

EURISLAM WORKPACKAGE 4

INTEGRATED REPORT ON SURVEY ANALYSIS



Actual submission date: 15 December 2011

Start date of project: 1 February 2009

Duration: 36 months

Organisation name of lead contractor for this deliverable: ULB

Revision [0]

Project co-funded by the European Commission within the Seventh Framework Programme

Dissemination Level

PU	Public	X
PP	Restricted to other programme participants (including the Commission Services)	
RE	Restricted to a group specified by the consortium (including the Commission Services)	
CO	Confidential, only for members of the consortium (including the Commission Services)	

1. Aims and scope

In workpackage 3 a survey questionnaire was developed which enables a study of the individual characteristics of Muslim immigrants, focusing on attitudes, norms, and values, particularly those relating to democratic norms, gender relations and family values, ethnic, religious, European and receiving society identification, and attitudes towards relations across ethnic and religious boundaries. We also look at cultural and religious resources and practices (language proficiency, adherence to various religious practices, interethnic and interreligious partnerships and marriages, the frequency and quality of interethnic and interreligious relationships with neighbours, friends and colleagues) as well as membership in social and political organisations both of the same group and of the receiving society.

The main objective of work package 4 is to move to the subsequent phase of data analysis (cross-tabulations, regression analysis, logistic regression, etc.). Through bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses we aim to assess the extent to which cross-national differences on key cultural variables persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration. This integrated survey report gives an overview of the main results of the survey endeavour.

2. Data and methods

We undertook data collection making use of a standardized questionnaire (see report on WP3) and a CATI-procedure (computer assisted telephone interviewing) among a sample of Muslims and a sample of the ethnic majority group in our six participating countries (Belgium, the UK, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland and Germany). The Muslim sample was constituted by making use of the following procedure: first, through an onomastic method (name recognition method), a sampling frame was constituted making use of digital phone book records (including both land lines as cellular phones), aimed at identifying people of Moroccan, Turkish, Pakistani and Ex-Yugoslav origin. Subsequently these people were phoned up by a polling agency and screened whether they had indeed the aforementioned national origins and were themselves Muslims or of Muslim descent.

Table 1 provides information about the realised sample sizes in the different countries and for the different groups. In total 7256 people were interviewed: 1188 in the Netherlands (NL), 1317 in Germany (DE), 1184 in Switzerland (CH), 1185 in the United Kingdom (UK), 1197 in Belgium (BE) and 1185 in France (FR). In each country we had the aim of interviewing 385 members of the national majority group (predominantly non-Muslims) and 250 or 150 Muslims of each of the ethnic minority groups. In countries where this ethnic minority group is sizeable, 250 people were interviewed, and if it concerns a small group the sample was limited to 150 people. The aim was to strike a balance between cost-effectiveness, minimal sample size requirements and information on all ethnic groups in our six participating countries.

Table 1: Sample sizes for Muslim groups and ethnic majority non-Muslim comparison group

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR	TOTAL
National majority group	385	390	383	387	386	383	2314
Ex-Yugoslavia group	151	256	249	150	153	150	1109
Turkish group	250	253	253	250	256	250	1512
Moroccan group	250	256	147	148	255	257	1313
Pakistani group	152	162	152	250	147	145	1008
N	1188	1317	1184	1185	1197	1185	7256

In all countries data-collection was subcontracted to professional polling agencies. Table 2 provides response and non-response rates for Belgium as an example. Patterns are similar for other countries. We can note that the rates of successful phone calls leading to a useable interview are highest for the national majority control group (19,8%), followed by the ex-Yugoslave group (15,6%) and the Turkish group (20,5%) and lowest for the Moroccan (11,4%) and Pakistani groups (7,3%). For the Pakistani group this is mainly due to the large number of non-useable phone numbers, while for the Moroccan group this is mainly due to refusal rate. If we calculate the response rate on the basis of successful contacts with people falling within the population sample frames (i.e. eligible contacts), the response rates are 45,1% for the national majority group in Belgium, 32,7% for the ex-Yugoslave group, 27,6% for the Moroccan origin group, 24% for the Pakistani origin group and 36,8% for the Turkish origin group. Those people who refused were asked a follow up question why they refused and almost all of them noted they either had no time or where not interested.

Table 2: Response and non-response rates for different groups in Belgium

BE	
National majority group	
Numbers dialed	1946
Successful interview	19,8%
Refusal	32,2%
Incorrect number / Screened out / No contact	56,2%
Response rate (eligible contacts)	45,1%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	
Numbers dialed	749
Successful interview	15,6%
Refusal	32,2%
Incorrect number / Screened out / No contact	52,2%
Response rate (eligible contacts)	32,7%
Turkish group	
Numbers dialed	1247
Successful interview	20,5%
Refusal	35,2%
Incorrect number / Screened out / No contact	44,3%
Response rate (eligible contacts)	36,8%
Moroccan group	
Numbers dialed	2247
Successful interview	11,4%
Refusal	29,8%
Incorrect number / Screened out / No contact	58,8%
Response rate (eligible contacts)	27,6%
Pakistani group	
Numbers dialed	1247
Successful interview	7,3%
Refusal	23,2%
Incorrect number / Screened out / No contact	69,4%
Response rate (eligible contacts)	24%

In the next section we provide the results of a number of univariate and bivariate analyses to present the main characteristics of our groups under study. In a subsequent section we will undertake a multivariate analysis.

3. Comparative overview

We will start off with presenting a number of basic characteristics of our realised samples.

3.1. Gender

In tables 3 to 8 we present the gender distribution for the different countries and different ethnic groups. We can observe that in the Pakistani and ex-Yugoslavian samples there are systematically more men present.

Table 3: Gender distribution for Belgium

	gender of the respondent		Total
	male	female	
national majority group	179	207	386
	46,4%	53,6%	100,0%
Yugoslavian	81	72	153
	52,9%	47,1%	100,0%
Turkish	120	136	256
	46,9%	53,1%	100,0%
Moroccan	119	136	255
	46,7%	53,3%	100,0%
Pakistan	98	49	147
	66,7%	33,3%	100,0%

Table 4: Gender distribution for UK

	gender of the respondent		Total
	male	female	
national majority group	192	195	387
	49,6%	50,4%	100,0%
Yugoslavian	77	73	150
	51,3%	48,7%	100,0%
Turkish	127	123	250
	50,8%	49,2%	100,0%
Moroccan	72	76	148
	48,6%	51,4%	100,0%
Pakistan	141	109	250
	56,4%	43,6%	100,0%

Table 5: Gender distribution for the Netherlands

	gender of the respondent		Total
	male	female	
national majority group	184	201	385
	47,8%	52,2%	100,0%
Yugoslavian	83	68	151
	55,0%	45,0%	100,0%
Turkish	104	146	250
	41,6%	58,4%	100,0%
Moroccan	97	55	152
	63,8%	36,2%	100,0%

Table 6: Gender distribution for France

	gender of the respondent		Total
	male	female	
national majority group	182 47,5%	201 52,5%	383 100,0%
Yugoslavian	77 51,3%	73 48,7%	150 100,0%
Turkish	108 43,2%	142 56,8%	250 100,0%
Moroccan	104 40,5%	153 59,5%	257 100,0%
Pakistan	87 60,0%	58 40,0%	145 100,0%

Table 7: Gender distribution for Germany

	gender of the respondent		Total
	male	female	
national majority group	167 42,8%	223 57,2%	390 100,0%
Yugoslavian	139 54,3%	117 45,7%	256 100,0%
Turkish	120 47,4%	133 52,6%	253 100,0%
Moroccan	153 59,8%	103 40,2%	256 100,0%
Pakistan	88 54,3%	74 45,7%	162 100,0%

Table 8: Gender distribution for Switzerland

	gender of the respondent		Total
	male	female	
national majority group	186 48,6%	197 51,4%	383 100,0%
Yugoslavian	155 62,2%	94 37,8%	249 100,0%
Turkish	127 50,2%	126 49,8%	253 100,0%
Moroccan	81 55,1%	66 44,9%	147 100,0%
Pakistan	103 67,8%	49 32,2%	152 100,0%

3.2. Age

In figures 1 to 6 the box whisker plots show the age distribution for the different samples of Muslims and the ethnic majority group in our six countries. We can observe that, with the exception of the UK, the ethnic majority group is on average older than the different groups with a Muslim background.

Figure 1: Age distribution for Belgium




Figure 2: Age distribution for UK




Figure 3: Age distribution for the Netherlands




Figure 4: Age distribution for France




Figure 5: Age distribution for Germany





Figure 6: Age distribution for Switzerland



3.3. Migration generation

In tables 9 to 14 for the four Muslims groups absolute figures and proportions per migration generation is given, distinguishing first generation (born outside of country from parents who never lived in receiving society), in between generation (born outside of country from parents who migrated to receiving society) and second generation (born inside the country from parents born outside the country). We can observe that the first generation is most present in our realised samples.

Table 9: Generation distribution for Belgium

	generation		
	first generation	In between generation	second generation
Yugoslavian	99 64,7%	45 29,4%	9 5,9%
Turkish	138 53,9%	52 20,3%	66 25,8%
Moroccan	89 34,9%	54 21,2%	112 43,9%
Pakistan	98 66,7%	29 19,7%	20 13,6%

Table 10: Generation distribution for UK

	generation		
	first generation	In between generation	second generation
Yugoslavian	102 68,0%	21 14,0%	27 18,0%
Turkish	135 54,0%	55 22,0%	60 24,0%
Moroccan	81 54,7%	32 21,6%	35 23,6%
Pakistan	60 24,0%	58 23,2%	132 52,8%

Table 11: Generation distribution for the Netherlands

	generation		
	first generation	In between generation	second generation
Yugoslavian	103 68,2%	42 27,8%	6 4,0%
Turkish	68 27,2%	122 48,8%	60 24,0%
Moroccan	85 34,0%	101 40,4%	64 25,6%
Pakistan	81 53,3%	34 22,4%	37 24,3%

Table 12. Generational distribution for France

	generation		
	first generation	In between generation	second generation
Yugoslavian	109 72,7%	25 16,7%	16 10,7%
Turkish	86 34,4%	81 32,4%	83 33,2%
Moroccan	133 51,8%	50 19,5%	74 28,8%
Pakistan	68 46,9%	35 24,1%	42 29,0%

Table 13: Generation distribution for Germany

	generation		
	first generation	In between generation	second generation
Yugoslavian	139 54,3%	53 20,7%	64 25,0%
Turkish	121 47,8%	68 26,9%	64 25,3%
Moroccan	120 46,9%	63 24,6%	73 28,5%
Pakistan	93 57,4%	31 19,1%	38 23,5%

Table 14: Generation distribution for Switzerland

	generation		
	first generation	In between generation	second generation
Yugoslavian	143 57,4%	93 37,3%	13 5,2%
Turkish	143 56,5%	63 24,9%	47 18,6%
Moroccan	135 91,8%	1 0,7%	11 7,5%
Pakistan	108 71,1%	27 17,8%	17 11,2%

3.4. Religious denomination

In tables 15 to 20 we present the religious faith denomination in our subsamples: those of the national majority group and those of the ethnic minority groups originating from Muslim countries and from Muslim descent (having Muslim parents).

Table 15: Religious denomination in subsamples for Belgium

	What is your religious faith denomination?					
	Protes- tant	Roman Catholic	Ortho- dox	Jewish	Islam / Muslim denomination	Buddhist
national majority group	3 0,8%	271 70,2%	0 0,0%	1 0,3%	2 0,5%	1 0,3%
Yugoslavian	0 0,0%	3 2,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	134 88,2%	0 0,0%
Turkish	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	2 0,8%	0 0,0%	251 98,0%	0 0,0%
Moroccan	0 0,0%	2 0,8%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	243 95,3%	0 0,0%
Pakistan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	144 98,0%	0 0,0%

Table 15 bis: Religious denomination in subsamples for Belgium (continued)

	What is your religious faith denomination?			Total
	atheist/agnostic/Do not belong to any denomination	Other	Jehova witness	
national majority group	106 27,5%	1 0,3%	1 0,3%	386 100,0%
Yugoslavian	15 9,9%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	152 100,0%
Turkish	2 0,8%	0 0,0%	1 0,4%	256 100,0%
Moroccan	9 3,5%	1 0,4%	0 0,0%	255 100,0%
Pakistan	3 2,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	147 100,0%

As we can observe in table 15 representing the results from Belgium, a majority of the dominant ethnic group identifies itself as being Roman Catholic (70,2%), while a sizeable minority (27,5%) states they are atheist, agnostic or do not belong to any denomination. Among the ethnic minority groups originating from Muslim countries and of Muslim descent, 88,2% of the ex-Yugoslave group, 98% of the Turkish origin group, 95,3% of the Moroccan origin group and 98% of the Pakistani origin group declare to be of Muslim denomination. Of the ex-Yugoslave group, almost 10% states they are atheists, agnostics or do not belong to a religious denomination.

Table 16 presents the results for the United Kingdom. We can observe that of the national majority group the majority declares itself to be Protestant (64,9%), these are mainly Anglicans. The second largest group (20,4%) declares to be atheist, agnostic or not belonging to any denomination, while 14,2% says to be Roman Catholic. Strikingly, in the UK all interviewees of the ethnic minority groups stemming from Muslim countries declare to be Muslims. This seems to be the unfortunate result of a misunderstanding by the polling agency

which only withheld self-identified Muslims as respondents. This should be taken into account when making comparisons with the results for other countries.

Table 16: Religious denomination in subsamples for United Kingdom

	What is your religious faith denomination?				Total
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	Islam / Muslim denomination	atheist/agnostic /Do not belong to any denomination	
national majority group	251 64,9%	55 14,2%	2 0,5%	79 20,4%	387 100,0%
Yugoslavian	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	150 100,0%	0 0,0%	150 100,0%
Turkish	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%
Moroccan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	148 100,0%	0 0,0%	148 100,0%
Pakistan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%

Table 17: Religious denomination in subsamples for the Netherlands

	What is your religious faith denomination?					
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	Orthodox	Islam / Muslim denomination	Buddhist	atheist/agnostic /Do not belong to any denomination
national majority group	92 23,9%	104 27,0%	1 0,3%	0 0,0%	2 0,5%	157 40,8%
Yugoslavian	1 0,7%	3 2,0%	3 2,0%	117 77,5%	0 0,0%	24 15,9%
Turkish	0 0,0%	1 0,4%	0 0,0%	236 94,4%	0 0,0%	10 4,0%
Moroccan	0 0,0%	1 0,4%	0 0,0%	247 98,8%	0 0,0%	2 0,8%
Pakistan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	137 90,1%	0 0,0%	5 3,3%

Table 17 reports on the pattern for the Netherlands. The largest group (40,8%) among the national majority sample opted for one of the responses of the answering category ‘atheist, agnostic or not belonging to any denomination’. This result is strikingly high and most probably is related to the fact that a number of people opted for the box ‘does not belong to any denomination’ as they did not see themselves reflected in the suggested answering categories. It should be noted that in the Netherlands there are historically several competing Christian (protestant) churches (Calvinists, Lutherans, Baptists, Reformists, Evangelists, etc.)

that are considered to be quite distinct and undoubtedly a group of people preferred choosing for ‘does not belong to any denomination’ instead of option for ‘protestant’. Of the sample 23,9% opted for the category ‘Protestant’, while 27% declares to be Catholic. Of more interest to us in the context of this research project, are, however, the results for the ethnic minority groups stemming from Muslim countries and being from Muslim descent. Among the ex-Yugoslave group, 77,5% states to be Muslim, of the Turkish group 94,4% says to be of Muslim denomination, while this is the case for 98,8% of the Moroccan group and 90,1% of the Pakistani group. Of the ex-Yugoslave group 15,9% ticked the box for the ‘atheist/agnostic/does not belong to any denomination’ option.

