



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Final Report**

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Funded by the 5<sup>th</sup> Framework Programme of the European Commission (Contract No. SERD-2000-00288) and the Swiss Office of Education and Science (Contract No. OFES 00.0388)

Project website: <http://ics.leeds.ac.uk/eurpolcom/unempol/>

June 2005

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## Table of contents

Introduction	p3
PART I: MAIN COMPONENTS OF THE RESEARCH	
1. Objectives and theoretical framework	p11
2. Methodological approach and data	p37
PART II: NATIONAL REPORTS	
3. UK	p44
4. Switzerland	p77
5. France	p124
6. Italy	p154
7. Germany	p196
8. Sweden	p225
PART III: COMPARATIVE AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES	
9. Protest on unemployment: forms and opportunities	p258
10. The political mobilization of the unemployed in comparative perspective	p277
11. Report on interviews at level of the European Union	p292
Appendix A: Codebook (Workpackage 1: Political claim-making in the public domain)	p339
Appendix B: Basic interview schedule (Workpackage 2: Policy deliberation in national policy domains)	p380
Appendix C: Schedule for unemployed organizations (Workpackage 2: Political deliberation in national policy domains)	p398
Appendix D: Questionnaire for interviews with European actors (Workpackage 3: Policy deliberation at the EU level)	p406
Appendix E: Readings on unemployment and related topics	p422



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**Introduction**

**Marco Giugni and Paul Statham**

The present report summarizes the main findings of the UNEMPOL project (*The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market*). UNEMPOL is a cross-national comparative project research project financed by the European Commission and by the Swiss Office of Education and Science through the Fifth Framework Program. It aimed to advance knowledge in labor politics by focusing on the “contentious politics of unemployment,” i.e. the relationships between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors over unemployment in the public domain. In other words, the project aimed to provide a more integrated approach to the study of unemployment by systematically linking analysis of the policy field on labor and employment to analysis of the field of political contention (collective mobilization and claim-making) on issues relating to unemployment in the public domain.

The UNEMPOL project started out as a smaller study of the mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland, conducted within the framework of the Plurifacultary program on social exclusion at the University of Geneva (see Giugni and Hunyadi for a summary of the main findings of this program). In fact, the movements of the unemployed have been largely neglected in the literature, perhaps because scholars have assumed that unemployment is a temporary condition which is not very conducive to political organization and mobilization. We know today that this is not necessarily true. Inspired by a recent study of the contested field of immigration and ethnic relations (see Koopmans and al. forthcoming for a summary of the main findings of this study), the idea was to study the relationship between certain aspects of the welfare state, conceived as a specific political opportunity structure for this movement, on the one hand, and the levels, forms, and content of the mobilization of the unemployed (claim-making), on the other.

However, we soon realized that an analysis of the mobilization of the unemployed should be embedded in a larger framework. The analysis was therefore broadened in four directions. First, we did not have to limit the analysis to a single national context, but had to adopt a comparative perspective in order to be able to link variations in the mobilization of the unemployed to differences in the political opportunity structures (general and specific). Second, we did not have to limit the analysis to the mobilization of the unemployed, but had to take into account as well the intervention of other actors in the field (in particular, policy actors, but also civil society actors such as private businesses and trade unions, as well as organizations defending the interests of the unemployed, such as welfare groups). Third, we did not have to limit the analysis to the overt, visible actions in the public domain, but had to take into account as well less visible forms of intervention in the field, such as ‘insider-lobbying’ (policy deliberation in the multi-organizational field). Fourth, we did not have to

limit the analysis to the national level, but had to take into account as well the role of the European Union in shaping national policy agendas in the field and vice-versa, thus addressing the ‘multi-leveling’ of politics.

At the end of this broadening of the scope of the analysis, the project had the following objectives:

- To generate a new body of data that will allow for longitudinal (specifically, from 1995 to 2002) and internationally comparative (specifically, in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) analyses of the ideological and policy positions of actors and their relationships in the unemployment issue-field;
- To advance theory and extend knowledge in the labor and employment politics field by developing a more integrated conceptual approach that systematically relates two dimensions of the field that have previously remained distinct and isolated fields of research: policy-making on one side, and political contentions and collective mobilization over unemployment issues by the organized citizenry (e.g. by NGOs) in the public domain, on the other;
- To advance knowledge on the nature of the organizational field of employment politics and investigating the potential for extending the established policy dialogue towards a more encompassing civil policy deliberation (specifically, feedback to policy-makers, and social movements, on their positions and strategies, and the potential for new forms of social/civil dialogues and a more participatory and effective policy deliberation);
- To provide a body of knowledge based on rigorous cross-national comparisons that will allow firmly grounded empirical statements to be made concerning the Europeanization of the field (specifically, the levels of convergence and divergence in the contentious politics of unemployment of the six countries, and the role that transnational political institutions and initiatives play as sources and targets of demands);
- To establish a research network that will last beyond the lifetime of the project, both internal and external to the research consortium.

These objectives were pursued through a variety of analytical tools drawn from different theoretical traditions and through a variety of methodological approaches stressing both qualitative and quantitative aspects. The theoretical framework and methodological approaches will be described in more detail in the next two chapters.

This report is one among a number of written outputs of the project which we have produced and plan to produce. It presents some of the main research findings, both at the national level and comparative, in a language that is accessible to a wider audience than academic experts in the field. Most of the written reports produced so far have been presented at academic conferences and workshops (Berclaz et al. 2004, 2005; Chabanet and Giugni 2005; Giugni and Berclaz 2002, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c; Linders 2005; Linders and Kalander 2003, 2004), and some have been published in academic journals or in edited volumes (Berclaz and Giugni 2005; Berclaz et al. 2005). In addition, a special issue of the *Swiss Journal of Sociology* (2005) was organized in the context of the Swiss part of the project. Other written outputs are planned. Most notably, we plan to produce a book presenting the main research findings of the comparative analyses for an academic audience. Given the originality, breadth, and systematic nature of the data gathered during the project, this volume promises to give a substantial contribution to the literature, both in the field of social movement studies and in the field of labor politics. We also plan to produce an edited volume from the closing conference organized at the end of the project (see below).

In addition to written reports, the project outputs were disseminated through conferences and workshops. Specifically, national workshops have been organized in each of the six countries involved. Given that one of the aims of our dissemination strategy was to strengthen the social dialogue among the parts involved as well as the linkages between researchers and stakeholders, to the extent that this was possible we invited to participate in these events both academic experts and practitioners in the field. Furthermore, a closing conference with invited speakers, only from the academic side this time, was held on Friday 1 April and Saturday 2 April 2005 at the *Centre Européen de Coppet*, a facility of the European Institute of the University of Geneva (IUEG) at the *Château de Coppet*, near Geneva. It had double objective: dissemination and exchange. On the one hand, members of the UNEMPOL research consortium presented the most relevant research outputs produced within the project, which have then been discussed at the conference. This provided an opportunity to disseminating the project's main findings. On the other hand, invited specialists on unemployment presented their own work in this field. This allowed for debating issues relating to the study of unemployment and for exchanging theoretical perspectives, research findings, and possible solutions to this problem. In this way, we were able to introduce our innovative approach which focuses especially on the linkages of the policy domain on unemployment to the public discourses and mobilization to existing scholars in the field, as well as draw on their substantive knowledge of specific aspects of our research field (e.g., trade unions, national policy contexts, specific policy mechanisms, market forces, the internal dynamics of unemployed mobilization) to advance our own future research. Thus a continuing academic dialogue that will extend beyond this project has already been initiated, and will bring its first output in the edited volume from the final conference.

The conference had three main thematic axes: (1) institutional approaches to unemployment; (2) collective action on unemployment; (3) European dimensions of unemployment. The first thematic axis concerns the ways in which unemployment is dealt with institutionally and the impact of the institutional treatment of unemployment on the civil society. This includes policy-making in this field, but also public discourses pertaining to unemployment and relating issues. The second thematic axis concerns the non-institutional side of the issue and the collective mobilizations by civil society actors. This includes the protest activities of unemployed themselves, but also the mobilization of other collective actors involved in this field. The third thematic axis concerns 'Europeanisation' of the policy field and processes of public deliberation, i.e., the emergent ways in which unemployment is framed, debated, and managed at the European level and the way that this shapes and interacts with national politics. This includes the impact of EU-level supra-national activities, but also the 'multi-leveling' of national politics that results from increasing intergovernmental co-operation within a European framework, such as transnational exchanges, learning and influences. Thus both the supra-national EU level and cross-national approaches of the experiences of European countries were included. In addition, the thematic axis on the EU-level was integrated into the two other thematic axes, as both the institutional approaches and the collective action on unemployment have a European dimension. Thus, the conference was structured around three sessions. The first session was devoted to the presentation of the UNEMPOL project and, especially, some of the main comparative findings reached so far. The second session was devoted to institutional aspects such as public policy to fight unemployment and market-related aspects (both at the national and European levels). The third session was devoted to collective action (both at the national and European levels).

It is important to stress that the present report and, more generally, the research findings produced so far by the project is work in progress. This is only a first step in what we consider as an innovative approach to the study of labor politics, focusing on the political process and

contentious politics of unemployment. Much more needs to be done along the line suggested in this report and, more generally, in the UNEMPOL project. We will pursue this avenue of research in our own work, first through the planned publications mentioned earlier. Above all, however, we hope that we were able to set an agenda for future research in the field that will be picked up by other researchers, both in the field of social movement and in the field of labor politics.

The report has three main parts. Part I introduces the main components of the UNEMPOL project. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the main objectives of project as well as the general theoretical framework adopted in the project. Chapter 2 explains the methodological approach adopted in the project as well as the type of data used in the empirical analyses. Part II is devoted to a presentation of main research findings in each of the six countries included in the project: the UK (chapter 3), Switzerland (chapter 4), France (chapter 5), Italy (chapter 6), Germany (chapter 7), and Sweden (chapter 8). These six country-reports are all structured in the same way and include information coming from the various deliverables produced during the lifetime of the project: the national templates, the national reports on Workpackage 1 (Political claim-making in the public domain) and the national reports on Workpackage 2 (Policy deliberation in the national policy domain). Some flexibility in this common structure was allowed in order to take into account national particularities. Part III, finally, summarizes some of the findings in comparative and European perspectives. Chapter 9 deals with the protest on unemployment from a social movement perspective, focusing in particular on the forms of and opportunities for protest on the issue of unemployment. Chapter 10 looks at the mobilization of the unemployed (the main constituency group in this field) following a revised political opportunity approach. Chapter 11 shifts the analysis to the EU-level using the interview data collected in Workpackage 2. We include in the Appendices the main instruments of analysis used in the project (codebook for claims data analysis and questionnaires for the interviews with actors in the field) as well as list of readings we compiled and the list of project deliverables.

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## **The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

### **Chapter 1: Objectives and theoretical framework**

**Marco Giugni and Paul Statham**

This chapter provides an overview of the main objectives of the project as well as the general theoretical framework adopted in the project. To do so, it draws in part from the research outline (Giugni and Statham 2002), but also includes theoretical advancements and developments made during the life-time project. In particular, we present a theoretical reflection about the relationship between conceptions of the welfare state, institutional approaches to unemployment, and claim-making in the employment political field (Berclaz et al. 2005). This theoretical framework will be used and complemented with other explanatory factors in chapter 10, which deals with cross-national patterns of claim-making in the field of unemployment.

The chapter divides into three main parts. In the first part we summarize the objectives and general research questions that have guided our work during the lifetime of the project. In the second part, we describe the research design and the specific research questions. In the third part we provide some elements of a theoretical framework for explaining claim-making in the field of unemployment politics following a political opportunity approach.

#### **1. Objectives and research questions**

##### ***1.1. Main objectives***

This project aimed to advance knowledge in labor politics by focusing on the “contentious politics of unemployment”, i.e. the relationship between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors over unemployment in the public domain. The research design operated at a six country cross-national comparative level and a transnational European level. Here we summarize our main objectives before introducing the project in more detail:

- A first objective was to generate a new body of data that allowed for longitudinal and internationally comparative (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) analyses of the ideological and policy positions of actors and their relationships in the unemployment issue-field. We focused on the politics of contention at work in this field, i.e. the potential impact that political conflicts and public disputes may have in shaping policy decisions. We did this by providing a systematic empirically grounded comparative study that in addition refers to the transnational European dimension. Our objective was to advance knowledge and also provide a body of research that would give practical

knowledge to political actors and policy-makers, whilst allowing future researchers to position their own research within an internationally comparative contextual framework.

