relationship between identification with the GJM and type of activism

Type of activism	**Identify with GJM**			
	Not at all	A little	Quite a lot	Very much
Occasional	20.0	7.5	.9	.2
Conformist	50.0	54.1	37.0	23.1
Reformist	30.0	18.5	21.7	19.4
Protesting	.0	10.3	14.5	11.9
Full	.0	9.6	25.9	45.4
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**10**	**146**	**557**	**463**

Gamma = .399 (significant at the 1% level)

Unsurprisingly, this is also the case for the auto-positioning on the left-right scale: the more an individual declares sympathy to the extreme left, the more he or she will be inclined to propose a radical form of action[77]. A somehow similar but theoretically very interesting variable (discrimination between traditional and radical left[78]) gives here some attractive results (table 4); against any intuitive expectation, those classified as "radical left" are no more inclined to propose a full activism than those classified as "traditional left" (only 36% versus the strong 45% for the traditional leftist). This is even more clear-cut after the elimination of the unclassified categories of the variable, which contains anyway about 70% of the data; the impact of this variable (now in a dummy shape) on the activism form is statistically significant and quite important[79]. Given the similarity with the more traditional variable (auto-positioning on the left-right scale), only this latter will be integrated in our multiple regression models.

Table 4 - Relationship between type of left and type of activism

Type of activism	**Type of left**			
	No member of organization	Traditional left	Radical left	Non leftist organization
Occasional	8.3%	.4%	.0%	1.5%
Conformist	62.8%	20.2%	28.0%	29.7%
Reformist	4.1%	27.7%	18.9%	22.3%
Protesting	11.7%	6.7%	17.4%	14.2%
Full	13.1%	45.1%	35.6%	32.2%
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**145**	**253**	**132**	**394**

Lambda = .117 (significant at the .01 level)

[77] Gamma = -.318 (Chi-square test = .000). The negative direction is simply explained by the fact that a higher score on the left-right scale signals an individual close to the right side of the political spectrum.
[78] The variable captures the difference between the radical and traditional leftist and is constructed on the individual most important group recoded; the variable makes sense therefore only for activists that declared an explicit interest in at least one of the groups proposed in the questionnaire (which explains the high level of uninteresting values).
[79] Phi = .210 (Chi-square test = .002).

The act of voting (in national elections) does have a positive and significant but only moderately intense effect on a more radical active behavior[80]. In other words, an absence of participation in the institutionalized sphere does provoke a lower level of participation on the antagonist scene, but this relation should certainly not be overestimated. We shall discuss later if this is still the case in multivariate models.

Another very interesting individual characteristic is the level of overall satisfaction of the activist with the decision-making process on different levels (his group, the groups and networks taking part in the GJM, his national political system, the EU, the UNO). We created first an additive variable based on the five different levels on which he or she expressed his or her level of satisfaction. The ordinal variable created on the first scale was then crossed with the activism level of each militant in our database. The results show a significant and averagely important negative effect of satisfaction on activism (table 5): the lower the first, the higher the second. This means that frustration with the decisional modalities present in the political system encourages the militant to engage him/herself more on a high-profiled activism. Note anyway that the distribution of the militants in our database on the satisfaction variable shows a concentration around the low modalities (which signals a quite low overall satisfaction).

Table 5 - Relationship between decisional satisfaction and type of activism

Type of activism	**Level of overall satisfaction**			
	Very unsatisfied	Moderately unsatisfied	Moderately satisfied	Very satisfied
Occasional	.6	.9	4.4	.0
Conformist	21.6	29.9	43.8	30.8
Reformist	18.5	20.8	27.7	23.1
Protesting	16.0	13.1	6.6	23.1
Full	43.2	35.2	17.5	23.1
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**162**	**749**	**137**	**13**

Gamma = -.268 (significant at the .01 level)

Incidentally, we found no effect at all of the strategic views on the type of activism. Based on five items demanding the opinion of the activist on the strategies the GJM should use to enhance democracy[81], we constructed a synthetic indicator signaling which one of these strategies the activist considers as the main one. The relationship between this synthetic indicator and the form of activism of the militant is however very feeble, even if statistically significant[82]. In other words, the level of activism does not depend on the strategic view the activist projects on the GJM.

Surprisingly enough, the trust in the major actors (in a broad sense[83]) of the political system does not have any effect on the level of mobilization proposed by the activists (table 6): the relationship between trust (additive scale recoded into an ordinal variable) and type of activism is very weak,

[80] Phi = .211 (Chi-square test = .000).
[81] Contact political leaders, practice democracy in groups, take to the streets, spread information to public, promote alternative models.
[82] Lambda = .055 (Chi-square test = .000).
[83] UNO, European Union, national government, national parliament, local government, the judiciary, police, political parties, trade unions, NGOs, SMOs, churches and mass medias. An additive scale is created on the declared trust for each actor (two missing data allowed); the resulting scale is then recoded into an ordinal variable with five modalities (from no trust to high trust).

even if significant[84]. Even with a re-focalization of the trust scale on the more institutional elements of the political system (i.e. by avoiding actors such as NGOs, churches, medias and SMOs), his impact on the type of activism remains practically absent[85]. This is also the case for the trust in the SMOs (taken alone), which shows no effect at all on the activism form[86]. Contrarily to a common and intuitive idea, as well as to the line of reasoning put forward by the civic culture and social capital tradition (Almond and Verba 1963, 1989; Putnam 1992, 2000) trust does not activate a particular form of activism.

Table 6 - Relationship between trust and type of activism

Type of activism	**Level of trust**				
	No trust	Low	Medium low	Medium high	High
Occasional	2.5	1.5	1.6	1.1	7.3
Conformist	34.7	34.1	35.4	25.3	31.7
Reformist	13.6	14.9	21.6	28.0	43.9
Protesting	22.0	18.2	8.9	6.5	4.9
Full	27.1	31.3	32.6	39.2	12.2
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**118**	**396**	**384**	**186**	**41**

Gamma = .007 (significant at the .01 level)

As before, we control our bivariate findings with regards to the activists' interest for the alternative scene. The effect of the identification with the GJM is strong, positive and statistically significant for both population (namely the activists who attended or planned to attend the alternative spaces at the ESF and those who remained within the general venue); interest in the alternative scene does not specify this relationship, which is also the case for the effect of the auto-positioning on the left-right scale (strong and significant for both populations).

By contrast, the effect of voting on the types of activism, which we found positive and significant, is specified by the interest in the alternative scene: this relationship is in fact very strong for people who did not participate in such events[87], and it is only moderately strong for those who attended the alternative spaces[88]. This means in other words that a less alternative activism increases the likelihood that the act of voting shapes the activism itself; with others words once more, an alternative behavior reduces the chances of an institutionalized effect (the vote) on the militant behavior: being alternative means, in this case, to not rely on an institutionalized form of actions (in this case the vote on national elections) when shaping the action itself, which is interesting even if not very unsurprising intuitively.

The real surprise here is that the relationship between satisfaction and activism repertoires (which we found quite strong in a bivariate way) nearly disappears when controlling for the interest of the militant in the alternative scene: the two relationships are no more statistically significant, and their force becomes sensibly lower; the only interesting result in this way is that those who are not interested in the ESF alternative side are a little more influenced by their level of satisfaction than those who declared an interest in that. Our results are however too precarious to draw any explicit

[84] Gamma = .007 (Chi-square test = .000).
[85] Gamma = -.018 (Chi-square test = .000).
[86] Gamma = .092 (Chi-square test = .132).
[87] Gamma = .412 (Chi-square test = .000).
[88] Gamma = .220 (Chi-square test = .000).

conclusion on this. Finally, the effects of the strategic view projected for the GJM and of trust in political actors remain globally low for both categories of participants.

Given the results found in our bivariate analyses, we propose a more complex analytical model, based on multiple regressions. This necessarily implies a re-consideration of our dependent variable (i.e. the type of activism), which now has to be treated as a continuous variable. Given the fact that the latter is constructed on six modalities which can be presented on a hierarchic order and which we consider as having an equal distance on a hypothetic metric axis, we do not estimate this procedure as particularly problematic. Our results will anyway be presented with some cautiousness.

Our multiple regression models will be constructed in two steps: first, we shall control the effect on type of activism produced by the major political factors described before; in a next step, we will introduce some sociodemographic variables, with the aim to control the effect of the political variables (table 7). As before, this model will then be tested, splitting our main population: interested vs. non-interested in the alternative ESF scene.

Table 7 - Estimates of effects of selected independent variables on type of activism (standardized regression coefficients)

	Model 1	Model 2
Identify with GJM	.21***	.21***
Left-right scale	-.17***	-.16***
Voted in last national elections	.04	.06
Level of overall satisfaction	-.15***	-.14***
Level of trust	.06	.06
Gender	-	-.03
Age	-	-.04
Level of education	-	-.06
Size of place of residence	-	.04
Unemployed (present)	-	.08*
Unemployed (past)	-	.09**
R2	.13	.15

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

The results of our first model (including the main variable of interest only) are very interesting, and confirm partially our bivariate findings. In the first step, our model underlines again the strong importance of some major political factors; controlled by the other variables entered, the identification with the overall movement (GJM) has a significant and strongly positive effect on the mobilization: the more the activist declares himself as close to the GJM – again, the rest being held constant – the more he or she will be inclined to propose a more radical form of activism. Note that the identification with the GJM is the independent variable having the greatest effect on the typology of activism among those entered in the first step of the model.

A high effect on the form of activism is also created by the level of satisfaction with the overall decision-making system; our multivariate results shows in our case a significant and quite strong (but negative, as before) effect: under the control of the other variables in the model, a low satisfaction increases the chances to be inclined toward a more radical behavior.

We also note that, in line with our previous findings, a leftist auto-positioning has a significant (and quite intense) effect on the activism itself, namely by increasing the likelihood of a more radical behavior. Also as before, the active participation in the electoral game does increase radical

activism (the relationship is however not too high and non-significant); this is not the case of the trust in the political actors (globally), with a non-significant and feeble effect. For this first step, the explained variance of the model remains in any case average (R^2 = .130), but certainly not uninteresting.

The second step (including sociodemographic factors as controls) does not add anything revolutionary to the previous configuration; there are however some interesting elements to put forward. The major difference concerning the political factors (namely those presents in the first step) is that the effect of voting in national elections gains a little bit in intensity (but remains always slightly not significant): an active participation in the electoral sphere finally does increase a little bit the likelihood of a more radical activism in a consistent way.

As for our bivariate analyses, the sociodemographic factors give quite disappointing results: gender, age, and size of the town do not have any significant impact on the type of activism; also as before, the only really interesting effect on the form of activism is caused by the employment situation of the militant: an unemployment situation (present and especially past) is a concrete impulsion for a radical activism, all thing being equal. The real difference with our previous analyses is that in our multivariate model the education level is finally associated with a near-significant[89] (even if not extremely high) effect: *ceteris paribus*, the higher the education level, the lower the radicalism of the militant action.

Before we analyze the models for different subpopulations as done for our bivariate analyses, note that the inclusion of sociodemographic factors does increase a little bit the explicative power of our model (from 13% to 14.8%), which remains however globally weak.

The discrimination between those activists who had attended the alternative spaces at the ESF or were planning to do so and those who remained within the general venue give some very interesting results, even if now most of the relationships are no more significant at the 5% level (table 8). First of all, the effect of the identification in the GJM is more intense for those that declare an explicit interest in the alternative scene; note by the way that the relationship between identification in GJM and action form is the only one which is significant for both populations (and at the highest level; $p<.001$). This is the case also for the effect of the electoral vote, level of education and present unemployment (for the two last factors, the relationships are however not statistically significant, except for the relationship between present unemployment and activism for those interested in alternative scene). For all these factors, being alternative means essentially being more influenced by them. The inverse happens for the effect of the auto-positioning on the left-right scale, the level of overall satisfaction, trust, size of town and past unemployment (with a significant relationship for the first factor only). These factors have therefore a greater impact on those who do not participated in the alternative spaces.

[89] P = .06.

Table 8 - Estimates of effects of selected independent variables on strategies of political mobilization by interest in alternative scene (standardized regression coefficients)

	Interested in alternative ESF scene	Not interested in alternative ESF scene
Identify with GJM	.32***	.24***
Left-right scale	-.12	-.20**
Voted in last national elections	.14*	.10
Level of overall satisfaction	-.03	-.09
Level of trust	-.04	.06
Gender	-.14*	.03
Age	-.15*	-.07
Level of education	-.05	-.03
Size of place of residence	.02	.07
Unemployed (present)	.15*	.08
Unemployed (past)	.09	.09
R2	.22	.17

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

This being, the most interesting effect of the comparison between the two subpopulations is the sudden significant and strong effect of the gender for the alternative militants: among those who explicitly announced their interest in the alternative spaces the males have clear and strong inclinations for more radical and engaging action forms, while the females prefer apparently a less profiled activism (the relationship between sex and interest for alternative scenes being very weak and not significant). A similar effect can also be signaled for age: being older decreases significantly the possibility of a radical behavior for those who declared an explicit interest in the alternative ESF spaces.

Note finally that the explained variance of the model is sensibly higher for those who did attend the alternative spaces in the ESF (near 22% of the variance explained versus 17% for those who did not attend these spaces).

3. Activism and conceptions of democracy

After having analyzed the forms of protest declared by participants of the ESF by exploring certain determinants of the type of activism at the individual level, we now turn to the third and final part of our analysis: the impact of protest forms on the conceptions of democracy of the participants in the forum. Again, we will rely on our typology of activism to summarize the ways in which respondents are involved in politics. We proceed in two steps. First, we show bivariate relationships between types of activism and a number of indicators of democratic views. Second, we adopt a multivariate approach with the aim of assessing the impact of types of activisms on conceptions of democracy under control of other factors.

The next four tables look at the relationship between types of activism and four indicators of the priorities that respondents give to certain aspects in political decision-making (arguments vs. resources, acceptance of opponents in the case of disagreement vs. non acceptance, delegation vs. participation, voting vs. consensus). Concerning the first kind of priority (table 9), we can see that there is no significant relationship between the type of activism and the view about the role of

arguments and resources in the political decisions to be taken.[90] In fact, most respondents think that the quality of arguments should make a difference in decision-making regardless of who produces them, while only a few prioritize the arguments of more resourceful and active groups or individuals. This is hardly surprising and reflects the visions about power relations conveyed by the GJM, which stresses communication rather than power as a basis for taking collective decisions.

Table 9 - Relationship between type of activism and view about political decisions to be taken (arguments vs. resources)

Arguments/resources	**Type of activism**				
	Occasional	Conformist	Reformist	Protesting	Full
Arguments rather than resources	77.8	69.2	66.5	70.9	72.7
More arguments than resources	11.1	21.7	22.9	20.1	18.4
More resources than arguments	11.1	5.2	8.7	5.2	5.5
Resource rather than arguments	.0	3.9	1.8	3.7	3.4
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**18**	**383**	**218**	**134**	**326**

Gamma = -.039 (not significant)

Things are not much different if we look at the second indicator, concerning the acceptance of the opponent as an equal discussant in the case of disagreement (table 10). Again, the type of activism has no impact[91] and, again, most of the respondents think that, in a political conflict, it is always important that the opponents accept each other as equal discussants, while only a few admit that there are situations in which mutual acceptance is not important. Indeed, this is another strong trait of the GJM linked to the ways in which power relations are conceived within the movement. Mutual acceptance reflects a more balanced and equitable distribution of power among contenders.

Table 10 - Relationship between type of activism and view about political decisions to be taken (acceptance vs. no acceptance)

Acceptance/non acceptance	**Type of activism**				
	Occasional	Conformist	Reformist	Protesting	Full
Acceptance always important	66.7	68.3	64.7	71.4	70.4
Acceptance sometimes important	27.8	18.8	19.7	20.3	18.3
Acceptance scarcely important	.0	7.1	9.6	6.8	5.8
Acceptance not important	5.6	5.8	6.0	1.5	5.5
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**18**	**382**	**218**	**133**	**328**

Gamma = -.038 (not significant)

The opposition between delegation and participation is the third indicator of democratic views relating to decision-making (table 11). This is a classical distinction both in the scholarly literature and in internal debates in social movements. The new social movements, in particular, have been at the forefront in this debate, stressing the need for more participatory forms of participation. The GJM puts even more emphasis on this aspect and has made of participative democracy one of its main goals. Yet, not all the participants in the Athens ESF think that the participation of all

[90] Gamma not significant.
[91] Gamma not significant.

interested persons should always be a priority in decision-making, although most of them do. A fair amount of people leave the door open to the delegation of political decisions in certain situations. Most importantly for our present purpose, there is a significant although not very strong correlation between the type of activism and the priority given to delegation or participation.[92] The positive sign of the coefficient means that the stronger the commitment to the movement, the more people emphasize participation in decision-making. Put it differently, the more radical activists (protesting and full activists) tend to see participation rather then delegation as important when it comes to taking political decisions. In contrast, the more moderate ones are more open to delegation. However, we should not overstress these results, as the most important difference comes from the fact that it is above all the occasional activists who think that delegation is sometimes or even always important.

Table 11 - Relationship between type of activism and view about political decisions to be taken (delegation/participation)

Delegation/participation	**Type of activism**				
	Occasional	Conformist	Reformist	Protesting	Full
Delegate always important	11.1	11.1	10.4	4.4	10.2
Delegate sometimes important	33.3	20.3	19.4	15.4	13.0
Participate sometimes important	22.2	25.3	28.4	25.7	25.2
Participate always important	33.3	43.3	41.9	54.4	51.6
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**18**	**379**	**222**	**136**	**322**

Gamma = .114 (significant at the .01 level)

Concerning the fourth and final indicator of views about political decision-making, voting vs. consensus (table 12), we also observe a significant correlation with the types of activism.[93] This is another classical distinction which confronts representative democracy to deliberative democracy. The sign of the coefficient is negative, indicating that the stronger the level of commitment, the less people think that consensus should be the basis for decision-making. This is quite a puzzling finding, not easy to interpret. Occasional activists, in particular, are much less inclined than the other four types to stress voting. The difference with protesting and full activists is especially strong: while less than 6% of occasional activists prioritize voting as always necessary, more than 35% of protesting and full activists do so. A possible explanation is that the latter are more engaged in protest activities and therefore see the difficulties inherent in consensual decision-making, while the former are more naively attached to the ideal of deliberative democracy because they have never touched with hands the obstacles that arise when one wants to implement it. Regardless of how we explain this, we can see that respondents are much more homogeneously distributed on this aspect than on the other three aspects, especially the first two (except perhaps occasional activists, but the low number of cases does not allow us to draw firm conclusions with regard to this category).

[92] Gamma = .114 (significant at the .01 level).
[93] Gamma = -.125 (significant at the .001 level).

Table 12 - Relationship between type of activism and view about political decisions to be taken (voting/consensus)

Voting/consensus	Type of activism				
	Occasional	Conformist	Reformist	Protesting	Full
Always voting	5.6	26.1	25.5	38.2	35.9
Sometimes voting	16.7	26.9	23.6	22.9	25.3
Sometimes consensus	50.0	24.5	25.5	22.1	20.9
Always consensus	27.8	22.6	25.5	16.8	17.8
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**18**	**376**	**220**	**131**	**320**

Gamma = -.125 (significant at the .001 level)

In addition to these four indicators relating to the ways in which political decisions, according to the ESF participants, should be taken we also wanted to see whether the type of activism influences the respondents' view about whether the involvement of citizens in decision-making improves the quality of political decisions (table 13). This indicator gives the best results among those mentioned so far, as there is a significant relationship.[94] While most of the respondents, regardless of the type of activism, agree that the involvement of citizens in decision-making improves the quality of political decisions, the negative sign of the coefficient suggests that the more one is active within the movement and makes use of radical form of actions, the less he or she is inclined to think that the citizens' involvement is instrumental in promoting good political decisions. In fact, if we look more closely at the table, we can see that the relationship is curvilinear rather than linear: those who agree the most with the statement about the impact of the involvement of citizens on the quality of political decisions are the conformist and reformist activists, while the most moderate and the most radical activists are somewhat less positive. As for the other significant relationships observed so far, however, the coefficient is not very strong and therefore this finding should be somewhat nuanced.

Table 13 - Relationship between type of activism and view about involvement of citizens in decision-making

Involvement of citizens in decision-making improves quality of political decisions	Type of activism				
	Occasional	Conformist	Reformist	Protesting	Full
Strongly disagree	.0	2.7	3.2	3.0	3.1
Disagree	25.0	11.5	10.0	10.4	17.5
Agree	45.0	46.2	46.1	56.3	54.6
Strongly agree	30.0	39.6	40.6	30.4	24.7
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**20**	**364**	**219**	**135**	**291**

Gamma = -.150 (significant at the .001 level)

Finally, we explored the relationship between our typology of activism and the typology of conceptions of democracy used more generally in the DEMOS project (table 14). The latter distinguishes between four main conceptions of democracy resulting from the combination of a dimension relating to the degree of delegation of power and a dimension concerning the degree of

[94] Gamma = -.150 (significant at the .001 level).

consensus: associational (high delegation of power and low consensus), assembleary (low delegation of power and low consensus), deliberative representative (high delegation of power and high consensus), and deliberative participative (low delegation of power and high consensus). To operationalize this typology with the survey data, we crossed two of the four variables discussed earlier which deal with the two dimensions of the typology (delegation vs. participation and voting vs. consensus.

Table 14 - Relationship between type of activism and conception of democracy

Conception of democracy	**Type of activism**				
	Occasional	Conformist	Reformist	Protesting	Full
Associational	11.1	23.4	16.5	13.7	18.7
Assembleary	11.1	29.6	32.6	47.3	42.4
Deliberative representative	33.3	8.3	12.4	5.3	5.1
Deliberative participative	44.4	38.7	38.5	33.6	33.9
Total	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**	**100%**
N	**18**	**372**	**218**	**131**	**316**

Cramer's V = .124 (significant at the .001 level)

A first interesting finding lies in the overall distribution of respondents across the four democratic models (results not shown). The deliberative participative (36.7%) and the assembleary (35.9%) models are by and large the most frequent ones, while the associational (19.1%) and especially the deliberative representative (8.2%) models are much less popular. Interestingly enough, this distribution is quite different from that obtained on the same typology of conceptions of democracy from the documents produced by the organizations studied in the DEMOS project (see della Porta and Reiter 2006). In that part of the research, the associational model was dominating (51.2% of the 244 selected organizations), followed at distance by the deliberative representative model (13.5%), the assembleary model (12.7%), and the deliberative participative model (9.4%). While these important differences might in part be the result of a "selection bias" in the choice of organizations, their scope suggest that individual participants in the GJM and the organizations which are part of the movement do not share the same democratic view.[95]

Turning to our main subject matter, we observe a significant relationship between the type of activism and the conceptions of democracy.[96] Reflecting what we found earlier, when we analyzed the component dimensions of this typology separately, the more committed and radical participants tend to prefer a less deliberative democratic model, perhaps as a result of their disenchantment vis-à-vis this way of conceiving democracy. The most important differences lie in the assembleary model, which is overwhelmingly approved by protesting and full activists, while it is only marginally accepted by occasional activists. The latter, in contrast, put much more emphasis on the deliberative representative model than all other types of activists. More generally, occasional activists (i.e. people who participate in the GJM for the first time) are much more prone to consensus and deliberation than the other types of activists, again perhaps due to the fact that ideals still prevail among them over reality.

The next two tables address the issues discussed so far, but through a multivariate and more explanatory approach. We take as dependent variables the same indicators we examined in the

[95] It should also be noted that the definition of democratic models based on organizational documents was quite restrictive. For example, an organization composed by all the members of the organization and defined as the highest decisional body, but with an executive committee with strong power, was classified as associational in spite of these participatory characteristics.

[96] Cramer's V = .124 (significant at the .001 level).

crosstabulations above and entered them in a series of multiple regressions (OLS or logistic, depending on the measurement level of the variables to be explained). In addition to the type of activism, which is what we are interested in, we included in the models two variables relating to the way respondents are linked to the movement (identification with the movement and position as leader in the group), one indicator of political orientation (self-placement on the left-right scale), and four standard controls (gender, age, education, and employment measured as being a student).

The first set of regressions deal with the four indicators of the priorities that respondents give to certain aspects in political decision-making and the indicator concerning the view about the involvement of citizens in decision-making and how this improves the quality of political decisions (table 15). As can be seen in the extremely low explained variance, all these models are largely underspecified. We therefore should not expect them to provide a good explanation of the phenomenon at hand, that is, democratic views of participants in the Athens ESF, and focus on the regression coefficient instead. Of course, given such a low quality of the models, it is unlikely that we find strong relationships among variables. That said, some results deserve to be mentioned. The most important one for our present purpose, reflecting what we found in the bivariate analyses, is the significant effects of the type of activism on the indicators of delegation vs. participation and voting vs. consensus, while no significant effect can be observed for the other indicators. Thus, once controlled for various attitudinal and sociodemographic variables, two of the main dimensions of deliberative democracy are influenced by the previous use of protest forms by participants in the GJM.