Table 17 bis: Religious denomination in subsamples for the Netherlands (continued)

	What is your religious faith denomination?		Total
	Other	Jehova witness	
national majority group	26 6,8%	3 0,8%	385 100,0%
Yugoslavian	2 1,3%	1 0,7%	151 100,0%
Turkish	3 1,2%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%
Moroccan	0 0%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%
Pakistan	1 0,7%	9 5,9%	152 100,0%

Of the French majority group, a large majority of 67,8% declared itself to be Roman Catholic as one can observed in Table 18. The rest of this group in majority says to be atheist/agnostic or not belonging to any denomination (26,5%). Of the ethnic minority groups, 95,3% of the ex-Yugoslaves declare to be Muslims, while this is the case of 98,4% of the Turkish origin group, 96,5% of the Moroccan origin group and 97,9% of the Pakistani origin group. Approximately 2 to 3 percent of these ethnic minority groups of Muslim descent say they are atheists/agnostics or do not belong to any denomination.

Table 18: Religious denomination in subsamples for France

	What is your religious faith denomination?					
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	Orthodox	Jewish	Islam / Muslim denomination	atheist/agnostic/Do not belong to any denomination
national majority group	11 3,0%	246 67,8%	0 0,0%	1 0,3%	7 1,9%	95 26,2%
Yugoslavian	0 0,0%	1 0,7%	2 1,3%	0 0,0%	142 95,3%	4 2,7%
Turkish	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	246 98,4%	4 1,6%
Moroccan	0 0,0%	4 1,6%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	248 96,5%	5 1,9%
Pakistan	1 0,7%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	142 97,9%	2 1,4%

Table 18 bis : Religious denomination in subsamples for France (continued)

	What is your religious faith denomination?		Total
	Other	Jehova witness	
national majority group	1 0,3%	2 0,6%	363 100,0%
Yugoslavian	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	149 100,0%
Turkish	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	250 100,0%
Moroccan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	257 100,0%
Pakistan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	145 100,0%

Table 19 presents the results for Germany. Of the national majority group, 43,4% declares to be Protestant, while 33,2% declares to be Catholic and 23,1% says to be atheist/agnostic or to not belong to any religious denomination. Of the ethnic minority groups, 97,3% of the ex-Yugoslave group, 98,4% of the Turkish group, 94,9% of the Moroccan group and 97,5% of the Pakistani group declare to be of Muslim denomination. Of the same groups respectively 1,2% of the ex-Yugoslave, 1,6% of the Turkish origin group, 3,9% of the Moroccan origin group and 2,5% of the Pakistani origin group declare to be atheist/agnostic or not belong to any religious denomination.

Table 19: Religious denomination in subsamples for Germany

	What is your religious faith denomination?					Total
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	Islam / Muslim denomination	atheist/agnostic /Do not belong to any denomination	Other	
national majority group	169 43,4%	129 33,2%	0 0,0%	90 23,1%	1 0,3%	389 100,0%
Yugoslavian	2 0,8%	2 0,8%	249 97,3%	3 1,2%	0 0,0%	256 100,0%
Turkish	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	249 98,4%	4 1,6%	0 0,0%	253 100,0%
Moroccan	1 0,4%	1 0,4%	242 94,9%	10 3,9%	1 0,4%	255 100,0%
Pakistan	0 0,0%	0 0,0%	157 97,5%	4 2,5%	0 0,0%	161 100,0%

Finally, in table 20 we present the results for the different subsamples in Switzerland. We can observe that there are about 48,8% Protestants and 36,5% Roman Catholics. Among the ethnic minority samples of Muslim descent, 97,6% of ex-Yugoslaves, 96,8% of the Turkish

origin group, 93,2% of the Moroccan origin group and 96% of the Pakistani group self identifies as being of Muslim denomination.

Table 20: Religious denomination in subsamples for Switzerland

	What is your religious faith denomination?						Total
	Protestant	Roman Catholic	Jewish	Islam / Muslim denomination	atheist/agnostic/Do not belong to any denomination	Other	
national majority group	186	139	2	2	51	1	381
	48,8%	36,5%	0,5%	0,5%	13,4%	0,3%	100%
Yugoslavian	1	1	0	243	4	0	249
	0,4%	0,4%	0,0%	97,6%	1,6%	0,0%	100%
Turkish	0	0	0	245	8	0	253
	0,0%	0,0%	0,0%	96,8%	3,2%	0,0%	100%
Moroccan	0	1	0	137	8	1	147
	0,0%	0,7%	0,0%	93,2%	5,4%	0,7%	100%
Pakistan	2	1	0	145	2	1	151
	1,3%	0,7%	0,0%	96,0%	1,3%	0,7%	100%

In table 21 we give a summary of the results for the different countries and different ethnic groups with regard to the proportion that is Muslim. We can see that in our control samples of the national majority group the proportion of self proclaimed Muslims is zero or very small. In every country there are, of course, converts but as their absolute number is small it is rather unlikely that they would pop up in a random sample. One striking result is the 100% Muslim denomination among ethnic minority groups in the UK, but this is an unfortunate bias introduced in the selection process of respondents during data collection. In the Netherlands and in Belgium the number of ex-Yugoslaves of Muslim descent that consider themselves to be Muslims is lower than in other countries and lower than for other ethnic minority groups. Otherwise there is no clear pattern to be observed in the data.

Table 20: Proportion of the number of self-identified Muslims per subsample per country

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	0%	0%	0,5%	0,5%	0,5%	1,9%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	77,5%	97,3%	97,6%	100%	88,2%	95,3%
Turkish group	94,4%	98,4%	96,8%	100%	98%	98,4%
Moroccan group	98,8%	94,9%	93,2%	100%	95,3%	96,5%
Pakistani group	90,1%	97,5%	96%	100%	98%	97,9%

We will now examine country per country and for the different ethnic minority groups to what branch of Islam respondents count themselves, starting with Belgium in table 21. As we can see in all groups Sunnites are in the majority, which is particularly the case for the Turkish and the Moroccans. Among the Pakistani almost 8% identifies as Shiite. There are 6% Alevi among the Turkish Muslims. Strikingly, the answers for the category 'other' are very high for the ex-Yugoslaves, amount to 12,9% for the Pakistani, 9,1% for the Moroccans and 3,6% for

the Turks. These respondents were able to specify and most cases they stated ‘just Muslim’ or ‘normal Muslim’, suggesting they do not know what particular branch they are part of.

Table 21: To what branch of Islam do Muslims in Belgium belong?

	Sunnite	Shiite	Alevi	Sufi	Ahmad- diyya	Hanafi	Other	Total
Ex-Yugoslavian	77 60,2%	5 3,9%	0	0	1 0,8%	0	44 34,4%	128 100%
Turkish	221 88,8%	3 1,2%	15 6,0%	1 0,4%	0 0,0%	1 0,4%	9 3,6%	249 100%
Moroccan	210 86,4%	5 2,1%	1 0,4%	0	2 0,8%	0	22 9,1%	243 100%
Pakistan	85 60,7%	11 7,9%	0	0	24 17,1%	0	18 12,9%	140 100%

Table 22 presents the results for the UK Muslims. Just as in the Belgian case, we can observe a high number of ex-Yugoslaves opting for the ‘other’ category. Among the UK Turks of Muslim denomination 8,8% is Alevi. Most Muslims declare themselves to be Sunnite and there seem to be hardly any Shiite Muslims.

Table 22: To what branch of Islam do Muslims in the United Kingdom belong?

	Sunnite	Shiite	Alevi	Sufi	Ahmad- diyya	Hanafi	Other	Total
Ex-Yugoslavian	85 56,7%	0	0	0	0	0	65 43,3%	150 100%
Turkish	219 87,6%	0	22 8,8%	0	0	0	9 3,6%	250 100%
Moroccan	144 97,3%	0	0	0	0	0	4 2,7%	148 100%
Pakistan	234 94,0%	5 2,0%	0	0	5 2,0%	0	5 2,0%	249 100%

Table 23 presents the results for the Dutch Muslims. We can note that, just as in Belgium and the UK, a considerable number of the ex-Yugoslave Muslims do not place themselves in a particular branch. This is also the case for a quite considerable number of Moroccan Muslims (25,9%). Among the Turkish Muslims, 9,7% state to be Alevi.

Table 23: To what branch of Islam do Muslims in the Netherlands belong?

	Sunnite	Shiite	Alevi	Sufi	Ahmad- diyya	Hanafi	Other	Total
Ex-Yugoslavian	48 41,0%	0	0	0	3 2,6%	0	66 56,4%	117 100%
Turkish	180 76,3%	4 1,7%	23 9,7%	2 0,8%	1 0,4%	0	26 11,0%	236 100%
Moroccan	177 71,7%	0	0	2 0,8%	4 1,6%	0	64 25,9%	247 100%
Pakistan	108 78,8%	8 5,8%	0	2 1,5%	6 4,4%	0	13 9,5%	137 100%

Table 24 presents the results for the Swiss Muslims. Strikingly, in Switzerland the ex-Yugoslave Muslims seem to have less difficulty in identifying their branch. Among the

Turkish Muslims, the majority is Sunnite, but there is a sizeable proportion of Alevi (28,3%) and some who spontaneously identified as Hanefi (4%), which we should note had not been offered as an answering category in any of the participating countries.

Table 24: To what branch of Islam do Muslims in Switzerland belong?

	Sunnite	Shiite	Alevi	Sufi	Ahmad- diyya	Hanefi	Other	Total
Ex-Yugoslavian	76	5	3	0	1	0	7	92
	82,6%	5,4%	3,3%		1,1%		7,6%	100%
Turkish	143	3	64	2	2	9	3	226
	63,3%	1,3%	28,3%	0,9%	0,9%	4%	1,3%	100%
Moroccan	113	0	1	1	2	0	2	119
	95,0%		0,8%	0,8%	1,7%		1,7%	100%
Pakistan	88	4	0	5	20	0	7	124
	71,0%	3,2%		4,0%	16,1%		5,6%	100%

Table 25 presents the results for the French Muslims. Just as in Switzerland, the ex-Yugoslave Muslims seem to have less difficulty in identifying their branch and nearly all claim to be Sunnite. Among the Turkish Muslims, the majority is Sunnite, but there is a sizeable proportion of Alevi (19,7%). Let us also note the spontaneous identification as Hanefi (7,8%) among the French Muslims.

Table 25: To what branch of Islam do Muslims in France belong?

	Sunnite	Shiite	Alevi	Sufi	Ahmad- diyya	Hanefi	Other	Total
Ex-Yugoslavian	48	1	0	0	0	0	0	49
	98,0%	2,0%						100%
Turkish	134	4	38	1	0	15	1	193
	69,4%	2,1%	19,7%	0,5%		7,8%	0,5%	100%
Moroccan	180	1	0	0	1	0	1	183
	98,4%	0,5%			0,5%		0,5%	100%
Pakistan	104	3	0	1	2	0	0	110
	94,5%	2,7%		0,9%	1,8%			100%

Table 26 presents the results for the German Muslims. Just as in Switzerland and France, the ex-Yugoslave Muslims seem to have less difficulty in identifying their branch and the majority claim to be Sunnite, although 7,9% state to be Shiite. Among the Turkish Muslims, the majority is Sunnite, with a smaller proportion of Alevi (10,9%).

Table 26: To what branch of Islam do Muslims in Germany belong?

	Sunnite	Shiite	Alevi	Sufi	Ahmad- diyya	Hanefi	Other	Total
Ex-Yugoslavian	104	10	3	0	1	1	7	126
	82,5%	7,9%	2,4%	0,0%	0,8%	0,8%	5,6%	100%
Turkish	207	1	26	1	0	3	1	239
	86,6%	0,4%	10,9%	0,4%	0,0%	1,3%	0,4%	100%
Moroccan	195	4	1	0	0	0	3	203
	96,1%	2,0%	0,5%	0,0%	0,0%		1,5%	100%
Pakistan	75	4	0	0	66	0	0	145
	51,7%	2,8%	0,0%	0,0%	45,5%			100%

3.5. Origin partner

Table 27 to 32 show to what extent people from our ethnic minority subsamples have a partner born in the same country of origin.

Table 27: Partner born in the country of origin? (results for Belgium)

	Yes	No	Total having a partner
Yugoslavian	103 92,0%	9 8,0%	112 100%
Turkish	160 73,4%	58 26,6%	218 100%
Moroccan	122 79,7%	31 20,3%	153 100%
Pakistan	90 91,8%	8 8,2%	98 100%

Table 28: Partner born in the country of origin? (results for United Kingdom)

	Yes	No	Total having a partner
Yugoslavian	123 99,2%	1 0,8%	124 100%
Turkish	191 92,3%	16 7,7%	207 100%
Moroccan	101 88,6%	13 11,4%	114 100%
Pakistan	152 78,4%	42 21,6%	194 100%

Table 29: Partner born in the country of origin? (results for the Netherlands)

	Yes	No	Total having a partner
Yugoslavian	107 97,3%	3 2,7%	110 100%
Turkish	164 89,6%	19 10,4%	183 100%
Moroccan	153 90,5%	16 9,5%	169 100%
Pakistan	102 95,3%	5 4,7%	107 100%

Table 30: Partner born in the country of origin? (results for France)

	Yes	No	Total having a partner
Yugoslavian	96 88,1%	13 11,9%	109 100%
Turkish	166 88,8%	21 11,2%	187 100%

	139	21	160
Moroccan	86,9%	13,1%	100%
Pakistan	79	5	84
	94,0%	6,0%	100%

Table 31: Partner born in the country of origin? (results for Germany)

	Yes	No	Total having a partner
Yugoslavian	158	10	168
	94,0%	6,0%	100%
Turkish	169	27	196
	86,2%	13,8%	100%
Moroccan	103	15	118
	87,3%	12,7%	100%
Pakistan	93	4	97
	95,9%	4,1%	100%

Table 32: Partner born in the country of origin? (results for Switzerland)

	Yes	No	Total having a partner
Yugoslavian	182	22	204
	89,2%	10,8%	100%
Turkish	172	26	198
	86,9%	13,1%	100%
Moroccan	59	28	87
	67,8%	32,2%	100%
Pakistan	90	12	102
	88,2%	11,8%	100%

In table 33 we indicate for those people that identify themselves as being Muslim to what extent they have a partner of the same or of another religion.

Table 33: Proportion of the number of self-identified Muslims who also have a Muslim partner per subsample per country

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Ex-Yugoslavia group	92,3%	82,8%	95,8%	90,9%	90,3%	85,7%
Turkish group	93,2%	92,2%	91,5%	91,6%	95,7%	92,2%
Moroccan group	94,2%	69,8%	66,9%	89,3%	90,8%	86,2%
Pakistani group	92,9%	91,5%	85,2%	97,9%	91,1%	90,6%

In almost all cases when the self-identified Muslim does not have a partner who is also Muslim, this partner is either Roman Catholic, Protestant (Anglican in the case of the UK) or does not belong to a religious denomination. It are mainly male Muslims who have a partner with another faith. In Germany and Switzerland, Moroccans who do not have a Muslim partner, in most cases either have a Roman Catholic or a Protestant partner. In both countries it predominantly concerns men.

3.6. Nationality (state citizenship)

Table 34 gives an overview of nationality figures for the different ethnic minority groups of Muslim descent in the participating countries. It is striking that the rate of state citizens is the lowest in Switzerland for all ethnic groups. It is the highest in the Netherlands, followed by Belgium. The proportion of citizens is still lower in France. In Germany it is low for ex-Yugoslaves and Turks but higher for Moroccans and Pakistani. In the UK it is considerably lower for Moroccans than for the other groups.

Table 34: Proportion holding state citizenship of country or residence

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
Ex-Yugoslavia group	86,8%	39,1%	41,8%	70,7%	78,4%	77,3%
Turkish group	83,2%	33,2%	46,2%	78,8%	88,7%	60,8%
Moroccan group	93,2%	75,4%	52,4%	39,9%	82,7%	68,5%
Pakistani group	90,1%	69,8%	56,6%	81,2%	76,9%	66,9%

3.7. Educational attainment

Table 35 presents an overview of highest educational attainment per subsample in Belgium. We should first of all note there is a high level of missing values (16,8%). The control sample of the national minority group seems to be biased towards the highly educated with 59,9% having a tertiary education degree while this is only 30,7% in 2010 in the age range 15-64 years according to Eurostat statistics¹. Even though our sample only includes adults, the sample result is clearly much higher than the Eurostat figure and higher educated people are thus overrepresented. There also seems to be a bias for the Moroccan and Pakistani group and to a lesser extent for the ex-Yugoslave group, although we do not have other data to our disposal to benchmark this.