- A second objective was to advance theory and extend knowledge in the labor and employment politics field. Our aim here was to go beyond the current tendency to refer to the socio-economic dimensions of the labor and employment field. We attempted to achieve this by developing a more integrated conceptual approach that systematically relates two dimensions of the field that had previously remained distinct and isolated fields of research: policy-making on one side, and political contentions and collective mobilization over unemployment issues by the organized citizenry (NGOs) in the public domain, on the other. The general aim here was to advance knowledge on the relationship between policy-making and political claim-making in the field of unemployment.
- A third objective was to advance knowledge on the nature of the organizational field of unemployment politics and investigate the potential scope for extending the established policy dialogues towards a more encompassing civil policy deliberation. We aimed to achieve this by collecting original data on (a) the national policy domains, (b) the institutional relations between the traditional social partners of capital and labor (i.e., by political parties of left and right, employers associations, trade unions), and (c) the organized citizenry representing or acting on behalf of the unemployed (e.g. social movements) in the third sector, including the unemployed themselves. Within this overall framework, a further aim was to assess the potential for political participation “from below” by NGOs and social movements which campaign for the rights and interests of the unemployed and marginalized sectors of society.) Overall our aim here was to provide a knowledge basis through our substantive empirically informed study that would allow feedback to policy-makers, and social movements, on their positions and strategies, and the potential for new forms of social/civil dialogues and a more participatory and effective policy deliberation.
- A fourth objective was to provide a body of knowledge based on rigorous cross-national comparisons that would allow firmly grounded empirical statements on the the nature, form and degree of ‘Europeanization’ of the field: (a) the levels of cross-national convergence and divergence of the contentious politics of unemployment of France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK; (b) the role that supra- and transnational political institutions and initiatives – e.g., the EU’s joint European Strategy and measures to tackle unemployment, poverty, social exclusion, and equal opportunities – play as sources and targets of demands. An important objective here was to provide original analysis addressing questions relating to the pattern and consequences of European integration on national politics, i.e., the emergent patterns and consequences of the ‘multi-leveling’ of unemployment politics in Europe.
- A fifth objective was to establish a research network that would last beyond the lifetime of the project. The wide range of national situations and different geographical areas in Europe included in the study, and the good anchoring of the research partners in both the national and international scientific communities, offered adequate conditions for the creation of such a network. In addition, our dissemination strategy (national seminars) for involving practitioners was intended to extend the network into specialist and wider public domains.

## ***1.2. Main research questions***

Creating effective political solutions for reducing unemployment is one of the major challenges facing both policy-makers and societies at large in the member states of the European Union. As the European Commission's detailed report *Employment in Europe 1999* illustrates, in the early to mid-1990s unemployment levels rose steeply in Europe. Although this situation has partly improved, unemployment remains at an overall level of 10%. It is important to note, however, that unemployment rates are unevenly distributed across countries, regions, and among different sections of the population (men/women, young/old, abled/disabled) and sections of the labor force (temporary/permanent, manual/skilled). The persistence of a significantly high level of unemployment in Europe poses a number of serious problems, such as threatening social cohesion, diminishing economic welfare/prosperity, and making governance at the national and European level more difficult.

The European Union has a long tradition of attempting to combat unemployment and social exclusion through the European Social Fund, but recognizes that new initiatives are necessary to tackle the issue. Indeed the national governments of the European Union considered the unemployment-related parts of the Amsterdam Treaty so important that they decided to implement them ahead of schedule without waiting for ratification. This indicates the high saliency of issues relating to unemployment on the political agendas of both the member states and the European Union itself. In addition, the increasing transnationalization of capital and the free movement of labor within Europe have transformed the traditional nature of labor relations, arguably leading to an erosion of the capacity for nation states to politically manage and deal with such problems in isolation. Finally, the new impetus on a common European social policy is complemented by widening the policy repertoire of instruments and actors involved, e.g. in that the regulatory action of European institutions is supplemented by a social dialogue between capital and labor and a higher participation of social NGOs and citizens' groups which represent the marginalized and which are active in social service provision. The aim of this extended policy deliberation and compliance-oriented implementation is to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of European action, as well as enhancing the acceptance and legitimacy throughout the European citizenry. It is not yet clear how far these attempts will prove to be a successful strategy in fighting against exclusion from the labor market.

Much previous research has focused on one side on the socio-economic conditions that give rise to changes in the labor market such as technological transformations and changes in the structure of the working population, and on the other on the policies that national governments have adopted to combat unemployment. Although this body of research offers important insights into the structural factors that give rise to unemployment and the nature and consequences of policies used to address them, it has so far remained relatively detached from an understanding of how these issues are mediated to the citizenry, and what the potential impact of political contentions and collective mobilization over unemployment can have on shaping the directions of policies and attempts to define the nature of the problems to be addressed. Our research provides a more integrated approach by systematically linking analysis of the policy field on labor and employment to analysis of the field of political contention (collective mobilization and claim-making) on issues relating to unemployment in the public domain. In this way, our research shows how policy-makers in various European nations are responding to the challenges raised by unemployment and how those responses are affected by the claims and demands made in the national political and public arenas by collective actors, such as political parties, interest groups, and social movements. A special emphasis is put on the impact that organized groups of citizens can have on policy decisions

in the field of unemployment and social exclusion from the labor market within each nation. It focuses centrally on unemployment within the labor politics field, thus addressing a topic which is of current policy relevance and is a highly resonant issue in the news.

By the “contentious politics of unemployment” we refer to political conflicts over the sections of the population who suffer from marginalization through the exclusion from the labor market (partial or full, temporary or permanent), on one side, and the policy measures which are designed to address such issues, on the other. The contested and negotiated character of this policy field expresses itself both in the public domain and in the institutional arenas for interest mediation. Therefore we look both at political claim-making in the public space and policy deliberation within the polity. Within this framework, an important aim is to examine the relationship between public claims, collective mobilizations, and policy decisions. We look at the ways in which the issue of unemployment and related issues are addressed in the public space by social and political actors, and how this relates to the formulation and implementation of policies and legislation to fight unemployment and promote employment. Relevant actors within our focus include governments, parties, unions, employer associations, social movement organizations, as well as other social groups such as the unemployed themselves. Within the actual constituency of the “unemployed”, special attention is given to the long-term unemployed, youth unemployed, unskilled unemployed, temporary employed workers, women (gender inequality), migrants and minorities (race/nationality inequality), and the “old” unemployed (age). We focus on the citizens’ organizations (NGOs) that mobilize on behalf of this constituency, and autonomous collective mobilization by sections of this constituency for greater social rights of participation, empowerment and inclusion within society.

There is as yet no substantive research that addresses the political and public contentiousness of unemployment by empirically mapping the field of ideological cleavages, policy positions, and political alliances on the issue. In addition, there has been relatively little research on how the policy domain exists as a structure of networks extending from national governments and the institutionalized partners of capital and labor to the broader public domain of the third sector (in which non-institutional actors such as citizens’ organizations and social movements represent and act on behalf of the sectors of society that are marginalized and socially excluded through unemployment). Moreover, research examining the extent to which policy decisions are influenced by public campaigns is sparse, especially in the context of unemployment. Our research provides a grounded empirical study of these dimensions of labor politics. By relating the public contentiousness of unemployment issues to the possible effects this might have on policy-making, it addresses a concern that was explicitly expressed by the Amsterdam Treaty which sought to respond to people’s practical concerns by supporting an extension of citizens rights in the field of social and employment affairs and increasing the participation of organized citizenry in European policy deliberation.

In addition to providing detailed national studies, we consider it also vital to place these within an international comparative framework, as this significantly increases the explanatory potential and scope of relevance of the research. This is all the more important given the multi-level structure of the European Union (both as a supra-national and intergovernmental entity), according to which national and European policy domains are strongly interrelated, yet remain distinct arenas of policy deliberation and making. A comprehensive study needs to address the realities of the national policy domains and the structure of the European level alike. Firstly, through cross-national comparison, we are able to gauge to what extent the British, French, German, Italian, Swedish, and Swiss experiences of unemployment politics remain essentially nationally distinct and bounded, or alternatively form part of a emergent

Europe-wide trend, or some combination thereof. The selection of the countries is based on two principles. The first is to provide a picture of political claim-making and policy deliberation that covers a wide range of national situations and different geographical areas in Europe. With this aim in mind, we selected the two larger central European countries (France and Germany), a southern European country (Italy), a Scandinavian country (Sweden), a country that often shows different patterns than other European nations, and is arguably closer to the US approaches (UK), and a country not belonging to the European Union (Switzerland). The second reason consists in having six nations that have different institutional arrangements for collaboration within the polity, specifically between the government and the organized interests in society, and different policy traditions.

Lastly, by addressing the transnational dimension, we are able to determine to what extent the labor politics field has been Europeanized by the growing influence of European institutions and initiatives (EU Court, Commission and Parliament, European employment initiatives), by European peak associations and NGO-networks (e.g. the social/civil dialogue, co-ordinated cross-national protests and lobbying), and/or by transnational debates on the issue (e.g. claims based on European rights to equal opportunities for men and women).

Although at present labor policies remain the domain of national domestic politics, changes toward a greater co-ordination are likely to be stimulated on several fronts, as the Amsterdam Treaty's provision for: more nation-state co-operation through the European joint strategy (whereby member states draw up national employment programs which are assessed each year by the Council in the context of the joint strategy); EU measures to encourage co-operation between member states to supplement their action on employment; the activities of the employment committee to co-ordinate national employment and labor market policies; and the EU powers to tackle poverty and social exclusion and improve existing arrangements on equal opportunities for men and women (for example, by allowing positive discrimination if one gender is clearly disadvantaged). In addition, other initiatives by transnational agencies to promote employment in conditions of equality, such as the International Program for More and Better Jobs for Women (WOMEMP) launched by the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1997. The outcomes of such efforts are little known, although they will no doubt have important repercussions on national politics and policy-making – in member states as well as countries in close geographical and economic proximity such as Switzerland – and are likely to be subject to new conflicts between opposed factions within public debates. Our research design attempts to enable us to study the emergence and development of such processes as they occur over the designated time-period. Although there has been a considerable amount of speculation about the extent of the transnationalization of politics and the consequences of this for national approaches to politics (e.g. Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1998; Soysal 1994), there have so far been very few empirical accounts that are informed by original cross-national data sets.

To summarize, our main research questions are:

- How is unemployment framed and constructed as a contentious political field through the mobilization by collective actors (including the unemployed themselves) in the public domain?
- What impact does the public contentiousness of unemployment issues have on the potential for effective political management of such conflicts, on one side, and to what extent does it provide opportunities for NGOs and the organized citizenry representing the unemployed to advance their goals, on the other (both within national policy domains and at the EU level)?

- Are the unemployed and those representing their interests and acting on their behalf becoming part of the institutional policy deliberation (both within national policy domains and at the EU level), and are they capable to define, frame or shape issues, problems and solutions?
- Do the contentious politics of unemployment in France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK follow a national path or are they part of an emergent European trend, and has the field Europeanized in any sense?

## 2. Research design

### 2.1. Main components of the research design

The overall design of the research has three main components:

- ***Mapping the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe: political opportunities and claim-making***  
Mapping the field of political contention (i.e. structures of ideological cleavages and actor relationships), both longitudinally for each country, and cross-nationally for France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Systematically comparing the form and contents of political claim-making: (a) across time, to examine the relationship between claim-making over unemployment issues and decision-making by political elites, and (b) across country, to examine the degree of convergence/divergence in national political issue-fields, and for signs of Europeanization.
- ***Public campaigning and policy deliberation in the national policy domains: the multi-organizational field of unemployment***  
Examining the nature of the multi-organizational field extending from the core policy domain to the public domain, i.e. networks and channels of political influence between core policy actors, political parties, trade unions, employment associations, on one side, and civil society organizations and social movements representing the unemployed (including the unemployed themselves), on the other. This actor-level study will provide a grounded understanding of (a) the degree of elite openness or closure of the national policy domain toward the public domain and (b) the campaign strategies of the organized citizenry for attempting to exert political influence and challenge a variety of unemployment-related issues (e.g. the number and types of jobs, relocation and training, equity and compensation, social exclusion).



- ***Public campaigning and policy deliberation at the EU Level: the multilevel governance of employment policy***

On one side, studying the nature of the interaction between EU-level and national policy-making in the unemployment politics field, and determining the nature of channels of political influence that exist between European institutions and national policy domains in the field (relationship between transnational, national and regional levels of top-down political authority). On the other, examining to what extent there are new political opportunities for the bottom-up empowerment of citizens' organizations that represent the interests of the unemployed (including the unemployed themselves), as a consequence of the emergence of the European Union as an actor in the field. The aim here is to assess to what extent these related developments constitute a new emergent basis for a social and civil dialogue that is capable of re-enfranchising the excluded and marginalized unemployed within the multilevel governance structure of the European Union.

## ***2.2. Mapping the contentious politics of unemployment in Europe: political opportunities and claim-making***

As it now seems to be generally accepted that it is undesirable though “normal” for a minority of the population to be unemployed in Western societies – and in some countries even the traditional social partners of capital and labor accept this as a “reality” – it is pertinent to raise the question of who politically represents the “unemployed”? Furthermore, what political institutional mechanisms are in place to prevent a slide into conditions of poverty, social anomie, and exclusion from which the welfare state was designed to rescue the working classes in the post-war period? As a marginalized section of the population, the unemployed possess relatively few institutional channels of access to the national polity and relatively few resources for autonomous mobilization (but this access is of course unevenly distributed across different types of the unemployed constituency). Nevertheless, most political contentions over unemployment tend to be conflicts about the unemployed, taking place between the political representatives of labor and capital within national societies. For this reason, the public construction of unemployment as a contentious issue has the characteristics of a symbolic struggle (Eder 1993; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). The contentious issue is the relationship of the unemployed groups to the national community, and the rights and duties to full participation in society which they possess. Conflicting opinions and political demands are mobilized by public actors which shape the ideological cleavage structure of the political issue-field. At one extreme, unemployment may be presented as an individual-level problem (i.e. individuals themselves are responsible for their own employment status), as opposed to being a problem located in the national or European political institutions, whereas at the other extreme, citizens of European countries may see it is their right to participate in the working life of their nation and Europe itself. Between these poles, there are many different intermediary positions taken up by institutional and public actors.

