

EURISLAM WORKPACKAGE 2

INTEGRATED REPORT ON MEDIA CONTENT



Due date of deliverable: July 31, 2010
Actual submission date: October 7, 2010

Start date of project: 1 February 2009

Duration: 36 months

Organisation name of lead contractor for this deliverable: UNIGE

Revision [0]

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme

Dissemination Level

PU	Public	X
PP	Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)	
RE	Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)	
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INTRODUCTION

1. Aims and scope

In addition to formal law and jurisprudence (see workpackage 1), cultural relations are also affected importantly by how conceptions of national identity, citizenship, church-state relations, and the position of Islam in relation to these, are framed and contested in the public sphere. This workpackage addresses the more informal understandings about culture that resonate in dominant and majority-oriented public discourses. Cultural identity and ways of dealing with differences are studied by means of a content analysis of public debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants. The analysis of public debates also allows for gauging the position of the EU as an actor and Europe as an issue

To gather the relevant content-analytic data, we followed a two-step procedure, which combines the advantages of automated search and selection of online media sources with the qualitative detail allowed by human coding. In the first step, we selected several national newspapers (available online through sources as Lexis-nexis) and sampled from them by relevant keyword searches for each country for the period 1999-2008. From the set of articles thus generated, we drew a representative sample, which was then in the second step coded by research assistants. By drawing a representative sample, we ensure that our analyses are not focused merely on spectacular and perhaps atypical events, but include the everyday debate about the position of Muslims and Islam in Europe. At the same time, our period of study also includes intensely debated, conflict-ridden events.

Following the method of political claims analysis (Koopmans and Statham 1999), which has proven fruitful in previous work in the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics (Koopmans et al. 2005) as well as in the field of unemployment politics (Giugni, forthcoming), we looked in particular at the actors intervening in public debates, the issues they address, their policy positions, the frames they advance, and so forth. Similar to the procedure followed for the indicators of citizenship, the systematic data collection and analysis was carried in each country based on common guidelines.

Next we give more detailed information about the data and methods used to retrieve the information. A full description of the coding rules and variables can be found in the media content analysis codebook. Then we provide a descriptive comparative overview of some of the main variables of interest. The remainder of the report will be devoted to showing more detailed analyses for each of the six countries included in the study.

2. Data and methods

The dataset has uniformly been built through collection of discursive interventions in each country. Each of these discursive interventions is characterised by a typical structure. Specifically, the structure of claims for our study has been broken down into six elements:

1. Claimants: the actor or actors making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
2. Form of the claim (HOW, by which action is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
3. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
4. The substantive content of the claim (WHAT action is to be undertaken?)
5. The object of the claim (TO WHOM is this action directed?)
6. Frame: the justification for the claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?)

Actor, object, addressee, and issue of the discursive intervention are the main variables for data collection and analysis through statistical software. In addition, we have also coded some valuable information on the “position towards the object” so as to evaluate which actors intervene more explicitly in favour or against the interests of Muslims. More specific variables allow for both nationally based and a cross-national comparative analyses (see codebook).

The units of analysis are instances of claim-making. An instance of claim-making (shorthand: a claim) is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc.). Decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim.

Our definition of claim-making implies two important delimitations that require some elaboration: (1) instances of claim-making must be the result of purposive strategic action of the claimant and (2) they must be political in nature.

- (1) To qualify as an instance of claim-making, the text had to include a reference to an ongoing or concluded physical or verbal action in the public sphere, i.e. simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors did not count as claim-making (see codebook for some examples). Verbs indicating action included, e.g., said, stated, demanded, criticised, decided, demonstrated, published, voted, wrote, arrested. Nouns directly referring to such action included, e.g., statement, letter, speech, report, blockade, deportation, decision. The occurrence in the newspaper report of such verbs or nouns was a precondition for the coding of a claim. Reports that only referred to “states of mind” or motivations were not coded.
- (2) Collected claims had to be “political,” in the sense that they had to relate to collective social problems and solutions to them, and not to purely individual strategies of coping with problems.

Claims are coded by random sampling 750 articles selected from five newspapers in each country and covering the period from 1999 to 2008.¹ Every country selected a maximum of five newspapers on the basis of their own criteria to increase representatives of the sample. The articles are sampled from all newspaper sections² on the keywords Islam* / Muslim* / Moslem* / mosque / imam / Qur'an (Quran, Qur'ān, Koran, Alcoran or Al-Qur'ān) / headscarf / burqa (burkha, burka or burqua) / minaret. Two categories of claims are coded: (1)

¹ This is the minimum number of claims to be coded in each country. The actual number of claims coded may be higher. For this report, the French dataset includes a lower number of cases. The dataset will be completed later on.

² Editorials are included.

claims about Islam and/or Muslims in Western Europe, regardless of the actor; (2) claims by Muslims in Western Europe, regardless of the issue (explicitly Muslim)³.

To be included, a claim must either be made in one of our countries of coding or be addressed at an actor or institution in one of our countries of coding. Claims are also included if they are made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which the country of coding is a member, on the condition that the claim is substantively (also) relevant for the country of coding. Claims reported in the issue consulted and which did not occur outside the two weeks before the date of appearance of that issue are also coded (but only if they have not already been coded; if they have already coded, additional information can be added to the first claim coded). We code all claims, unless we know that they occurred more than two weeks ago. The date of the claim is also coded, when the date is not mentioned (e.g. recently), the day prior to the newspaper issue is taken as the default.

The following newspapers have been used as a source for the coding: De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, De Telegraaf, and Het Parool in the Netherlands; Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick, Tagesanzeiger, Le Matin, and Le Temps in Switzerland; Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt, and Tagesspiegel in Germany; Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Sun, and The Times in the UK; Het Laatste Nieuws, Le Soir, Gazet Van Antwerpen, La Dernière Heure, and De Standaard in Belgium; Libération, Le Figaro, Le Monde, La Croix, and Le Point in France. The sampling was stratified in each country so as to have an equal proportion of claims from each newspaper.

Coding has been done by 13 different coders. Reliability tests have been performed in order to check the consistency of coding across the different coders. These tests yield a strong consistency both with regard to the selection of claims and their description. The Chronbach alpha for selection bias (computed on a sample of 15 articles) is 0.905. The Chronbach alphas for description bias (computed on a sample of 4 articles) is, respectively, 0.973, 0.976, 0.975, and 0.983, for an average of 0.979.

3. Comparative overview

Next we provide a brief overview of some of the main comparative findings of the media content analysis. The starting point of such a comparison lies in the analysis of the actors of claims (table 1). The distribution of claims according to types of actors shows important variations across countries in the presence of actors in the public domain when dealing with Islam and related issues. At the most aggregate level, the relative share of claims by state actors and civil society actors vary from one country to the other. However, the latter play a bigger role in all six countries with the exception of Germany, where state actors are more important. This trend becomes even more evident if we include political parties among the latter.

If we look at the more specific categories, we observe similarly interesting differences. Among state actors, for example, while governments are responsible for a substantial share of claims in all six countries, legislatives are present above all in the Netherlands and the judiciary power intervenes especially in Germany. In addition, we can observe the important role played by policy and security agencies in both Germany and the UK. These differences

³ Everyone from a predominately Muslim country is considered Muslim.

can be explained, at least in part, by the general features of the political system in each country as well as by their more specific approaches to immigration, ethnic relations, and cultural diversity.

Turning to civil society actors, we can see that certain actors, such as for example unions as well as workers and employees, are nearly absent in all the countries. While this is not so surprising after all (these actors focus their intervention on other issues), the weak presence of antiracist, pro-minority, and solidarity and human rights organizations is quite striking as the situation of Muslims should be an issue of interest to them. Perhaps this suggests that these actors are still more oriented to intervening in the public domain on behalf of migrants and minorities more generally rather than focusing on Muslims. In other words, they would frame their interventions more in ethnic than religious terms. The same explanation, although in the opposite direction, could hold for the low presence of extreme-right actors, which display some degree of intervention only in Belgium and partly in France.

Table 1: Claims by actor (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
State actors	42.7	54.5	34.3	37.7	34.6	28.1
Governments	21.2	24.2	15.4	15.6	15.1	16.0
Legislatives	11.1	3.8	4.2	.6	3.8	4.4
Judiciary	2.7	13.0	6.5	7.9	8.0	3.3
Police and security agencies	5.9	10.7	4.4	12.9	5.4	3.6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	.3	1.3	1.6	.0	.6	.4
Other state executive agencies	1.5	1.4	2.2	.7	1.6	.5
Political parties	6.3	7.1	6.6	5.4	4.4	3.8
Civil society actors	46.7	35.2	45.3	54.9	51.8	63.9
Unions	.7	.5	.0	.2	.0	.2
Workers and employees	.1	.3	.0	.6	.1	.4
Employers organizations and firms	.9	1.0	1.0	1.6	.2	.2
Churches	.9	3.7	2.8	.9	1.7	2.5
Christians	.2	0	1.4	1.1	.5	.7
Media and journalists	5.9	7.0	6.6	5.1	4.2	1.8
Professional organizations and groups - think tanks/intellectuals	15.9	4.8	6.5	8.2	8.1	20.1
Muslim organizations and groups	16.2	15.9	18.6	32.3	26.0	28.2
Other minority organizations and groups	1.8	.4	1.0	.7	.5	1.5
Antiracist organisations and groups	.5	.1	.5	.4	1.1	1.3
Pro-minority rights and welfare organizations and groups	.7	.0	.6	.4	.5	.4
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	.7	.6	.6	1.2	.7	1.1
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	1.2	.4	1.4	.7	4.7	2.4
Other civil society organizations and groups	1.1	.4	4.3	1.5	3.4	3.1
Unknown actors	4.3	3.2	13.8	2.0	9.1	4.2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	888	784	790	1173	812	551

Other types of actors are more active. In particular, we observe an important share of claims made by professional organizations and groups, especially in France and the Netherlands. Yet the most relevant finding in our perspective concerns the presence of Muslim organizations and groups, that is, the actors whose interests are most directly at stake in this field. A first remark in this regard is that Muslims are responsible for a substantial amount of claims. In other words, they are protagonists of claim-making rather than simple objects of others' discourses and actions. At the same time, however, we observe important variations across countries. Muslims are particularly active in the UK, but also in France and Belgium, while their presence is less important in the other three countries.

Actors intervene in the public domain in different ways. We can therefore have a look at the forms of actions used in this field (table 2). Again, we observe both similarities and differences across the six countries. Verbal statements (press conferences, interviews, written statements and declarations) largely prevail in all the countries. Other forms of interventions include conventional actions (indoor meetings, judicial action, direct-democratic action, petitioning) and protest actions (demonstrative, confrontational, violent). These forms, however, are much less frequent than verbal statement. State actors, in addition, can also intervene by means of repressive measures or political decisions, which other actors by definition cannot adopt.

Table 2: Forms of action (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
State intervention	9.7	21.8	13.7	21.5	16.7	10.7
Repressive measures	5.9	16.8	5.7	13.6	8.7	5.1
Political decision	3.8	5.0	8.0	7.9	8.0	5.6
Verbal statements	75.3	62.6	71.9	59.1	65.5	73.1
Conventional actions	8.4	13.0	8.4	13.1	10.4	7.9
Protest actions	6.6	2.8	6.0	6.2	7.4	8.3
Demonstrative protests	1.6	1.3	2.2	2.4	3.8	4.5
Confrontational protests	1.1	.4	.9	1.2	1.1	1.1
Violent protests	3.9	1.1	2.9	2.6	2.5	2.7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	888	784	790	1173	812	551

However, here we are most interested in highlighting differences across countries. An interesting finding in this regard concerns state intervention, whose share is highest in Germany and the UK, lowest in the Netherlands and France, and at an intermediate level in Switzerland and Belgium. In addition, most of these differences come from repressive measures. This suggests that some countries (namely, Germany and the UK) adopt a tougher stance towards Muslims.

Protest actions are a particularly interesting form of intervention in the public domain. Overall, the share of protest actions over the total claims is relatively limited, ranging from little less than 3 percent in Germany to over 8 percent in France. This suggests that, in spite of a commonsensical idea, the degree of “contentiousness” of the field is relatively limited, at least in terms of action forms. As a matter of comparison, the proportion of protests found in the very same countries (except Belgium) for the field of immigration and ethnic relations ranges between 22 percent in Britain to 67 percent in Switzerland (Koopmans et al. 2005). It should be stressed, however, that the latter figures refer to the 1992-1998 period and do not include state intervention.

If we look more specifically at the most radical or contentious form of action, we reach a similar conclusion. Indeed, while violent protest here range from little more than 1 percent in Germany to a maximum of nearly 4 percent in the Netherlands, the share of violent protests on the field of immigration and ethnic relations politics ranges between 6 percent in the Netherlands and 19 percent in Germany (Koopmans et al. 2005). The latter case is particularly striking: claim-making in Germany seems to be much more contentious in the field of immigration and ethnic relations than when it comes to address issues relating to Muslims and Islam. While this might in part be due to the changes occurred in the institutional approach to

immigration and minority integration policies in Germany, leading to a relaxation of rules, it also point to a difference in the way ethnic and religious issues are framed.

Apart from who intervene in the public domain on these issues and how, another crucial aspect lies in the issues addressed, that is, what is conveyed by such intervention (table 3). We can make a distinction between three main issues fields in this regard: immigration, asylum, and alien politics; minority integration politics; and antiracism and islamophobia (including islamophobic claims). In addition, we also consider claims made by Muslims addressing other issues (homeland politics, transnational politics). The relative weight of these three issue fields is similar in the six countries: the large majority of claims deal with minority integration politics. Among them, most focus on religious rights and minority social problems. Such a prevalence of issues concerning minority integration is in sharp contrast with the distribution found in the same countries (except Belgium) for the field of immigration and ethnic relations for the 1992-1998 period (Koopmans et al. 2005), where overall most claims addressed issues pertaining to immigration, asylum, and aliens politics.

Table 3: Issues of claims (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	4.1	6.3	6.1	1.9	.9	3.1
Minority integration politics	76.9	76.8	67.5	68.5	71.7	78.5
Minority integration general	8.3	4.0	7.6	2.9	3.3	5.8
Minority rights and participation: citizenship rights	2.0	4.0	2.7	1.9	3.7	3.8
Minority rights and participation: social rights	4.5	1.4	1.3	3.1	2.7	2.0
Minority rights and participation: cultural rights	2.7	.9	.4	1.7	2.0	3.8
Minority rights and participation: religious rights	19.6	26.0	24.1	11.9	30.7	29.4
Minority rights and participation: other rights	.5	.3	.4	.7	.2	2.2
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1.9	.8	2.9	5.4	1.2	1.6
Minority social problems	28.6	38.3	26.1	37.3	26.2	19.6
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	8.8	1.3	2.2	3.8	1.6	10.3
Antiracism/islamophobia	11.3	12.9	15.4	16.0	14.8	11.4
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	8.8	8.0	9.6	3.7	5.4	8.0
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	2.5	4.8	5.8	12.4	9.4	3.4
Islamophobic claims	4.3	2.0	5.3	2.6	8.1	2.9
Actor claims Muslims	3.3	1.9	5.2	9.1	3.9	3.4
Homeland politics	.9	.5	1.5	.9	1.0	.2
Transnational politics	2.4	1.4	3.7	8.3	3.0	3.3
Other	.2	.1	.5	1.9	.6	.9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	888	784	790	1173	812	551

Again, we observe variations across countries, although they are not very strong. While being important everywhere, claims on minority integration politics play an even greater role in France, and the Netherlands. Claims on immigration, asylum, and aliens politics are more often made in Germany and Switzerland, two countries that put a particular emphasis on this aspect in policy making. Claims dealing with antiracism and islamophobia are more frequent (if we include islamophobic claims) in Belgium and Switzerland. Finally, claims made by Muslims on other issues emerge above all in the UK (most of them dealing with transnational politics). Among the more specific categories of issues, we could stress the much lower share of claims on religious rights in the UK.

Given their relevance in this field, we can have a closer look at claims dealing to religious rights (table 4). Most of these claims concern public institutions, while only a smaller part

refer to religious practice. This suggests that the role of the state in this field is important and many actors refer to it when addressing claims relating to religious rights. Once again, however, strong variations across countries can be observed. Thus, claims referring to religious practice are more frequent in Belgium and Switzerland than in the other four countries. Conversely, claims referring to public institutions play an important role especially in Germany and France.

The distribution of issues addressed by the interventions in the public domain concerning Muslims and Islam are “neutral,” in the sense that they make abstraction of the policy direction they convey. To get this information we must look at the position of claims. We created an indicator of the position of claims based on a simple scoring system. All claims whose realization implies deterioration in the rights or position of Muslims receive code -1, no matter if the reduction is minor or large. The -1 also goes to claims which express a negative attitude with regard to Muslims (both verbal and physical) or a positive attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. All claims whose realization implies an improvement in the rights and position of Muslims (minor or major) receive code +1. This code also goes to claims expressing (verbally or physically) a positive attitude with regard to Muslims, or a negative attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. Neutral or ambivalent claims, which are not necessarily related to any deterioration or improvement in Muslims’ position or rights and do not express a clear attitude with regard to migrants and minorities or their opponents receive code 0.

Table 4: Claims on religious rights (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Rights and religious practice	4.6	7.4	21.2	3.8	22.4	8.0
Religious rights and public institutions	77.6	84.3	70.4	59.1	60.6	84.0
Other	17.8	8.3	8.5	37.1	17.1	8.0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	174	204	189	132	246	162


By averaging the scores thus attributed across all claims, we obtain a raw yet helpful overall indicator of the discursive context in this field (table 5). According to this measure, our six countries can be placed in three groups. Firstly, we have countries that offer a relatively open and “positive” context (France, the Netherlands, and the UK). Secondly, there are countries that are more closed, but still on the positive side (Belgium and Switzerland). Thirdly, one of the countries has a particularly closed and “negative” context in this regard (Germany). Thus, Muslims in different countries face very different discursive contexts, which might influence their capability for integrate socially, politically, and culturally. In addition, positions are more polarized in certain countries than in other, as indicated by the standard errors. Specifically, claim-making in this field seems most polarized in Germany and least so in the UK, where a larger consensus seems to emerge towards a positive stance vis-à-vis Muslims.

Table 5: Position of claims

	Mean	N	Standard error
NL	.23	805	.792
DE	-.17	769	.951
CH	.03	775	.888
UK	.23	1141	.560
BE	.09	784	.815

Beyond such a static picture, however, equally or perhaps even more interesting is to see to what extent claim-making in this field has evolved over time in each country (figure 1). Without going into the details of the evolution in each of the six countries, overall we observe a slight downward trend in all the countries. At the same time, however, there are important fluctuations within the period considered. This holds especially for France and Germany, while the other four countries display a more stable trend, particularly in the UK. In addition, the paths followed in the six countries in the period under study have brought them closer to each other towards the end of the period. This holds in particular for 1006, when the discursive context in the six countries was very similar.

Figure 1: Position of claims by year



A particularly interesting aspect given out subject matter is the impact that the attacks of September 2001 in New York might have had on the position of claims in this field. Our data suggests that this event had an important effect as in most countries the discursive context became more negative. Claims became overall much more negative after 2001 in particular in France and Germany, but to some extent also in the Netherlands and Switzerland, while they did not so in Belgium and the UK. Yet, this downward trend observed in most countries was not durable, suggesting that even the most dramatic events may alter the discursive context, but that more structural changes depends on other factors.

The object of a claim is the group whose interests, rights, or identity are affected (positively or negatively) by the realization of the claim. Ultimately, Muslims are always the object in this field. However, the object can be framed in different ways. Here we distinguish between two main types of objects (Muslims as actors and Islam as religion) and further differentiate between more specific objects within each type.

The distribution of objects of claims (table 6) shows, firstly, that Muslims as actors are at center

stage in all six countries. However, the relative weight of this way of framing the object varies strongly across countries, being very high in Germany and to a lesser extent also in Belgium and Switzerland, while being much lower in the Netherlands, the UK, and especially in France. Islam as religion is much less important as an object in all six countries, but especially so in the UK, while plays a substantial role in France and to some extent also in Switzerland. Finally, there are also very different shares of claims that have no Muslim object. This gives us an indication of the saliency of the issue of Islam in the public domain. It is noteworthy that the higher share of claims not having Muslims as objects are observed in the three countries in which Islam is an issue (France, the UK, and the Netherlands), suggesting that in these countries this issue is also framed in alternative terms.

Important cross-national variations also exist in the more specific categories. In particular, claim-making in Switzerland and the Netherlands tend to be framed around Muslims in general, while in Germany and Belgium the focus is above all on a specific minority or group of Muslims. Similarly, claims on Islam in general are more frequent in Switzerland and France.

Table 6: Objects of claims (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Muslims as actors	60.4	89.9	78.1	63.8	79.4	44.7
All Muslims in general	32.3	12.6	42.3	26.5	23.8	24.1
Majority/most Muslims	2.6	1.7	1.5	1.4	3.1	1.1
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	12.6	50.1	14.4	18.3	36.7	10.0
Individual Muslims	11.4	22.2	18.4	15.1	15.3	7.1
Unclassifiable Muslims	1.5	3.3	1.5	2.5	.5	2.4
Islam as religion	10.5	7.6	14.6	2.9	8.9	18.8
Islam in general	7.0	2.3	11.9	2.0	7.6	10.7
Islam mainstream	.1	.1	.3	.0	.0	1.6
Minority currents within Islam	2.0	.0	1.0	.0	.2	1.5
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	.9	5.2	1.4	.8	.9	4.4
Unclassifiable Islam	.5	.0	.0	.1	.2	0.6
No Muslim object	29.2	2.4	7.3	33.4	11.7	36.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	888	784	790	1173	812	551

A final aspect that we would like to examine in this comparative overview refers to the scope of claims. Scope refers either to the organizational extension of the organization or institution making a claim or the geographical and/or political scope of the claim. If we look at the scope of actors (table 7), we can see first of all that most claims are made by national or subnational (regional, local) actors. National actors are particularly relevant, as they are responsible on average for about half of the claims made during the period being considered. Local actors are also quite important in all six countries. In contrast, supranational actors play only a minor role, suggesting that the claim-making on Islam and Muslims remained largely a national affair.

Table 7: Scope of actors (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Supra- or transnational: European	2.6	.6	3.4	.6	3.6	.3
Supra- or transnational: other	2.5	.1	4.5	4.2	1.7	1.3
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	.2	1.5	.0	.0	.4	.0
Foreign national: other	13.9	2.5	5.5	10.9	11.9	.3
Bilateral	1.4	.3	.0	.2	.2	.6
National	57.3	44.3	48.8	72.7	42.0	58.8

Regional	1.7	25.1	16.8	2.4	12.5	12.2
Local	20.5	25.6	21.1	9.1	27.7	26.4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	653	716	531	662	528	311

Cross-national variations, however, are very strong here, perhaps even more than on the aspects previously addressed. For example, the share of claims by national actors, while quite high everywhere, is particularly important in the UK and to a lesser extent also in the Netherlands and France. While this may in part reflect the centralized structure of the country (as the distribution of claims by regional actors also indicates), it points to a higher degree of nationalization of the public domain in these countries in this field.

The issue of the degree of nationalization or supranationalization of the public domain can also be tackled by looking at the scope of the issues addressed by the claims (table 8). The findings largely reflect those observed for the scope of actors: a prevalence of national issues followed by local issues and a smaller share of supranational issues. However, apart from the Netherlands and Germany, the latter level plays a more important role in the scope of issues than in the scope of actors. This nuances a bit our previous statement about the weak degree of supranationalization of the field, at least in some of the countries.

Table 8: Scope of issues (percentages)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Supra- or transnational: European	3.3	.8	4.3	1.1	3.6	2.0
Supra- or transnational: other	4.0	.6	15.7	12.8	13.7	11.7
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	.8	4.7	1.6	.2	1.0	.4
Foreign national: other	10.5	11.2	8.5	5.9	5.8	.8
Bilateral	2.6	.1	3.4	1.9	.8	1.8
National	59.7	40.9	41.5	65.8	33.2	59.4
Regional	.9	12.1	7.4	.9	6.1	4.7
Local	18.1	29.5	17.6	11.2	34.7	18.8
National or subnational	.0	.0	.1	.3	1.0	.6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	849	784	772	1110	773	512

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THE NETHERLANDS

Anja van Heelsum and Sjef van Stiphout

1. Introduction

- *The EURISLAM project*

This report is an outcome of the larger EURISLAM research project, executed by six national research teams and funded by the European Commission. The project is focussed on the following general **research question**:

How have different traditions of national identity, citizenship, and church-state relations affected European immigration countries' incorporation of Islam, and what are the consequences of these approaches for patterns of cultural distance and interaction between Muslim immigrants and their descendants, and the receiving society?

We have elaborated our core research question into more specific questions and research methods. In this report we will deal with the first sub question, namely:

What are the differences between European immigration countries in how they deal with cultural and religious differences of immigrant groups in general, and of Muslims in particular?

This again has two aspects. Firstly, the more formal aspect of legislation and jurisprudence, which we have addressed by way of gathering a systematic set of cross-national indicators using secondary sources in work package 1 of this study (Koopmans, forthcoming). And secondly, and now we come to the subject of this report on work package 2, cultural relations are also affected importantly by how conceptions of national identity, citizenship, church-state relations, and the position of Islam in relation to these, are framed and contested in the public sphere. These more informal understandings of national and European identity and ways of dealing with cultural differences will be investigated by way of a content analysis of debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants. In the future we will go ahead (work package 3) with a survey on the attitudes of Muslims and non-Muslims on relevant issues.

- *Location in time and place*

Content analysis of debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslims has been undertaken in the six European countries that participate in this project: the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom, France and Switzerland. In this country report we will show the results of the analysis on the debate in the newspapers in the Netherlands. We have chosen to analyse the debate in the period 1999 to 2008.

- *Country-specific aspects*

The Netherlands has a few specific characteristics that are relevant to this analysis. Firstly religious rights are laid down in national law long before the arrival of Muslims. Maussen describes four principles that the Netherlands traditionally applies in the spirit of these laws⁴:

⁴ For more information Maussen (2006: 17) 'Ruimte voor Islam'.

- Equal treatment, not only of citizens but also of religious and non religious organisations. This means that a faith based associations such as ‘*Leger des Heils*’ (the Salvation Army) may not be rated lower when it sets up social work than a non-religious association. In line with this principle, already in 1977, a decree on meat inspection made Islamic slaughter possible, and the Islamic burial was made possible by a change in the law on burials in 1991.
- Religious freedom is not only a negative freedom (in the sense that it shouldn’t be obstructed) but also positive: the government can sometimes actively help to provide for religious needs; this is called the social component of basic rights. Of course public space rules apply like safety of the building, and nuisance. Yet, since the constitutional revision of 1983 there is no direct financing of religion any longer.
- The public sphere is pluriform and there is no single state institution, so it’s considered better to have several types of schools than one state-school. The Dutch school system makes it possible that public, Catholic, Protestant, Muslim and Hindu schools apply for the same subsidies, as long as they follow the national curriculum and maintain the required quality standards. Also within the national broadcasting system a Muslim and a Hindu broadcasting organisation get subsidies, just like the many other broadcasting organisations.
- There is an emphasis on freedom of choice. This means that there has to be a choice, both on the religious terrain - protection against religious coercion - and on the social terrain. So if there is social work for youngsters, there have to be at least two institutions to give people a choice.

The history of church-state relations in the Netherlands has been strongly marked by pillarisation, though this is not the active system any longer (Maussen 2006).

Secondly the Netherlands had considerable immigration since the end of the nineteen sixties, and include from Muslim countries like Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco. So immigration is nothing new, contrary to for instance South and East European countries. There is already a considerable Dutch born second generation. According to data of the Central Bureau of Statistics there were 944,000 Muslims in the Netherlands in 2004 (5.8 % of the population), of which 582,000 of the first generation (62%) and 362,000 second generation (38%). The main countries of origin are: Turkey 238,000, Morocco 296,000, Afghanistan 36,000, Iraq 42,000, Surinam 32,000, Iran 28,000, Somalia 25,000 and ‘other non Western countries’ 116,000 and other Western countries 43,000.

Because this is not obvious to all, we have to be aware that only 67.3% of the Turks answer Muslim on the question to which religious denomination do you feel related, and 77.9% of Moroccans as a survey of the Statistical Bureau of the city of Amsterdam shows (O+S/Amsterdamse Burger Monitor 2006). This means that we have to be careful in assuming that all Turks and Moroccans are Muslims, a generalization that we often find in newspapers.

A third characteristic of the Netherlands relevant here, is that at first sight and without research information in this, there has been a relatively overheated debate on Muslims. This was particularly the case since the events of 9/11 (2001), the rise of the politician Pim Fortuyn since 2001, the murder on Fortuyn in 2002, and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004. Pim Fortuyn is supposed to have put Islam as something questionable ‘on the agenda’, and politicians on the right like Rita Verdonk, Ayaan Hirshi Ali and Geert Wilders went on picturing Islam as dangerous. Besides terrorism and radicalisation, also issues like gay rights, women’s rights, honour killings and troublesome Moroccan youngsters were part of this discussion. Right wing parties managed to get a considerable number of votes using anti immigrant views, once during the period of our study (2002 LPF) and after the period of our

study (2010 Wilders). Of course reactions and counter arguments were then put forward by both Muslims and non-Muslims. All this led to an ongoing stream of issues related to Islam in the newspapers in the period of this study and we will surely notice its effect when analyzing the claims on Islam.

– *Criteria of selection of newspapers*

For the data analysis in the Netherlands we have selected five newspapers. The size of the papers mattered (if possible the largest), the availability in the database of Nexus Lexus, and we looked for variation in the political spectrum and reach, therefore the following five were selected: ‘De Volkskrant’, ‘Trouw’, ‘NRC Handelsblad’, ‘De Telegraaf’ and ‘Het Parool’. ‘De Volkskrant’ and ‘Trouw’ are considered more to the left, actually Trouw is most to the left, even though ‘Trouw’ is the only newspaper that has a Christian religious basis. ‘NRC Handelsblad’ is supposed to be read by the elite, while ‘Telegraaf’ and ‘Parool’ are read by lower educated people. ‘Parool’ is a national paper, but focussed on Amsterdam. The large ‘Algemeen Dagblad’ was considered but not available in Nexus Lexus for all years necessary. Free newspapers like ‘Metro’ also have a considerable readership, but are not available in Nexus Lexus. Table 1 shows the circulation strength of the selected papers.