Table 15 - Estimates of selected independent variables on views about decision-making (standardized regression coefficients)

	Arguments/ Resources	**Acceptance/ no acceptance**	**Delegation/ participation**	**Voting/ consensus**	**Involvement of citizens in decision-making improves quality of political decisions**
Type of activism	-.03	-.03	.13***	-.10*	-.06
Identification with the movement	-.03	-.06	.04	.02	.04
Position in the group (leader=1)	.05	-.04	-.11**	.03	.08*
Self-placement on the left/right scale	.07	-.03	-.08	-.12**	.11**
Gender (woman=1)	-.02	-.08*	-.02	-.03	-.01
Age	-.11*	-.04	.11*	-.05	.11*
Education	.02	.03	-.06	-.03	.06
Employment (student=1)	-.11	-.09	.01	-.00	.04
R2	.02	.02	.05	.03	.04

* p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

The final set of analyses we would like to offer look at the impact of types of activism on the four democratic models discussed earlier (table 16). Since the latter are operationalized in terms of presence or absence (i.e. dummy variables), here we use logistic regression. Let us focus once again on the existence of statistically significant effects rather than on the very low explained variance. The important point is that three out of four democratic models are influenced by the type of activism. Only the regression coefficient concerning the deliberative participative model is not significant. Yet, if we look at the odds ratios, we see that the effects go in opposed directions. While a more radical type of activism increases the likelihood that one embraces an assembleary conception of democracy, it diminishes the chances to have an associational or a deliberative

representative democratic view.[97] This suggests that the type of activism indeed matters for the ways in which participants in the GJM conceive of democracy, intended as the degree of participation and consensus in decision-making, although it is difficult to infer the direction of causality from these analyses.

Table 16 - Estimates of effects of selected independent variables on conceptions of democracy (odds ratios)

	Associational	Assembleary	Deliberative representative	Deliberative participative
Type of activism	.83*	1.31***	.71**	.96
Identification with the movement	.90	1.03	.87	1.09
Position in the group (leader=1)	1.45	.66*	1.72	.94
Self-placement on the left/right scale	1.08	1.14	1.07	.79**
Gender (woman=1)	1.05	1.16	1.27	.76
Age	.98	1.02*	.99	1.00
Education	1.12	1.00	1.01	.94
Employment (student=1)	.99	1.07	.75	1.04
Nagelkerke R2	.04	.07	.05	.03
-2 log likelihood	609.926	806.505	369.294	827.122
Degrees of freedom	8	8	8	8

p≤.05, ** p≤.01, *** p≤.001

It should also be noted that we tested for the effect of the two additional variables considered in the part dealing with the determinants of activism, namely the variable distinguishing between respondents who have attended the alternative spaces at the ESF and those who have remained within the general venue, on one hand, and the variable measuring the political orientation of the organizations of which they are member (traditional Left, radical Left, non-leftist organization). However, for both variables we found no significant effect, except in the case of the analysis of involvement of citizens in decision-making as improving the quality of political decisions.

4. Conclusion

Our analysis of the relationship between the forms of protest used by participants in the ESF held in Athens in 2006 and their conceptions of democracy has proceeded in three steps.

In the first part, we discussed the ESF as a form, as a catalyst and as a target of protest. Considering the structure of the ESF as an open space, with no one being authorized to express positions claiming to be those of all its participants, more than a clearly defined form of protest the forum is a space were different forms and conceptions of protest may be practiced. As far as action repertoires are concerned, the ESF in fact encourages the acceptance of diversity in forms of action, with the one discriminant of non-violence. This holds true also for the single protest events organized during the days of the forum, in particular the concluding mass demonstration, and for the events promoted by the assembly of social movements beyond the forum itself. In some cases the acceptance of diversity in forms of action, seen positively by the ESF as part of the general diversity of the GJM considered one of its strengths and not a weakness, led to friction not only with state authorities, but also within the ESF, provoked by divergences about the appropriateness of certain action forms.

[97] An odd ratio greater than 1 can be seen as indicating a positive effect and an odd rati lower than 1 as showing a negative effect of the independent variable.

As a promoter of protest, the ESF has been very successful, as in the case of the 15 February 2003 protests against the impending war in Iraq. Notwithstanding this success, however, the ESF's capacity to build a frame for mobilizations has been judged problematic by parts of the GJM. The role of the ESF, or more precisely of the assembly of social movements, is in fact limited to indicating the target and setting the dates of common events, with any concrete planning being conducted by those networks and organizations willing to collaborate for that task. The tension between the demand for more efficient decision-making and the criticism of a top-down approach has invested the social forum process in general. Increasingly, in fact, the ESF has emerged as a plural and contested space, with the forum itself becoming the target of protest, directed in particular against decision making perceived as dominated by traditional established organizations (horizontals vs. verticals).

In the second part, we proposed some models seeking for determinants of the activism forms presented before. Based upon bivariate and then multivariate analyses, our results show globally a quite strong effect of the major political determinants: identification with the overall justice movement has a strong and highly significant impulsion on the radicalization, and so does a leftist position (on the autopositioning scale), a low overall satisfaction with the political system and (partially) the active participation in the electoral game. All these factors systematically increase (with changing strengths) the likelihood of a radical behavior of the activists in our database. The only political factor with no incidence on the activism form is the level of trust accorded to major political institutions of the country; all things being equal, a low trust does not push the activists to a radicalization of their manners, and inversely. Our results showed inversely an overall low impact of the major sociodemographic factors. Almost all factors related to this category have a weak and (sometimes strongly) non-significant effect on the activism of the militants: gender, age, level of education and size of the residence town do not shape the militant behavior at all. The only sociodemographic factor we found statistically connected to activism is the militant's work condition: a present or past unemployment does increase the likelihood of a radical behavior.

Transversally, the behaviors of two different sub-population among the militants were analyzed: the activists who have attended the alternative spaces at the ESF versus those who have remained within the general ESF venue. This splitting has no revolutionary effect on the robustness of our results, but does help sometimes to better understand the effect of some factors on activism; when implementing the same analysis for the two subpopulations, our results show a better specification of the unemployment effect, which is higher for those interested in the alternative scene; similarly, gender becomes an important (and statistically significant) factor shaping the activism: among those who explicitly announced their interest in the alternative spaces the men have clear and strong inclinations for more radical and engaging action forms, while the ladies prefer apparently a less profiled activism. Finally, the effect of political factors does not evolve too much when the analyses are done for each subpopulation.

In the third part, we focused on the impact of protest forms on democratic views of participants in the forum, using our typology of activism as independent variable. Statistically speaking, the results are quite weak, at least in terms of variance explained in the multivariate models. However, some of the findings deserve to be mentioned. Two of then are particularly interesting. First, the conceptions of democracy at the individual level and at the organizational level are sensibly different. If we compare the typology of democratic models, we can see that participants in the Athens ESF do not have the same democratic view as resulting from the documents produced by organizations, at least with regard to the two main dimensions used to build this typology (delegation/participation and voting/consensus). If, at the organizational level, the associational model largely prevails, at the individual level the participatory dimension is much more important. Second, we observe a significant impact of democratic models on the forms of activism. This appears in both bivariate and multivariate analyses. In particular, there is an effect of the two main dimensions composing the typology of democratic models, which suggest that the way participants in the GJM think about power relations and decisional modes within the movement matter for their

participation in and commitment to the movement, although the direction of causality is not easily assessed, as it may also be that the form of action influence the democratic views rather than the other way around.

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Chapter 9

Communicating the Forum

by Lorenzo Mosca, Dieter Rucht, Simon Teune, and Sara Lopez Martin

Introduction

The four European Social Fora (ESFs) that took place thus far are, first of all, large gatherings of individuals and groups. Such meetings, even when lasting only four to five days, require an enormous amount of work in terms of preparation and implementation. Hundreds of people, almost all of them volunteers, are involved in the organisation of the ESF. In this context, organisation is a broad generic term which, at a closer look, includes many specific aspects such as selecting the location and time of the meeting, developing the structure of the program, collecting and allocating the necessary personal, material and financial resources, securing interpretation into different languages, providing technical facilities and equipment, offering accommodation, catering food, etc. Some of these tasks are inherently bound to political decisions, e.g., the question, whether or not to apply for funds from local or regional governments, may be a matter of heated debates between those opting for a pragmatic line and those who fear that strings may be attached to such flows of money. Other tasks are merely technical or purely organisational, e.g. deciding which rooms to use for which purpose. Particularly these latter kinds activities require countless acts of communication which, for the most part, simply occur without much planning and reasoning: Where can I find x? Who will call y? When do we need to have achieved x? However, there is also a need for "organising" communication in a more systematic sense. In this regard, we can broadly distinguish between internal and external communication.

First, the various groups and committees which fulfill distinct political and/or organisational roles within the Social Fora have to communicate with each other. Sometimes they even may need to set up special bodies or meetings to secure such flows of internal communication. In this case, internal communication has two dimensions. On the one hand, coordination is required among the local – and sometimes national – organisers who work in various sub-groups and committees. On the other hand, the organisation of a specific ESF reaches beyond the local/national organisers. Over time, an informal transnational infrastructure of the ESF process has emerged. Hence there are groups beyond the host country who are involved in the ESF process and who want to give advice and/or wish to have a saying in the overall content and shape of the specific ESF. Again, somehow communication between domestic and non-domestic groups has to be organised.

Second, and probably more important, the ESF is conceived to be a mass event that attracts both as many participants as possible but also sends a message to the wider public not only in the respective host city or country, but possibly in the direction of Europe at large. To this purpose, the organisers have to think about how to reach their external target groups and audiences.

This chapter pays less attention to the internal process of organisation and communication. Instead, it mostly concentrates on the two dimensions of communicating the ESF to external groups according to the two kinds of addressees mentioned above. First, we will look at the ways and channels to reach and mobilise people who consider or actually decided to participate in the ESF. Second, we investigate how the ESF is presented to external audiences, ranging from the inhabitants of the hosting city to the European or even world-wide mass publics which, at best, learn about the ESF via media reports. To this purpose, we will also look at the extent of media coverage of the four ESFs.

In a brief third section preceding our concluding remarks, we will shed some light on how the most recent forum in Athens in 2005 has been assessed by both the organisers, participant activists and observers, and selected mass media.

1. Informing and Mobilizing Participants

1.1 The organizational infrastructure for communication in the Florence ESF

In order to understand the communicative structures and problems of the ESFs, it is useful have a look at the various agents, target groups and channels involved in the process. As a starting point, we present a scheme of the organizational infrastructure for communication as developed for the first ESF in Florence in 2002. As Figure 1 shows, both mediated and unmediated strategies were employed by the different actors.

The centerpiece in the background of the mediated communication was the National Organizing Committee. It started to communicate with the media via press conferences and press releases. Only four weeks before the forum it was agreed to create a press office to counter what the organizers perceived as a "criminalizing campaign" launched by mainstream media. These media labeled the forthcoming forum as "Genoa 2", thereby evoking the image of violence and rebellion that they associated with the G8 meeting in the previous year (see section 2).

Figure 1 - Organizational infrastructure for communication and its targets (Florence ESF)



The activities of the press office were complemented during the event by providing a media center and, for a longer period, the official website of the forum (http://www.fse-esf.org). These three components of communicative infrastructure addressed different targets: While the press office aimed at the influencing the coverage of established media, the website focused mainly on activists providing information about the forum, how and where to registration, on logistics, etc. The media center was supposed to reach different publics, i.e. mainstream media, activists and Florence's citizens. The national organizing committee gave inputs to all three components of the communicative infrastructure, the local social forum only engaged with the press office.

Besides mediated communicative strategies, a set of non-mediated communicative strategies played an important role in the Florence ESF. These strategies were especially designed to address the citizens of Florence. A first element was a door-to-door campaign aiming at sensitizing local shopkeepers and citizens. Secondly, "thematic squares" in various places in the city (recalling Genoa's demonstration during the G8-meeting) intended to inform citizens that were not going to the Fortress, the place where forum was held. Last but not least, "autonomous spaces" were set up to allow for communication from below. These spaces were mainly addressing activists. In part, they aimed at developing practices of media-activism and creating alternative media. For example, the Global project of the "Disobedients" was meant to create an alternative system of communication based on a journal, a network of radios, a website, and a satellite television channel.

Also the final demonstration has to be considered being part of the communicative strategies. Its aim was to mobilize citizens and activists, and to address the mainstream media. In addition, to cover the forum for participants, a newspaper ("Social Press") was published and distributed in the Fortress during the days of the forum. Further, a project was set up to keep memory and create an archive of the discussions, seminars and workshops held during the forum (Scriba project). Finally, in the "Journalists for one day"- project, volunteers attended various events to report on them from their personal viewpoint.

All these efforts to communicate the forum were not simply complementing each other. At least in some respects, they were accompanied by tensions, rivalry and conflict. This will become apparent when taking a more specific look at two elements of the infrastructure of communication: the media center and the ESF website.

The Media Center caught in a conflict between different communication approaches

In the Florence ESF, there was no group specifically in charge of producing official information about the forum since this information was supposed to be created and delivered by the media center. From the beginning the organisers rejected the idea to have an official voice of the forum because it would have been a permanent source of conflict.

The media center was equipped with fifty computers that operated constantly throughout the Florence ESF forum. As in other movement events, it was created to facilitate a continuous flow of information around the forum as such. The media center was set up according to the Genoa model, offering alternative coverage of the G8 counter-summit in July 2001. For political reasons, computer configurations were all performed in Linux, and social gatherings were organized to inform about open source software in the media center.

However, the Florence ESF media center was caught in the middle of a conflict between two groups who were in charge: One group affiliated with Indymedia-Florence and grassroots radios was responsible for the technical requirements of the media center, such as computer connectivity, etc. Another group, more closely associated with the hard core ESF organisers, was delegated to spread information about the forum, for instance through managing the website, etc.

The conflict between both groups evolved around the degree of openness of the media center that was hosted in the fortress during the ESF. Grassroots activists wanted to provide unrestricted access for all participants, while the other group wanted to restrict the access to accredited personell only. In the end, a strategy was put into place that distinguished between movement media and mainstream media reserving two different areas in the media center for each groups of journalists. The grassroots activists were severly opposed to the strategy and tried to scandalise this praxis (interview 10). Even though the grassroots media activists were contracted to manage the media center technially and look after the hardware, many computers were stolen during the forum. This obviously restricted the usability of the media center.

The press office: Managing mass media resonance

The press office (PO) of the Florence ESF was only established one month before the forum began. The nucleus of the PO consisted of three press officers who were supported by a group of twenty to thirty volunteers (nearly all of them journalists), with a core of six to seven people collaborating more closely with the three press officers. After a defamatory campaign of the mainstream media against the ESF, the PO was expected to act rather defensively (interview 1). According to the statement of someone in charge of managing the ESF budget, very little resources were invested in the external communication of the forum: most of the budget was foreseen for the media center with the provision of services such as Internet and telephone access (interview 6).

According to one of the members of the PO,

"during that period we received reimbursement of expenses for the telephone … We did everything with the Internet, the email and the telephone. At that time the three people managing the PO (including myself) worked as press officers for some groups thus were economically covered by these organizations. We didn't need a physical place and everyone worked at home. However, in Florence there was a general headquarter that was located in the *Arci* (Italian leisure and cultural association) headquarter before the forum while during the forum we had a space in the Fortress" (interview 1).

The Florence ESF attracted impressive media coverage: 1,800 journalists (1,000 Italians and 800 foreigners) were officially accredited. Public and private Italian television channels were present as well as the BBC, French TV, German TV, radios, etc. A press portfolio was prepared and distributed to the journalists during the accreditation process. The folder contained a badge, press releases, a map of the city, and the complete program of the forum. The most prominent journalists covering the event received special treatment by being accompanied by journalists of the PO throughout the entire duration of the forum. However, most of the foreign media had their own national reference sources. Each national delegation dealt with journalists from their home country. As a matter of fact, the PO almost entirely targeted Italian media, and the information it produced was in Italian. A multi-lingual communication was perceived as too complex to be managed by only one PO. This choice became evident when the national organizing committee, pressured by Florentine activists, decided to issue a press release emphasizing the constructive and nonviolent nature of the forum. This press release was written in Italian.

The core people at the PO had been working together since Genoa. The intensity and continuity of their relationships in the year following Genoa favored the emergence of mutual trust and cooperation among each other. Interestingly, the people involved at the PO belonged to three important organizational networks of the Italian movement (interview 1). The presence of three representatives of these networks followed "a logic of distribution": the first was the press officer of *Rete Lilliput* (important eco-pacifist network at the time), the second was the press officer of *Attac* (i.e. a left network of the youngest generation) and the third belonged to *Arci* (representing the old left). The press officers formed a part of the national organizing committee (approx. forty people) and by journalistic means they conveyed the decisions made to a larger public.

It is interesting to notice that among the press officers there was nobody belonging to the radical sectors of the movement. This could be explained by the fact that such groups related to the forum following the formula "one foot in, one foot out". More radical groups were present in Florence to express their own identity but at the same time they kept at armlength from the overall process which they perceived to be bureaucratic, institutionalized, and moderate. Therefore, the ESF that began as a single project ultimately broke down into parallel autonomous initiatives, including *Cobas* (rank-and-file union) thematic Squares in the city center, the *Disobedientes* 'No Work, No Shop' space, and a *Eur@ction* Hub (Juris 2005: 265). However, the role of autonomous arenas in Florence should not be overemphasized, especially if their significance is compared to those following ESFs that were perceived as more bureaucratic and oligarchic (this is especially true for London 2004).

The groups involved in the Florence ESF followed different communication strategies: a strategy of adaptation and a strategy of alternative (Rucht 2004). On the one hand there was a strong strand which preferred setting up own communication networks (i.e. Global project and Eur@ction Hub). On the other hand there was an effort to attract media coverage by adapting to media needs. Disruptive action that was organised during the forum is one example for that (protest marches, direct actions by the *Cobas*, direct actions by the *Disobedienti*, occupations by a group of radical students[98]).

An apparent cleavage between different organizations evolved around the very idea of the forum and it continued to be an issue of discussion during the following ESFs. Some groups understood the forum as a place of active battle and struggle while others stuck to the idea of a forum as a place of calm debate on the basis of similarities. These tensions were also mirrored in the external communication. Those organizations emphasizing conflict wanted to describe the forum that way and aimed at making conflicts visible. This strategy was adopted especially by the more radical organizational networks, such as the anticapitalists and *Disobedienti*. The conflict became visible before the official opening of the ESF, when the *Disobedienti* occupied a branch of the multinational corporation Caterpillar. Caterpillar was accused to have provided means to the Israeli army in order to repress the Palestinians. Anticapitalist groups occupied a construction site of high speed trains denouncing environmental destruction and demonstrated against the NATO basis in Camp Darby. As one of the spokesperson of the local social forum affirmed, this created some problems to the coherence of the message the forum organisers tried to convey to the public. While they were engaged in making citizens aware of the forum, other groups were taking a different approach aimed at attracting the interest of mass media (interview 5).

As one spokesperson of the local social forum recalled, there were different interpretations of media "logic" within the national organizing committee:

"Casarini [leader of the *Disobedienti*] told us in informal meetings 'we have to keep the tension high because this is the way to succeed in disseminating our messages' while others replied 'No! Keeping the tension on the physical confrontation and on violence will kill the message' … it is clear that talking about violence only on one side kills the message, but on the other it keeps media attention high. When the discussion on violence disappeared, also media attention decreased. I think that the rhetoric of physical confrontation can be very appealing for young people and that it generates curiosity." (interview 2).

The press officer provided official press releases on many issues related to the forum and made an effort in transmitting univocal messages but this was not always possible. Not surprisingly, the positions of diverse organizational networks (e.g. ecopacifist and anticapitalist) were conflicting on some issues. When journalists asked people belonging to specific groups for comments or

[98] This direct action was intended to express dissent towards the *SIAE* (Italian Society of authors and publishers) considered as the main symbol of copyright and the co modification of authors' rights.

interviews, messages and interpretations could also be contradictory. This was something that the press office could try to solve or explain only ex post.

One of the strategies to trigger media coverage that was adopted by press officers was "pure spamming" (interview 1). All kinds of communication (service information, programs, official positions on specific topics, etc.) were circulated mostly via the Internet. Press releases were sent to a mailing-list, including accredited journalists as well as mailing-lists of the movement. Several press releases were issued per day, and their number increased as the event was approaching. The press office further collaborated directly with some sympathetic radio stations, such as Popolare Network and Radio Carta that opened time slots in their daily programs for the official communication of the press office. However, the press office also received the support and the help of the official press office of the regional authority that favored the access to traditional channels of communication, such as newspapers and the local press (interview 1).

The organizational function of the official website of the Florence ESF

For the official ESF website, the organizers decided that it should have help to organize participants rather than providing information to externals. The idea of an informative space in the internet stood in contrast to the idea of plurality and diversity and posed the risk of creating a chaotic situation, because the site would then have to be open to every group.

The website could be updated by a large group of people (mostly those belonging to the administrative office and the press office) but there was no editorial staff. It was created in a brief period of time and without involving in-depth thought processes and a definite plan, because there was the necessity to have an instrument of visibility and one of networking. It offered only very fundamental information for the management of the event, such as a brief description of the organizational process, the charter of principles of Porto Alegre, a list of the organizations promoting the forum, information on subscriptions[99], arrivals, dormitories, the final program, and special information for journalists.

Even if the homepage of the website advertised the translation of its contents in many languages, it was finally realized in Italian and English only. The software used for the ESF website was free software (Spip), the same developed by a French group which had already created and developed the website of the world social forum. The use of such software was framed as a political consumerist choice, coherent with the spirit of the forum.

It should be kept in mind that the media climate and the political climate at the time were very negative. Errors by the organizers were taken up to underline contradictions, a risk for public order, etc. An open publishing section on the website was avoided for these reasons. The organizers knew that mainstream media would have selected weird postings from an open publishing section to discredit and damage the reputation of the organizers, often labeled by mainstream media as "those of Genoa". This is the reason why the website, if not neutral, had to be at least as general as possible. However, the organizers did not want to keep the website empty but to fill it after the starting of the forum with information produced by the media center. The original idea was to provide an multi-lingual section to cover the event during the days of the forum inspired by the experience of the alternative news platform *Ciranda* (www.ciranda.net), created in Porto Alegre in 2002. Internal webpages had been already prepared to build that section, but all the problems concerning the definition of the final program (see chapter 2) and the problems related to the managing of the media center (see above) made it impossible to implement such section. Besides, it is worth noticing that the detachment of the national organizing committee on the one side and the operative group setting up the website on the other side did not allow having a continuous flow of communication that could be reflected on the website.

[99] Users could subscribe to the ESF online. Approx. 15,000 people took the chance to register online.

Covering the forum for participants

As seen above, the forum was characterized by the presence of parallel, not unified, projects for granting alternative coverage and for keeping memory of the forum itself. Before the forum, the idea of a double language self-financed and self-produced eight-paged newspaper to narrate the forum was raised. The newspaper was called *Social Press* and realized by a working group on communication of the local social forum of Milan with the collaboration of the local social forum of Florence and the ESF press office.

As the inventor of social press stated "we aimed at being an instrument of service for the movement. After the implosion of the local social forum of Milan we were a group of fifteen people that wanted to keep on working together. Between the summer and autumn there were some meetings and then the crazy decision to create a newspaper in Florence to narrate the social forum" (interview 11).

Four issues of *Social Press* were prepared and distributed during the Florence ESF. In the beginning, the newspaper was supposed to be published and distributed together with three different left journals sympathetic towards social movements: *Il Manifesto* (communist newspaper), *Liberazione* (newspaper of the Communist Refoundation party), and *Carta* (weekly magazine). In the end, the project failed because only *Liberazione* agreed in printing and distributing the newspaper but the people working on it feared to be closely identified with the Communist Refoundation party and thus decided to produce the paper on their own (interview 11). They estimated that they had to sell at least 1,000 copies to self-fund the journal but in the end between 18,000 and 19,000 copies were sold.[100] According to its presentation "the newspaper wants to give voice to networks, cities and people belonging to the movement of movements … it will devote space to the events and the program of the forum privileging however the great issues of debate and the individual experiences forming it. Each number will also provide one page focusing on the city of Florence. Every day it will deepen one topic: labour and migrations, technologies, war, food and health" (Vita, 05.11.2002).

Another interesting initiative concerning the contents of the social forum was the *Scriba* (writer) project that was promoted by the *COSPE*, a local NGO, with the goal to keep memory of the discussions taking place within the Florence ESF (http://www.lookabass.com/scriba/index.php). The *COSPE* organized a team of volunteers who participated in as many seminars and workshops as possible and took notes of the discussion. The information was later stored and organized on a web server and it is now accessible and searchable through a search engine (Testimonianze 2002, 425-6).

Translations: enabling mutual understanding

If little resources were devoted to external communication, interpretation costs would make up a large part of the ESF overall budget (300,000 Euros for equipment and 100,000 Euros for professional interpreters). The interpreters network *Babels*[101] was created on the occasion of the

[100] The same idea was later considered for the Paris ESF but it proved to be unfeasible and was then substituted by a website with daily updates and correspondences from France. The website (http://www.socialpress.it) is still active in covering movement's events.

[101] "Babels is a network of volunteer interpreters and translators … Babels is made up of activists of all tendencies and backgrounds, united in the task of transforming and opening up the Social Forums. We work to give voice to peoples of different languages and cultures. We fight for the right of all, including those who don't speak a colonial language, to contribute to the common work. We try to allow everyone to express themselves in the language of their choice. By increasing the diversity of contributions to the debate, we transform its outcome ... Babels is not a provider of linguistic services, it is a political actor. We do not work on any project in whose process we have not been involved from the beginning, contributing to the definition of the project itself with our ideas and demands … The first European Social Forum was held in Florence, in November 2002. Just three months before this event, a self-organised process was

Florence ESF. As a new network, its capacity to manage the translation for the whole event was uncertain. Hence, volunteer interpreters from Babels were on service in the seminars, while professional translators were contracted for the plenary conferences. All plenary conferences were interpreted in five languages (English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish), seminars were interpreted in three languages. It was discussed during the preparatory process to interpret the plenary conferences in more than five language, but it was estimated that any additional language would incur costs between 50,000 and 60,000 Euros (interview 6). Apart from high interpretation costs, the technical infrastructure was very expensive as well. However, costs for interpretation were reduced significantly in the following fora: on the one hand, all translations are now managed by the volunteer group of *Babels*, on the other hand a group of activists invented an inexpensive technology to transmit the interpretations through FM radio waves and thus the costs of the technological infrastructure were lowered.