Table 35: Highest educational attainment per subsample for Belgium

		educationlev3			Total
		primary school or lower	secondary school	higher education	
	national majority group	14 4,5%	111 35,6%	187 59,9%	312 100,0%
	Yugoslavian	28 19,7%	70 49,3%	44 31,0%	142 100,0%
ethnic group	Turkish	68 31,6%	118 54,9%	29 13,5%	215 100,0%
	Moroccan	18 9,3%	96 49,7%	79 40,9%	193 100,0%
	Pakistan	9 6,7%	57 42,5%	68 50,7%	134 100,0%

¹ EUROSTAT http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_ifse_07&lang=en

Table 36 provides the same data for the United Kingdom. We are confronted with 2% missing values. The bias among the national majority population is less outspoken here than in the Belgian case with 40,8% tertiary education in the sample, while in the age range 15 to 64 years it was 31,6% in 2010 according to Eurostat-data².

Table 36: Highest educational attainment per subsample for the United Kingdom

		educationlev3			Total
		primary school or lower	secondary school	higher education	
	national majority group	2 0,5%	227 58,7%	158 40,8%	387 100,0%
	Yugoslavian	29 19,3%	74 49,3%	47 31,3%	150 100,0%
ethnic group	Turkish	45 19%	145 61,2%	47 19,8%	237 100,0%
	Moroccan	11 7,9%	74 52,9%	55 39,3%	140 100,0%
	Pakistan	42 17,0%	128 51,8%	77 31,2%	247 100,0%

Table 37 provides the same data for the Netherlands. We are confronted with 18,3% missing values. Once again the higher educated are overrepresented among the national majority group, as we can observe a score of 42,4% having done tertiary education, while in the age range 15 to 64 years it was 27,7% in 2010 according to Eurostat-data³.

Table 37: Highest educational attainment per subsample for the Netherlands

		educationlev3			Total
		primary school or lower	secondary school	higher education	
	national majority group	15 7,1%	106 50,5%	89 42,4%	210 100,0%
	Yugoslavian	15 10,5%	82 57,3%	46 32,2%	143 100,0%
ethnic group	Turkish	35 14,6%	155 64,9%	49 20,5%	239 100,0%
	Moroccan	25 10,8%	138 59,7%	68 29,4%	231 100,0%
	Pakistan	25 16,9%	74 50,0%	49 33,1%	148 100,0%

² Eurostat data: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_07&lang=en

³ Eurostat data: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_07&lang=en

Table 38: Highest educational attainment per subsample for France

		educationlev3			Total
		primary school or lower	secondary school	higher education	
	national majority group	49 13,0%	212 56,1%	117 31,0%	378 100,0%
	Yugoslavian	19 12,8%	88 59,1%	42 28,2%	149 100,0%
ethnic group	Turkish	65 26,5%	137 55,9%	43 17,6%	245 100,0%
	Moroccan	40 18,3%	106 48,4%	73 33,3%	219 100,0%
	Pakistan	10 7,0%	87 61,3%	45 31,7%	142 100,0%

Table 38 provides the same data for France. We are confronted with 4,4% missing values. Non-response is hence remarkably lower than in the preceding countries and the sample also seems to have less of a bias although there does seem to be a slight overrepresentation of the higher educated. We can observe a score of 31% of the national majority group having done tertiary education, while in the age range 15 to 64 years it was 26,3% in 2010 according to Eurostat-data⁴.

Table 38: Highest educational attainment per subsample for Germany

		educationlev3			Total
		primary school or lower	secondary school	higher education	
	national majority group	2 0,6%	231 74,3%	78 25,1%	311 100,0%
	Yugoslavian	28 11,6%	187 77,3%	27 11,2%	242 100,0%
ethnic group	Turkish	6 2,6%	215 93,1%	10 4,3%	231 100,0%
	Moroccan	14 6,6%	161 75,6%	38 17,8%	213 100,0%
	Pakistan	12 8,0%	117 78,0%	21 14,0%	150 100,0%

Table 38 presents the results for Germany, where we have 12,9% item non-response on education. The results for the proportion of the national majority group holding a tertiary education degree (25,1%) does not deviate a lot from Eurostat data on the age range 15 to 65 (22,6%).

⁴ Eurostat data: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_07&lang=en

Table 39 finally presents the results for Switzerland where we are confronted with only 2,1% non-response. The results for the educational level of the national majority group (31,1% with tertiary education) does correspond fairly well to the available Eurostat data for the age range 15 to 65 in 2010 (30% with tertiary education)⁵.

Table 39: Highest educational attainment per subsample for Switzerland

		educationlev3			Total
		primary school or lower	secondary school	higher education	
	national majority group	35 9,1%	229 59,8%	119 31,1%	383 100,0%
	Yugoslavian	53 22,0%	130 53,9%	58 24,1%	241 100,0%
ethnic group	Turkish	84 34,0%	121 49,0%	42 17,0%	247 100,0%
	Moroccan	8 5,8%	68 49,3%	62 44,9%	138 100,0%
	Pakistan	14 9,3%	54 36,0%	82 54,7%	150 100,0%

3.8. Employment rate

In Table 40 we give an overview of the percentage of people per subsample who have paid work (for more than 12 hours per week).

Table 40: Proportion per subsample per country of people currently holding paid work

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	55,6%	50,4%	63,7%	64,1%	56,2%	54,3%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	49,7%	64,5%	74,3%	42%	62,1%	60,7%
Turkish group	60,4%	48,6%	60,9%	39,2%	52%	46,4%
Moroccan group	63,2%	63,1%	68,7%	41,9%	58%	47,1%
Pakistani group	50,7%	41,1%	63,8%	50,4%	44,9%	50,3%

In table 41 we examine what kind of employment status those who hold paid work have. We can observe that Pakistani in the Netherlands and Belgium have a very high likelihood of having their own business. The pattern is also present (albeit less outspoken) for the Pakistani in Germany and France. Turks also have a relatively high likelihood to own their own business, especially in the Netherlands, Belgium and France. In the UK quite some ex-Yugslaves have their own business and it is furthermore striking that quite some Turks are active as freelancers. A striking result for Belgium is the relatively high proportion of Moroccans working as freelancers.

⁵ Eurostat data http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_07&lang=en

Table 41: Proportion per subsample per country of people currently holding paid work

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group						
Employee	79,4%	82,7%	89,3%	87,9%	88,5%	88,8%
Own business	15,4%	8,7%	9,4%	6%	6,9%	9,2%
Freelance (interim)	5,1%	6,6%	1,2%	6%	4,6%	1,9%
Ex-Yugoslavia group						
Employee	90,7%	80%	92,9%	81%	85,3%	85,7%
Own business	6,7%	15,8%	6,5%	12,7%	8,4%	13,2%
Freelance (interim)	2,7%	4,2%	0,5%	6,3%	6,3%	1,1%
Turkish group						
Employee	74,8%	82,1%	88,9%	71,1%	73,7%	81,9%
Own business	23,8%	13,8%	7,2%	13,4%	16,5%	16,4%
Freelance (interim)	1,3%	3,3%	3,9%	15,5%	9,8%	1,7%
Moroccan group						
Employee	88,6%	87%	89,1%	88,7%	68,9%	89,3%
Own business	9,5%	6,2%	9,9%	8,1%	11,5%	10,7%
Freelance (interim)	1,9%	6,2%	1%	3,2%	19,6%	
Pakistani group						
Employee	58,4%	70,8%	89,1%	82,5%	50%	79,5%
Own business	40,3%	18,5%	9,3%	8,7%	43,9%	20,5%
Freelance (interim)	1,3%	9,2%	4,1%	8,7%	6,1%	

3.9. Contact at school with out-group (school segregation)

In Table 42 we give an indication of the level of school segregation that those who went to school in their country of residence have experienced. We provide the figures for those who say ‘a minority’ or ‘almost none’ of the fellow pupils in primary or secondary school were member of the outgroup (i.e. national majority group for Muslims and Muslims for national majority group).

Table 42: Proportion of people who went to school in country of residence and had only a minority, few or no pupils of the outgroup in their class

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	99,0%	98,5%	97,6%	81,7%	95,8%	96,0%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	9,6%	14,8%	19,6%	17,1%	20,8%	9,7%
Turkish group	15,5%	37,5%	18,4%	17,8%	23,8%	14,5%
Moroccan group	13,4%	25,0%	50,0%	41,2%	13,0%	16,2%
Pakistani group	34,8%	12,3%	38,5%	22,2%	23,3%	26,9%

We can observe that with the exception of the UK, members of the national majority group very rarely find themselves in a class with a lot of Muslim fellow pupils. A substantial

proportion of all ethnic minority group members have lacked contact at school (in their class) with children from the national majority group. In the Netherlands and France this is particularly the case of Pakistani pupils (35% in the Netherlands and 27% in France), in Germany and Belgium it mainly concerns Turkish students (37,5% for Germany and 23,8% for Belgium), in Switzerland and the UK mainly the Moroccan pupils have no fellow national majority group pupils (50% for Switzerland and 41% for the UK).

3.10. Perceived distance to outgroup

To the national majority groups we asked how they compare themselves to Muslims, while to Muslims we asked to compare themselves with the national majority group. In all countries we asked how similar or different they are with regard role division between men and women in the household, the role of religion in society and freedom of speech. In the Netherlands and France we did not ask questions with regard to teaching of children or ideas on sexual abstinence before marriage.

3.10.1. Education of children

In table 43 to 47 we first present the bivariate results for all answering categories, while in table 48 we provide an overall comparison focussing on the joint scores for “very similar” and “quite similar”. As can be seen in table 43 Turks in Belgium seem to perceive the biggest distance to the national majority with regard to education of children. Ex-Yugoslaves perceive the least distance to the national majority groups with regard to values taught to children.

Table 43: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to values they teach their children for Belgium

		in the values they teach their children			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	9,1%	30,6%	36,0%	24,2%
	Yugoslavian	23,6%	36,8%	26,4%	13,2%
	Turkish	9,0%	18,9%	27,9%	44,3%
	Moroccan	13,9%	36,7%	29,1%	20,3%
	Pakistan	9,9%	35,5%	35,5%	19,1%

As we can observe in table 44 for the UK, Pakistani’s have the least perceived distance to the national majority group compared to other immigrant ethnic minority groups with a Muslim heritage.

Table 44: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to values they teach their children for the UK

		in the values they teach their children			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	5,9%	16,8%	61,2%	16,0%
	Yugoslavian	10,2%	27,0%	23,4%	39,4%
	Turkish	0,4%	31,8%	33,2%	34,5%
	Moroccan	1,5%	33,3%	34,1%	31,1%
	Pakistan	19,5%	36,6%	28,0%	15,9%

In tables 45 and 46, for respectively Germany and Switzerland, we can also observe that the Turks perceive the biggest distance in values compared to the national majority group.

Table 45: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to values they teach their children for Germany

		in the values they teach their children			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	7,5%	22,4%	36,7%	33,4%
	Yugoslavian	26,9%	31,0%	27,3%	14,7%
	Turkish	8,7%	18,2%	31,0%	42,1%
	Moroccan	22,9%	29,3%	39,0%	8,8%
	Pakistan	17,3%	28,2%	31,4%	23,1%

Table 46: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to values they teach their children for Switzerland

		in the values they teach their children			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	15,5%	24,4%	33,6%	26,5%
	Yugoslavian	26,7%	34,1%	29,7%	9,5%
	Turkish	10,3%	27,4%	27,4%	35,0%
	Moroccan	17,3%	22,3%	43,2%	17,3%
	Pakistan	14,0%	33,6%	36,4%	16,1%

In alternative presentation allowing more easily for international comparison is offered in table 47. We each time present the proportion of respondents who answered « quite similar » or « very similar » to the question how different or similar most people of the outgroup are. The lower the percentage is, the higher the perceived cultural distance is. We can observe that in the UK the national majority group perceives more of a distance than the majority group in Belgium and Switzerland. Except in the UK, ex-Yugoslaves consider the national majority group to be quite similar. In most countries Turks perceive quite some difference with the national majority group.

Table 47: Perceived distance to outgroup with regard to values they teach their children (score “% quite similar + %very similar”) for different countries

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group		29,9%	39,9%	22,7%	39,8%	
Ex-Yugoslavia group		58,0%	60,8%	37,2%	60,4%	
Turkish group		26,9%	37,6%	32,3%	27,9%	
Moroccan group		52,2%	39,6%	34,8%	50,6%	
Pakistani group		45,5%	47,6%	56,1%	45,4%	

3.10.2. Role division between men and women in the household

In Tables 48 to 53 we present the results for the question “How different or similar do you think most people of [*OUTGROUP*] are compared to you on the following topic? In the way roles are divided between men and women in households?” In table 54 we give a summary by focussing on the proportion of respondents who responded either “quite similar” or “very similar”.

Table 48: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to gender role division in household for Belgium

		in the way roles are divided between men and women in households			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	1,6%	11,3%	30,4%	56,7%
	Yugoslavian	18,1%	37,6%	29,5%	14,8%
	Turkish	10,1%	20,6%	27,4%	41,9%
	Moroccan	17,3%	41,8%	27,7%	13,3%
	Pakistan	7,7%	35,7%	39,9%	16,8%

Table 49: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to gender role division in household for United Kingdom

		in the way roles are divided between men and women in households			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	2,1%	3,9%	72,9%	21,2%
	Yugoslavian	12,8%	20,9%	27,7%	38,5%
	Turkish	2,2%	30,3%	28,1%	39,5%
	Moroccan	7,4%	30,4%	30,4%	31,9%
	Pakistan	7,3%	12,6%	47,0%	33,2%

Table 50: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to gender roles in the household in France

		Gender roles in the household			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	9,4%	14,6%	30,2%	45,8%
	Yugoslavian	37,5%	22,8%	25,7%	14,0%
	Turkish	17,4%	25,8%	29,2%	27,5%
	Moroccan	22,7%	25,3%	37,6%	14,4%
	Pakistan	22,1%	27,5%	32,1%	18,3%

Table 51: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to gender role division in household for the Netherlands

		in the way roles are divided between men and women in households			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	2,3%	16,4%	40,9%	40,3%
	Yugoslavian	13,8%	47,1%	23,9%	15,2%
	Turkish	9,4%	37,9%	33,6%	19,1%
	Moroccan	15,4%	36,7%	26,2%	21,7%
	Pakistan	11,7%	29,2%	33,3%	25,8%

Table 52: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to gender role division in household for the Germany

		in the way roles are divided between men and women in households			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	3,2%	8,3%	28,4%	60,2%
	Yugoslavian	25,4%	29,5%	25,0%	20,1%
	Turkish	10,2%	19,6%	28,2%	42,0%
	Moroccan	26,1%	34,7%	28,2%	11,0%
	Pakistan	14,0%	26,0%	34,0%	26,0%

Table 53: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to gender role division in household for Switzerland

		in the way roles are divided between men and women in households			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	6,2%	11,9%	33,7%	48,2%
	Yugoslavian	26,4%	36,2%	28,5%	8,9%
	Turkish	13,2%	27,3%	28,9%	30,6%
	Moroccan	32,1%	26,9%	21,6%	19,4%
	Pakistan	16,2%	39,4%	26,8%	17,6%

Table 54 allows for quick international comparison of patterns, by focussing on the proportion of respondent who stated the *outgroup* is either “quite similar” or “very similar”. We can see that especially in the UK the national majority group believes there is a cultural difference with Muslims as far as gender roles in the household are concerned (only 6% perceives similarity). Remarkably, in the UK there are proportionally less ex-Yugoslaves and Pakistani’s who see similarities than in other countries in the study. In France, there are less Turks and Moroccans than in other countries who see similarities in gender roles between them and the majority group.