The important point is that contentions over unemployment are strongly linked to questions of belonging to and participating in a national political community, and take on symbolic forms. Historically, conflicts between labor and capital have been an important part of the development of nations, and current political contentions over unemployment may give important information on the ways that countries defines themselves as political nations in response to contemporary pressures of globalization (increasing European integration, transnationalization of capital, free movement of labor) and pluralization (increasing diversity and political identities, such as gender, among the population). Although they have this symbolic form, however, the political claims that are mobilized by collective actors over

unemployment issues in the public domain relate strongly to the institutional domain of politics and involve actual material stakes in political power. In this research we aim to systematically study the relationship between public debates on unemployment and the forms of policy deliberation, both in regard to interorganizational structures and issue-related debates. In particular, we propose to place a special emphasis on the opportunities that are available for organizations within civil society to represent the interests of the unemployed, by engaging influentially in the public debate on unemployment through public campaign strategies.

The nature of the impact of public debates on the framing and direction of policies has been much discussed in the literature on political discourse and campaigns, but empirical evidence remains sparse and inconclusive. Some authors argue that under certain conditions public debates can shape the timing and outcomes of policy decisions, whilst others claim that political elites are well able to manage policies away from the distortions and noise of public discourse. At present these academic debates have been largely speculative and conducted in the absence of systematic data on political discourses in the public domain. This means that researchers are forced to fall back on descriptive impressionistic accounts rather than empirically grounded analyses, and therefore face difficulties when attempting to link public discourses to policy domains. In order to overcome these limitations we propose to use a political opportunity approach drawn from social movement research (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; McAdam 1999; McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1989, 1998; Tilly 1978, 1986, 1995). This has the benefit of using an analytic framework that relates to both the discursive and institutional dimensions of politics, which relates the policy approaches of political elites – i.e. political opportunity structures – to the claim-making by collective actors in the public domain, and which is also suitable for both longitudinal and cross-national comparative analyses.

In our research, we build on an analytic approach that has been developed and successfully applied to other topic areas in the same general field such as the integration of immigrants and ethnic minorities in host societies. We conceptualize unemployment as a field where political and social rights are contested, i.e. “contested citizenship” (Tilly 1997). National institutional approaches and policy positions on unemployment politics are specified as the key variables for the political opportunities which confront potential claim-makers on behalf of or among the unemployed in the field. By determining the criteria for granting rights to the unemployed, they structure the political field – discursive and institutional – that is available for collective actors to mobilize claims that challenge these terms. By claim-making here we refer to all types of collective action which mobilize political demands into the public domain (ranging from protest to conventional action forms; from non-verbal physical acts to verbal statements; and by institutional and civil society actors).

### ***2.3. Public campaigning and policy deliberation in the national policy domains: the multi-organizational field of unemployment***

Some interactions between political elites, officials, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) occur directly through institutional channels that are partly hidden from the public domain. These institutional forums where political elites negotiate with expert advisers, interest groups and NGOs can be conceptualized as policy domains (Kingdon 1995), and form the structural basis for the process of institutional policy deliberation (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993) which is the focus of this part of our research. As a key aim of our research is to gauge the potential influence of public contention over employment policy decisions, it is particularly important to gain an understanding of (a) to what extent, (b) under what conditions, and (c) to whom the policy domain is open and closed to public

organizations. Determining this degree of accessibility to core policy-makers is a key dimension for the political opportunities that are available to claim-makers. We aim to do this by gaining an understanding of (a) the ideological positions of the core policy-makers that underpin official discourses and (b) their networks/relationships with organizations in the public domain. Key questions are: To what extent are policy decisions based on information mobilized by specialist campaign organizations, e.g. submissions to parliamentary committees, lobbying? What influence does the intensity and framing of the public debate on unemployment have on (a) the adoption of specific policies, (b) the framing of policies, (c) the implementation of policies, and (d) the effectiveness of policies?

In this context it is also important to reach an understanding of the role played by specialist intermediary actors in linking the policy and public domains: political parties and employers associations and trade unions. At what times and under what conditions are the activities of these intermediary actors likely to influence the positions of the core policy elite? What factors govern the decisions of political parties and employers associations and trade unions on whether to campaign on the issue, and how do they frame the issue in the public domain? Is the issue of unemployment subject to party political competition (left v. right)? Under what conditions does unemployment become a topic for media thematization (e.g. after key symbolic events)?

In addition, we address the bottom-up dimension of claim-making and movement campaigns. Here we study the perceptions of political opportunities by the pro-welfare movements, movements of unemployed, and their civil society allies (civil rights groups, women's groups, poverty action, etc.) and how they attempt to exert political influence. On the one hand, it is important to gain an understanding of the structure of the internal networks of the movement. For example, do protest organizations have links to conventional campaign organizations, and do these networks extend into broader alliances with mainstream civil society organizations, such as trade unions? On the other hand, what channels of political access do different sectors of the movement use to exert political influence, either (a) indirectly through public constituency-building or (b) through direct lobbying to the policy domain? This requires looking at the movement's organizational forms, action repertoires, types of political claims, framing, targets and addressees.

Within this bottom-up dimension, we devoted a specific attention to the organization and activities of unemployed, the targeted beneficiary and constituency of this field of politics. To look at this specific collective actor is important as very little scientific knowledge has been produced thus far on the topic (e.g. Bagguley 1999). The aim is to study 'internal dynamics of mobilization': to what extent the unemployed are capable of organizing and mobilizing as a collective actor to fight unemployment, and to what extent it succeeds in doing so, both at the national and at the European level.

#### ***2.4. Public campaigning and policy deliberation at the EU Level: the multilevel governance of employment policy***

Reference to the potential emergence of the transnational level of European governance is clearly built into the first two parts of our project. These are able to trace patterns of convergence and divergence in claim-making, both within and between the six countries, as well as tracing any shift in transfer of institutional influence away from the national political arenas to transnational European institutions. In this third part we build on the information on claim-making and the nature of the multi-organizational field on unemployment politics, and directly address the role of transnational political institutions and transnational social movements and NGOs. Clearly the European Union is increasingly creating opportunities for

interest representation and lobbying activities beyond the national policy domains (e.g. Greenwood 1997; Mazey and Richardson 1993). A particular concern is to assess to what extent the organized citizenry representing the unemployed is able to bypass and challenge the authority of the nation-centered politics of unemployment, by directly using transnational norms, rights and institutions as a means of empowerment. As such processes are in their infancy and it is as yet somewhat premature to predict the path that they will take, this part of the research seeks insights into the future development of the transnational politics of unemployment.

As the countries of Europe increasingly come to face similar structural problems over the coming decades, such as an aging working population, there is likely to be an intensification of the European-level dialogue about such problems, including a convergence on resolutions. Such processes are already emerging, and have in part been stimulated by the greater level of national co-operation that has been facilitated by European institutions and initiatives. Whatever the long-term solutions to such problems may be, for example, an increase in immigration from non-EU countries may be a solution to replenishing the decreasing size of the working population, alternatively retraining or re-skilling the unemployed, it is clear that common solutions to such problems will be highly contentious. Politicians will not only need to find appropriate technical solutions to structural problems in the employment field, but will have to find a way of politically selling them to their domestic publics, whose expectations and uncertainties may have been built within different traditions and understandings of their rights and duties to work. Thus contemporary British elite discourse on employment focuses on the need for a dynamic knowledge-based economy and the promotion of competition and enterprise as Prime Minister Tony Blair made clear when addressing the Lisbon Summit in March 2000, where the outlines for common European employment strategies were drawn up. In contrast, his French counterpart, employment minister Martine Aubry explicitly defined the primary needs for employment as a drive toward full employment and greater solidarity. Seen in crude terms, these two competing visions are underpinned by different national policy approaches to unemployment: in Britain, policy concentrates on giving limited access to social benefits and fixing a low minimum wage that provides few inhibitions to the hiring of workers; in France, policies aim to create jobs by shortening the working week and subsidizing youth work, whilst enforcing relatively high costs on employers for hiring and firing workers.

If one takes the British Prime Minister's (competition and enterprise) and French Minister's (full employment and greater solidarity) pronouncements cited above at face value, there would appear to be few chances of reaching a common approach to unemployment between the British and French, without political contention. However, rhetoric can be deceptive, particularly when made by politicians with a keen eye on the domestic impact of their public statements at European meetings. There is evidence that there are considerable cross-national learning processes taking place between European countries when addressing employment issues. Indeed the French advisors to Lionel Jospin are regularly sent to London to learn from the British approach (*The Economist*, 18 March 2000). As this is at present largely an elite level process, it is necessary to question the national policy core as well as transnational policy elites to discover these processes that are in part hidden from the public domain. This enables us to gather evidence on the possibility of a soft convergence emerging in the co-ordinated approaches of European countries to unemployment. However, such processes have a discursive dimension, specifically because the European Union sponsors framings of potentially conflictual issues in a way that aims to facilitate greater co-operation. Thus in the example we have referred to, Anna Diamantopoulou, the European Commissioner for jobs called for a "commitment to combine competitiveness and cohesion" at the Lisbon summit, in

a strategic attempt to bridge the seemingly divergent and incompatible views expressed by the French and British.

While scholarly writing has been divided in assessing the potentials for a common European social policy, there is consent about the fact that the European policy domain is a proper arena of action within the European Union's multilevel structure (e.g. Hooghe 1996; Keohane and Hoffman 1991; Leibfried and Pierson 1995; Marks 1993; Marks et al. 1996). The latter is not just an intergovernmental body, where social policies remain subjected to only the political bargaining between the member states within the Council of Ministers. The EU has a proper supranational component, which is represented in a bold manner by the Commission and the European Court, and in part, by the European associations of capital and labor and the renewed vigor of the social partnership amongst them. It is also widely accepted that the earlier strategy for European harmonization has failed largely, given the persistence of diverging national policy styles and institutional constraints, and given the danger of a "race to the bottom" due to the regulatory competition within the European bargain (Streeck 1998; Scharpf 1998). Instead, the European institutions are seemingly opting for another, twofold strategy: on the one hand, defining broad policy goals and "rules of the game", leaving nation-states more room for proper policy strategies; on the other hand, opting for a "compliance" rather than regulatory enforcement strategy, which seeks to integrate the diverging views of member states, European associations and NGO-networks into a common platform of policy deliberation (Ross 1998). In this regard, European politics is increasingly adopting a proper and complementary function that does not necessarily reduce national sovereignty in a zero-sum-game manner, and at the same time it is developing a proper style of policy deliberation and making.

In regard to this European dimension we wish to address: (a) how such European attempts at framing problems are formed, (b) how they are mediated by the European employers associations and trade unions to the national level, and (c) how they provide new political opportunities for the organized citizenry to challenge unemployment and social exclusion through local and transnational forms of collective action. In addition, to the work conducted in the other parts on the transnational dimension, in this part we focus explicitly on (a) European institutions and initiatives to tackle unemployment and social exclusion, (b) European Trade Unions, and (c) transnational NGOs acting on behalf of the unemployed (and local level initiatives funded from Europe).

In regard to the relationship between the national level and the EU level, it is necessary to address to what extent unemployment is located within national politics or becoming Europeanized or localized/regionalized. This can be achieved by referring to representatives of transnational elites (e.g. European Commission and Parliament, Council of Europe, ILO) and transnational citizens' organizations (e.g. European Network of the Unemployed, European Anti-Poverty Network, European Network of Women, Platform of European Social NGOs), as well as representatives of local authorities and local campaign groups. For example, are European initiatives to harmonize and co-ordinate national action on unemployment shifting the context of unemployment politics to the transnational or local levels?

### **3. Conceptions of the welfare state, institutional approaches to unemployment, and claim-making in the employment political field**

#### ***3.1. Conceptions of the welfare state as a specific opportunity structure for the employment political field***

One of the points of departure of the UNEMPOL project was the idea that there is a relationship between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors over unemployment in the public domain in European countries. In other words, we started from the assumption that institutional approaches to unemployment channel the political claim-making of collective actors in this field. This idea was inspired by a recent study of migration politics in which the authors show how “configurations” or “models” of citizenship play a crucial role in defining and structuring the socially and politically contested field of immigration and ethnic relations (Koopmans et al. forthcoming; see also Giugni et Passy 2003a, 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2000). In this perspective, dominant conceptions of citizenship and their institutional concretizing (for example, in legislation pertaining to migration) form a specific opportunity structure that determines the option for action in this field and channels the claim-making bearing on these issues: who intervenes in this field, through which means, on which specific issues, through which discursive practices, and so forth. Furthermore, the authors make a distinction between institutional and discursive opportunities in order to show how the discursive context in which claim-making takes place can either encourage or discourage the claim-making by minority groups. In other words, political opportunities have both an institutional and a discursive side. From an institutional point of view, they are options for collective action that provide actors with different chances and poses different risks from one context to the other (Koopmans 2004). From a discursive point of view, they are options for collective action that provide actors with varying visibility, resonance, and legitimacy from one context to the other (Koopmans et al. forthcoming).