Table 1: Selected Newspapers

Newspaper	Circulation strength (first quarter of 2008)
De Telegraaf	627.057
De Volkskrant	236.364
NRC Handelsblad	204.572
Trouw	93.524
Het Parool	64.251

– *Selection of articles and claims for each newspaper* (total articles, article retrieved, articles coded, claims retrieved)

The number of articles that was selected per newspaper was 750. Articles were selected when one of the following keywords were found in the text: (Islam!) or (Moslim!) or (Moeslim!) or (Moskee) or (Imam) or (Koran) or (Qoer'ān) or (Qoer'an) or (Hoofddoek) or (Boerka) or (Burka) or (Burqa) or (Minaret).

Secondly articles with claims were used and articles without claims were not taken into account. To recognize a claim we used the following definition stated in the Eurislam Codebook 17.03.2010: “An instance of claim-making (shorthand: a claim) is a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by some form of physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression takes (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc. etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc. etc.). Note that decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claim-making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim.” (Eurislam Codebook 2010, p 2).

“To be included, a claim must either be made in one of our countries of coding or be addressed at an actor or institution in one of our countries of coding. Claims are also included

if they are made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which the country of coding is a member (e.g., the UN, the EU, the International Organisation for Migration), on the condition that the claim is substantively (also) relevant for the country of coding (e.g., a statement by the UNHCR criticising the Belgian government is not included in the British or German data, but a EU decision on common asylum rules is included because it affects all member states, including Germany and the UK). Claims reported in the issue consulted and which did not occur outside the two weeks before the date of appearance of that issue are also coded (but only if they have not already been coded; if they have already coded, additional information can be added to the first claim coded). We code all claims, unless we know that they occurred more than two weeks ago. The date of the claim is also coded, when the date is not mentioned (e.g. recently), the day prior to the newspaper issue is taken as the default.” (Eurislam Codebook 2010, p 6).

Table 2 shows the number of articles per year per newspaper, the number articles retrieved and coded and the number of claims retrieved. In the final dataset 750 articles ended up in the sample, and a total of 890 claims were retrieved. Three coders, namely Sjef van Stiphout, Josine Jansen en Maarten Koomen managed to code the enormous number of articles. We report on the inter-coder reliability in a separate paper. Interestingly the total number of claims is highest in Volkskrant (196) and lowest for the religious Trouw (170).

Table 2 Selected articles and claims by newspaper:

Telegraaf

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	245	24	3	5
2000	326	32	3	6
2001	465	45	13	18
2002	675	67	8	11
2003	684	68	9	11
2004	1187	118	35	46
2005	1136	113	30	36
2006	957	95	16	19
2007	929	92	17	17
2008	967	96	15	18
Total	7571	750	149	187

Volkskrant

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1067	41	2	5
2000	1068	41	6	9
2001	1711	66	18	25
2002	1807	69	9	11
2003	1663	64	11	16
2004	2489	96	21	27
2005	2402	91	18	22
2006	2809	108	17	20
2007	2343	90	15	19
2008	2187	84	13	15
Total	19546	750	130	169

NRC

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1160	42	0	0
2000	1214	44	5	9
2001	1951	70	8	12
2002	1783	64	5	9
2003	2060	74	13	14
2004	2739	98	30	49
2005	2567	91	16	21
2006	2728	98	21	29
2007	2498	90	18	21
2008	2213	79	12	18
Total	20913	750	128	183

Trouw


Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1253	43	5	7
2000	1264	44	10	10
2001	1984	69	20	30
2002	2051	71	17	24
2003	1935	67	16	20
2004	2781	96	20	28
2005	2640	91	16	18
2006	2840	98	12	13
2007	2680	93	6	8
2008	2267	78	9	12
Total	21695	750	131	170

Parool

Newspaper	Total Articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	634	38	4	6
2000	691	41	7	8
2001	1280	76	16	20
2002	1252	75	14	17
2003	1196	71	13	17
2004	1726	103	28	37
2005	1707	102	25	28
2006	1500	89	14	16
2007	1324	79	14	15
2008	1278	76	14	17
Total	12588	750	149	181


In figure 1 we show the total number of claims per year graphically. As becomes immediately visible, there are two peaks, one in 2001 (105 claims), that seems related to the events of 11 September and one in 2004 (187) - 2005 (125) that seems related to Theo van Gogh's murder.

Figure 1: Number of claims by year.



To see in more detail whether the claims in 2001 were related to the events on 11 September, we show the number of claims per month in 2001 in figure 2. There is indeed a sharp increase of claims in September and October, though the number drops back already in November.

Figure 2: Number of claims per month in 2001.



As the Eurislam Codebook mentions, generally one can distinguish the following elements, inspired by Franzosi's idea to use the structure of linguistic grammar to code contentious events. So we have broken down the structure of the summary codes into five claim elements, for each of which a number of summary variables has been constructed:

1. Claimants: the actor or actors making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
2. Form of the claim (HOW, by which action is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
3. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
4. The substantive content of the claim (WHAT action is to be undertaken?)
5. The object of the claim (TO WHOM is this action directed?)

6. Frame: The justification for the claim (WHY should this action be undertaken?)

In the following chapters we will distinguish these elements subsequently.

2. Actors

This chapter deals with the main claimants: the actor(s) making the claim. Who are these actors? We have categorized the actors into 21 categories + 1 category unknown. As table 3 shows, there are only a few categories of actors that make claims on Muslim issues. The most frequently observed actor (21%) were governments. The second largest groups are professional organizations and groups (16%) and Muslim organizations and groups (also 16%). Furthermore, legislative actors are responsible for 11% of the claims, police and security agencies 6%, political parties 6%, media and journalists 6%. The remaining claimants are involved with 4% or less of the total number of claims.

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State Actors (total 43%):	
Governments	21
Legislatives	11
Judiciary	3
Police and security agencies	6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0
Other state executive agencies	1
Political parties	6
Civil society actors (total 35%):	
Unions	1
Workers and employees	0
Employers organisations and firms	1
Churches	1
Christians	0
Media and journalists	6
Professional organisations and groups	16
Muslim organisations and groups	16
Other minority organisations and groups	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	0
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	1
Unknown actors	4
Total	100%
N	890

Who are the Muslim actors? Concerning the Muslim actors, the next question is: how often are the organisations of the Muslim actors mentioned in the newspapers? Firstly only in 31% there was a Muslim actor. In total 69% no Muslim actor at all was mentioned. As table 4 shows, in 16% of the cases (so half of the Muslim actors) the name of the organisation he stands for is mentioned and in 15% of the cases a Muslim actor without an organisational name is mentioned.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim and non Muslim actors.

	%
Muslim actor, organization name mentioned	16
Muslim actor, no organization name mentioned	15
no Muslim actor	69
<hr/>	
Total	100%
N	890

Out of the total of 890 claims, 31% of the actors are Muslim actors, while 43% of the actors are classified as migration/minority actors. There are not many cases in which we have clues about the nationality of these minority/migrant actors, but as table 5 shows, most of the know cases are nationals of one of the European countries (12%). After European background the next largest category is North Africa (mainly Morocco) with 7% and the Middle East (6%). Note that foreign policy issues are not part of this analysis, so conflicts in the Middle East itself are not considered. Only claims on issues in one of the countries of this study are considered, but of course actors from the Middle East, may claim.

Table 5: Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

	% overall	% when not specified is not included
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	12	
Country of residence nationality	2	
Europe: EU	12	14
Other Europe	0	0
Asia: middle east	6	6
Asia: south and east	1	2
Africa: North	7	8
Africa: other	2	2
Caribbean	0	1
North America	0	0
Not applicable: no minority or migrant actor	57	66
<hr/>		
Total	100%	100%
N	890	759


What kind of groups do these minority actors represent? As table 6 shows, in 66% of the cases this question doesn't apply, because the actor is no minority actor or is not part of a group. In nearly two third of the other cases the actor represents a religious group, while in one third of the cases the actor represents a status group. When someone represents a status groups, the following types of people are represented: for instance 'foreigners', 'minorities', '(im)migrants', 'allochthonen' (a word often used for non Dutch), 'asylum seekers', 'refugees' and similar types of people. Since we were searching for claims that have to do with Muslims and Islam, it is not very surprising that the actors from minority background, in this case often represent religious interests.

Table 6: Identity of the minority actor.

	%
Status groups	10
Racial groups	0
Religious groups	20
National and ethnic groups:	1
Unclassifiable actor	4
Not applicable	66
<hr/>	
Total	100
N	890

In figure 3 we have looked at the number of claims that Muslim and non-Muslim actors made per year. The two peaks are again visible, in 2001 (the 11 September peak) and in 2004 (the Theo van Gogh Peak). It the figure shows, Muslim actors are more responsible for the peaks, particularly the 2004 peak.

Figure 3 Claims per year by Muslim and non-Muslim actors



In the next table we go back to all actors, so including governments, legislative bodies, etceteras. The following questions deals with the scope of operation of the actors. As we saw earlier that largest categories of actors were government, professional organisations and groups and Muslim organisations and groups. As table 7 shows, all these types of actors may have a local, national or even supra- or transnational scope. As the bottom row of table 5 shows, most of the 890 claims are national (namely 374 claims), while 145 are local and 135 supra- or transnational (and 236 unclear). When we consider all national claims, the largest percentages are from governments (25%), or legislative bodies (21%), with less of them from Muslim groups (13%) and political parties (10%). When we consider the local claims, even more claims come from governments (38%) and professional organisations (16%), while less come from legislative bodies (8%) and political parties (6%). Compared to national claims, the supranational claims tend to come more often from Muslim organisations (19%) and from political parties and security agencies (13%). Governments make a considerable part of the claims, also here (28%).

Table 7: Scope of the actor

	Supra or trans- national	National	Local	Unclear	Total
State Actors:					
Governments	28	25	38	1	21
Legislatives	7	21	8	0	11
Judiciary	4	3	1	2	3
Police and security agencies	13	6	7	1	6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	1	0	0	0
Other state executive agencies	3	1	3	0	1
Political parties	3	10	6	2	6
Civil Society Actors:					
Unions	1	1	1	0	1
Workers and employees	0	0	0	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	2	1	1	0	1
Churches	1	1	2	0	1
Christians	0	1	0	0	0
Media and journalists	4	4	0	14	6
Professional organisations and groups	5	9	16	33	16
Muslim organisations and groups	19	13	12	22	16
Other minority organisations and groups	5	1	1	1	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	1	1	0	0	0
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	0	1	1	0	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	2	1	0	0	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	1	0	4	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	0	4	1	1
Unknown actors	0	0	0	17	4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	135	374	145	236	890

3. Forms of the claim

In chapter 2 we dealt with the question WHO is making the claim. As we explained in the introduction the second part of our analysis includes the form of the action. The form of the claim deals with the question HOW (by which action) is the claim inserted in the public sphere?

Table 8 shows the forms of the claims found in our study in the Netherland. As becomes clear from this table 75% of the claims were verbal statements, while only 8% took the form of conventional actions, 6% repressive measures, and only 4% were violent protests or political decisions and 1% on confrontational protest. In the second column, state interventions are excluded, and the percentage of verbal statements is even higher (83%).

Table 8: Form of the encountered claims (in percentages).

	Overall	State intervention excluded
State intervention:		
Repressive measures	6	
Political decisions	4	
Verbal statements	75	83
Conventional actions	8	9
Protest actions:		
Demonstrative protests	2	2
Confrontational protests	1	1
Violent protests	4	5
Total	100%	100%
N	890	804

The form of the claim differs per actor, as table 9 shows. The claims of Muslim organisation are 78% verbal claims, for 10% conventional actions, for 3% demonstrative protests and for 7% violent protest.

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (in percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
State intervention:				
Repressive measures	13	0	0	1
Political decisions	9	0	0	0
Verbal statements	67	95	78	81
Conventional actions	11	4	10	5
Protest actions:				
Demonstrative protests	0	2	3	3
Confrontational protests	0	0	1	3
Violent protests	0	0	7	8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N				

4. Addressees and criticized actors

After looking at the actor in chapter 2 (WHO), the form of the claim in chapter 3 (HOW), we will move on to the addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?) The claim can be neutrally simply addressed to someone – the addressee - but may also be criticizing or supporting an actor – whom we’ll call the criticized actor or the supported actor. Note that it may happen that the addressee and the criticized or supported actor are the same persons, but this doesn’t have to be the case.

Table 10: Number of claims by addressee (percentages)

	Addressee	‘No addressee’ not included
State actors:		
Governments	14	38
Legislatives	3	8
Judiciary	0	1
Police and security agencies	1	2
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	1
Other state executive agencies	0	1
Political parties	2	4
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	1	2
Churches	0	1
Christians	0	0
Media and journalists	1	2
Professional organisations and groups	1	2
Muslim organisations and groups	10	23
Other minority organisations and groups	1	2
‘pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups’	0	2
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1	2
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	1	2
No addressee	64	-
Total	100%	100%
N	890	331

As table 10, 11 and 12 show, in most cases there is no addressee (64%), no criticised actor (56%) and no supported actor (73%). So actually the criticised actor is more common than any of the other addressees. Interesting is that Muslim organisations occur most as supported actor and criticised actor and less in a neutral role of addressee, while governments occur most in the role of addressee, less in the role of criticised actor and nearly never in the role of supported actor.

We mention a few striking facts on which actor addresses which addressee. As table 10 shows, the largest number of claims towards governments come from political parties as actors, and secondly from state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants, and general solidarity and human rights or welfare organisations.

The largest number of claims towards Muslim organisations come from racist and extreme right organisations and groups or judiciary actors, while less claims come from governments, police and security agencies, churches and pro minority rights and welfare organisations and

groups. These racist and extreme right groups focus mainly on Muslim organisations as actors, and to a lesser extent at governments, but to nobody else.

If we look at Christians and Churches as actors, Churches tend to address governments firstly, then Christians, Muslim organisations and other minority organisations, but Christians as such are not very often actors.

In the field of labour, unions tend to address governments, police and security agencies and employees organisations, while employers organisations tend to address only governments.

Table 11: Number of claims by criticised actor

	Criticised actor	'No criticised actor' not included
State actors:		
Governments	12	26
Legislatives	3	7
Judiciary	1	2
Police and security agencies	1	2
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	0
Other state executive agencies	0	1
Political parties	3	7
Civil society actors:		
Workers and employees	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	0	1
Churches	0	1
Christians	0	3
Media and journalists	1	3
Professional organisations and groups	2	2
Muslim organisations and groups	15	31
Other minority organisations and groups	0	1
'pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups'	0	1
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	2	1
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	1
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	0
No addressee	56	-
Total	100%	100%
N	890	401

As table 11 shows, governments and Muslim groups are most often criticized. Striking is that it are state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants stand out as highest followed by legislative actors (2), racist and extreme right organisations and groups (3), and antiracist organisations and groups (4) and political parties (5).

As table 12 shows, Muslim organisations are most often the supported object of the claims by all kinds of actors. The five largest percentages are support from anti-racist organisations and groups (1) employers organisations (2), churches and unions (3/4) and general solidarity and human rights organisations (5).

Table 12: Number of claims by addressee

	Supported actor	'No supported actor' not included
State actors:		
Governments	2	6
Legislatives	0	1
Judiciary	0	0
Police and security agencies	0	1
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	0
Other state executive agencies	0	1
Political parties	1	2
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	0	0
Churches	0	0
Christians	0	1
Media and journalists	0	1
Professional organisations and groups	1	1
Muslim organisations and groups	20	69
Other minority organisations and groups	2	8
'pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups'	0	0
Antiracist organisations and groups	0	0
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1	2
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0	0
Other civil society organisations and groups	0	2
No addressee	73	-
Total	100%	100%
N	890	245

5. Issues and attitude towards Muslims

After looking at the actor(s) (WHO), the form of the claim (HOW), the addressee (AT WHOM is the claim directed?), we will now look at the substantive content of the claim: WHAT action is to be undertaken?

As table 13 shows, we have categorized the issues in 6 main categories, and these are again subdivided into fields.

Table 2: Types of issues encountered (in percentages).

	%
1. Immigration, asylum, and aliens' politics (4%)	
1. Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	4
2. Minority integration politics (77%)	
Minority integration general	8
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	2
Minority rights and participation social rights	4
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	3
Minority rights and participation religious rights	20
Minority rights and participation other rights	0
Discrimination and unequal treatment	2
Minority social problems	29
Interethnic, inter-, and intra-organizational relations	9
3. Anti-racism, islamophobia (11%)	
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	9
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme rights in society	2
4. Islamophobic claims (4%)	
Islamophobic claims	4
5. Actor claims Muslims (3%)	
Homeland politics	1
Transnational politics	2
6. Other (0%)	
Other	0
Total	100
N	890

As table 13 shows, most of the claims deal with issues that we have classified in category 2 'minority integration politics' (77%), while 11% fall in category 3 'anti-racism/islamophobia' category 4% in the category 'islamophobic claims', 4% with issues of 'immigration, asylum and aliens politics', 3% that we called 'actor claims Muslims' which includes for instance homeland politics and transnational politics.

The difference between category 3 and 4 needs some explanation; in category 3 (anti-racism/islamophobia) include issues like for instance racism/islamophobia and extreme right language in politics, police racism/islamophobia and violence against minorities, and stigmatization of minorities/Muslims/Islam in the public debate, while in category 4 (islamophobic claims) one finds: general islamophobic claims, claims against 'islamification' and other anti-Islam/Muslim claims.


Since most claims are on issues that we have labelled 'minority integration politics', more detail is possible on the sub field of these claims. Most of the claims within this category concern issues that deal with 'minority social problems' (29%), while a smaller section (20%)

concerns 'minority rights and participation: religious rights'. Smaller issue categories include: 'Interethnic, inter-, and intra-organizational relations' (9%) and 'minority integration general' (8%), while 'minority rights and participation social rights' cover only 4% and 'minority rights and participation cultural rights' covers 3% of the issues.

In figure 4 we have show how the issues fluctuate per year. The two peak that we saw earlier (2001, 11 September peak and 2004 Theo van Gogh peak) seem not to have a lot of consequences for the division of the types of issues. Minority integration policy issues are highest in 1999 and diminish towards 2003, they increase around the Theo van Gogh Peak, but again in 2006 (election year).

Clearly visible is that immigration/asylum/alien policy becomes less and less relevant after 2006, bu that anti-racism and islamophobia is on the rise (highest in 2008 – probably due to Wilders attracting attention in newspapers).

Figure 4: Number of claims by issue and year



Because Islamic religious rights seem more relevant in this context, we show in table 14 the types of claims we encountered dealing with religious rights. Out of 890 claims, 20% deals with Islamic religious rights (174 claims), and most of them concern religious rights and public institutions, like for instance wearing head scarves in public offices. Of these 174 claims only 5% percent dealt with rights and the religious practice itself, and 78% with religious rights and public institutions.


Table 3: Types of Islamic religious rights (RELRIGHT, one and main two-digit codes, not applicable not included).

	%
Rights and religious practice	5
Religious rights and public institutions	78
Other	18
Total	100
N	174

To what extent are claims positive or negative on the positions of Muslim's rights? To find out, we coded the claims either negative (-1) i.e. anti-Muslims/Islam/xenophobic/extreme right, neutral/ambivalent (0), or positive (+1) pro-Muslims/Islam/antiracist/anti-extreme right. This variable should provide a general indicator of the position of claims with regard to the rights, position and evaluation of migrants and minorities (and, conversely, of those who mobilise against them). All claims whose realisation implies deterioration of the rights or position of Muslims have received code -1, no matter if the reduction is minor or large. The -1 also went to claims which express a negative attitude with regard to Muslims (both verbal and physical) or a positive attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. All claims whose realisation implies an improvement in the rights and position of Muslims (minor or major) have received code +1. This code also went to claims expressing (verbally or physically) a positive attitude with regard to Muslims, or a negative attitude with regard to xenophobic and extreme right groups or aims. Neutral or ambivalent claims, which are not necessarily related to any deterioration or improvement in Muslims' position or rights and do not express a clear attitude with regard to migrants and minorities or their opponents, received code 0. To code a claim as +1 'pro-Muslim' it did not matter whether this referred to a demand that is shared by all Muslims. E.g., a claim granting Muslims the right to settle family disputes in sharia courts or to allow the burqa was coded as +1 even if many Muslims might disagree. Repressive measures without verbal claims were also categorised with this variable: -1 went to repressive measures directed against Muslims, +1 to repressive measures directed against xenophobic and extreme right individuals and groups.

Firstly figure 5 shows how the mean score developed over the years. As becomes clear the mean score was 1,20 at the start of the research period, and went down considerably after the events of 11 September. After this it remained for many years about 0.30/0.40. This means that more negative viewpoints were found in the articles beside positive ones, but that the mean never sank below zero. So the positive attitudes outnumbered the negative ones.

Figure 5: Development per year in the mean score expressing positive or negative attitude in the claim towards the position and rights of Muslims (means).



In table 15 we present the total mean score and the standard deviation per actor. It becomes visible whether a certain actor mainly put forward claims with a positive intention towards the rights of Muslims (+ scores), or mainly claims with negative intentions (- scores). Note that 807 of 890 claims could be coded. As the table shows, the actors that mainly put forward claims with positive intentions towards the rights of Muslims are more than those who put forwards claims with negative intentions. The positive ones include: governments, judiciary bodies, ‘other state executive agencies’, unions, workers and employees, employers organisations and firms, churches, media and journalists, professional organisations and group and – not very surprising - Muslim organisations and groups, other minority organisations and groups, anti-racist organisations and groups, pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups, general solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations and other civil society organisations and groups. The highest positive score for workers and employees is only about one claim.

The actors that mainly put forward negative claims are: legislative bodies, state executive agencies specially dealing with migrants, political parties (the score is not extreme), and 37 unknown actors. It is not surprising that racist and extreme right organisations and groups have the highest negative score: all there claims were negative so the mean was -1,00. It strikes us that governments in general tend to put forward positive claims and ‘other state executive agencies’ also, while ‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants’ put forward negative claims, but we have to remark that the last actor is only responsible for two claims, while governments are responsible for 167 claims.

Actors that were neutral or nearly neutral were: police and security agencies and Christians (the last one with only two claims).

Table 4: Mean score expressing positive or negative attitude in the claim towards the position and rights of Muslims per actor.

	Mean	N	Standard Deviation.
State actors:			
Governments	0,67	176	2,052
Legislatives	-.32	94	0,765
Judiciary	1,0	22	2,655
Police and security agencies	0,18	44	1,529
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-.50	2	0,707
Other state executive agencies	1,36	11	2,580
Political parties	-0.09	56	0,837
Civil society actors:			
Unions	0,40	5	0,894
Workers and employees	1,00	1	
Employers organisations and firms	0,75	8	0,463
Churches	0,38	8	0,744
Christians	0,00	2	0,000
Media and journalists	0,54	52	1,863
Professional organisations and groups	0,68	128	2,008
Muslim organisations and groups	1,04	140	1,240
Other minority organisations and groups	1,08	12	2,610
Antiracist organisations and groups	0,50	4	1,000
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	0,40	5	0,548
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	0,40	5	0,548
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	11	0,000
Other civil society organisations and groups	1,0	10	2,718
Unknown actors	0,13	38	1,758
Total	0,51	834	1,738

Table 16 shows the position taken in the claims per type of issue under discussion. We find the most positive opinions expressed on homeland politics (1,57) and discrimination and equal treatment (1,59), while islamophobic claims are obviously the most negative (-0,67). Claims on ‘Racism/islamophobia’ are most of the time positive, so defending the rights of Muslims both in institutional and non institutional contexts.

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	0,37	27	1,864
Minority integration politics:			
Minority integration general	0,75	68	2,181
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	0,31	13	0,751
Minority rights and participation social rights	0,87	39	1,436
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	0,46	24	0,658
Minority rights and participation religious rights	0,38	172	1,587
Minority rights and participation other rights	0,25	4	0,500
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1,59	17	2,852
Minority social problems	0,33	230	1,983
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	0,72	75	1,521
Antiracism/islamophobia:			
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	0,95	77	1,450
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	0,90	21	0,301
Islamophobic claims	-0,67	39	0,737
Actor claims Muslims:			
Homeland politics	1,57	7	3,359
Transnational politics	0,89	19	0,315
Other	1,00	2	0,000
Total	0,51	834	1,738

In table 13 we have already shown how many claims we found on different issues, with a sub-classification into fields. Table 17 shows which actors formulate claims on these issues, now showing the percentage of claims on certain issues per type of actor. The most often encountered issue, minority integration policy, the state actors are the most active (85% of their claims), while Muslim organisation are relatively less active on this issue, though it still involves 67,4 % of their claims.

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	4,5	7,1	2,1	3,9
Minority integration politics	85,2	73,2	67,4	71,4
Antiracism/islamophobia	7,1	14,3	20,1	11,9
Islamophobic claims	1,8	5,4	0,7	9,0
Actor claims Muslims	1,1	0	9,0	3,9
Other	0,3	0	0,7	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	379	56	144	311

Muslim organisation are relatively more active on antiracism/islamophobia claims, so fighting racism and islamophobia, since this is true for 20% of their claims. The percentage is much lower for state actors (7%).

Table 13 also shows that political parties and other civil society actors in the Netherlands are the ones who put forwards islamophobic claims (the most obvious one is ‘racist and extreme right organisations and groups’, (73% of their 11 claims are islamophobic), second

‘employers organisations and firms’ (13% of their 8 claims are islamophobic) and ‘unknown actors’, with 41% of the 39 claims islamophobic).

6. Object of the claim

After looking at the actor(s) (WHO), the form of the claim (HOW), the addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?), the content of the claim (WHAT) action, we now turn to the object of the claim (TO WHOM is this action directed?)

In our selection of claims in the Dutch newspapers, we selected claims on Muslims or Islam, but this doesn't mean that the claim is always directed towards Muslims or Islam. In 31% of the cases Muslims were not the object of the claim, while in 79% of the cases they were. In table 18 we show the the 631 cases where Muslims were an object. More than half of the claimants address either Muslims in general (46%), or Islam in general (10%), without distinction, so together 56%. In 18% of the cases a minority or a small particular group was addressed, and in 3% of the cases a minority current in Islam. This means that more than half of the cases actors in newspaper articles do not differentiate between for instance radical Muslims and mainstream Muslims: they are lumped together.

Table 5: Objects of the claims (percentages).

	%
Muslims as objects (85%)	
All Muslims in general	46
Majority most	3
Minority a small/particular group	18
Individual	16
Unclassifiable Muslims	2
Islam as religion (15%)	
Islam in general	10
Islam mainstream	0
minority currents within Islam	3
specific religious stream / movement within Islam	1
unclassifiable Islam	1
Total	100%
N	631

In table 19 we have looked at the nationality of the objects of the claim. In nearly half of the cases there was no specification of the nationality of the object of the claim. In the cases where a nationality was specified the object was mostly from Europe (35+23=58%), and in 25% of the cases from North Africa (Moroccans), and in 22% of the cases from the Middle East.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)

	Overall	'Not specified/ applicable' excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	43	
Europe: EU	9	35
Europe: other	6	23
Asia: middle east	3	22
Asia: south and east	1	5
Africa: North	7	25
Africa: other	0	1
Not applicable: no object	30	
Total	100%	100%
N	890	237

Table 20 gets back to the issue of taking either the people (Muslims) or the religion (Islam) as an object. Political parties take more often Islam as their object (17%) than the other actors, whereas Muslim organisations and groups tend to focus more on Muslims as their object (94%) than the other actors.

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Muslims as actors				
All Muslims in general	35	42	70	53
Majority/most Muslims	2	0	4	6
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	21	16	11	16
Individual Muslims	23	8	11	10
Unclassifiable Muslims	3	3	0	2
Islam as religion				
Islam in general	10	24	3	10
Islam mainstream	0	0	0	1
Minority currents within Islam	5	3	0	1
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	1	3	3	1
Unclassifiable Islam	1	3	0	1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	297	38	75	221

Table 21 shows the nationality or ethnicity of objects per actor. The actors don't seem very different in their tendency to specify the nationality of the object, except maybe that state actors seem more explicit in naming the country of the object.

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	58	71	60	64
Country of residence nationality	14	8	12	13
Europe: EU	9	8	9	7
Asia: middle east	5	3	4	3
Asia: south and east	1	0	5	2
Africa: North	10	8	8	9
Africa: other	1	0	1	0
Not applicable, no object	1	3	0	2
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N				

7. Scope of the claimant, the addressee of the claim and of the issues

In the chapters until now, we looked at the actor(s) making the claim in chapter 2 (WHO), the form of the claim in chapter 3 (HOW), the addressee of the claim in chapter 4 (AT WHOM), the substantive content of the claim in chapter 5 (WHAT), and the object of the claim in chapter 6 (TO WHOM?). In this last chapter we will treat the ‘frame’ of the claim that is the justification for the claim: WHY should this action be undertaken?

Firstly we look at the scope variable in terms of its relevance for the scale of the claim: the claim can have a local, national or supra national scope (or reach). In table 22 we have listed the scope of the actors. The scope of the actor is most often (42%) on national level, while 15% is on local level, and 15% is on supra national/foreign level (27% is unknown).

Table 22. Scope (or reach) of the actors.

	Actor
Supra or transnational: European	2
Supra or transnational: other	2
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0
Foreign national: other	10
Bilateral	1
National	42
Regional	1
Local	15
Unknown	27
Total	100%
N	890

For the addressee, the criticised and the supported actor, the scope is most of the time unknown (63%, 55% and 72%), but in the cases that it is clear, the national level dominates, just like among actors. Table 23 shows the scope of the criticised and the supported actor as far as it is known. As the table shows, the scope of the addressee is in 61% of the cases where it is known, national, for the criticised actor this is 63% and for the supported actor 62%.

Table 23. Scope (or reach) of the addressee, criticized actor and supported actor

	Addressee	Criticised actor	Supported actor
Supra or transnational: Europe	3	3	1
Supra or transnational: other	2	3	2
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0	1	2
Foreign national: other	14	13	12
Bilateral	2	1	1
National	61	63	62
Regional	1	1	20
Local	18	16	1
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	331	400	245

Table 24 shows the scope of the issue. In this case there are no unknown cases and all issues can be coded, though 4% of the cases were not verbal. Again we see that most issues are national (57%), while 25% is supranational/foreign and 17% is local.

Table 64: Scope (or reach) of the issue.

	Issue
no verbal claim	4
supra- or transnational: European	3
supra- or transnational: other	4
foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1
foreign national: other	10
bilateral	3
national	57
regional	1
local	17
no verbal claim	4
Total	100%
N	890

In table 25 we show more detail on the scope of the claim per actor. These data are similar to the ones in table 7, but in this case the percentages are calculated per row instead of per column. For all actors most of the claims have a national scope: for state actors 55%, for political parties 75%, for Muslim organisations 56%, for other civil society actors 57%.