Table 54: Perceived distance to outgroup with regard to gender roles in household (score “% quite similar + %very similar”) for different countries

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	18,7%	11,5%	18,1%	5,9%	12,9%	24,0%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	60,9%	54,9%	62,6%	33,8%	55,7%	60,3%
Turkish group	47,2%	29,8%	40,5%	32,5%	30,6%	43,2%
Moroccan group	52,1%	60,8%	59,0%	37,8%	59,0%	48,0%
Pakistani group	40,8%	40,0%	55,6%	19,8%	43,4%	49,6%

3.10.3. Role religion in society

Table 55: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion (Belgium)

		in how they think about the role religion in society			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	2,4%	14,1%	30,7%	52,8%
	Yugoslavian	21,1%	32,3%	31,6%	15,0%
	Turkish	4,9%	11,3%	21,9%	61,9%
	Moroccan	10,6%	21,2%	32,2%	35,9%
	Pakistan	4,3%	23,9%	33,3%	38,4%

Table 56: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion for France

		In how they think about the role of religion in society			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	9,2%	20,7%	31,8%	38,4%
	Yugoslavian	30,4%	25,6%	28,8%	15,2%
	Turkish	10,5%	15,0%	30,9%	43,6%
	Moroccan	8,5%	18,3%	38,8%	34,4%
	Pakistan	14,5%	21,8%	40,3%	23,4%

Table 57: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion (UK)

		in how they think about the role religion in society			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	2,8%	4,1%	45,2%	47,8%
	Yugoslavian	14,5%	20,2%	42,7%	22,6%
	Turkish	1,7%	25,9%	42,3%	30,1%
	Moroccan		24,3%	47,3%	28,4%
	Pakistan	3,7%	11,8%	44,7%	39,8%

Table 58: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion (Netherlands)

		in how they think about the role religion in society			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	4,9%	23,8%	41,0%	30,2%
	Yugoslavian	7,9%	40,9%	31,5%	19,7%
	Turkish	7,9%	21,1%	37,0%	33,9%
	Moroccan	5,7%	21,0%	37,1%	36,2%
	Pakistan	6,9%	21,6%	36,2%	35,3%

Table 59: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion (Germany)

		in how they think about the role religion in society			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	3,2%	12,9%	30,9%	52,9%
	Yugoslavian	16,5%	32,0%	33,3%	18,2%
	Turkish	3,0%	11,0%	27,5%	58,5%
	Moroccan	10,4%	21,2%	46,8%	21,6%
	Pakistan	7,3%	15,2%	41,7%	35,8%

Table 60: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion (Switzerland)

		in how they think about the role religion in society			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	9,3%	13,0%	31,5%	46,2%
	Yugoslavian	17,1%	32,9%	39,9%	10,1%
	Turkish	8,0%	21,3%	32,0%	38,7%
	Moroccan	16,8%	23,7%	33,6%	26,0%
	Pakistan	8,0%	27,5%	38,4%	26,1%

Table 61: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to role of religion (% quite similar and % very similar)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	28,8%	16,2%	22,3%	7,0%	16,5%	29,8%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	48,8%	48,5%	50,0%	34,7%	53,4%	56,0%
Turkish group	29,1%	14,0%	29,3%	27,6%	16,2%	25,5%
Moroccan group	26,6%	31,6%	40,5%	24,3%	31,8%	26,8%
Pakistani group	28,4%	22,5%	35,5%	15,4%	28,3%	36,3%

Table 61 summarising the results showing the % that thinks the outgroup is quite or very similar, shows that outgroup distance is the smallest for Ex-Yugoslaves and is, in general,

smaller in France and the Netherlands than in other countries.

3.10.4. Sexual abstinence before marriage

Table 62: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to sexual abstinence before marriage (Belgium)

		in the way they think about sexual abstinence before marriage			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	4,4%	15,8%	31,4%	48,3%
	Yugoslavian	6,9%	31,0%	27,6%	34,5%
	Turkish	3,6%	4,4%	10,1%	81,9%
	Moroccan	6,6%	15,6%	23,4%	54,5%
	Pakistan	2,1%	15,6%	28,4%	53,9%

Table 63: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to sexual abstinence before marriage (UK)

		in the way they think about sexual abstinence before marriage			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	1,0%	4,1%	11,1%	83,7%
	Yugoslavian	12,9%	23,6%	18,6%	45,0%
	Turkish		21,6%	22,5%	55,9%
	Moroccan	12,0%	33,6%	32,0%	22,4%
	Pakistan	0,4%	10,9%	47,4%	41,3%

Table 64: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to sexual abstinence before marriage (Germany)

		in the way they think about sexual abstinence before marriage			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	4,8%	10,9%	27,5%	56,9%
	Yugoslavian	18,4%	24,6%	26,3%	30,7%
	Turkish	5,6%	5,2%	10,9%	78,2%
	Moroccan	14,5%	18,7%	31,8%	35,0%
	Pakistan	8,2%	8,9%	23,4%	59,5%

Table 65: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to sexual abstinence before marriage (Switzerland)

		in the way they think about sexual abstinence before marriage			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different

ethnic group	national majority group	9,9%	15,0%	28,4%	46,6%
	Yugoslavian	19,3%	34,1%	30,5%	16,1%
	Turkish	9,1%	15,7%	17,4%	57,8%
	Moroccan	12,7%	21,6%	19,4%	46,3%
	Pakistan	7,7%	18,2%	30,1%	44,1%

Table 66: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to sexual abstinence before marriage (% quite similar + % very similar)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group		15,7%	24,9%	5,2%	20,3%	
Ex-Yugoslavia group		43,0%	53,4%	36,4%	37,9%	
Turkish group		10,9%	24,8%	21,6%	8,1%	
Moroccan group		33,2%	34,3%	45,6%	22,1%	
Pakistani group		17,1%	25,9%	11,3%	17,7%	

Table 66 summarizing the results show that perceived outgroup distance is the lowest for ex-Yugoslaves and highest for Pakistanis. Perceived outgroup distance is smaller in Switzerland than in other countries.

3.10.5. Freedom of speech

Table 67: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (Belgium)

		in the way they think about freedom of speech			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	7,0%	25,1%	43,0%	24,9%
	Yugoslavian	24,0%	46,0%	22,0%	8,0%
	Turkish	13,7%	18,5%	32,9%	34,9%
	Moroccan	22,5%	40,6%	20,5%	16,5%
	Pakistan	12,7%	40,8%	27,5%	19,0%

Table 68: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (Netherlands)

		in the way they think about sexual abstinence before marriage			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	18,0%	27,7%	31,2%	23,2%
	Yugoslavian	38,7%	30,7%	21,9%	8,8%
	Turkish	24,3%	28,7%	25,7%	21,3%
	Moroccan	26,2%	30,0%	31,6%	12,2%
	Pakistan	27,6%	29,9%	31,3%	11,2%

Table 69: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (UK)

		in the way they think about freedom of speech			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	3,4%	14,0%	43,7%	39,0%
	Yugoslavian	23,9%	19,7%	30,3%	26,1%
	Turkish	11,1%	29,5%	29,9%	29,5%
	Moroccan	14,3%	32,3%	34,6%	18,8%
	Pakistan	15,4%	19,9%	34,6%	30,1%

Table 70: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (Netherlands)

		in the way they think about freedom of speech			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	5,1%	33,4%	41,9%	19,5%
	Yugoslavian	14,8%	38,5%	34,8%	11,9%
	Turkish	10,1%	33,3%	33,3%	23,2%
	Moroccan	13,3%	35,8%	28,3%	22,5%
	Pakistan	13,3%	23,3%	40,8%	22,5%

Table 71: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (Germany)

		in the way they think about freedom of speech			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	8,4%	23,7%	37,5%	30,3%
	Yugoslavian	36,1%	31,1%	24,2%	8,6%
	Turkish	15,7%	23,6%	31,8%	28,9%
	Moroccan	36,5%	28,2%	30,7%	4,6%
	Pakistan	27,5%	28,2%	30,9%	13,4%

Table 72: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (Switzerland)

		in the way they think about freedom of speech			
		Very similar	Quite similar	Quite different	Very different
ethnic group	national majority group	15,7%	23,0%	29,7%	31,7%
	Yugoslavian	30,0%	37,9%	24,6%	7,5%
	Turkish	15,0%	27,5%	25,9%	31,6%
	Moroccan	48,9%	25,5%	17,0%	8,5%
	Pakistan	29,0%	35,2%	20,7%	15,2%

Table 73: Subjective perception of distance to outgroup with regard to freedom of speech (% quite similar + % very similar)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	38,5%	32,1%	38,7%	17,3%	32,2%	45,7%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	53,3%	67,2%	67,9%	43,7%	70,0%	69,3%
Turkish group	43,5%	39,3%	42,5%	40,6%	32,1%	53,0%
Moroccan group	49,2%	64,7%	74,5%	46,6%	63,1%	56,1%
Pakistani group	36,7%	55,7%	64,1%	35,4%	53,5%	57,5%

Table 73 summarizing the results shows that outgroup distance with regard to freedom of speech is the lowest in France, followed by Switzerland and the Netherlands and is the highest in the UK.

3.11. Attitude towards democracy

3.11.1. Free speech

Table 74: Attitude towards free speech (Belgium)

		How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following? Everybody has the right to say whatever he or she wants in public.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
	national majority group	26,7%	40,4%	8,8%	18,1%	6,0%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	42,5%	36,6%	8,5%	6,5%	5,9%
	Turkish	39,0%	53,4%	0,8%	4,8%	2,0%
	Moroccan	35,3%	35,3%	10,7%	11,9%	6,7%
	Pakistan	35,9%	44,1%	6,2%	9,0%	4,8%

Table 75: Attitude towards free speech (United Kingdom)

		How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following? Everybody has the right to say whatever he or she wants in public.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
	national majority group	34,4%	38,2%	18,1%	6,2%	3,1%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	45,3%	48,0%	0,7%		6,0%
	Turkish	41,2%	36,0%	14,8%	7,2%	
	Moroccan	42,6%	45,9%	9,5%	2,0%	
	Pakistan	16,8%	23,2%	3,6%	30,4%	25,6%
Total		34,5%	36,8%	11,1%	10,2%	7,2%

Table 76: Attitude towards free speech (Germany)

		How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following? Everybody has the right to say whatever he or she wants in public.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	74,1%	21,5%	2,8%	1,0%	0,5%
	Yugoslavian	63,2%	33,2%	2,4%	0,8%	0,4%
	Turkish	66,9%	29,4%	1,6%	1,6%	0,4%
	Moroccan	58,6%	35,2%	4,3%	1,6%	0,4%
	Pakistan	52,5%	26,9%	10,0%	6,9%	3,8%

Table 77: Attitude towards free speech (Switzerland)

		How much do you agree or disagree with each of the following? Everybody has the right to say whatever he or she wants in public.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	58,1%	25,1%	8,1%	6,3%	1,8%
	Yugoslavian	57,8%	28,5%	4,4%	6,8%	1,2%
	Turkish	64,8%	24,5%	4,0%	3,2%	2,0%
	Moroccan	33,3%	22,4%	12,9%	12,9%	17,7%
	Pakistan	38,8%	34,2%	13,2%	7,9%	3,9%
Total		53,9%	26,5%	7,7%	6,8%	4,0%

Table 78: Attitude towards free speech (% agree strongly + agree)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group		95,6%	83,7%	72,6%	67,1%	
Ex-Yugoslavia group		96,4%	87,4%	93,3%	79,1%	
Turkish group		96,4%	90,8%	77,8%	92,4%	
Moroccan group		93,8%	56,2%	88,5%	70,6%	
Pakistani group		79,4%	74,5%	40,2%	80%	

Table 78 summarizing the results shows that support for free speech seems actually to be lower for the national majority group than for most ethnic minority groups in the UK and Belgium. The lowest level of support for free speech seems to be found among Pakistani in the UK. Support for free speech is very high in Germany for all groups, with the exception of the Pakistani who score a bit lower. The question was not asked in the Netherlands and in France.

3.11.2. More people with strong beliefs in office

Tables 79 to 85 provide the results for the item assessing to what extent people wish to see more people with strong religious beliefs holding public office. Possible responses range from 'agree strongly', 'agree', 'neither agree or disagree', 'disagree' to 'strongly disagree'.

Table 79. Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (Belgium)

		It would be better for <Belgium > if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	5,0%	15,2%	18,6%	30,1%	31,2%
	Yugoslavian	20,4%	23,4%	16,8%	20,4%	19,0%
	Turkish	25,9%	47,4%	5,7%	12,1%	8,9%
	Moroccan	21,1%	33,3%	16,0%	14,8%	14,8%
	Pakistan	15,4%	35,3%	14,0%	21,3%	14,0%

Table 80. Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (UK)

		It would be better for < the United Kingdom> if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group		2,1%	24,5%	38,0%	35,4%
	Yugoslavian	15,0%	28,3%	8,8%	30,1%	17,7%
	Turkish	13,4%	17,3%	28,7%	22,3%	18,3%
	Moroccan	24,4%	24,4%	20,5%	15,7%	15,0%
	Pakistan	6,4%	10,3%	26,0%	43,1%	14,2%

Table 81. Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (the Netherlands)

		It would be better for < the Netherlands > if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	3,0%	21,2%	21,0%	34,7%	20,2%
	Yugoslavian	5,9%	20,7%	31,9%	26,7%	14,8%
	Turkish	8,9%	35,9%	16,5%	27,4%	11,4%
	Moroccan	12,4%	41,5%	16,2%	24,4%	5,6%
	Pakistan	7,0%	34,8%	24,3%	27,0%	7,0%

Table 82. Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (France)

		It would be better for < France > if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	9,3%	14,3%	19,7%	16,9%	39,9%
	Yugoslavian	14,7%	17,8%	20,2%	22,5%	24,8%
	Turkish	28,3%	24,8%	20,9%	12,2%	13,9%
	Moroccan	24,6%	23,3%	28,4%	10,2%	13,6%
	Pakistan	21,8%	32,3%	18,0%	13,5%	14,3%

Table 83. Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (Germany)

		It would be better for < Germany > if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	10,3%	20,6%	17,7%	34,1%	17,2%
	Yugoslavian	18,7%	32,6%	12,6%	27,4%	8,7%
	Turkish	30,1%	34,7%	10,9%	17,6%	6,7%
	Moroccan	11,4%	34,5%	25,0%	20,5%	8,6%
	Pakistan	8,3%	19,3%	22,8%	22,8%	26,9%

Table 84. Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (Switzerland)

		It would be better for < Switzerland > if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office.				
		Agree strongly	Agree	Neither agree or disagree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	5,6%	15,6%	21,5%	25,8%	31,5%
	Yugoslavian	18,9%	36,8%	12,3%	24,1%	7,9%
	Turkish	25,4%	20,3%	13,1%	23,7%	17,4%
	Moroccan	23,7%	14,4%	23,0%	14,4%	24,5%
	Pakistan	12,5%	31,6%	27,2%	17,6%	11,0%

Table 85: Wants more people with strong beliefs in office (% agree strongly + agree)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	24,2%	31%	21,5%	2,1%	20,2%	23,6%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	26,7%	51,3%	12,3%	43,3%	43,8%	32,6%
Turkish group	44,7%	64,9%	13,1%	30,7%	73,3%	53%
Moroccan group	53,8%	45,9%	23%	48,8%	54,4%	47,9%
Pakistani group	41,7%	27,6%	27,2%	16,7%	50,7%	54,1%

Table 85, summarizing the results for all countries, show that the call for more people with strong beliefs in office is the lowest in the UK. Ethnic minority groups tend to want more people with strong beliefs in office, but there are some notable exceptions (Turks in Switzerland).

3.11.3. Strong leaders

Tables 86 to 90 give the results for the call for strong leadership as an alternative to democratic governance for Belgium, the UK, Germany and Switzerland. The question was not asked in France and the Netherlands. The question is formulated in such a way that a preference for strong leadership is a proxy for an anti-democratic (anti-parliamentarian) attitude.