Following a similar reasoning, we have explored the role of specific opportunities for claim-making in the field of unemployment in order to examine to what extent the actors, interests, and collective identities involved in the employment political field are influenced by certain aspects of their institutional and discursive context. To do so, we focussed on the characteristics of the welfare state as a specific political opportunity structure shaping the claim-making and structuring the public discourse on unemployment (Berclaz and Giugni 2005). Our argument is that the prevailing view of the welfare state specific to a given country impinge in significant ways upon the “contentious politics of unemployment”, that is, the public debates and collective mobilizations pertaining to unemployment. In this neo-institutionalist perspective, dominant conceptions of the welfare state define a political opportunity structure that enlarge or constrain the options for action by collective actors that intervene in this field. Although we consider both the institutional and discursive opportunities deriving from the type of welfare state that characterizes a given country, we speak of conceptions of the welfare state as we maintain that such opportunities stem largely from the ways in which a given political or issue field is collectively defined. In sum, one of the main theoretical arguments underlying this project is that the modalities of the intervention of collective actors in the field of unemployment, including the mobilization of the unemployed, depend on a mix of specific opportunities that, in turn, are influenced by the prevailing “welfare state regime.”

The goal of this part is to provide some elements for a better definition of the specific political opportunity structure stemming from the dominant conceptions of the welfare state. To do so,

we draw from the existing comparative literature on welfare states, in an attempt to link it to the study of contentious politics and social movements. Indeed, one of our aims in this project was to contribute to establish a theoretical bridge between these two bodies of literature. While recent studies have attempted to link different characteristics of welfare states to the situation of unemployed and other socially excluded groups as well as to the individual experience of unemployment from a sociological perspective (e.g. Gallie and Paugam 2000), much is left to do on the impact of welfare regimes on the patterns of political participation and mobilization.

### *3.2. A typology of conceptions of the welfare state*

In the works mentioned earlier concerning the migration political field, configurations or models of citizenship are defined along two main dimensions: the formal criteria for individual access to citizenship (opposing an ethnic to a civic definition) and the cultural group rights associated to it (opposing a monist to a pluralist view). In other words, the authors maintain that political opportunities for the mobilization of actors that intervene in the field of immigration and ethnic relations depend both on the level of equality of individual access to citizenship and the quantity of cultural difference and collective rights provided by citizenship (Koopmans et al. forthcoming). Let us continue with our parallel and let us try to see whether we can find an analogous way to conceptualize the collective definitions of the welfare state, starting from the idea that there are different underlying logics of unemployment-insurance and social-aid regimes (Valli et al. 2002).

The literature on the welfare state is very large (see Merrien 1996 for an overview). In particular, a great many works stress the variations that exist across countries in the conceptions and modalities of the management of social protection. Thus, Merrien (1996: 417; our translation) is right in saying that “there is not a model of the welfare state, but welfare states profoundly divergent welfare states.” The literature offers us several typologies to show these differences. Although it goes beyond the framework of state intervention, the typology proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) is probably the most well known. He distinguishes between three “welfare state regimes”: the liberal or residual welfare state (typical of the United Kingdom and the U.S.), the bismarckian or insurance-based welfare state (illustrated by the cases of Germany, France, or Switzerland), and the universalist or social-democratic welfare state (found in the Scandinavian countries and of Sweden in particular). This trilogy is present in numerous other authors, with certain variations from one author to the other.

Esping-Andersen is more interested in the relationships between state and market as well as the degree of de-commodification of individuals according to the different welfare state regimes than to show the level of state protection vis-à-vis unemployment. Gallie and Paugam (2000) have proposed a typology with the aim of studying the impact of the welfare state on the experience of unemployment. They consider three factors that may influence the experience of unemployment: the degree of coverage, the level of financial compensation, and the importance of active measures for employment. Based on these three factors, they distinguish between four “unemployment-providence regimes.” The sub-protecting regime (examples: Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) provides the unemployed with a protection below the substance level. The liberal/minimal regime (examples: United Kingdom, Ireland) offers a higher level of protection, but does not cover all the unemployed and the level of compensation is weak. The employment-centered regime (examples: France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium) offers a much higher level of protection, but the coverage remains incomplete because of the eligibility principles for compensation. Finally, the universalist

regime (examples: Denmark, Sweden) is characterized by the breadth of the coverage, a much higher compensation level, and more developed active measures.

The advantage of Gallie and Paugam's typology is that it bears more directly on the field that interests us, as it is based on indicators of policies aimed at fighting unemployment. However, these authors have studied the effects of the degree and modalities of state protection on the experience of unemployment. The creation of a typology that allows us to link the forms of the institutional treatment of unemployment to the political claim-making in this field remains to be done. We carry this task by drawing on certain aspects dealt with in the specialized literature in order to define a typology of conceptions of the welfare state resulting from the combination of two analytical dimensions: the *formal criteria of eligibility* to social rights (in particular, the rights concerning the loss or lack of remunerated work) and the *obligations relating to eligibility* (in particular, the obligations for the recipients of the rights concerning unemployment). The first dimension refers to the criteria that define the conditions of access to social provisions for job-seekers as well as the quantity and "quality" of such rights. In other words, here we want to know who has the right to benefit from which social provisions in the field of unemployment and under what conditions. The criteria of eligibility can be more or less restrictive (exclusive) or loose (inclusive). The second dimension refers to the obligations attached to the condition of unemployed. In other words, here we want to know, what are the constraints that weight upon the unemployed who have the right to social provisions? The obligations relating to eligibility can be more or less heavy or light. The choice of these two dimensions is justified by the fact that social provisions include both rights and obligations: on the one hand, they grant people who have lost their job rights to be compensated, but certain obligations are attached to these rights to benefit from social security.

Figure 1 shows the four ideal-types of conceptions of the welfare state resulting from the combination of the two analytical dimensions considered. Since these two dimensions are to be considered as continua rather than discrete categories, this typology represents a bidimensional space allowing us to locate the actual conceptions of the welfare state. Thus, the ideal-types yielded by the combination of the two dimensions are models having heuristic value rather than concrete empirical realities.

The first type represents a conception that we may call minimalism, insofar as it combines restrictive eligibility criteria and heavy obligations attached to the benefit of social provisions. It is a situation close to the residual model, according to which the state must help the most deprived, in particular through social aid, and engage only a minimal level of distributive resources. The conception of the welfare state that corresponds to the situation that we call corporatism share with the minimalist approach restrictive eligibility criteria, but poses less constraints in terms of obligations required to benefit from social provisions. When light obligations are accompanied by a facilitated access to social provisions – that is, loose eligibility criteria –, we have a conception characterized by its universalism. Here the prevailing approach aims to enlarge the access and coverage to the largest number of people, in particular to the largest number of job-seekers, imposing at the same time a weak level of obligations. Finally, the conceptions corresponding to the situation that we call surveillance characterizes by loose eligibility criteria, but at the same time heavy obligations that the state requires from the unemployed in order to keep their right to social provisions.



### 3.3. Operationalization of the typology

The typology outlined above, similar to the approach in which it has its origin, lends itself to a comparative analysis of welfare states and their impact on the claim-making pertaining to unemployment. To do so, we must place the various states within the typology and advance a number of hypotheses linking prevailing conceptions of the welfare state to collective mobilizations in this field. However, in order to avoid falling into national clichés, but above all to allow for a systematic and empirically informed analysis of such a linkage, it is necessary to find indicators that allow us to operationalize the typology. To do so, we identify a number of aspects allowing to differentiate welfare states in their operating mode for each of the two dimensions of the typology. Since we are interested in particular in the role of the state in relation to the remunerated labor market as well as its impact on public debates and collective mobilizations in this field (i.e. the contentious politics of unemployment), our indicators bear on rights and obligations concerning unemployment, and focus above all on legislation and institutions aimed at compensating people who have lost their job. Again, this way of operationalizing conceptions of the welfare state draws from a similar approach followed in the study mentioned earlier and dealing with the field of immigration and ethnic relations (Koopmans et al. forthcoming; see also Giugni and Passy 2003b). The general goal is to be able, on an empirical basis, to place the (European) countries on the two dimensions of the typology and show the relative differences in terms of views and practices of social security.

On the first dimension – the formal criteria of eligibility to social provisions – we can distinguish between five main aspects: (1) the formal prerequisites for obtaining social provisions, (2) the level of coverage, (3) the extension of coverage, (4) the existence of differentiations among recipients, and (5) the existence of institutional structures favoring the insertion of job-seekers into the labor market. Table 1 summarizes these aspects as well as the specific indicators for each of them. Let us describe them in some more detail in order to better understand how we can classify the different welfare states by means of these indicators.

*Formal prerequisites for obtaining social provisions.* The first aspect relating to the formal eligibility criteria concerns the conditions that a jobless person must fulfill in order to be considered as unemployed and therefore having right to receive the unemployment-insurance compensations of, depending on the country, those coming from another institution of social security. Among the possible indicators we can mention the minimal duration of contribution to the unemployment-insurance necessary to obtain the rights to compensation and the amount of this contribution (for example, as a percentage of the salary).

*Level of coverage.* The second aspect aims to determine to what extent the compensation allow the unemployed to keep its life standard and how long. The indicators for this dimension are the amount of the coverage (for example, as a percentage of the last salary), the duration of the coverage, and the possible existence of a minimal compensation.

*Extension of coverage.* Here we want to see who is insured or compensated in case of unemployment, who is not, and more generally what are possibilities for a financial aid for the people who have lost their job. Two indicators can be used to capture this aspect. First, we can look at the number of recipients of the unemployment-insurance as a proportion of job-seekers (i.e. the coverage rate of the unemployment-insurance). Second, we should also take into account the possible existence of one or several state social institutions that cover the

unemployed who have exhausted their rights or who do not fulfill the criteria for having right to the compensations of the unemployment-insurance.

*Differentiation of recipients.* The degree of openness or closedness of the social security system in a country is not only given by the formal conditions of access or the scope of the coverage, but also depends on the presence of rules that open the access to certain groups or individuals, closing it for others. Here we therefore look at the existence of a differential treatment of recipients on the admission level and at the coverage level of the unemployment-insurance or another social-security institution. Such a differentiation could be applied towards certain categories of unemployed, such as for example the youngsters, women, or people close to retirement age.

*State structures for the insertion into the labor market.* In the 1990s, many European countries have witnessed a trend towards a shift from a passive perspective of social allocations to more active measures of the labor market. The goal is no longer to simply compensate a loss of gain due to unemployment, but to provide the unemployed with structures aimed at favoring the professional integration by giving them, for example, the possibility to attend vocational training courses, of professional reorientation, or by granting them an aid allowing them to follow an independent activity. Therefore, this aspect looks at the measures created by the state aimed at facilitating the reinsertion of the unemployed into the labor market (according to the rights that are granted to them). Among the possible indicators, we can mention the amount of public spending for active measures (for example, as a percentage of the GNP), the obligation on the legislative level to create structures aimed at the insertion and reinsertion into the labor market, and the accessibility of such structures.

For the second dimension – the obligations relating to the eligibility to social provisions – we can distinguish between three main aspects: (1) the general conditions for obtaining social provisions, (2) the existence of counter-provisions asked to the recipients, and (3) the existence of sanctions in case of failed respect of the conditions on the part of the recipients. As for the first dimension, we propose a number of specific indicators for each aspect, summarized in table 2 and which we shall describe in some more detail.

*General conditions for obtaining social provisions.* The first aspect of the dimension of the obligations relating to eligibility concerns the conditions that a person who has lost her job has to meet in order to belong to the category of the unemployed and therefore have the right to social provision. One of the first objectives of any policy in the field of unemployment is the reinsertion of jobless people into the labor market. Therefore, the search for a job remains the primary obligation for a recipient of the unemployment-insurance. Furthermore, the unemployed must accept a job considered as convenient or acceptable by the legislation in the field. On the basis of these elements, we can take into account the following indicators: the definition of a convenient or acceptable job as foreseen in the existing legislation (according to several criteria such as the salary level, the requirement for a professional reorientation, or the geographical distance from the place of work), the obligation to apply, and the quantity of offers which the jobless person must send to have the right to social provisions.

*Counter-provisions.* The second aspect bears on the obligations which the unemployed must fulfill in order to remain recipient of the social provisions. Here we can mention the obligation for the jobless person to attend occupational programs in the context of the active measures of the labor market or to vocational training. In both cases, the goal is to improve her employability. With these indicators, we want to know whether the modalities of the implementation of active measures shows the first signs of a workfare system.

*Sanctions.* The last aspect concerning the obligations relating to eligibility looks at the rigidity of the system, and more precisely to the measures and instruments created with the aim of controlling the abuses of the recipients. Here we can consider the following indicators: the existence of financial sanctions if the unemployed does not fulfill the obligations relating to obtaining the compensations, the frequency of the use of the sanctions, the restriction of the access to formation, and, as *estrema ratio*, the suppression of social provisions.

It is important to note that the indicators proposed here bear above all on the unemployment-insurance, as they refer in particular to countries that have an insurance-based system. However, in order to have a broader picture of the social protection system in case of loss of remunerated job, but above all in order to be able to compare the criteria of eligibility across countries that have different welfare-state regimes, it is important to take into account both the compensations of the unemployment-insurance and the allocations coming from other social-security institutions. Finally, we must stress that this is not an exhaustive list. Our goal at this stage is rather to suggest a number of ways to operationalize the typology presented above.