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
no verbal claim	3	0	5	6
supra- or transnational: European	3	0	5	4
supra- or transnational: other	4	2	3	4
foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1	0	3	0
foreign national: other	11	7	10	9
bilateral	3	0	1	2
national	55	75	56	57
regional	1	0	1	1
Local	18	16	15	18
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	379	56	144	311

8. Summary

In this report we presented the results of a content analysis of the debate in the newspaper on Islam and the integration of Muslims in the Netherlands. As we described in the introduction the context of the Netherlands can be characterised as: a) a country with an institutionalised system of equal rights of different religions, based on the earlier pillar system, b) a country with a considerable history of migration in the last 50 years and currently 5,8% Muslims, and c) a country with a rather heated debate on Muslims and Islam, and some political parties that openly criticize Muslims and Islam.

We have selected articles with Islam, Muslim and similar keyword, and 750 articles ended up in the sample, in five newspapers in the period from 1999 up to 2008. We found 890 claims either by Muslims or about Muslims. There were two peaks in the number of claims, namely in 2001, after 11 September, and in 2004-2005 after the death on Theo van Gogh.

Generally the most observed actors that have been putting forwards claims in this period were firstly governments (21%), secondly professional organizations and groups (16%), and Muslim organizations and groups (also 16%) and thirdly legislative actors (11%). Smaller parties were: police and security agencies (6%), political parties (6%), media and journalists (6%).

The forms of the claim was dominantly verbal (in 75% of the cases), only 8% were conventional actions, 6% repressive measures, and only 4% were violent protests or political decisions and 1% confrontational protests.

In most cases there is no-one addressed by the claimants (64%), and also no-one criticised (56%) and no-one supported (73%). In the cases where someone is addressed, the criticised actors are more common than any of the other addressees. Interesting is that Muslim organisations occur most as supported actor and criticised actor and less in a neutral role of addressee, while governments occur most in the role of addressee, less in the role of criticised actor and nearly never in the role of supported actor. The largest number of claims towards governments come from political parties as actors followed by 'state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants', 'general solidarity-, human rights- and welfare organisations'.

The largest number of claims towards Muslim organisations comes from racist and extreme right organisations and groups or judiciary actors, while less claims come from governments, police and security agencies, churches and pro minority rights and welfare organisations and groups. These racist and extreme right groups focus mainly on Muslim organisations as actors, and to a lesser extent on governments, but on nobody else.

The content of most of the claims in the Netherlands deal with issues that we have classified in a category labelled 'minority integration politics' (77%), while 11% fall in category labelled 'anti-racism/islamophobia' category 4% in the category 'islamophobic claims', 4% with issues of 'immigration, asylum and aliens politics', 3% that we called 'actor claims Muslims' which includes for instance homeland politics and transnational politics. The major category minority integration politics drops in importance after 11 September 2001, but gets back to the attention soon after. Islamophobic claims increase in the research period (199-2008).

To what extent are claims positive or negative on the positions of Muslim's rights? We coded the claims either negative (-1) i.e. anti-Muslims/Islam/xenophobic/extreme right,

neutral/ambivalent (0), or positive (+1) pro-Muslims/Islam/antiracist/anti-extreme right. Results show that the actors that mainly put forward claims with positive intentions towards the rights of Muslims are more than those who put forwards claims with negative intentions. The positive ones include: governments, judiciary bodies, 'other state executive agencies', unions, workers and employees, employers organisations and firms, churches, media and journalists, professional organisations and group and – not very surprising - Muslim organisations and groups, other minority organisations and groups, anti-racist organisations and groups, pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups, general solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations and other civil society organisations and groups. The highest positive score for workers and employees is only about one claim.

The actors that mainly put forward negative claims are: legislative bodies, state executive agencies specially dealing with migrants, political parties (the score is not extreme), and 37 unknown actors. It is not surprising that racist and extreme right organisations and groups have the highest negative score: all there claims were negative so the mean was -1,00. It strikes us that governments in general tend to put forward positive claims and 'other state executive agencies' also, while 'state executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants' put forward negative claims, but we have to remark that the last actor is only responsible for two claims, while governments are responsible for 167 claims.

Actors that were neutral or nearly neutral were: police and security agencies and Christians (the last one with only two claims).

In 31% of the cases Muslims were not the object of the claim, while in 79% of the cases they were (of course partly a consequence of looking for it). In the 631 cases where Muslims were an object, more than half of the claimants address either Muslims in general (46%), or Islam in general (10%), without distinction, so together 56%. In 18% of the cases a minority or a small particular group was addressed, and in 3% of the cases a minority current in Islam. This means that in more than half of the cases actors in newspaper articles do not differentiate between for instance radical Muslims and mainstream Muslims: they are lumped together.

The scope (reach) of the claimant (actor) is most often (42%) on national level, while 15% is on local level, and 15% is on supra national level, and 27% unknown. For the addressee, the criticised and the supported actor, the scope is most of the time unknown (63%, 55% and 72%), but in the cases that it is clear, the national level dominates, just like among actors. In the case of the issue, there are no unknown cases: all issues can be coded, though 4% of the cases are not verbal. Again we see that most issues are national (57%), and 20% supranational and 18% local.

Generally the picture that comes forward in this report is that the heated debate on Muslims has not lead to completely unbalanced claim making by either pro- or anti Muslim actors. Also the attitudes towards Muslims that we found in the claims were not totally pro- or anti Muslim, except for extreme right groups. Claim making in the debate on issues around Muslims and Islam in the newspapers seems to be a more open debate than the heated discussion sometimes suggests.

GERMANY

Sarah Carol, Zuhai Kavacik and Ruud Koopmans

1. Introduction

Country-specific aspects

Currently there are about 3.2 to 3.5 million Muslims living in Germany. They make up about 4% of the overall population. Therewith, Islam is the second largest confession after Christians. However, there are no exact figures on the number of Muslims living in Germany, because the statistical agencies do not gather information on the religious affiliation. For estimations information about foreign nationals from predominantly Muslim countries and numbers of naturalisations of former Turkish citizens are used.

Muslims in Germany come from about 40 different countries. Turks form the largest group with 1.8 million. In addition, 200.000 Muslims are from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 100.000 from Iran, 80.000 from Morocco and 70.000 from Afghanistan. Furthermore, there are 800.000 naturalised Muslims and Germans with a Muslim immigrant background, predominantly of Turkish origin.

Muslims in Germany belong to different religious streams. 80% are Sunni Muslims. The second and third largest groups are Alevi (17%) and Shiites (3%). Ahmadiyya Muslims form a very small group.

In Germany no Muslim organisation exists which speaks in the name of all Muslims. As mentioned before, there is a great variety between Muslims and also organisations. Some of the better known organisations, which are also represented in the German media debate, are for instance:

- Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (IR)
- Türkisch-Islamische Union der Anstalt für Religion e.V. (DITIB)
- Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD).⁵

Initiated by the former minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble, different Islamic organisation and politicians met for the first time in 2006 to establish a dialogue between Muslims and the state. Within this conference topics like values, compatibility of religious rights and the German law, the role of the economy and media as well as Islamic extremism were tackled.

Concerning migrants rights Germany represented until the mid-90s the assimilationist integration approach (Koopmans et al. 2004)⁶. By 2002 it reached a more ambiguous position with some multicultural and assimilationist elements (ibid.: 71ff.). Regarding Muslims' religious practices outside of public institutions, Germany has granted increasing rights to Muslims (ibid.: 57). Also regarding cultural rights and provisions in public institutions Germany moved from a more assimilationist position into the direction of a pluralist position, but this varies between the different federal states (ibid.: 63).

Criteria of selection of newspapers

⁵ http://www.integration-in-deutschland.de/cIn_110/nn_284396/sid_1E139146B2EDFF592A2F095674C15A8C/SubSites/Integration/EN/03__Akteure/ThemenUndPerspektiven/Islam/Deutschland/deutschland-inhalt.html?__nnn=true

⁶ Koopmans, Ruud et al. 2005. *Contested citizenship: immigration and cultural diversity in Europe*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

To achieve a representative picture of the German print-media landscape for the time period 1999 to 2008, we have chosen five nationwide daily newspapers with the widest circulation. More specifically, we decided to analyse newspapers from different political viewpoints, ranging from tabloid, centre-right/left to the left. The “Bild Zeitung” was classified as tabloid, the “Welt” as conservative/right, the “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ)” was located in the centre-right while “Süddeutsche Zeitung (SZ)” and the “tagesspiegel” represent the centre-left/left orientation. The latter one has only the 6th highest circulations, but was considered, because it is published in Berlin which has one of the largest immigrant populations in Germany.

Table 1: Selected newspapers

Newspaper	circulation strength
Bild	3.500.000
Süddeutsche Zeitung	447.000
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung	373.000
Welt	279000
tagesspiegel	140000

Selection of articles and claims for each newspaper

The following tables display in the 2nd column (total articles) the absolute frequencies of articles which contained one of the keywords “Islam* or Muslim* or Moslem* or Moschee* or Imam or Qur’an or Quran or Koran or Alcoran or Kopftuch or Burqa or Burkha or Burka or Burqua or Minarett”. From the total number of articles, we retrieved our random sample of articles. For the Bild Zeitung we sampled for instance 606 out of 3.294 published articles to achieve 150 claims. Only 108 articles out of the 606 turned out to be relevant and contained at least one claim (see column “Articles coded”). The column “Claims retrieved” shows the number of coded claims per year out of the coded articles.

Table 2: Selected articles and claims by newspaper

Bild	Total articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	256	51	3	5
2000	262	42	5	5
2001	422	78	10	23
2002	309	57	4	5
2003	287	51	14	18
2004	411	78	23	31
2005	249	45	9	12
2006	421	78	19	28
2007	372	72	14	18
2008	305	54	7	7
Total	3.294	606	108	152

Welt	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1168	30	4	5
2000	1132	30	1	1
2001	1364	36	7	9
2002	1269	36	6	14
2003	2025	54	18	34
2004	1727	45	10	27
2005	1532	40	10	14
2006	2069	55	14	29
2007	1672	44	4	11
2008	1268	33	9	18
Total	15.226	403	83	162
FAZ	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1983	64	2	2
2000	1872	61	3	8
2001	3182	104	7	17
2002	2524	82	9	13
2003	2514	82	6	12
2004	3072	101	10	20
2005	2631	85	6	6
2006	3337	109	13	26
2007	2875	94	14	30
2008	2543	89	9	18
Total	26.533	871	79	152
SZ	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1214	25	3	12
2000	1785	40	2	5
2001	2311	52	5	11
2002	1965	43	5	6
2003	2169	46	8	16
2004	2654	61	9	17
2005	2250	50	7	10
2006	4348	94	18	26
2007	4464	97	16	37
2008	4034	90	12	22
Total	27194	598	85	162
tagesspiegel	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved

				d
1999	1285	26	2	2
2000	1234	26	1	2
2001	1981	41	4	10
2002	1759	38	9	22
2003	1929	40	5	9
2004	2222	46	4	5
2005	1541	31	9	23
2006	2331	54	16	40
2007	2806	58	9	19
2008	2227	46	11	24
Total	19315	406	70	156

On average every 7th article turned out to be relevant. While only ~ 400 articles were needed to retrieve at least 150 claims for the Welt and the tagesspiegel, for the Bild and SZ ~600 articles were needed. On average one article contained 2 claims. For the FAZ we needed more than 800 articles to achieve the same amount of claims. Most articles were irrelevant, because they addressed foreign politics or cultural/historical issues without addressing German Muslims.

Overall we retrieved 784 claims. The diagrams below show the distribution of claims over the course of time. The number of claims per year varied strongly within the period 1999-2008. They increased from 2001, after 9/11 over the course of time and reached their peak in 2006. The debate was centered on the Danish Mohammed cartoons, a planned Ahmadiyya mosque, the headscarf ban for teachers and the first meeting of the Islamkonferenz and Islamic extremism. Afterwards the number of claims decreased continuously.

Figure 1: Claims by year





Figure 2: Claims in 2001 by month



In view of the fact that some actors (the persons or organisations which make the claims) only account for a small number of claims, we will draw conclusions only for those who are sufficiently represented. Percentages are rounded in the textual description.

2. Actors

Most claims were carried out by governmental actors (24%), followed by Muslim organisations and groups (16%). Approximately every 10th claim was done by judiciaries and police or security agencies. In the public debate political parties and media or journalists were

involved with 7% each. Professional organisations, legislatives, churches, unknown/individual actors, state executive agencies and employers are all below the 5%, but above the 1% margin. Less than 1% of the claims were made by racist and extreme right organisations, unions, workers/employees, other minority groups, antiracist and general solidarity or other civil society organisations.

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State Actors	
Governments	24,2
Legislatives	3,8
Judiciary	13,0
Police and security agencies	10,7
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	1,3
Other state executive agencies	1,4
Political Parties	7,1
Civil Society Actors	
Unions	,5
Workers and employees	,3
Employers organisations and firms	1,0
Churches	3,7
Media and journalists	7,0
Professional organisations and groups	4,8
Muslim organisations and groups	15,9
Other minority organisations and groups	,4
Antiracist organisations and groups	,1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	,6
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	,4
Other civil society organisations and groups	,4
Unknown actors	3,2
Total	100%
N	784

The majority of claims were made in the name of organisations and not by single actors. This is especially true for state actors. Among the fairly better represented civil society actors e.g. professional organisations, media and journalists as well as Muslim organisations claims were comparably more often from an individual point of view compared to other actors, but still they mainly claimed as organised actors. Claims from individual point of views were often made by actors from organisations with less homogenous opinions e.g. media and journalists or professional organisations (this table is not shown here).

As mentioned before, the majority of actors were non-Muslim organisations. The percentage of Muslim actors was around 24%. In 17% of the cases names of Muslim organisation were mentioned and for 7% not.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

Muslim actor, organisation name mentioned	16,7
Muslim actor, no organisation name mentioned	7,1

No Muslim actor	76,1
Total	100%
N	784

Overall, Muslim actors are far from being well represented outside of Muslim organisations. If one takes a closer look at organisations in which Muslim actors can be found (except Muslim organisations) it turns out that, Muslims can rather be found in professional organisations (5% of all actors are Muslims) and legislatives as well as political parties (4% each) (this table is not shown here).

The next table (No. 5) shows the origins or nationalities of migrant actors. In 42% of the cases with a migrant actor, the ethnicity of a migrant actor was not specified. If the nationality was specified, the Middle East was comparably most often named (42%), especially Turkey. If one considers only the cases in which the nationality of a migrant actor was specified, migrants from the Middle East were represented with 71%.

Table 5: Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	41,5	
Europe: EU	11,9	20,4
Europe: other	,5	,9
Asia: middle east	41,5	70,8
Asia: south and east	2,6	4,4
Africa: north	1,6	2,7
Africa: other	,5	,9
Total	100%	100%
N	193	113

100% of all claims were stated by religious groups. While the largest part of claims was not made by a specific religious stream, but by Muslims in general, a few actors demarcated themselves from the mainstream and made claims from the Alevi's and Ahmadiyya's point of view. Ralph Giordano (journalists) and Paul Spiegel (Chairman of Central Council of Jews) were the only Jewish actors involved in the debate.

Table 6: Identity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

Status groups	,0
Racial groups	,0
Religious groups	100
National and ethnic groups	,0
Total	100%
N	193

Almost half of the actors can be located either on the regional or the local level, 2/5th on the national level. Actors of a wider scope, namely a supra-/foreign/transnational or bilateral scope played a minor role. The actors on supra-/foreign/transnational or bilateral levels are in large part governments (31%). Approximately one-fifth of these actors are Muslim organisations, 17% judiciaries and 14% media and journalists.

Also among the national actors, governments are highly represented (19%). Muslim organisations as well as police and security agencies have a share of 16% each. As before judiciaries and media are worth mentioning as well with slightly more than 10%. Police and security agencies were primarily active on the national level (16%), as were legislatives (7%). Political parties were almost equally active on the national (9%) and regional/local level (7%). The regional and local level reflects the same distribution as the other two levels with governments (33%), judiciaries (17%) and Muslim organisations (14%) as main actors. Among the unknown scopes unknown actors are fully represented, but also an outstanding number of individuals from Muslim or professional organisations.


Table 7: Scope of actors

	supra- /foreign transnationa l/bilateral	national	regional/lo cal	Unknown
State Actors				
Governments	30,6	18,6	32,8	1,5
Legislatives	2,8	6,6	2,2	,0
Judiciary	16,7	11,0	16,5	1,5
Police and security agencies	2,8	15,8	9,1	,0
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	,0	,6	2,2	,0
Other state executive agencies	5,6	,3	2,2	,0
Political parties	2,8	8,8	7,4	,0
Civil society actors				
Unions	,0	,9	,3	,0
Workers and employees	,0	,0	,3	1,5
Employers organisations and firms	,0	1,3	1,1	,0
Churches	2,8	4,4	3,9	,0
Media and journalists	13,9	12,3	1,1	10,3
Professional organisations and groups	2,8	1,9	4,7	20,6
Muslim organisations and groups	19,4	16,1	13,5	26,5
Other minority organisations and groups	,0	,9	,0	,0
Antiracist organisations	,0	,0	,3	,0

and groups				
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	,0	,3	1,1	,0
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	,0	,0	,6	1,5
Other civil society organisations and groups	,0	,0	,8	,0
Unknown actors	,0	,0	,0	36,8
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	36	317	363	68

The percentage of Muslim actors varied extremely between 1999 and 2002, but this might also be due to low case numbers for these years (except 2001). From 2004 till 2007 the percentage of Muslim actors marginally increased. The introduction of the Islamkonferenz in 2006 could be one explanation. However, one has to be careful with drawing conclusions about the impact of the Islamkonferenz for the inclusion of Muslim actors into the media debate. Therewith the question to what extent the political opportunity structure shapes Muslim's inclusion in Germany cannot so clearly be answered. The number of claims slightly decreased in 2008.

Figure 3: Claims by Muslim actors by year



3. Forms of action

As the second column of Table 8 shows, a clear majority of actors (62%) addressed their issues verbally. About 17% of all claims appeared as repressive measure and 13% as conventional actions such as meetings, judicial action, petitioning or direct-democratic action.

Less than 3% of all claims were carried out physically by demonstrative, confrontational or violent protests.

Table 8: Forms of action (percentages)

	Overall	State interventio n excluded
State intervention		
Repressive measures	16,8	
Political decisions	5,0	
Verbal statements	62,4	79,8
Conventional actions	13,0	16,6
Protest actions		
Demonstrative protests	1,3	1,6
Confrontational protests	,4	,5
Violent protests	1,1	1,5
Total	100%	100%
N	784	613

As Table 9 shows, state actors, political parties, Muslim organisations as well as other civil society actors formulated their issues mainly verbally. 53% of the state actors, 88% of the political parties, 64% of Muslim organisations and 77% of the other civil society actors made verbal statements. It can be concluded that political parties and other civil society actors used more often a verbal way than for instance Muslim organisations. 29% of the latter also used conventional actions (29%). 7 Muslim organisations and 10 unknown actors resorted to physical claims (conventional, demonstrative and violent protest). However, due to the small number of physical claims one cannot draw any conclusions. Not surprisingly, repressive measures occurred predominantly on the side of state actors (28%).

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisatio ns and groups	Other civil society actors
State intervention				
Repressive measures	28,3	,0	1,6	5,1
Political decisions	7,7	10,7	,0	,0
Verbal statements	52,7	87,5	64,0	76,7
Conventional actions	11,0	1,8	28,8	10,2
Protest actions				
Demonstrative protests	0,2	,0	3,2	2,8
Confrontational protests	,0	,0	,0	1,7
Violent protests	,0	,0	2,4	3,4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	427	56	125	176

4. Addressees, criticised and supported actors

In this section we distinguish addressees from criticised and supported actors. Addressees of claims are those actors that are called to act while criticised and supported actors are mentioned either in a negative way (criticised) or are backed in their position by another actor (supported).

Nearly 60% of the claims weren't addressed to someone specific. Among the claims that had an addressee, primarily governments were called to act (37%). In 28% of the cases with an addressee, Muslim organisations were addressed.

Table 10: Addressees (percentages)

	Overall	No addressee excluded
State actors		
Governments	14,7	36,5
Legislatives	,5	1,3
Judiciary	3,1	7,6
Police and security agencies	1,1	2,9
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	,6	1,6
Other state executive agencies	,8	1,9
Political parties	1,5	3,8
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	,4	1,0
Employers organisations and firms	,9	2,2
Churches	,8	1,9
Christians	,8	1,9
Media and journalists	2,3	5,7
Professional organisations and groups	,9	2,2
Muslim organisations and groups	11,4	28,3
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	,1	,3
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	,1	,3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	,1	,3
Other civil society organisations and groups	,1	,3
No addressee	59,8	
Total	100%	100%
N	784	315

The picture for criticised actors is similar. 73% of all claims did not address any actors in a negative way. Among the claims which included a criticised actor, here as well governments (35%) and Muslim organisations (28%) were mainly targeted.

Table 11: Criticised actors (percentages)

State actors	Overall	No criticised actor excluded
Governments	9,4	34,6
Legislatives	,6	2,3
Judiciary	1,5	5,6
Police and security agencies	,6	2,3
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	,3	,9
Other state executive agencies	,4	1,4
Political parties	1,7	6,1
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	,1	,5
Employers organisations and firms	,1	,5
Churches	,9	3,3
Christians	,1	,5
Media and journalists	2,8	10,3
Professional organisations and groups	,6	2,3
Muslim organisations and groups	7,5	27,6
Other minority organisations and groups	,1	,5
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	,1	,5
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	,1	,5
Other civil society organisations and groups	,1	,5
No criticised actor	72,7	
Total	100%	100%
N	784	214

Claims contained least supported actors, meaning that someone backed somebody else. With the exception of 10% no supported actors were mentioned. Muslim organisations are again at the top, followed by governments and judiciaries to a much lesser extent.

Table 12: Supported actors (percentages)

State actors	Overall	No supported actor excluded
Governments	1,4	13,4
Judiciary	1,5	14,6
Police and security agencies	,8	7,3
Civil society actors		
Workers and employees	,1	1,2
Employers organisations and firms	,1	1,2
Churches	,4	3,7
Christians	,4	3,7
Media and journalists	,5	4,9

State actors	Overall	No supported actor excluded
Professional organisations and groups	,1	1,2
Muslim organisations and groups	5,1	48,8
No supported actor	89,5	
Total	100%	100%
N	784	82

In more detailed analyses it turned out that governmental actors mostly addressed other governmental actors (16%) as well as Muslim organisations (14%). The legislatives addressed in the first place governments (40%) and in the second place Muslim organisations (23%). Political parties on the contrary, addressed Muslim organisations to a much lesser extent (only 5%). Their targets were mainly governments (27%) or political parties (9%). Churches in turn addressed Muslim organisations straight ahead (17%), but governments too (14%). Media and journalist had basically governments in their sight (24%). Police and judiciaries acted mostly without addressing someone, since they simply carry out the law/a sentence. Claims by other actors are too low to draw any conclusions.

Furthermore, it turned out that governmental actors mostly criticised other governmental actors (8%) and Muslim organisations (7%). Also other actors from politics such as legislatives and political parties mainly criticised governments or Muslim organisations, but especially legislatives have more negative attitudes towards the governments than towards Muslim actors. Media and journalists criticised governments and Muslim organisations nearly equally often (~20-22%) while churches talked slightly more negative about Muslim actors than governments (17% vs. 14%). 13% of governmental actors, 8% of the media and journalists and 6% of the Muslim organisations were mentioned in a negative way by Muslim actors themselves.

Since the amount of supported actors is very low overall, it is difficult to draw any conclusions. Governments mostly backed Muslim organisations (7%), so did political parties as well (5%). Additionally, political parties also supported judiciaries in 5% of the cases. Interestingly, churches supported Muslim organisations just as often as they criticised them (17%). Muslim organisations rather backed other Muslim organisations (6%) (these tables are not shown).

5. Issues and positions

Overall the media debate about Muslims is dominated by claims concerning integration politics (77%). Within this field mostly Islamic extremism (240 claims) cultural rights and participation: religion (204 claims) were tackled. General evaluations or policy directions were thematised to a much lesser extent (27 claims). Only very few cases appeared in the field of discrimination.


In 13% of the cases, claims against racism and islamophobia were made. Islamophobic claims account for 2%. Claims by German Muslims about foreign issues or other topics like Islamic solidarity make up 2%. Immigration politics also play only a minor role with 6%.

Table 13: Issues of claims (percentages)

Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	6,3
Minority integration politics	
Minority integration general	4,0
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	4,0
Minority rights and participation social rights	1,4
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	,9
Minority rights and participation religious rights	26,0
Minority rights and participation other rights	,3
Discrimination and unequal treatment	,8
Minority social problems	38,3
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	1,3
Anti-racism, islamophobia	
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	8,0
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme rights in society	4,8
Islamophobic claims	2,0
Actor claims muslims	
Homeland politics	,5
Transnational politics	1,4
Other	,1
Total	100%
N	784

Figure 4 below displays the different thematic fields of claims in the course of time. Only claims from fields with at least 49 claims were included. Over time claims about minority social problems, mainly about Islamic extremism were increasingly addressed. Between 2003 and 2005 they slightly declined before it peaked in 2007 when mainly governmental actors issued other press statements (outside of interviews and parliaments) about terrorists. Big issues were among others, online searches, the arrests of the terroristic Sauerland group and further lawsuits against suspected terrorists in that year. Another strongly addressed field was religious rights and participation. Claims in this field did not follow a linear trend. Peaks here were in 2004 and 2006. In 2004 mostly governments were highly involved into the headscarf-debate about teachers (10 claims) while in 2006 Muslims got a chance to speak in the Islamkonferenz. This time their needs revolved around the recognition of building mosques (13 cases) instead of the issue of headscarves for teachers. The second most common issue was headscarves for female students (7 cases). In 2004 not only religious rights but also immigration policies were highly debated, in particular expulsions, e.g. the case about Metin Kaplan. Claims in the category “anti-racism/islamophobia”, especially about the “stigmatisation of Muslims in the public debate” climaxed in 2006 when the debate about the Mohammed caricatures reached Germany.

Figure 4: Issues of claims by year



Claims about Muslim’s religious rights revolved around religious rights and public institutions (173 of 204 claims/85%), in particular headscarves (64 claims), state recognition of building mosques (46 claims) and Islamic religious classes in state schools (30 claims). The right to wear a burqa played a minor role (11 claims). The headscarf debate was concentrated on teachers. The demands for religious practice e.g. slaughtering, allowance of call to prayer, burying and Islamic holidays were only mentioned by few actors. At least for burying and also the call to prayer (azan) the law varies within Germany. In Hamburg for instance it was allowed to be buried without a coffin and in the Ruhr area to call to prayer (Koopmans et al. 2005: 55ff.). So, it seems like that there was at least for these areas less demand for discussion. The same is true for slaughtering according to Islamic rights. Our finding that slaughtering has not been part of the controversy is in line with findings from Koopmans et al. (2005).

Table 14: Claims on religious rights (percentages)

Rights and religious practice	7,4
Religious rights and public Institutions	84,8
Other	7,8
Total	100%
N	204

Especially regarding the two most often mentioned issues, namely religious rights and islamic extremism, differences between the newspapers were found. The tabloid Bild had a strong focus on Islamic extremism and tended to ignore the discussion about religious rights. This might explain why the number of claims in the Bild Zeitung decreased so extremely after 2007 (compare table 2). Their main issue lost obviously relevance compared to other issues.

The following figure shows the overall position of actors towards Muslim’s rights over the course of time. The scale ranges from -1 (anti-Muslim), 0 (neutral, ambivalent) to +1 (pro-Muslim). The tone of the discussion is slightly negative with an overall mean of -.17. Over the course of time it varied between positive and negative. In 1999 it was slightly positive. In

2000 it neutralised before it became predominately negative after 9/11. In 2005 and 2006 it was again almost neutral, went down in 2007 before it became once more almost neutral in 2008.

Figure 5: Position of claims towards Muslim rights by year (means)




Table 15 displays the position of different actors towards Muslim’s rights. Right-wing groups and other minorities took over the most negative positions, but again the overall number of claims by these actors is comparably low. Police and security agencies also have a very negative position. Due to their function their claims mainly consist of arrests of Muslims. The same is true for judiciaries. Other state executive agencies, governments, media and journalists also have negative positions, but to a lesser extent.

The opinions of media and journalists varied between the newspapers. The tabloid “BILD” as well as the more conservative newspaper “Die Welt” reported more anti Muslim claims (65% and 61%) than for instance the Süddeutsche Zeitung who prints anti-Muslim and pro-Muslim claims about equally often (44% and 46%). In the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and the tagesspiegel negative claims slightly outweigh positive claims with a ratio of 5:4.

Interestingly, Muslim professional organisations (e.g. teachers, King Fahd Academy) were much more critical about Muslim rights than religious groups, but the sample size of this group is very low. Of course, the Muslim religion-based groups had the most positive positions among the actors who are sufficiently represented. Unions, legislatives and solidarity groups took over neutral positions on average. Slightly positive were claims by researchers, professional organisations, state executive agencies dealing with migrants, churches, workers and employees.

Table 15: Position of claims by actor

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
State Actors			
Governments	-,35	190	,882
Legislatives	,00	29	,964

Judiciary	-,49	102	,853
Police and security agencies	-,83	84	,487
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	,20	10	1,033
Other state executive agencies	-,36	11	,924
Political parties	,02	56	,963
Civil society actors			
Unions	,00	4	1,155
Workers and employees	,50	2	,707
Employers organisations and firms	,25	8	1,035
Churches	,24	29	,951
Media and journalists	-,31	55	,940
Professional organisations and groups	,11	9	1,054
Researchers/think tanks/intellectuals	,07	28	,979
Muslim: profession-based	-,25	8	1,035
Muslim: religion-based groups	,61	96	,773
Muslim: other organisations and groups	,18	11	,982
Other minorities: religion-based groups	-1,00	3	,000
Antiracist: other	1,00	1	.
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	,00	1	.
General solidarity: profession-based	1,00	1	.
General solidarity: church-based	1,00	2	,000
General solidarity: other	,00	1	.
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1,00	1	.
Other racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1,00	2	,000
Other civil society: citizens' initiatives	-1,00	2	,000
Other civil society: other	1,00	1	.
Unknown actors	,09	22	1,019
Total	-,17	769	,951

Claims which displayed completely negative positions were islamophobic claims and to a lesser extent claims in the field of minority social problems which included e.g. Islamic extremism, homophobia, position of women and crimes in general. Claims on immigration politics in regard to Muslims are also clearly negative. Claims about Muslim's religious rights are neutral on average, but also have one of the highest standard deviations which means that answers reach from the one extreme negative pole (-1) to the extreme positive pole (+1). Overall, claims regarding minority rights, integration in general, discrimination (low n!) and anti-racism (in institutional contexts) are discussed from a more positive point of view. Entirely positive discussed were claims in the field of non-institutional racism/islamophobia.