Table 86. Call for strong leadership in BELGIUM

		For the following one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? It is better to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.			
		Very good	Fairly good	Fairly Bad	Very bad
	national majority group	6,1%	29,1%	29,9%	34,9%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	16,2%	31,6%	11,8%	40,4%
	Turkish	16,6%	28,8%	29,3%	25,3%
	Moroccan	14,5%	38,5%	15,8%	31,2%
	Pakistan	15,6%	35,6%	23,0%	25,9%

Table 87. Call for strong leadership in UNITED KINGDOM

		For the following one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? It is better to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.			
		Very good	Fairly good	Fairly Bad	Very bad
	national majority group		1,3%	67,0%	31,7%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	26,0%	23,6%	27,6%	22,8%
	Turkish	26,2%	20,7%	31,0%	22,1%
	Moroccan	12,4%	20,7%	35,5%	31,4%
	Pakistan	4,2%	13,2%	37,6%	45,0%

Table 88. Call for strong leadership in GERMANY

		For the following one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? It is better to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.			
		Very good	Fairly good	Fairly Bad	Very bad
	national majority group	3,0%	8,6%	24,7%	63,7%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	9,6%	22,2%	24,3%	43,9%
	Turkish	5,9%	12,2%	13,1%	68,8%
	Moroccan	5,4%	10,7%	24,9%	59,0%
	Pakistan	6,3%	13,3%	29,4%	51,0%

Table 89. Call for strong leadership in SWITZERLAND

		For the following one, would you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? It is better to have a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections.			
		Very good	Fairly good	Fairly Bad	Very bad
	national majority group	3,0%	13,3%	21,0%	62,7%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	12,2%	40,3%	23,1%	24,4%
	Turkish	17,4%	20,6%	15,1%	46,8%
	Moroccan	21,6%	24,0%	16,8%	37,6%
	Pakistan	13,0%	23,9%	29,7%	33,3%

Table 90: Call for strong leadership (% very good + fairly good)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	30,3%	37,4%	31%	3,2%	29,3%	39,3%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	31,3%	56,2%	60,5%	52,7%	54,1%	43,3%
Turkish group	50,5%	69,5%	55,4%	37,6%	80,4%	61,6%
Moroccan group	57%	50,2%	50,5%	57,4%	63,9%	55,4%
Pakistani group	44,9%	37,7%	49,6%	19,4%	59%	63,2%

From a normative view, table 90 shows worrying results as a substantial part of the population thinks strong leadership is more important than representative democracy. Only in the UK there is no clear call for strong leadership. Ethnic minority group members seem to be more in favour of strong leadership than the national majority groups.

3.11.4. Democracy not good at maintaining order

Tables 91 to 96 also tap into anti-democratic attitudes, assessing to what extent one thinks democracies are not good at maintaining order.

Table 91. Democracy not good at maintaining order (BELGIUM)

		Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	4,7%	26,6%	40,9%	27,9%
	Yugoslavian	12,7%	34,5%	21,1%	31,7%
	Turkish	6,8%	33,8%	42,3%	17,1%
	Moroccan	10,5%	34,3%	29,3%	25,9%
	Pakistan	15,7%	29,3%	42,1%	12,9%

Table 92. Democracy not good at maintaining order (UNITED KINGDOM)

		Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group		6,2%	39,8%	54,0%
	Yugoslavian	10,5%	51,6%	37,1%	0,8%
	Turkish	7,1%	21,4%	53,1%	18,4%
	Moroccan	16,7%	31,7%	37,3%	14,3%
	Pakistan	13,1%	28,2%	43,2%	15,5%

Table 92. Democracy not good at maintaining order THE NETHERLANDS

		Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	3,0%	22,7%	58,7%	15,5%
	Yugoslavian	5,8%	31,9%	50,7%	11,6%
	Turkish	7,7%	22,6%	51,9%	17,9%
	Moroccan	6,3%	24,7%	52,0%	17,0%
	Pakistan	2,6%	32,8%	51,7%	12,9%

Table 93. Democracy not good at maintaining order (FRANCE)

		Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	16,0%	26,3%	27,2%	30,5%
	Yugoslavian	14,3%	28,6%	16,1%	41,1%
	Turkish	21,1%	31,9%	23,0%	23,9%
	Moroccan	16,3%	22,7%	24,6%	36,5%
	Pakistan	21,4%	25,6%	11,1%	41,9%

Table 94. Democracy not good at maintaining order GERMANY

		Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	3,4%	11,6%	28,8%	56,1%
	Yugoslavian	5,2%	19,0%	44,4%	31,5%
	Turkish	4,1%	15,1%	40,2%	40,6%
	Moroccan	1,8%	11,4%	35,5%	51,4%
	Pakistan	8,6%	9,4%	42,4%	39,6%

Table 95. Democracy not good at maintaining order SWITZERLAND

		Could you please tell me if you agree strongly, agree, disagree or disagree strongly, after I read each one of them? Democracies aren't good at maintaining order.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly

	national majority group	8,0%	15,6%	23,1%	53,3%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	13,1%	38,4%	32,8%	15,7%
	Turkish	18,8%	24,0%	29,3%	27,9%
	Moroccan	13,4%	20,9%	16,4%	49,3%
	Pakistan	11,4%	28,6%	32,9%	27,1%

Table 96: Democracy not good for keeping order? (% agree + strongly agree)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	25,8%	15,1%	23,6%	6,2%	31,2%	42,3%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	37,7%	24,1%	51,5%	62,1%	47,2%	42,9%
Turkish group	30,2%	19,2%	42,8%	28,6%	40,6%	53,1%
Moroccan group	30,9%	13,2%	34,3%	48,4%	44,8%	38,9%
Pakistani group	35,3%	18%	40%	41,3%	45%	47%

From a normative view, also table 96 shows worrying results as a substantial part of the population thinks a democracy is not the most suited for keeping order. Scores tend to be higher among ethnic minority groups than among the ethnic majority groups, but once again there are important fluctuations.

3.1.1.5. Democracy best form of government

Table 97 to 102 indicate the responses given to the statement that democracy is better than any other form of government.

Table 97. Democracy best form of government BELGIUM

		Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
	national majority group	40,8%	44,0%	12,0%	3,1%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	45,8%	45,1%	6,3%	2,8%
	Turkish	25,6%	57,9%	11,6%	5,0%
	Moroccan	36,2%	50,2%	8,1%	5,5%
	Pakistan	33,6%	49,0%	14,0%	3,5%

Table 98. Democracy best form of government UNITED KINGDOM

		Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
	national majority group	15,5%	78,3%	5,2%	1,0%
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	14,4%	85,6%		
	Turkish	20,3%	52,1%	27,6%	
	Moroccan	22,7%	33,6%	39,8%	3,9%

Pakistan	23,5%	44,6%	21,6%	10,3%
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Table 98. Democracy best form of government THE NETHERLANDS

		Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	36,4%	54,7%	8,4%	0,5%
	Yugoslavian	31,7%	59,2%	7,7%	1,4%
	Turkish	32,5%	52,7%	11,8%	3,0%
	Moroccan	30,5%	57,1%	9,9%	2,6%
	Pakistan	27,0%	55,7%	16,4%	0,8%

Table 99. Democracy best form of government FRANCE

		Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	50,9%	31,3%	11,1%	6,7%
	Yugoslavian	60,9%	24,1%	9,8%	5,3%
	Turkish	49,8%	25,8%	12,9%	11,5%
	Moroccan	41,6%	36,9%	12,1%	9,3%
	Pakistan	55,5%	28,1%	9,4%	7,0%

Table 100. Democracy best form of government GERMANY

		Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	68,7%	23,4%	5,3%	2,6%
	Yugoslavian	47,9%	41,3%	8,3%	2,5%
	Turkish	45,4%	43,6%	8,3%	2,8%
	Moroccan	49,3%	42,0%	6,4%	2,3%
	Pakistan	52,6%	34,6%	7,5%	5,3%

Table 101. Democracy best form of government SWITZERLAND

		Democracy may have problems, but it's better than any other form of government.			
		Agree strongly	Agree	Disagree	Disagree strongly
ethnic group	national majority group	62,4%	29,8%	6,5%	1,3%
	Yugoslavian	37,7%	48,7%	12,3%	1,3%
	Turkish	57,9%	32,3%	7,2%	2,6%
	Moroccan	67,6%	21,6%	4,3%	6,5%
	Pakistan	39,4%	51,4%	7,0%	2,1%

Table 102: Democracy best form of government? (% agree + strongly agree)

	NL	DE	CH	UK	BE	FR
National majority group	91,1%	92,1%	92,2%	93,8%	84,8%	82,2%
Ex-Yugoslavia group	90,8%	89,3%	86,4%	100%	90,8%	85%
Turkish group	85,2%	89%	90,2%	72,4%	83,5%	75,6%
Moroccan group	87,6%	91,3%	89,2%	56,2%	86,4%	78,5%
Pakistani group	82,8%	87,2%	90,8%	68,1%	82,5%	83,6%

In table 102 we give the general overview, attesting that in all groups and all countries a large majority of groups are convinced democracy is better than any other system of government. Strikingly, in France and Belgium anti-democratic sentiments are the highest among the national majority group.

3.12. Identification

3.12.1. Identification as member of national community of country of residence

Table 103. Identification as Belgian

		To what extent do you see yourself as <Belgian >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	35,0%	42,2%	15,5%	4,7%	2,6%
	Yugoslavian	19,9%	36,4%	28,5%	6,6%	8,6%
	Turkish	9,8%	15,0%	46,9%	7,5%	20,9%
	Moroccan	22,8%	35,2%	28,0%	6,4%	7,6%
	Pakistan	17,9%	42,8%	26,2%	5,5%	7,6%

Table 103. Identification as English

		To what extent do you see yourself as <English >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	16,3%	69,3%	14,5%		
	Yugoslavian	1,4%	14,1%	47,9%	12,7%	23,9%
	Turkish	9,6%	7,6%	52,0%	12,4%	18,4%
	Moroccan	16,2%	16,9%	21,6%	30,4%	14,9%
	Pakistan	3,2%	19,4%	60,5%	3,2%	13,7%

Table 104. Identification as Dutch

To what extent do you see yourself as <Dutch >?

		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	30,8%	53,4%	13,2%	2,4%	0,3%
	Yugoslavian	13,6%	46,9%	27,2%	7,5%	4,8%
	Turkish	9,7%	40,3%	31,0%	8,9%	10,1%
	Moroccan	20,6%	45,7%	22,3%	4,0%	7,3%
	Pakistan	25,6%	42,6%	27,1%	3,1%	1,6%

Table 105. Identification as French

		To what extent do you see yourself as <French>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	59,4%	23,6%	10,9%	3,7%	2,4%
	Yugoslavian	22,1%	36,9%	25,5%	7,4%	8,1%
	Turkish	13,4%	25,1%	27,9%	6,9%	26,7%
	Moroccan	19,0%	23,7%	30,4%	9,5%	17,4%
	Pakistan	28,4%	34,8%	31,2%	2,8%	2,8%

Table 106. Identification as German

		To what extent do you see yourself as <German>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	41,8%	36,9%	19,3%	1,5%	0,5%
	Yugoslavian	15,7%	31,8%	31,0%	7,1%	14,5%
	Turkish	2,0%	9,2%	28,5%	9,2%	51,0%
	Moroccan	14,7%	29,8%	32,1%	10,7%	12,7%
	Pakistan	10,8%	22,2%	41,8%	8,2%	17,1%

Table 107. Identification as Swiss

		To what extent do you see yourself as <Swiss>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	51,8%	27,7%	17,8%	1,6%	1,0%
	Yugoslavian	15,9%	33,3%	32,5%	7,3%	11,0%
	Turkish	9,7%	25,0%	40,7%	8,1%	16,5%
	Moroccan	22,7%	40,4%	21,3%	3,5%	12,1%
	Pakistan	15,6%	44,9%	27,2%	6,8%	5,4%

In comparing the above results we should take into account that in the UK the wording « see yourself as English » is less appropriate in the context of the UK, especially outside of England (i.e. Scotland and Wales). The same holds for the question asking to what extent one is proud to be English.

3.12.2. Proud of being member of national community of country of residence

Table 108. Proud to be Belgian

		To what extent are you proud of being a <Belgian >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	30,1%	36,5%	25,4%	4,4%	3,6%
	Yugoslavian	25,5%	38,3%	23,5%	3,4%	9,4%
	Turkish	9,8%	14,3%	46,9%	4,9%	24,1%
	Moroccan	18,5%	37,3%	26,1%	9,2%	8,8%
	Pakistan	28,0%	41,3%	20,3%	4,2%	6,3%

Table 109. Proud to be English

		To what extent are you proud of being <English >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	15,2%	68,5%	15,8%		0,5%
	Yugoslavian	1,4%	6,5%	34,1%	23,9%	34,1%
	Turkish	8,2%	1,3%	17,2%	13,7%	59,7%
	Moroccan	8,5%	3,5%	23,9%	22,5%	41,5%
	Pakistan	1,2%	12,5%	52,4%	15,3%	18,5%

Table 110. Proud to be German

		To what extent are you proud of being a <German >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	27,0%	36,9%	23,3%	7,1%	5,8%
	Yugoslavian	15,9%	31,7%	24,4%	8,9%	19,1%
	Turkish	0,4%	4,1%	15,9%	10,6%	69,1%
	Moroccan	13,4%	31,4%	26,8%	9,2%	19,2%
	Pakistan	14,9%	24,0%	30,5%	5,8%	24,7%

Table 111. Proud to be Swiss

		To what extent are you proud of being a <Swiss>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	national majority group	41,3%	29,7%	21,8%	3,9%	3,2%
	Yugoslavian	24,3%	33,3%	22,2%	5,8%	14,4%
	Turkish	10,3%	26,5%	33,3%	11,1%	18,8%
	Moroccan	26,1%	43,0%	16,2%	7,7%	7,0%
	Pakistan	31,2%	42,0%	18,8%	2,9%	5,1%

3.12.3. Identification as member of community of country of origin

Table 112. To what extent do you see yourself as member of group of origin BELGIUM

		To what extent do you see yourself as a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	36,8%	30,1%	20,3%	5,3%	7,5%
	Turkish	66,9%	21,7%	8,7%	0,8%	2,0%
	Moroccan	45,7%	30,2%	20,7%	2,6%	0,9%
	Pakistan	32,5%	28,5%	29,3%	5,7%	4,1%

Table 113. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of group of origin UNITED KINGDOM

		To what extent do you see yourself as a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?		
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	44,0%	34,7%	21,3%
	Turkish	93,6%	3,2%	3,2%
	Moroccan	68,2%	12,8%	18,9%
	Pakistan	29,2%	40,4%	30,4%

Table 114. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of group of origin THE NETHERLANDS

		To what extent do you see yourself as a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	19,3%	36,7%	30,0%	5,3%	8,7%
	Turkish	27,1%	43,7%	21,5%	4,9%	2,8%
	Moroccan	23,8%	40,2%	29,9%	4,9%	1,2%
	Pakistan	10,6%	40,2%	34,1%	8,3%	6,8%

Table 115. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of group of origin FRANCE

		To what extent do you see yourself as a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	51,4%	27,0%	11,5%	5,4%	4,7%
	Turkish	50,6%	29,3%	13,7%	4,4%	2,0%
	Moroccan	62,5%	20,7%	12,4%	2,8%	1,6%
	Pakistan	44,2%	28,3%	18,8%	3,6%	5,1%

Table 116. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of group of origin GERMANY

		To what extent do you see yourself as a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	35,0%	33,1%	19,7%	7,5%	4,7%
	Turkish	54,2%	24,1%	16,6%	2,8%	2,4%
	Moroccan	24,7%	34,9%	31,0%	8,2%	1,2%
	Pakistan	24,4%	35,0%	26,9%	10,6%	3,1%

Table 117. To what extent do you see yourself as a member of group of origin SWITZERLAND

		To what extent do you see yourself as a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	33,9%	24,1%	24,1%	9,4%	8,6%
	Turkish	49,0%	23,9%	19,8%	2,8%	4,5%
	Moroccan	63,4%	19,3%	11,0%	4,8%	1,4%
	Pakistan	32,9%	32,2%	22,8%	8,7%	3,4%

3.12.4. Proud of being member of community of country of origin

Table 118. To what extent pour to be member of group of origin? BELGIUM

		To what extent are you proud of being a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	44,4%	27,1%	12,8%	4,5%	11,3%
	Turkish	70,2%	20,2%	6,3%	0,8%	2,4%
	Moroccan	45,3%	33,8%	17,5%	2,6%	0,9%
	Pakistan	35,5%	33,1%	21,0%	4,0%	6,5%

Table 119. To what extent pour to be member of group of origin? UNITED KINGDOM

		To what extent are you proud of being a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	52,0%	29,3%	14,0%		4,7%
	Turkish	77,2%	12,0%	10,8%		
	Moroccan	73,0%	14,2%	12,2%	0,7%	
	Pakistan	26,8%	29,6%	42,0%	1,6%	

Table 120. To what extent pour to be member of group of origin? GERMANY

		To what extent are you proud of being a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	46,1%	25,2%	18,5%	5,1%	5,1%
	Turkish	64,1%	18,1%	8,1%	2,4%	7,3%
	Moroccan	29,0%	30,9%	29,0%	8,2%	2,9%
	Pakistan	32,9%	29,1%	20,3%	7,0%	10,8%

Table 121. To what extent pour to be member of group of origin? SWITZERLAND

		To what extent are you proud of being a <Bosnian/Kosovo-Albanian/Macedonian/Montenegrin/Moroccan/Pakistani/Serb/Turk>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	43,5%	25,2%	19,9%	4,5%	6,9%
	Turkish	51,9%	26,3%	13,2%	4,1%	4,5%
	Moroccan	70,6%	18,9%	7,7%	1,4%	1,4%
	Pakistan	34,9%	35,6%	17,8%	6,2%	5,5%

3.12.5. Inclusiveness of host society

Table 122. To what extent do you regard migrants as part of ingroup ?