### ***3.4. The impact of conceptions of the welfare state on claim-making in the employment political field: tentative hypotheses***

How do the different collective definitions of the welfare state, as well as their concretization in institutional approaches toward unemployment (as measures through indicators such as those described above), reflect in variations in the claim-making on issues pertaining to unemployment? In the study on contentious politics in the field of immigration and ethnic relations that has inspired our approach, the authors could show how the collective definitions of the nation and citizenship determine a set of opportunities, both institutional and discursive, which facilitate or constrain the mobilization of certain actors and channel the claims toward certain issues rather than others (Koopmans et al. forthcoming; see also Giugni and Passy 2003a, 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2000). Thus, for example, a closed system, to the extent that it rests on an ethnic and monist (i.e. assimilationist) conception of citizenship restricts the possibilities for the action of migrants and tends to channel the public debates toward issues concerning the regulation of migration flows (i.e. the criteria of entry into and exit from the nation), whereas a more open system, insofar as it rests on a civic and pluralist conception of citizenship, provides migrants with more opportunities and results on public debates that stress issues relating to minority integration.

The formulation of hypotheses concerning the impact of the welfare state on claim-making in the field of unemployment follows a similar reasoning. On the most general level, we argue that the conception which we have called minimalism is the most “closed” in terms of opportunities for the collective actors mobilizing in the field of unemployment. At the other end, the conception that we have called universalism is the most “open.” Corporatism and surveillance represent intermediate situations, located somewhere in between. We expect these differences in the prevailing conceptions of the welfare state to influence in significant ways the public debates pertaining to unemployment, namely the presence of certain actors, the forms of claims, and their content. Table 3 summarizes the hypotheses that we can advance at this stage.

Concerning the *presence of actors* in the public domain on issues pertaining to unemployment, we expect those actors who mobilize with the aim of enlarging the rights of the unemployed and, more generally, of jobless people to be more present in a context in

which they have more eligibility rights and less obligations relating to eligibility. This holds both for the unemployed themselves and the organizations helping them. In other words, we expect the unemployed as well as other groups and organizations defending the rights of unemployed to display a higher level of mobilization in a situation in which prevails a universalist conception of the welfare state and a lower level of mobilization in the context of minimalism. The presence of these actors in the situations of corporatism and surveillance should be equivalent and be at an intermediate level.

The hypothesis concerning the *forms of claims* follows the same logic. The comparative works on political opportunities have looked especially at this aspect of the mobilization of social movements and have shown how closed opportunity structures tend to radicalize the movements' action, whereas open opportunity structures favors a moderation of action repertoires (see, for example, Kriesi et al. 1995). A similar reasoning can be applied to the specific opportunity structure formed by the prevailing conception of the welfare state. Therefore, we expect the forms of action of be more radical in a situation of minimalism and more moderate in a situation of universalism. Again, the other two situations represent intermediate cases.

As for the *content of claims*, we may distinguish between three different aspects. First, concerning the *issues* addressed by the claims, we draw directly from the recent works in the impact of models of citizenship on the mobilizations in the field of immigration and ethnic relations. These works have shown that, in the context of a closed model, claims tend to focus on issue relating to the rights of access to citizenship, whereas in an open model they deal with minority integration (Koopmans et al. forthcoming). Following a similar reasoning, we expect a minimalist (therefore closed) conception of the welfare state to favor claims dealing with the definition of the access to social provisions, whereas a universalist conception should channel the public debates toward issues concerning the situation of the unemployed who have these rights. The other two cases should once again be considered as intermediate situations.

Second, concerning the *objects* of claims (i.e. the groups whose rights, interests, and identities are affected by the realization if a claim), we expect a minimalist welfare state to favor claims that have as their object specific categories of unemployed, whereas a universalist welfare state should favor claims that have as their object the unemployed in general. Furthermore, in the context of a minimalist conception, workers threatened of redundancy should be often at the center of claims, as their are in a situation in which one must ask the question of the access to social provisions. Once more, the other two cases are intermediate situations.

Third, concerning the *policy position* of actors when they intervene in the field of unemployment, we expect the discursive climate to be more positive in the context of a universalist welfare state, as this conception favors a more favorable attitude vis-à-vis the rights of the unemployed. A minimalist conception, in contrast, forms a more hostile discursive climate, which should induce collective actors to make more negative statements on such rights. Furthermore, we may expect the level of polarization on these issues to be stronger in the context of a minimalist conception a compared to a universalist welfare state, as the more positive discursive climate tend to produce a convergence of the positions of the various actors. Here too, we can consider the other two cases as being intermediate situations.

#### **4. Concluding Caveat**

This first chapter has attempted to present a general overview and introduction to the multi-leveled research agenda which has been initiated through the UNEMPOL project, whilst at the time indicating in more detail the specific theoretical direction in which our study has taken us. As stated at the beginning this is still ‘work in progress’ and much remains to be done in testing and refining our theoretical advances through empirical analyses. This especially applies to our cross-national comparative research, since it was necessary first to become acquainted with the national fields before this part of the research could begin. It should be noted therefore that the directions indicated in this report are intended to be illustrative of the current direction of our collective research agenda and we are aware that they are far from a definitive statement –based on strict cross-national comparison- that we hope will emerge from our proposed continuing collaboration and interpretation of our findings. The more substantive chapters which follow in this report should also be read in this light, and are intended here to demonstrate and report on the current stage of development of our collective cross-national work. We expect more refined versions to be produced for the forthcoming announced publications.

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
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**Figure 1: A two-dimensional space for situating conceptions of the welfare state**



**Table 1: Indicators for the dimension of the formal criteria of eligibility**

<p><b>Formal prerequisites for obtaining social provisions</b> Duration of contribution Amount of contribution (in % of salary)</p> <p><b>Level of coverage</b> Amount of coverage (in % of salary) Duration of coverage Minimal compensation</p> <p><b>Extension of coverage</b> Number of recipients Existence of other structures</p> <p><b>Differentiation of recipients</b> On the admission level On the coverage level</p> <p><b>State structures for the insertion into the labor market</b> State spending for active measures Obligation to create structures Accessibility of structures</p>
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**Table 2: Indicators for the dimension of the obligations relating to eligibility**

**General conditions for obtaining social provisions**

Definition of convenient/acceptable job

Obligation to apply

Quantity of offers to be sent

**Counter-provisions**

Obligation to attend work employment programs

Obligation to attend vocational training

**Sanctions**

Financial sanctions

Restriction of access to vocational training

Suppression of social provisions

**Table 3: Summary of the hypotheses concerning the impact of conceptions of the welfare state on claim-making in the field of unemployment**

	<b>Minimalism</b>	<b>Corporatism</b>	<b>Surveillance</b>	<b>Universalism</b>
<b>Presence of actors</b>	Weak	Intermediate	Intermediate	Strong
<b>Action repertoires</b>	Radical	Intermediate	Intermediate	Moderate
<b>Issues</b>	Access to social provisions	Access and situation	Access and situation	Situation of the unemployed
<b>Objects</b>	Specific groups of unemployed	Specific groups and in general	Specific groups and in general	Unemployed in general
	Workers threatened of redundancy	Workers threatened of redundancy and unemployed	Workers threatened of redundancy and unemployed	Unemployed
<b>Policy position</b>	Positive	Intermediate	Intermediate	Negative
	Strong polarization	Mean polarization	Mean polarization	Weak polarization



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

**Chapter 2: Methodological Approach and Data**  
Marco Giugni and Paul Statham

**1. Introduction**

**Overall Data-Retrieval Aim:** Systematic national and cross-national data-sets on multiorganizational fields linking policy domain over unemployment to public domain, taking into account multi-levelling of politics, and especially role of supra-national EU.

Following on from the approach outlined in chapter 1, we aimed to develop and extend methodologies that would allow for gathering data on the positions and relationships of collective actors in the field, who are linked together in an interactive ‘multi-organisational field’ linking the policy domain to the public domain, and thereby allowing processes of deliberation. At the same time it was important that our research design permitted us to retrieve data that would examine the ‘multi-leveling’ of politics, and thereby trace potentially emergent patterns and forms of ‘Europeanisation’.

For the independent variable we have developed national reports on ‘political opportunity structures’ and policy developments specific to unemployment for each national case as well as the EU level. This was drawn from policy documentation and secondary literature, and has allowed for hypothesis building both on cross-national differences and on institutional and discursive opportunity structures, e.g., different national types of welfare state, unemployment provision, social partnerships (see chapter 1).

For the dependent variables and our original data sources our data retrieval strategy was undertaken along four basic dimensions, which we shall elaborate in more detail below :

- A. Claim-making in National Public Spheres
- B. Policy Deliberation in National Multi-Organizational Fields
- C. Policy Deiberation in EU-level Multi-Organizational Fields
- D. Organization and Actions of the Unemployed

First, however, we give an indication of how these four dimensions relate to one another.

Claim-making analysis was the most labour intensive part of the research and retrieves systematic comparative data, drawn from newspaper sources, on the public discourses and positions of different types of collective actors who make public demands or mobilize over unemployment issues. It allows for both analysis of the shares and positions of different collective actors in national public spheres, as well as for examining the extent to which European actors are involved, or addressed, or issues are framed with reference to Europe.

Claim-making analysis was thus the ‘backbone’ of our overall research agenda, because it produces a systematic comparative picture of the general differences between the contentious politics of unemployment in the countries.

Not all acts of deliberation, mobilization and lobbying by collective actors in policy domains become visible in the public sphere. In order to add an actor-level understanding of the relationships of collective actors in the multi-organisational field, we decided to undertake a systematic network analysis of the key actors from civil society, the NGO sector and policy domain, to gain a deeper understanding of the nature and type of relationships within unemployment politics. This was undertaken cross-nationally comparatively, and questions were also asked about Europe, so that this approach could be closely related to findings from the claim-making.

As there is nothing approximating a supranational European public sphere, it was not possible to undertake a claim-making analysis at the supra-national European level. Instead such undertakings were taken from the presence of Europe within claim-making in national public spheres. However, it was possible to undertake an analysis of the emergent EU-level multi-organizational field of transnational and national actors. This was tailored to be as close as possible to our analysis of the national multi-organizational fields of actors but undertaken within EU actors, and other supra- and transnational actors (both institutional and civil society) which are active over unemployment.

Finally, whereas the claims-making and network analyses of the multi-organisational fields provide comparative information on the types of actor-relationships which constitute policy deliberation over unemployment, we felt that it was necessary to undertake a more detailed and open, and at times ethnographic, approach to studying the internal dynamics of unemployed mobilization itself, in those countries where it was found to be significantly present. This allowed for a contextual and detailed understanding of micro-level and local processes at work in the mobilization of the unemployed.

## **2. Claim-making: Mapping the Contentious Politics of Unemployment**

As there were no other available data sets on contentious claim-making, and other types of data such as opinion surveys lacked the required rigor and sensitivity for the type of analyses envisaged, it was necessary to produce our own data sets. Our methodological approach followed the tradition of protest event analysis (e.g. Olzak 1989; Rucht et al. 1998; Tarrow 1989) and frame analysis (e.g. Eder 1993; Gamson 1992; Gamson and Modigliani 1989; Snow et al. 1986) from social movement research, and built on and extended these methods. Newspaper print media coverage of reported acts was used as the primary data source for claim-making. Newspapers were selected in preference to other media (TV, radio) as this allowed the ability to go backwards in time, facilitating longitudinal study.

We have defined an instance of claim making (shorthand: a claim) as a unit of strategic action in the public sphere. It consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticisms, or physical attacks, which, actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors. Unlike the narrow definition of contentious politics that underlies studies of protest events, our definition includes political claims regardless of the form in which they are made (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.) and regardless of the nature of the actor (governments, social movements, NGO's, individuals, anonymous actors, etc.). Note also that

political decisions and policy implementation are defined as special forms of claims making, namely ones that have direct effects on the objects of the claim.

Inspired by Roberto Franzosi's (2004) idea to use the structure of linguistic grammar to code contentious events, we have broken down the structure of claims into seven elements:

1. Location of the claim in time and space (WHEN and WHERE is the claim made?)
2. Claimant: the actor making the claim (WHO makes the claim?)
3. Form of the claim (HOW is the claim inserted in the public sphere?)
4. The addressee of the claim (AT WHOM is the claim directed?)
5. The substantive issue of the claim (WHAT is the claim about?)
6. Object actor: who is or would be affected by the claim (FOR/AGAINST WHOM?)
7. The justification for the claim (WHY?)

The information from news reports is used as a record of significant political events in the field. The coded acts for claim-making range from protest events (demonstrations, riots, strikes, etc.) to conventional action forms (public statements, press conferences, etc.) to policy decisions. All acts pertaining to unemployment and related policies are coded. Here our definition of the field is important. All claims are coded which belong to the issue field of unemployment, i.e., all political decisions, verbal statements, and protests dealing with the following themes: unemployment, underemployment, joblessness, exclusion from the labor market, measures and provisions for unemployed people (including training courses, financing of unemployment insurance, and workfare). Claims referring to related fields are coded only if they explicitly refer to the issue field of unemployment. Thus, employment policy, economic development policy, etc.. and labor market and job creation issues are included only if the claims makes an explicit reference to unemployment, under-employment, or joblessness (and their synonyms). In addition, claims referring to the precariously employed were deemed to belong to the constituency and thematic field and therefore included. All claims by organized groups of unemployed were included regardless of their focus, because they were the constituency of the study, however claims by individual unemployed people who were not representing a group were not included.