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Mittelwert	N	Standardabweichung
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	-,53	49	,844
Minority integration politics			
Minority integration general	,29	31	,824

Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	,29	31	,938
Minority rights and participation social rights	,36	11	,924
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	,71	7	,756
Minority rights and participation religious rights	,01	204	,962
Minority rights and participation other rights	,50	2	,707
Discrimination and unequal treatment	,67	6	,816
Minority social problems	-,71	300	,663
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	,00	10	,943
Antiracism/islamophobia			
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	,79	63	,544
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme rights in society	1,00	38	,000
Islamophobic claims	-1,00	16	,000
Other	1,00	1	
Total	-,17	769	,951

From the previous tables we know that most claims were stated in the field of minority integration politics, in particular Islamic extremism and religious rights. This is true for all types of actors. Governments addressed 85% of their claims in this field, while legislatives also tried to bring into the discussion racism and islamophobia (23%). Churches made 21% of their claims in this field, but Muslim organisations and media placed here proportionally more claims than all other actors (27% and 24%). Judiciaries had an outstanding number of claims in the field of immigration (15%), as had governments (8%) and political parties (9%), mainly because they had to deal with several expulsions.

The following table shows that all actors placed their claims predominately in the field of minority integration policies (state actors 83%, political parties 75%, Muslim organisations 62% as well as other civil society actors 73%); state actors to a greater extent than Muslim organisations for instance. The latter addressed also an outstanding number of claims in the field of antiracism.

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	9,1	8,9	,8	2,3
Minority integration politics	82,7	75,0	62,4	73,3
Antiracism/islamophobia	7,3	16,1	27,2	15,3
Islamophobic claims	0,7	,0	0,8	6,8
Actor claims Muslims	0,2	,0	8,0	2,3
Other	,0	,0	0,8	,0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	427	56	125	176

6. Object

Except for 2% of claims, all had a Muslim object to which action was directed. Only 13% of the claims with an object were concerned about Muslims in general. Half of all claims concentrated on a particular group. Another 23% had an individual as object. Islam in general, the mainstream or specific streams was the object in less than 8% of the cases where an object was mentioned.

Table 18: Objects of claims (percentages)

Muslims as object	
All Muslims in general	12,9
Majority / most Muslims	1,7
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	51,4
Individual Muslims	22,7
Unclassifiable Muslims	3,4
Islam as object	
Islam in general	2,4
Islam mainstream	,1
Specific religious stream / movement within Islam	5,4
Unclassifiable Islam	,0
Total	100%
N	765

The nationality of Muslim objects was not specified in most cases (72%). Objects whose nationality was specified came predominantly from a country in the Middle East (61%), especially Turkey. Second most often, but to a much lesser extent, North Africans (15%) and EU-nationals e.g. German nationals were mentioned (13%). From the (East) European, or (South) Asian countries only single actors were represented, although the ex-Yugoslavians form one of the largest minority groups in Germany.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	71,8	
Europe: EU	3,8	13,4
Other europe	,8	2,8
Asia: middle east	17,3	61,1
Asia: south and east	1,4	5,1
Africa: North	4,3	15,3
Africa: other	,7	2,3
Total	100%	100%
N	765	216

The majority of actors focused in their claims on particular groups/ a minority of Muslims (State actors 51%, political parties 59%, Muslim organisations 50%, other civil society actors 51%).

Nevertheless, the tendency to talk about Muslims in general was slightly more common among Muslim organisations (18%) and other civil society actors (17%) while 10% of the state actors and 13% of the political parties generalised their claims. State actors were also more concerned about individuals due to the arrests and court cases about suspected terrorists.

Taking a more detailed insight, it is striking, that governments and political parties made claims about a specific group in ca. 60% of the cases. Churches in contrast tended to generalise claims much more (28%), but half the claims were still about particular groups. Slightly less than half the claims of professional groups, media and journalists and Muslim organisations were about a particular group. The police and security agencies on the contrary focused on specific groups in 54% of the cases and on individuals in one-third of the cases. Cases without Muslim objects appeared in claims by Muslims.

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Muslims as object				
All Muslims in general	10,2	12,5	18,0	16,6
Majority/most Muslims	,9	8,9	,9	1,7
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	50,8	58,9	49,5	51,4
Individual Muslims	30,7	10,7	9,9	15,4
Unclassifiable Muslims	1,9	5,4	9,0	2,9
Islam as object				
Islam in general	,5	,0	5,4	5,7
Islam mainstream	,0	,0	,0	,6
Minority currents within Islam	,0	,0	,0	,0
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	5,0	3,6	7,2	5,7
Unclassifiable Islam	,0	,0	,0	,0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	423	56	111	175

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	66,9	82,1	76,6	77,1
Europe: EU	4,3	1,8	2,7	4,0
Europe: other	1,4	,0	,0	,0
Asia: middle east	18,4	14,3	16,2	16,0
Asia: south and east	1,7	,0	2,7	,6
Africa: North	6,4	1,8	1,8	1,7

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Africa: other	,9	,0	,0	,6
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	423	56	111	175

7. Scope variables

44% of the organised actors (unknown actors are excluded) are on the national level. The regional and local level is represented with ~25% each. Supra- or transnational actors rarely appear in the public debate. It should be mentioned that there are differences between the newspapers. The Bild-Zeitung reports in more than half the cases issues addressed by national actors while the other newspapers have a stronger local and regional focus. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung considers foreign actors slightly more than the other newspapers.

Table 22: Scope of actors (percentages)

Supra- or transnational:	,6
European	
Supra- or transnational: other	,1
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1,5
Foreign national: other	2,5
Bilateral	,3
National	44,3
Regional	25,1
Local	25,6
Total	100%
N	716

In claims where we have addressees/criticised or supported actor they are also most often located on the national level (addressees 48%, criticised actors 40%, supported actors 44%). Criticised actors can be more often located on the foreign national level (13%) than addressees (4%) or supported actors (5%).

Table 23: Scope of addressees, criticised actors and supported actors (percentages)

	Addressee	Criticised actor	Supported actor
Supra- or transnational:	1,3	,9	6,1
European			
Supra- or transnational: other	,6	1,9	1,2
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1,9	2,8	2,4
Foreign national: other	2,2	10,3	2,4
Bilateral	1,3	,0	,0
National	47,9	39,7	43,9
Regional	21,0	18,7	17,1
Local	22,8	25,7	26,8

Taking a look at the scopes of actors that criticised others, it turns out that actors criticise mainly actors that act on the same level. National and local actors for instance addressed in more than 60% of the cases other actors on their level. Actors on higher levels addressed 53% of their claims to other actors on their level, but 31% also to national actors. Unknown actors seem to be more active on the local level (46%) (table not shown here).

Corresponding to the actors, the issues were also most often placed within the national context (41%). 30% were on the local level and 16% foreign national. Less than 1% of the claims had a supranational/European scope.

Table 24: Scope of issues (percentages)

Supra- or transnational: European	,8
Supra- or transnational: other	,6
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	4,7
Foreign national: other	11,2
Bilateral	,1
National	40,9
Regional	12,1

The next table illustrates that state actors (40%) and Muslim organisations as well as other civil society actors (45% each) mostly addressed issues on the national level while political parties addressed mainly issues on the local level (38%), but 27% of their claims were also about issues on the national level.

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Supra- or transnational: European	,7	,0	,0	1,7
Supra- or transnational: other	,7	,0	1,6	,0
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	5,9	3,6	5,6	1,7
Foreign national: other	10,8	12,5	11,2	11,9
Bilateral	,2	,0	,0	0
National	40,0	26,8	44,8	44,9
Regional	14,1	19,6	6,4	9,1

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Local	27,6	37,5	30,4	30,7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	427	56	125	176

If one distinguishes different state actors, governments primarily made claims which were related to the national context (43%), but also to the regional (20%) as well as the local one (23%). Legislatives dealt mainly with national (40%) and regional (23%) issues. Judiciaries in turn addressed foreign issues (33%) more often what makes sense considering that they dealt more often with expulsions due to extremist affiliations. Slightly more than half of all claims by police and security agencies were on the national level e.g. the anti-terror defense. One-third was on the local level. Churches and media or journalists mainly tackled national issues. Muslim organisations seem to concentrate on issues both on the national (45%) or the local level (30%) and sometimes on issues outside of Germany (17%). Issues outside of Germany were for example homeland politics, the Iraq war, the Israel-Palestine conflict, Afghanistan war or a call to Islamic solidarity. Other foreign issues not made by German Muslims were excluded from the analyses (table not shown here).

8. Conclusion

After 9/11 the media coverage about Muslims, especially concerning Islamic extremism has increased compared to the years before. However, the debate is not only about Muslims, but also shaped by them. Muslim organisations made 16% of all claims. Only governments made more claims in the public debate about Muslims in Germany with 24%. The percentage of claims made by Muslim actors rises, if Muslims outside of Muslim organisations are taken into account. Then the percentage of Muslims actors increases to 24%. Hence, Muslim actors can also be found outside of Muslim organisations, but to a much lesser extent. Outside of the Islamkonferenz and organised Muslim groups they are for instance represented among professional organisations (5%), legislatives and political parties (4% each).

Taking a look at Muslims as objects of claims, it has to be concluded that the debate is rarely about Muslims from certain countries. In most cases the nationality of Muslim objects is not even mentioned. If it is specified, objects are mainly from the Middle East, in particular Turkey. Ex-Yugoslavians for instance who are numerically well represented in Germany are not explicitly mentioned in the debate.

Issues were mostly negotiated on the national (41%), local (30%) and regional (12%) level. 45% of all Muslim actors addressed issues on the national and 30% on the local level. The police and security agencies' field of attention is to a large extent also on the national level. This could be due to the Anti-Terror-law in which in particular the Federal Criminal Police Office and constitution protection is involved. Supranational issues addressed by actors like the European Union only play a minor role in the public debate.

In order to voice one's opinion the majority of actors chose either a verbal or a conventional action (e.g. meetings, judicial action, petitioning, direct-democratic action). Physical claims appeared very seldom in the public sphere.

Usually, claims were addressed at those who have the authority to act, namely governments (15%) and in 11% of the cases also Muslims. The majority of claims, however, were not addressed to someone specific. Among the criticised actors, governments and Muslim organisations were almost equally often mentioned. Interestingly, churches backed Muslims just as often as they criticised Muslims. This arouses the impression that they tried to strengthen Muslim's rights in order to defend their own dominating position, e.g. concerning the right for religious classes. Nevertheless, the church used the opportunity to criticise the Muslim community.

Religious rights (e.g. right to wear headscarves, mosque recognition and Islamic religious classes) (204 claims) and Islamic extremism (240 claims) were the most often tackled issues within the field of integration politics. Since 77% of all claims were stated within the field of integration politics other fields played a minor role; only 13% of all claims were in the category of anti-racism/islamophobia and 6% in immigration politics. Claims by Muslims about Muslims in foreign countries and islamophobic claims accounted for 2% each.

The high percentage of claims about Islamic extremism caused a slightly negative tone of the overall discussion with a mean of $-.17$ on a scale from -1 (anti-Muslim) to $+1$ (pro-Muslim). It became more negative after 9/11, but almost neutralised in 2008 to the same level as before 9/11. On average, right-wing groups, police and security agencies and judiciaries made more anti-Muslim claims. Governments and media were also a little negative. Churches were on average more pro-Muslim which underlines the assumption that churches try to defend their own status by claiming for Muslim rights. It is self-explanatory that Muslim groups are rather pro than anti-Muslim.

Regarding the tone of the discussion a distinction has to be made between the newspapers. The Bild-Zeitung which is the newspaper with the widest circulation, as well as the conservative oriented Welt, report more anti-Muslim claims than for instance the Süddeutsche Zeitung which reports pro- and anti-Muslim claims equally often. Unsurprisingly, issues about Islamic extremism within the field of integration politics are evaluated extremely negative, but the discussion about religious rights remained relatively neutral, although with a high standard deviation. While issues about racism in non-institutional contexts were entirely pro-Muslim, the opinions in the field of racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts drifted apart due to the discussion whether the Mohammed caricatures entailed a stigmatisation of Muslims or would be a sign of freedom of opinion.

To sum up, we can say that Muslims were hardly able to expand their place in the German public debate to verbalise their needs and opinions. They mostly claimed as members of Muslim organisations and not within host society organisations such as governments or unions. Since their positions are predominately pro-Muslim the tone of the debate changed concerning issues they make claims about, e.g. religious rights. However, we have to keep in mind that the newspaper Bild which is the most often read newspaper in Germany has a one-sided view by reporting primarily anti-Muslim claims. It needs to be tested which consequences this might have on the attitudes of the host society towards Muslim migrants in Germany.

SWITZERLAND

Elisa Banfi

1. Introduction

To understand how the national identities of the contemporary European states affect the recently settled Muslim component of European populations, it is necessary to retrace the genesis of each specific nation building process, with a comparative perspective. Each European state has emerged from a particular process of national unification that structurally determines the current relationship between public institutions and religious communities. In the WP2 of the Eurislam project, discursive opportunities structures of each country are examined in order to see how the structure of the media public space affects the common representation and self-representation of Muslims at the supranational, national and local level. The analysis of the political opportunities structures in different countries explains how Islamophobia and Islamophilia are likely related to the popular appropriation and reformulation of "traditional" national identities promoted by the mass media.

Countries have built up a sentiment of national belonging among their citizens through various process of unification taking into account the degree of the population heterogeneity and local differences. The creation of a national identity was fundamental in aggregating an entity of territory with different historical backgrounds and structures; and the practice of the citizenship in the European nation states is still marked by the experience and the characteristics of the unification process. Languages, in particular, were crucial in fashioning national entities over the last two centuries. Newspapers were in many cases the main tool to build the belonging to the fatherland.

Nowadays the globalization of the information process and the development of media technologies increase the power of media instruments and newspapers are becoming more accessible to an increasing number of citizens by the internet use.

In Switzerland, where differences were maintained by the Federal System that institutionalizes regional autonomies and peculiarities, languages have played a not negligible role in perpetuating local features of different territorial entities.

The Federal system, set up in the Constitution of 1848, made it possible to reconcile the divergences which emerged in the Sonderbund war and gather the pre-unitarian sovereign entities (cantons) around a central power able to respect and valorize specificities, including, of course, languages.

The regional media, residuals of the pre-unitarian situation largely contributed towards differentiating the Francophone, Germanophone and Italophone public discourse.

The lack of federal newspapers fosters the development of subnational media that are a reference for each linguistic-area; and an empowerment of regional newspapers that which while maintaining a local format tend to wish to be considered as national media.

Another important factor is the impact of the German, French and Italian newspapers on the Swiss ones. Concerning subject as well as form, Swiss newspapers are influenced by neighbors who, due the size of their respective populations possess relevant prestige and potential readership. Consequently a different influence is observed in each area in account of the familiarity of Germanophone, Francophone and Italophone Swiss readers with political and cultural events of the nearest country of linguistic reference.

Even on issues concerning Muslim and Islam, it is possible to observe the interest of each area for the debate in Italy, France or Germany above all when similarities with the local context are perceived. Familiarity with neighboring TV channels (in each Swiss area daily watching of foreign TV channels, broadcast in one of the spoken cantonal language, is very common) makes it possible to introduce in the public domain foreign actor (intellectuals, institutions, Muslim organizations) taking a stand on various issues concerning immigrant, Muslim and integration policies.

In this report, an actor based approach is adopted and thanks to particular attention given to different scopes of actors, it is possible to determine the centripetal and centrifugal degree of the Swiss public debates concerning Islam and Muslims.

Variations in claim-making in the field of Muslim issues are obviously related to variations in claim-making in the field of migration and ethnic relations politics, since Islam is still an immigrant religion. For that reason, qualitative and quantitative features of the Muslim population, in each linguistic area of Switzerland, impact on the nationality or ethnicity of Muslim actors visible in WP2 mass media analysis.

For example, the focus on Turkish claim-making in Germany is very strong in Germanophone newspapers and less present in Francophone ones, where the headscarf issue takes an important place.

Moreover, issues gaining visibility in the public domain are related to historical debates between local or national powers and religious communities and to the different configurations in the balance of power between religions and secular institutions.

The importance given in some cantons to gender issue and the defence of secularity can mean that such subjects have more visibility than in another geographical area.

Visibility in the media of some Islamic leader or group seems to be more conditioned by and reactive to external discursive opportunity structures background rather than being autonomous and proactive.

Discursive opportunity structures impact on the political participation of Muslim actors and their interactions with public institutions and local actors because they structure which collective identities and specific claims can reach legitimacy in the public domain.

The analysis of the discursive opportunity structures is crucial to understanding the interference of public institutions and local actors on dynamics of competition and selection within a population of Muslim actors trying to gain visibility in the media arena.

Discursive opportunity structures play a central role in fashioning the organisational and identitarian stabilisation of the Swiss Muslim population and may help explain how both identities, immigrant and Muslim, interact with each other differently in a different linguistic area.

In fact, the shared understandings that motivate and legitimate collective action in terms of Muslim identity are strongly influenced by discursive opportunity structures that define who and how certain actors can become visible and subsequently, thus be able to exist in the public space. Reduced visibility can frustrate the aim to gaining access to political opportunities, alliances and resources.

In order to make a European comparative analysis in the following report, the Swiss WP2 data will be analyzed overcoming subnational differences that we analyzed briefly in this introduction.

Table 1: Selected newspapers (2008)

Newspaper	Circulation strength
NZZ	143.009
Blick	231.235
Tagesanzeiger	213.738
Le Matin	61.345
Le Temps	45.883

Table 2: Selected articles and claims by newspaper

NZZ	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	52764	1247	34	8
2000	55513	1306	21	6
2001	54621	2089	24	10
2002	58591	2291	29	6
2003	56695	2225	28	21
2004	57419	2651	31	36
2005	59145	2702	31	34
2006	59219	3048	30	13
2007	61588	3105	36	12
2008	62915	2084	30	7
Total	578470	22748	294	153
Blick	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	24992	171	17	17
2000	24723	161	17	15
2001	23959	357	33	12
2002	23765	275	25	15
2003	21826	346	31	18
2004	23198	417	41	19
2005	20450	402	38	12
2006	19119	462	42	21
2007	17944	342	35	12
2008	17801	276	27	14
Total	217777	3209	306	155
Tagesanzeiger	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	33144	670	31	8
2000	33782	646	23	1
2001	37844	1208	43	11
2002	38582	1152	40	9
2003	32547	1263	53	16
2004	33865	1636	87	37
2005	41011	1588	61	19
2006	45879	1971	77	42
2007	65078	1949	71	30

2008	64300	1552	55	9
Total	426032	13635	557	162
Le Matin	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	15056	573	37	12
2000	14420	495	32	11
2001	16289	1163	76	21
2002	18792	1388	91	15
2003	12460	1329	87	24
2004	17284	1380	90	28
2005	20309	744	49	6
2006	22126	786	51	14
2007	20303	843	55	11
2008	16423	598	39	9
Total	173462	9299	606	151
Le Temps	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	22549	832	69	5
2000	22885	718	59	1
2001	23317	1044	87	8
2002	19370	986	78	25
2003	15760	851	71	3
2004	14825	1008	85	34
2005	17361	960	82	19
2006	17252	1237	103	33
2007	18244	1135	95	16
2008	18417	995	84	5
Total	189980	9766	813	149

In this report, we may verify the distribution of discursive opportunity structures throughout different parts of society.

We analyse for Switzerland the most widespread newspapers in the German-speaking cantons and the Romandy.

For Germanophone population, two quality newspapers are selected “Tages-Anzeiger” (213.738) and “Neue Zürcher Zeitung” (143.009) and one tabloid “Blick” (231.235) while for the Francophone area, Le Matin et Le Temps.

Figure 1: Number of claims by year





Figure 2: Number of claims in 2001 by month



2. Actors

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State actors	34.3
Governments	15.4
Legislatives	4.2
Judiciary	6.5
Police and security agencies	4.4
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	1.6
Other state executive agencies	2.2
Political parties	6.6
Civil society actors	45.3
Unions	0
Workers and employees	0
Employers organizations and firms	1
Churches	4.2
Media and journalists	6.6
Professional organizations and groups - think tanks/intellectuals	6.5
Muslim organizations and groups	18.6
Other minority organizations and groups	1
Antiracist organisations and groups	0.5
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	1.2
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	1.4
Other civil society organizations and groups	4.3
Unknown actors	13.8
Total	100%
N	790

The claiming activity is polarised between governments (15.4%) and Muslim organizations (18.6%). Muslim groups that gain visibility are primarily religion-based organisations (10,1%) more than other Muslim groups. The claim-making of the Muslim religion-based organisations is related mainly to religious rights and participation (20%), Islamic extremism and violence (24%) issues, as well as governments; even so they spend more energy on religious rights and participation issues (30%) than on Islamic extremism and violence issue (15%).

Even though governments and Muslim organisations are the real protagonists/antagonists in the public domain concerning Muslim issues, six other actors play a relevant part, three state actors and three civil society ones.

Judiciary actors are more proactive (6.5%) than legislatives ones (4.2%) and police and security agencies (4.4%). Their actions validate the presence of Muslim issues in the public domain as a state concern, because all state powers are interested in speaking and acting in order to take a clear stand on Muslims topics.

On the other hand, among civil society actors, media and journalists seem to abandoning their role of neutral observers becoming the most active civil actor for or against Muslims after Islamic organisations and before think-tanks intellectuals and Christians (churches and Christians).

The scandal of the Mohammed cartoons could partly account for media claims related to Muslims; however, for better understanding, it is necessary remember the TSR’s contestation during citizen demonstration against the Minaret initiative of 2009 in which strong anti-media feeling was shown by pro-Muslim activists; and for many years pro-Muslim readers were highly critical of many newspapers in Francophone area.

In Switzerland the important role played by think tanks intellectuals is firstly explained by the omnipresence of Tariq Ramadan in the public debate and the strong reaction that his personality produces in Swiss society. Secondly it is important to emphasize the major role played by experts and university researchers as consultants for Swiss institutions and authorities in the political decision-making process.

In both cases, the weight of media and journalists or think-tank intellectuals claiming for or against Muslims is a result of the globalisation of the media in the public debate on Muslim subjects. By the beginning of the Iraq war and al-Jazira TV channel activity, the stigmatisation of Muslim actors and their “justification” also impacted on the use of media in the European public discourse.

The global dimension of the Muslim debate means that trans-national claims of intellectuals of other countries inflame the intra-national public arena. The presence of Christians and churches presence is largely explained by the interest in ecumenical projects and in the secularisation debate.

The absence on the left-wing organisations and unions among relevant actors has to do with the internal and historical debate of “the left” concerning the problematic integration of “Muslim interests” among other interests defended by it.

The refusal of the radical left and unions to mobilise their structures and resources in support of Muslims is complementary to this absence of workers and employers among claiming actors.

Questions related to the right to be veiled or to wear a headscarf in hospitals, schools or in other public institutions are rarely brought into the public arena by Muslim actors who exploit working class structures and resources. Such claims tend to be made by Muslim religion-based actors.

The claiming activity of racist and extreme right organizations and groups (1.3%) is modest if compared with the visibility of political parties claiming on Muslim subjects. All Swiss political parties without exception are obliged by the electoral challenge and the extreme anti-Islam position of the UDC to take a stand on Muslim issue.

Among the Swiss political parties, PDC (2.6%), UDC (2.4%), PS (2%) possess the same claiming activity, that it is a twice the extreme right one.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

Muslim actor, organization name metioned	17.3
Muslim actor, no organization name metioned and individuals	13.8
no Muslim actor	68.9
Total	100%
N	790

The presence of Muslim actors is common to some categories: Muslim actors often speak as individuals from newspapers, universities or research centres. This individual and “expert” claiming action (3.5%) shows to what extent Muslim actors are integrated in key-sectors of public knowledge production.

Considering that the Swiss Muslim population is still mainly composed by immigrants and has no political rights as nationals, it is likely that in coming years, a more settled and autochthonous Muslim population add to such an individual and qualified presence in strategic media sectors.

Table 5: Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	18.6	
Contry of residence	27.4	33.7
Europe: EU	5.9	7.3
Europe: other	7.6	9.3
Asia: middle east	20.7	25.4
Asia: south and east	5.9	7.3
Africa: north	12.7	15.5
Africa: other	0.4	0.5
Oceania	0.8	1
Total	100%	100%
N	237	193

Swiss Muslim followers are either converted or immigrants and the second generation has not yet achieved a real status related to political rights because the *ius solis* and strict naturalisation rules prevent them from obtaining Swiss nationality. So those are born in the country, converted or long-resident are still sometimes considered as a foreign religious group that have recently come to Switzerland from the Middle East or North Africa.

However, the main identity whereby Muslim actors become visible in the majority of newspaper articles is religious rather than racial. Among the 18% of Muslim actors, only 1.9% is defined mainly as immigrant or asylum seekers, while for the majority, 14%, the main concern is religious belonging. The Muslim category is used for the 70.3% explicitly in the case of Muslim actors.

Muslim are sometimes presented as belonging to national or ethnic allochthonous groups, but chiefly as a religious group with national origin secondary. We can affirm that in the majority of the cases the religious identity is not explicitly connoted by attributes related to unfamiliar identities.

Table 6: Identity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

Status groups	18
Racial groups	0
Religious groups	77
National and ethnic groups	4

Status groups	18
Racial groups	0
Religious groups	77
National and ethnic groups	4
<hr/>	
Total	100%
N	229

Table 7: Scope of actors (percentages)


	Supra-/foreign transnational/bilateral	National	Regional/local	Unknown
State actors	60.6	51	41.3	5
Governments	46.5	20.1	18.4	0
Legislatives		6.9	5.5	1.5
Judiciary	5.6	12.	4.5	2.7
Police and security agencies	8.5	8.1	3	0.8
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0	1.5	4.5	0
Other state executive agencies	0	2.3	5.5	0
Political parties	1.4	16.2	3.5	0.8
Civil society actors	38	32.9	55.3	52.1
Unions	0	0	0	0
Workers and employees	0	0	0	0
Employers organisations and firms	1.4	1.5	1.	.4
Churches	8.5	2.3	4.5	4.6
Media and journalists	5.6	6.2	8.5	5.8
Professional organisations and groups	2.8	3.5	5.5	11.2
Muslim organisations and groups	14.1	14.7	29.9	15.1
Other minority organisations and groups	0	1.2	1.	1.2
Antiracist organisations and groups	1.4	0.8	0	0.4
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1.4	2.4	1.5	0
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1.4	.4	1.5	2.3
Other civil society organisations and groups	1.4	0	2	11.2
Unknown actors	0	0	0	42.1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	71	259	201	259

Muslim actors oriented their claiming action more towards the residence countries than towards Muslim states of origin. Moreover, while the scope of all actors is mainly national, among Muslim organisations the scope is local at 40.8% (regional 11% and municipal 29,8%).

46.5% of actors with supranational scope are governments, while actors with national scope are more evenly distributed: governments (20.1%), judiciary (12), Muslim organisations (14.7%), and political parties (16.2%).

On the contrary actors with local scope are polarised: governments (18.4%) and Muslim organizations (29.9%).

Figure 3: Number of claims by Muslim and non-Muslim actors by year



3. Forms of action

Table 8: Forms of action (percentages)

	Overall	State intervention excluded
State intervention	13.7	
Repressive measures	5.7	
Political decisions	8	
Verbal statements	71.9	83.3
Conventional actions	8.5	9.8
Protest actions	6	6.9
Demonstrative protests	2.2	2.5
Confrontational protests	0.9	1
Violent protests	2.9	3.4
Total	100%	100%
N	790	682

The impressive percentage of verbal statements is mainly found in newspaper interviews (20,5%) and other press statements/declarations (30%) that do not include statements in opinion article/open letter (8.9%), parliament/government (3.8%), report/book (3.3%), public speech (2.2%), press conference (1.5%), editorial (1.1%), TV interview (0.6%).

Conventional actions split their total percentage between meetings (4.4%) and judicial action (3%) that are more widespread than direct-democratic action (0.4%), petitioning (0.6%). Demonstrative actions are chosen by student actors, while violent protests tend to come from extreme rights organizations.

Muslim organizations and governments actors privilege press statements/declarations as well as media and journalists and intellectuals.

Repressive forms are restricted to police and judiciary actors, while churches and Christians use the same form as the main claiming actors: press statements.

The predominance of the discursive form rather than violent or confrontational ones shows how in the Swiss public domain the nature of the conflicts between pro and anti Muslims is developing by media and debate around the minority problem of integration with a significant participation of the population in the debate (8.9% opinion article/open letter).

The lack of forms of violent protest among Muslim organizations and groups confirms that the consensus way so specific to Swiss society has also influenced the public domain concerning Muslims and Islam. Muslim actors who are visible in the public discourse are actors who have adopted the Swiss way of solving problem. Openly violent conflict and more confrontational protests are not observable in the Swiss public domain as a component of the public debate on Muslims.

The lack of forms of violent protests among the extreme right organizations can be explained by the presence in the political arena of the UDC, a political party which expresses in

democratic forms xenophobe and Islamophobic elements by using the claiming form verbal violence or media strategy rather than the direct form of violent contestation. Repressive measures are mainly aimed at individuals and minority groups, while violent protests seem to have mainly an undefined and general object and only in some cases extreme rights organizations attacks Muslim individuals.