1.2 Communication within organizations and networks

Like any other event, the ESF does attract many participants by nature. The mobilization of thousands of activists is made possible through a large number of intermediary actors. As our analysis of the survey shows, a high percentage of activists is affiliated with an organization. Especially participants from abroad are mobilized by their political organization and accompanied by fellow activists. As communication within organizations is central to understand the success of an ESF in terms of mobilization, we will analyze the dynamics of communication within organizations in the following section. We will attend to this question in order to determine the role of certain informative and deliberative spaces inside the organizations in the information flows, paying special attention to the uses of technologies of communication in this process.

The transmission of information about the forum seems to have worked well in advance within organizations in other countries than Greece. Most of the organizations interviewed knew about it before an official call for assistance was released by the forum organisers. Previously existing formal and informal contacts with other organizations working in the same area allowed for an exchange of information in the preparatory stage: preparatory meetings, proposals for the participation on conferences (timetable design), calls for logistical support, etc.

In the case of formal (more structured) organizations, first contacts are made by members of the organization who take part in the organization of the forum itself. Moreover, in most cases, these groups have federal entities with specific secretaries in charge of following up the international agenda (via e-mail) and of keeping in touch with similar organizations abroad. Both sources of information combined, maintain the flow of information to federal entities. From these nodes, the information flows to the rest of the organization in different ways: mailing lists, working groups and mentions in plenary assemblies.

In other cases, the organization itself, or at least some sections of it belong to the European Preparatory Assembly (EPA), so they have direct access to decisions and information about the process of development of the ESF. Inside those groups with a federal organizational model, the

started to find volunteer interpreters and translators for the forum. A considerable (though still insufficient) number of activist volunteer interpreters came together in these three months. This is how Babels was born." (http://www.babels.org/article4.html)

[102]Due to problems with collection of information, this section is based on a preliminary selection of sources that will be improved for a later version. Up to the present, the analysis is based on five interviews with activists. It also based on the analysis of websites of the organizations the interviewees represented and others for illustrative purposes. The analysed groups are: In Spain, *Espacio Alternativo* - Trotskyite, current inside the communist party *Izquierda Unida*- and *Ecologistas en Acción* -ecologist committee, made up of many small ecologist groups; in Germany, *Attac* and *Solid*, the youth organization of the party *Die Linke*; in the United Kingdom, the Trotskyite *Socialist Workers Party* and the *Green Party*.

transmission of information follows similar channels as in centralized organisations: from the federal entities to the rest of the organization, via e-mail and meetings.

Although most of these groups knew about the forum early, before the official announcement, in most cases articles and calls for participation were not published on their own websites until the final program of activities was published in the official website of the ESF.

Among the Greek organizations, most of the groups were involved in the EPA. This is true for *Kokkino* (RED), whose members belonged to the Greek and European education network, and it is also the case for the Youth section of the radical left p . Communication flows are quicker inside organizations from the hosting country: they used their mailing lists, monthly newspapers and their own websites to inform the whole organization about different aspects of the meeting; in many cases, there were general assemblies some weeks before the event, in order to prepare all members for participating in the ESF.

In the case of less formal grassroots organizations most of the information about the start up of the forum comes via informal contacts in similar nets and participation of other big organizations in their assemblies. Most of these groups do not pay attention to the Forum as a whole, but only to those areas in which they work, looking for new sectorial coordination spaces. The transmission of information to the rest of the group goes mainly through two main resources: Internet (for information) and assemblies (for decision about participation).

Organizations that encourage their members to go to the forum do so with different levels of emphasis and insistence depending on the country and type of organization. For instance, the Spanish groups that went to Athens did not send formal representatives to the meeting, though they supported the individuals that decided to go at their own expense. The special situation of Greece has influenced the mobilization to the ESF. Firstly, it might be problematic to plan collective journeys to a country that is not very well-connected to the rest of Europe. Secondly, linkages with social nets in that part of Europe might also be underdeveloped. More in general, the importance of the European Social Forum is perceived as decreasing or, participation in the meeting is simply not a political priority for political activists. These are some of the reasons that could explain why organizations did not encourage people to go to the forum. Especially less structured organizations have problems dealing with their own agendas, so they do not even think of working with other groups at the European level, or at least not through the forum. In the few cases in which they encouraged participation, they used their website and sometimes added an information point in an assembly. However, there is much more visibility of the ESF in Spanish websites than in those of other countries: eleven of twenty-seven[108] websites published information before and after the forum, even though the Spanish participation turned out to be low in Athens. Articles before the ESF appeared very close to the beginning of the Forum, announcing the call for participation and the organizations' own preferences regarding the program of activities. Most of the articles during the forum were reports from the demonstration of 6 May.

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[103]Organization of the revolutionary left, observers of the Fourth International; participates in the Greek Social Forum and *SYRIZA* (coalition of radical left).

[104] The full name of *Synaspismos* translates: "Coalition of the Left, of Social Movements and Ecology".

[105] In Spain, this is the case of *ACME* (main students association, with contacts with other similar organizations in Greece and Italy). In a similar way, but related to participation in autonomous spaces, *Wombles UK*.

[106] Based on interviews with Spanish organizations.

[107] These are the websites of *Attac Madrid*, *Jóvenes de Izquierda Unida*, *Quién debe a quién*, *APDHA*, *Nodo50*, *STES*, *Corriente Roja*, *Diagonal*, *La Haine*, *Espacio Alterantivo*, and *Ecologistas en Acción*.

[108] See Appendix number 3.

[109] In Spanish websites, there are only two articles in the website of the trotskists organization *Espacio Alternativo* before the Forum (see http://www.espacioalternativo.org/node/1293 and http://www.espacioalternativo.org/node/1351 Last accessed 2 February 2007), one in the website of *Ecologistas en Acción* (http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/IMG/rtf/construc_UE_manu_militari.doc.rtf Last accessed 2 February 2007), talking about other themes, and another one in the website of *Jóvenes de IU* (http://www.jovenesdeiu-

The analysis of thirty-seven British websites[111] shows that only eleven of them mentioned the ESF before it took place. Though many organizations did not pay attention to the Forum after its third edition in London (due to geographical proximity), the ones that, in fact, informed about the forum in Athens made huge efforts in announcing the call for participation. The Trotskyite paper *Socialist Worker* tried to make their most publishing the event in many of their articles about other items, and made published their own calendar of activities four times However, the internet is not the only means they use to encourage participation of their members: they also used the monthly printed version of the *Socialist Worker* and their mailing lists (those of local groups, the sectorial ones and the general one) to circulate information about the ESF. The organization actively encourages participation in all European meetings, and Athens is not an exception: there's a specific group of well-known people (representatives) who organized the journey. Individual members had to contact them in order to travel to Athens and, once there, to attend events as decided by the party.

Other groups such as the *World Development Movement* (WDM) rather informed about the forum as it took place: there is only one press note announcing their preferences over the program, while there are daily reports about the events in which representatives took part in a specific weblog. *Friends of the Earth Europe* also used its website actively to stimulate attendance. There are three items in their calendar of activities, one of them showing their events in Athens. The organization also created a weblog very similar to the one launched by *WDM* to publish photographs and reports about their activities during the forum. On the websites of grassroots groups such as *Wombles UK* there is no information about the ESF at all before it began. This is mainly due to the fact that these groups tended to participate rather in the autonomous spaces that were organized parallel to the Forum. After the ESF, their priority is informing about prisoners of the demonstration of 6 May, when many anarchists were arrested and some of them sent to prison. For a long time, the *Wombles* kept on supporting the anarchist block with monthly reports of their hunger strike.

Compared to other European meetings, the websites of German organizations pay little attention to the event. They do not seem to give special importance to the Forum, compared to the rest of contents: There are not specific sections, nor campaigns or banners to inform about it.

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madrid.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=762&Itemid=36 Last accessed 7 February 2007); *ACME* doesn't even mention it (http://www.nodo50.org/acme). Last accessed 2 February 2007

[110] For links, see appendix number 1.

[111] See Appendix number 3.

[112] These are the websites of *Unison*, *Green Party*, *National Assembly Against Racism*, Red Pepper, *New Statesman*, *Indymedia UK*, *War on Want*, *Socialist Worker*, *World Development Movement*, *Friends of the Earth* and *Wombles UK*. In contrast to the Spanish case, most of articles appeared before the ESF. For links, see appendix number 2.

[113] See http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8380 and http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8830, before and after the ESF; Last accessed 5 February 2007.

[114] See http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8747, http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8589, http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8714 and http://www.socialistworker.co.uk/article.php?article_id=8416; Last accessed 5 February 2007.

[115] Based on an interview with a member of the *Socialist Workers Party*.

[116]See http://www.wdm.org.uk/esf/ Last accessed 5 February 2007.

[117]See the chronicle for 4 May 2006: http://www.wdm.org.uk/esf/blogs/thursday4.htm, 5 May 2006: http://www.wdm.org.uk/esf/blogs/friday5.htm, 6 May 2006: http://www.wdm.org.uk/esf/blogs/saturday6.htm, and 7 May 2006: http://www.wdm.org.uk/esf/blogs/sunday7.htm; Last accessed 5 February 2007.

[118]The English section of *FOE* does not even mention it, but links with the European campaigns area.

[119]See http://www.foeeurope.org/events/ESF/Index.htm, http://www.foeeurope.org/events/events.htm and http://www.foeeurope.org/events/ESF/ESF_2006.pdf; Last accessed 5 February 2007.

[120]See http://esf2006.blogspot.com; Last accessed 5 February 2007.

[121]See http://www.wombles.org.uk/topics/prisoners/athensesf; Last accessed 6 February 2007.

[122]For Germany, there are only two notes, one in each website of every interviewed organization, like *Attac* Deutschland (a press note; see http://www.attac.de/aktuell/presse/index.php?jahr=2006; Last accessed 2 February

Finally, in Greece as the hosting country there were efforts to involve people for participation. Delegates from many local and national organizations were involved in preparatory work for the meeting. Many groups actively encouraged their members to participate, sending people to Athens to help the Greek Social Forum. The great logistic efforts and continuous meetings in order to reach political agreements among the groups involved, made necessary the presence of activists from all over the country. Not surprisingly, Greek websites provide an extensive (alternative) media coverage of the forum. Almost every single analyzed organization published the call for participation[123], and many of them used mailing lists and newspapers for diffusion before and after the forum. Less frequent to find are articles evaluating the ESF. This is due to the fact that evaluations took place in assemblies and meetings, in an internal field[124].

It is worth mentioning that, in general, there are not very big efforts by alternative media to publish information about the ESF in Athens before it started. The same is true for the websites of organizations from most European countries. These findings contrast with the information that was available about the previous ESFs. Even though there is no intensive analysis about the information flows for others forums, searches for the phrase "European Social Forum" make clear that there was much more attention on activists websites for the third ESF in London. For Athens, most of the information covers the demonstration of 6 May, the riots and information about people arrested.

However, participants of the forum would inform their groups when coming back, by writing reports (sent by e-mail or published in websites), highlighting general agreements, mobilization agendas and the results of the assembly of the social movements. Those groups that have their own means of communication, such as reviews or bulletins, would publish the reports in order to provide wider diffusion. In grassroots organizations, the post forum information reports took place during their assemblies, and only paying attention to their specific interests.

2. Presentation of the Forum to External Audiences

The ESF is organised not only as a temporary meeting place for activists from all over the continent; it is also designed as a protest event that conveys the message of "Another Europe is possible" to those who are not involved in the meeting. In an evaluation of the third ESF in London, Attac France contends that the fora have become the "most visible public expression of the alterglobalisation movement "[127]. Because social movements usually aim at persuading citizens about the need of certain changes, they have to convey their view of reality, i.e. to identify problems and their causes and possible solutions (Snow and Benford 1988). In the case of the first ESF in Florence, the organisers also had to do the groundwork in order to be heard: They had to battle against the negative public image of the forthcoming forum that had been produced by the national government and parts of the mass media in the view of previous protest activities.

There are several ways how the ESF activists try to get their message across. The local population of the city harbouring the ESF is most likely to be physically confronted with the event. The locals can be addressed by posters or banners, in protest activities or cultural events. For a more intense contact, locals can be encouraged to get in touch with the participants, visit the forum's

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2007) and *Solid* (one line in their online calendar; see http://kalender.solid-web.de/index.php?monat=5&jahr=2006&region=0&thema=0 Last accessed 2 February 2007).

[123] See, for instance, *Kokkino* (http://www.kokkino.org/ Last accessed 4 febraury 2007) and *Synaspismos* Party (http://www.syn.gr/gr/epik.php?year=2005&month=5 Last accessed 3 February 2007).

[124] Interview with Parys Crysos (*Kokkino*).

[125]Again, in Spain, *Espacio Alternativo* published two notes after the forum(see http://www.espacioalternativo.org/node/1391 and http://www.espacioalternativo.org/node/1437 Last accessed 2 February 2007), and *Ecologistas en Acción* only one, announcing a latter conference about the Forum (http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article_pdf.php3?id_article=5087 Last accessed 2 February 2007). *ACME* doesn't mention anything. There are no reports on the two German websites analyzed about agreements during the ESF.

[126] S

[127] http://www.euromovements.info/upload/attac_france.doc (last access: 25 January, 2007).

venue and get a glimpse of the activities. As soon as the non-involved are physically more distant from the venue, communicating the forum to these people gets more difficult. To reach them, mass media are indispensable. Even though the relation of mass media and social movements is tense, all ESFs have tried to get their message across through the often distorting media of TV, radio and press. This is not as easy for the European level when compared to the national level. In the national context, activists are familiar with the media system; they know some journalists, and they speak the same language. Therefore, a Greek organiser can more easily provide information to a Greek newspaper than to a Turkish TV station. The local organisers are usually responsible for media relations and the major demonstration during the ESF. But they are, of course, not the only group that has an interest in outbound communication. Every single organisation, group or network that comes to an ESF has its own ideas and preferences regarding the forum as an opportunity to appear in public. As a consequence, the participants bring along a number of differing and sometimes conflicting communication strategies.

The basic means to communicate the ESF to the public developed over time and reappear in every single ESF. What was described above for the forum in Florence was similar for the subsequent events. Of course, the different targets and respective channels of communication are not always attached the same importance in every single ESF, since every national (or local) organising committee defines its preferences anew.

2.1 Presentation of the forum to the local public

Attempts to familiarise local citizens with the ESF and maybe even attract them to the site had a very different shape in all four forums. The most basic strategy used in all ESFs was to make the event visible in the city through posters and banners. Beyond the mere eye-catching effect, this public presentation of the forum also seeks to invite uninvolved citizens to come to site and to prepare the ground for more substantial communication. At the venue, the market-like atmosphere of countless stands filled with information on very different actors and issues may be another reason for locals to come.

In addition, ESF organisers have always tried to offer low threshold events that allow locals to mingle with activists. One doorway is organising cultural events such as concerts and art exhibitions. This proved to be successful in Athens. Every night concerts were organised in which nationwide known artists performed on three stages across the spacious venue. Many young locals attended the concerts, and some of them seized the opportunity to stroll through the central hall picking up information from the stalls. In Porto Alegre, WSF participants tried to call attention to their claims in a series of events labelled “street dialogue”. Public street theatre and music shows were organised to attract citizens who otherwise were not involved in the forum. Similar events were occasionally reported for the ESFs. Especially in Florence where the ESF was confronted with a negative public image prior to the event, activists found it necessary to engage in a dialogue with the citizens of the host city and to eliminate prejudices in face-to-face communication.

The door-to-door awareness campaign “Florence Open City”

One working group within the local social forum of Florence started to prepare the campaign “Firenze Città Aperta” (Florence Open City) during the summer of 2002 and launched it in September. The campaign was launched against the backdrop of criticism raised against the national organising committee that was seen as highly involved in political discussions, but scarcely engaged in preparing the city for this international event. As the promoter recalls:

“When we presented our idea to the national organisational committee they told us that we were crazy and that they could not understand the meaning of the campaign since they were not used to do such kind of awareness-raising in the cities hosting events like this. As a matter of fact, they

conceived the social forum as a five-days-event while we saw it as an event lasting for much more time and we wanted to involve the city." (Interview 7)

A similar feeling is expressed in the words of one spokesperson of the local social forum:

"I think that the national organisational committee was very worried about a national and international failure of the forum. On the national level because the committee was formed mainly by national organisations that were politically very exposed and that would have paid for a fiasco. On the international level, because this was the first European social forum and so they felt this responsibility and wanted to gain international credibility from this event. For these reasons the attention devoted to the local level and the city was inadequate." (Interview 5)

Hence, the campaign "Firenze Città Aperta" originated out of a conflict taking place within the Italian organising committee of the ESF. The organising group was mainly formed by representatives of different national organisations, but also local activists participated in the open meetings that were generally held in Florence. Some activists belonging to the local social forum were worried about the relationship with the local citizenry. Most of these activists had participated in the Genoa social forum in 2001, where many locals were scared of the protesters. As the promoter of the campaign explained:

"We remembered Genoa and we knew that an important problem there consisted in the non-involvement of the city, and we learned that when the city is not involved then it can become a very dangerous affair" (interview 7).

In fact, the mainstream media described the forum's participants as radical "no globals" coming to Florence to devastate the city and its monuments.[128] The door-to-door campaign, based on a strategy of visibility, aimed at direct talks with citizens and shopkeepers to demonstrate that there was no reason to fear the ESF.[129] Instead, the activists presented themselves as citizens interested in discussing issues important for the future of humankind. Forum participants were labelled as sons of the *angeli del fango* (angels of mud), drawing a parallel to people who had come to Florence from all over Italy to help with the reconstruction of the city after the big flood in 1966. Interestingly, among the proponents of this strategy of visibility, there was a woman with a long experience in the lesbian movement that used to reflect and work on the idea of visibility (Interview 9).

The name of the campaign was proposed by a cineaste during an assembly of the local social forum of Florence. He wanted to recall the name of a famous neorealist film by Roberto Rossellini, addressing resistance against the occupation of Nazis. The aim of the campaign was to create a positive environment in the city to host the forum.

"The campaign aims at disseminating information among the citizens on the big topics of the movement and presenting our constructive and joyful face, involving individual citizens, associations and their members. We want to address the wholeness of the citizen textile, underling the sensitivity, intelligence, culture of hosting and confronting that characterise our city. The name of the campaign fully represents the spirit and the goals of our work: we want Florence to be considered an open city by everyone." (http://firenzesocialforum.net/firenzeaperta)

The awareness campaign aimed at transforming the city from a passive "container" to an active protagonist of the event. The campaign focused on three main axes: shopkeepers, citizens' hospitality towards participants, and the creation of an "information service" for the final demonstration.

[128] To oppose the message that "the noglobals are those who devastate monuments", the *Lilliput* network made a gift to the city of Florence by donating a statue of the French artist Jean Michel Folon ("The man of the rain").
[129] In the Florence ESF, organisers announced the arrival of the journalist Oriana Fallaci, who had strongly attacked the event before its official starting. However, instead of the nation-wide known journalist, a satiric actor imitating and ridiculing her made a performance.

Most of the shopkeepers were frightened by the negative media campaign. *Confcommercio*, one of the most important associations of shopkeepers, strongly opposed the European forum, suggesting to its members to keep their shops closed during the event. The president of the local chapter stated:

"Florence is an outraged city, betrayed, suffering an event that has been imposed from above without any consultation of its citizens … to those defining the closure of the shops as an act of cowardliness we reply that it is instead a reaction of strong pride and love to this city that doesn't want to be offended" (Confcommercio on-line, November 2002).

The same organisation also announced that around 90 percent of the shops would have to close during the days of the social forum, thus causing a damage of at least 250 million Euros for the tourist sector and the commercial sector.

However, the forum organisers felt that the shopkeepers could become important allies in opposing the criminalising campaign by some mainstream media. In September 2002, the working group in charge of the campaign started to distribute a letter explaining the rationale of the event to and inviting the shopkeepers to become involved:

"We ask the shopkeepers to be active witnesses of Florence as a hospitable city and open to dialogue, proposing initiatives to control prices and quality of products, parties, hospitality, workshop, events, exhibitions involving those coming from all over Europe and the Florentines" (http://firenzesocialforum.net/firenzeaperta).

Another association of shopkeepers (*Confesercenti*) that was contacted by the campaigners decided to support the forum with a shop-to-shop engagement. The president of the local branch of *Confesercenti* had a very important role in this campaign. She declared:

"We think to have the right to do our work, always, but also the duty to offer our services … before being shopkeepers we are citizens … we can still retake control of ourselves to reconfirm our civicness … as fundamental gestures opposite to globalisation without rules." (La Repubblica, 4 November 2002)

"We think that the best defense of our firms, of our shops, the best deterrent against any provocation of violent fringes, is the presence, the normal life of the Florentines and the shopkeepers in the streets and in the squares." (Mercurio, 01.12.2002)

In order to involve the city districts in the forum, the day before its official start a series of parties was organised by both shopkeepers and campaigners with the support of the presidents of different districts on five squares. The parties were mainly conceived for families with children.

The second axis of the awareness campaign focused on Florentine citizens and aimed at making available free accommodations for forum participants. The municipality had already provided various buildings to host large groups of participants. In addition, the campaign wanted "to offer a supplemental form of accommodation of great human quality and to favour occasions for contacts and mutual exchange between Florentines and participants in the forum" (http://firenzesocialforum.net/firenzeaperta). According to the promoter of the campaign, "this was not an objective need but we wanted to demonstrate that Florentines were so supportive to the forum that they were even willing to offer their houses" (interview 7). According to data collected by local organisers, between 700 and 800 Florentines finally hosted forum participants in their houses free of charge. However, many more people were accommodated in Florentines' houses during the forum via personal networks and not registered by the organisers.

The third axis of the awareness campaign aimed at providing information to the participants in the final demonstration. To this purpose, volunteers posited themselves along the route of by the demonstration to create a bridge between demonstrators and passers-by. Already in the two weeks preceding the event, the volunteers contacted the people living in the buildings along the route,

explained to them the idea of the social forum and the final demonstration, thereby trying to develop an atmosphere of trust.

"The work done in the city was so effective and this sense of the citizens' leading role linked to the event was really great. When we circulated an appeal to the Florentines to welcome the participants along the path of the demonstration, we prepared 600 bands to make them recognisable. Yet 1,300 people arrived! It was incredible!"

The forum itself was criticized by more radical groups as it was perceived as being closed, exclusive, and taking place in isolation within the fortress. In an attempt similar to the campaigns in the run-up described above, some groups tried to geographically extend the forum to the city, recalling the experience of Genoa where the different organizational networks assembled in "thematic squares" to communicate their specific ideas to the citizens. This strategy was also supposed to reach people who were not interested in the forum but who might pass by one of these squares accidentally.

2.2 The protest march

Of course, the march itself is considered to be an important element in communicating the forum to the population of the hosting city and beyond. It is conceived as a mass event concluding the forum. Due to their size of tens of thousands of participants, the marches are not only visible to the bystanders but are also reported in local, national and foreign media. As a rule, the participants in the forum are complemented by other political groups from the host country, thereby presenting a broad spectrum of claims and issues that can be related to the general idea of "Another Europe is possible". Probably with the exception of Florence where, due to the awareness campaign, a partial link between ESF participants and the local citizenry could be created, few "ordinary" citizens tend to join the march. To them, the march is more of a colourful spectacle than a framework in which they want to be included. But one also has to acknowledge that the marches are not only an outward-directed activity. They also serve to strengthen the collective identity of the Forum participants, who enjoy the relaxed atmosphere and the power in numbers.

2.3 Relations to Media

Even though informing and directly interacting with the local public was notoriously claimed a priority by the organisers, participants' evaluations of the past ESFs suggest that mass media resonance is to be perceived as one of the most important criteria for a successful forum. Of course, also the organisers are aware of the crucial role of mass media. However, the relationship to mass media is deeply ambivalent. As the prime source of information for uninvolved citizens, organizers consider mass media an important target to spread their message. At the same time, there are good reasons to be sceptical about this channel of information. The mechanisms of news production, the aspects of reality that are considered worth reporting and the political and social distance of many journalists and editors vis-à-vis non-institutional politics tend to produce a distorted picture of the forums.

The organisers of *the first ESF in Florence* already developed offers to journalists, such as one or more daily press conferences. In addition, every day there was an extra program for journalists consisting of three to four events, typically performed by well-known organisations or focusing on celebrities. However, as far as we know from the archived web presence, the program was presented in Italian only.[130] Besides the more top-down initiated relations to media, also other groups engaged in media work. Most notably, the ecopacifist network *Rete Lilliput* initiated the project "Journalists for one day". According to a press release of the network, a team of volunteers

[130] Resonance of the forum in Italian newspapers for twelve days is documented on the website.

and activists was set up to "collect comments, messages, and the more significant appeals launched by panelists participating in the ESF and, in the meantime, to collect information on all special things, news and developments that accompany the event." (http://lists.peacelink.it pcknews/msg03177.html).