Important variables are: actor types; action forms; the size, target and intensity of protest mobilization (if present); and the institutional or civil society actor on whom demands are made (addressee). Regarding the content of claims, these are coded for political aims, causal reasoning devices, and symbolic frames. The different claims made by one actor in relation to a specific event are coded as part of a unitary act. The journalist's own comments on events are not coded, as we are not interested in the media's own agenda here. For cross-national comparison, a common coding scheme of summary variables was designed (see appendix A), using one newspaper of similar affiliation for each country. Coded data was stored in a text-free database and analyzed using SPSS. Control for news selection and reporting bias was conducted at the national level.

The resultant database has a high level of flexibility for different types of analyses. It gives detailed information on a particular actor, and specific types of claims and frames, and their strategic location within the national issue-field. In addition, it is suitable for the macro-level analyses of general issue-fields and actor positions that will be required for the international comparison.

## **2. Semi-structured interviews and network analysis: Policy Deliberation in the National Policy Domains**

The information derived from newspapers on political claim-making forms our primary data base. This kind of information, however, is not well suited to grasp certain aspects of the contentious politics of unemployment, such as less visible forms of public campaigning by collective actors within the field under study and their participation in processes of policy deliberation in the national policy domains. To give a more grounded understanding of (a) the ideological positions and (b) networks of actors in the multi-organizational field of unemployment politics, 40 to 55 semi-structured interviews were conducted in each country with the following national-level actors (for EU/transnational level see below): core national policy-makers; party politicians (from major political parties/coalitions left and right), and employers' associations and trade union leaders; civil society and third sector organizations, NGOs, pro-welfare and anti-social exclusion movements, and organizations of the unemployed themselves.

The number of interviews given here is indicative as it varied slightly from one country to another. Specifically, in federal countries such as Germany and Switzerland we needed a higher number of interviews due to the fragmentation of the political system and the delegation of policy implementation tasks at the regional/local level. The interview schedule for each category of actor was specifically designed to determine where they locate themselves in relation to other actors in the field (allies/opponents).

In addition to gaining structured information on the activities and relationships of these key collective actors in the multi-organizational field, we took the decision to extend our initial ambitions and apply a questionnaire schedule that would also allow for more comprehensive network analysis techniques to be applied (see appendices B and D for schedules). This involved drawing up a list of the most important actors in the field of unemployment and then asking each actors specifically about their relationships with all other actors. Such relationships can consist of disagreements, co-operations, and influence. This has allowed a more systematic and sophisticated analysis of actor relationships than was originally envisaged.

## **3. Cross-national comparison, semi-structured interviews and network analysis: 'Europeanisation' and Policy Deliberation at the EU Level**

In order to make the research strictly comparative, coding schemes were developed and used with common variables. This allowed the integration of the different national studies into a single data base and facilitated cross-national comparative analysis of national political debates on unemployment based on original data. It was therefore possible to arrive at grounded answers to the key research questions regarding: (a) whether national differences continue to be significant in approaches to unemployment politics that are in some way related to structural differences in the countries, (b) whether there are emergent forms of convergence over time, and (c) which European forms of policy deliberation are emerging.

In order to address the further question, of whether any changes observed in the comparison of the national claim-making data can be explained by increasing EU integration and co-ordination in the field, it was necessary to question the relevant actors. Thus in addition to drawing on the extent to which Europe was present in national studies of claim-making and multi-organizational fields, we also directly repeated the study of actor relationships and networks at the supra- and transnational European level. This required modifying the



questionnaire slightly, but basically following the same principal of inquiry, and conducting interviews with policy, civil society, and NGOs at the EU level.

#### **4. Interviews, ethnographic insights and local cases: the mobilization of the unemployed**

Interviews were used to inquire into the organization and activities of the unemployed within the framework of our analysis of policy deliberation. However, given the lack of knowledge about the unemployed as a political collective actor, we also examined in more detail their organizational structure and their campaigns aimed at representing their interests both within the local and national and EU levels. Thus additional and more open-ended interviews were conducted with key activists in unemployed organizations in order to better understand the internal dynamics and strategies of their mobilization (see appendix C for schedule).

#### **5. Summary of Inter-related Data Retrieval Approaches**

##### **Independent Variables:**

- Reports on ‘political opportunity structure’ and policy development in field of unemployment from secondary literature and policy documentation
- Hypothesis building on institutional and discursive national differences: e.g., different types of welfare state, social partnerships,
- UK, CH, F, I, S, D and EU

##### **Dependent Variables: original inter-relatable data-sets**

###### **1: Political claim-making in the public domain**

- Collective action and public debates over unemployment that are visible in the public domain
- Systematic data-set on political claim-making over unemployment retrieved from newspaper sources, representative over time, 1995-2002.
- Report on national case based on original data, both for national study and as a preliminary step toward building knowledge for cross-national comparison
- In absence of European transnational public sphere, European involvement gauged from presence in national public sphere
- UK, CH, F, I, S, D

###### **2: Policy deliberation in the national policy domain**

- Invisible forms of collective action (especially ‘insider’ lobbying) and the nature of organizational linkages extending from the policy to the public domain: ‘multi-organizational fields’
- Systematic data-set of coded responses from approx. 40 structured interviews per country, with policy elites, political parties, interest groups, and NGOs (biased toward public domain)
- Network analysis of influence, disagreement and collaboration within multi-organisational field
- Data on action forms (public v. policy oriented); campaigns on key issues; perceived effectiveness on policy
- UK, CH, F, I, S, D

### **3: Policy deliberation at EU level**

- Invisible forms of collective action (especially ‘insider’ lobbying) and the nature of organizational linkages extending from the policy to the public domain: ‘multi-organizational field’ at EU transnational level
- Systematic data-set of coded responses from approx. 40 structured interviews, with policy elites, political parties, interest groups, and NGOs (biased toward public domain) at EU transnational level
- Network analysis of influence, disagreement and collaboration within multi-organisational field
- Data on action forms (public v. policy oriented); campaigns on key issues; perceived effectiveness on policy
- EU

### **4: Organization and Actions of Unemployed**

- In countries with significant levels of mobilization by the unemployed (I, F, D) detailed in-depth qualitative interviews (in addition to step 2) to understand the internal mechanisms of mobilization.
- In countries with low mobilization (e.g. UK) interviews with activists on ‘historical’ or past mobilizations, to inquire about absence of mobilization.

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**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

**Chapter 3: Final report for the UK**

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction
  2. Basic parameters of the British policy approach
    - 2.1. Historical background and classification of the British welfare state
    - 2.2. British policy model
  3. Unemployment and public policy
    - 3.1. Development and structure of unemployment in the UK
    - 3.2. National policy instruments and benefits to fight unemployment
  4. Public debates on unemployment: the claims-making data
    - 4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis
    - 4.2. Media discourse on British unemployment
    - 4.3. Public actors – who is involved in the media discourse
    - 4.4. The role of the unemployed in public discussion
    - 4.5. Argumentative structure of the public discussion
    - 4.6. Targets of public criticism
    - 4.7. The Role of the EU in public discourse
  5. Political deliberation in the field of labour market policies
    - 5.1. Interviews with political actors
    - 5.2. Organisational networks
    - 5.3. Action forms of actors
    - 5.4. The role of the unemployed within unemployment policies
    - 5.5. The role of the EU in political deliberation
  6. Résumé and conclusion
- Table 11B: List of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor location (multiple options)
- Table 12B: The ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor location

## 1. Introduction

Unemployment has stood out as a crucial and controversial issue in the UK. Long term and unskilled unemployed have assisted powerlessly to the continuous erosion of their welfare entitlements, with little prospect of finding work. The New Labour government has promoted significant reforms to the labour market in order to move more people from welfare to work. These include the working families' tax credit, changes to the system of national contribution, a national minimum wage, and the New Deal, which started as a specific policy directed at young people, but was soon extended to older people, single parents and the disabled. The unemployment issue has thus attained high priority on the agenda of both mass media and public administration, especially during the first New Labour government, opening space for further involvement of civil society at large.

In this context, it is of great interest to analyse actors, their initiatives and their action across the public and policy domains. The following report aims to synthesize the main findings of this analysis for the British case. Amongst others, it strives to reconstruct the main strands of public contentions in regard to issues, participating actors and debated policy solutions. It also wishes to underscore the role of the European Union and its potential impact on British public debates. In particular, we are interested in learning how inclusive these public debates are with reference to weak and precariously organized groups such as the unemployed. To this end, we will present the findings of the British project in three steps. First, we will give a picture of unemployment in the UK and describe the established policy instruments and strategies – as a frame for better understanding the role and direction of current policy debates and reforms. Second, we will reconstruct the structure of public debates by presenting our data on claims-making within a leading British newspaper (the Guardian). Finally, institutionalised policy deliberations and various aspects of the public domain will be analysed using interviews conducted with important political actors.

## 2. Basic parameters of the British policy approach

The fight against unemployment is part and parcel of British public policies since a long time. Moreover, we can identify a specific 'neo-liberal' approach to combating unemployment and dealing with the unemployed. To better understand the debates and policy reforms, it is thus beneficial to reflect upon this British policy style before entering the specifics of our findings.

The liberal model of welfare state promotes means-tested assistance, modest universal transfers, or modest social-insurance plans, while encouraging the market either passively or actively [Esping-Andersen, 1993]. This model is generally based on poor benefits and strict rules for entitlement, targeting a stigmatised clientele of low-income. In particular, it is characterised by 1) low ratio social expenditure/GDP, 2) low social protection from effects of unemployment, sickness, old age, maternity and lone parenthood, 3) high exposure of households with below- average incomes to the full costs of market, 4) low replacement levels of income by state benefits and pensions, 5) high levels of income inequality and relative poverty, 5) crucial role for means-tested benefits, 6) predominance of male breadwinner model, and 7) a culture of reliance on self-financed, family support and care, supplemented by charity and occupational provision [Ginsburg, 2001]. Of course, this model provides an important instrument for furthering the analysis of the British welfare state, since it is possible to match the theoretical model with actual developments of welfare structures, assessing the extent to which the UK fits with the liberal model.

## ***2.1. Historical background and classification of the British welfare state***

It can be argued that the so-called ‘classic’ British welfare state between WWII and the end of the 1970s did not fit properly the liberal model, but it relied on a welfare model establishing social rights to a basic, universal level of provision and protection. The extensive provision of low rent social housing, the national health services and public social services provided outstanding protection from the market costs of housing, health and social care. In addition, the social insurance system, which was accompanied by the development of a safety-net role for means-tested benefits, provided almost everyone with a nationally uniform and unstigmatised right to subsistence income. However, the New Right long leadership of Thatcher, which was established in May 1979 and lasted firmly until November 1990, brought about significant changes in the British welfare system. While founding its leadership on a pragmatic and populist approach, the new government was increasingly driven by neo-liberal faith in 1) monetarism, 2) supply-side policies, 3) anti-public discourse, and 4) new managerialism.

Firstly, the control of inflation replaced ‘full employment’ as the principal goal of economic policy, with the consequential control of the money supply through interest rate rises and restraint of public expenditure. Secondly, the New Right relied on capital and labour deregulation, rejection of foreign exchange controls, tax and benefits cuts, anti unions measures, utility privatisation, removal of minimum wage legislation. Thirdly, the New Right stood against the provision of services by public bodies, particularly local government, fostering ideas that undermined the pay and status of public professionals. Lastly, the ‘contract culture’ and the ‘new managerialism’ in the public and third sectors firmly emphasised the importance of efficiency and effectiveness, aiming to changes which were cost-driven, performance sensitive and commercially minded. The ‘globalisation discourse’ offered a crucial opportunity for the implementation and formulation of this new economic policy framework. While the anti-inflationary strategy was presented as the only recipe to face global market competition, mass unemployment was considered to be the necessary evil of this strategy. The restructuring (and consequential job loss in basic industries such as steel, coal, railways, telecoms and energy) was hardened by public expenditure restraint, since the New Right drastically reduced the resources which could have answered the needs and claims raising from the process of restructuring, with no possibility to reengage the unemployed within public service employment.

Two main arguments have developed in the social policy literature about the changes which have been brought about by the New Right. On the one hand, supporters of the ‘modernisation view’ have argued that the classic welfare state has been modernised according to the needs of global competition to achieve further efficiency, while maintaining its main welfare structures. Indeed, the neo-liberal agenda was never widened as far as including elimination of housing allowances, private schooling, and private health insurance. On the other hand, supporters of the ‘residualisation view’ have emphasised that a deeper transformation of the British welfare state has been taking place since the early 1980s, leading to the reinforcement of liberal regime characteristics. From this point of view, New Right policies have been completely shaped according to the neo-liberal model, drawing on arguments about inevitability and economic advantage of globalisation.