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
State intervention	37.6	5.8	0	0.9
Repressive measures	16.2	0	0	0
Political decisions	21.4	5.8	0	0.9
Verbal statements	53.9	82.7	81.0	80.1
Conventional actions	8.5	11.5	12.2	8.5
Protest actions	0	0	6.8	10.4
Demonstrative protests	0	0	0.7	4.3
Confrontational protests	0	0	0	1.9
Violent protests	0	0	4.1	4.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	271	52	147	211

4. Addressees and criticised actors

Table 10: Addressees (percentages)

	Overall	No addressee excluded
State actors	26.8	37.9
Governments	18.5	26.1
Legislatives	1.6	2.3
Judiciary	2.8	3.9
Police and security agencies	1.4	2
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0.5	0.7
Other state executive agencies	2	2.9
Political parties	2.9	4.1
Civil society actors	41.0	58
Workers and employees	0.1	0.2
Employers organisations and firms	0.8	1.1
Churches	1	1.4
Christians	1	1.4
Media and journalists	5.7	8.1
Professional organisations and groups	2.8	3.9
Muslim organisations and groups	25.4	36
Other minorities	0.8	1.1
Antiracist organisations and groups	0.1	0.2
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	0.4	0.5
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1.4	2
Other civil society organisations and groups	1.5	2.1
No addressee	29.2	0
Total	100%	100%
N	790	559

The distribution for addressee is the same observed for main actors: we observe a polarisation between Muslim organisations and governments, with an additional less significant presence of intellectuals, media and the other state actors.

Muslim groups, professional organisations, governments and intellectuals are actors who chiefly address their claims to governments, while actors dealing with Muslim organisations are more various: both state and non state actors.

A strong interaction between Muslim actors and governments is evidently emerging and this show how, in the Swiss public domain, the Muslim issue is mainly expressed in the form of negotiation between a Muslim community and public institutions.

Table 11: Criticised actors (percentages)

	Overall	No criticized actor excluded
State actors	15.3	28.6
Governments	10.4	19.3
Legislatives	1	1.9
Judiciary	1	1.9
Police and security agencies	1.3	2.4
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0.4	0.7
Other state executive agencies	1.2	2.4
Political parties	2.5	4.7
Civil society actors	35.8	66.7
Workers and employees	0.1	0.2
Employers organisations and firms	0.8	1.4
Churches	0.6	1.2
Christians	0.9	1.7
Media and journalists	4.2	7.8
Professional organisations and groups	2.7	5
Muslim organisations and groups	23.8	44.3
Other minority organisations and groups	0.8	1.4
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	0.1	0.2
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	1.5	2.8
Other civil society organisations and groups	0.4	0.7
No criticised actor	46.3	0
Total	100%	100%
N	790	424

Table 12: Supported actors (percentages)

	Overall	No supported actor excluded
State actors	4.7	20.9
Governments	2.7	11.9
Legislatives	0.1	0.6
Judiciary	0.6	2.8
Police and security agencies	0.9	4
Other state executive agencies	0.4	1.7
Political parties	1	4.5
Civil society actors	16.7	74.6
Workers and employees	0.3	1.1
Churches	0.3	1.1
Christians	0.4	1.7
Media and journalists	0.5	2.3
Professional organisations and groups	1	4.5
Muslim organisations and groups	13.2	58.8
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	0.1	0.6
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	0.3	1.1
Other civil society organisations and groups	0.8	3.4
No addressee	77.6	0
Total	100%	100%
N	790	177

The internal debate of Muslim communities is also clearly visible since how Muslim organisations also constitute one of the most important addressees for Muslim actors.

Among criticised actors, the presence of Muslim organisations is conspicuous, government and state actors are less criticized along with media and journalists. Muslim groups are criticised especially by Muslim organisations themselves, but also by media, intellectuals, political parties and state actors.

The lack of civil society actors criticising Muslim actors reveals how in Switzerland intercommunity conflicts or social problems arising from Islamic terrorism are absent and that in the public domain Muslim issues are matters for state actors or experts.

The absence of unions and leftist organizations is completely confirmed in the case of addresses, criticised and supported actors, and that lack explains the reluctance of such of actors to appear in the public domain in support or not of Muslim claims.

Unions and leftist organizations are obviously absent in the public domain also as a potential addressee for Muslim organizations and groups.

A small percentage of racist and extreme right organizations and groups are the addressee/criticised actor for Muslim groups or police and security agencies, while they never play the role of supported actors.

Supported actors are often Muslim organizations and groups sustained chiefly by Muslim actors themselves but sometimes by state and civil society actors.

5. Issues and positions

Table 13: Issues of claims (percentages)


Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	6.1
Minority integration politics	67.5
Minority integration general	7.6
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	2.7
Minority rights and participation social rights	1.3
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	0.4
Minority rights and participation religious rights	24.1
Minority rights and participation other rights	0.4
Discrimination and unequal treatment	2.9
Minority social problems	26.1
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	2.2
Antiracism/islamophobia	15.4
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	9.6
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	5.8
Islamophobic claims	5.3
Actor claims Muslims	5.2
Homeland politics	1.5
Transnational politics	3.7
Other	0.5
Total	100%
N	

All actors focus their interests mainly on issues related to minority religious rights and minority social problems and in less significant way on anti-racist and Islamophobia. Then in the public domain Muslim demands are put forward as a core issue by Muslim organisations, governments and political parties negotiating in public discourse frontiers for the practice of Islam in Swiss society.

The presence of political parties is accounted for by the electoral results that a political agenda more or less tolerant towards the Muslim community may obtain.

Issues related to minority social problems concern Islamic extremism and violence and are at the heart of the public discourse about Muslims in Switzerland.

Figure 4: Number of claims by issue and year



Judiciary actors and police and security agencies regularly also involve this kind of issues; Muslim organisations are often obliged to deny any connection with individuals or groups accused of terrorism by media and journalists.

Even in the case of issues, we can affirm that the public domain is very concerned about the real impact that the Muslim presence could have on Swiss society in terms of increasing religious extremism and violence and modifying frontiers between secular and religious spheres.

The practice of Islam is more relevant in the Swiss public debate when it impinges on autochthonous structures and public institutions.

Subjects historically already developed in the public arena for other religious communities, as the Jewish community, emerge frequently: for example 1.3% in the case of ritual slaughtering and 3.3% burial according to the Islamic rite.

Two other subjects also emerge: the veil question in public sectors 5.2% and the initiative against minarets 3.5%.

Table 14: Claims on religious rights (percentages)

Rights and religious practice	21.2
Religious rights and public Institutions	70.4
Other	8.5
Total	100%
N	189

Other state executive agencies are the sole relevant state actor with a positive attitude towards Muslims. On the contrary, judiciary actors, police and security agencies and state executive agencies dealing with migrants adopt a negative attitude while governments and legislative actor a neutral one.

Political parties take a negative position close to the extreme right ones and to the police. Among civil society actors, the only ones that adopt a negative attitude are media and journalist.

Figure 5: Position of claims towards Muslim rights by year (means)




Table 15: Position of claims by actor

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
State actors	-.14	266	.893
Governments	.02	117	.900
Legislatives	-.09	33	.914
Judiciary	-.22	51	.901
Police and security agencies	-.69	35	.676
State executive agencies specifically dealing with Migrants	-.31	13	.855
Other state executive agencies	.24	17	.752
Political parties	-.60	52	.748
Civil society actors	.25	354	.852
Employers organisations and firms	.75	8	.463
Churches	.29	21	.845
Christians	.18	11	.751
Media and journalists	-.23	52	.942
Professional organisations and groups	.27	11	.905
Researchers/think tanks/intellectuals	-.05	39	.887
Muslim: profession-based	.71	7	.488
Muslim: religion-based groups	.63	79	.581
Muslim: other organisations and groups	.50	60	.701
Other minorities: organizations and groups	.33	3	.577
Other minorities: religion-based groups	-.25	4	.500
Antiracist organisations and groups	1	1.	
Antiracist: profession-based	1.	1.	
Antiracist: church-based	0	1.	
Antiracist: other	1.00	1	.
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	1	2	.000
Pro-minority: church-based	1	3	.000
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	.67	3	.577
General solidarity: other	.00	2	1.414
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	7	.000
Extreme right political parties	-1.00	1.	
Other racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-1.00	3	.000
Other civil society: students	1.00	6	.000
Other civil society: new social movements	.00	1.	
Other civil society: neighbourhood associations	-.60	5	.894
Other civil society: citizens' initiatives	1.00	1.	
Other civil society: other	-.20	20	.951
Unknown actors	.04	103	.827
Total	.03	775	.888

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	-.11	45	.910
Minority integration politics	-.03	529	.883
Minority integration general	.28	60	.825
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	-.10	20	.912
Minority rights and participation social rights	.00	10	.816
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	-.67	3	.577
Minority rights and participation religious rights	.18	190	.931
Minority rights and participation other rights	.67	3	.577
Discrimination and unequal treatment	.52	23	.846
Minority social problems	-.37	206	.746
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	.00	14	.679
Antiracism/islamophobia	.41	119	.817
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	.50	74	.815
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	.27	45	.809
Islamophobic claims	-.56	41	.808
Actor claims Muslims	.54	37	.605
Homeland politics	.10	10	.316
Transnational politics	.70	27	.609
Other	.00	4	.000
Total	.03	775	.888

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	8.9	13.5	1.4	5.7
Minority integration politics	73.4	67.3	68.7	61.6
Antiracism/islamophobia	15.1	5.8	17	20.9
Islamophobic claims	1.1	13.5	2.7	7.1
Actor claims Muslims	1.5	0	8.8	4.3
Other	0	0	1.4	0.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	271	52	147	211

6. Objects

Table 18: Objects of claims (percentages)

No Muslim as object	7.3
Muslims as objects	78
All Muslims in general	42.3
Majority/most Muslims	1.5
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	14.4
Individual Muslims	18.4
Unclassifiable Muslims	1.5
Islam as religion	15
Islam in general	11.9
Islam mainstream	.3
Minority currents within Islam	1
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	1.4
Unclassifiable Islam	0
Total	100%
N	790

In the Swiss case, the public debate on Muslims and Islam has a tangible and concrete object, Muslims (42.3%). This discourse concerns the interests of Muslim population living at the local and national level. Even differences among various categories of Muslim (individuals 18.4%, minority 14.4%, or majority 1.5%) are not conceived as qualitative divergences, but as a quantitative difference tied to the behavior or attitudes of the Muslim present on the territory at the national or local level. The very object of the claim-making activity is Muslim communities interacting on the territory with state and civil society actors.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	52.1	0
Country of residence nationality	10.6	22.1
Europe: EU	6.2	12.9
Europe: other	8.9	18.6
Asia: middle east	13	27.2
Asia: south and east	2.2	4.6
Africa: North	5.5	11.5
Africa: other	1.2	2.6
Total	100%	100%
N	729	349

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No Muslim OBJECT frame	5.2	3.8	10.2	7.6
Muslims as actors	83	69.2	81	73.5
All Muslims in general	33.6	53.8	45.6	40.3
Majority/most Muslims	0.7	0	1.4	2.4
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	16.6	13.5	19	11.4
Individual Muslims	29.9	1.9	15	17.5
Unclassifiable Muslims	2.2	0	0	1.9
Islam as religion	11.8	26.9	8.8	19
Islam in general	8.5	23.1	6.1	16.6
Islam mainstream	0	0	0.7	0
Minority currents within Islam	1.8	3.8	0	0.5
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	1.5	0	2	1.9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	271	52	147	271

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	45.9	78	56.8	58.2
Contry of residence	9.8	16	6.1	8.2
Europe: EU	7.1	2	6.8	6.7
Europe: other	13.3	2	6.1	11.3
Asia: middle east	12.5	.0	14.4	6.7
Asia: south and east	2.7	.0	0	3.1
Africa: North	5.5	2	9.1	5.2
Africa: other	2.4	.0	0.8	0.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	255	50	132	194

The objects of the two groups with the more negative posit score are intellectuals, media and journalists.

The claiming activity of these two actors concerns the theological and anthropological perspective of the Islamic faith.

Rather than focusing on quotidian problems and local actors, intellectuals and media sometimes attacks other Muslim think-tanks or the Islamic conception of social life.

Individual objects are monitored by the police and security agencies and judiciary powers which are interested in particular Islamic groups. Governments, legislative powers and political parties axe their activity mainly around the Muslim population chosen as concrete and object.

7. Scope variables

Table 22: Scope of actors (percentages)

Supra- or transnational: European	3.4
Supra- or transnational: other	4.5
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0
Foreign national: other	5.5
Bilateral	0
National	48.8
Regional	16.8
Local	21.1
Total	100%
N	531

Table 23: Scope of addressees, criticized actors and supported actors (percentages)

	Addresses	Criticised actors	Supported actors
Supra- or transnational: European	3.8	3.8	2.3
Supra- or transnational: other	12.2	15.6	11.9
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0.9	1.2	0
Foreign national: other	8.2	8.1	1.7
Bilateral	0.4	0.5	0.6
National	43.7	40	39.2
Regional	9.9	7.1	9.7
Local	21	23.7	34.7
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	558	422	176

Table 24: Scope of issues (percentages)

Supra- or transnational: European	4.3
Supra- or transnational: other	15.7
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1.6
Foreign national: other	8.5
Bilateral	3.4
National	41.5
Regional	7.4
Local	17.6
Total	100%
N	772

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Supra- or transnational: European	6.7	0	2.1	5.3
Supra- or transnational: other	16	7.7	11.3	20.8
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1.1	0	0	0
Foreign national: other	7.8	5.8	6.3	7.2
Bilateral	4.9	0	2.8	1.9
National	36.9	75	41.5	40.1
Regional	9.7	1.9	7.7	5.3
Local	16.4	9.6	28.2	19.3
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	268	52	142	207

In Switzerland, actors with a national scope are more interested in the intra-national articulation of the public discourse. The police and security agencies are interested in issues with a supranational scope due to their anti-terrorism engagement; all other state actors privilege the intra-national dimension.

Media, journalists and intellectuals focus on issues with both national and supranational scope.

In the Swiss public domain analysed, the scope of issues often match the scope of actors. Local actors (Muslim groups) are interested in issues with local and national scopes.

If we look at the scope variable in terms of its relevance for actors, the scope is most often 48.8% on national level, while 21.1% is on local level, and 16.8% is on regional level.

In terms of scope relevance for addressee, the scope is most often 43.7% on national level, while 21% is on local level, and 12.2.% is on supra- transnational level.

In terms of scope relevance for criticized actor, the scope is most often 40% on national level, while 23.7% is on local level, and 15.6% is on supra- transnational level.

In terms of scope relevance for supported actor, the scope is most often 39.2% on national level, while 34.7% is on local level, and 11.9% is on supra- transnational level.

Considering the issue, we see that most issues are national (41.5%), and 17.6% local.

8. Conclusion

Discursive opportunity structures concern the constraints and opportunities provided by the public space to motivate and legitimate the collective action and media strategy of claiming actors. Face with specific situation or problem, the leaders or members of an association as well as individuals and institutions choose motivational, diagnostic and prognostic frames to support their claiming activity, thus increasing its visibility.

The form taken by actor's media identity may be influenced by particular features and rules impacting the publish discourse in local special contexts. In Switzerland state actors and civil society actors claim and act towards Muslim and Islamic issues in an asymmetric public domain in which the whole range of social actors do not share same behaviours and alliances.

Thanks to the WP2 data, in our analysis of the Swiss public domain concerning Muslims, we are able to present the following findings:

1. Unions, workers and leftist movements are completely absent and actors who structure their claiming activity often around the working class identity do not appear among actors concerned by Muslim religious and minority rights as well as by Islamophobic topics. In Switzerland all actors address Muslim issues always separating the religious dimension from the socio-economic integration of the Muslim believers in the country. Never did actors attempt to link Islamic extremism to social condition, poverty or social exclusion.
2. Muslim organisations that gain visibility in newspapers chose anti-islamophobic issues adopting an intercommunity perspective. They identify themselves as a separate body from the autochthonous society and are present in the public space as a separate group without forming any alliance with other civil society actors that normally help in defending rights of minority or in fighting racism. Such visibility of Muslim groups in the Swiss public discourse creates a sort of media ghettoisation of the Muslim actors who seem not to belong to any other social category. The only exception is the intellectuals/experts category; through them, Muslims can speak in Switzerland without being automatically designated as Muslim believers.
3. For Swiss political parties, Muslim issues are becoming increasingly an electoral challenge. This is a consequence of the UDC's success in achieving Muslim stigmatisation in the public debate. The effect of this political strategy has been to oblige all parties to step into the public arena in order to take up a negative position; in fact, for all parties present in the public arena conservative, liberal or socialist the position on Muslim issues is negative.
4. Media and journalist actors play a prestigious role in the Swiss debate concerning Muslims; in fact their presence is equivalent to 1/3 of the Muslim group's activity and 1/2 of the government's. They intervene in the impressive way and by taking a clear anti-Muslim stand on the minority integration problem. This animosity and lack of objectivity of the media professionals can affect the whole construction of the public debate and accounts for their presence among the civil society actors most criticised by Muslim groups.

5. The lack of forms of political violence in the public arena towards Islam and Muslims can be explained by the historical practice of consensus strategy of the Swiss society. The place in the public space of the verbal statement as form of favourite claiming activity suggests that it is possible to become visible in the public arena by adopting the autochthons attitude in order to avoid open conflicts and urban clashes. With little latitude allowed even for confrontational protest, there is clear rejection of any form of social tension expressing itself without the intermediation of the institutional state actors in charge of solving social conflicts. The dichotomization between government and Muslim organisations suggests that in the Swiss public domain, the debate on Muslim interests has to be confined to a limited and asymmetric space in which only state actors, media and experts can interact with Muslim actors, thus excluding the whole universe of the all civil society actors.

Different ways through which Muslim and no Muslim actors engage themselves in the public discourse in Switzerland have been carefully considered in our research. Going along with this analysis, we argue that discursive opportunity structures could have a noticeable impact on Muslim visibility.

We assert, in line with the new social movement scholars, that discursive opportunities structures play a central role in shaping the internal dynamics of civil society actors and state actors; we show how the two identities interact with each other as the stabilisation process of a new component of population - in our case - the Muslim minority evolves.

Visibility affects access to opportunities, alliances and resources and even impacts on the identity stabilisation process of a Muslim minority which seems to be conditioned by and reactive to external forces for example in the Swiss case, the omnipresence of state actors and the structure and role of the media. Discursive opportunity structures are a formal possibility, either given or not given to Muslim actors to become visible via external opportunities entailing risks and chances.

Discursive opportunities indicators are not often used in trans-national comparative studies. This research systematically shows how historical features of a public domain impact on the integration into the pre-existent rules of the general public discourse of new actors -in our case- of Muslim actors.

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UK

Marta Bolognani and Paul Statham

1. Introduction

According to the 2001 Census, Muslims are the second largest religious group in Britain, making up for around 3.0% of the population.

It is important to notice that the way 'Muslim' is institutionally understood in the UK tends to be independent from practice and ascribed more to upbringing or heritage (Bosveld et al. 2006:2). In the Census, ethnicity and religion are often closely related but there is not complete homogeneity, as exemplified by the table below, derived by Bosveld and Connolly (2006:22):

Table a: Muslim population in UK

	Proportion of total population	Proportion of ethnic group	Proportion of religious group	Total population (Numbers)
Pakistani Muslim	1.2	91.9	43.2	686,179
Bangladeshi Muslim	0.5	92.4	16.5	261,380
Indian Muslim	0.2	12.6	8.3	132,566
Other White Muslim	0.2	8.3	7.4	117,713
Black African Muslim	0.2	20.0	6.1	97,109
Other Asian Muslim	0.2	37.5	5.8	92,761
Mixed Muslim	0.1	9.7	4.1	65,592
White British Muslims	0.1	0.1	4.0	63,891
Other ethnic group Muslim	0.1	26.0	3.8	59,675

Although the presence of Muslims in the UK dates back to 1800 (Ansari 2004), the most significant wave of Muslim migration to Britain occurred in post second world war Britain (ibid.) and originated mostly from former colonies, such as the newly-founded Pakistan. Muslims in the UK have therefore been a constant part of public debates on immigration since 1945. As the majority of Muslims are now born in the UK rather than abroad (Bosveld and Connolly 2006:20), the place taken by Muslims in the public debate goes much beyond migration matters and covers social and economic issues as well as integration. Muslims in

Britain are in fact affected by a number of social problems, such as unemployment (Bosveld et al. 2006:23), overcrowded housing (ibid.), and crime (Bolognani 2009:12). Probably since 1989, the date of the so-called Rushdie Affair, the debate has often regarded issues of extremism and radicalisation, as well as issues of segregation and public unrest (for example the Northern riots in 1995 and 2001, see Bolognani 2007).

This report is based on the analysis of five national newspapers covering the decade 1999-2008. The choice of the five newspapers was consistent with the British newspaper industry that is more oriented towards national rather than local press. Accessing databases of local papers and finding enough material to include them in the national comparative framework proved impossible. The team thus selected one left-wing (*The Mirror*) and one right-wing (*The Sun*) tabloid, one centre-left (*The Guardian*) and one centre-right (*The Times*) broadsheet, and one popular newspaper (*The Daily Mail*). The random selection of articles to analyze through the key-word search (Islam / Muslim / mosque / imam / Quran, / headscarf / burqa / minaret) aimed at collecting a total of 1000 articles with the hope to reach around 750-1,000 claims. However, after the selection and coding it was clear that 1,000 articles were not enough to provide the desired amount of claims. The main reason for this lack of correspondence between the articles selected through the key-word search and the scope of our project was that terms such as ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’, especially post 2001, were mostly found in articles related to Afghanistan and Iraq. In order to obtain 1173 claims, 8500 articles had to be retrieved. On average every 7th article turned out to be relevant.

Table 1: Selected newspapers

Newspaper	Circulation strength
Daily Mail	2,092,643
Daily Mirror	1,248,919
The Guardian	286,220
The Sun	2,979,999
The Times	503,642

Table 2: Selected articles and claims by newspaper

Daily Mail	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	698	111	2	2
2000	340	55	0	0
2001	914	147	6	6
2002	736	119	3	3
2003	866	138	10	13
2004	1157	186	13	13
2005	1329	213	21	22
2006	2017	323	26	29
2007	1776	286	23	24
2008	1413	122	24	38
Total	11246	1700	128	150
Daily	Total	Article	Articles	Claims

Mirror	articles	retrieved	coded	retrieved
1999	290	51	7	7
2000	274	46	5	5
2001	1268	222	23	38
2002	1058	184	32	39
2003	1071	186	17	30
2004	1292	225	33	62
2005	1306	228	29	33
2006	1263	218	37	44
2007	1052	186	25	25
2008	935	153	26	28
Total	9809	1700	234	311
Guardian	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1126	99	4	4
2000	966	86	7	8
2001	1772	159	12	14
2002	1704	152	14	18
2003	1879	168	16	24
2004	2152	192	16	21
2005	2478	221	34	42
2006	2717	243	23	30
2007	2331	207	22	29
2008	1959	173	23	29
Total	19084	1700	171	219
The Sun	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	173	38	3	4
2000	159	36	4	4
2001	558	127	20	21
2002	457	103	18	19
2003	502	113	17	18
2004	741	168	31	37
2005	947	214	27	31
2006	1712	387	44	55
2007	1272	287	48	60
2008	1122	227	34	38
Total	7643	1700	246	287
The Times	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	1034	92	1	1
2000	845	76	5	6
2001	1681	151	10	14
2002	1648	148	14	17
2003	1926	174	18	22
2004	2291	206	24	30
2005	2448	220	35	44
2006	2838	255	27	36
2007	2333	209	21	25

2008	1899	169	10	11
Total	18943	1700	165	206

Figure 1 below shows the distribution of claims over the course of time. The number of claims per year varied strongly within the period 1999-2008. They increased in 2001, after 9/11, and reached their peak in 2006, mainly due to the number of news related to terror-related State institutions' claims in the aftermath of the London bombings (7th July 2005).

Figure 1: Number of claims by year





Figure 2: Number of claims in 2001 by month



2. Actors

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State actors	37.7
Governments	15.6
Legislatives	0.6
Judiciary	7.9
Police and security agencies	12.9
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-
Other state executive agencies	0.7
Political parties	5.4
Civil society actors	54.9
Unions	0.2
Workers and employees	0.6
Employers organizations and firms	1.6
Churches	2.0
Media and journalists	5.1
Professional organizations and groups	8.2
Muslim organizations and groups	32.3
Other minority organizations and groups	0.7
Antiracist organizations and groups	0.4
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	1.6
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	0.7
Other civil society organizations and groups	1.5
Unknown actors	2.0
Total	100%
N	1173

Around a third (32.3%) of the actors mentioned in the newspapers selection belongs to Muslim organizations and groups. The second most frequent actors are governments (15.6%), and the third consists of police and security agencies (12.9%). Professional groups (8.2%), the judiciary (7.9%), political parties (5.4%) and media and journalists (5.1%) are also substantially represented. Only 0.7% of the claims were made by racist and extreme right organisations and groups.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

Muslim actor, organization name mentioned	21.9
Muslim actor, no organization name mentioned	25.2
No Muslim actor	52.9
Total	100%
N	1173

Nearly half of the claims (47.1%) were made by Muslim actors whose organization was either mentioned (21.9%) or not (25.2%).

Table 5: Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	8.3	
Europe: EU	82.3	89.6
Europe: other	0.9	0.9
Asia: middle east	2.6	2.7
Asia: south and east	2.5	2.4
Africa: north	0.9	0.9
Africa: other	0.3	0.3
Total	100%	100%
N	1173	

The vast majority of the actors were identified as European (82.3%) although 8.3% were not attributed a either a specific nationality or ethnicity. Middle Eastern actors (2.6%) and South Asian actors (2.5%) were the most visible minorities.

Table 6: Identity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

Status groups	0.9
Racial groups	2.2
Religious groups	43.5
National and ethnic groups	0.2
Total	100%
N	1173

In half of the cases (50.1%) it was not possible to attribute a social identity to the minority/migrant actors, but when this was possible, the identity was described along religious lines (43.5%) in the majority of cases. It is interesting to note that only 0.5% of the identity descriptions carried hyphens.


Table 7: Scope of actors

	Supra-/foreign transnational/bilateral	National	Regional/local	Unknown
State actors	62.8	55.6	36.9	15.7
Governments	19.0	21.4	14.5	9.6

Legislatives	1.9	0.8	-	0.2
Judiciary	12.4	13.9	5.3	1.8
Police and security agencies	27.6	18.9	13.2	4.1
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-	-	-	-
Other state executive agencies	1.9	0.6	3.9	-
Political parties	1.0	3.3	7.9	7.8
Civil society actors	36.2	41.1	44.8	71.8
Unions	-	0.2	-	0.2
Workers and employees	-	0.4	-	1.0
Employers organizations and firms	4.8	2.5	1.3	0.2
Churches	1.0	1.2	5.2	2.4
Media and journalists	3.8	6.9	1.3	4.3
Professional organizations and groups	3.8	4.0	11.8	12.5
Muslim organizations and groups	20.0	20.6	27.6	46.6
Other minority organizations and groups	-	0.8	-	0.8
Antiracist organizations and groups	1.0	0.4	-	0.4
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	1.0	1.8	5.3	1.0
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-	1.2	-	0.4
Other civil society organizations and groups	1.0	0.8	2.6	2.2
Unknown actors	-	-	-	4.7
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	105	481	76	511

Probably reflecting the team's choice to choose all the five newspapers among the national ones, the most frequent scope of the actor reported is national. Governments (21.4%), Muslim groups (20.6%), police (18.9%) and the judiciary (13.9%) were all significant actors mentioned at a national level. Among the actors with the unknown scope, Muslim groups were often mentioned without a clear identification of scope (46.6%), indicating thus the confusion that may arise from the number of Muslim associations present in the country.

Figure 3: Number of claims by Muslim and non-Muslim actors by year



The trend of distribution between Muslim actors (in pink in the table) and non-Muslim actors (in blue) reaches a rough balance between 2004 and 2006, but in 2007, for the first time after 2003, the number of claims by non-Muslims surpasses the others with a marked difference (nearly double the amount of claims by Muslims).

3. Forms of action

Table 8: Forms of action (percentages)

	Overall	State intervention excluded
State intervention	21.5	
Repressive measures	13.6	
Political decisions	7.9	
Verbal statements	59.2	
		75.3
Conventional actions	13.0	16.5
Protest actions	5.2	6.6
Demonstrative protests	2.4	3.0
Confrontational protests	1.2	1.5
Violent protests	2.6	2.1
Total	100%	100%
N	1173	

More than half of the claims (59.2%) were made in the form of verbal statements, followed by repressive measures (13.6%), conventional actions (13%) and political decisions (7.9%). If we merge 'repressive measures' and 'political decisions', state intervention would figure as the second highest form of action (21.5%).

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organizations and groups	Other civil society and actors
State intervention	17.4	0.3	0.8	0.1
Repressive measures	12.6	-	-	0.1
Political decisions	4.8	0.3	0.8	-
Verbal statements	14.4	4.6	23.1	0.9
Conventional actions	5.6	0.4	4.9	0.3
Protest actions	0.4	-	3.5	0.3
Demonstrative protests	0.3	-	1.4	0.3
Confrontational protests	0.1	-	0.9	-
Violent protests	-	-	1.2	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1173			

The verbal statements were made by a relative majority of Muslim organizations and groups (23.1%), followed by governments (10.1%) and professional and organizational groups (6.2%). Among repressive measures, there was a slight majority of the ones enacted by police and security forces (8%) over the ones enacted by the judiciary (3.6%), with a total of 17.4% made by State actors. Protest actions were mainly linked to Muslim organizations and groups (3.5%).

4. Addressees and criticized actors

In this section we differentiate addressees, criticized and supported actors. Addressees of claims are those actors who are called to act while criticized and supported actors are mentioned in a negative way, respectively backed the position of another actor.

Table 10: Addressees (percentages)

	Overall	No addressee excluded
State actors	23.4	34.3
Governments	16.7	24.4
Legislatives	0.9	1.3

Judiciary	1.7	2.5
Police and security agencies	3.7	5.4
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-	-
Other state executive agencies	0.4	0.5
Political parties	0.8	1.1
Civil society actors		67.8
	46.3	
Workers and employees	0.2	0.3
Employers organizations and firms	0.8	1.1
Churches	0.3	0.4
Christians	0.3	0.4
Media and journalists	1.9	2.7
Professional organizations and groups	1.5	2.1
Muslim organizations and groups	34.3	50.2
Pro-minority rights and welfare organizations and groups	1.3	1.9
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	0.5	0.7
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-	-
Other civil society organizations and groups	-	-
No addressee	31.8	
Total	100%	100%
N	1173	

All together, civil society actors were the most popular addressees (46.3%), while State actors appeared only in 23.4% of the cases. Muslim groups (which include the general label ‘Muslims’) were mentioned as addressees in 34.3% of cases; 8% of the Muslim addressees were individual actors. Within state actors, governments were by far the most popular addressees (16.7%). Nearly a third of all claims did not have an addressee, and racist and extreme rights organizations and groups were never addressed.