		To what extent do you regard migrants who permanently live in <COUNTRY > as <INGROUP >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
	Belgium	6,8%	29,1%	43,8%	11,8%	8,4%
	UK	1,3%	8,1%	54,0%	21,0%	15,6%
	The Netherlands	7,0%	49,3%	37,0%	5,3%	1,4%
	France	28,5%	31,3%	30,7%	5,6%	3,9%
	Germany	8,3%	29,3%	48,8%	10,1%	3,5%
	Switzerland	10,8%	35,3%	42,6%	6,2%	5,1%

Table 123. To what extent accepted as Belgian ?

		To what extent do people of <BELGIUM > origin regard you as a <Belgian >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	16,9%	41,2%	25,7%	8,1%	8,1%
	Turkish	10,0%	11,2%	34,3%	18,7%	25,9%
	Moroccan	13,9%	29,5%	30,3%	10,0%	16,3%
	Pakistan	10,5%	37,1%	24,5%	14,0%	14,0%

Table 124. To what extent accepted as English ?

		To what extent do people of <UK > origin regard you as <English >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	0,8%	3,0%	43,2%	25,8%	27,3%
	Turkish	1,5%	16,7%	21,2%	15,3%	45,3%
	Moroccan		14,5%	26,6%	30,6%	28,2%
	Pakistan	8,9%	23,2%	46,9%	2,2%	18,8%

Table 125. To what extent seen as Dutch ?

		To what extent do people of <Dutch > origin regard you as <Dutch >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	11,0%	37,7%	31,5%	13,0%	6,8%
	Turkish	10,2%	28,9%	32,5%	15,4%	13,0%
	Moroccan	14,0%	24,4%	38,0%	13,6%	9,9%
	Pakistan	16,4%	37,5%	25,0%	16,4%	4,7%

Table 126. To what extent seen as French ?

		To what extent do people of <French > origin regard you as <French >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	22,9%	35,6%	22,0%	13,6%	5,9%
	Turkish	12,1%	25,1%	23,4%	10,5%	28,9%
	Moroccan	10,7%	21,9%	33,5%	23,2%	10,7%
	Pakistan	18,0%	26,6%	32,8%	13,3%	9,4%

Table 127. To what extent seen as German ?

		To what extent do people of <German > origin regard you as <German >?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	15,2%	30,7%	28,7%	13,9%	11,5%
	Turkish	5,0%	9,5%	19,8%	16,1%	49,6%
	Moroccan	10,2%	25,6%	31,7%	14,2%	18,3%
	Pakistan	11,4%	16,8%	34,2%	18,8%	18,8%

Table 128. To what extent seen as Swiss ?

		To what extent do people of < Swiss> origin regard you as a < Swiss>?				
		Very strongly	Strongly	Somewhat	Hardly	Not at all
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	19,2%	31,4%	33,5%	9,2%	6,7%
	Turkish	11,7%	28,8%	25,8%	15,0%	18,8%
	Moroccan	14,5%	40,6%	27,5%	14,5%	2,9%
	Pakistan	7,9%	26,4%	32,1%	22,1%	11,4%

3.13. Language use

Table 129. To what extent do you have problems with national language in BELGIUM?

		How often do you have problems with the <Dutch/English/French/NATIONAL LANGUAGE> language in a conversation?				
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	39,2%	24,8%	30,7%	4,6%	0,7%
	Turkish	34,5%	19,2%	31,4%	5,9%	9,0%
	Moroccan	70,2%	14,9%	11,8%	1,6%	1,6%
	Pakistan	44,9%	18,4%	26,5%	2,7%	7,5%

Table 130. To what extent do you have problems with national language in UNITED KINGDOM ?

		How often do you have problems with the < NATIONAL LANGUAGE> language in a conversation?				
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	54,7%	16,0%	12,7%	9,3%	7,3%
	Turkish	61,2%	15,2%	15,2%	2,4%	6,0%
	Moroccan	59,5%	17,6%	14,2%	6,1%	2,7%
	Pakistan	85,2%	8,4%	6,0%	0,4%	
Total	67,2%	13,6%	11,6%	3,8%	3,8%	

Table 131. To what extent do you have problems with national language in THE NETHERLANDS

		How often do you have problems with the <Dutch > language in a conversation?				
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	45,7%	21,2%	27,2%	4,6%	1,3%
	Turkish	42,6%	17,7%	28,5%	8,4%	2,8%
	Moroccan	54,4%	18,8%	23,6%	2,8%	0,4%
	Pakistan	64,9%	9,3%	23,2%	1,3%	1,3%

Table 132. To what extent do you have problems with national language in FRANCE

		How often do you have problems with the < French> language in a conversation?				
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	54,7%	14,7%	23,3%	6,0%	1,3%
	Turkish	64,8%	6,8%	13,6%	9,2%	5,6%
	Moroccan	72,0%	5,5%	15,4%	4,3%	2,8%
	Pakistan	63,4%	10,3%	16,6%	9,0%	0,7%

Table 133. To what extent do you have problems with German in GERMANY

		How often do you have problems with the <German > language in a conversation?				
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		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	50,4%	25,0%	16,0%	7,4%	1,2%
	Turkish	36,9%	18,3%	24,2%	14,3%	6,3%
	Moroccan	57,8%	21,1%	16,4%	4,3%	0,4%
	Pakistan	43,5%	13,7%	25,5%	14,3%	3,1%

Table 134. To what extent do you have problems with national language in SWITZERLAND

		How often do you have problems with the < NATIONAL LANGUAGE(S)> in a conversation?				
		Never	Rarely	Sometimes	Often	Always
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	55,1%	18,2%	20,6%	4,5%	1,6%
	Turkish	54,8%	17,3%	19,0%	6,5%	2,4%
	Moroccan	82,3%	7,5%	8,2%	1,4%	0,7%
	Pakistan	46,2%	18,9%	25,2%	6,3%	3,5%

Table 135. How frequent do you speak the national language with friends in Belgium?

		How frequently do you use the < NATIONAL LANGUAGE> language with the following people in <Belgium >? <ex- Yugoslavian/Moroccan/Pakistani/Turkish> friends				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	8,9%	19,9%	24,7%	17,1%	29,5%
	Turkish	5,5%	16,5%	36,6%	15,0%	26,4%
	Moroccan	26,2%	27,8%	26,6%	12,3%	7,1%
	Pakistan	13,4%	15,5%	34,5%	16,2%	20,4%

Table 136. How frequent do you speak the national language with children in Belgium ?

		Children				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	28,6%	28,6%	22,6%	6,8%	13,5%
	Turkish	15,5%	21,6%	40,5%	10,3%	12,1%
	Moroccan	43,6%	31,4%	15,7%	6,4%	2,9%
	Pakistan	27,4%	31,0%	22,1%	5,3%	14,2%

Table 136. How frequent do you speak the national language with partner in Belgium ?

		Partner				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	12,7%	14,2%	32,1%	14,9%	26,1%
	Turkish	6,4%	9,4%	28,5%	17,0%	38,7%
	Moroccan	26,1%	29,1%	20,7%	11,8%	12,3%
	Pakistan	12,1%	12,1%	30,2%	15,5%	30,2%

Table 137. How frequent do you speak the national language with siblings in Belgium ?

		Siblings				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	16,8%	15,4%	16,8%	7,7%	43,4%
	Turkish	13,2%	17,8%	26,0%	11,0%	32,0%
	Moroccan	36,1%	27,9%	11,9%	8,6%	15,6%
	Pakistan	22,0%	17,1%	17,9%	6,5%	36,6%

Table 138. How frequent do you speak the national language with friends in UNITED KINGDOM ?

		How frequently do you use the <ENGLISH >language with the following people in < the United Kingdom>? <ex-Yugoslavian/Moroccan/Pakistani/Turkish> friends				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	17,3%	14,7%	12,0%	16,0%	40,0%
	Turkish	22,8%	12,8%	30,0%	2,8%	31,6%
	Moroccan	10,1%	17,6%	35,1%	20,3%	16,9%
	Pakistan	34,0%	24,0%	19,6%	12,0%	10,4%

Table 139. How frequent do you speak the national language with children in UK ?

		Children				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	11,3%	19,1%	21,7%	12,2%	35,7%
	Turkish	17,5%	9,3%	25,7%	6,6%	41,0%
	Moroccan	10,7%	21,4%	35,7%	18,8%	13,4%
	Pakistan	27,9%	27,4%	21,1%	11,6%	12,1%

Table 140. How frequent do you speak the national language with partner in the UK ?

		Partner					
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	
ethnic group	Yugoslavian		11,4%	14,6%	13,0%	10,6%	50,4%
	Turkish		11,5%	16,8%	21,6%	8,2%	41,8%
	Moroccan		18,2%	15,7%	30,6%	14,9%	20,7%
	Pakistan		16,3%	29,8%	25,3%	19,7%	9,0%

Table 141. How frequent do you speak the national language with siblings in the UK ?

		Siblings					
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	
ethnic group	Yugoslavian		10,3%	15,2%	13,8%	9,0%	51,7%
	Turkish		21,1%	16,7%	14,5%	10,1%	37,7%
	Moroccan		11,6%	25,3%	25,3%	17,8%	19,9%
	Pakistan		44,2%	21,3%	10,0%	12,0%	12,4%

Table 142. How frequent do you speak the national language with siblings in France ?

		How frequently do you use the <FRENCH >language with the following people in <FRANCE>? <ex-Yugoslavian/Moroccan/Pakistani/Turkish> Siblings				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	29,5%	13,1%	10,7%	5,7%	41,0%
	Turkish	36,6%	23,3%	12,8%	3,1%	24,2%
	Moroccan	34,6%	17,1%	13,4%	2,8%	32,1%
	Pakistan	42,6%	16,3%	10,9%	3,1%	27,1%

Table 143. How frequent do you speak the national language with friends in GERMANY ?

		How frequently do you use the <GERMAN >language with the following people in <GERMANY >? <ex-Yugoslavian/Moroccan/Pakistani/Turkish> friends				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	8,4%	20,4%	20,0%	16,4%	34,8%
	Turkish	38,4%	22,4%	28,8%	8,4%	2,0%
	Moroccan	19,3%	22,8%	24,8%	17,8%	15,3%
	Pakistan	9,1%	16,9%	22,7%	15,6%	35,7%

Table 144. How frequent do you speak the national language with children in GERMANY ?

		Children				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	29,6%	25,5%	20,4%	6,6%	17,9%
	Turkish	32,2%	21,5%	27,1%	14,5%	4,7%
	Moroccan	42,8%	23,3%	16,7%	9,4%	7,8%
	Pakistan	19,7%	29,1%	22,2%	5,1%	23,9%

Table 145. How frequent do you speak the national language with partner in GERMANY ?

		Partner				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	23,2%	11,8%	15,2%	11,4%	38,4%
	Turkish	51,4%	14,6%	19,8%	4,7%	9,4%
	Moroccan	46,9%	16,9%	13,0%	10,6%	12,6%
	Pakistan	19,0%	8,3%	17,4%	20,7%	34,7%

Table 146. How frequent do you speak the national language with siblings in GERMANY ?

		Siblings				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	19,0%	19,0%	13,2%	9,9%	38,8%
	Turkish	46,3%	19,0%	20,0%	12,2%	2,4%
	Moroccan	28,6%	21,2%	16,9%	6,1%	27,3%
	Pakistan	20,7%	16,0%	11,3%	7,3%	44,7%

Table 147. How frequent do you speak the national language with friends in SWITZERLAND ?

		How frequently do you use <one of the national languages> with the following people in <Switzerland >? <ex-Yugoslavian/Moroccan/Pakistani/Turkish> friends				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	13,9%	26,5%	25,3%	15,1%	19,2%
	Turkish	18,5%	23,0%	21,8%	11,7%	25,0%
	Moroccan	19,3%	20,7%	27,4%	11,9%	20,7%
	Pakistan	5,8%	16,5%	19,4%	13,7%	44,6%

Table 148. How frequent do you speak the national language with children in SWITZERLAND ?

		Children				
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
ethnic group	Yugoslavian	24,1%	23,1%	21,8%	10,6%	20,4%
	Turkish	27,4%	20,8%	21,2%	10,2%	20,4%
	Moroccan	38,5%	20,7%	18,5%	8,9%	13,3%
	Pakistan	22,6%	17,7%	25,8%	11,3%	22,6%

Table 149. How frequent do you speak the national language with partner in SWITZERLAND ?

		Partner					
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	
ethnic group	Yugoslavian		19,5%	14,1%	19,5%	11,8%	35,0%
	Turkish		27,0%	9,1%	13,9%	10,9%	39,1%
	Moroccan		40,0%	13,3%	14,1%	13,3%	19,3%
	Pakistan		21,5%	5,0%	19,0%	11,6%	43,0%

Table 150. How frequent do you speak the national language with children in SWITZERLAND ?

		Siblings					
		Always	Often	Sometimes	Rarely	Never	
ethnic group	Yugoslavian		20,9%	17,4%	14,5%	8,5%	38,7%
	Turkish		22,0%	22,8%	12,9%	6,9%	35,3%
	Moroccan		26,4%	16,0%	15,1%	9,4%	33,0%
	Pakistan		17,7%	10,5%	12,9%	3,2%	55,6%

3.14. Attitudes towards intergroup contact

In the following table attitudes towards the outgroup as respectively a neighbour, a boss or a marriage partner of a family member are presented. In France and the Netherlands the question with regard to the boss was not asked.