## ***2.2. British policy model***

As I have already stated, post-New Right Britain has been drawing on a ‘neo-liberal’ model that combines both residualisation and modernisation. Although it is emphasising the elements of modernisation, the current New Labour government has not abandoned residualisation, relying extensively on the legacies of Thatcherism. As regards taxation, New Labour is following on the path of New Right, ruling out ‘tax and spend’ policies and emphasising the virtue of prudence in public finance. At the same time, increases in indirect taxation have enabled the government to finance further spending on welfare-to-work, health service and education, since groups lobbying on behalf of lone parents, disabled people and pensioners have challenged New plans to cut pensions and welfare benefits. As regards income inequality, New Labour policies aim to achieve positive redistributive effects, particularly in favour of low-income households with children. The introduction of a Working Families Tax Credit, a new Child Care Tax Allowance, and increases in Income Support for families and Child Benefit for the first child, aim to redress effectively the dramatic peak of people living on incomes of less than half the average, which was reached during the Thatcher government.

As regards flexibility, New Labour is clearly following the New Right belief in a flexible market to stand against global economic competition. The British labour market has emerged in the last two decades as one of the least regulated amongst the OECD states, with different measures to promote non-standard conditions of employment such as part-time, fixed-term, freelance and temporary contracts. These measures have undermined unions’ power, increased work incentives for benefits’ claimants, abolished minimum wages, contracted out public services and taken at distance European social-democratic influence. Nevertheless, New Labour is ignoring the New Right assumption that flexibility is synonymous of deregulation, thereby reversing some policies of previous governments, such as the decision to abolish minimum wages regulations in low-pay industries, or the decision not sign up to the EU Social Charter. Lastly, as regards privatisation of welfare, the process of state hollowing out, with gradual disappearance of public service, has been favoured by New Labour measures, in line with a trend started with the New Right. Yet, the New Labour frameworks of legal and administrative regulation and of public finance corroborate the British welfare state as much as the provision of direct public services, effectively addressing the risk to transform the government into a mere financier of privately provided services.

In sum, while it continues to follow the important paths that were drawn by the New Right, the New Labour government (like other EU social-democratic governments) is trying to firmly sustain welfare provisions with the crucial aim to protect the weaker parts of the population, tackling unemployment, poverty, and income dispersion. It can be argued that the British welfare state is currently drawing on a ‘neo-liberal’ model, which is close to but different from the conventional liberal model. While emphasising the elements of modernisation, the current New Labour government is extensively drawing on the legacies of Thatcherism. Economic competitiveness, workfare/labour market policies, and interventionist governance were already central features of the Conservatives’ strategy between 1979 and 1997. The New Labour government has broadened this latter strategy, although it has clearly strengthened its intervention in workfare and developing measures which deal directly with social exclusion. New Labour is continuing the monetarist and supply-side policies carried out during Thatcherism. It is relying on workfare policies, emphasising the necessity to raise living conditions of people in low paid employment through the minimum wage, working families tax credit, child care tax credit and wage subsidies. It is promoting interventionist and regulatory governance embracing both public service and private finance and contracting for welfare provision. At

the same time, New Labour is implementing some measures to promote social cohesion and tackle social exclusion.

### 3. Unemployment and public policy

Unemployment is definitely not homogeneously distributed across the UK labour force, with some groups heavily suffering unemployment (for example, young and unskilled men) and other groups virtually immune from it (for example, professional workers).

- Unemployment and Gender: In contradiction with many countries of Continental Europe, in the UK unemployment amongst men is considerably higher than it is amongst women.
- Unemployment and Age: Younger workers have substantially higher unemployment rates than their elders. The position of young people has worsened since the 1970s, particularly in comparison to the over-fifties.
- Unemployment and Profession: Unemployment rates amongst unskilled and semi-skilled worker men are the highest.
- Unemployment and Ethnic Groups: Not surprisingly, white suffer very low unemployment if compared with other ethnic groups. Amongst all ethnic groups, men have the highest unemployment rate.

#### 3.1. Development and structure of unemployment in the UK

Focusing on the last century, four main significant periods for unemployment can be indicated:

1. Before WWI: unemployment rate was around 5%.
2. The Interwar Time: unemployment rate fluctuated around 9%.
3. The Post-War Boom (1945-75): unemployment fluctuated around 2.5%.
4. From the 1970s Recession Onwards: unemployment has been between 7% and 9%.

Unemployment falls when aggregate demand expands and rises when there is a contraction. Thus, one possible strategy of government can consist in sustaining an expansion of real demand through an expansionary fiscal policy and reduction of interest rates. However, this strategy unavoidably leads to rising inflation and deterioration of trade balance. This explains exactly what happened, for example, between 1986 and 1990, when the drop of unemployment rate from 11% to 7% (thanks to expansionary fiscal and monetary policy, alongside with an international boom and a fall in commodity prices) was matched by a sudden increase of inflation (which rose from 2.5% to 7.8%) and a trade balance deficit of 4% of GDP. The government, at this point, started a policy contraction. By 1993, unemployment had risen back over 10%, but inflation had dropped at 3% alongside with a considerable improvement of trade balance.

This pattern of high inflation and trade balance deficit when there is low unemployment, and low inflation and positive trade balance when there is high unemployment, is not only the basis on which the suffered choices of fiscal and monetary policy of government are founded, but the clear indication of the existence of a 'systemic' baseline level of unemployment such that actual employment should not move below it (otherwise contractionary policies will soon be necessary). This systemic baseline level of unemployment is known as the 'equilibrium rate' or the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment). Although it is difficult to detect which particular factors may change the equilibrium rate, as well as to understand its precise different numerical dimensions throughout time [Layard *et al.*, 1991: 435-48], it



seems evident that until the late 1960s both actual and equilibrium unemployment were relatively stable at around 2.5%. Afterwards, until 1980 unemployment was sustained below the equilibrium rate, as rising inflation and trade balance worsening show. Yet, the fact that unemployment rose clearly testifies that fact that the equilibrium rate must have increased even further. Rising unemployment above the (still increasing) equilibrium rate in the first half of the 1980s was matched by decreasing inflation and trade balance surplus. At the end of the 1980s unemployment fell relative to a stable equilibrium rate inflation and trade balance worsened again. Throughout the 1990s, finally, the equilibrium rate appears to have constantly decreased. This has brought about a parallel decline of actual unemployment, which, and at the end of the old millennium, was (and probably still is) a little below the equilibrium rate [Nickell, 1999:21].

While it is quite straightforward that the marked increased generosity of the unemployment benefit system, the sharp rise in trade union pressure and a remarkable rise in commodity prices produced the sudden rise in equilibrium unemployment at the end of the 1960s, it seems difficult to understand why the same equilibrium rate has not fallen faster and further (possibly, near the 1960s level) once, since the mid-1980s, many of the original causes of its increase have gone into reverse; that is, commodity prices have come back in real term at their level of 1960s, the unemployment benefit system have become substantially less generous, and the power of trade unions has been broken down. Certainly, some benefits are still provided in a way that they encourage unemployment (for example, housing benefits in high rent areas). To this it should be added that the recession of early 1980s increased the specific proportion of long-term unemployment (which contributed to the persistence of high unemployment, since the long-term unemployed find it very difficult to come back in a job), as well as the decline in the value of North Sea oil production which put pressure on the trade balance (thereby raising the equilibrium rate of unemployment).

Yet, the most important factor which seems to explain why the UK equilibrium rate remains high is the collapse in demand for unskilled workers since the late 1970s, induced by the widespread advent of technological industry and informatics on the one hand, and by the competition of new economic ‘tigers’ at the level of global trade. At the same time, increasing demand for skilled workers has outpaced its supply, thereby producing negative effects on the equilibrium rate. This means that in the UK skill shortages have caused inflationary pressure even when unemployment has been at a historically high level. The possible solutions should thus consist in programmes targeting the long-term unemployed and the unskilled, aimed at the same time to the provision of a higher level of training and education, as well as to the reform of benefit system.

### ***3.2. National policy instruments and benefits to fight unemployment***

Expenditure on social security is the largest single function of government spending. Over 30 million people (more than half of the population) receive income from at least one social security benefit. For means-tested benefits such as income support, receipt of the benefit will depend upon the income of the claimant, as well as upon personal characteristics such as age and family type. For contributory benefits such as incapacity benefit, eligibility depends upon the right amount of National Insurance Contributions (NICs) paid by the claimant during her life. Some benefits, such as child benefit, are universally available to all people who meet some qualification criteria.

Focusing in particular on unemployment benefits, the Jobseeker's Allowance (JSA) is a taxable benefit and can be either contributory or means-tested. It was introduced by the Conservative cabinet and replaced unemployment benefit and income support for unemployed people from 1996. Claimants of this benefit cannot work more than 16 hours per week, have to be able to start work immediately, and have to actively look for a job (attending interviews, collecting information or writing applications). The claimant must also sign a 'job agreement' with the Employment Service, in which she indicates the desired hours and type of job, placing reasonable restrictions to preferences and offering his/her work for up to 40 hours per week. Refusing to take a job offer may result (if no justifiable reason is provided) in loss of JSA. There are two different types of JSA:

1. Contribution-Based Jobseeker's Allowance: This is paid for up to six months provided that the claimant have paid sufficient NICs in one of the two tax years prior to the beginning of the year in which the claimant claims the benefit. Claimants cannot have earnings above £5 per week or be in receipt of income support. It is possible to receive contribution-based JSA regardless of savings, capital or partner's earnings.
2. Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance: This is a means-tested benefit which might be received by those who do not qualify for contribution-based JSA provided that they have a sufficiently low income. Claimants cannot be in receipt of income support and must not be working more than 16 hours per week. Only one partner in a couple can receive income-based JSA, and the partner of the claimant may not be working for more than 24 hours per week.

Other unemployment benefits include the Job grant, which is a one-off Euro156 ca. tax-free means- tested payment for people aged 25 or over who were previously receiving a qualifying benefit, such as jobseeker's allowance, income support, incapacity benefit or severe disablement allowance, and who are starting or returning to full-time work. This work must last at least five weeks. While it is not a benefit specifically elaborated for unemployed people (but rather, for people on low income), the Income Support (IS) is indeed very similar to income-based JSA. IS, which is a taxable and means-tested benefit, protects mainly lone parents and carers, people who are incapable of work and disabled people. IS claimants cannot be working more than 16 hours per week or be in full-time education. As with income-based JSA, claimants' income (with earnings' disregard as for JSA) must be less than their basic personal allowance. Lastly, the New Deal Employment Credit is a taxable and means-tested benefit consisting in a wage top-up which can be paid for up to 52 weeks. Recipients are those who start work, including self-employment. They must have adhered to a New Deal programme, and they can also receive a training grant to help pay for work-related training.

Since its election in 1997, the New Labour government has made a number of reforms to the labour market designed to move more people from welfare to work. These include the working families' tax credit, changes to the system of national contribution, a national minimum wage, and, in particular, the New Deal. This was launched in 1998 by the New Labour government to help people to find work, that is, giving the chance to undertake meaningful work that might be valued by future employers. It started as a specific policy directed at young people aged 18-24 (The New Deal for Young People) but was soon extended to people over 25 years old (New Deal 25+; and New Deal 50+), to single parents (New Deal for Lone Parents) and to the disabled (New Deal for Disabled). The New Deal for Young Persons aims at helping long term unemployed into a stable employment status through the implementation of a set of actions. These include advice and guidance to improve job searching, training and education to improve participants' skills, as well as provision of work experiences in environmental task forces, in voluntary service or in some kind of subsidised employment. Accordingly, the programme which is co-ordinated nationally by the

Employment Service through local Jobcentres, has relied on a wide network of governmental bodies and private corporations, charity societies and voluntary groups, environmental organisation and local associations, training providers and local authorities across the UK. The programme is universal, that is, eligible participants (young unemployed for more than six months) are due to participate on the charge of having their subsidies cut off.

The New Deal 25+ is aimed to those who are aged 25 or over and who have been claiming Jobseeker's Allowance for 18 months or more out of the last 21. In this case too, New Deal provides the individual with a Personal Adviser, a service tailored to her needs, the possibility to draw an action plan for getting a job, practical help and training, job-focused interviews skills. If the participant does not find a job during the first four months, a package of 'full-time intensive help' is agreed with the personal adviser, which includes at least two of the following: work experience, work placement with employers, occupational training and help with motivation and the skills (communication, presentation, and teamwork amongst the others) needed to be employed. While maintaining many of the characteristics common to the programmes for Young People and 25+, such as the personal adviser and the provision of intense help in order to understand and fully grasp real chances and potentialities in the labour market, the New Deal is not compulsory for people over 50 years old, lone parents and the disabled, who can voluntary take part in the programme by contacting their local jobcentre or Jobcentre Plus office.

#### **4. Public debates on unemployment: the claims-making data**

In democratically structured polities the public sphere has a strong impact on the formulation and implementation of public policies. In this sense, it is crucial to investigate whether the portrayed policy debates follow and/or take up debates within the mass-mediated public sphere. Moreover, it is of importance to analyse the structure and dynamic of these public discourses in regard to issues, actors and arguments in order to understand better who influences and/or dominates the public definition of the problem, of the political accountability and of adequate measures. Likewise, we need to trace back whether public debates exclude specific actors and/or issues, and which effect this exclusion has on the course of public debates. It is to be assumed that public debates are responsive to pressing social problems and public worries, and thus quite inclusive for non-institutionalized actors such as the unemployed.