Table 11: Criticized actors (percentages)

	Overall	No criticized actor excluded
State actors	17.4	43.7
Governments	12.0	30.1
Legislatives	1.0	2.5
Judiciary	0.7	1.7
Police and security agencies	3.3	8.2
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0.1	0.2
Other state executive agencies	0.3	0.7
Political parties	0.8	2.0
Civil society actors	21.6	54.2

Workers and employees	0.1	0.2
Employers organizations and firms	0.6	1.5
Churches	0.3	0.7
Christians	0.1	0.2
Media and journalists	2.7	6.7
Professional organizations and groups	2.0	5.0
Muslim organizations and groups	13.6	34.1
Other minority organizations and groups	0.6	1.5
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	0.1	0.2
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-	-
Other civil society organizations and groups	-	-
No criticized actor	60.2	
Total	100%	100%
N	1173	

Governments appeared as criticized actors (12%) less than as addressees (16.7%). Muslim groups (which include the general label ‘Muslims’) were mentioned as criticized actors in 13.6% cases against the 34.3% of cases as addressees. Claims did not have a criticized actor in 60.2% of cases and civil society actors were the ones criticized in the relative majority of cases (21.6%), followed by State Actors (17.4%). Racist and extreme right organisations and groups were once again invisible in the claims.

Table 12: Supported actors (percentages)

	Overall	No supported actor excluded
State actors	2.7	13.8
Governments	1.0	5.1
Legislatives	-	-
Judiciary	0.2	1.0
Police and security agencies	1.5	7.7
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-	-
Other state executive agencies	-	-
Political parties	0.2	1.0
Civil society actors	18.2	93.6
Workers and employees	-	-
Employers organizations and firms	-	-
Churches	0.2	1.0
Christians	0.2	1.0
Media and journalists	0.4	2.0
Professional organizations and groups	0.6	3.0
Muslim organizations and groups	12.9	66.3
Pro-minority rights and welfare organizations and groups	0.1	0.5

General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	0.5	2.5
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-	-
Other civil society organizations and groups	-	-
No addressee	80.6	
Total	100%	100%
N	1173	

Only in 19.4% of claims there was a supported actor. The most supported actor was Muslims (12.9%) followed by far by police and security agencies (1.5%). Altogether, civil society actors figured as supported actors in 18.2% of cases. Once again, Racist and extreme right organizations and groups did not appear.


5. Issues and positions

Table 13: Issues of claims (percentages)

Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	1.9
Minority integration politics	68.5
Minority integration general	2.9
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	1.9
Minority rights and participation social rights	3.1
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	1.7
Minority rights and participation religious rights	11.9
Minority rights and participation other rights	0.7
Discrimination and unequal treatment	5.4
Minority social problems	37.3
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganizational relations	3.8
Antiracism/islamophobia	16.0
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	3.7
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	12.4
Islamophobic claims	2.6
Actor claims Muslims	9.1
Homeland politics	0.9
Transnational politics	8.3
Other	1.9
Total	100%
N	1173

Nearly two thirds of all claims regarded minority integration politics (68.5%), while only a very small number covered issue related to immigration (1.9%). Among integration problems, the one most discussed was related to minority social problems (37.3%), a term that included issues such as unemployment, poverty, health, housing, but also extremism. 16% of all claims covered issues related to anti-racism and islamophobia, but only 2.6% of all claims were islamophobic. Claims that regarded directly issues of homeland politics or transnational politics corresponded to 9.1%.

Figure 4: Number of claims by issue and year



Although minority social problems are a constant in the public debates on Muslims in the UK, two significant peaks are recorded in 2001 and 2005, in correspondence with 9/11 and 7/7. This may be considered an indicator of the themes that the press follows when analysing the background to terror attacks. For example, in the aftermath of 7/7 the British press published substantial material on deprivation in the areas where the London bombers came from. Political extremism and radicalisation are also included under the umbrella of ‘minority social problems’. Interestingly, Islamophobic claims do not seem to be related to the occurrence of terror attacks. The number of anti-racist and anti-islamophobic claims has been quite steady since 2001.


Table 14: Claims on religious rights (percentages)

Rights and religious practice	0.4
Religious rights and public Institutions	6.6
Other	4.2
Total	100%
N	1173

The vast majority of the claims (88.7%) did not concern religious rights; only 6.6% dealt with religious rights and public institutions, and 0.4% religious practice. 4.2% regarded other types of Muslim rights and participation. This may be related to the fact that the headscarf (albeit not the burqa) is widely accepted in the UK, has been included in school uniforms and is not publicly debated anymore. The same goes for prayer room facilities, slaughtering, halal provisions in school refectories, Muslim chaplaincy in prisons and certain flexibility among employers’ organizations about religious holidays. The claims framed as religious rights are mainly reports on exceptions and anecdotes and therefore do not form a substantial number of claims in the issues total.

The following tables record the position of claims towards Muslim rights. The scale ranges from -1 (anti-Muslim), 0 (neutral, ambivalent) to +1 (pro-Muslim).

Figure 5: Position of claims towards Muslim rights by year (means)



The overall tone of the discussion is positive with an overall mean of +0.23. Over the course of time the position of the debate has become less positive but it has never overall gone under +0.14. The highest positive position was in 2000 (+0.52).

Table 15: Position of claims by actor

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
State actors			
Governments	0.18	180	0.560
Legislatives	0.07	7	0.900
Judiciary	0.08	92	0.352
Police and security agencies	0.13	150	0.396
State executive agencies specifically dealing with Migrants			-
Other state executive agencies	0.5	8	0.535
Political parties	0.06	62	0.597
Civil society actors			
Unions	0	2	0.000
Workers and employees	0.14	7	0.690
Employers organizations and firms	0.52	19	0.612
Churches	0.5	10	0.707
Media and journalists	0.18	59	0.601
Professional organizations and groups	0.28	95	0.570
Researchers/think tanks/intellectuals	0.33	21	0.483
Muslim: profession-based	0.12	57	0.503

Muslim: religion-based groups	0.27	86	0.471
Muslim: other organizations and groups	0.50	4	0.577
Other minorities: religion-based groups	-	-	-
Antiracist: other	0.4	5	0.957
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	0.22	9	0.441
General solidarity: profession-based	-	-	-
General solidarity: church-based	-	-	-
General solidarity: other	0.50	2	0.707
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-1	8	0.000
Other racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-1	1	0.000
Other civil society: citizens' initiatives	1.00	1	0.000
Other civil society: other	0.89	9	0.333
Unknown actors	-0.55	20	0.686
Total	0.23	1141	0.560

In only three cases the position of the claims are negative towards Muslims: when the claims are made by racist and extreme rights organisations (-1), by unknown actors (-0.55) and by Christians (-0.07). The highest positive value is encountered in the claims made by citizens' civil society initiatives (+1.0). Muslim groups are rather pro than anti, with Muslim professional groups at the lower end (+0.12) and other Muslim organizations at the higher (+0.50).

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	0.00	19	0.471
Minority integration politics			
Minority integration general	0.21	33	0.485
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	0.10	21	0.539
Minority rights and participation social rights	0.46	35	0.611
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	0.53	19	0.612
Minority rights and participation religious rights	0.44	140	0.539
Minority rights and participation other rights	0.29	7	0.756
Discrimination and unequal treatment	0.60	62	0.613
Minority social problems	0.03	428	0.358
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganizational relations	0.37	43	0.578
Antiracism/islamophobia			
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	0.57	42	0.703
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	0.48	143	0.615
Islamophobic claims	-0.77	30	0.504
Actor claims Muslims			
Homeland politics	0.11	9	0.333
Transnational politics	0.25	92	0.460
Other	0.17	18	0.383
Total	0.23	1141	0.560

In this table there is only one negative value and it refers to Islamophobic claims (-0.77). The most positives refer to discrimination and unequal treatment (+0.60), antiracism in institutional contexts (+0.57) and minority participation and cultural rights (+0.53).

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organizations and groups	Other civil society and actors
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	0.9	0.3	0.3	0.1
Minority integration politics	29.2	3.5	19.0	0.7
Antiracism/islamophobia	5.3	0.4	6.1	0.6
Islamophobic claims	0.4	0.4	0.1	-
Actor claims Muslims	1.7	0.5	5.6	0.2
Other	0.2	0.3	1.2	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1173			

Minority integration policies are the most popular field of claims for governments, judiciary, police and security agencies for a total of 29.2 %.), and in the most obvious case Muslim organisations and groups (19%).For Muslim organizations and groups, anti racism/Islamophobia (6.1%) and claims related to homeland and transnational politics (5.6%) were also substantial.

6. Objects

Table 18: Objects of claims (percentages)

Muslims as objects	63.8
All Muslims in general	26.5
Majority/most Muslims	1.4
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	18.3
Individual Muslims	15.1
Unclassifiable Muslims	2.5
Islam as religion	2.9
Islam in general	2.0
Islam mainstream	-
Minority currents within Islam	-
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	0.8
Unclassifiable Islam	0.1
Total	100%
N	1173

The majority of claims’ objects referred to Muslims (63.8%), especially Muslims in general (26.5%). Only 2.9% referred to Islam as a religion.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	70.0	
Europe: EU	3.7	12.2
Europe: other	0.8	2.5
Asia: middle east	16.8	56.0
Asia: south and east	1.4	4.5
Africa: North	4.2	13.9
Africa: other	0.6	1.9
Total	100%	100%
N	1173	

In 70% of cases the ethnicity or nationality of the object was not specified. Among those specified, 16.8% were from the Middle East and 3.7% from Europe.

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organizations and groups	Other civil society and actors
Muslims as actors				
All Muslims in general	10.7	5.5	8	1.4
Majority/most Muslims	0.4	-	0.4	0.1
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	8.8	5.1	5.7	1.2
Individual Muslims	11.4	4.0	1.9	0.6
Unclassifiable Muslims	1.0	3.4	0.8	0.3
Islam as religion				
Islam in general	0.7	13.0	0.4	0.3
Islam mainstream	-	-	-	-
Minority currents within Islam	-	-	-	-
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	0.3	-	0.3	-
Unclassifiable Islam	0.1	-	-	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1173			

State actors referred mainly to individual Muslims as objects (11.4%), then to Muslims in general (10.7%) and minorities among Muslims (8.8%). Muslim organizations and groups referred to minorities among themselves in 5.7% of cases, and political parties were the only actors which addressed mainly Islam in general (13.0%).

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organizations and groups	Other civil society and actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	4.3	0.4	4.3	0.1
Europe: EU	21.8	2.7	11.0	0.5
Europe: other	0.3	-	-	0.1
Asia: middle east	0.8	0.1	1.4	0.1
Asia: south and east	0.6	-	0.4	0.2
Africa: North	1.7	-	0.1	-
Africa: other	0.4	-	0.1	-
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1173			

State actors' objects were mainly European (21.8%), as they were for Muslim organizations and groups (11.0%).

7. Scope of claims

Table 22: Scope of actors (percentages)

Supra- or transnational: European	0.3
Supra- or transnational: other	2.4
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	-
Foreign national: other	6.1
Bilateral	0.1
National	41.0
Regional	1.4
Local	5.1
Total	100%
N	1173

In 44.6% of cases the scope of the actor was not mentioned. The majority of cases referred to actors with a national scope (41%) and only 0.3% to supranational European actors.

Table 23: Scope of addressees, criticized actors and supported actors (percentages)

	Addressee	Criticized actors	Supported actors
Supra- or transnational: European	0.3	0.5	-
Supra- or transnational: other	3.4	3.7	2.6
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0.3	-	0.2
Foreign national: other	7.2	4.2	1.5
Bilateral	0.4	0.3	0.1
National	45.8	26.7	12.1

Regional	0.5	0.3	0.2
Local	9.9	4.1	2.6
Total	100%	100%	100%
N			
1173			

The national bias was obvious among addressees (45.8%), criticized actors (26.7%) and supported actors (12.1%). Local addressees had a relative high percentage (9.9%) as well as other foreign national addressees (7.2%).

Table 24: Scope of issues (percentages)

Supra- or transnational: European	1.0
Supra- or transnational: other	12.1
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	0.2
Foreign national: other	5.6
Bilateral	1.8
National	62.2
Regional	0.9
Local	10.6
Total	100%
N	1173

Again, the national scope was the most popular among issues (62.2%), followed by ‘transnational other issue’ (12.1%).

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organization s and groups	Other civil society actors
Supra- or transnational: European	0.5	0.1	0.3	-
Supra- or transnational: other	3.9	0.2	6.0	-
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	-	-	0.2	-
Foreign national: other	3.1	-	2.0	-
Bilateral	1.1	-	0.8	-
National	23.1	4.6	17.8	0.6
Regional	0.5	0.1	0.1	-
Local	2.9	0.4	4.1	0.1
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	1173			

Both State actors (23.1%) and Muslim organizations (17.8%) mainly dealt with national issues, followed by transnational non European issues, in respectively 3.9% and 6.0% of cases. Issues outside of Europe were for example homeland politics, the Iraq war, the Israel-Palestine conflict, Afghanistan war, Guantanamo Bay or Islamic solidarity in general.

8. Conclusions

Coverage of Muslims in the British press has been present for many years, but has increased of a very significant extent in 2001, following the New York attacks. Most of the information related to Muslims in the press is about the areas where British troops are involved or the areas that are considered to be important in the economy of international diplomacy, such as Palestine and Kashmir. Even when the claims selected revolve only around Muslims within the EurIslam project realm, however, the increment in attention is very clearly marked by 9/11 (see figures 1 and 2).

Muslim actors account for nearly half of the claims (see table 4). Britain has a high number of Muslim organisations and associations whose representativeness is debatable but whose presence in the public debate is quite obvious, such as the one of the Muslim Council of Britain (Radcliffe 2004:369). The vast majority of Muslim actors were European (see table 5). Issues about Muslims were mostly negotiated at the national level (table 22). The low scores in regional and local actors must be situated within our choice not to include local newspapers among the five selected (see introduction).

The European Union seems to play a negligible role in these claims (0.3%).

In order to voice one's opinion the majority of actors chose verbal action (e.g. meetings, judicial action, petitioning, direct-democratic action). Physical claims appeared very seldom in the public sphere. Claims were addressed mainly to civil society actors (table 10), whereas those who have the authority to act, that is to say State actors, were only addressed in 23.4% of the cases, half as much. Although in 60% of cases there was not a criticized actor, Muslim groups (13.6%) and governments (12%) were almost equally often mentioned.

Minority integration problems were the most often tackled issues as far as claims are concerned (37.3%). Religious rights (e.g. right to wear headscarves, mosque recognition and Islamic religious classes) accounted only for a relatively small part of minority integration problems (11.9%) and this may be related to the fact that catering to these rights has a long tradition in the UK and therefore only exceptions and violation to such tradition are reported in the press, while, for example, veiling (apart from burqa) is hardly ever discussed. Although minority social problems are a constant in the public debates on Muslims in the UK, two significant peaks are recorded in 2001 and 2005, in correspondence with 9/11 and 7/7. This may be considered an indicator of the themes that the press follows when analysing the background to terror attacks. For example, in the aftermath of 7/7 the British press published substantial material on deprivation in the areas where the London bombers came from. Political extremism and radicalisation are also included under the umbrella of 'minority social problems'. Interestingly, Islamophobic claims do not seem to be related to the occurrence of terror attacks. The number of anti-racist and anti-islamophobic claims has been quite steady since 2001.

The high percentage of claims about minority social problems including Islamic extremism did not cause a very obvious negative tone of the overall discussion with a mean of +0.23 on a scale from -1 (anti-Muslim) to +1 (pro-Muslim), especially as the way the claims were framed tended to isolate extremists as the exception rather than the rule, with a tendency towards an ambiguous position (= 0). In only three cases the position of the claims are negative towards Muslims: when the claims are made by racist and extreme rights organisations (-1), by unknown actors (-0.55) and by Christians (-0.07). The highest positive value is encountered in the claims made by citizens' civil society initiatives (+1.0). It is self-explanatory that Muslim groups are rather pro than anti, but not unanimously, with Muslim professionals groups at the lower end (+0.12) and other Muslim organizations at the higher (+0.50).

From this analysis it emerges that Muslims in Britain are very present in the public debates, especially as actors. Claims revolving around Muslims as objects are generally positive and negative positions are often countered by a way of framing a claim that make exceptions rather than rule out of negative claims.

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BELGIUM

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1. Introduction

Belgium has massively attracted foreign workers after the Second World War to rebuild its economy. First Italian and other Southern European workers were recruited, later joined by Moroccans and Turks once it became more difficult for Belgium to keep attracting European ‘guestworkers’ in the 1960s⁷. It is mainly due to the presence of these migrant workers and their descendents that Islam has become a visible religion in Belgium today. Despite the fact that Belgium immediately conceived family reunification as an integral part of immigration policy, nothing was done to welcome the foreign workers and their families up till the seventies. Like in other European countries, their stay was supposed to be temporary. By the end of the eighties, however, one started to face the reality that immigrants have become permanent residents⁸. This also has an impact on their demands and the way they are tackled by political elites. For those immigrants originating from Muslim countries, issues related to the recognition of their Muslim identity in the public sphere have been gaining prominence during the last couple of decades.

The Muslim population in Belgium has gradually grown significantly due to the effects of several factors: the natural birth cycle and socialisation of children, family reunification as foreseen in the guestworker agreements and encouraged by the Belgian authorities to promote integration, marriage of Belgian Muslims (men and women) with partners from the country of origin, the arrival of political refugees, conversions, etc. Muslims in Belgium according to estimates today constitute more or less 4 percent of the national population⁹, including a fraction of converts from Belgian or another European origins¹⁰. The two main countries of origin of the Muslim population are Morocco and Turkey but a significant part of this population is Albanian, Pakistani, Egyptian or possesses other North African nationalities or origins (Tunisia, Algeria, etc.). In Belgium, official statistical agencies are not allowed to keep track of the religious affiliation of the population. So these numbers are only estimations, based on the number of people who have the nationality of a country with a predominantly Muslim population and based on extrapolations, taking into account the number of migrants from ‘Muslim countries’ who obtained Belgian nationality and adding to this the number of their descendants, the so-called second and third generations. But they do not, of course, automatically all activate their Muslim heritage or family identity. So, one should be very carefully when using these general figures. What is certain is that Islam has over the last couple of decades become the second largest religion in Belgium. Furthermore, immigrant origin citizens originating from Muslim countries have in recent years become a

⁷ Boussetta, H., Gsir, S. & Jacobs, D. (2005) *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Belgium*, Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, 2005, www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe.

⁸ Boussetta, H., Gsir, S. & Jacobs, D. (2007) 'Belgium', p.33-44 in A. Triandafyllidou and R. Gropas (eds.) *European Immigration: A Sourcebook*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

⁹ Manço, Ural and Kanmaz, Meryem 2002, 'De la pathologie au traitement. La gestion municipale de l'islam et des musulmans de Belgique', *Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien*, 33.

¹⁰ Aksöyek, A. (ed.), *Sociographie de la population turque et d'origine turque. Quarante ans de présence en Belgique (1960-2000) : Dynamiques, problèmes, perspectives*, Bruxelles: Centre de Relations Européennes, 2000.

considerable electoral force¹¹ and as a side effect issues related to Islamic practices have gained policy interest¹².

The Belgian policy approach to religious diversity is quite original¹³. Belgium's Law of 4 March 1870 on the management of the temporal aspects of religions, refers to the concept of "recognised religions". Indeed, the State commits itself to provide a financial contribution to a number of worships, which have received beforehand an official agreement of both the Parliament and the government. Whereas the Parliament has jurisdiction over the granting of the label of "officially recognised religion", the government is competent alone for the crucial aspect of organising the procedure in practice. This latter stage involves the recognition of a chief interlocutor (meaning that decentralised churches have to unite or federate). Six religious groups have hitherto received the official agreement from both the Parliament and government. These are the Roman Catholic, the Protestant, the Anglican, the Israelite, the Orthodox and the Islamic religions. In 1974, Islam unexpectedly received the official recognition from the Parliament. The law of 19 July 1974 was indeed voted in the context of the oil crisis and in parallel to bilateral negotiations between Belgium and Saudi Arabia on oil contracts. This sudden progress on the parliamentary level has, however, not been put into concrete form (potentially leading to actual financial support) until 1999, when a High Council for Muslims (later replaced by the so-called Muslim Executive) was created. This very long delay was due to the extreme difficulty encountered by both Muslim communities and the Belgian government to let emerge and recognise a representative head of the Islamic religion. Due to active involvement of the government-linked *Center for Equal Opportunities and the Fight Against Racism* a Muslim Council was finally established, but it was for a long time paralysed due to internal conflicts and suspicion of financial malversations. As a result, only since a few years do (some) mosques and imams actually receive money from the State.

Criteria of selection of newspapers

To assess Belgian public debates in the mass media on Islam and the integration of Muslim immigrants, five Belgian newspapers were analyzed with a content analysis. Keeping in mind the linguistic specificity of Belgium, we chose to select comparable newspapers from the two most important linguistic parts of the country. We thus focus on the Dutch-speaking press and French-speaking press. German-speaking press was excluded of the sampling for having a too small audience (less than 1% of the population). As Belgium does not have politically oriented newspapers with a large audience, as we can find them in other European countries, we decided to select newspapers according to three types of criteria: the most important tabloid, the most important newspaper considered as more 'serious' and politically neutral and a local newspaper with a very large audience from a city with an important Muslim population. As a result, *Het Laatste Nieuws* (a Dutch-speaking tabloid style newspaper¹⁴) which is the most read newspaper in Belgium and *La Dernière Heure* (a French-speaking tabloid style newspaper) were selected according to the first criterion. *Het Laatste Nieuws* has over one million copies sold on a daily basis in a region inhabited by six million people,

¹¹ Jacobs, D., Martiniello, M. & Rea, A. (2002) 'Changing patterns of political participation of citizens of immigrant origin in the Brussels Capital Region: The October 2000 Elections', *Journal of International Migration and Integration / Revue de l'intégration et de la migration internationale*, 3 (2): 201-221.

¹² Boussetta, H. & Jacobs, D. (2006) "Multiculturalism, citizenship and Islam in problematic encounters in Belgium", pp.23-36 in Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A. & Zapata-Barrero, R. (eds.) *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship. A European Approach*, London: Routledge.

¹³ Boussetta, H., Gsir, S. & Jacobs, D. (2005) *Active Civic Participation of Immigrants in Belgium*, Country Report prepared for the European research project POLITIS, Oldenburg, 2005, www.uni-oldenburg.de/politis-europe.

¹⁴ These popular newspapers are not really to be compared to British tabloids which are much more populist in style.

making it one of the journals with the highest penetration-rate among its targeted readership in the world. *La Dernière Heure* on Francophone side is read by over half a million people on a daily basis for a Francophone population of about three and a half million. These are the newspapers with the highest circulation in their language communities. They do not really have an outspoken ideological position (anymore) but both tend to be more center-right. We then opted for two newspapers (in line with the second criterion) which are to be considered as more highbrow quality newspapers: *De Standaard* (about 358.000 readers) was selected on Flemish side, while *Le Soir* (about 183.000 readers) was opted for on Francophone side. They do not really have an outspoken ideological position anymore (except maybe on issues related to the linguistic struggle in Belgium) and can both be considered to be centrist (both in fact having evolved from a more right wing position to a more left wing position). As the Dutch speaking population is bigger than the Francophone population and the Flemish press has a larger circulation than the Francophone press, we decided that the fifth selected newspaper should be a Dutch-speaking one. We opted for the tabloid-style *Gazet van Antwerpen* which is generally considered to be right-wing and is the dominant newspaper in the city of Antwerp, holding a large Muslim population (and for long being the stronghold of the extreme right-wing and racist party *Vlaams Belang*). In table one we provide an overview of the circulation strength of the five selected newspapers.

Table 1: Circulation strength of the five selected newspapers

Newspaper	Circulation strength ¹⁵
Het Laatste Nieuws	1.063.700
Le Soir	580.700
Gazet Van Antwerpen	443.600
La Dernière Heure	439.800
De Standaard	355.400

So the Belgian newspapers selected for the analysis are *Het Laatste Nieuws*, *La Dernière Heure*, *De Standaard*, *Le Soir* and *Gazet van Antwerpen*. Of these newspapers a sample of articles treating the issues of Islam or the presence of Muslims in Europe throughout the period 1999-2008 will be analyzed. It is fair to say that together these newspapers fairly well represent the spectrum of the printed media landscape of Belgium. As Lexis Nexis does not include these newspapers, we had to use the Belgian press databases *Mediargus* for the Dutch-speaking press and *PressBanking* for the French-speaking press to retrieve articles of interest to us. Unfortunately, *La Dernière Heure* and *Le Soir* are not available on *PressBanking* before October 1999. The nine first months of 1999 are therefore absent from our analysis for the two newspapers, leading to a (small) bias.

Articles were traced and selected through the use of keywords which are being used by all EURISLAM-partners in their media content analysis exercise. A Dutch translation (*islam**, *moslim**, *moskee**, *imam**, *coran*, *koran*, *hidjab*, *hiedjab*, *hoofddoek**, *burqua*, *burqa*, *burkha*, *burka*, *minaret**) or a French translation (*islam**, *musulman**, *mosquée**, *imam**, *coran*, *koran*, *hidjab*, *hiedjab*, *foulard**, *burqua*, *burqa*, *burkha*, *burka*, *minaret**) of

¹⁵ In 2007-2008, according the Center for information on Media (Centre d'information sur les médias - CIM). The census of CIM has registered a total of 4, 913 million readers for the Belgian press (1, 977 million or the French-speaking newspapers and 3, 059 million for the Dutch-speaking newspapers). See "Het Laatste Nieuws reste le journal belge le plus lu », *7sur7*, 16/09/2008, <http://www.7sur7.be/7s7/fr/1531/Culture/article/detail/418596/2008/09/16/Het-Laatste-Nieuws-reste-le-journal-belge-le-plus-lu.shtml>.

these keywords was introduced in Mediargus and PressBanking for the period 1999-2008 to retrieve all relevant articles. It should, however, be noted that for the French translation of the keyword “headscarf”, we decided to keep the French word “foulard” and to exclude the word “voile” which gave too many irrelevant results such as sailing boat competitions, fashion shows and so on... Before going ahead with the exclusion of the keyword “voile”, tests were run and these showed that when the article found by the keyword “voile” was relevant, the article contained another keyword of the list in 95% of cases. Therefore, the possible loss of relevant articles was limited and the relevance of the sampling was highly increased.

Table two displays the absolute frequencies of articles which contained the relevant keywords (total articles). From the total number of articles, we retrieved a random sample of articles. Our aim was to distill minimally 150 claims per newspaper for the covered period. As a first selection of 200 articles per newspaper did not suffice to achieve this goal, we had to proceed to a second sampling round. After the coding, we finally obtained 174 claims for *Het Laatste Nieuws*, 170 claims for *La Dernière Heure*, 159 claims for *De Standaard*, 144 claims for *Le Soir* and 174 claims for *Gazet van Antwerpen* (821 claims sum-total). As similar claims were coded in several newspapers, double claims were excluded to obtain a total of 812 claims.

So let us have a closer look at table two. For *Het Laatste Nieuws* we for instance sampled 362 articles out of 7716 articles identified in order to achieve 174 claims. Only 121 out of 362 articles were relevant and contained at least one claim (see column “articles coded”). The column “Claims retrieved” shows the number of coded claims per year out of the number of coded articles. So the 121 relevant articles published in *Het Laatste Nieuws* provided us with 174 relevant political claims. *Gazet van Antwerpen* showed 11421 results. We selected randomly 509 articles and found 123 articles to code and 174 claims. The same research gave 14576 results for *De Standaard* from which 504 articles were randomly selected. From this sampling, 111 articles were coded and gave 159 claims. For *La Dernière Heure*, the keyword research in PressBanking gave 7509 articles. We selected randomly 610 articles of this result and we coded 117 articles to obtain 170 claims. The same keywords in PressBanking gave 12651 results for *Le Soir*. From this result, 402 articles were randomly selected, 73 of them contained claims and were coded to obtain 144 claims.

Table 2: Selected articles and claims by newspaper

Het Laatste Nieuws	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	292	13	6	7
2000	363	17	3	3
2001	682	31	5	5
2002	815	34	11	18
2003	755	36	13	23
2004	1108	55	21	29
2005	993	45	17	23
2006	1077	50	22	34
2007	860	43	13	18
2008	771	38	10	14
Total	7716	362	121	174
Gazet van Antwerpen	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	355	17	1	1
2000	425	20	3	6
2001	1559	75	12	14
2002	3553	146	31	41
2003	921	41	11	14

2004	1101	53	13	23
2005	1040	42	13	17
2006	964	43	15	19
2007	829	40	9	11
2008	674	32	15	28
Total	11421	509	123	174
De Standaard	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	805	27	2	1
2000	796	29	3	4
2001	1347	47	5	5
2002	1507	51	7	10
2003	1489	50	7	7
2004	1990	71	20	23
2005	1751	58	16	23
2006	1974	68	25	38
2007	1588	56	15	27
2008	1329	47	11	21
Total	14576	504	111	159
La Dernière Heure¹⁶	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	131	9	1	1
2000	518	43	3	3
2001	874	71	6	7
2002	916	76	15	32
2003	861	69	12	22
2004	941	78	16	19
2005	826	67	15	17
2006	855	71	20	28
2007	961	75	21	30
2008	626	51	8	11
Total	7509	610	117	170
Le Soir¹⁷	Total articles	Article retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	113	2	0	0
2000	888	28	1	1
2001	1227	40	6	19
2002	1277	41	6	12
2003	1389	44	4	11
2004	1740	54	15	27
2005	1528	50	11	25
2006	1838	59	20	27
2007	1431	45	6	12
2008	1220	39	4	10
Total	12651	402	73	144


We can observe that tabloids (*Het Laatste Nieuws*, *La Dernière Heure*) have less articles on Islam for the period under study than top-end newspapers (*Le Soir*, *De Standaard*). Popular newspaper *Gazet van Antwerpen* is nevertheless an exception to this tendency. Perhaps this is related to the local context which has an impact on the editorial style of the newspaper. *Gazet van Antwerpen* has an editorial style in which the focus is clearly on Antwerp. Local personalities as Filip Dewinter (leader of the extreme right wing party *Vlaamse Belang*) or

¹⁶ Articles of ‘La Dernière Heure’ are not available on PressBanking before October 1999 (Only October, November and December are included for 1999).

¹⁷ Articles of ‘Le Soir’ are not available on PressBanking before October 1999 (Only October, November and December are included for 1999).