Table 151. Attitude towards outgroup as a neighbour (BELGIUM)

		AT1		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	2,6%	7,9%	89,5%
	Yugoslavian	10,0%		90,0%
	Turkish	22,4%	2,7%	74,9%
	Moroccan	17,2%		82,8%
	Pakistan	15,0%	1,4%	83,7%
Total		12,4%	3,3%	84,3%

Table 152. Attitude towards outgroup as boss (BELGIUM)

		AT2		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	0,8%	18,1%	81,1%
	Yugoslavian	7,2%	1,3%	91,4%
	Turkish	11,1%	8,7%	80,2%
	Moroccan	6,7%	1,6%	91,7%
	Pakistan	11,0%	4,1%	84,9%
Total		6,3%	8,7%	85,0%

Table 153. Attitude towards outgroup as a marriage partner family (BELGIUM)

		AT3		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	2,1%	23,9%	74,0%
	Yugoslavian	4,7%	20,3%	75,0%
	Turkish	8,8%	44,4%	46,8%
	Moroccan	11,9%	30,0%	58,1%
	Pakistan	5,4%	32,7%	61,9%
Total		6,3%	30,2%	63,5%

Table 154. Attitude towards outgroup as a neighbour (UK)

		AT1		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	2,3%	16,6%	81,0%
	Yugoslavian	10,0%	0,7%	89,3%
	Turkish	43,6%	0,8%	55,6%
	Moroccan	48,0%		52,0%

	Pakistan	16,0%	0,8%	83,2%
Total		20,6%	5,8%	73,5%

Table 155. Attitude towards outgroup as a boss (UK)

		AT2		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	0,5%	12,0%	87,5%
	Yugoslavian	8,8%	4,1%	87,2%
	Turkish	36,5%	4,4%	59,0%
	Moroccan	27,0%	35,1%	37,8%
	Pakistan	12,0%	0,8%	87,1%
Total		15,0%	9,9%	75,1%

Table 156. Attitude towards outgroup as a marriage partner family (UK)

		AT3		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	0,5%	25,1%	74,4%
	Yugoslavian	20,1%	14,6%	65,3%
	Turkish	19,8%	19,4%	60,9%
	Moroccan	41,9%	43,2%	14,9%
	Pakistan	7,7%	13,8%	78,5%
Total		13,7%	22,5%	63,8%

Table 157. Attitude towards outgroup as a neighbour (Netherlands)

		AT1		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	1,0%	11,8%	87,2%
	Yugoslavian	6,5%	1,4%	92,0%
	Turkish	10,8%	0,4%	88,8%
	Moroccan	9,2%	0,4%	90,4%
	Pakistan	20,4%	1,4%	78,2%
Total		8,0%	4,4%	87,7%

Table 158. Attitude towards outgroup as a marriage partner family (Netherlands)

		AT3		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	1,1%	28,1%	70,8%
	Yugoslavian	3,7%	12,5%	83,8%
	Turkish	3,6%	22,3%	74,1%
	Moroccan	3,3%	23,0%	73,8%
	Pakistan	4,0%	28,6%	67,5%
Total		2,7%	23,9%	73,4%

Table 159. Attitude towards outgroup as a neighbour (FRANCE)

		AT1		
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		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	5,4%	3,8%	90,8%
	Yugoslavian	11,0%	0,7%	88,3%
	Turkish	15,4%	1,2%	83,4%
	Moroccan	11,7%	3,1%	85,2%
	Pakistan	23,8%	0,7%	75,5%
Total		11,9%	2,3%	85,8%

Table 160. Attitude towards outgroup as a marriage partner family (FRANCE)

		AT3		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	3,9%	13,7%	82,4%
	Yugoslavian	4,9%	18,2%	76,9%
	Turkish	10,2%	29,4%	60,4%
	Moroccan	8,8%	39,4%	51,8%
	Pakistan	11,5%	30,2%	58,3%
Total		7,4%	25,3%	67,3%

Table 161. Attitude towards outgroup as a neighbour (GERMANY)

		AT1		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	5,3%	9,5%	85,3%
	Yugoslavian	18,8%	1,2%	80,1%
	Turkish	11,1%	1,6%	87,4%
	Moroccan	12,1%		87,9%
	Pakistan	9,3%	1,9%	88,8%
Total		10,9%	3,5%	85,6%

Table 162. Attitude towards outgroup as a boss (GERMANY)

		AT2		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	0,5%	21,4%	78,0%
	Yugoslavian	12,6%	4,3%	83,1%
	Turkish	4,4%	3,6%	92,1%
	Moroccan	9,4%	3,9%	86,6%
	Pakistan	3,2%	4,5%	92,3%
Total		5,8%	9,0%	85,2%

Table 163. Attitude towards outgroup as a marriage partner family (GERMANY)

		AT3		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	1,6%	29,3%	69,1%
	Yugoslavian	8,0%	22,3%	69,7%
	Turkish	5,3%	30,5%	64,2%
	Moroccan	6,8%	25,3%	67,9%
	Pakistan	2,7%	43,0%	54,4%

Total	4,7%	29,0%	66,3%
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Table 164. Attitude towards outgroup as a neighbour (SWITZERLAND)

		AT1		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	3,2%	9,3%	87,5%
	Yugoslavian	8,5%	1,2%	90,3%
	Turkish	12,0%		88,0%
	Moroccan	15,6%	0,7%	83,7%
	Pakistan	16,7%	0,7%	82,7%
Total		9,5%	3,4%	87,1%

Table 165. Attitude towards outgroup as a boss (SWITZERLAND)

		AT2		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	2,0%	16,5%	81,6%
	Yugoslavian	6,1%	4,1%	89,8%
	Turkish	8,1%	1,2%	90,7%
	Moroccan	9,0%	0,7%	90,3%
	Pakistan	10,7%	2,7%	86,6%
Total		6,2%	6,7%	87,1%

Table 166. Attitude towards outgroup as a marriage partner family (SWITZERLAND)

		AT3		
		Pleasant	Unpleasant	Would not make a difference
ethnic group	national majority group	3,5%	22,0%	74,5%
	Yugoslavian	5,3%	19,8%	74,9%
	Turkish	8,8%	13,7%	77,5%
	Moroccan	9,0%	30,6%	60,4%
	Pakistan	8,4%	21,0%	70,6%
Total		6,3%	20,6%	73,1%

3.15. Other variables

Other variables we collected related to experiences of discrimination, religiosity and attitudes towards the place of religion in society. We refrain from presenting these here to keep the number of tables and pages limited. We will extensively report on these results in further publications.

4. Multivariate analysis

In our multivariate analyses of the survey data we wish to establish to what extent cross-national differences on our various socio-cultural variables persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration. Moreover, these analyses can establish to what extent these cross-national differences are stable across Muslim groups from various countries of origin, or whether there are specific interaction effects between destination and source countries of immigration. The survey data will also be used to analyse the issue of the relation between cultural and socio-economic integration.

With regard to cultural distance and interactions between Muslims and the receiving society population, one can distinguish four aspects:

- Language competencies as a precondition for communication across cultural boundaries. The idea here is clear. Sharing the same language promotes communication across group boundaries and enhances mutual identification.
- Mutual identification and acceptance as a basis for solidarity across cultural and religious groups. Identifying as members of the same political entity promotes the notion of common interest and thus develops solidarity across groups (see Van Parijs 2004).
- Shared core norms and values as a basis for democracy in a culturally diverse society. Each democracy assumes a common core of democratic values (see Held 1987), although there is some controversy over the content and interpretation of this core, which may include the equality of men and women; the separation of church and state and the freedom of speech and association.
- Bridging social capital (social networks and trust) as a basis for social cohesion across cultural groups. As Granovetter (1973) has argued, network ties that reach outside the own social group (so-called ‘weak ties’) are also important for individuals’ access to scarce information and resources, such as job opportunities. Others, however, have emphasised the role of support networks of the own ethnic group in facilitating immigrants’ socio-economic participation (Portes and Zhou 1996).

4.1. Language competencies

Men have less problems with the national language than women. The more highly educated have less problems with the national language than the lower educated. People who have a paid job have less problems with the national language than those who do not work. The first generation and – to a lesser extent - the one and half generation (which arrived in the country before the age of 18) have more problems with the national language than the second generation. Controlling for all these variables, Moroccans have more difficulty with the national language in the UK, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands than they have in France. In Switzerland Moroccans have a better mastery of the national language than in France. In France, ex-Yugoslaves, Turks and Pakistanis have more trouble with French than

Moroccans. Pakistani have more problems with the national language in Switzerland but have less problems in the UK and the Netherlands. Turks have more language trouble in Switzerland and have less problems in the UK. Ex-Yugoslaves have less language problems in the Netherlands and more difficulties in Switzerland.

Table 167. Regression model for problems with national language

	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	1,279	,081		15,738	,000
United Kingdom (ref. France)	,272	,102	,089	2,670	,008
BELGIUM	,249	,093	,081	2,691	,007
Netherlands	,466	,089	,158	5,262	,000
Germany	,320	,091	,112	3,537	,000
Swiss	-,434	,103	-,147	-4,218	,000
Ex Yugoslave (ref. Moroccan)	,208	,100	,080	2,084	,037
Turkish	,510	,087	,211	5,839	,000
Pakistani	,367	,101	,136	3,631	,000
UKYugoslave	-,106	,151	-,016	-,703	,482
UKTurk	-,453	,138	-,079	-3,287	,001
UKPakistani	-,525	,142	-,108	-3,691	,000
BelgianPakistani	-,099	,146	-,015	-,680	,497
SwissPakistani	,484	,151	,076	3,211	,001
GermanPakistani	,050	,143	,008	,347	,729
DutchPakistani	-,636	,141	-,102	-4,505	,000
BelgianTurk	,181	,128	,035	1,415	,157
GermanTurk	,124	,125	,025	,992	,321
SwissTurk	,259	,133	,053	1,950	,051
DutchTurk	-,100	,123	-,020	-,811	,417
SwissYugo	,534	,143	,108	3,741	,000
GermanYugo	-,130	,133	-,027	-,979	,328
BelgianYugo	-,024	,144	-,004	-,167	,867
DutchYugo	-,374	,141	-,059	-2,656	,008
male	-,141	,030	-,063	-4,753	,000
Education in years	-,028	,004	-,103	-7,617	,000
dummywork	-,155	,030	-,069	-5,138	,000
Firstgen (ref. second generation)	1,188	,039	,535	30,495	,000
oneandhalfgen	,259	,041	,109	6,353	,000

$R^2 = 0.292$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.288$

4.2. Mutual identification and acceptance

Table 168 presents the regression results for the identification by Muslim ethnic minority members to their country of residence. Scores range from 'very strongly' to 'not at all' and a positive regression coefficient hence indicates there is less identification. The constant in the

model provides the score for a second generation Moroccan in France. Men identify more to the country of residence than women. The higher educated also identify more to the country of residence than the low educated, just as those who have a job have a higher level of identification than those who do not have a job. The first generation and – albeit to a less extent – the one and a half generation identifies less with their new country than the second generation.

Table 168. Regression model for identification with country of residence

	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	2,789	,097		28,803	,000
United Kingdom (ref. France)	,340	,121	,101	2,816	,005
BELGIUM	-,235	,111	-,069	-2,128	,033
Netherlands	-,359	,105	-,109	-3,408	,001
Germany	,155	,108	,050	1,441	,150
Swiss	-,466	,124	-,144	-3,773	,000
Ex Yugoslave (ref. Moroccan)	-,360	,119	-,125	-3,027	,002
Turkish	,408	,104	,154	3,927	,000
Pakistani	-,480	,121	-,160	-3,961	,000
UKYugoslave	,625	,182	,085	3,443	,001
UKTurk	-,357	,164	-,057	-2,180	,029
UKPakistani	,642	,170	,121	3,782	,000
BelgianPakistani	,415	,175	,058	2,369	,018
SwissPakistani	,618	,180	,090	3,434	,001
GermanPakistani	,575	,171	,083	3,358	,001
DutchPakistani	,315	,173	,043	1,822	,069
BelgianTurk	,231	,152	,041	1,515	,130
GermanTurk	,708	,149	,128	4,755	,000
SwissTurk	,289	,159	,054	1,817	,069
DutchTurk	,029	,146	,005	,196	,845
SwissYugo	,727	,171	,135	4,263	,000
GermanYugo	,239	,159	,044	1,505	,132
BelgianYugo	,310	,171	,045	1,807	,071
DutchYugo	,323	,168	,046	1,917	,055
Male	-,105	,035	-,043	-2,979	,003
Education in years	-,027	,004	-,087	-5,942	,000
dummywork	-,162	,036	-,066	-4,494	,000
Firstgen (ref. second generation)	,604	,046	,247	13,004	,000
oneandhalfgen	,219	,048	,084	4,512	,000

$R^2 = 0.179$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.174$

Moroccans in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland identify more to their country of residence than those in France and Germany. Moroccans in the UK identify less with their country of residence. Turks identify less with France, while Ex-Yugoslaves and Pakistani identify more with France. UK Turks identify more with the UK than Moroccans in France do to France. Pakistani and ex-Yugoslaves, in contrast, identify less with the UK. While

Pakistani in France identify very much with France, they do a lot less identify with their country of residence in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands. While there is no difference in identification with the host country for Turks in Belgium and the Netherlands, Turks in Germany and in Switzerland have a lesser degree of identification. In Switzerland also the ex-Yugoslaves have a lower identification.

In table 169 we can observe that there is no significant difference between men and women as far as they perceive to be accepted as fellow citizens by the national majority group. People who have a job and who have a higher level of education perceive to be better accepted. There is no significant difference between the one and a half generation and the second generation. The first generation thinks to be less accepted than the second generation. Moroccans in Switzerland perceive to be better accepted than Moroccans in France. Moroccans in the UK perceive to be less accepted. There is no statistical significant difference for Moroccans in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. Ex-Yugoslaves and Pakistani feel better accepted than Moroccans in France, while Turks feel less accepted. Pakistani in the UK feel better accepted. Ex-Yugoslaves in the UK and Switzerland, Pakistani in Switzerland and Turks in Germany feel less accepted as fellow citizens.

Table 169. Regression model for perceived acceptance as fellow citizen in country of residence

	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	3,003	,106		28,384	,000
United Kingdom (ref. France)	,704	,136	,197	5,178	,000
BELGIUM	-,095	,118	-,028	-,806	,420
Netherlands	-,114	,113	-,035	-1,006	,314
Germany	,074	,116	,023	,637	,524
Swiss	-,595	,132	-,181	-4,491	,000
Ex Yugoslave (ref. Moroccan)	-,561	,136	-,189	-4,122	,000
Turkish	,251	,112	,092	2,230	,026
Pakistani	-,259	,133	-,084	-1,946	,052
UKYugoslave	,593	,205	,077	2,889	,004
UKTurk	-,165	,183	-,024	-,900	,368
UKPakistani	-,346	,189	-,062	-1,832	,067
BelgianPakistani	,128	,188	,018	,679	,497
SwissPakistani	,859	,195	,123	4,415	,000
GermanPakistani	,330	,186	,047	1,777	,076
DutchPakistani	-,030	,186	-,004	-,163	,870
BelgianTurk	,259	,162	,045	1,602	,109
GermanTurk	,676	,159	,121	4,241	,000
SwissTurk	,352	,170	,065	2,072	,038
DutchTurk	-,111	,156	-,020	-,712	,477
SwissYugo	,693	,188	,127	3,689	,000
GermanYugo	,293	,176	,053	1,662	,097
BelgianYugo	,161	,188	,023	,855	,393
DutchYugo	,319	,185	,046	1,722	,085
Male	,087	,038	,035	2,297	,022

Education in years	-,016	,005	-,050	-3,273	,001
dummywork	-,168	,039	-,067	-4,326	,000
Firstgen (ref. second generation)	,370	,050	,148	7,406	,000
oneandhalfgen	,050	,052	,019	,965	,335

$R^2 = 0.139$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.133$

In table 170 we focus on the acceptance of Muslims as fellow citizens by the national majority samples. We can observe that there is no statistically significant difference in the attitudes of men and women towards Muslims as members of the national community. Those who have paid work and how are higher educated have a larger inclination to accept Muslims. In comparison to the French – and controlling for gender, educational level and employment status -, the British, the Belgians, the Germans, the Swiss and the Dutch are less inclined to accept Muslims as fellow citizens. The gap is the biggest between the British and the French and the smallest between the French and the Dutch.

Table 170. Regression model for acceptance of Muslims as fellow citizens

	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Beta		
(Constante)	2,694	,095		28,317	,000
United Kingdom	1,214	,069	,484	17,555	,000
BELGIUM	,668	,073	,244	9,110	,000
Netherlands	,192	,083	,058	2,321	,020
Germany	,566	,075	,204	7,584	,000
Swiss	,324	,069	,127	4,668	,000
male	-,041	,043	-,020	-,966	,334
Education in years	-,031	,007	-,099	-4,396	,000
dummywork	-,114	,044	-,056	-2,594	,010

$R^2 = 0.163$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.160$

4.3. Shared core norms and values

Table 171 presents a regression model with perceived distance to the outgroup as a dependent variable. The higher the score, the more distance there is perceived with the outgroup. The constant represents a national majority group member in France. Perception of outgroup distance is the highest in the UK, followed by Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. Muslims perceive less distance than the national majority group. Ex Yugoslaves perceive the least difference, followed by respectively Moroccans, Pakistani and Turks. Men perceive less distance than women, the higher educated perceive less distance than the lower educated, as do those in paid work compared to those not holding a job. Turks in the UK and Moroccans in Belgium, Switzerland and Germany perceive less difference.