For media contacts a dual structure was created: The local social forum was represented by six spokespersons (three females and three males), while the national organising committee was not represented by any spokesperson. This was a deliberate decision in contrast to the anti-G8 summit in Genoa, where Vittorio Agnoletto was recognised as the movements' only spokesperson. The absence of official spokespersons in the national committee produced a misunderstanding by many newspapers that tended to identify the spokespersons of the local forum with the spokespersons of the ESF as a whole.

While the national organising committee was criticised for being insufficiently engaged in communicating with the city of Florence and preparing its inhabitants for the forum, it developed a peculiar communicative strategy towards mass media based on what an interviewee referred to as "a kind of democratic communication." This strategy is illustrated by one of the committee members:

"We released documents that were agreed upon and that represented our line… it was a kind of democratic communication because you established some rules that everyone had to respect… I'm not sure that we can talk about an explicit strategy of communication on the part of the organisers. However, if I should point out a communication strategy, I would say that this mechanism of subdivision of the process was so strong that maybe it was the real strategy… the reports of our meetings were agreed upon at the end of the meetings and they were shared, especially the political and the programmatic part… this was particularly so for the internal communication." (Interview 4)

The same interviewee also refers to the strategy of external communication that should mark the distinctiveness of the forum when compared to more traditional left organisations:

"As for the external (communication), when we were contacted by journalists we decided each time whom to send… One of the strategies consisted in letting less known people speak with journalist because we wanted to transmit the egalitarian spirit among us… The journalists faced unknown people, but in the end some of them told us that this strategy of a plurality of voices proved to be effective. It was used to mark our difference in comparison with political parties. In the beginning, journalists were lost because they were expecting a single spokesperson or two/three spokespersons while they had instead to cope with many people." (Ibidem).

The spokespersons of the local social forum reported that they accompanied some journalists to explain the forum, but the journalists' general attitude was quite problematic. As she remembered:

"One day I accompanied a reporter of the *Corriere della Sera*. I was astonished when we met and he said 'bring me to have a walk around and understand a bit these noglobals'. Then I had a walk with him in the Fortress and he complained 'no, I don't want to see these ones! Bring me to see those strange, those smoking joints'. Hence it was clear that they were looking for things like that." (Interview 5).

Another spokesperson of the local social forum referred to similar episodes:

"Radio and press journalists were completely unleashed, always asking if something was happening somewhere, if someone had beaten someone else, and then the repeated question was everywhere 'Did something happen?'. Each time there was an enormous disappointment because at the end of every day nothing had happened. Even the tiniest episode did not happen… a broken window, or… and thus you saw these groups of journalists that were really frustrated and they seemed to say 'what the hell are we doing here?'" (Interview 3).

In the preparation of the *ESF in Paris in 2003*, again the organisers considered interaction with mass media to be a key problem. In an analysis of the relation between ESF and media, Sandrine

Lévêque (2005) portrays the conflict between adapting to the needs of mass media and criticising them. The ESF in Paris certainly made a leap forward in the professionalisation of PR work. A press centre was established at the venue to supply journalists with the infrastructure they needed. It was accessible for accredited journalists only, while alternative media activists had their own media centre near by. In order to give a voice to the polyphonic event, two spokespersons were hired on a part-time basis. They distributed one press release in French, English, Spanish, and Italian every day of the forum to a list of 2,000 journalists. Email and telephone contacts to both spokespersons were offered on the website. Also, the archiving of the media coverage was conducted in a professional way by an external company that filed reports from September to November 2003. Interest of the media was already impressive before the start of the event. 300 to 400 journalists attended a press conference prior to the ESF.

In the light of these professional media relations, it is no wonder that press resonance was considered among the most important criteria for the success of the event as a whole. This aspect occupied half of the evaluation report that was produced by the paid staff after the event (Lévêque 2005: 77). These steps towards professionalisation were taken to reach the main aims in public relations: visibility and homogeneity. Yet the aim to present the event as "univoque" (Lévêque 2005: 77) or – as one of the spokesperson said in an interview – "as if the Forum was a person" (Interview 12), resulted in the separation between political and organisational aspects. The spokespersons decided to present the ESF as a concept, abstaining from clear political messages. No wonder that members of the organising committee considered the PR work as a flop. The vague political statements by the press officers and their focus on logistics was of little interest for the journalists (Lévêque 2005: 81). As a consequence, many journalists ignored or circumvented the press officers by using pre-existing contacts to interview political celebrities.

A more effective element of the public relations concept was to display a unifying symbol for the event as a whole. The ESF logo, applied to T-Shirts and paraphernalia, was very present in the city of Paris. It was even used by the mass media in their reports about the forum. The logo also symbolised the identity of the social forum process on an international scale. The European network of Local Social Forums and the social forum in Germany used it as a template for their logo.

Even though the organisers emphasised professional media contacts, the criticism of mass media by activist groups played an important role in the discussions of the ESF. Sandrine Lévêque identifies three strands of criticism (Lévêque 2005: 83): The first strand was represented by experts present in discussions and workshops that were dealing with "processes of marketisation of information". The second strand of criticism emanated from three forums organised by leftist and/or alternative media: "Archipel des revues", "Metallos Medialab" and "Projet K", harbouring Marxist media. The third strand of criticism was represented by journalists' trade unions that discussed the problems of news production in the framework of the ESF. The prominence of critical media at the ESF in Paris fits well into a national trajectory of the *mouvement altermondialiste*. In France, *Le Monde Diplomatique*, a monthly left journal that played an important role in the foundation of Attac and as a site for a critical debate of globalisation, was a natural ally of the organisers of the ESF.

The London event in 2004 was the one in the ESF series that attracted most criticism by grassroots activists. In general, it had a similar PR layout as Paris. The adaptation to the needs of commercial journalism was even more definite. The most important difference was the monopolisation of media relations by one person. As a service for journalists, the ESF website included a section to access press releases and information about accrediting. According to the website, 600 journalists seized the opportunity to report on the ESF.[131] Criticism that was raised against the PR work resembles in part the general objections against the organisation of the forum. Critics interpreted the fact that only one person was in charge for media contacts as an expression of the hierarchical style of the organisation as a whole. Criticism was also expressed because the ESF website was technically administered by the *Greater London Authority* and access was limited to a

[131] See http://www.ukesf.net/en/ (last access: 25 January, 2007).

small group.[132] Although a handful of seminars dealt with the biases of commercial news production and the opportunities of self-organised community media, the critical debate that characterised the ESF in Paris was not promoted by the organisers in London. While the Paris ESF found a balance to fulfil the needs of both mass media and alternative media, the latter were largely neglected in London. Activist journalists were even denied access to the press centre facilities. The seizure of two Indymedia computer servers on October 7, 2004 by FBI agents without any justification made an independent coverage on the ESF even more difficult. Because of this interference, about twenty national and regional sites of the international network (among them the British, Italian, Portuguese, and parts of the German site) were not available.

In the *Athens ESF in 2005*, as a reaction to the criticism of the London ESF and an expression of the collectivist spirit of the organisers, the media work was performed by a group of five activists, one of them identifiable as an ESF press officer. The self-conception of the press team was facilitating contacts between journalists and activists rather than providing a service to the mass media. However, the team issued press releases that were available in Greek and English. A press centre was established at the venue, but the website did not have special features for journalists. In an interview some of the organisers reported that access to the media was made possible through journalists, who were on friendly terms with the activists. In addition, the organisers tried to benefit from a domestic law that assures air time in public media to social messages. To their regret, this opportunity was not effectively used because of organisational and practical flaws (Interview 13). In their evaluation, the organisers emphasised the high number of locals who visited the forum. They also pointed to the number of some 70,000 protestors at the final march, interpreting this as a success in politicising people in Greece.[133] On the other hand, the march was also discredited in the eyes of some of the media, because of violent clashes between some radical demonstrators and police. The fact that there were also some fistfights among rival groups in the demonstration provoked strong criticism among the organisers, but went largely unnoticed by the media.

2.4 Media coverage

This section focuses on the press coverage of the ESFs in the respective host country and in two other countries – Spain and Germany – where no ESF took place thus far.[134]

As a novel event in the spirit of the WSF, the first ESF in Florence triggered broad media coverage. Riots and police brutality in the context of protests against the G8 summit in Genoa in July 2001 added to the attentive attitude of the media towards the Florence ESF. After the Genoa events, Prime Minister Berlusconi had hallucinated about "definite devastations" he expected to take place in the context of the forum. The conservative newspapers echoed this excitement. To them, Florence prepared for the "no global risk" (Corriere della Sera, 6 October, 2002). The day after the official start of the forum, the "Corriere della Sera" published an open letter to the citizens of Florence written by the Florentine journalist Oriana Fallaci:

"Have dignity … express your indignation … close the shops … close the restaurants, the bars, the markets. Close the theatres, the cinemas, the pharmacies. Close everything, pull down portcullises, expose there the cartel that the braves put in 1922 when Mussolini's fascists made the

[132] Also, the nomination process for the press officer was deemed intransparent. For a summary of the criticism see: http://www.euromovements.info/upload/esf_media.doc (last access: 25 January 2007).

[133] Especially the fact that so many people could be mobilised independent from the Greek communist Party was seen as a leap forward in the autonomy of the Greek social movements (see the report on the ESF by Yannis Almpanis, http://lists.fse-esf.org/pipermail/fse-esf/2006-May/000962.html, last access: 30 January, 2007).

[134] For each country, the analysed newspapers comprise a conservative and a liberal outlet. These are for Italy: Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica; for France: Le Figaro, Le Monde; for the UK: The Telegraph, The Guardian; for Greece Kathimerini, Eleytherotypia, for Spain: El Mundo, El País; and for Germany Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung. Die tageszeitung (Germany) is added for illustrative reasons.

march on Rome. Closed for mourning… and don't send your children to school… impose yourself a sort of curfew, feel as you felt in 1944 when the Germans have blown up our bridges".

While conservative papers seem to agree with Fallaci – *The Telegraph*, for instance, quoted "the prominent Florentine author and journalist" with her view on the global justice activists as "people who respect Saddam Hussein, love Osama bin Laden, and bow before the military and theocratic regimes of Islam" (9 November, 2002), liberal newspapers took a different stance. For example, the German *Süddeutsche Zeitung* qualified Fallaci's statements as "insults that are typical for her" (8 November, 2002). Many of our interviewees quote Fallaci's letter and also refer to some other manipulative accounts before and during the days of the social forum. An exemplary case is a report of the local newspaper *La Nazione*. The day after the official start of the forum, the newspaper presented a report on its front page entitled "This is how the noglobals started to destroy Florence". A photograph displayed a broken bench in piazza Santa Croce, where a cultural event opening the forum took place the day before. Actually, the benches were removed by the local administration because one tourist had a problem with them (Interview 1).

During the days of the forum, several correspondents mentioned the pressure exerted by their directors and editorial staff to report negatively on the event. The correspondent of the most important Italian newspaper, *Corriere della Sera*, decided to quit his job after some of his articles reporting positively about the forum were censored by his director (Interview 8). In order to protest against the negative media campaign, journalists belonging to the Italian organising committee sent a public letter to the National Federation of the Italian Press (the national unitary journalists' union) after the forum. Under the title "we feel ashamed to be journalist" they stated:

"This circumstance has revealed dramatically a real democratic emergency and a deep pathology of the way to produce information. The campaign of hate and terror created by the press against the Florence forum is without precedent in the republican history." (Carta, 14 November, 2002)

The letter provides many examples of manipulation of reality and points to the fact that a great part of the mainstream media used images of the Genoa 2001 counter-summit to describe and stigmatise the Florence ESF. Furthermore, the letter accused the public television RAI of never having replied to the request of the forum's organisers to provide a live broadcast of the final demonstration. Instead, the demonstration was finally transmitted by a minor private national TV channel (La Sette) only. More generally, only the more marginal and/or the local media tended to be receptive to the ESF, as indicated by the director of an alternative radio:

"The local media coverage was amazing because the event contained very strong features… a significant ingredient of communication was this extremely interesting group of people that visited the local shops and told 'we are the people of the social forum, give a look to us, we are normal people, you don't have to be scared about us, we are interested in topics such as water as a common good while we are not interested in violent actions'. This was a conciliative element of communication bypassing radios, televisions, newspapers, new media, etc. It was very old but also very modern: the old door-to-door performed by party candidates forty years ago. Getting back to face-to-face had its efficacy." (Interview 8)

As already stated above, mainstream media devoted early attention to the forum. Rather than addressing the contents of the forum, the Florence ESF was presented as the sequel of the anti-G8 summit of Genoa and the forum participants as people who would vandalise the city. The communicative strategy of the organisers was a desperate effort aimed at changing public opinion and presenting themselves as reliable and non-violent. A spokesperson of the local social forum clarifies the logics of news production well:

"When we convened press conferences we tried to talk about topics of the forum but the journalists always asked questions about the demonstration, the path of the march, the participants, the violent groups coming to the demonstration, etc. This is what they only wanted to know during

press conferences! We always tried to move the discussion on the contents but this was clearly not appealing for them." (Interview 2)

However, one of the members of the ESF press office reported the case of Jeffrey Brady, a journalist of the New York Times, who had experienced the forum in developing a positive attitude towards it. This may also explain the very good coverage of the demonstration of the February 15, 2003 against an imminent war in Iraq. This "global day of action" was proclaimed the European assembly of social movements at the end of the forum in Florence. According to *CNN*, 110 million people responded to the social movements' call for this demonstration. The journalist of the New York Times, who described this political event as "the birth of the second world power" was the same who covered the Florence ESF.

In Paris, thanks to the professional media work but also to the strong interests of some left newspapers in the forum in Paris, media coverage was not only extensive, but also positive, especially in left-wing media. *L'Humanité*, *Liberation* and *Le Monde* outbid each other in publishing special issues, columns and announcements that encouraged the French to join the Forum (Lévêque 2005: 92). Some papers even published the programme for every day. Pictures show nice young people evoking a positive image of the event. Thanks to *Agence France Press* that distributed a lot of wires also many local newspapers featured the forum on their front pages. The forum was also an issue for conservative media. Even though some articles had a critical or derogatory tone, the coverage was quite exhaustive, maybe in part as a reaction to the hype produced by leftist media. This explains why the Paris ESF received a broader coverage than the three other ESFs in twelve European newspapers (see Figure 2). In a search for articles that contained the phrase "European Social Forum" in the respective language, most articles covered the ESF in France. The most important issues that were taken up by the French mass media were the expected effects of the forum on French and European politics. Especially the presence of established political players such as the socialist party was of interest to the media. Another issue was the integration of Muslims in Europe, triggered by the appearance of the Swiss orientalist Tariq Ramadan.

Figure 2 - Coverage of the ESFs in ten European newspapers[135]



With the exception of the ESF media partner *Guardian* that announced the event as "the most important political gathering in Britain" (17 December, 2003), the ESF in London did not attract much attention among the analysed newspapers. All articles on this event add to a total of 61, which is equivalent to a quarter of the articles published on the ESF in Paris. The scarce resonance is also lamented by activists. Susan George writes in the *Guardian*: "not many Britons are aware that tens of thousands of thinkers and activists from across Europe and beyond gather this week in London for the third European Social Forum (ESF)" (15 October, 2004). *The Telegraph* does not devote much space to cover a "world full of alarming contradictions" (17 October, 2004) where capitalism is rejected and at the same time Che Guevara T-shirts are sold for ten pounds each. More generally, it is especially the conservative papers that lost interest in the forum and state an "altermondialiste fatigue" (Le Figaro, 22 October, 2004). The main issues in the London coverage are the war in Iraq, the ambivalence of Labour's Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, as a supporter and usurper of the event, and the participation of Che Guevara's daughter Aleida in a panel discussion. Even if there is one article in the *Guardian* about the contested domination of the forum by the *Greater London Authorities* and national trade unions, this topic tends to be belittled in other articles of this paper.[136]

The subsequent forum in Athens attracted the least attention. This applies even to newspapers that were open-minded about the social forum model. For example, the *Guardian* that had accompanied the forum in London with sympathy now refers to the "cuddly anarchists" (23 April, 2006) who are seen as a minor threat on the part of the authorities after September 11, 2001. In Greece, the host country of the ESF, national attention was directed to the forum due to a mere coincidence. A major football match was postponed because the necessary police force was foreseen to protect Athens during the mass demonstration. Even though one might presume that the threat to a national sport might raise hot tempers, the ESF coverage was not affected in a negative way. In the international context, the only incident that triggered media coverage also in

[135] Greek papers are pending.
[136] Critics of the unions' and the authorities' dominance are compared to Margaret Thatcher, who understood the trade unions as the "enemy within" the country (The Guardian, 16 October 2004).

conservative newspapers was the huge anti-war demonstration on February 15, 2003. Hopes of drawing media attention to the forum by organising a large final demonstration at the ESFs proved to be highly ambiguous. The most positively perceived event in this respect was probably the peaceful demonstration in Florence that contrasted sharply with the fear-mongering of the Italian government and the conservative media. The demonstration four years later in Athens, by contrast, was accompanied by clashes between anarchists and the police. As a sure-fire news value, the violence drew the attendance of most of the media coverage for the entire ESF. In Germany, the majority of the newspapers reduced their coverage to this particular incident, while the forum as such was of secondary importance only.[137] Protests including or even marginally associated with violence can hardly expect media coverage that includes the basic facts, be it the most important claim or the group organising the event (Blickhan & Teune 2003, Gitlin 1980, Halloran et al. 1970). A demonstration as a colourful and spectacular event, particularly if associated with violence, tends to trigger episodic forms of press coverage, focussing on the specific features of one single event rather than on thematic forms that would reflect processes and contexts (for the distinction of thematic and episodic coverage see: Iyengar 1991: 14).

Looking at the media coverage on the ESFs over time and comparing the news from six countries, three trends are obvious: proximity is the key explanatory factor for the amount of press coverage, the media interest in the event decreases over time, and liberal and conservative media differ widely in their coverage.

It is only too obvious that in every country that hosts the ESF the coverage in this particular country increases significantly (in France the number of articles explodes) at least for the time of the event. Then, reports go deeper than providing the basic facts (as usual when the forum takes place in other countries). Especially in the first three forums, the attitude of the national and local government towards the event is a major issue for the press. Whereas the first forum was condemned by the national government in Italy and supported by the local authorities of Florence and Tuscany, the discussion around the Paris and London ESFs focused on the financial and logistic support by officials. The ESF is also taken as an opportunity to discuss issues such as domestic security (Italy), Muslim integration (Paris) or the Iraq war and the left leaning of London's Mayor. In the same vein, an ESF held in a foreign country becomes an issue as soon as domestic politics are affected. In France, for instance, the coverage of the ESF starts even before the first meeting in Florence just because there was a prior discussion on having the first meeting in Paris or Florence. In Spain, the ESF in Athens was attracting media attention as soon as Rafael Díez Usabiaga, a Basque trade unionist charged with supporting the illegal Batasuna party, was allowed to exit the country to attend the ESF. This issue is mentioned in four of five articles both in *El Mundo* and *El País* that refer to the ESF.

Beyond the national characteristics in the aspects being reported, the extent of press coverage has decreased over time. In the evaluation of the London forum, a fleeting "newness" was identified as a reason for the sparse resonance (Lee 2004: 12). Even the German *tageszeitung*, a newspaper that emerged from discussions in the German social movements in the 1970s and still claims to share the concerns of movement activists, gradually lost interest in the ESF (Figure 3 shows). The fading interest in the ESF is not only apparent in the newspapers' space devoted to the forum, but also in the positioning of their reports. While the forum made it to the front page during the first three forums, the Athens forum almost disappeared in the paper. This stands in stark contrast to the Florence ESF, which was reported on by various journalists in different sections of the paper.

[137] The fact that violent clashes also occurred among competing protest groups is not portrayed.

Figure 3 - Extent of press coverage in the German die tageszeitung



The view of liberal and conservative newspapers of the ESF is not completely opposite. However, liberal papers tend to devote more space to the forums. Also, they emphasise different aspects and exhibit more support for the movements. Regarding the first ESF in particular, liberal media applaud the congregation of critical activists. The euphoria in view of an "alternative citizenship" (El País, 15 November, 2002) that is partly written in pamphlet-style, however, fades away with the London forum at the latest. At this point, the forum is just a "receptacle for do-gooders" (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18 October, 2004) even for liberal papers. For the ESF in Athens, both liberal and conservative devote the same amount of articles to the event and even the content of the coverage does not differ significantly.

3. Evaluation of the forum

As in any other large international social movement gathering, the resources of the ESFs organizers are notoriously scarce. Moreover, individuals and groups with strikingly different experiences and political stances take part. Given such a situation, it is not rare that conflicts and misunderstandings, errors, and organizational failures did occur. So from an internal viewpoint, the ESFs often looks chaotic. On the other hand, however, the mere fact of tens of thousands of people taking part in the many workshops and performances can be considered as a success. Hence, the organizers of every of the four ESFs tend to be basically satisfied that the event actually took place without any major disasters. The fact that the last ESF in Athens attracted significantly less participants than the three preceding gatherings should not be considered as an indicator for a decline of the forum process. Rather it has to do with Greece as a country that is on the periphery of Europe and thus far has not had developed strong global justice movements. Also, the late decision on the date of the Athens ESF may have contributed to lower the number of participants.

Regarding the organization of the communication around the forum, an assessment has to keep in mind the various dimensions of the process as well as different criteria for success.

Internal communication among the organizers is sometimes cumbersome, marked by organizational rivalry and power struggles, but somehow works in spite of many frictions. In every ESF, a new division of labor has to be found among the major players, i.e. the local organizing committee, the national organizing committee, and the European Preparatory Assemblies that are held every few months in a different place.

The communication of the organizers with (potential) participants is not overly demanding or difficult. Prior to the meeting, the event is announced mainly via the internet and more conventional means such as newsletters and flyers distributed by and within political groups across Europe and, most importantly, in the hosting country. So far, no systematic attempt has been made to evaluate the ESFs from the perspective of the "ordinary" participants, although such plans did exist. From our own insights and accounts in our environment, we have the impression that most participants tend to criticize certain aspects of the communication process, e.g. the late presentation of the programme and the many changes made in the last minute, but are satisfied or even energized by the event as a whole.

The organizers who are directly confronted with complaints and failures tend to arrive at a differentiated and sometimes contradictory assessment. Those who are keen to get extensive, and possible sympathetic, mass media attention tend to be disappointed. For most of the journalists, the ESF is just one of the countless events that occur and with which they do not identify. Accordingly, most media reports tend to be short, superficial, and often focusing on what the activists perceive as side aspects. Moreover, as it has been shown, the media's interest in the ESFs is decreasing rather than increasing over time. This leads to a skeptical assessment of those who have been responsible for public relations strategies.

Last but not least, within the ESF process there are groups who would not measure the effect of communication strategies in terms of media coverage. This is particularly true for those engaged in the so-called autonomous spaces. Instead, these activists believe in the value of direct face-to-face communication, in small group experiences that allow for intense participation, deliberation and grassroots democracy. These and other groups also deplore the increasing weight of formal organizations, e.g. political parties and trade unions that was particularly obvious in Athens.

4. Conclusion

The comparison of ways to communicate the ESF at its four meetings taking place thus far has shown a variety of approaches that mirror the peculiarities of the respective organisational processes. Each ESF meeting has been characterised by specific discussions and problems that had an effect on the flow of information. The first ESF in Florence (in 2002) took place in a rather hostile environment. This induced the forum activists to invent forms of communication that were appropriate to such a situation. They succeeded in doing so with a number of creative campaigns that addressed the citizens of Florence directly. At least the liberal media were supportive of this new form of political activism. As a consequence, the first ESF had a positive public image. This might have been amplified by the negative ascriptions made in advance that turned out not to be true. For the second ESF in Paris (in 2003), the environment was much more relaxed and supportive than in Florence. Local authorities, the national government, and large part of the mass media welcomed the meeting. In this situation, the forum organisers had the opportunity to give room to both professionalized media relations and a critique of the logics mass media tend to follow. The forms of communication that could be observed at the third forum in London (in 2004) mirrored much of the organising process that had been criticised by grassroots activists for being "vertical" and bureaucratic. Media relations were monopolised by one press officer, and the administration of the ESF website was restricted to a small circle of contractors. The monopolising communication strategy, however, could not compensate for the fading interest of mass media in the event. This trend was still visible on occasion of the fourth ESF in Athens (in 2006). The large European newspapers provided only scarce information about the meeting and the demonstration march.

Though the negative trend of London with a decline in public attention and the number of participants continued in Athens, a qualitative change in the communication and mobilisation strategy was obvious. First, the organisation of the forum was more open and transparent. Second, the Greek organisers succeeded in mobilising large groups of participants from central and Eastern Europe who did not participate in the preceding fora in Western European countries.

The debates evolving around the question how to communicate the forum to the public have been very productive, at least for part of the GJMs. The criticism that was raised against the hierarchical and univocal PR concept that was most obvious in London resulted in a different concept of media relations as practiced by the *dissent!* network during the protest against the G8 summit in Gleneagles (CounterSpin Collective 2005). Organisers concerned with media relations present themselves as a group of equals and define themselves as facilitators who enable journalists to meet activists rather than presenting themselves as central and authoritative "press officers". As far as the ESF process is concerned, adaptation to the needs of professional journalists was perceived as negative once it became the single most important aim of communication. In the aftermath of the London meeting, activists abandoned this strategy, re-emphasising the importance of alternative media and resisting the journalists demand for a single spokesperson.