Dyab Abou Jahjah (leader of the Arab European League) clearly pop up more often in this newspaper.

Figure 1: Number of claims by year



In figure 1 we present the number of claims per year. We can observe an increase from 1999 to 2006 and then a decrease beginning in 2006. The first important increase in 2002 is the consequence of the attacks of 9/11 in New York and European police arrests of people suspected of Islamic terrorism, linked with Al Qaida. Indeed, Belgian press widely commented Belgian police investigations around Nizar Trabelsi, suspected of preparing a bomb attack toward a Belgian military base, and investigations around Tarek Maaroufi, suspected of having planned the murder of Massoud in Afghanistan. An important part of the claims in 2002 concerns Islamic violence and extremism. Before the 13th of September 2001, no claims on this subject were found, after this date, it becomes the second most important issue.

Let us focus on a number of factual events which have played an important role for the discursive context of the debate about Islam in Belgium. The terrorist attacks of 2001 led suspicion on Muslim organizations in Belgium. Some pundits suspected them to encourage Islamic extremism in the Muslim population, while others talked about their moderating role. In 2002, the Arab European League (AEL) and its leader Dyab Abou Jahjah were brought under the spotlight. AEL organized street patrols in Antwerp to keep a watch over the police which was suspected of practicing systematically racism towards Maghrebians during ID-controls. The street patrols were considered to be militia by the political establishment and Abou Jahjah became highly criticized. He had, however, in the meantime become an important leader for a part of the younger Muslim population of Antwerp. During riots in Antwerp – triggered by a racist murder - , he called young people to stop the violence, but some observers interpreted it on the contrary as an incitement to rioting which led him to be incarcerated for a while. In 2003, the AEL joined the extreme left party PVDA to found the party RESIST for the elections but this did not lead to the expected results and it contributed to the rapid decline in popularity and reputation of AEL. In 2004 and 2005, various representatives of the Muslim Executive of Belgium were suspected of embezzlement. Various conflicts between members during elections of the new representatives increased the negative image of the Muslim Executive of Belgium in the press. In 2006, Joe Van Holsbeek, a Belgian teenager, was murdered in the Central Station of Brussels for his MP3-player. The Prosecutor’s office broadcasted the information coming from witnesses that muggers had a North African origin. In reality, they came from Poland. This event showed the stigmatization of North African people associated with crime and triggered many reactions from civil society. In 2007 eighteen year old Hans Van Themssche, the nephew of a *Vlaams Belang* MP, shot and killed a small child and her Malinese babysit and severely wounded a veiled Turkish woman sitting on a bench in Antwerp. The aim of this rampage was to kill as many ‘allochtones’ as possible. This incident triggered quite some antiracist mobilization.

Figure 2: Number of claims in 2001 by month

Claims in 2001




Figure two focuses on the pivotal year 2001. There is a clear impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New-York on the amount of claims. Indeed, claims about Islam are almost inexistent in the eight first months of 2001 but show an important peak in September.

2. Actors

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State actors	34.5	
Governments	15.1	
Legislatives	3.8	
Judiciary	8.0	
Police and security agencies	5.4	
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	.6	
Other state executive agencies	1.6	
Political parties	4.4	
Civil society actors	51.7	
Unions	0	
Workers and employees	.1	
Employers organizations and firms	.2	
Churches	1.7	
Christians	.5	
Media and journalists	4.2	
Professional organizations and groups	8.1	
Muslim organizations and groups	26.0	Let us now
Other minority organizations and groups	.5	focus on the
Antiracist organisations and groups	1.1	actors making
Pro-minority rights and welfare organizations and groups	.5	claims on
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	.7	Islam and
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	4.7	Muslims in
Radical left organizations and groups	0	Belgium by
Other civil society organizations and groups	3.4	using table 3.
Unknown actors	9.1	State actors
Total	100%	represent
N	812	

34.5% of the actors making claims, primarily governments (15%) and the judiciary (8%). Muslim organizations and groups are, however, also quite present in the debate: they are actor in 26% of the claims. Professional organizations and group represent 8.1% of the actors. This category for instance contains think thanks giving their analyses on issues as multicultural aspects or terrorism. Teachers and school directors are also included in this category. They are actors of various claims about the allowance or prohibition of the headscarf in schools.

Government actors are predominantly local representatives (51.2%) before national representatives (24.4%) and supra-national or foreign country representatives (23.6%) which

imply governments from France, Nederland, etc. but also the European Union. Mayors of municipalities with a large Muslim population usually formulate claims about local issues as the organization of the Islamic ritual slaughtering, the allowance of building mosques, etc. This illustrates that local government seems to be central in Belgium for the public regulation of Islam, especially due to the lack of efficiency and legitimacy of the Muslim Executive of Belgium. The judiciary has an important presence. This covers a wide variety of interventions, ranging from the sentences given to terrorists over rulings with regard to wearing of the headscarf at school, the prohibition of anti-Islam protests to the sanctioning of islamophobic or racist discourses, etc. Claims from police and security agencies mainly related to crime and ‘Islamic’ violence issues.

Racist and extreme right organizations and groups (including extreme right political parties) represent 4.7% of claims makers, which is a higher score than those of all non-extremist political parties (4.4%). In this category of racist and extreme right organisations, 46.9% is taken up by the Flemish party Vlaams Belang. This observation shows the predominance of the Vlaams Belang as a discursive actor. Moreover, observing the names of the actors, we can see that Filip Dewinter, leader of Vlaams Belang, is the individual who is most prominently present as a claims maker (2.2%). The second most cited individual is Dyab Abou Jahjah (Arab European League) with 0.6%. It should be noted that the extreme right parties of the French part of the country (FN, FNB) are almost totally absent as actors in our sample. Two explanations can be put forward: the electoral success of francophone right-wing parties is negligible in comparison to the strength of the Vlaams Belang and the francophone press has a tendency to avoid giving a forum to right-wing extremists. It should be noted that *Gazet van Antwerpen* reports on more claims with actors from extreme right parties and groups than other newspapers.

Actors are predominantly men and this is a reality for all categories of actors. We can observe that there are in general three times more men than women in all categories (governments, Muslim organization...), the only category with a different composition is the category ‘Racist and extreme right organizations and groups’ which contains only men. Muslim women are present in the same proportion as non Muslim women.

Claims from the category ‘Other civil society organizations and groups’ are predominantly the product of neighborhood associations that are protesting against the building or the expansion of a mosque. In this category a recurrent actor is furthermore the association GAIA (Global Action in the Interest of Animals) which organizes every year objects to the organization of Islamic ritual slaughtering. Claims from associations for the defense of women rights as “*Ni Pute Ni Soumise*” are rare while issues about Muslim women as the headscarf are important.

Despite the importance of the terms “interculturality” and “intercultural relations” in Belgian public debates, claims asserted by other religious communities are very little present.

Actors of claims are predominantly non-Muslim (64.9%) (see Table 4). Muslim actors (35.1%) are predominantly organizations or institutions (51.9%) before individuals (38.6%) and unorganized collectivities (8.8%). The *Muslim Executive of Belgium* is the Muslim institution which is the most present before the *Arab European League*.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

Muslim actor (organization name mentioned)	18.2
Muslim actor (no organization name mentioned)	16.9

No Muslim actor	64.9
Total	100%
N	812

Table 4 shows that claims mentioning the name of one Muslim organization are as numerous that claims with no mention of a Muslim organization. Each of these two categories represents less than 20 % of the claims.

Table 5: Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)*

	Overall	% with not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	69,1	/
Country of residence nationality	4,9	15,9
Europe: EU	3,2	10,2
Europe: other	1,1	3,4
Asia: middle east	7,7	25
Asia: south and east	1,8	5,7
Africa: north	10,2	33
Africa: other	1,8	5,7
Total	100%	100%
N	285	88

**(Category 'not applicable: no minority or migrant actor' excluded)*

Regarding the nationality or ethnicity, the most common case is the absence of nationality specification in the articles (69.1%). In the rarer cases where the nationality or ethnicity is explicitly mentioned in the article, the two ethnicities the most presents are Moroccans (2.6%) and Turks (1.7%) which are the two main Muslim communities in Belgium. In Table 5, we can observe the predominance of the categories 'Africa: north' (33%) which includes Moroccan nationality or ethnicity but also Tunisian, Algerian and other origins which are present in Belgium. We also note the importance of the category 'Asia: middle east' (25%) which includes the Turkish nationality or ethnicity.

Table 6: Identity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

Status groups	8
Religious groups	86,4
National and ethnic groups	3,4
Hyphen homeland-country of residence	2,3
Total	100%
N	

Table 7: Scope of actors

	Supra-/foreign transnational/ bilateral	National	Regional/local	Unknown	Total
State actors	58,5%	41,0%	57,5%	4,6%	34,6%
Governments	30,9%	13,5%	29,7%	,4%	15,1%
Legislatives	2,1%	4,1%	4,2%	3,9%	3,8%
Judiciary	11,7%	13,1%	11,3%	,4%	8,0%
Police and security agencies	12,8%	8,6%	6,1%	,0%	5,4%
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	,0%	,9%	1,4%	,0%	,6%
Other state executive agencies	1,1%	,9%	4,7%	,0%	1,6%
Political parties	4,3%	9,9%	3,3%	1,1%	4,4%
Civil society actors	37,2%	49,1%	39,2%	68,3%	51,8%
Workers and employees	,0%	,0%	,5%	,0%	,1%
Employers organisations and firms	1,1%	,0%	,0%	,4%	,2%
Churches	4,3%	1,8%	1,4%	1,1%	1,7%
Christians	,0%	,0%	,9%	,7%	,5%
Media and journalists	3,2%	3,2%	1,9%	7,0%	4,2%
Professional organisations and groups	2,1%	1,8%	2,8%	19,0%	8,1%
Muslim organisations and groups	19,1%	22,1%	20,3%	35,6%	26,0%
Other minority organisations and groups	,0%	,9%	,0%	,7%	,5%
Antiracist organisations and groups	3,2%	2,7%	,0%	,0%	1,1%
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	,0%	,5%	1,4%	,0%	,5%
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	1,1%	,9%	,9%	,4%	,7%
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	3,2%	14,9%	8,5%	3,5%	7,9%
Other civil society organisations and groups	,0%	,5%	,5%	,0%	,2%
Unknown actors	,0%	,0%	,0%	26,1%	9,1%
	94	222	212	284	812
	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Concerning the identity of migrant actors, the use of a religious label is predominant (86.4%). In our sample, migrant people are therefore determined predominantly by their religion before others terms as “allochtonen”, “foreigners”, “immigrants”, etc. This could, however, be a direct consequence of the sampling strategy (as ‘Muslim’ was a keyword for selection). Migrant people in our sampling are predominantly named “Muslims” without further specification (terms as Sunnite, Shiite, etc. are quasi absent) and without specification of their ethnicity.

Claims by supra-national actors and actors from foreign countries are frequent and are predominantly stemming from state actors. Actors from foreign countries as France, Nederland, United Kingdom and Germany are more present in the press than actors from homeland countries of migrants. At the local level, state actors also dominate. However, at the national level, actors from the civil society are more numerous than state actors. This could be

due to the Belgian federalism and the power of federal entities as regions, communities and local governments. Indeed, as we can see in Table 7, regional and local governments obtain a score superior (29,7%) to national government (13,5%).

Figure 3: Number of claims by Muslim and non-Muslim actors by year




Figure 3 shows that the number of claims asserted by non Muslim actors are higher than claims expressed by Muslim actors. The year 2002 is really different from other years, as it shows more Muslim actors than previous and further years, obtaining an equality between Muslim and non-Muslim actors. It also shows an impressive increase compared to 2001 which was the year with the least presence of Muslim actors. After 2002, the proportion of Muslim actors gradually decreases again till 2006 when we can observe a new increase of Muslim actors. This drops again in the years 2007 and 2008.

3.Forms of action

Table 8: Forms of action (percentages)

	Overall	State intervention excluded
State intervention	16,7	/
Repressive measures	8,7	/
Political decisions	8	/
Verbal statements	65,5	78,7
Conventional actions	10,3	12,4
Protest actions	7,4	8,9
Demonstrative protests	3,8	4,6
Confrontational protests	1,1	1,3
Violent protests	2,5	3
Total	100%	100%
N	812	812

Regarding the form of the claim, verbal statements are predominant for all categories of actors except the judiciary and police and security agencies. The judiciary and the police are generally using repressive measures and state actors are the unique actors taking political decision. In our sample, no political decision from the Vlaams Belang appears. The party uses other modes of expression as verbal statements (64.1%), conventional actions (20.3%), demonstrative protests (12.5%), confrontational and violent protest (1.6% and 1.6%). This is to be understood in the light of the existence of a so-called “cordon sanitaire”, an agreement between all other political parties to never make deals with the Vlaams Belang and not allow them to take any governmental responsibility.

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
State intervention	45,2%	11,1%	,9%	1,1%
Repressive measures	24,2%	,0%	,9%	,4%
Political decisions	21,0%	11,1%	,0%	,7%
Verbal statements	43,8%	75,0%	71,1%	81,7%
Conventional actions	10,0%	11,1%	15,6%	6,7%
Protest actions	1,1%	2,8%	12,3%	10,6%
Demonstrative protests	,7%	2,8%	7,1%	4,6%
Confrontational protests	,4%	,0%	1,4%	1,8%
Violent protests	,0%	,0%	3,8%	4,2%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N	812	812	812	812

Violent protests are predominantly the action of unknown actors (55%) before Muslim actors (40%) and racist groups and extreme right parties (5%). However, it should be stressed that violent protests represent only 3.8% of the form of claims by Muslims who use predominantly verbal statements (71.5%), conventional actions (15.6%) and demonstrative protest (7.1%).

4.Addresses and criticized actors

If we observe the addressee of the claims, Muslims are the first addressee (44.1%), the first criticized actor (55.9%) and the first supported actor (70.6%). Governments always pop up in second place (22.9% for addressee, 16.7% for criticized actor and 7.8% for supported actor).

Table 10: Addressees (percentages)

	Overall (%)	No addressee excluded (%)
State actors	17,7	33,3
Governments	12,2	22,9
Legislatives	1,7	3,2
Judiciary	2,3	4,4
Police and security agencies	,9	1,6
Other state executive agencies	,6	1,2
Political parties	1,2	2,3
Civil society actors	34,4	64,4
Workers and employees	,1	,2
Employers organisations and firms	,6	1,2
Churches	,6	1,2
Christians	,2	,5
Media and journalists	1,6	3,0
Professional organisations and groups	2,5	4,6
Muslim organisations and groups	23,5	44,1
Other minority organisations and groups	1,1	2,1
Antiracist organisations and groups	,1	,2
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	,5	,9
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	,2	,5
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	2,1	3,9
Other civil society organisations and groups	1,1	2,1
No addressee	46,7	/
Total	100,0	100,0
N	812	812

Table 11: Criticized actors (percentages)

	Overall (%)	No criticized actors excluded (%)
State actors	10,1	22
Governments	7,6	16,7
Legislatives	,4	,8
Judiciary	,5	1,1
Police and security agencies	1,1	2,4
Other state executive agencies	,5	1,1
Political parties	1,5	3,2
Civil society actors	34,2	74,7
Employers organisations and firms	,4	,8
Churches	,7	1,6
Christians	,1	,3
Media and journalists	1,7	3,8
Professional organisations and groups	1,5	3,2
Muslim organisations and groups	25,6	55,9
Other minority organisations and groups	,7	1,6
Antiracist organisations and groups	,5	1,1
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	,1	,3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	2,5	5,4
Other civil society organisations and groups	,4	,8
No criticised actor	54,2	/
Total	100,0	100,0
N	812	812

Table 12: Supported actors (percentages)

	Overall (%)	No supported actors excluded (%)
State actors	2,1	11,1
Governments	1,5	7,8
Judiciary	,2	1,3
Political parties	,4	2,0
Civil society actors	16,7	88,9
Employers organisations and firms	,1	,7
Churches	,1	,7
Media and journalists	,2	1,3
Professional organisations and groups	,6	3,3
Muslim organisations and groups	13,3	70,6
Other minority organisations and groups	,5	2,6
Antiracist organisations and groups	,1	,7
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	,2	1,3
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	,7	3,9
Other civil society organisations and groups	,7	3,9
No supported actor	81,2	/
Total	100,0	100,0
N	812	812

5. Issues and positions


Table 13: Issues of claims (percentages)

Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	.9
Minority integration politics	71.2
Minority integration general	3.3
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	3.7
Minority rights and participation social and cultural rights	4.7
Minority rights and participation religious rights	30.7
Minority rights and participation other rights	.2
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1.2
Minority social problems	26.2
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganisational relations	1.6
Antiracism/islamophobia	14.8
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	5.4
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	9.4
Islamophobic claims	8.1
Actor claims Muslims	3.9
Homeland politics	1.0
Transnational politics	3.0
Other	.6
Total	100%
N	812

In terms of issues, “minority integration politics” is the most recurring type of the claims. More precisely, in this category minority rights and participation/religious rights and minority social problems are predominant. It is mainly related to claims concerning the inclusion of Islam in the receiving society and implications on the level of religious rights (implantation or construction of mosques, conflicts surrounding the organization of the slaughtering of the sheeps, etc.). Islamic extremism comes afterwards as the most present subject type of claims.

When can observe that ‘Minority rights and participation religious rights’ as an issue becomes more important than ‘minority social problems’ after 2002. The peak in 2001 and 2002 for the category ‘minority social problem’ is linked with the attacks of 9/11 in New York and Washington (and their consequences in Europe, as highlighted before). After this crisis, articles related to Islam and Muslims in Belgian press are much more related to intercultural issues than to terrorism or Islamic extremism inside Europe. (*NB: The research does not include articles about terrorism and Islamic terrorism outside Europe*).

Figure 4: Number of claims by issue and year



When taking a closer look we can notice that within the category of ‘Minority rights and participation religious rights’ the (organization of) Islamic slaughtering is a yearly recurring topic. Other topics, like the wearing of the headscarf, pop up in different forms at different moments in time. Claims with regard to ‘minority rights and participation religious rights’ show a peak in 2007. This peak is due to an important increase of claims with regard to the headscarf (and particularly the wearing of headscarves by people holding public functions). This is the consequence of the decision of the municipality of Ghent to ban headscarf for their employees. In reaction, the social service of the same city decided to explicitly allow the headscarf. Understandably this polemic triggered numerous debates in the press, stretching beyond the local situation in Ghent.

In 2005 and 2006 there was also a headscarf debate, but this time concerning its use in the private sector. The claims present in the press were triggered by the story of an employer who had received anonymous death threats if he would not fire one of his employees wearing the headscarf at work.

In the same way, issues about building mosques are directly related to some specific cases. In 2003, claims about mosques in Vilvoorde and Antwerp are numerous. The press shows interest for the decision of the mayor, the reactions of Muslim associations, neighborhood organizations and racist groups and includes a number of opinion articles written by ‘ordinary’ citizens. In 2005, the same type of events occurred in Mechelen, Deurne and Antwerp with reactions spilling over in the press until the year 2006.

The issue of the headscarf for students is frequently present from 2002 to 2007. It came to the front as a result of various local decisions to ban the headscarf in particular schools, at times turning into a broader ethical debate about the legitimacy of decisions wanting to either allow or ban the headscarf in schools. In contrast, issues about the *burqa* are really rare from 1999 and 2008. We should, however, note that in 2009, a year which was not included in our analysis, both the headscarf in schools and the banning of burqa popped up again in the Belgian debate.


Table 14: Claims on religious rights (percentages)

Rights and religious practice	6,8
Religious rights and public institutions	18,3
Other	5,2
Not applicable	69,7
Total	100%
N	812

As far as religious rights are concerned, we can notice that claims pertaining to public institutions are the more predominant. These concern mainly the wearing of the veil in schools and work places.

Figure 5 indicates the mean position of the public debate surrounding Muslim rights in Belgium. As one can notice, the debate is predominantly of a positive tone with the exception of the years 2000 and 2004. Even after 2001, the mean position of the debate grows slowly until 2004. This is somewhat surprising, as in contradiction with general assessments of the discursive climate with regard to Islam¹⁸.

Figure 5: Position of claims towards Muslim rights by year (means)



¹⁸ Boussetta, H. & Jacobs, D. (2006) "Multiculturalism, citizenship and Islam in problematic encounters in Belgium", pp.23-36 in Modood, T., Triandafyllidou, A. & Zapata-Barrero, R. (eds.) *Multiculturalism, Muslims and Citizenship. A European Approach*, London: Routledge.

Table 15: Position of claims by actors

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
State actors	-,01	268	,781
Governments	0,13	123	0,799
Legislatives	-0,35	31	0,709
Judiciary	-0,04	57	0,706
Police and security agencies	-0,49	39	0,601
State executive agencies specifically dealing with Migrants	0,4	5	0,548
Other state executive agencies	0,85	13	0,376
Political parties	-0,03	35	0,857
Civil society actors	,23	407	,786
Workers and employees	0	1	.
Employers organisations and firms	1	2	0
Churches	0,08	13	0,954
Christians	0,75	4	0,5
Media and journalists	0,16	32	0,677
Professional organisations and groups	0,2	65	0,733
Muslim organisations and groups	0,53	203	0,608
Other minority organisations and groups	0,5	4	0,577
Antiracist organisations and groups	0,57	7	0,535
Pro-minority rights and welfare organisations and groups	1	4	0
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organisations	-0,17	6	0,983
Racist and extreme right organisations and groups	-0,89	38	0,388
Other civil society organisations and groups	-0,39	28	0,832
Unknown actors	-0,31	74	0,89
Total	0,09	784	0,815

The general discursive position of the claims is neutral (0.09 (SD=0.815)). State actors show a neutral position toward Muslims, however, they present high differences between them. Governments presents a position slightly positive (0.13 (SD=0.799)). The legislatives (-0.35 (SD=0.709)) and police and security agencies (-0.49 (SD=0.601)) have the position the most negative towards Muslims while the judiciary (-0.04 (SD=0.706)) and state executive agencies specially dealing with migrants (0.4 (SD=0.548)) have a more neutral position. The category ‘other state executive agencies’ has a position really different from other state actors, showing a position which is highly positive (0.85 (SD=0.376)).

The position of political parties is relatively neutral but the standard deviation is important, showing the difference of attitude towards Muslims according to the political party (-0.03 (SD=0.857)). Racist and extreme right parties have obviously the position the most negative towards Muslims (-0.89 (SD=0.388)) when antiracist organizations and groups (0,57 (SD=0,535)) and Muslim organizations and groups (0,53 (SD=0,608)) presents positive positions. A category unexpected to be so positive toward Muslims is ‘churches’ which has a really high score (0.75 (SD=0.5)).

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Moyenne	N	Standard deviation
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	-,14	7	,690
Minority integration politics	,06	563	,805
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	0,1	29	0,9
Minority rights and participation social rights	0,32	22	0,78
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	0,75	16	0,577
Minority rights and participation religious rights	0,21	246	0,849
Minority rights and participation other rights	0	2	0
Discrimination and unequal treatment	0,3	10	0,675
Minority social problems	-0,27	198	0,65
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganizational relations	0,15	13	0,555
Antiracism/islamophobia	,63	118	,552
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	0,66	44	0,479
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme rights	0,61	74	0,593
Islamophobic claims	-0,76	63	0,588
Actor claims Muslims	,36	28	,678
Homeland politics	-0,13	8	0,641
Transnational politics	0,55	20	0,605
Other	0,2	5	0,447
Total	0,09	784	0,815

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	1,1%	,0%	,5%	1,1%
Minority integration politics	81,5%	86,1%	71,6%	60,2%
Anti-racism, islamophobia	11,4%	2,8%	16,6%	18,3%
Islamophobic claims	3,2%	11,1%	1,4%	17,6%
Actor claims muslims	1,8%	,0%	9,0%	2,8%
Other	1,1%	,0%	,9%	,0%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N	812	812	812	812

The category “Antiracism/Islamophobia” shows the highest positive mean position among the issues while “Islamophobic claims” lead to the highest negative mean position. The issue category “Immigration, asylum and aliens politics” receives a negative mean position. The issue category “Minority integration politics” is more tricky to explain. Indeed, this category contains at the same time elements with positive and negative positions. The subcategory “minority social problems” has a negative mean position because of the presence of the items “Islamic extremism” and “crime”. In contrast, the subcategory concerning religious rights

receives a positive mean position showing that claims concerning religious rights are mostly in favor of Muslims people.

All four categories of actors expressed the highest number of claims on the issue “minority integration politics”. As we have noted before, this category includes the religious rights subcategory. While ‘Anti-racism, islamophobia’ is the second most represented issue for all other categories of actors, political parties have islamophobic claims (11.1%) as second category of issues.

6.Objects

Table 18: Objects of claims (percentages)

No Muslim object	11,7
Muslims as objects	79,4
All Muslims in general	23,8
Majority/most Muslims	3,1
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	36,7
Individual Muslims	15,3
Unclassifiable Muslims	0,5
Islam as religion	8,9
Islam in general	7,6
Minority currents within Islam	0,2
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	0,9
Unclassifiable Islam	0,2
Total	100%
N	812

Muslims are predominantly the object of the claims. Claims refer the most often to a minority or a small group of the Muslim community or target all Muslims in general before targeting individual Muslims.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)*

	Overall	Not specified excluded
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	83,6	/
Country of residence nationality	,9	5,2
Europe: EU	2,4	14,8
Europe: other	,6	3,5
Asia: middle east	3,6	21,7
Asia: south and east	1,4	8,7
Africa: North	6,8	41,7
Africa: other	,7	4,3
Total	100,0	100%
N	703	115

*(Category ‘not applicable: no object’ excluded)

Regarding the object of the claims, there is most often no specification of nationality or ethnicity. When nationality or ethnicity is specified, North African (41.7%) and Middle East Asian (21.7%) are predominant.

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No Muslim object	8,9%	,0%	19,4%	10,2%
Muslims as objects	85,80%	91,70%	76,8%	73,20%
All Muslims in general	17,8%	27,8%	19,9%	32,0%
Majority/most Muslims	3,2%	2,8%	4,3%	2,1%
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	41,3%	55,6%	37,4%	29,2%
Individual Muslims	23,5%	5,6%	14,7%	8,8%
Unclassifiable Muslims	,0%	,0%	,5%	1,1%
Islam as religion	5,3%	8,3%	3,8%	16,5%
Islam in general	3,9%	2,8%	3,3%	15,1%
Minority currents within Islam	,4%	,0%	,0%	,4%
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	,7%	5,6%	,5%	,7%
Unclassifiable Islam	,4%	,0%	,0%	,4%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%
N	812	812	812	812

Table 20 shows that Muslims are the predominant object of the claims of our 4 categories of actors. Minorities or small groups of Muslim are more often the object of the claims than Muslims in general or individual Muslims for all categories. Civil society actors speak more about Islam than other categories of actors but Muslims remains their principal object.

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	79,0%	97,2%	80,1%	88,8%
Country of residence nationality	,8%	,0%	2,4%	,0%
Europe: EU	3,6%	,0%	1,8%	2,0%
Europe: other	,8%	,0%	1,2%	,0%
Asia: middle east	4,0%	2,8%	3,6%	3,2%
Asia: south and east	1,2%	,0%	1,8%	1,6%
Africa: North	9,9%	,0%	8,4%	3,6%
Africa: other	,8%	,0%	,6%	,8%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	252	36	166	249

Table 21 shows that the 4 categories of actors do not specify any nationality or ethnicity in their claims. However, when they do, state actors and Muslim organizations and groups do it more often than other categories. We can also see that their objects are more North African people than Middle East Asian people.

7. Scope of claims

Table 22: Scope of actors (percentages)

Supra- or transnational: European	2,3
Supra- or transnational: other	1,1
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	,2
Foreign national: other	7,8
Bilateral	,1
National	27,3
Regional	8,1
Local	18,0
Unknown: no organisation	35,0
Total	100,0
N	812

Most of the actors intervening in the Belgian public debate surrounding the integration of Islam belong to the national and to the local political arenas.

Table 23: Scope of addressees, criticized actors and supported actors (percentages)

	Addresses	Criticised actors	Supported actors
Supra- or transnational: European	1,9	3,0	6,2
Supra- or transnational: other	7,5	14,7	6,2
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	,2	1,9	6,3
Foreign national: other	10,0	11,2	81,4
Bilateral	,5	,5	0
National	38,3	37,9	0
Regional	7,5	4,4	0
Local	34,1	26,4	0
Total	100,0	100,0	100%

Most of the addressees and of the criticized actors of the claims are national and local actors while most of the supported actors are foreign national.

Table 24: Scope of issues (percentages)

No verbal claim (no issue)	4,8
Supra- or transnational: European	3,4
Supra- or transnational: other	13,1
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	1,0
Foreign national: other	5,5
Bilateral	,7
National	31,7
Regional	5,8
Local	33,0
Total	100,0

Issues of claims concern predominantly the local and national public spheres.

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organisations and groups	Other civil society actors
No verbal claim	7,1%	2,8%	3,3%	3,9%
Supra- or transnational: European	4,6%	2,8%	,5%	4,6%
Supra- or transnational: other	12,5%	5,6%	13,7%	14,1%
Foreign national: migrant homelands and exile	,0%	,0%	2,4%	1,1%
Foreign national: other	5,7%	2,8%	6,6%	4,9%
Bilateral	1,1%	,0%	,0%	1,1%
National	23,1%	44,4%	36,0%	35,2%
Regional	6,4%	2,8%	3,8%	7,0%
Local	38,1%	36,1%	33,6%	27,1%
Total	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

The four categories of actors included in table 25 express themselves the most about national and local issues.

8. Conclusion

To summarize this report we can say that the number of claims per year during the entire period is fluctuant. Indeed, we have observed an increase of the claims from 1999 to 2006 and a decrease in 2007. The actors of the claims are very diverse but the two main categories are state actors and Muslim organizations and groups. Governments are predominantly composed by local representatives (51.2%) before national representatives (24.4%) and supra-national or foreign country representatives (23.6%). Racist and extreme right organizations and groups (including extreme right political parties) represent a little bit less than 5%. The political party *Vlaams Belang* is the predominant actor for this category. Actors are predominantly men and

this is a reality for all categories of actors. Actors of claims are predominantly non-Muslim (64.9%). Muslim actors (35.1%) are predominantly organizations or institutions (51.9%) before individuals (38.6%) and unorganized collectivity (8.8%). The Muslim Executive of Belgium is the Muslim institution the most present Muslim actor before the Arab European League. Regarding nationality or ethnicity, actors have predominantly a non-minority ethnicity (64.9%). For migrant people, the most common case is the absence of nationality specification in the articles (24.3%). In the rare cases where the nationality or ethnicity is explicitly written in the article, the two ethnicities which are the most presents are Moroccans (2.6%) and Turks (1.7%), which are the two main Muslim communities in Belgium. Concerning the identity of migrant actors, the use of religious terminology is predominant (32.9%). In our sample, migrant people are therefore determined predominantly by their religion before others terms as “allochtonen”, “foreigners”, “immigrants”, etc. Despite the importance of the terms “interculturality” and “intercultural relations” in Belgian public debates, claims asserted by other religious communities are very little present.