Table 171. Regression model for perceived distance outgroup

Modèle	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Beta		

	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	3,080	,064		47,786	,000
United Kingdom (ref France)	,352	,055	,177	6,348	,000
Belgium	,328	,059	,159	5,538	,000
Netherlands	,096	,068	,044	1,426	,154
Germany	,360	,062	,177	5,773	,000
Switzerland	,127	,057	,064	2,216	,027
male	-,096	,019	-,063	-4,949	,000
Education in years	-,015	,003	-,074	-5,666	,000
dummywork	-,069	,020	-,045	-3,452	,001
agenow	,002	,001	,043	3,179	,001
UKYugoslave	,212	,110	,037	1,936	,053
UKMoroccan	-,011	,100	-,002	-,108	,914
UKTurk	-,224	,093	-,048	-2,414	,016
UKPakistani	,211	,097	,056	2,185	,029
BelgianPakistani	-,010	,108	-,002	-,093	,926
SwissPakistani	-,028	,106	-,006	-,267	,790
GermanPakistani	-,087	,109	-,017	-,794	,427
DutchPakistani	,321	,116	,057	2,775	,006
BelgianTurk	,038	,091	,009	,422	,673
GermanTurk	-,028	,093	-,007	-,307	,759
SwissTurk	-,013	,089	-,003	-,146	,884
DutchTurk	-,023	,096	-,006	-,236	,814
DutchMoroccan	,122	,099	,030	1,242	,214
BelgianMoroccan	-,353	,094	-,083	-3,760	,000
GermanMoroccan	-,461	,097	-,106	-4,769	,000
SwissMoroccan	-,300	,101	-,055	-2,961	,003
SwissYugo	-,016	,099	-,004	-,164	,869
GermanYugo	-,145	,102	-,036	-1,419	,156
BelgianYugo	-,162	,107	-,031	-1,514	,130
DutchYugo	,296	,116	,052	2,559	,011
Ex Yugoslave	-,768	,077	-,363	-9,939	,000
Turkish	-,205	,065	-,110	-3,144	,002
Moroccan	-,391	,068	-,194	-5,791	,000
Pakistani	-,450	,078	-,210	-5,770	,000

R²= 0.195, adjusted R²=0.190

Table 172 presents the regression model for family and gender values. The higher the score the more progressive one is. Once again we take autochthonous French as the reference category. Controlling for all other variables in the model, men are less progressive than women. The older are less progressive than the younger. The higher educated and those holding a job are more progressive on family and gender values. The UK, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands are more progressive than France and Belgium. Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans and ex-Yugoslaves are less progressive than the national majority group.

Table 172. Regression model for family and gender values

Modèle	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	2,911	,037		79,589	,000
United Kingdom (ref France)	,312	,032	,243	9,849	,000
Belgium	-,003	,033	-,002	-,088	,930
Netherlands	,159	,038	,115	4,211	,000
Germany	,226	,034	,175	6,680	,000
Switzerland	,228	,032	,181	7,139	,000
male	-,105	,012	-,108	-9,108	,000
Education in years	,019	,002	,147	12,024	,000
dummywork	,087	,012	,089	7,342	,000
agenow	-,003	,000	-,093	-7,263	,000
UKYugoslave	-,416	,064	-,121	-6,526	,000
UKMoroccan	-,590	,056	-,185	-10,459	,000
UKTurk	-,183	,056	-,058	-3,277	,001
UKPakistani	-,345	,058	-,136	-5,917	,000
BelgianPakistani	-,095	,064	-,028	-1,482	,138
SwissPakistani	-,159	,063	-,049	-2,533	,011
GermanPakistani	-,242	,065	-,071	-3,738	,000
DutchPakistani	,002	,069	,001	,028	,978
BelgianTurk	-,029	,053	-,011	-,541	,588
GermanTurk	-,153	,053	-,058	-2,885	,004
SwissTurk	-,099	,051	-,039	-1,935	,053
DutchTurk	,010	,055	,004	,173	,863
DutchMoroccan	,004	,057	,001	,066	,948
BelgianMoroccan	-,001	,054	,000	-,011	,991
GermanMoroccan	-,012	,056	-,004	-,207	,836
SwissMoroccan	-,197	,059	-,057	-3,359	,001
SwissYugo	-,317	,058	-,126	-5,482	,000
GermanYugo	-,250	,060	-,096	-4,201	,000
BelgianYugo	-,140	,063	-,043	-2,221	,026
DutchYugo	,007	,066	,002	,113	,910
Ex Yugoslave	-,166	,045	-,125	-3,655	,000
Turkish	-,273	,037	-,227	-7,347	,000
Moroccan	-,189	,038	-,148	-4,967	,000
Pakistani	-,281	,046	-,201	-6,101	,000

$R^2 = 0.239$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.235$

Table 173 presents the regression model for ethical conservatism/progressiveness (measured through attitudes with regard to abortion, homosexuality and premarital sex). The higher the score the more progressive and tolerant one is. Once again we take autochthonous French as the reference category. The older are less progressive on ethical issues than the younger. The higher educated and those holding a job are more progressive on ethical issues. The UK, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland are less progressive than France and the Netherlands.

Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans and ex-Yugoslaves are considerably less progressive than the national majority group.

Table 173. Regression model for conservatism/progressiveness (attitude on abortion, homosexuality, premarital sex)

Modèle	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	7,007	,190		36,930	,000
United Kingdom (ref France)	-1,742	,165	-,237	-10,572	,000
Belgium	-,559	,174	-,075	-3,221	,001
Netherlands	,178	,197	,023	,906	,365
Germany	-,942	,177	-,128	-5,330	,000
Switzerland	-,382	,166	-,053	-2,294	,022
Male	-,107	,060	-,019	-1,788	,074
Education in years	,075	,008	,102	9,228	,000
dummywork	,539	,062	,097	8,765	,000
agenow	-,013	,002	-,072	-6,254	,000
UKYugoslave	,825	,328	,044	2,518	,012
UKMoroccan	1,286	,294	,070	4,367	,000
UKTurk	1,267	,287	,072	4,419	,000
UKPakistani	1,618	,305	,107	5,307	,000
BelgianPakistani	,741	,331	,039	2,234	,026
SwissPakistani	,935	,325	,050	2,882	,004
GermanPakistani	,896	,331	,048	2,708	,007
DutchPakistani	,557	,343	,029	1,626	,104
BelgianTurk	-,729	,276	-,048	-2,644	,008
GermanTurk	,117	,277	,008	,423	,672
SwissTurk	1,124	,268	,077	4,202	,000
DutchTurk	,530	,286	,037	1,853	,064
DutchMoroccan	,585	,293	,040	1,995	,046
BelgianMoroccan	,346	,284	,022	1,216	,224
GermanMoroccan	1,673	,296	,096	5,651	,000
SwissMoroccan	,730	,304	,037	2,401	,016
SwissYugo	-,244	,305	-,016	-,799	,424
GermanYugo	,437	,311	,030	1,405	,160
BelgianYugo	,071	,329	,004	,217	,828
DutchYugo	1,370	,342	,074	4,004	,000
Ex Yugoslave	-2,632	,239	-,348	-11,033	,000
Turkish	-3,845	,193	-,563	-19,898	,000
Moroccan	-3,890	,198	-,529	-19,604	,000
Pakistani	-4,542	,239	-,574	-19,032	,000

$R^2 = 0.374$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.371$

4.4. Bridging social capital

By way of exploration, table 174 presents the regression model for bridging social capital (measured through level of acquaintances of outgroup). The higher the score the less bridging social capital with the outgroup one has. Once again we take autochthonous French as the reference category. We observe there is more bridging social capital in the UK and the Netherlands. The higher educated and people holding a job have more bridging capital. Pakistanis have less and ex-Yugoslaves, Turks and Moroccans have more bridging capital than the ethnic majority group.

Table 174. Regression model for acquaintances of outgroup

Modèle	non standardised coefficients		Standardised coefficients	t	Sig.
	B	SE	Bêta		
(Constante)	5,243	,104		50,644	,000
United Kingdom (ref France)	-,607	,091	-,151	-6,674	,000
Belgium	,012	,096	,003	,126	,900
Netherlands	-,959	,108	-,222	-8,896	,000
Germany	-,055	,097	-,014	-,574	,566
Switzerland	-,048	,090	-,012	-,525	,599
Male	-,047	,032	-,015	-1,465	,143
Education in years	-,023	,004	-,056	-5,199	,000
dummywork	-,170	,033	-,055	-5,124	,000
agenow	-,001	,001	-,013	-1,180	,238
UKYugoslave	,262	,171	,026	1,534	,125
UKMoroccan	1,097	,162	,103	6,754	,000
UKTurk	1,211	,146	,147	8,318	,000
UKPakistani	,005	,160	,001	,029	,977
BelgianPakistani	-,583	,178	-,054	-3,277	,001
SwissPakistani	-,291	,172	-,028	-1,693	,091
GermanPakistani	-,590	,177	-,056	-3,343	,001
DutchPakistani	1,323	,182	,128	7,283	,000
BelgianTurk	-,135	,151	-,016	-,894	,371
GermanTurk	-,017	,150	-,002	-,114	,910
SwissTurk	-,130	,144	-,016	-,902	,367
DutchTurk	,667	,156	,081	4,269	,000
DutchMoroccan	,542	,160	,065	3,393	,001
BelgianMoroccan	-,159	,156	-,018	-1,022	,307
GermanMoroccan	-,509	,155	-,058	-3,283	,001

SwissMoroccan	-,384	,163	-,036	-2,350	,019
SwissYugo	-,210	,158	-,026	-1,328	,184
GermanYugo	-,454	,163	-,055	-2,785	,005
BelgianYugo	-,707	,175	-,067	-4,042	,000
DutchYugo	-,030	,182	-,003	-,167	,867
Ex Yugoslave	-1,830	,121	-,440	-15,134	,000
Turkish	-1,868	,104	-,500	-17,988	,000
Moroccan	-1,911	,106	-,470	-17,964	,000
Pakistani	5,243	,104		50,644	,000

$R^2 = 0.345$, adjusted $R^2 = 0.342$

5. Conclusion

In workpackage 3 a survey questionnaire was developed which enabled a study of the individual characteristics of Muslim immigrants, focusing on attitudes, norms, and values, particularly those relating to democratic norms, gender relations and family values, ethnic, religious, European and receiving society identification, and attitudes towards relations across ethnic and religious boundaries. We also look at cultural and religious resources and practices (language proficiency, adherence to various religious practices, interethnic and interreligious partnerships and marriages, the frequency and quality of interethnic and interreligious relationships with neighbours, friends and colleagues) as well as membership in social and political organisations both of the same group and of the receiving society.

The main objective of work package 4 was to move to the subsequent phase of data analysis (cross-tabulations, regression analysis, logistic regression, etc.). Through bivariate and multivariate statistical analyses we aimed to assess the extent to which cross-national differences on key cultural variables persist when controlling for individual-level background characteristics, such as gender, age, level of education, labour market position, and timing of immigration. This integrated survey report gives an overview of the main results of the survey endeavour.

We present some of the most striking observations. We observed that naturalization rates for ethnic minority groups of Muslim descent were consistently lower in Germany and Switzerland than in other countries. They are the highest in the Netherlands and Belgium. It was striking that, with the exception of the UK, in all countries members of the national minority group had very little likelihood to have had Muslim pupils in their class. Furthermore, a substantive part of all ethnic minority groups lacked contact with the majority outgroup, thus attesting to the high level of school segregation in most countries. Nevertheless, it is also in the UK that perceived distance to the outgroup is the highest, thus showing that mixed schools do not automatically foster mutual understanding.

Support for free speech in most countries is – in contrast to the general stereotype - higher among the ethnic minority groups of Muslim descent than among the national majority group. However, some patterns confirm that ethnic minority groups have a different outlook on politics than the national majority group: ethnic minority groups of Muslim descent everywhere find it more important than the majority group to have more people with strong religious beliefs in office. They also more often wish for strong leadership and are more sceptical about the capability of democracies to maintain order. In general they do, however, share the belief with a large majority of the national majority group that democracy is the best form of government.

Our multivariate analysis focussed on language competencies, mutual identification, shared core values and bridging social capital. Men have less problems with the national language than women. The more highly educated have less problems with the national language than the lower educated. People who have a paid job have less problems with the national language than those who do not work. The first generation and – to a lesser extent - the one and half generation (which arrived in the country before the age of 18) have more problems with the national language than the second generation. Controlling for all these variables, Moroccans have more difficulty with the national language in the UK, Belgium, Germany and the

Netherlands than they have in France. In Switzerland Moroccans have a better mastery of the national language than in France. In France, ex-Yugoslaves, Turks and Pakistanis have more trouble with French than Moroccans. Pakistani have more problems with the national language in Switzerland but have less problems in the UK and the Netherlands. Turks have more language trouble in Switzerland and have less problems in the UK. Ex-Yugoslaves have less language problems in the Netherlands and more difficulties in Switzerland.

Men identify more to the country of residence than women. The higher educated also identify more to the country of residence than the low educated, just as those who have a job have a higher level of identification than those who do not have a job. The first generation and – albeit to a less extent – the one and a half generation identifies less with their new country than the second generation. Moroccans in Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland identify more to their country of residence than those in France and Germany. Moroccans in the UK identify less with their country of residence. Turks identify less with France, while Ex-Yugoslaves and Pakistani identify more with France. UK Turks identify more with the UK than Moroccans in France do to France. Pakistani and ex-Yugoslaves, in contrast, identify less with the UK. While Pakistani in France identify very much with France, they do a lot less identify with their country of residence in Belgium, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands. While there is no difference in identification with the host country for Turks in Belgium and the Netherlands, Turks in Germany and in Switzerland have a lesser degree of identification. In Switzerland also the ex-Yugoslaves have a lower identification.

We furthermore observed that there is no significant difference between men and women as far as they perceive to be accepted as fellow citizens by the national majority group. People who have a job and who have a higher level of education perceive to be better accepted. There is no significant difference between the one and a half generation and the second generation. The first generation thinks to be less accepted than the second generation. Moroccans in Switzerland perceive to be better accepted than Moroccans in France. Moroccans in the UK perceive to be less accepted. There is no statistical significant difference for Moroccans in France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Germany. Ex-Yugoslaves and Pakistani feel better accepted than Moroccans in France, while Turks feel less accepted. Pakistani in the UK feel better accepted. Ex-Yugoslaves in the UK and Switzerland, Pakistani in Switzerland and Turks in Germany feel less accepted as fellow citizens.

We also observed that there is no statistically significant difference in the attitudes of men and women towards Muslims as members of the national community. Those who have paid work and how are higher educated have a larger inclination to accept Muslims. In comparison to the French – and controlling for gender, educational level and employment status - , the British, the Belgians, the Germans, the Swiss and the Dutch are less inclined to accept Muslims as fellow citizens. The gap is the biggest between the British and the French and the smallest between the French and the Dutch.

Perception of outgroup distance is the highest in the UK, followed by Germany, Belgium and Switzerland. Muslims perceive less distance than the national majority group. Ex Yugoslaves perceive the least difference, followed by respectively Moroccans, Pakistani and Turks. Men perceive less distance than women, the higher educated perceive less distance than the lower educated, as do those in paid work compared to those not holding a job. Turks in the UK and Moroccans in Belgium, Switzerland and Germany perceive less difference.

Controlling for all other variables in the model, men are less progressive than women. The older are less progressive than the younger. The higher educated and those holding a job are more progressive on family and gender values. The UK, Switzerland, Germany and the Netherlands are more progressive than France and Belgium. Turks, Pakistanis, Moroccans and ex-Yugoslaves are less progressive than the national majority group.

Finally, we observe there is more bridging social capital in the UK and the Netherlands. The higher educated and people holding a job have more bridging capital. Pakistanis have less and ex-Yugoslaves, Turks and Moroccans have more bridging capital than the ethnic majority group.

The overall conclusion is that educational attainment and labour market position play an important role for more symmetric intergroup relations. We furthermore observe that there are significant differences between the ethnic minority groups of Muslim descent in the same countries and that one can hence not observe unequivocal country effects. In future social-scientific publications we will extensively analyse all these patterns tracked down in our multivariate analysis models. We will then also link them up with the results of the workpackages on political opportunity structures and the discursive climate.