Even though relations with established media continue to be one of the most important way to communicate the forum, unmediated forms of communication continue to play a significant role. Posters and banners are used to announce the event and the demonstration is part and parcel of the forum. The organisers of the forum in Athens also attracted a lot of uninvolved citizens by offering an appealing cultural program. Overlooking the ESF communication processes since 2002, it is obvious that every national organising team develops its own ways of spreading information about the ESF and defines their priorities anew.

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Interviewees

1 – Cristiano Lucchi, rete Lilliput (ESF press officer).
2 – Gregorio Malavolti, Arci/DS, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum and administrative staff, national organizational committee.
3 – Tommaso Fattori, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum and national organizing committee.
4 – Bruno Paladini, Cobas/Mat, national organizing committee (Working Group on organization, logistics and finance).
5– Sara Nocentini, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum and national organizing committee.
6 – Stefano Kovac, ICS/Arci, national organizational committee (Working Group on organization, logistics and finance).

7 – Massimo Torelli, Florence local social forum, inventor of the awareness campaign “Firenze Città Aperta”.
8 – Raffaele Palumbo, director of ControRadio/Popolare network.
9 – Graziella Bertozzo, Arcilesbica, spokesperson of the Florence local social forum.
10 – Jason Nardi, director of OneWorld Italy, administrative staff, Working Group on communication.
11 – Marco de Filippi, Social Press, Working Group on communication.
12 – Julie Paratian, spokesperson of the Paris ESF (7 February 2007)
13 – Interview with four members of the Greek organising committee (7 November 2006)
14 – Miguel Urbán. Espacio Alternativo. Spain
15 – Ramón Fernández Durán. Ecologistas en Acción. Spain
16 – Iñigo Errejón. Asamblea contra la Mercantilización de la Información (ACME). Spain
17 – Parys Chrysos, Kokkino (RED). Greece
18 – Isis Estellés. Socialist Worker. United Kingdom

Appendix 1 Links: Articles in spanish websites after the ESF

Jovenes de IU (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
http://www.jovenesdeiu-madrid.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=790&Itemid=127

Quién debe a quién:(Last accessed 7 February 2007)
- http://www.quiendebeaquien.org/spip.php?article192

Corriente Roja: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.nodo50.org/corrienteroja/articulo.php?p=2383&more=1&c=1
-http://www.nodo50.org/corrienteroja/articulo.php?p=2304&more=1&c=1

APDHA
-http://www.apdha.org/nosotros/infoapdha/2006/120506.htm#6

La Haine: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.lahaine.org/index.php?blog=4&p=20101
-http://www.lahaine.org/index.php?blog=3&p=14691

STES: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.stes.es/informacion/060403_atenas.html
-http://www.stes.es/comunicacion/clarion/clarion15/EC15pp%208-9.pdf

Attac Madrid: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.attacmadrid.org/d/6/060327192055.php
-http://www.attacmadrid.org/d/7/060605131147_php/060605131147.php

Nodo50 (links to other websites): (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://barcelona.indymedia.org/newswire/display/255845/index.php
-http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=el&article_id=500980#500995
-http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=el&article_id=500918
-http://www.babylonia.gr/video_download.php?id=17
-http://www.babylonia.gr/video_download.php?id=16
-http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=el&article_id=500956
-http://www.socialforum.gr/english_index.htm
-http://estrecho.indymedia.org/newswire/display/24588/index.php
-http://athens.indymedia.org/front.php3?lang=en&article_id=500980
-http://www.redconvoz.org/IMG/mp3/200605091.mp3

Espacio Alternativo: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.espacioalternativo.org/node/1437

-http://www.espacioalternativo.org/node/1391

-Ecologistas en Acción: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org/article_pdf.php3?id_article=5087

Appendix 2: Links: Articles on English websites before the ESF

National Assembly Against Racism: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.naar.org.uk/events/esf.asp

Green Party: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://lists.greenparty.org.uk/pipermail/yg-international/2006-January/000008.html
-http://lists.greenparty.org.uk/pipermail/yg-international/2005-December/000006.html
-http://lists.greenparty.org.uk/pipermail/yg-international/2005-November/000003.html

Red Pepper: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.redpepper.org.uk/Jan2005/x-Jan2005-debatingESF.htm

New Statesman: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.newstatesman.com/200605080019

Indymedia UK: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
- http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/westcountry/2006/04/338735.html
- http://www.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/world/2005/07/319302.html?c=on
- https://www1.indymedia.org.uk/en/2004/10/299354.html?c=on
- https://indymedia.org.uk/en/2005/07/319302.html?c=on
- https://www1.indymedia.org.uk/en/regions/world/2006/03/335643.html?c=on

War on Want: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.waronwant.org/Blogging+from+the+European+Social+Forum+12055.twl

After the ESF: Unison: (Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-http://www.unison.org.uk/file/3021.pdf

Appendix 3 Analyzed website

Spanish websites (For all of them, Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-Asamblea contra la Mercantilización de la Educación, ACME (http://www.nodo50.org/acme)
-Red Ciudadana por la Abolición de la Deuda Externa (http://www.rcade.org)-Baladre, Coordinación estatal de luchas contra el paro, la pobreza y la exclusión social (http://www.redasociativa.org/baladre)
-Otra Democracia es Posible (http://otrademocraciaesposible.net)
-Asociación por la Tasación de Transacciones Financieras para Ayuda de los Ciudadanos - Madrid (http://www.attacmadrid.org)
-Justicia y Paz (http://www.juspax-es.org)
-Coordinadora Estatal contra la Constitución Europea (http://www.nodo50.org/noconstitucion)
-Plataforma Aturem la Guerra (http://www.fundacioperlapau.org/iraq/plataforma.htm)
-Grupo Antimilitarista de Carabanchel (http://www.nodo50.org/moc-carabanchel)
-Mujeres en Red (http://www.mujeresenred.net)
-Jóvenes de IU-Madrid (http://www.jovenesdeiu-madrid.org)
-Ecologistas en Acción (http://www.ecologistasenaccion.org)
-Confederación de Sindicatos de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza, STES (http://www.stes.es)
-Xarxa de Mobilització Global (http://www.xarxaglobal.net)
-Hemen eta Munduan (www.nodo50.org/hemenetamunduan)
-Confederación General del Trabajo (http://www.cgt.es)
-Intermón-Oxfam (http://www.intermonoxfam.org)

-Red de Apoyo Zapatista de Madrid (www.nodo50.org/raz)
-Derechos Para Todos (http://www.nodo50.org/derechosparatodos)
-Red Acoge - Federación de Asociaciones pro Inmigrantes (http://www.redacoge.org)
-Izquierda Unida (http://www.izquierda-unida.es/federal)
-Espacio Alternativo (http://www.espacioalternativo.org)
-Corriente Roja (http://www.nodo50.org/corrienteroja)
-Coordinadora Estatal de Comercio Justo (http://www.ecomerciojusto.org)
-Amnistía Internacional - España (http://www.es.amnesty.org)
-Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía APDHA (http://www.apdha.org)
-Diagonal (http://www.diagonalperiodico.net)
-Red con Voz (http://www.redconvoz.org)
-Indymedia Barcelona (http://barcelona.indymedia.org)
-Nodo50 (http://www.nodo50.org)
-Foro Social de Palencia (http://www.comunica-accion.org/fspalencia)
-Foro Social de Sevilla (http://www.forosocialsevilla.org)
-Fòrum Social de Barcelona (http://www.forumsocialbarcelona.org)
-Sindicatos de Estudiantes (http://www.sindicatodeestudiantes.org)
-Plataforma Rural (http://www.cdrtcampos.es/plataforma_rural)
-La Haine (http://www.lahaine.org)
-Sindominio (http://sindominio.net)
-Consulta Social Madrid (http://www.nodo50.org/cse-madrid/web)

English websites (For all of them, Last accessed 7 February 2007)
-Jubilee Debt Campaign (http://www.jubileedebtcampaign.org.uk)
-Tobin Tax Network (http://www.tobintax.org.uk)
-Pax Christi UK (http://www.paxchristi.org.uk)
-Christian Aid (http://www.christian-aid.org.uk)
-Stop the War Coalition (http://www.stopwar.org.uk/press.asp)
-National Assemby of Women (http://www.sisters.org.uk)
-People and Planet (http://www.peopleandplanet.org)
-Friends of the Earth (http://www.foe.co.uk)
-Unison (http://www.unison.org.uk)
-Transport and General Workers Union (http://www.tgwu.org.uk)
-Anarchist Federation (http://flag.blackened.net/af)
-Wombles (http://www.wombles.org.uk)
-Oxfam (http://www.oxfam.org.uk)
-Sexual Freedom Coalition (http://www.sfc.org.uk)
-National Assembly Against Racism (http://www.naar.org.uk)
-Green Party (http://www.greenparty.org.uk)
-Fair Trade Foundation (http://www.fairtrade.org.uk)
-World Development Movement (http://www.wdm.org.uk)
-Red Pepper (http://www.redpepper.org.uk)
-Radio Rampart (http://www.rampartradio.co.nr)
-New Statesman (http://www.newstatesman.co.uk)
-Indymedia UK (http://www.indymedia.org.uk)
-Schnews (http://www.schnews.org.uk)
-London Social Forum (http://www.londonsocialforum.org.uk)
-Sheffield Social Forum (http://www.sheffieldsocialforum.org)
-The Muslim Association of Britain (http://www.mabonline.info/english)
-Dissent! Network (http://www.dissent.org.uk)
-Globalise Resistance (http://www.resist.org.uk)
-Rising Tide (http://www.risingtide.org.uk)
-War on Want (http://www.waronwant.org)

-Socialist Workers (http://www.socialistworker.co.uk)
-Committee to Defend Asylum Seekers (http://www.defend-asylum.org)
-Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (http://www.cafod.org.uk)
-Urban 75 (http://www.urban75.com)
-Make Poverty History Coalition (http://www.makepovertyhistory.org)
-Trade justice movement (http://www.tradejusticemovement.org.uk)
-Global Justice Movement (http://www.globaljusticemovement.net)

German websites (For all of them, Last accessed 3 February 2007)
-ATTAC Deutschland: http://www.attac.de
-Solid (Germany): http://www.solid-web.de

Greek websites (For all of them, Last accessed 2 February 2007)
-Kokkino (RED): http://www.kokkino.org
-Synaspismos Party: http://www.syn.gr

Chapter 10

The European Left and the ESF

by Massimiliano Andretta and Herbert Reiter

1. Introduction

When entering the public scene, with the protests against the third World Trade Organization conference in November 1999 in Seattle, the global justice movement (GJM) presented itself as an unusual coalition of traditional organizations, new social movements, and groups emerging with the contestation of neoliberal globalization. The organizers of the Seattle protests in fact included "turtles and teamsters", i.e. activists of the Sea Turtle Restoration Project and trade unionists, with a spectrum reaching from the People for Fair Trade/Network opposed to WTO (PTF), to the Direct Action Network (DAN), and the American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) with its local affiliates (Levi and Murphy 2006, 652).

Since Seattle, similar alliances have spread from the new to the old continent, with however one important difference between the GJM in the USA and in Europe: organizations of the socialist or communist tradition, including political parties, are largely absent from the former, but quite central for the latter. It is with these parties and organizations that the large European trade unions historically are closely intertwined (Bartolini 2000). Alongside this block of parties, trade unions, and collateral organizations, which we consider as the "traditional left", in the European GJM we find a "radical left" sector of parties, grassroots trade unions and groups of an autonomous, anarchist or trotzkyist tradition, with their roots in the New Left of the 1970s (della Porta and Rucht 1995; Tarrow 1989). In the following chapter we will analyse the involvement of traditional left and of radical left organizations and activists in the GJM, their integration into GJM decision-making, and in particular the democratic models that they advance.

In the first part of the chapter, dedicated to the involvement of organizations of the traditional and the radical left in the social forum process, we will use documents of our left organizations as sources (we conducted a search of their websites for documents related to the rise of the GJM and to the ESF process), as well as the programmes of the ESFs, and material connected with the organization of the successive forums. We will first briefly sketch some national differences in the traditions of the left, which may have contributed to differences in organizational involvement in the GJM. We will then discuss the reactions of the European left to the emerging GJM, characterized for socialist and social democratic organizations by a protracted diffidence, whereas organizations with a communist past, together with the groups of the radical left, embraced the movement from early on. For the socialists, differences with the GJM about the answers to develop to the challenges of globalization are particularly evident, including the question of democratic governance. However, also the communist parties, in particular when prepared to sustain centre-left governments, experience internal tension between those privileging the institutional political arena and those privileging participation in the movement. The radical left, critical of any involvement in government, to varying degrees favour the function of the social forum as a space of interlinking for action and resistance, up to theorizing a "forum of struggle", with the overarching strategy to build an alternative to "the system". We will further sketch the role played by traditional and radical left organizations within the European Social Forum process. Important resources, fundamental for the holding of the forums in Florence, Paris, London and Athens, were in fact provided by these organizations, including those of the traditional left with socialist and social democratic roots. Traditional and radical left organizations also figure prominently in the programmes of the ESFs as organizers of seminars and workshops. In addition, activists of organizations of both the traditional and the radical left constituted a considerable portion of those directly involved in the preparation of the successive ESFs, e.g. in the European Preparatory Assemblies (EPA).

The second part of this chapter is dedicated to an analysis of our activist survey conducted at the ESF in Athens in 2006. We will first present some indicators of the presence of the European left in the successive ESFs from Florence to Athens. Isolating the activists that declared a traditional left or a radical left group as the one most important to them, we will present the socio-graphic and national characteristics of these activists and indicate differences in the patterns of political activism. It is, in fact, the traditional leftists which show the closest proximity to more conventional and in particular party oriented forms of activism. Our analysis of the involvement of leftist activists in the GJM, however, will show the strong participation of the traditional and of the radical leftists in both GJM activities and decision-making. In the final part of our chapter we will concentrate on the perception activists have of the democratic practices in their group of reference, confronting them with their ideals of democracy. Our findings seem to indicate processes of diffusion, filtered, however, through existing organizational cultures. If the ideal of direct participation is overwhelmingly supported also by activists of the traditional left, deliberation, although supported by large sectors, emerges as majoritarian only among activists of those newest social movements directly connected with the rise of the GJM. Traditional left activists show the greatest incongruence between perceived democratic practices and ideals, being at the same time those most unsatisfied with democracy within their group.

2. The Involvement of European Left Organizations in the Social Forum Process

2. 1 The traditional and the radical left in Europe: National differences

For our analysis we divided the European left-wing organizations and groups into two broad categories: the traditional left, including socialist or social democratic and communist or post-communist parties and organizations, as well as traditional trade unions; the radical left, including grassroots unions and political parties and organizations with their roots in the New Left of the 1970s. If among the traditional left trade unions and communist or post-communist parties and organizations dominate, for the radical left Trotskyite groups emerge as the most numerous component.

In our analysis, we did not specifically consider the national differences in the leftist political culture, which can only be briefly indicated. As far as the traditional left is concerned, in some of the countries covered by the Demos project (like Germany or the UK) historically a socialist or social democratic tradition dominated within the left, including the trade unions. In other countries (like Italy or France) the communist party had a far greater or even dominant influence, also within the trade union movement. As far as the radical left is concerned, in some countries (like Italy) grassroots unions and autonomous groups dominate, in others (like France) Trotskyites. In still other countries, like Greece, the left is particularly fragmented. It can be assumed that these national characteristics contribute to the differences in the importance the social forum process seems to have for organizations, in particular of the traditional left, in the various countries.

Reflecting the strength of the GJM in the respective countries, the role social forums play within the self representation of left organizations on their websites varies considerably between the different countries,: Italian websites, for instance, are richer in material than German ones. This phenomenon can be observed also for political parties of the same party family, e.g. the German SPD and the Italian DS, both members of the European Socialist Party: a google search of the website of the former for “Sozialforum” gives no result, the same search for “forum sociale” for the DS website gives 329 hits. These results seem to correspond with participation in the ESFs: of the ca. 1000 strong delegations of ECOSY (the federation of European socialist party youth organizations) at the ESFs in Florence and in Paris, for instance, only five were representatives of the German Jusos.[138]

[138] See the reports on Juso participation in these two ESFs in Update 2.7 (http://www.jusos.de/servlet/PB/show/1168409/249%20update2.7%23rz.pdf); Update 3.5

Strong differences emerge also for trade unions clearly active within the social forum process. On the webpages of the Italian trade union confederation CGIL, traditionally dominated by the communists, and especially of some of its member unions like the metal workers of the FIOM, numerous documents on the ESF and the social forum process in general can be found. To the contrary, such material is practically non-existent on the webpages of the German federation DGB, dominated by the social democrats. It is also rare on the webpages of those of its member unions most closely involved in the social forum process, like the metal workers of the IG Metall or the services union Ver.di. On the latter's website, for instance, the section on the ESF contains only a short report on Ver.di's participation in the Paris 2003 forum, but no material on the Athens' ESF, where at a workshop the international campaign against the retailer Lidl was presented, a campaign which was started by Ver.di and which figures prominently on its website.

A similar picture emerges if we look at the trade unions mentioned as organizers of seminars or workshops in the printed programme of the Athens ESF. International union organizations, of global or EU-level, appear eight times in this role. Concentrating on the countries covered by the Demos project, neither British nor Swiss trade unions are mentioned. Spanish presence is limited to two traditional and two radical unions, while German traditional unions (Ver.di and IG Metall) appear nine times as co-organizers of seminars. In contrast massive, instead, is the presence of Italian and French trade unions, including traditional federations like the CGIL and the CGT: for Italy we count 22 mentions of traditional unions and 21 of grassroots unions, for France we count 32 mentions of traditional unions and 15 of grassroots unions. In addition, while the German unions appear only in connection with seminars reflecting specific trade union concerns, French and especially Italian unions, of both the traditional and the grassroots type, are mentioned as co-organizers also for seminars covering other themes, like peace, migration, or (in the case of grassroots unions) repression. We can hypothesize that this reflects a traditionally stronger political conception of a union's role within the (communist dominated) French and Italian left-wing trade union movement.

As underlined already, in the following we will not discuss these national differences in detail. Where possible, examples for illustrating the attitudes of the European Left towards the GJM and the ESF process will be taken from the transnational level, e.g. the Socialist international. Examples will be developed especially for the German and Italian cases.

2.2 The European Left and the GJM

Social movement theory stresses the role of political allies — especially that of left-wing political parties — in favouring mobilization. During the protest cycle of the late sixties and early seventies, if the emerging New Left criticized the institutional Left for the alleged betrayal of their original "revolutionary" values (Pizzorno 1996), the traditional left-wing parties however channeled many of the emerging demands in the representative institutions. Since the eighties, a *de facto* division of tasks developed: social movements "retreated" to the social sphere and political parties "represented" them in political institutions. When the GJM appeared, however, political opportunities presented themselves as far more closed. The acceleration of the evolution from mass-parties to "base-less", "professionalized" parties (Katz and Mair 1992; della Porta 2001) had reduced the potential for contacts and alliances between the GJM and left-wing parties, in particular of the socialist or social democratic tradition. Especially in these parties, in fact, the effects of the crisis of Keynesian economic policies and the hegemony of neoliberal ideology were felt. Communist and post-communist parties, instead, which after the fall of the Berlin wall were seen as being doomed to a more or less rapid demise, saw an opportunity for mobilization in the globalization process, as did those groups which we classified as radical left. In addition, the threat

(http://www.jusos.de/servlet/PB/show/1477580/update3.5_P03.pdf). If not indicated differently, all web documents were accessed in February 2007.

posed by neoliberal policies to the European welfare state model opened the possibility of at least partial alliances between the GJM and even moderate trade unions. The attraction of the GJM, however, was felt especially where social conflict was strong, and in countries where since the 1980s grassroots unions had grown in competition with the established trade union organizations.

The relationship between the GJM and the dominant moderate left-wing European parties of the socialist or social democratic tradition, especially when in government, has been strained. This diffident if not conflictual relationship developed in spite of the fact that the European socialist parties had discussed problems of global development and of global governance from early on, significantly shaping important UN-reports (Independent Commission on International Development Issues 1980; Commission on Global Governance 1995). Starting with the 1980s, they had also opened the (up to that point largely European) Socialist International to parties from the developing world, including progressive parties not belonging to the socialist party family in the strict sense. The "Declaration of principles of the Socialist International", adopted at the XVIII congress (Stockholm, June 1989), contains a specific section on globalization, affirming the principles of freedom, justice, and solidarity and calling for "the creation of a pluralist and democratic world, based on consensus and cooperation".[139]

When in government in the 1990s, however, European socialist parties in response to the challenges of globalization adapted to neoliberal policies. They paid scarce attention to the emerging GJM, in particular to the criticism of policies realized at home, in Europe, reducing the significance of the movement to a mobilization for the poor of the world. During the preparatory phase of the Genoa anti-G8 protests in 2001, conducted largely under a center-left government, authorities for a long period centered their efforts on convincing the movement to hold the counter summit a week before the G8 (della Porta et al. 2006, chap. 6). This attitude cannot be explained exclusively by the fear of disorders happening like in Seattle or, just a short period before Genoa, at the EU summit in Gothenburg. In the discussion in the aftermath of the Genoa counter summit, in fact, divergent views of the European socialist parties and of the GJM emerged not only on the answers to give to the challenge of globalization, concerning both social justice and democratic governance, but also on the role of civil society and in particular of social movements (ibid., chap. 7).

While the GJM promoted participatory and deliberative forms of democracy, criticizing the dominant representative models, the socialists in fact remained skeptical of the role of civil society, defending the predominance of parliamentary representative democracy and the role of political parties also at the global level. The Socialist International's report "Governance in a Global Society – the Social democratic approach", adopted at the XXII congress, in Sao Paolo in October 2003, affirms: "Civil society participation must be complementary to, not a substitute for, the role of parliaments. Participatory democracy goes hand in hand with representative democracy … The goal of the SI must be to parliamentarise the global political system – with the representation of political parties that offer alternative global political values, theories and projects."[140]

In this scenario, the role of civil society and of social movements is restricted to being a marker for emerging problems, the solutions for which are to be provided by parliaments and political parties. This is true also for the sectors of European socialist parties directly and closely involved with the GJM, like for instance the youth organizations or thematic groups specifically working on global justice themes. The European federation of socialist youth organizations ECOSY, in a resolution on the European Social Forum at the 2nd ECOSY Bureau Meeting (Perugia, 9-12 Oct. 2003), defined the Social Forums as "valuable platforms", advocating participation both on the regional and the international level. The role of the European young socialists was seen as offering political formulations to the issues raised by the social movement, forming a bridge between civil society and politics: "Our priority should be to convince the new grassroots activists of the social

[139] Available at http://www.socialistinternational.org/4Principles/dofpeng2.html.
[140] Available at http://www.socialistinternational.org/5Congress/XXII-SAOPAULO/xxiiglobalgovernance-e.html.

movement of the relevance of politics in the strategy for the overall reforms needed (inclusion of the reformed WTO, IMF, WB, into a transparent and democratic global governance through a more political UN) in the pursuit of a world based on the principles of Liberty, Equality, Solidarity and Justice."[141] Similarly "Altrimondi", thematic group of the Italian Democratici di Sinistra (DS; Democrats of the Left)[142] in the document approved at its first national congress (12 October 2002), defines the idea of a party being part of the movement as instrumental and invasive: "The Democrats of the Left have to know how to listen to the demands, and especially to the criticism, but as a party their specific task is a propositive one: knowing how to give political answers to the questions posed by the movements".[143]

The sectors of socialist and social democratic parties closest to the movement in fact follow a "double strategy": they see themselves as part of both the GJM and their parties and try to act as a bridge between the two realities. However, as the above quote from the ECOSY Bureau resolution on the ESF shows, whereas the activities of parties are considered being politics, the activities of the GJM are not. As a German member of the ECOSY bureau put it in an article on the ESF in London: "The ESF will never be our main topic, but it would be wrong not to accompany it politically."[144] Evident is the clear preference for a logic of influence over a logic of membership (Schmitter and Streeck 1981).

If we compare the attitudes of socialist European parties with those of the traditional trade union confederations, differences emerge: many unions, in fact, including the European federation ETUC, have participated in the ESF since its first edition in Florence in 2002. As already mentioned, also in countries where trade union confederations traditionally have been strongly intertwined with social democratic parties (like in Germany) the pursuit of neoliberal policies by governments led by socialist or social democratic parties, provoked friction between union and party finding its expression also in different attitudes towards the GJM. In 2002, for instance, the German trade union confederation DGB elaborated a joint resolution on globalization with ATTAC and the Association of German Development NGOs.[145] Also some of its member unions called for broader cooperation with NGOs and civil society actors against neoliberal globalization.[146] Within the German trade unions, however, other voices called for a concentration of activities on the core tasks, leaving political mediation to the social democratic party. Also for critics of this position – like the IG Metall liaison office social movements – the GJM seems to remain one of many possible allies of the union, with the ecology and the peace movement mentioned separately, alongside churches and social initiatives.

In countries where the communist party historically had a strong position within the trade union movement, unions showed a greater openness towards the GJM, in particular towards the claims for participatory democracy. In Italy, the traditional left-wing trade union confederation CGIL initially displayed a cautious attitude towards the GJM. Differently from some of its member unions, like the metalworkers of the FIOM, it did not officially participate in the Genoa Social Forum and the

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[141] Available at http://www.ecosy.org/uploads/media/031012_BM_Italy_RESOL_ESF.PDF.