Regarding the form of the claim, verbal statements are predominant for all categories of actors except the judiciary and police and security agencies. Violent protests represent only 3.8% of the form of claims by Muslims who use predominantly verbal statements (71.5%), conventional actions (15.6%) and demonstrative protest (7.1%). If we observe the addressee of the claims, Muslims are the first addressee, the first supported actors and the first criticized actors.

In terms of issues, “minority integration politics” is the first category among the claims. In this category minority rights and participation/religious rights and minority social problems are predominant. Some issues are relatively consistent in time but Islamophobic claims and claims about the stigmatization of Islam and crime are more dispersed in time. With regard to claims on religious rights, claims made about public institutions are the predominant. These concern mainly the wearing of the veil in schools and work places.

Surprisingly – as this contradicts earlier general assessments in the literature -, the mean position of the public debate surrounding Muslim rights in Belgium is positive during the period with the exception of the years 2000 and 2004. Even after 2001, the mean position of the debate grows slowly until 2004.

Muslims are predominantly the object of the claims. Claims refer the most often to a minority or a small group of the Muslim community or target all Muslims in general before targeting individual Muslims. Moreover, there is most often no specification of nationality or ethnicity. Regarding the scope of the claims, most of the actors intervening in the Belgian public debate surrounding the integration of Islam belong to the national and to the local political arenas. Most of the addressees and of the criticized actors of the claims are national and local actors while most of the supported actors are foreign national. Once again, issues of claims concern predominantly the local and national public spheres.

FRANCE

Manlio Cinalli, Alessandra El Hariri and Gabrielle Maas

1. Introduction

France has a few specific characteristics that make the analysis of public debates particularly relevant. Its Republican model tends to translate in terms of religious rights as a strict secularism which accords full freedom of conscience in private life, but attempts to maintain neutrality in the public sphere and a ‘blind’ policy in distribution of resources. In other words, French Republicanism preaches that religion, as a form of communal identity, must remain outside the arena in which group affiliation is subsumed into shared citizenship. At the same time, France is one of the countries with the longest history of immigration, including countries with large Muslim majorities. This means that there are considerable percentages of Muslim ‘second’ and ‘third’ generations, a large majority of whom are from families with origins in the former French colonies and protectorates of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. More recently, sub-Saharan immigration has also grown, as has the number of new arrivals from the South Asia, expanding France's Muslim population once more.

While statistics can hugely diverge in their estimates owing to particular constraints of French law, Muslim do stand out today as a main ‘religious minority’ in the country. An additional characteristic of the French case consists in the fact that there has been a large debate on ‘laicite’ and potential contradictions between Islam and Republicanism. One could refer to the ban on 'ostentatious religious symbols' or again to the rising force of the extreme right, based on perceived and debated threats to the values of the French Republic.

For the content analysis of this report, we have selected five newspapers, on the basis of their distribution, political leaning, and type of format. Our choice was also taken within the limits of newspapers’ availability in electronic databases (Factiva and LexisNexis). The random selection of articles to analyze through the key-word search (Islam / Muslim / mosque / imam / Quran, / headscarf / burqa / minaret) aimed at collecting a total of 1000 articles, that is, 200 articles for each newspaper, with the hope to reach 750. However, after the selection and coding of first 1000 articles a second round of further 1000 articles was necessary to identify at least a minimum threshold of 500 claims.

Table 1: Selected newspapers

Newspaper	Circulation strength
Le Monde	323,039
Le Figaro	315,656
Liberation	117,240
La Croix	104,901
Le Point	62,106

Table 2 shows the number of articles, the number of coded articles and the number of identified claims across different newspapers and time. The final dataset was made of 269 articles and a total of 551 claims. Two coders engaged with the analysis of these articles, achieving satisfying inter-coder reliability (national figures reported in a dedicated Eurislam paper).

Le Figaro	Total articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	26	1	0	0
2000	42	0	0	0
2001	823	12	2	7
2002	1,113	18	4	8
2003	1,434	25	5	17
2004	2,252	37	10	45
2005	2,033	36	6	8
2006	2,320	36	5	10
2007	1,447	23	1	8
2008	751	12	2	2
Total	12,241	200	35	105
La Croix	Total articles ¹⁹	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	-	15	1	2
2000	-	19	1	1
2001	-	18	3	5
2002	-	20	3	5
2003	-	29	6	10
2004	-	31	8	20
2005	-	20	8	21
2006	-	13	3	3
2007	-	21	4	5
2008	-	24	9	19
Total	2,921	200	46	91
Le Monde	Total articles	Articles retrieved	Articles coded	Claims retrieved
1999	636	33	3	3
2000	642	37	3	6
2001	1,183	68	1	1
2002	881	50	3	4
2003	1,345	76	3	8
2004	1,472	80	16	31
2005	1,304	74	9	15
2006	1,289	73	10	22
2007	1,241	71	4	9
2008	874	48	8	17
Total	10,867	610	60	116
Libération	Total	Articles	Articles	Claims retrieved

¹⁹ Retrieval of articles by year was not possible with the database used (Factiva)

	articles	retrieved	coded	
1999	-	-	-	-
2000	1,495	71	3	10
2001	998	48	2	10
2002	1,645	79	5	17
2003	1,780	85	15	57
2004	2,375	69	20	106
2005	2,894	64	11	52
2006	3,237	68	3	13
2007	2,676	62	2	15
2008	1,871	70	4	17
Total	18,971	616	65	

Figure 1 below shows the distribution of claims over the course of time. The number of claims per year varied strongly within the period 1999-2008. In particular, they increased in 2004, mainly due to the number of news related to debate over the ban of veil in French schools. Contrary to what we see in other countries of the Eurislam project, 2001 is not the crucial year for French claims-making, in spite of relevance of September 2001 (figure 2).

Figure 1: Number of claims by year





Figure 2: Number of claims in 2001 by month



2. Actors

So which actors stand out as most recurrent claims-makers in the field? As table 3 shows, Muslim organisations and groups themselves are the single category which intervenes more often over issues of their own interest. Professional organisations and groups are the second most present actor in the field, followed by government (at different territorial levels). Perhaps surprisingly, many actors who usually intervene across a broad range of political and issue fields enter only very rarely in the public space with claims over Islam. Even political parties score poorly.

Table 3: Claims by actor (percentages)

State actors	28.1
Governments	16.0
Legislatives	4.4
Judiciary	3.3
Police and security agencies	3.6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	.4
Other state executive agencies	.5
Political parties	3.8
Civil society actors	63.9
Unions, Workers and employees	.6
Employers organizations and firms	.2
Churches and Christians	3.2
Media and journalists	1.8
Professional organizations and groups	20.1
Muslim organizations and groups	28.2
Other minority organizations and groups	1.5
Antiracist organizations and groups	1.3
General solidarity, pro-minorities, human rights and welfare organizations	1.5
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	2.4
Other civil society organizations and groups	3.1
Unknown actors	4.2
Total	100%
N	551

Since Muslim actors themselves are the most present actor in the debate over Islam, it is extremely relevant to assess the extent to which Muslim organisations and groups are directly mentioned through the voice of newspapers. Table 4 shows that in 27.9% of cases the specific name of a Muslim organisation is mentioned. Cases where Muslims perform as actors but with no explicit acknowledgement of an organisation account for 15.8% of cases.

Table 4: Claims by Muslim actors (percentages)

Muslim actor, organization name mentioned	27.9
Muslim actor, no organization name mentioned	15.8
No Muslim actor	56.3
Total	100%
N	551

Table 5 shows that most of the claims have no specification of nationality or ethnicity, or otherwise refer to the country of residence nationality. European countries account for 6.7%. After European background the next largest category is North Africa (mainly Algerian) with 5.1%. Other categories, including the Middle East, account for only a tiny share of claims.

Table 5: Nationality or ethnicity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

	%
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	35.2
Country of residence nationality	39.0
Europe: EU	6.0
Other Europe	0.7
Asia: middle east	1.8
Asia: south and east	0.4
Africa: North	5.1
Africa: other	0.4
North America	0.2
Not applicable: no minority or migrant actor	11.3
Total	100%
N	551

It is then relevant to evaluate which kind of groups these minority actors represent. Table 6 shows this question is not applicable for over half of the sample since the actor is no minority actor or is not part of a group. The most impressive figure refers to the 42.5% threshold for religious groups, while remaining categories reach only very tiny percentages.

Table 6: Identity of minority or migrant actors (percentages)

Status groups	2.4
Racial groups	0.2
Religious groups	42.5
National and ethnic groups	2.6
Total	100%
N	551


Our analysis continues with the evaluation of scope of actors. Probably reflecting the team’s choice to choose all the five newspapers among the national ones, the most frequent scope of the actor reported is national. Yet, an important number of claims are also made by actors at the sub-national level (local and regional). Only a small share of claims-makers have supra-national and trans-national scope.

Table 7: Scope of actors

	Supra-/foreign transnational/bilat eral	National	Regional/local
State actors	-	29.4	14.6
Governments	-	1.4	16.2
Legislatives	10.0	3.6	6.2
Judiciary	10.0	6.8	1.5
Police and security agencies	-	0.9	-
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	-	0.5	1.5
Other state executive agencies	10.0	8.1	-
Political parties	-	-	-
Civil society actors	-	0.9	-
Unions	10.0	1.8	6.2
Workers and employees	-	0.9	1.5
Employers organizations and firms	-	1.8	0
Churches	10.0	8.6	8.5
Media and journalists	50.0	28.1	40.0
Professional organizations and groups	-	0.9	1.5
Muslim organizations and groups	-	2.7	0.8
Other minority organizations and groups	-	0.5	-
Antiracist organizations and groups	-	1.8	-
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	-	0.5	-
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-	0.9	0.8
Other civil society organizations and groups	-	-	-
Unknown actors	100%	100%	100%
N	551	551	551

As regards the trend of distribution between Muslim actors (in pink in the table) and non-Muslim actors (in blue), this follows a rough balance throughout the decade 1999-2008, with non-Muslims predominating (nearly) throughout the time period.

Figure 3: Number of claims by Muslim and non-Muslim actors by year



3. Forms of action

We can now move to analyse the different forms by which claims-makers enter the public space. Table 8 shows the forms of action found in our study of the French public space. Figures show that nearly three quarters of claims consist of verbal statements, while all other forms are much more limited, with 7.9% of conventional actions, 5.1% of repressive measures, 5.6% of political decisions, 5.6% of protests (including both demonstrative and confrontational), and 2.7% of violent actions.

Table 8: Forms of action (percentages)

	Overall	State intervention excluded
State intervention		
Repressive measures	5.1	
Political decisions	5.6	
Verbal statements	73.1	80.1
Conventional actions	7.9	8.3
Protest actions		
Demonstrative protests	4.5	6.3
Confrontational protests	1.1	1.5
Violent protests	2.7	3.8
Total	100%	100%
N	551	396

Most crucially, forms of claims-making are variable across different types of actors as table 9 shows. It is interesting to notice that Muslims have the highest scores in terms of conventional

and demonstrative mobilization, leaving to other civil society actors the lion’s share of confrontational protests and violent actions.

Table 9: Forms of action by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organizations and groups	Other civil society actors
Repressive measures	17.4	0	0	0
Political decisions	20	0	0	0
Verbal statements	56.1	95.2	72.3	84.1
Conventional actions	6.5	0	15.5	4.1
Demonstrative protests	0	4.8	9	4.5
Confrontational protests	0	0	0.6	2.3
Violent protests	0	0	2.6	5.0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	551	551	551	551

4. Addressees and criticised actors

We can now move to the specific analysis of the addressee of claims (AT WHOM is the claim directed?) The claim can be neutrally addressed to someone – the addressee - but may also be criticising or supporting an actor – whom we will call the criticised actor and the supported actor respectively. Table 10 shows that in most cases there is no addressee (77.5%). It is interesting to notice that, at nearly 10%, both state actors and civil society actors stand out as the most popular addressees. Muslim organizations and groups were mentioned as addressees in 7.4% of cases. Within state actors, governments were by far the most popular addressees (9.6%).

Table 10: Addressees (percentages)

	Overall	No addressee excluded
State actors		
Governments	9.6	42.7
Legislatives	0.7	3.2
Judiciary	1.5	6.5
Police and security agencies	0.4	1.6
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0.2	0.8
Other state executive agencies	0.1	0.8
Political parties		
	0.2	0.8

Civil society actors		1.6
Employers organizations and firms	0.2	1.6
Christians	0.4	3.2
Media and journalists	0.3	33.1
Professional organizations and groups	0.6	0.8
Muslim organizations and groups	7.4	3.2
Other minorities: religious based groups	0.2	-
Other civil society organization and groups	0.7	100%
No addressee	77.5	42.7
Total	100%	100%
N	551	124

Table 11: Number of claims by criticized actors (percentages)

	Overall	No criticized actor excluded
Governments	11.8	33.9
Legislatives	1.8	5.2
Judiciary	0.5	1.6
Police and security agencies	0.5	1.6
Other state executive agencies	0.2	0.5
Political parties	0.4	1.0
Employers organizations and firms	0.2	0.5
Media and journalists	2.5	7.3
Professional organizations and groups	1.5	4.2
Researchers	0.9	
Muslim organizations and groups	12.7	36.5
Other minority organizations and groups	0.9	2.6
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	0.2	0.5
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	1.1	3.1
Other civil society organization and groups	0.5	1.6
No criticized actor	65.2	-
Total	100%	100%
N	551	

The majority of claims (65.2%) involved no criticized actor. Of those that did, the two types of actors by far the most frequently criticized were governments (33.9% of all claims involving a criticized actor) and Muslim organizations and groups (36.5%). Media and journalists, while falling well behind these figures, also account for a noticeable proportion of claims; in France, this is due largely to the involvement of press organizations such as *Charlie Hebdo* in high-profile polemics, for example that which took place over the Prophet cartoons.

Table 12: Supported actors (percentages)

	Overall	No supported actor excluded
State actors		
Governments	2.0	8.1
Media and journalists	1.3	5.2
Professional organizations and groups	0.2	0.7
Muslim organizations and groups	19.2	78.5
Other minority and organization groups	1.3	5.2
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	0.2	0.7
Other civil society organization and groups	0.4	1.5
No supported actor	75.5	-
Total	100%	100%
N	551	

In the case of supported actors, table 12 shows that the proportion of claims involving none is again high (75.5%). Here, however, there is just one noticeable frontrunner: Muslim organizations and groups (78.5% of all claims involving a supported actor). It should be noted, however, that a significant number of these are accounted for by Muslim actors supporting other Muslim actors, as for instance in the debate over the hijab or the creation of the CFCM.

5. Issues and positions

Table 13: Issues of claims (percentages)


Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	3.1
Minority integration politics	
Minority integration general	5.8
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	3.8
Minority rights and participation social rights	2.0
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	3.8
Minority rights and participation religious rights	29.4
Minority rights and participation other rights	2.2
Discrimination and unequal treatment	1.6
Minority social problems	19.6
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganizational relations	10.3
Antiracism/islamophobia	
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	8.0
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	3.4
Islamophobic claims	2.9
Actor claims Muslims	
Homeland politics	0.2

Transnational politics	3.3
Other	0.5
Total	100%
N	551

Table 14 shows that there is a clear bias towards two areas of discussion. Firstly, minority *religious* rights and participation (29.4% of all claims): a good deal of claims dealing with this issue were generated by the debate around the passing of the ban on 'ostentatious religious symbols' in public spaces (most prominently schools) in 2004. Another sub-issue frequently seen in claims under this rubric was state recognition and/or funding for mosque construction projects (long-term debates over projects in Strasbourg, Paris and Marseille). The second significant areas of discussion were those falling under the rubric 'minority social problems' (19.6%); of these claims, most were related to political or Islamic extremism (within France – e.g. Islamist *groupuscules* in the *banlieues* – more than external events such as 9/11), and a smaller number to crime and position of women in Islam.

Other than this, another issue that generated quite some debate was that of interethnic and inter-/intraorganizational relations, mostly around the creation of the CFCM and the factional struggles within it after its creation. Two figures that are surprisingly low, and that can perhaps be explained partially by the specific French context, are discrimination/unequal treatment and homeland politics. The first tends not to be discussed because France's refusal to acknowledge ethnicity as a valid criterion for social action (there are, for instance, no ethnic census figures available) also leads to a reluctance to discuss ethnic discrimination in the public sphere. Similarly, the low figure for homeland politics claims may be something to do with the French ideology of republican universalism, in which any activity seen as pertaining to a 'private' or 'communitarian' form of identity – foreign national, religious, ethnic – is seen as having no place in the public sphere. This may help to explain why discussion of homeland politics in national newspapers is relatively scarce, although we know from other sources that there is actually intense homeland politics-related activity (for instance within the CFCM), especially among Algerian nationals in France.

Figure 4: Number of claims by issue and year



As regards the peak in claims-making, figure 4 shows that this occurred in 2004, with the debate on the ban of 'ostentatious religious signs' in the public sphere, seen generally as a measure intended to exclude the wearing of the hijab. Most of these claims thus fell under the rubric of minority integration politics (religious rights). The rise in claims-making overall is also noticeable between 1999 and 2001, when the issue of Islamic extremism came to mass public attention with 9/11. Muslim actors' claims on issues of foreign and transnational politics, meanwhile, peaked in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq by the US-UK coalition, from which France abstained. The frequency of Islamophobic claims, interestingly, follows the trend produced by the hijab debate, peaking in 2004.

Table 14 shows that the frequency of debate on religious rights and public institutions is comparatively high in France, especially when contrasted with a country such as the UK (see UK report) where the relationship between the public sphere and private religious beliefs is far less contested. In France, the ideology of *laïcité* (roughly translating as secularism) has long governed behaviour in public institutions, where all forms of 'communitarian' affiliation are seen as properly subordinated to a universal French citizenship. The French attitude to expressions of religious particularism in the public sphere has thus tended to be one of intolerance; this applied in claims variously to demands for halal meat in school canteens, Islamic religious classes in schools (or indeed Islamic schools), right to public holidays for employees and schoolchildren on important Islamic festival days, and so on. Again, however, by far the majority of these claims relating to religious rights and public institutions were accounted for by the hijab debate.

Table 14: Claims on religious rights (percentages)

Rights and religious practice	8.0
Religious rights and public Institutions	84.0
Other	8.0
Total	100%
N	162

Figure 5 gives rather surprising results. The peak in positive positioning towards Muslim rights in 2000 does not correspond to any significant national event. The smaller peak in 2004, meanwhile, is presumably a result of support for Muslim schoolgirls over the hijab issue. The trough in 2006 corresponds to the wave of responses to what was widely seen as a disproportionate Muslim backlash against *Charlie Hebdo's* publication of the Prophet cartoons. N.B. A very high number of claims had to be coded as having a neutral or ambivalent position towards Muslim rights (code 0). Although the overall positioning is slightly positive (between 0.1 and 0.4) over the period between 2000 and 2008, these results are therefore perhaps less reliable than we might wish.

Figure 5: Position of claims towards Muslim rights by year (means)




Table 15: Position of claims by actor

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Governments	0.13	82	0.750
Legislatives	0.42	24	0.654
Judiciary	-0.20	15	0.561
Police and security agencies	-0.28	18	0.461
State executive agencies specifically dealing with migrants	0.0	2	1.414
Other state executive agencies	-0.50	2	0.707
Political parties	-0.24	21	0.768
Unions	0.0	1	-
Employers organizations and firms	-0.50	2	0.707
Churches	0.64	11	0.505
Christians	0.25	4	0.500
Media and journalists	0.22	9	0.833
Professional organizations and groups	0.18	107	0.596
Muslim organizations and groups	0.59	138	0.507
Other minorities: religion-based groups	0.0	8	0.535
Antiracist organizations and groups	0.14	7	0.900
Pro-minority rights and welfare organizations and groups	1.00	2	0.000
General solidarity, human rights and welfare organizations	1.00	5	0.000
Racist and extreme right organizations and groups	-0.92	12	0.289

Other civil society organizations and groups	0.14	14	0.864
Unknown actors	0.36	25	0.700

Table 15 shows that the actors most likely to make claims negatively positioned towards Muslims can be seen to be the judiciary (legal proceedings), police and security agencies (arrests/investigations etc), individual political parties, and – unsurprisingly – racist and extreme right organizations.

Table 16: Position of claims by issue

	Mean	N	Standard deviation
Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	-0.13	16	0.806
Minority integration general	0.35	31	0.608
Minority rights and participation citizenship rights	0.33	18	0.594
Minority rights and participation social rights	0.55	11	0.688
Minority rights and participation cultural rights	0.50	20	0.607
Minority rights and participation religious rights	0.48	155	0.677
Minority rights and participation other rights	0.17	12	0.835
Discrimination and unequal treatment	0.13	8	0.835
Minority social problems	-0.20	93	0.543
Interethnic, inter-, and intraorganizational relations	0.09	53	0.450
Racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts	0.66	44	0.526
Non-institutional racism/islamophobia, xenophobia and extreme right in society	0.36	14	0.633
Islamophobic claims	-0.93	15	0.258
Homeland politics	0.0	1	0.00
Transnational politics	0.59	17	0.507
Other	1.00	1	1.00

Table 16 shows that the areas in which claims were most likely to be negatively positioned were Islamophobic claims (unsurprisingly), minority social problems (accounted for by criticisms of extremist tendencies) and immigration politics. Aside from these areas, the overall tone of the discussion was largely positive, with noticeable support for Muslim rights in the areas of racism/islamophobia in institutional contexts (mean: 0.66) and minority rights and participation issues in general.

Table 17: Issues of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organization s and groups	Other civil society actors
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Immigration, asylum, and aliens politics	7.1	0	1.9	1.4
Minority integration politics	78.7	85.7	82.6	75
Antiracism/islamophobia	13.5	4.8	10.3	11.4
Islamophobic claims	0	9.5	0	6.4
Actor claims Muslims	0.6	0	3.9	5.5
Other	0	0	1.3	0.5
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	551			

Table 17 shows which type of actors were most likely to make claims about which issues. As we can see, all types of actor expressed themselves most often on the issues of minority integration politics. State actors surprisingly expressed more claims about antiracism/islamophobia than either Muslim organizations or other civil society actors. Individual political parties or their adherents can be seen as most likely to express Islamophobic claims.

6. Objects

Table 18: Objects of claims (percentages)

No Muslim object	36.5
Muslims as actors	44.7
All Muslims in general	24.1
Majority/most Muslims	1.1
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	10.0
Individual Muslims	7.1
Unclassifiable Muslims	2.4
Islam as religion	18.8
Islam in general	10.7
Islam mainstream	1.6
Minority currents within Islam	1.5
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	4.4
Unclassifiable Islam	0.6
Total	100%
N	551

Most claims coded as having a Muslim object were about Muslims as actors (36.5%) rather than Islam as a religion (18.9%). Of these, most referred to Muslims in a general sense, while a smaller number dealt with a specific group (usually when discussing extremist tendencies) or individual Muslim actors. Of the claims dealing with Islam as a religion, similarly, most discussed Islam in general and fewer discussed the nature of a specific movement.

Table 19: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims (percentages)

	Overall
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	42.6
Country of residence nationality	12.3
Asia: middle east	0.2
Turkish	0.5
Saudi Arabian	0.2
Pakistani	0.4
Afghan	0.4
Africa: North	0.2
Maroccan	1.5
Algeria	3.1
Total	100.2
N	551

Table 19 shows that in 42.6% of cases the ethnicity or nationality of the object was not specified. Among those specified, 12.3% were from the country of residence and 3.1% from Algeria.

Table 20: Objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organization s and groups	Other civil society actors
Muslims as actors				
No Muslim object	26.5	38.1	47.7	35.5
All Muslims in general	27.1	23.8	21.3	24.1
Majority/most Muslims	0	0	1.3	1.8
Minority / a small group / a particular categorical group of Muslims	14.8	4.8	7.7	8.6
Individual Muslims	15.5	0	2.6	5.0
Unclassifiable Muslims	0.6	4.8	2.6	3.2
Islam as religion				
Islam in general	5.8	28.6	6.5	15.5
Islam mainstream	3.2	0	1.3	0.9
Minority currents within Islam	1.9	0	0.6	1.8
Specific religious stream/movement within Islam	3.2	0	7.1	3.6
Unclassifiable Islam	1.3	0	1.3	0
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	551			

Table 20 shows which actors most frequently make claims with different types of Muslim object. Figures that stand out are that state actors are most likely to make claims both about a

minority/small group of Muslims and about individual Muslim objects. Since most of the claims with minority/individual Muslim objects relate to extremism or surrounding issues, the prevalence of state actors can be understood as a result. Political parties seem more likely than other types of actor to make claims involving the object 'Islam as religion'.

Table 21: Nationality or ethnicity of objects of claims by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organization s and groups	Other civil society actors
No specification of nationality or ethnicity	42.6	47.6	32.9	49.1
Country of residence nationality	14.2	9.5	14.2	10.0
Asia: middle east	1.3	0	0.6	0.9
Asia: south and east	1.3	0	0	0.9
Africa: North	11.0	0	2.6	2.7
Not applicable: no object	29.7	42.9	49.7	36.4
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	551			

Table 21 shows that all types of actors were most likely to make claims in which there was no specification of the nationality/ethnicity of the object. Of those claims that did specify, most claims by all types of actors had a country-of-residence (ie. French) nationality object. State actors (governments, legislatures, judiciary, police, executive agencies etc) also frequently made claims with a North African object, unsurprisingly given the origin of most of France's Muslim population.

7. Scope of claims

Table 22: Scope of actors (percentages)

Supra- or transnational	1.8
National	40.1
Local	23.6
Unknown	34.5
Total	100%
N	551

Table 22 shows that most claims were made by an actor with national scope (40.1%): this applied to any state actor other than local politicians and any actor from a national Muslim umbrella organization such as the CFCM. Local actors – both politicians and association leaders etc – also had some voice in the debate, with 23.6% of all claims. The very low figure

for supra- and transnational actors is testament to the rather inward-looking tone of France's national debate about Islam.

Table 23: Scope of addressees, criticized actors and supported actors (percentages)

	Addresses	Criticized actors	Supported actors
Supra- or transnational	1.3	6.4	2.5
National	16.2	21.4	14.0
Local	5.3	7.8	9.3
Unknown	77.3	64.4	74.2
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	551	551	551

Again, of those claims that involve an addressee, criticized or supported actor, most in all three categories were national in scope (table 23). More criticized actors than addressees or supported actors (proportionally) were supra- or transnational; this trend was due largely to criticisms of the US-UK invasion of Iraq.

Table 24: Scope of issues (percentages)

No verbal claim	7.1
Supra- or transnational	15.4
National	55.2
Local	21.8
Unknown	0.5
Total	100%
N	551

Table 24 confirms that the level of the debate in France is largely national in terms of the geographical scope of the issues discussed (55.2%). A significant proportion (21.8%) is also local, often related to issues such as mosque construction projects or attempted installation of Islamic schools. Supra- and transnational issues (15.4%) were gathered around the pole issues of 9/11 and the Iraq war.

Table 25: Scope of issues by type of actor (percentages)

	State actors	Political parties	Muslim organization s and groups	Other civil society actors
No verbal claim	5.2	4.8	9.0	7.3

Supra- or transnational	11.0	4.8	13.5	20.9
National	56.8	81.0	53.5	52.7
Local	26.5	9.5	23.9	18.2
Unknown	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.9
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	551			

A majority of claims made by all types of actor were national (table 25). However, state actors and Muslim organizations also regularly discussed local issues (26.5% and 23.9% respectively of claims made by state and Muslim actors). As a proportion of claims made by each type of actor, civil society actors were most likely to make claims relating to supra- and transnational issues.

8. Conclusion

Overall this report has shown that France has a few specific characteristics that make the analysis of public debates particularly relevant. Its republican model tends to translate in terms of religious rights as a strict secularism which accords full freedom of conscience in private life, but attempts to maintain neutrality in the public sphere and a 'blind' policy in distribution of resources. In other words, French republicanism preaches that religion, as a form of communal identity, must remain outside the arena in which group affiliation is subsumed into shared citizenship.

While statistics can diverge hugely in their estimates owing to particular constraints of French law on the gathering of ethnic statistics, this report has confirmed that Muslims do stand out today as a main 'religious minority' in the country, and are certainly treated as such by the heated media debate on Islam. In particular, coverage of Muslims in the French press has drastically increased between 2003 and 2004, when discussions over the principle of *laïcité* have referred to famous ban on 'ostentatious religious symbols' at schools. Put simply, a main characteristic of the French case consists in the fact that there has been more and more discussion, over the past decade, of *laïcité* and potential contradictions between Islam and republicanism.

While referring to famous case of the ban on 'ostentatious religious symbols' in the public sphere, passed in 2004 and widely perceived as a specific measure targeting female students wearing the Muslim hijab in schools, this report has gone beyond discussion of famous instances in the public debate, shedding light on many different aspects of French political debates through systematic treatment of empirical evidence.

Overall, the French debate is characterized by the fact that Muslim organisations and groups themselves intervene extensively over issues of their own interest. It is also interesting to notice that Muslims had the highest scores in terms of conventional and demonstrative mobilization. When looking at themes of discussion, there is a clear bias towards two areas. Firstly, minority *religious* rights and participation, as a good deal of claims dealing with this issue were generated by the debate around the passing of the ban on 'ostentatious religious symbols' in public spaces (most prominently schools) in 2004. Another sub-issue frequently

seen in claims under this rubric was state recognition and/or funding for mosque construction projects. The second significant areas of discussion were those falling under the rubric 'minority social problems'; of these claims, most were related to political or Islamic extremism (within France more than external events such as 9/11). As regards actors most likely to make claims negatively positioned towards Muslims, one can single out the judiciary through legal proceedings, police and security agencies through arrests and investigations, and extreme right organizations.

Finally, the French public debate is characterized by predominance of the national level also when looking at more detailed variables such as those contained in articulated interventions reporting an addressee, criticized or supported actor. Yet, it should be noticed that a relevant number of claims are made by sub-national actors, both at the local and the regional level.