[142] The fall of the Berlin wall led to the decision to reform and rename the Italian communist party (PCI), opposed by a minority which founded *Rifondazione Comunista*. The DS, the largest successor party, are of social democratic orientation, and a member of the Socialist International and of the European Socialist Party.

[143] Available at http://www.dsonline.it/autonomie/altrimondi/documenti/dettaglio.asp?id_doc=8153.

[144] Simone Burger, "Contra und pro zum Europäischen Sozialforum vom 15.ß17.Oktober in London", in: update 4.5, Informationsdienst des Juso Bundesvorstands (available at www.jusos.de/servlet/PB/show/1536340/bund_update_4_5.pdf).

[145] "Globalisierung gerecht gestalten – gemeinsame Erklärung von DGB, VENRO und ATTAC" (www.dgb.de/themen/themen_a_z/abisz_doks/g/globalisierung.pdf/view?showdesc=1). "Globalisierung gerecht gestalten" was also the DGB motto for the Labour Day celebrations on the 1st of May. See also the resolution "Eine neue internationale Gewerkschaftseinheit – bessere Chancen, die Globalisierung sozial zu gestalten" passed at the 18th federal congress in 2006 (www.dgb.de/dgb/kongress2006/beschluesse/internationale_politik_globalisierung.pdf).

[146] See the resolution "Globalisierung nicht dem Markt überlassen – Handlungserfordernisse für eine politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und ökologische Gestaltung", passed by the Ver.di federal congress in October 2003 (http://globalisierung.verdi.de/)

anti-G8 counter summit of 2001. When the CGIL declared its participation in the first ESF in Florence, it continued to underline a clear difference between trade union and movement, but acknowledged that the movement had put the theme of the unjust effects of globalization on scene of the world politics. Moreover, it declared that the movement had objectively assumed responsibility, proposing civic participation as a politically relevant act.[147] The metal workers union FIOM, associated to the CGIL, in the introduction to the international section of its website, declares its participation in a larger antiliberal movement that continues to develop in the social forums.[148] This participation, however, is only one of the international commitments of the union, the other being international trade unionism, to which a separate part of the international section of the website is dedicated.

Within the traditional left, an open attitude towards the GJM was displayed especially by communist and post-communist parties. Federated recently in the European Left, they declared at the first congress in Athens in 2005: "The European Left and its member parties are committed to fight together with social movements, trade unions, and political left forces for another Europe, which is possible. In this context, we fully support all European mobilisations and initiatives against neo-liberalism and war, particularly the Fourth European Social Forum to be held in Athens."[149] In the executive board motion "Yes, we can change Europe - Political theses" the European Left defined the emergence of new movements and their capacity to link up in a collective drive forward as the real novelty about the dawn of this century and affirmed: "Our task is to contribute to generate a popular left and social majority that is, and must be, bigger than us: with other political parties, with European Social Forum and social movements, with feminists, trade unions, popular associations and individuals. A popular majority will grow with alliances and convergences with all who want to build with us another Europe."[150]

However, if the parties of the European left underlined their openness for participation in the GJM on an equal footing, without any hegemonic intentions, their original agenda remained clearly visible in their framing of the GJM as anticapitalist. This is also the case for the Italian Rifondazione Comunista (RC), probably the European political party which, especially through its youth organization Giovani Comunisti (GC), is most closely connected with the GJM. In its constitution, adopted in April 2002, it affirms the autonomy of the organisms of the alternative left and of the movements, with which the party collaborates on an equal footing and in which its members participate in democratic and non-sectarian ways.[151] In October 2003, a document approved by the National Political Committee of RC affirmed: "The participation of RC in the movement against war and neoliberal politics, which effectively has been defined as 'movement of movements', is an essential element of its political initiative, more, it constitutes the basic inspiration".[152]

The very role of a party, however, risks jarring with the participative and deliberative democratic ideas of the movement, and also with the more antagonistic strategies of the radical left."[153]

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[147] "Forum Sociale Europeo: Perché la CGIL partecipa" (available at http://www.cgil.it/ufficiostampa/ufsta/ht/notizia_large.asp?stato=archivio&ref=1669)..

[148] A document of the political commission for the 23rd congress of the FIOM (2004) explicitly called for the continuation of the union's participation in the mobilizations of the movement (available at http://www.fiom.cgil.it/eventi/2004/xxiii_con/doc_pol.htm)

[149] Available at http://www.european-left.org/press/pressreleases/pr/pressrelease.2005-11-23.8395199335.

[150] Available at http://www.european-left.org/press/pressreleases/pr-fr/pressrelease.2005-10-14.7592296840.

[151] Available at http://www.rifondazione.it/v/doc/statuto_definitivo.html.

[152] Available at http://www.rifondazione.it/cpn/031025/doc_app.html.

[153] At the London ESF, RC's secretary Fausto Bertinotti was criticized from an autonomous position, for an "atrophied perspective" in which "self-organization" and the reinvention of politics (as party politics) are the same. John Holloway questioned the use of a party to construct the revolutionary subject as meaning the building of hierarchies, decision making in the name of others, instead of the self-construction of the subject: "Our power is no counter-power but anti-power". See Mario Candeias, "Antinomies: Relations between Social Movements, Left Political Parties and State. Reflections on the European Social Forum in London and beyond" (available at: www.moviments.net/euromovements/tiki-download_file.php?fileId=97).

Increasingly, in fact, RC's moves in the institutional political arena created tension both inside the party and with sectors of the GJM. In face of the upcoming elections in April 2006, at RC's 2005 congress party secretary Bertinotti presented a motion defining as a fundamental challenge the construction of a participative democracy in which the critique of the movements could transform itself into a left-wing political and programmatic alternative, a process of transformation of capitalist society. In this context he posed the problem of the participation in government of an antagonist force, not as a decision of value but as a necessary phase to liberate Italy from the Berlusconi government. The primary objective of a future government coalition was to be the construction of participative democracy.

As one of the Greek organizers of the Athens ESF underlined, the participation of RC in the center-left government which emerged victorious from the election created a sentiment of disappointment in a large number of activists, especially among radical youth.[154] This move created particular problems for the youth organization GC, deeply involved in the GJM and more so than the youth organizations of other European communist or post communist parties.[155] Already in the document they presented at the 2005 party congress, the GC had asserted: "today the idea that the revolution coincides … with the taking of one or more places of power is unsustainable. … Revolution is not the exercise of counter-power but the construction of another kind of power".[156] Participative democracy was defined as a new space in which politics (and the GC) were called to transform themselves into conflictuality and not into representation in institutions. A motion presented at the GC's third national conference (September 2006) likened entering the government to entering a cage and spoke of the decision as weighing like a stone on the GC, significantly narrowing their space of autonomy and of initiative.[157] The majority document passed asserted: "It is the critique of power which permits us to live the decision of the party to contribute to the government of the country, not as an end, but as an instrument to construct a season of rights, breaking with the dynamic conflict – repression: … we chose the government with which to enter in conflict, knowing that the construction of an alternative passes through society".[158]

The radical left involved in the social forum process presents a far more variegated picture than the traditional left, ranging from grassroots unions, developing in different national contexts (in particular in Italy and in France) since the 1980s, to political parties referring to different traditions of the New Left of the 1970s, to autonomous and anti-imperialist groups of more recent formation. From early on grassroots unions like the French Union Syndical Solidaires or the Italian Cobas played an important role in the GJM and within the European social forum process. Bearers of a trade union conception that sees the union also as a political (and cultural) subject, they are critical of the mainstream of traditional unionism in Europe, accused of having followed a policy of purely accompanying neoliberal politics. A dividing point in this context is the EU Constitutional Treaty, opposed by the grassroots union but accepted by the traditional unions, albeit with reservations. Advancing an anti-capitalist and autonomous interpretation of globalization, both Cobas and Solidaires see themselves as part of the GJM and encourage their members to actively take part in

[154] Yannis Almpanis (Greek program group), "A_personal_report_on_Athens_ESF" (available at http://www.euromovements.info/upload/Yannis%20Alpamis%20A_personal_report_on_Athens_ESF.rtf?PHPSESSID=84bf15594f4c907b8418e31dc9643f07).

[155] Solid, the youth organization of the German sister party of RC, is not as closely connected with the GJM as the GC. As for other German organizations, for Solid the GJM is at the moment the most important movement, but it is only one of many movements in which it seeks to radicate itself.

[156] "Emendamento integrativo del documento "alternativa di società" – perché "alternativa di società", offline document.

[157] "Giovani comunisti di lotta o di governo. Per una sinistra anticapitalista globale" (available at http://www.giovanicomunistiancona.it/downloads/documenti/gc/terzaconferenza/Terzo%20doc%20-%20giovani%20comunisti%20di%20lotta%20o%20di%20governo.rtf.).

[158] For the synthesis of the majority document ("Rigenerazioni: l'autonomia di una generazione che diserta, disobbedisce, ama") published by the party newspaper see http://www.liberazione.it/giornale/060922/LB12D6AB.asp.

the struggles against neoliberal globalization.[159] Some differences also have to be underlined: Solidaires has a more state-centered approach, and is more concentrated on a social agenda, while the Cobas follow a stronger autonomous line, with great emphasis on self-organization.

As far as the ESF process is concerned, both unions see the forum as a place where a GJM with common action strategies should be constructed and common European campaigns and mobilizations should be agreed upon.[160] Solidaires, in fact, laments that notwithstanding the holding of the assembly of social movements, uniting those movements willing to act together, the forums did not yet succeed in elaborating common action strategies. It calls for a supplementary phase in the construction of a social movement at European level, beyond imposing its themes on the public debate capable of constructing the necessary balance of power for imposing its own alternatives.[161] In a similar vein, the Cobas push for a "synthesis between discussion and action", favourably commenting on the fact that in Athens the ESF had presented itself not any more as a show event, but as a relevant passage in the continuous process of European self-organization. The Cobas expressed satisfaction about the evident radicalization in terminology – e.g. the dominance of terms like anticapitalism and anti-imperialism over terms like neoliberalism – and also in themes, contents and objectives.[162]

Also other organizations of the radical left, e.g. Trotskyite parties and groups, push for a more radical and action oriented stance of the GJM and in particular of the ESF process. At its 15th world congress in 2003, the 4th international declared: "We continue to support and build the 'movement against neo-liberal globalization' around imperialist summits, so as to denounce neo-liberal international policies, delegitimize the 'new institutions' of global capitalism and build an anti-capitalist/anti-imperialist, internationalist pole."[163] The French Trotskyites of the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (LCR) underline the function of the ESF to define that common action program at the European level which the trade unions alone were incapable of defining during the last 40 years.[164]

In varying degrees, these groups appear less open to inclusiveness and contamination than the grassroots unions, arguing for more organization and less "movement". In this context, the role political parties are to play in the social forum process takes on special importance. After the Florence ESF, LCR called for an acceptable solution that allowed for the presence of political parties in the preparation and the course of the forum, respecting the independence of social movements. LCR, in fact, criticized the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) for not having respected this independence by shouting their slogans and displaying their banners at the assembly of social movements concluding the Florence ESF.[165] At the London ESF, Phil Hearst, a member of the SWP and of the 4th International, insisted that the left needed institutions for continuous politics.

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[159] For the Union Syndicale Solidaires see resolution 1 ("Contexte international et européen, mouvement altermondialiste"), Congress December 2004 (available at www.solidaires.org/IMG/pdf/resolution1-2.pdf); for the Cobas see the presentation published in 2002 on its website by its international commission (available at http://www.cobas.it/Sito/Commissione%20Internazionale/Presentazione/Cobas%20presentazione.doc).

[160] Also mainstream unions criticize a weakness of the ESF in coordinating action (see e.g. for the IG Metall Verbindungsbüro soziale Bewegungen the minutes of the Frankfurt EPA in November 2006, available at http://www.fse-esf.org/IMG/pdf/Minutes_from_EPA_Nov4_06.pdf). For grassroots unions, however, this criticism is embedded in a larger political strategy.

[161] See Union Syndical Solidaires, ibid.

[162] In this context particularly underlined are the difficulties of RC, characterized as a sustainer of the term "against war and terrorism". See La delegazione della Confederazione COBAS al Forum sociale europeo di Atene, "Relazione generale sul 4° Forum Sociale Europeo di Atene" (available at http://www.cobas.it/Sito/Documenti/Forum%20Sociale%20Mondiale/Atene_2006/Relazione%20FSE%20Atene.doc).

[163] "Role and tasks of the fourth international" (available at http://www.isg-fi.org.uk/spip.php?article100).

[164] See http://www.lcr-rouge.org/article.php3?id_article=1110.

[165] See "Mouvement altermondialist. Retour sur Florence" (available at http://www.lcr-rouge.org/archives/121902/controv.html). The participation of political parties remained an important theme for LCR also at subsequent ESFs, up to Athens. See "Forum Social d'Athènes. Réussite incontestable" (available at http://www.lcr-rouge.org/article.php3?id_article=3997).

According to him, the plurality of movements alone did not develop a solid strategic convergence of positions, and a party, and not simply the sum of social movements, might still be the best agent of conscious 'unification' in a 'worker's state'.[166]

At the borders of the ESF process, the position that the ESF should be more strictly organized for the task of directing the struggles of the GJM is driven to extremes by the League for the 5th International, which at the Athens ESF organized a seminar on "A Charter of citizens rights or programme of action – From the ESF to a world party of social revolution". The 5th International expressed its content over the fact that in Athens "the reactionary Principles of Porto Alegre, which ban the participation of parties and the taking of decisions" were largely ignored. It proposed to throw off the tutelage of the WSF and underlined that since Florence it had argued that "the ESF must turn itself into a permanent organising centre of struggle against neoliberalism and imperialism. We believe it is vital to break the logjam in how the movement operates, particularly the wretched and hypocritical 'consensus principle', which effectively amounts to a veto, whereby the most right wing forces can paralyse indefinitely the whole movement, and indeed prevent the Assembly of the Social Movements debating any political or tactical differences." As a solution the League for the 5th International proposes a decision-making process – majority vote on resolutions presented and debated – and organizational changes – the election of a standing committee or council of the ESF (supposed to respond to "urgent tasks arising from the class struggle" and to develop a political action programme for the movement) – which run counter to the debate within the ESF, centred instead on participative and deliberative practices. In the eventuality of a stalling of the ESF, the creation of "a forum of struggle" by those forces "who do not place unity with the neoliberal parties above the needs of the working class" is prospected.[167]

2.3 The European Left and the Organization of the ESF

Turning to the direct involvement of European left organizations in the ESF process, we will look at three aspects: the furnishing of logistic support (see also chapter 2), visibility in the ESF programme, and participation in the European Preparatory Assemblies (EPA). According to the World Social Forum Charter of Principles, the forum is an open space for groups and movements of civil society opposed to neo-liberal globalization.[168] At the same time it is stated that it is a "non-governmental and non-party context". Alongside military organizations, in fact, also party representations are excluded from participation, while government leaders and members of legislatures who accept the commitments of this Charter may be invited to participate in a personal capacity. However, government representatives and agencies and well established left-wing organizations provided indispensable material resources for the organization of all ESFs. In addition, associations or personalities identifiable as close to political parties, if not clearly representing them, appear in the programmes of the ESFs, and traditional and radical left groups, including party youth organizations (to whom the ban on political parties does not apply) figure prominently as organizers of seminars and workshops. Finally, activists of traditional and radical left organizations, including trade unions but also political parties, form an important component of the EPAs.

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[166] Mario Candeias, "Antinomies" (see note 16). As was pointed out, this position leaves the current weakness of workers' resistance out of consideration, as well as concrete relations between movements and party.

[167] "Fourth European Social Forum a success" (available at http://www.fifthinternational.org/index.php?id=14,390,0,0,1,0). According to the document "European Social Forum: A crisis of direction" it is the European Left parties, in particular RC, that consciously and deliberately try to prevent the ESF from becoming a fighting body, because they want to enter into coalitions with the socialist parties (available at http://www.fifthinternational.org/index.php?id=14,585,0,0,1,0).

[168] The charter (available at http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2) speaks of "groups and movements of civil society that are opposed to neo-liberalism and to domination of the world by capital and any form of imperialism, and are committed to building a planetary society directed towards fruitful relationships among Mankind and between it and the Earth."

For the first ESF in Florence, the resources provided by local government institutions (all led by the DS, of social democratic leaning) were of great importance for the success of the meeting. These resources consisted in general assistance for the accommodation of the forum participants, and in the Fortezza da basso, the ESF venue, placed at the disposal of the organizers by the regional government led by a president who had shown more attention towards the GJM than his party. The participation of well established traditional left organizations, in particular the Italian (CGIL) and the European (ETUC) trade union confederations, helped overcome diffidence and resistance in state institutions (including the police) and local government agencies.[169]

Also for the following ESFs the material resources provided by local government agencies and established left wing organizations were fundamental and, differently from Florence, included direct contributions – the exclusions of direct contributions by third parties for the first ESF had led to a deficit of ca. 80.000 €. For the Paris ESF, resources and support were provided above all by the communist-led municipalities of the banlieue. In the case of the London ESF, two of the principle organizers were the SWP and the Socialist Action group of the mayor of the city, Ken Livingston. The Greater London Authority is said to have put an estimated 400.000 £ towards the event. For the Athens Social Forum, the Greek trade union federations GSEE and ADEDY provided 350.000 €, with a further 30.000 € contributed by other Greek trade unions. GSEE provided the entire infrastructure necessary for the accommodation and function of the Greek Organising Committee.[170] The importance of the support and involvement of well established organizations is further testified by the fact that at Athens the German and Austrian candidacies for holding the next ESF evaporated because of the unwillingness of the major trade unions to become involved in the process.[171] The importance of contributions of well established organizations emerges also in the case of national social forums.[172]

Numerous organizations of the traditional and the radical left, many of them well established, appear also in the official social forum programme as organizers of seminars or workshops. The programme of the ESF in Florence saw the participation of major traditional trade unions, starting with the European confederation ETUC, and including the Italian confederation CGIL, the Italian metalworkers union FIOM, the French confederation CGT, and the German service union Ver.di. As far as the traditional left is concerned, we also find party youth organizations, like the Sinistra giovanile, close to the DS, or the GC, while other party representatives were identified under the name of the internal current they belong to.[173] In addition, important DS figures took part in their institutional vest, like the regional president Martini and the mayor of Florence Domenici. Present were also foundations with clear and direct links to political parties like the French Espace Marx (PCF) and the German Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (PDS). However, a clear identification of participants as party figures seems to have been given only for the plenary on movements and political parties.[174] Similarly, as far as the radical left is concerned, grassroots trade unions (like the Italian Cobas, Sin.Cobas and CUB, or the French Solidaires) were directly identified, while

[169] Interview with a spokesperson of the Florence ESF, conducted 24 April 2004.

[170] Dimitris Stratoulis, "The trade-union network's report for the 4th ESF" (available at http://www.openelibrary.info/autorsview.php?id_autore=341&PHPSESSID=06ee3c907c4007cabb2d85796d58e0a3).

[171] La delegazione della Confederazione COBAS al Forum sociale europeo di Atene, "Relazione generale sul 4° Forum Sociale Europeo di Atene" (see note 22).

[172] See the testimony that the first German social forum at Erfurt would not have materialized without the support of the regional organization of the trade union confederation DGB and the post-communist party PDS. Angela Klein, "Das 1. Sozialforum in Deutschland. Eine Bilanz", in: Sozialistische Zeitung, September 2005 (available at http://www.linksnet.de/textsicht.php?id=1903).

[173] This is the case for instance for Cesare Salvi of the left wing of the DS, whose "Socialismo 2000" figures as a coorganiser of a seminar. ECOSY, the European federation of socialist youth organizations, presented four seminars and was present in Florence with more than 900 participants from 18 member organizations and 15 countries (see http://www.ecosy.org/uploads/media/Reports_Activities_2001-2002.PDF, pp. 109ff.).

[174] This plenary saw the participation of Elio di Rupo (Belgian Socialists), Rosi Bindi (Margherita, identified as democratic Catholic), Fausto Bertinotti (RC), Christian Ströbele (German Greens), and a representative of the French Trotskyite party LCR.

exponents of parties like the SWP were presented with their professional identity (e.g. university professor) or appeared as representatives of SMOs (e.g. Globalize Resistance).

In the subsequent editions of the ESF, the presence of established traditional and radical left organizations in the official programme seems to have consolidated itself. At the Athens ESF, the European Trade-Union Confederation (ETUC) and forty more confederations and sector federations from Europe participated in the seminars or had a stand. If many of these activities regarded trade union core issues – thirty seminars were dedicated to the implications of the neo-liberal policies in the field of employment and twelve seminars to privatizations and civil services – traditional unions (in particular from Italy and France) also addressed other themes: the Italian CGIL had representatives as speakers in 24 seminars, ranging from the Bolkestein directive to the self-determination of the Western Sahara. Of the grassroots unions, the Italian Cobas were involved in ca. 25 seminars and thematic assemblies, apart from core union issues covering themes like peace, education, health, migrants, women, ecology, and repression.[175]

As far as left-wing political parties are concerned, apart from the seminar on "Basic democratic agreement for the resolution of the Basque political conflict", for which several Basque parties are mentioned as organizers, the Athens ESF programme only in one case directly mentions a party (the Communist Party of Great Britain) as co-organizer of an event, while in other cases party youth organizations (e.g. the Greek Youth of Synaspismos, the Italian Sinistra giovanile and GC, the German Solid) are indicated. The ban on political parties is also reflected in the fact that as far as speakers are concerned even for members of parliament the printed programme rarely indicates party provenance. As in previous editions, however, actors more or less directly linked to political parties can be identified, e.g. in foundations like the Rosa-Luxemburg-Stiftung (PDS) or in party newspapers like Liberazione (RC). Athens also saw the indirect participation of the traditional European socialist parties in the form of the Global Progressive Forum, co-organizer of a seminar ("The role of Europe and of the social forces in the peace process in the Middle East").[176] Radical left parties, in particular the SWP, as in previous editions of the ESF did not appear directly but under the name of connected organizations like Globalize Resistance.[177]

It has to be underlined, that the different sectors we individuated do not necessarily appear separate. Many seminars on the themes of social justice and workers' rights saw traditional and grassroots unions as co-organizers, in some national cases, like Italy, signing jointly as a campaign together with other SMOs (e.g. against the Bolkestein directive). In addition, other seminars were organized by ESF networks, like the European network of Education of the ESF, the ESF Network against security policies and repression, the European Network for the right to health, the ESF migrations network, etc. At Athens, a European network for providing an alternative response of the trade unions to the Lisbon criteria for employment and working relations was built, as well as a European network for the defense of civil services.

Notwithstanding this characteristic of increased networking, a look at the groups mentioned in the programme of the Athens ESF as organizers of seminars and workshops can give some indications on the presence of the traditional and the radical left within the ESF process (see table 1). If about 50% of the mentions concern NSMOs, NGOs, and other groups, the traditional left

[175] Dimitris Stratoulis, "The trade-union network's report for the 4th ESF" (see note 33); for initiatives of the CGIL see http://www.cgil.it/internazionale/Tematiche/RapportoConMovimenti/ForumSocialeEuropeo/FSEAteneSeminari.htm; for initiatives of the Cobas see the report of the Cobas delegation (note 22).

[176] The Global Progressive Forum (since March 2006 member of the International Council of the WSF), is an initiative of the PES (the European socialist party), the Socialist group in the European Parliament, and the Socialist International. It is aimed at creating a space for cooperation and dialogue on globalisation between progressive politicians, NGOs and trade unions. The GPF vice president attended the ESF in London and in Athens.

[177] Commenting positively on the fact that in Athens speakers of parties were advertised as such, not pretending they spoke for this or that movement, Tina Becker of the UK Communist Party underlined as unsurprising that groups like the SWP and the ISP continued to hide behind covers like Globalize Resistance (available at http://www.euromovements.info/upload/Extremely%20pleasant%20Tina%20Becker.rtf?PHPSESSID=09f9823603eb2e245ef2c1f28fdd362c).

counts in with ca. one fourth of the mentions, while the radical left was present as an organizer in a strength equal to the one of the newest movements directly connected with the rise of the GJM.

Table 1 - Groups indicated as organizers of seminars or workshops at the Athens ESF[178]

Type of group	n.° of mentions as organizer	%
Traditional left	280	25.3
Radical left	126	11.4
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	533	48.1
Newest movements	130	11.7
ESF networks	39	3.5
Total	**1108**	**100**

If we compare these data on the visibility of organizations in the programme of the Athens ESF with the presence of activists emerging from the survey we conducted, we see that NSMOs, NGOs and others are more visible in the programme, while the traditional and the radical left are more present with their activists, and the newest movements show a balanced presence. In fact, excluding activists that indicated no organization as close, 33.5% of the surveyed participants indicated a traditional left organization as closest, 18.3% a radical left organization, 12.5% a newest movement, and 35.8% a NSMOs, an NGO or other.

A final indicator for the role which the European left plays in the ESF process is constituted by the presence of its activists in the EPAs. However, information on the organizational provenance of EPA participants is available on the web only for the March 2002 EPA in Vienna (see table 2). These data indicate that within the preparatory process of the ESFs, if activists of the organizations with greater resources (of the traditional left) play an important role, it is above all those of groups more committed to the ESF process (of the radical left and of the newest movements) that show a comparatively strong representation.

[178] We based our count on the printed programme of the Athens ESF, considering 277 seminars and workshops, excluding the seminar on the solution of the Basque problem, which saw the mention of numerous Basque parties and movements. In correspondence to the other sectorial assemblies (anti-imperialist, etc.), the women's assembly was counted with only one organizer. For lack of information, in particular on the Turkish organizations, not all groups mentioned in the printed program could be classified.

Table 2 - Participants EPA Vienna, 10-12 May 2002 (only countries covered by Demos project)[179]

	Traditional left	Radical left	NSMOs, NGOs and others	Newest movements	Not indicated	Total
Italy	11	8	9	7	3	38 (32.8%)
France	6	6	9	8	2	31 (26.7%)
Germany	6	4	4	3	1	18 (15.5%)
UK	3	7	4	1	1	16 (13.8%)
Spain	2	2	1	3	1	9 (7.6%)
Switzerland	2	0	1	1	0	4 (3.4%)
Total	**30 (25.9%)**	**27 (23.3%)**	**28 (24.1%)**	**23 (19.8%)**	**8 (6.9%)**	**116 (100%)**

It has to be added, that from within the movement there are also critical voices concerning the composition of the EPA. According to the Attac European Network, participation in the EPA is still limited to the individuals and organizations present from the beginning; in particular the representation of unions, environmental, development and human rights NGOs is too limited.[180]

3. Activists of Organizations of the European Left at the ESF: Involvement in the Social Forum Process and Conceptions of Democracy

3.1 The presence of activists of organizations of the European left at the ESFs in Florence, Paris and Athens: Some indications

Turning from the organizations of the European left to their activists, some of the original variables used in three surveys conducted in Florence, Paris and Athens can give us indications about the importance of the presence of left activists in the various ESFs. The data show a continuous and important presence of left activists in the ESFs held between 2002 and 2006 (see table 3).

Asked to place themselves on a left – right scale, an average of 75% of the activists surveyed in the three ESFs placed themselves in the left or in the radical left of the political spectrum. In fact, the European GJM's activists can be considered an important electoral constituency for leftist parties: about 68% in Florence and 82% in Athens declared to have voted in the last elections held before these forums, while in Paris as much as 90% declared to "always" or "often" vote in general

[179] For the list of participants see http://www.euromovements.info/e-library/autorsview.php?id_autore=677. Detailed information on the participants in the EPAs could be found on the web only for the Vienna assembly in preparation of the first ESF. As far as the preparatory process for the Athens ESF is concerned, at the first EPA (Athens, February 2005) 211 Greek delegates, 71 delegates of 29 European associations, and 23 delegates of trade unions participated (see http://www.fse-esf.org/spip.php?article15). At the EPA in Istanbul (October 2005) 450 delegates from 34 countries were present, representing 106 European and 61 Turkish organizations (see http://www.fse-esf.org/spip.php?article105). Contributions to the budget of this EPA were given by the Confederation of Revolutionary Workers Union, the Chamber of Electrician Engineers, the Chamber of Doctors of Istanbul, the Confederation of Public Workers Union, the Chamber of Engineers and Architects, and other Turkish organizations (ibid.).

[180] Contribution to the European Preparatory Assembly of the ESF in Frankfurt, 3-5 November 2006. In the same document Attac lamented that Athens saw the confirmation of the high influence and visibility of political parties, which it defined as a clear breach of the WSF charter. Attac underlined the urgent need to discuss the place of political parties in the ESF process and spoke of the danger that their visibility might lead to a reduction of the scope of potential participating groups). Available at http://www.euromovements.info/upload/attacnetworkinfranckfurt.doc?PHPSESSID=94032928677863b8b34b64cf834d2b2a.

elections. Of those who declared that they did not vote in the last elections, 13.3% in Florence and 23% in Athens indicated as a reason that no party reflected their political ideas, and respectively 13.5% and 15.3% that they did not approve of representative democracy.

At the first ESF held in Florence in 2002, 33.5% of the activists declared to be (or to have been in the past) members of political parties, and 31.8% of trade unions. Four years later, at the ESF in Athens, these figures had not declined: about 40% of the activists declared to be (or to have been) members of political parties, and 30.2% of trade unions. Indications about the proximity of activists to left organizations are also provided by the data on action repertoires: 52% of the surveyed activists in Florence and 54% in Athens had persuaded someone to vote for a political party; 33.5% and 41% had worked within the last five years in political parties, and 86% in Florence, 71% in Paris and 57% in Athens had participated in strikes.[181]

Further data, however, indicate some distance between the activists surveyed at the ESFs and the traditional forms of organizational participation of the European left. Trust in political parties, for instance, scores fairly low at the three ESFs, with an average of just above 20% of "enough" or "much" trust. This low score is difficult to explain by the fact that the relevant question asked for trust in political parties in general, not only in the leftist ones. Trust in trade unions scores significantly higher than trust in political parties: 73% in Florence (56.8% for non-Italians), 54% in Paris and 49% in Athens declared to trust unions at least enough.

A presence less prominent than the one shown by members of political parties and trade unions is displayed by other political groups of the (radical) left spectrum: 32% of the activists surveyed in Florence declared to be or to have been members of autonomist groups or social centres (Italy has a well established presence of autonomist social centres, playing an important role in the domestic social movement landscape), but in Paris their presence declined to a mere 4.4%, though it increased again to 13% in Athens. For Athens, with a different drafting of this variable, we can also say that about 6% of the activists surveyed were members of anarchist groups and as many as 13% members of Trotskyite organizations.

Table 3 - Indicators of the presence of activists of the European Left in the ESFs

	Florence 2002 Yes of 100 % (Yes of total N)	**Paris 2003** Yes of 100% (Yes of total N)	**Athens 2006** Yes of 100% (Yes of total N)
Membership in [182]			
Parties	33.5 (865 of 2500)	34.2 (740 of 2162)	39.9 (474 of 1187)
Trade Unions	31.8 (795 0f 2500)	32.8 (720 of 2198)	30.2 (358 of 1187)
Autonomist group	32.1 (795 of 2473)	4.4 (97 of 2198)	13.4 (159 of 1187)
Anarchist group	---	---	5.5 (65 of 1187)
Trotskyist group	---	---	12.6 (149 of 1187)
Type of activity			
Persuaded someone to vote for a political party	51.8 (1293 of 2494)	_ _ _	54.1 (645 of 1193)
Worked in a political party	33.5 (837 of 2496)	_ _ _	41.2 (491 of 1193)
Took part in a strike	86.0 (2155 of 2507)	71.2 (1388 of 1950)	56.7 (677 of 1194)

[181] According to ILO figures, strikes are far more numerous in Italy and in France than in Greece.

[182] In Athens and in Paris the questionnaire asked for present and past membership in separate items, while in Florence the question of membership was asked in one single item for both past and present membership. Thus, in order to compare Athens' data with the previous ones, we aggregated past and present membership into one single variable.

Trust in [183]			
Local institutions	46.1 (1091 of 2365)	43.1 (876 of 2034)	26.6 299 (of 1122)
Political parties	20.4 (495 of 2423)	23.0 (461 of 2007)	21.2 (237 of 1120)
Unions	72.7184 (1778 of 2445)	57.5 (1164 of 2025)	49.0 (550 of 1122)
Political position [185]			
Radical left	29.7 (716)	31.1 (643)	36.2 (418)
Left	45.7 (1102)	43.3 (896)	39.6 (457)
Centre	10.2 (245)	5.2 (107)	10.8 (125)
Right	0.4 (11)	1.8 (38)	0.7 (8)
Cannot place	14.0 (337)	18.6 (385)	12.7 (146)
Total	100 (2411)	100 (2069)	100 (1154)
Voted in last elections			
Yes	67.9 (1667 of 2454)	90.0186 (1918 of 2131)	82.1 (935 of 1139)
Reason for not voting			
Inability/ not entitled to vote*	65.3 (514)	_ _ _	50.3 (92)
No party reflect political ideas	13.3 (105)	_ _ _	23.0 (42)
Non-approval of representative democracy	13.5 (106)	_ _ _	15.3 (28)
Other reasons	7.9 (62)	_ _ _	11.5 (21)
Total	**100 (787)**	**_ _ _**	**100 (183)**

3.2 The presence and characteristics of activists of traditional left and of radical left organizations at the Athens ESF

3.2.1 Traditional and radical left activists at Athens

As the self collocation on the left – right scale shows, the overwhelming majority of the activists surveyed at Athens and at the previous ESFs consider themselves left. In this chapter, however, we are concerned with those activists that identify above all with two areas of the European left: the traditional left of social democratic, socialist or communist inspiration, and the radical left with its roots in the New Left of the 1970s.

In order to isolate activists of these two areas of the European left we recoded the variable of our Athens questionnaire asking ESF participants to indicate the full name of the group most important to them. Concentrating on the fourth ESF, in this way we can isolate the members that attach more meaning to traditional left or radical left organizations than to other groups. For the recoding, we considered as traditional left organizations established leftist political parties of the communist or

[183] The degree of trust was translated into a dichotomous variable in the following way: 'not at all' and 'little' = 'no'; 'a fair amount' and 'a lot' = 'yes'.

[184] The Italian version of the Florence questionnaire gave respondents the opportunity to specify the trust in a specific union, without indicating their general trust. A new variable was constructed that only considers the highest value of trust (first version of questionnaire: respondent's trust in unions: N = 417, 16.1%; second version of questionnaire: trust in Cisl/ Uil: N = 229; 8.9%; trust in Cgil: N = 1104, 42.8%; trust in grass-root trade union N = 990, 38.4%).

[185] Translation of values of Florence questionnaire: 'Radical left' → 'Radical left'; 'Left' → 'Left'; 'Centre-left' and 'centre' → Centre; 'Centre-right', 'Right' and 'Radical right' → Right; Translation of values of Paris questionnaire: '1' → 'Radical left'; '2' and '3' → 'Left'; '4' and '5' → 'Centre'; '6'; '7'; '8' and '9' → right; Translation of values of Athens questionnaire: '0' → 'Radical left'; '1' and '2' → 'Left'; '3'; '4' and '5' → Centre; '6'; '7'; '8' and '9' → 'Right'.

[186] In Paris the questionnaire asked the frequency of voting behaviour: in the table we only mentioned the activists who answered they have being voted "always" or "often".

the socialist/social democratic party family, established trade unions of the same tradition (such as the Italian CGIL, the French CGT, or the German Ver.di), student groups linked to the established leftist parties, and communist or socialist non party organizations (such as the Italian ARCI, or the French Espace Marx). The activists falling into this category are 260 and represent about 22% of the full sample, 28.2% if we exclude the missing cases (activists who are members of an organization but who did not specify the group most important to them or did specify a group which we were unable classify, 23.5% of the sample), and about 33.5% if we also exclude activists with no membership (about 16% of the sample). As radical left organizations we considered anarchist, autonomist or Trotskyite groups or parties, and grassroots trade unions such as the Italian Cobas, or the French Sud. The activists of the radical left number 142 and represent 12% of the full sample, 15.4% if we do not consider the missing cases, and about 18% if we also exclude the non members (see table 4).

In our analysis, we will compare the two types of leftist activists with the members of those newest social movement organizations (such as ATTAC, Indymedia, local social forums, etc.) that emerged with the GJM. In this category we find 97 activists, i.e. 8% of the full sample, about 11% if we do not consider the missing cases, and 18.3% if we also exclude the non members. In addition, we grouped together members of new social movement organizations (NSMOs), NGOs, and any other organization that did not fall into one of the previous categories. These activists number 278 (23% of the full sample, 30% if we do not consider missing cases, and about 36% if we also exclude non members). Here we find above all environmental organizations and NGOs, but also non leftist parties like the Greens, and some catholic trade unions. Finally, we will also consider the 145 activists (12% of the full sample and about 16% if we exclude missing cases) who are not members of any organization.

Table 4 - Frequencies for the typology of activists

Typology of activists	%	Valid cases
Non members	15.7	145
Traditional left	28.2	260
Radical left	15.4	142
NSMOs/NGOs and others	30.2	278
Newest Social Movements	10.5	97
Total	**100.0**	**922**

The data confirm the importance of the organizational components of both traditional and radical left within the ESF process: taken together the activists of these two areas of the European left represent the most numerous component of the ESF in Athens.

3.2.2 Socio-graphic characteristics and occupational status

Looking at the socio-graphic characteristics and the occupational status, some differences between members of the traditional and the radical left, as well as with the other categories emerge (see table 5). The proportion of men and women is less balanced in the traditional than in the radical left, but in both cases the percentage of women remains below the average. Women are in fact more represented in NSMOs and NGOs, while the newest social movements are similar to the radical left in this respect. As far as age is concerned, most of the participants at the fourth ESF (46%) were up to 29 years old. This age cohort, which can be understood as the GJM-generation proper, was particularly strong among the participants who were not members of any organization. Surprisingly, among the organized elements of the ESF it is the traditional left that with 48% most represents the

young activists, whereas the radical left with 42% shows the same result as NSMOs and NGOs. Of the members of the traditional left, 21% were between 30 and 44 years old, 18% between 45 and 53, and 14% aged 54 or more. For the radical left these percentages are respectively 24%, 16% and 18%. Unexpectedly, the newest social movements have the oldest activists: 35% were up to 29 years old, the same percentage between 30 and 44, and as many as 27% were older than 54, i.e. can be considered of the 1968-generation.

Table 5 - Sociographic features and occupational status

	Socio-graphic features		
	Female	Age	Education
Cramer's V	.13**	.15***	.15***
Non members	48.2	Up to 29 (70%)	Post compulsory (55%)
Traditional left	37.5	Up to 29 (48%)	University and post-grad (50%)
Radical left	42.8	Up to 29 (42%)	University and post-grad (49%)
NSMOs, NGOs and others	53.1	Up to 29 (42%)	University and post-grad (60%)
Newest social movements	43.2	30-44 (35%)	University and post-grad (72%)
Total	**45.3**	**Up to 29 (46%)**	**University post-grad (54%)**

	Occupational Status				
	Employment status		Sector of work		Temporary Job
Cramer's V	.20***		.19***		.14*
First two	First	Second	First	Second	% Yes
Non members	Student (67%)	Professional (10%)	Private (42%)	Public (35%)	38%
Traditional left	Student (40%)	Non-manual worker (23%)	Public (38%)	Associative (26%)	30%
Radical left	Student (34%)	Non-manual workers (26%)	Public (60%)	Private (21%)	18%
NSMO, NGOs, and others	Student (30%)	Non manual worker (26%)	Public (35%)	Associative (33%)	37%
Newest social movements	Student (24%)	Non manual worker (24%)	Public (42%)	Private (27%)	28%
Total	**Student (39%)**	**Non manual worker (22%)**	**Public (40%)**	**Private (24%)**	**31%**

As already shown in a previous chapter, most of the activists in Athens have a university or a post graduate degree (see chap. 5). This percentage, however, remains lower for non members (41%), radical leftists (49%), and traditional leftists (50%), whereas it is decisively higher for members of NSMOs and NGOs (60%) and of newest social movements (72%). If on average only 8% of the surveyed activists have only a compulsory degree, this is true for 11% of both traditional and radical leftists, while the percentage remains lower for non members (5%), members of NSMOs and NGOs (7%), and activists of newest social movements (5%). Among the organized

participants of the Athens ESF, the traditional and the radical left therefore represent the element with less formal education.

As far as the occupational status is concerned, most of the activists surveyed are students or non-manual workers of the public and private sector, with a full time contract. The unemployed are in general very few (6%), with non-members (3.4%) and NSMOs and NGOs (5.5%), but also the traditional left (5%) below this average. The unemployed are more present within the radical left (8.5%), and the newest social movements (10.3%). Teachers instead are more represented by the radical left (17.1%, against 10.1% of the traditional left and an average of 9.6%), while professionals, not surprisingly, are more present within NSMOs and NGOs (13.2%, against 10.6% in the traditional left and only 3.4% in the radical left, with an average of 10%). Only weakly represented among the ESF participants are manual workers, with the radical left (3.4%) and the traditional left (4.0%) only slightly above the average of 3.2%. Surprisingly, whereas 31.2% of the overall sample have a temporary job, this figure is considerably lower for the radical left (18.4%) and the newest social movements (27.5%). Also the traditional left in this respect lies slightly below average (30.2%), whereas temporary workers are more represented within NSMOs and NGOs (37.2%) and ESF participants who were not a member of any organization (38.2%).

Summarizing the socio-graphic features of the traditional and radical left activists present at the Athens ESF, we can say that they are mostly male, young (up to 29), well educated (although less than the other organized participants), especially students and non manual workers of the public sectors. The only relevant difference between the traditional and the radical leftists is that the former, but even more so the members of NSMO and NGOs, when not students are mostly employed in the associative sector, i.e. can be classified as professional politicians. More precisely, many members of the traditional left present at the Athens ESF are directly employed by their own organizations, as leaders or paid staff, something that the radical left has traditionally criticized as a sign of bureaucratization, one of the most important radical leftist principles being the refusal of delegation and of professional politics. In fact, while about 46% of the traditional left activists declared to be leaders or paid staff members of their group, for the radical left this percentage falls to 29% (NSMOs and NGOs: 37%; newest movements: 31%; Cramer's V: .13***). Correspondingly, the percentage of the radical left that declared to be voluntary activists/campaigners (29.7%) is considerably higher than the figure for the traditional left (19.5%), although lower than for NSMOs and NGOs (34.1%) or for the newest movements (39.8%). Both the radical left (34.1%) and the traditional left (27.3%) were however represented at the Athens ESF with a far higher percentage of ordinary members than both NSMOs and NGOs (17.6%) and newest movements (18.3%). This indicates that the decision of the left leadership to attend the ESF is sustained by the mobilization of the rank and file members.

3.2.3 National opportunities for transnational participation?

Some national differences – connected with the different traditions of the left in the various countries which we briefly indicated in the first part of this chapter – become apparent when looking at the activists surveyed at the Athens ESF. The results for the single countries seem to confirm only partially the hypothesis based on the literature (Kriesi et al. 1995) that the left will be less present in protest in the consensual and corporatist countries where the old cleavages are pacified. If the radical left is particularly strong in majoritarian countries, the re-emergence of social cleavages expresses itself in a stronger involvement of organizations of the traditional left also in consensual countries (see table 6). We can hypothesize that the traditional left of consensual countries is more involved in the mobilizations of the GJM, because on the one hand it is trying to defend a social model threatened by neoliberalism, while on the other hand its organizations risk to lose the power gained through corporatist practices.

In a further step we used two indicators elaborated by Lijphart (1999): the executive-parties dimension, which classifies the countries on the basis of whether decisions are taken by majority or

by compromise (majoritarian vs. consensual); the interest groups pluralism index, which classifies the countries on the basis of the type of interest representation (pluralist vs. corporatist). Covering 1,104 activists, i.e. 91.6% of our sample, we applied the scores attributed by Lijphart for each country present both in his research and in our sample (Austria, Belgium, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, and the USA).

Our results confirm that the radical left is particularly prominent in majoritarian and pluralist regimes, but that the traditional left shows strongly also in consensual and corporatist regimes, where however both NSMOs and NGOs and the newest social movements are especially strong (see table 6). Combining the different models, we find the radical left most strongly represented in majoritarian and pluralist regimes, the traditional left in consensual and pluralist ones, and the non-left and the newest social movements in consensual and corporatist ones.

Table 6 - Traditional and radical left activists by country and type of democratic regime

Country	Type of organization considered most important					
	Non members	Traditional Left	Radical Left	NSMOs, NGOs, and others	Newest Social Movements	Valid cases
Greece (majoritarian/pluralist)	25.0	29.5	14.8	22.3	8.3	264
Italy (consensual/pluralist)	9.4	41.5	6.9	31.4	10.7	159
France (majoritarian/pluralist)	11.0	21.2	29.5	24.7	13.7	146
Germany (consensual/corporatist)	14.7	29.3	10.7	30.7	14.7	75
Spain (majoritarian/pluralist)	21.6	17.6	19.6	25.5	15.7	51
UK (majoritarian/pluralist)	2.5	15.0	37.5	45.0	0.0	40
Western Europe (consensual/corporatist)	9.2	23.1	7.7	52.3	7.7	65
Scandinavia (consensual/corporatist)	6.0	40.0	2.0	34.0	18.0	50
Turkey, central & Eastern Europe	16.0	20.0	12.0	44.0	8.0	50
Total	15.2	28.6	15.3	30.2	10.7	900
Cramer's V= .20***						

Type of democratic regime						
Majoritarian	18.8	24.6	21.0	25.3	10.2	499
Consensual	10.5	35.2	7.7	34.9	11.6	352
Cramer's V= .24***						
Type of interest representation model						
Pluralist	16.5	28.5	17.9	26.9	10.2	666
Corporatist	11.4	30.8	7.0	37.8	13.0	185
Cramer's V = .16***						
Type of regimes combined						
Majoritariana and pluralist	18.8	24.6	21.0	25.3	10.2	499
Consensusal and pluralist	9.6	40.1	8.4	31.7	10.2	167
Consensual and corporatist	11.4	30.8	7.0	37.8	13.2	185
Cramer's V = .18***						

3.2.4 Left patterns of political activism

In various respects, the traditional and the radical left show differences in the patterns of political activism. Although it seems to have successively incorporated new emerging themes, the traditional left, in fact, more than others remains anchored in patterns of political activism consonant with representative democracy. The radical left, to the contrary, shows a greater distance to the established and institutionalized forms of political participation.

As has been underlined in another chapter, the activists participating in the ESF in Athens are characterized by multiple membership in different types of organizations (see chapter 7). This characteristic is even more pronounced for leftist activists than for others: on average members of both traditional and radical left organizations declared to be also members of another 4.5 groups (for NSMOs/NGOs the figure is 3.9 and for newest social movement 3.8). Thus, our traditional and radical left organizations share their members with different types of NSMOs and NGOs, such as women's right organizations (23% for the traditional left, 22% for the radical left), peace organizations (both about 34%), gay and lesbian groups (10% and 11%), human rights organizations (35% and 37%), and international solidarity groups (40% and 38%). If the traditional leftists seem to be more inclined towards consumerism and fair trade (20% and 12%), development aid organizations (18% vs. 11%), and charity organizations (15% and 6%), the radical leftists tend to favour anti-racist organizations (50% vs. 37%), student groups (33% vs. 27%), environmental groups (22.5% vs. 18.8%) and unemployed organizations (13% vs. 10%).

We can therefore conclude that also the traditional and radical left activists are expressions of a new politics – postmaterialist, postmodern, postfordist, as we want to call it – just like other GJM activists: they have multiple and open identities which make it possible to bridge old and new social movements and frames (Andretta 2005, della Porta 2005, della Porta et al. 2006, chap. 3). Activists of the traditional and the radical left are in fact also involved in newest social movement organizations, e.g. in Local Social Forums (36% and 29%, respectively), in groups against the neoliberal economic agenda (6% and 9%), and in alternative media (14% and 11%).

However, activists of the traditional and of the radical left show distinguished patterns as far as action repertoires are concerned. It is especially the traditional left which shows party related action repertoires: 77.8% persuaded someone to vote for a political party (vs. 58.1% for the radical left, 53.7% for NSMOs and NGOs, 48.4% for newest social movements, and 29.9% for non-members);

75.5% worked in a political party (vs. 56.6% for the radical left, 30.1% for NSMOs and NGOs, 29.5% for newest social movements, and 5.2% for non-members). As far as trade union activity is concerned, the differences between the traditional and the radical left narrow considerably: 66.5% of the former and 68.4% of the latter participated in a strike, while for NSMOs and NGOs and for newest social movements the percentage is, respectively, 51.5% and 66.3%, and for non-members 35.1%. Finally, with 36.7% the traditional left activists showed the lowest propensity of all categories to visit the autonomous spaces (vs. 45.5% for the radical left, 59% for NSMOs and NGOs, 48.8% for newest social movements, and 60.7% for non-members).

All organized activists of the ESF regularly practice the more conventional participative forms of action like going to a demonstration, signing a petition, or handing out leaflets (NSMOs and NGOs showing a lower percentage for the latter). The radical left, however, far more than the traditional left favours unconventional and antagonistic forms of action like civil disobedience (59.6% vs. 47.5%), non-violent direct action (64% vs. 61.5%), blockade (53.7% vs. 37%), occupation of public buildings (56% vs. 42.8%) or of abandoned homes (19% vs. 11%), and violence against property (13.2% vs. 5.4%). As far as the strategies of the GJM are concerned, it is the radical left that with 31.3% (vs. 19.7% for the traditional left, 10.3% the newest movements, and 9.3% for NSMOs and NGOs) attributes the greatest importance to the option "take to the streets to express dissent publicly".[187]

A greater vicinity of the traditional left to institutionalized representative politics emerges also from the data on trust in political actors: 40.4% of traditional leftists trust political parties at least a fair amount, vs. 17.6% of the radical left, 19% of the members of NSMOs and NGOs, 14.6% of the members of newest social movements, and 7.6% of non-members. Trade unions are trusted by 63.4% of the traditional left, vs. 41.1% of the radical left, 45.8% of NSMOs and NGOs, 47.7% of the newest movements, and 38.5% of the non-members.[188] With 33% and 28%, respectively, the traditional left also shows comparatively high trust in local government (average: 28%; radical left: 10%) and in the national parliament (average: 22%; radical left: 6%). The radical left, to the contrary, of all our categories (including non-members) is the one showing the lowest trust in all political actors with the only exception for trust in political parties and trade unions (also in these two cases, however, trust remains low), confirming their distance to institutional politics as practiced in western democracies.

Finally, about 42% of traditional leftists place themselves in a radical leftist position and about 46% in a more moderate but still leftist position; for the radical leftists these percentages are respectively about 66% and 26%, for NSMO members 31% and 41%, and for the newest social movements 30% and 54%.

3.2.5 Leftist activists and the GJM: which kind of involvement?

In the first part of our chapter, on the basis of the organizational affiliation of participants in the EPAs, we noticed that within the preparatory process of the ESFs the traditional left plays an important role, although it is above all the groups most committed to the ESF process (the radical left and the newest movements) that show a comparatively strong representation (see table 2). These results seem confirmed by our survey of participants in the Athens ESF.

[187] The option "promote alternative social and economic models", instead, is favoured especially by the newest movements with 43.2%, against 39.8% for NSMOs and NGOs, 36.8% for the traditional left, and 26.4% for the radical left.

[188] It is interesting to notice that only a low percentage of radical leftists, who are involved in grassroots trade unions, declare to trust unions in general. This can be explained by the fact that the question refers to trade unions in general, and radical leftists might not want to express trust for a category which includes also the established unions they criticize.

Our data first of all show that identification with the GJM is highest among activists of newest social movements and of the radical left, but remains high also for those of the traditional left (see table 7). Both traditional and radical leftists identify with theGJM on average more than "enough", but in this respect no difference emerges with the full sample,

Table 7 - The involvement of leftist activists in the GJM

	Identification with GJM189		General Participation in GJM activities190		Only National participation in GJM191		Transnational participation 192		Participation in GJM decision mak.193	
	means	ETA	means	ETA	means	ETA	Means	ETA	means	ETA
Non members	1.8	.336***	2.3	.348***	1.3	.322***	.22	.282***	.27	.356***
Traditional leftists	2.3		6.2		4.0		.53		.73	
Radical leftists	2.4		6.6		2.8		.65		.81	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	2.3		5.0		2.7		.52		.64	
Newest movements	2.6		8.0		5.9		.70		.74	
Total	**2.3**		**5.5**		**2.9**		**.51**		**.65**	

Analyzing the degree of involvement in the GJM, we notice that the activists of newest social movements show the highest degree of participation in GJM activities. Also leftist activists, however, show a strong involvement: if in general activists participated in more than 5 events of the GJM prior to Athens, traditional leftists did so more than 6 times, and radical leftists about 7 times, while the participation of activists of NSMOs and NGOs remains below average. Interestingly, if we isolate the activists who (prior to Athens) had participated only in national events, but not in GJM activities outside their countries of residence, the level of participation of the traditional left is significantly higher than that of the radical left and of NSMOs and NGOs, though it remains lower than that of newest social movements. As far as transnational participation is concerned, traditional leftists with 53% show a level of participation similar to NSMOs and NGOs, while activists of the radical left (65%) and especially of newest social movements (70%) participated far more in GJM activities outside their own countries. Unsurprisingly, at all levels non organized activists are far less involved than activists with any kind of membership.

The results on participation in GJM decision-making do not mirror those on participation in GJM activities. Here, in fact, organizational commitment and available resources come into play. As the example of the EPA in Vienna in May 2002 presented in the first part of this chapter had indicated (see table 2), in GJM decision-making both the traditional and the radical left seem to play an important role, as important or even more important than the one played by the newest social

[189] The original variable varies from 0 (no identification) to 3 (much identification). If the mean is more than 2, on average activists of the relative category declare to identify with GJM more than "enough".

[190] The original variable varies from 0 to 4: 0=never before; 1=once; 2= 2-5 times; 3= 6-10 times; 4= more than 10 times. We recoded the variable by assigning to each value the median of the attached range (for instance we attached to value 2, the value 3.5, or to value 3, the value 8).

[191] We used the same variable as indicated in note 50, selecting those activists who prior to Athens had never participated in a protest/demonstration in a country other than their country of residence.

[192] The original variable was a dichotomy: 0= NO, I did not participate in a country other than my own; 1= Yes, I did. We calculated the means for each type of activist. The means reflect the proportion of members participating at transnational level (i.e. a mean of 0.53 for the traditional leftists means that 53% of them participated at transnational level).

[193] The original variable was a dichotomy: 0 = No, I did not participate in GJM decision making; 1+ yes, I did. The means represent the proportion of activists having participated in GJM decision making (for instance .71 for the traditional leftists means that 71% of them have participated in such decision making settings).

movements. In fact, 73% of the traditional leftists and as many as 81% of the radical leftists declare to have been involved in GJM decision-making, against 65% on average. The involvement of activists of newest social movements with 74% mirrors that of the traditional left, while NSMOs and NGOs with 64% remain slightly below the average of 65%.

Concluding, both our categories of left activists, notwithstanding the closer proximity of those of the traditional left to institutional forms of political participation, are clearly and strongly involved in GJM activities, and play a prominent role in GJM decision-making.

3.3 Democratic practices and ideals of leftist activists in the GJM in Europe

As we already noticed in other chapters, the GJM has reactivated a reflection on "radical democracy" by emphasising a "new" model of democracy based on consensus and direct participation. In Chapter 3, we have shown that most of the activists surveyed at the Athens ESF share a normative democratic ideal that we called "deliberative-participative democracy", based on the refusal of delegation and on consensual decision-making. In Chapter 5 we saw that this model of democracy is advanced in particular by the newest and most innovative sector of the movement. Seeing the importance of the involvement of the traditional and the radical left activists in GJM activities, and above all in GJM decision-making, an analysis of the democratic practices and ideals of these activists is of particular interest.

In the following section of our chapter we will investigate whether specific traits of traditional left and of radical left activists emerge as far as perceived democratic practices and democratic ideals are concerned. Two competing hypotheses can be advanced and tested. According to a "path dependency" argument (Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000), activists associated with the traditional left should support more than others the "associational model" of democracy, based on delegation and majority decision-making, traditionally implemented in the organizations of the workers' movement. Considering the critique of delegation and bureaucratisation advanced by the New Left of the 1970s, activists of the radical left should support what we have called the "assembleary model", combining direct participation with majority decision-making. Following instead a sociological institutionalism approach (March and Olsen 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1991), one could hypothesize that the involvement of leftist activists in the GJM led to contamination with and acceptance of the deliberative-participative democratic ideal advanced by the new movement, based on consensus and direct participation. In this case, a process of diffusion of new ideas and practices through intense and sustained networking could be seen at work (McAdam et al. 2001). We can test the two hypotheses by correlating our typology of left GJM activists with perceived democratic practices within the group of reference and with normative ideals of democracy, according to the models elaborated in chapter 3.

3.3.1 Perceived democratic practices in traditional left and radical left groups

As far as the perception of democratic practices within the group of reference is concerned (see table 8), our data give conflicting results. If the relative majority of traditional leftists perceive the practice of their own group as being associative (with a clear majority indicating decision-making by vote, but slightly more than 50% the participation of all members), the relative majority of radical leftists characterize their group not as assembleary but as deliberative participative (with a clear majority indicating the participation of all members and slightly more than 50% consensus as decision-making method). Further elements are added taking a separate look at the original variables of our Athens survey, i.e. participation of members in decision-making and decision-making method, measured on a four digit scale. If we concentrate on the extremes of the scales, as far as participation is concerned traditional leftist and activists of NSMOs and NGOs show the highest frequencies for the option that only few members participate in decision-making and the lowest for the option that all members do so. As far as consensus is concerned, it is the traditional

and the radical left that show the highest frequencies for the option that decisions are always taken by vote and the lowest for the option that they are always taken by consensus.

Table 8 - Typology of activists and perceived organizational democratic practices

Typology of activists	Perceived organizational democratic practices					
	Associative	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Total	Cr.'s V
Type of activists						
Traditional left	32.4	16.2	29.6	21.9	247	.14***
Radical left	15.9	9.5	31.0	43.7	126	
NSMOs, NGOs and others	23.6	20.0	21.4	35.0	220	
Newest movements	15.5	14.3	23.8	46.4	84	
Total Sample Row	**24.4**	**16.0**	**26.4**	**33.2**	**677**	

Our findings seem to indicate processes of diffusion, filtered, however, through existing organizational cultures. In fact, contradictory results emerge in particular, as far the traditional left is concerned, for participation and, as far as the radical left is concerned, for decision making-method, i.e. consensus. In this respect we can advance the hypothesis that the perception of the activists reflects tension between organizational practices and particular original democratic values of the two types of left organizations, exposed by the participatory and deliberative claims of the GJM. For organizations of the traditional left, in fact, participation remains a fundamental value, repeatedly stressed in key documents, but increasingly problematic in its translation into practice (della Porta and Reiter 2006). Similarly, the ideal of unanimity of the radical left, in organizational practice often translated into provisions of qualified majorities, is particularly challenged by the deliberative forms of decision-making advanced by the GJM.

Finally, the fact that in the perception of the activists their organizations increasingly practice participation and deliberation – about 21% even of the traditional leftists perceive the practice of their group as "deliberative-participative" – indicates that (regardless of whether these perceptions correspond to real practices or not) something "new" is happening in the internal democracy of the both traditional and radical left, at least as far as the aspiration of activists are concerned.

3.3.2 Democratic ideals of traditional left and of radical left activists

In order to isolate the aspiration of activists, i.e. their democratic ideals, in our survey we also asked them to indicate how they think political decisions should be taken in general (see also chap. 3). We did this by asking activists to express their degree of agreement with four items, confronting them with different aspects of the issue: should the quality of arguments prevail in political decisions or should the arguments of more resourceful or active individuals/groups have more weight (item 1); in a political conflict, is it always important that opponents respect each other as equal discussants or are there situations in which mutual acceptance is not important (item 2); is it right to delegate political decisions to others or should the participation of all interested persons always be a priority in the decision-making should (item 3); should political decisions be taken by voting or by consensus (item 4).

As far as item 1 is concerned (see table 9), we can notice that the large majority of the activists involved in traditional left politics believe that in decision-making the quality of arguments should always be considered more important than resources: about 70% express a clear preference for this option, while 20% take a position attributing more importance to the quality of arguments than to

resources; only 2% clearly privilege resources, and 5% believes that resources should have more weight than arguments. There are no significant differences with the positions of radical leftists, nor with those of the other types of activists on this item.

Table 9 - Typology of activists and item 1 of normative democratic ideals

Typology of activists	*Which of the opposite statements below describes how you think political decisions should be taken in general? (Item 1)*					
	QUALITY OF ARGUMENTS SHOULD MAKE A DIFFERENCE		**RESOURCEFUL AND ACTIVE PEOPLE/ORGS SHOULD HAVE MORE WEIGHT**			
	Arguments	More arguments than resources	More resources than arguments	Resources	Total	Cr.'s V
Type of activists						
Non members	66.2	21.1	8.3	4.5	133	n.s.
Traditional left	72.1	20.6	5.3	2.0	247	
Radical left	71.8	18.3	7.6	2.3	131	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	66.4	22.7	7.3	3.6	247	
Newest movements	72.1	19.8	5.8	2.3	86	
Total Sample Row	**69.4**	**20.9**	**6.8**	**3.0**	**844**	

Item 2 is even less discriminating, with an average of about 90% of both traditional and radical left activists more or less convinced that in a situation of political conflict opponents should accept each other as equal discussants, with almost no difference with the others types of activists (see table 10). Activists of radical left groups, however, seem to be even more "tolerant" than the others, since about 78% believe that opponents should <u>always</u> be accepted as equal discussants, compared to about 69% of the full sample.

Table 10 - Typology of activists and item 2 of normative democratic ideals

Typology of activists	*Which of the opposite statements below describes how you think political decisions should be taken in general?*					
	IN A POLITICAL CONFLICT IT IS ALWAYS IMPORTANT THAT OPPONENTS ACCEPTANCE OTHER AS EQUAL DISCUSSANTS					
	Always important	Sometimes important	Scarcely important	Not important	Total	Cr. 's V
Type of activists						
Non members	66.2	16.5	9.8	7.5	133	n.s.
Traditional left	67.6	21.5	5.7	5.3	247	
Radical left	77.9	14.5	4.6	3.1	131	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	65.3	20.6	9.7	4.4	248	
Newest movements	70.9	19.8	7.0	2.3	86	
Total Sample Row	**68.6**	**19.2**	**7.5**	**4.7**	**845**	

As far as the item distinguishing between delegation and participation is concerned, overall a clear preference for the ideal of direct participation emerges. About 73% of the traditional left activists believe that participation of all interested persons should be a priority in decision making, with the same result registered for members of NSMOs and NGOs. If newest social movements show the clearest rejection of delegation, it comes as a surprise that together with the non-members it is the radical leftists, who are relatively more inclined than the others towards delegation as a possible solution for democratic decision making (see table 11).

Table 11 - Typology of activists and item 3 of normative democratic ideals

Typology of activists	*Which of the opposite statements below describes how you think political decisions should be taken in general?*					
	In many cases delegation is important		**Participation of all always a priority**			
	Delegate always important	Delegate sometimes important	Participate sometimes important	Participate always important	Total	Cr. 's V
Type of activists						
Non members	15.9	15.9	26.5	41.7	132	n.s.
Traditional left	8.0	19.3	28.1	44.6	249	
Radical left	11.4	20.5	22.0	46.2	132	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	9.1	18.9	25.5	46.5	243	
Newest movements	7.1	8.2	35.3	49.4	85	
Total Sample Row	**10.0**	**17.7**	**26.9**	**45.4**	**841**	

Our results for the item opposing decision-making by voting and by consensus show that preferences for the consensus method have made important inroads into movement sectors traditionally using the majority vote (see table 12). Still, with the only exception of the newest movements (46% of whose activists, however, are also favourably disposed towards using the vote at least sometimes) an overall preference for voting emerges for all of our types of activists, from non-members (66%), to traditional leftists (57%), radical leftists (54%) and members of NSMOs and NGOs (54%). Again, it can be instructive to take a look at the opposing ends of the four digit scale on which the activists were asked to collocate their answers. As far as a clear preference for voting is concerned, we find the highest frequencies for the radical left, followed by non-members, NSMOs and NGOs, and the traditional left. At the same time, however, radical leftists show a higher clear preference for consensus than activists of NSMOs and NGOs, or of the traditional left and non-members, being surpassed in this respect only by activists of newest social movements. These results may indicate both internal divisiond on this issue and different preferences for various decision-making contexts.

Table 12 - Typology of activists and item 4 of normative democratic ideals

Typology of activists	*Which of the opposite statements below describes how you think political decisions should be taken in general?*					
	Political decisions should be taken by voting		**Political decisions should be taken by consensus**			
	Always voting	Sometimes voting	Sometimes consensus	Always consensus	Total	Cr. 's V
Type of activists						
Non members	33.8	32.3	16.2	17.7	130	.09*
Traditional left	29.1	27.5	23.5	19.8	247	
Radical left	35.7	17.8	24.0	22.5	129	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	29.8	24.1	25.7	20.4	245	
Newest movements	24.1	21.7	20.5	33.7	83	
Total Sample Row	**30.6**	**25.2**	**22.8**	**21.5**	**834**	

If we crosstabulate item 3 and 4, we obtain the four type typology of democratic models that we used in the previous section for discriminating between perceived democratic practices in the group of reference (see also chapter 3), with the associational, the deliberative-representative, the assembleary and the deliberative-participative model now representing different ideal models of democracy (see table 13). It comes as a surprise that as much as 38% of the traditional leftists prefer an assembleary model – the model of the new left-libertarian movements of the sixties and the seventies – against the 36% of the whole sample, and, more importantly, the 31% of the radical leftists themselves. Moreover, few traditional leftists are inclined to see an associational setting as an ideal type of decision making: only members of newest social movements refer to such a model less often. Activists who mentioned as their most important group a radical leftist organization are relatively more inclined to see the associational model as an ideal of democracy. The activists who most favour a deliberative-participative ideal are, not surprisingly, those of the newest social movements (47% against about 36% on average), but both the traditional and the radical leftists are not less inclined towards deliberative participation than average. Finally the deliberative-representative model is the least popular ideal option for all types of activists.

Table 13 - Typology of activists and normative democratic models

Typology of activists	**Normative democratic models**					
	Associative	Deliberative representative	Assembleary	Deliberative participative	Total	Cr.'s V
Type of activists						
Non members	26.4	5.4	39.5	28.7	129	n.s.
Traditional left	18.6	8.9	38.1	34.4	247	
Radical left	21.7	10.1	31.8	36.4	129	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	20.1	7.9	33.9	38.1	239	
Newest movements	8.4	7.2	37.3	47.0	83	
Total Sample Row	**19.7**	**8.1**	**36.0**	**36.2**	**827**	

Summarizing, traditional left activists show considerable distance towards the old associative model and appear far closer to a more participative type of democracy, be it assembleary or deliberative-participative. At the same time, activists involved in radical left groups generally support either their traditional assembleary model or the new deliberative-participative one. However, within the radical groups a democratic model based on delegation and voting seems to hold an unexpected appeal.

The diffusion model is compatible with our findings, but as underlined before processes of diffusion are filtered through existing organizational cultures. This is visible in particular as far as voting is concerned, with consensus emerging as minoritarian for both traditional and radical leftists. However, even activists of the traditional left – also by re-appropriating and reinterpreting, it can be assumed, original participatory values of their organizations – show considerable distance to a democratic model based on delegation of power. Of difficult explanation remains the fact that the radical leftists show a comparatively higher support for the traditional leftist practice of delegating power.

3.3.3 Internal democratic practices challenged

Comparing the results of the normative models of democracy with those of the perceptions of democratic practices at the group level, we notice visible signs of incongruence between the two (see table 8 and table 13). For instance, if 33% of the activists primarily involved in traditional left organizations perceive their group as practicing an associational model, only 18% support this model as a democratic ideal. Similarly, if 41% of the activists primarily involved in radical leftist organizations perceive their group as "deliberative participative", only 34% bear a congruent ideal of democracy.

We can analyze more precisely the degree of congruence between perceived democratic practices of the group of reference and democratic ideals by calculating the differences between the respective scores, as we did already in chapter 3 for the perceived democratic practices within the GJM in general. Since activists were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with the same kind of statements for both actual practices in their group and democratic ideals, the differences for each couple of items can vary from minus three to three, zero representing the value for perfect congruence. Consequently, a greater distance of the value from zero indicates less congruence between perceived practices and ideal models of decision making. In order to calculate an index measuring the level of incongruence regardless of its direction, we transformed the negative values in positive ones, arriving for each item at an index varying from zero (full congruence) to three (full incongruence). We then calculated a synthetic additive index which sums the four indexes and divides the sum by 4.[194]

[194] This means that the synthetic index will also vary from 0 to 3.

Table 14 - Typology of activists and level of incongruence and satisfaction with democracy in the group

Typology of activists	Incongruence between group democratic practices and democratic ideals and (dis)satisfaction with democracy in the group							
	Inc. in Item 3: deleg./partic.		Inc. in Item 4: voting/consensus		Index of total incongruence		Dissatisfaction with group democracy	
	Means	ETA	Means	ETA	Means	ETA	Means	ETA
Traditional left	1.00	.122*	.87	n.s.	.94	.182***	1.04	.236***
Radical left	.80		.64		.67		.58	
NSMOs, NGOs, and others	1.12		.81		.87		.80	
Newest movements	.92		.68		.76		.74	
Total	**.99**		**.78**		**.85**		**.83**	

The results show that for both item 3 (delegation/participation) and item 4 (voting/consensus), activists who declared their primary involvement in traditional left organizations show a higher degree of incongruence than radical leftists between perceived democratic practices in their group and democratic ideals (see table 14). The differences in the index of total incongruence (considering all the 4 items) are statistically significant. If we dichotomize the index by distinguishing between activists with an acceptable degree of incongruence (we accepted a score of incongruence of up to 0.75, which means an average of less than 1 point on the 0-3 scale for each item), from those who report a higher incongruence, we see that as many as 51.5% of the traditional left activists show real incongruence, against only 31% of the radical leftists, 37% of the activists of newest social movements, and 43% of the members of NSMOs and NGOs (the average is 43%).

Not surprisingly, the level of incongruence is correlated with dissatisfaction with democracy within the group of reference.[195] Traditional leftists emerge as those less satisfied with democracy in their own group: 21% declare to be moderately or very unsatisfied, against only 6% of the radical leftists (10% for NSMOs and NGOs, 12% for newest movements, and 14% on average). If we isolate this 21% of unsatisfied traditional leftists, we notice that 83% of them perceive that in their group decisions are not taken by all (or almost all) participants, while 77% of them highly value direct participation in democratic decision making; 69% perceive that decisions are taken by voting, while 47% value consensus as an ideal method; 60% of them perceive decision-making in their group as following the associational model, while as many as 76% indicate a participatory ideal, preferring either an assembleary (39%) or a deliberative-participative model (37%). Only 10% describe their group as assembleary and only 8% as deliberative participative. In general, if we extend the analysis to the full sample, 47% of those activists describing their group as associational would prefer an assembleary model and 24% a deliberative participative one, while only 21% of those activists describing their group as "assembleary", and as few as 8% of those describing it as deliberative-participative would prefer an associational model.

Concluding, the organizational model of the traditional left, based on delegation and voting, is still perceived as an organizational option, not only by traditional leftists. The radical leftist model, based on direct participation and voting, is even more widely indicated as an ideal by activists, and not only among radical leftist activists. These findings suggest that the presence of the traditional and the radical left in the GJM is felt not only in terms of their organizations and activists, but also in terms of their democratic traditions and ideals. At the same time, however, we have seen

[195] The Kendall's tau-b of the correlation between the two variable is .29, significant at .001 level.

evidence for the diffusion of a new model of democracy, based on direct participation and deliberation, among both traditional and radical leftists. The contamination of these activists with a new democratic model could become particularly important among those activists who are members of organizations adopting an associational model: strongly favouring direct participation, they could decide to leave if they don't see their aspirations satisfied. However, disillusion might mount also with regards to the GJM. As we have seen in chapter 3, in the perception of the activists also GJM decision-making does not (yet?) conform to the ideal of deliberative participation, and if a relative majority concedes that deliberation is practiced most activists (with the exception of those of newest movements) hold that direct participation is not realized.

4. Conclusions

As we argued in the first part of this chapter, different sectors of the European left showed divergent reactions to the rise of the GJM. For social democratic and socialist parties, diffidence dominated, based on the defence of representative democratic practices and of the dominant role of political parties also in the transnational political arena. The threat posed by the neoliberal economic agenda to the European welfare model led the traditional European trade unions, instead, to greater openness, particularly marked for those unions with a historically strong communist influence. Communist and post-communist parties, in fact, saw an opportunity for mobilization in the globalization process. For these parties, however, tension with the GJM and with those of their own members active in the movement developed because of the very role of a political party in the institutional political arena, particularly acute when the question of sustaining a government arose. Grassroots unions and radical left political groups with their roots in the New Left of the 1970s were instead deeply involved in the GJM from the very beginning. Some of these groups, however, argued for a structured organization of the social forum process, aimed at uniting and leading resistance to "the system", at odds with the deliberative and participative ideals of the GJM and its open network character.

Analyzing the involvement of traditional left and radical left organizations in the social forum process, we underlined that in particular the traditional left contributed important resources to the organization of the successive ESFs. In addition, both traditional and radical left organizations emerge as important contributors to the ESF programmes, organizing numerous seminars and workshops. However, comparing participation of activists in the ESF with visibility in the programme, both sectors of the European left are characterized by more participation than visibility. Finally, as the example of representation in the EPAs shows, activists of both traditional and radical left organizations are prominently involved in the preparatory process of the ESFs.

Turning to the results of our activist survey, we underlined the strong and continuous presence of the activists of the European left in the successive ESFs from Florence to Athens. As far as sociographic characteristics and occupational status are concerned, the most important results to underline are that, surprisingly, it is the traditional left that shows the highest percentage of young activists. At the same time traditional left activists more than others are employed by their own organization as paid staff or leaders and can therefore be seen as professional politicians. On the other hand, it is the traditional left that together with the radical left was most present at the ESF with ordinary members, signifying that any decision of the leadership to attend the ESF was sustained by mobilization of rank and file members. Looking at national differences, we find the radical left most strongly represented in majoritarian and pluralist regimes, the traditional left in consensual and pluralist ones, and NSMOs and NGOs as well as the newest social movements in consensual and corporatist ones.

Differences between the traditional and the radical left emerged in the patterns of political activism. If the further, remaining anchored in forms of political activism consonant with representative democracy, show greater vicinity to conventional and in particular party related action forms, the latter privilege more radical and disruptive action repertoires, showing a greater

distance to the established and institutionalized forms of political participation. Regardless of these differences, both the traditional and the radical left show a high involvement in GJM activities, and in particular in GJM decision-making

In the final part of our chapter we concentrated on perceived democratic practices within the group of reference and on democratic ideals. Our findings seem to indicate processes of diffusion, filtered, however, through existing organizational cultures. In fact, if the ideal of direct participation emerges as particularly strong, deliberation, although making important inroads into the traditional and in particular the radical left, is shared as a value only by a minority. Especially for activists of the traditional left, we saw however a considerable distance between their democratic ideals and the perceived model of democratic decision making in their own group. To this incongruence between democratic ideals and perceived practices corresponds a particularly marked dissatisfaction with democratic practices in the group of reference. The contamination of activists with a new democratic model could create particular problems for organizations adopting an traditional model of decision making combining delegation and voting, as they might risk alienating activists strongly favouring direct participation. However, the GJM might run a similar risk: activists in fact perceive GJM decision-making as not (yet?) conforming to the ideal of deliberative participation, and in particular as not realizing direct participation.

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