##### ***4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis***

The British data on political claims-making were collected from every second edition of the Guardian Newspaper (Monday, Wednesday and Friday) and for the comparative part of the project cover eight years 1995-2002 inclusive. After data cleaning the British sample has 750 cases. The unit of analysis was the single political claim, broadly defined as a strategic intervention, either verbal or non-verbal, that is made in the public sphere on behalf of constituency group, which if realised would bear on the interests or rights of other groups or collectivities. In order to define a sample for political claims-making acts over unemployment, we included only claims-making acts that referred explicitly to unemployment, underemployment, or joblessness, and their related synonyms. This meant excluding those claims relating to the economy or labour market which were unrelated to the core political issue field of unemployment. Claims referring to related fields (i.e. employment policy, economic development policy, and other issues concerning the situation of the labour market or the creation of jobs) were coded only if they referred explicitly to the issue of

unemployment. In addition, claims by organised groups of unemployed people were also coded, regardless of their thematic focus. Hence, our sample of claims-making is not directly compatible with a single policy field but focuses on the political issue-field relating to unemployment. For an instance of political claims-making there must by definition be a defined set of interests of a ‘beneficiary’ within the constituency of the unemployed, whose interests would be affected –either beneficially or harmfully- if the stated political claim were realised.

#### ***4.2. Media discourse on British unemployment***

Table 1 shows the beneficiaries the ‘unemployed constituencies’ from the sample of claims-making. A first point to note here is that in more than half of cases (56.1%) political claims-making acts defined a beneficiary of workers or labour groups whose interests were either being challenged or promoted. This included workers at companies under threat or facing actual redundancy and the precariously employed (36.8%), workers and employees under threat in general (16.8%), the working poor (2.4%) and illegal workers (0.1%). A further four tenths of demands (43.6%) were about the interests of the actual organisations and groups of the unemployed, where among those categories specified by political claims the young unemployed were prominent (8.9%). This indicates that more than half of the debate about unemployment in the UK is about people who are actually in work, but who are facing the prospects of unemployment in some way, whereas the remainder of the debate is about people actually in the condition of unemployment. We will use this distinction in investigating some of the findings below.

The first row in Table 2 shows the distribution of claims-making acts per annum. This shows a fluctuating pattern of claims-making over the time period. The bottom row of Table 2 shows the unemployment rate in the UK which declines over the period from 9.8% in 1995 to 5.6% in 2001. At first glance it appears that the fluctuations in the overall level of claims-making over unemployment do not bear any clear relationship to the objective indicator for unemployment over the period. However, when we distinguish between claims-making relating to workers’ facing the prospects of unemployment (row two) and claims-making relating to the unemployed (row three), we see that the overall trend in the political discourse about the (already) unemployed in general falls over the period as does the objective level of unemployment. This suggests that the political discourse over the unemployed is declining and becoming pacified over the period in line with actual falls in unemployment. This issue field appears to be becoming less contentious. However, at the same time there appears to be a rise in overall contentiousness in the debates about workers’ threatened with unemployment. This leads to the tentative conclusion that in the British case, political contention over the actual unemployed appears to be being replaced to a certain extent by political contention over the position of workers’ under threat of unemployment.

#### ***4.3. Public actors – who is involved in the media discourse***

A starting point for examining the actual contents of the British data-set is to look at the collective actors who made demands or engaged in collective actions over the issue of unemployment in our sample. Table 3 details the share of claims-making by collective actors in the field of unemployment politics. In Table 3 the detailed types of actors have been aggregated into eight categories: state and executive; political parties; private companies, employers’ associations, trade unions, non- governmental organisations acting specifically on behalf of the unemployed, the constituency of the unemployed acting for themselves, and

finally, other civil society actors. A first point from Table 3 is the prominence of state and executive actors who make over a third of claims-making (35.5%) in the field of contentious politics over unemployment. More than a fifth of all claims were made by British government and executive actors (22.0%), compared to only 3.5% by regional and local state actors, and a tiny 2.0% by the European Union, and 1.1% by extra-EU Supranational and transnational state bodies, such as the IMF, ILO and OECD. This shows that central government is by far the most dominant actor in debates about unemployment in the UK.

A second point to note from Table 3 is private companies (19.7%) and employers' associations (5.5%) together account for a quarter of claims-making. These business interests account for a larger share than the trade unions (16.7%), NGOs for the unemployed (0.8%), and the unemployed themselves (0.5%). This weaker showing of the representatives of labour interests, in contrast to the representatives of capital and commerce, perhaps gives a first indication of the extent to which British debates about unemployment are strongly shaped by economic interests, rather than workers' or labour interests. In addition, the miniscule presence of the unemployed and NGOs working on their behalf, in the political debates about their interests, suggests that debates about the unemployed in the UK have been pacified, or that the unemployed are too weak to mobilise sufficient resources to enter the public domain. The unemployed themselves appear as 'objects' of the discourse about their condition and are not significantly 'protagonists'. Of the other civil society actors who made up more than a sixth of demands (16.9%), by far the largest proportion (12.3%) were research institutes, think tanks, and universities, who in most cases were making political claims about unemployment issues on the basis of their research. Again this strong presence of a research community implies an institutionalised field of politics about unemployment, where grants and sponsorship are available for expert knowledge production on the problem. The only other type of civil society actors who were present to any extent were Churches (0.7%) and welfare organisations (0.7%).

The second two columns in Table 3 show the shares of claims by actors, first in the field of claims where the interests of workers' under threat of unemployment were at stake, and second in that where the unemployed were the constituency. This uses the distinction about the constituencies made in Table 1. The interesting point to note from the second two columns of Table 3 is that there appears to be two overlapping debates in the field of unemployment politics in the UK, the first about workers' facing the prospect of unemployment, and the second about how to deal with the unemployed. Private companies (33.3%) are the most prominent actor in debates about workers' facing unemployment, followed by the trade unions (22.8), and state and executive actors only come third (20.7%). The structure of this political field is very different to the one about the unemployed, where private companies make hardly any contribution (2.4%), and state and executive actors dominate the field making more than half of all claims (54.1%), followed by other civil society actors (24.3%), which as we have already stated are primarily research institutes, think tanks and universities.

#### ***4.4. The role of the unemployed in public discussion***

As already determined before the unemployed themselves as well as their situation hardly play any role in the public discussion. Analysing whether the actors argue more in favour or disfavour of the unemployed we created a position-variable that shows for every claim if the intention is positive, negative or technocratic from the unemployed's point of view. We coded each act of claims-making with a score of -1, 0, +1, dependent upon whether if realised the political demand could be seen to be beneficial (+1) or harmful (-1) to the interests of the

constituency of the unemployed. A score of zero was given for cases of neutral positions, or where the expressed political demand was not clearly beneficial or detrimental to the interests of the unemployed constituency. When we calculate an average score for each collective actor, then we arrive at a figure between -1 and +1 for the aggregate position of the claims-making of that actor with respect to the interest of the unemployed. The first column in Table 4 shows the average position scores for the collective actors in the field of unemployment politics. We have arranged the actors in order running top-to-bottom from -1 (against to the interests of the constituency) to +1 (in favour of the interests of the constituency). This gives a first qualitative indicator for the positions of collective actors relative to one another in the issue field over unemployment. A first point to note from the first column of Table 4 is that the claims-makers who take up the most strong position against the interests of the unemployed are private companies (-0.77) and employers' associations (-0.12). At the other pole of the discursive field Trade Unions (+0.74), unemployment-specific NGOs (+0.83) and the Unemployed (+1.00), make the case for the unemployed, though it should be noted that we have already seen from Table 3, that the unemployed themselves and unemployment NGOs, have only a very small presence in the public domain. Effectively this shows that the key protagonists in the British contentious field of unemployment politics are private companies (19.7%, -0.77), on one side, the trade unions on the other (16.7%, +0.74). This demonstrates evidence for a cleavage between the interests of capital, on one side, and the interests of labour, on the other. However, it is also worth noting that the position of private companies against the interests of the unemployed is a discursive gulf away from the overall average (+0.24), and that state and executive actors (+0.39), other civil society actors (+0.57), and political parties (+0.68), take up a position that is far more supportive to the interests of the unemployed. This indicates that there are also more likely to be links and coalitions between actors on the pro-unemployed side of the debate, whereas the private companies take up a more isolated position in the public sphere.

Turning to the second and third columns in Table 4, we have once more made a distinction between those claims made about the constituency of workers facing potential unemployment, and the constituency of the already unemployed. Here we see important differences that build on those already mentioned regarding the share of actors in the field (Table 3). A first point to note is that the strong position against the interests of the unemployed constituency that we find among private companies occurs with respect to workers under threat of unemployment, where indeed most of the claims by private companies were made (33.3% share of field, -0.84 position). This appears as a highly contentious issue field, with this strong anti-constituency position of the private companies opposed by the strong pro-constituency position of the trade unions (22.8%, +0.72), who gain significant support from other civil society actors (11.2, +0.55) and to a lesser extent from the state and executive actors (20.7, +0.37). Here then it appears that the protagonists in the debate about workers under threat of unemployment are the private companies, whose position is challenged by the trade unions, supported by civil society actors and political parties, and the state also takes a stance that is also broadly defensive toward the interests of workers under threat (+0.37, compared to an overall average of +0.06). By contrast, the third column shows a different structure of contentious issue field where the interests of capital are far less present. Employers associations make public demands against the interests of the unemployed (4.0, -0.08), but the small amount of demands by private companies are actually in favour of the unemployed, most likely about increasing employment (2.4%, +0.50). The British political debate about the unemployed is strongly dominated by the state whose position is slightly below the overall position (54.1%, +0.40, compared to overall average +0.47). The trade unions again take up a pro-unemployed position but again have much less to say than they do about workers under threat (8.8%,

+0.79). In fact the political discourse about the unemployed appears to be a strongly pacified debate with the state dominating proceedings and then civil society actors (24.3%, +0.58), which are mostly universities and research institutes, presenting a stance that is more pro-unemployed than the government but not a large discursive distance away from the official stance. This gives the impression of an institutionalised field of politics where exchanges are between the state as a provider and researchers and expert knowledge providers who –often supported by the state– offer advice on policy directions. Overall then, there are clear differences in the debate about unemployment, between the political field over the conditions of workers under threat of unemployment which is highly contentious, and the field over the unemployed, which is broadly uncontested, and where the debate most likely exists to specify policy alternatives for state and executive actors.

#### ***4.5. Argumentative structure of the public discussion***

Another important aspect of claims-making is the contents of issues which are raised by political demands. Table 5 shows the type of issues that were mobilised by claims-making in the UK. It divides the issues into five main macro categories: socio-economic issues in relation to the labour market; welfare systems and social benefits; (re)insertion into the labour market; issues relating to the constituency of the employed; and other issues. In general, these run from market issues (Non-state then state), to welfare provision, to measures for inserting the unemployed back into the labour market, and then issues relating to the conditions and situation of the unemployed themselves. We have included subcategories and sub-subcategories under these macro categories, which are of special interest for the British case. In addition to these issue categories, in the second column of Table 5 we have also aggregated the average position (-1 to +1) of all claims made in each issue category relative to whether they were for or against the interests of the unemployed. This then shows an indicator for to what extent overall claims-making about a specific issue is either favourable (+1) or unfavourable (-1) to the unemployed. The first striking finding from Table 5 is that issues mobilised about unemployment in the UK are strongly focussed on market and economy type issues with 77.5% of all claims being about socio-economic issues relating to the labour market, in contrast to a tiny 1.2% about issues relating to the condition of the unemployed. An eighth (12.5%) of claims-making mobilised issues about measures for getting the unemployed back into the labour market, and a further 7.5% covered issues about welfare and benefits to them. In addition, the second column in Table 5 shows that socio-economic issues were mobilised in a way that was in general more against the interests of the unemployed (+0.17), when compared to issues about welfare (+0.43) and measures for reinsertion into jobs (+0.56), and about the condition of the unemployed (+0.44).

Indeed the major conflict lines in unemployment politics in the UK appear to come within the category of socio-economic issues relating to the labour market. Here we see that more than four tenths (41.7%) of issues over unemployment are about macro-economic issues which exclude state activities, and that these tend to go against the interests of the unemployed (-0.10 compared to average +0.24). A key component here is that a quarter of all demands were about dismissals (25.9%) which of course are strongly against the interests of workers and the unemployed (-0.36). What we see here then in the British case is that a considerable proportion of the debate about unemployment is constructed by economic issues that occur beyond the state's activities and responsibilities. The UK appears to a large extent to be dominated by a free market type discourse focussed on macro-economic issues which shapes the way in which issues about unemployed are mobilised in the public domain. However, the is still a debate about the role of the state within the economy with almost a fifth of demands

(18.7%) raising issues about the state's regulation of the economy and its consequences for unemployment, and a further tenth (9.5%) about state policies relating to the labour market. That economic development/promotion issues (+0.43) and state policy relating to the labour market (+0.49) both give an overall position that is much more favourable to the interests of the unemployed than macro-economic issues (-0.10), shows a line of cleavage in the British debate over unemployment regarding the extent to which and how the state should intervene into the economy for the unemployed.

#### ***4.6. Targets of public criticism***

One important element of political discourses resides in the fact that actors speak with each other, meaning that they refer to the statements or actions of other organizations, blame them for particular problems and/or call them into action. Thus, another important variable coded by our data refers to the institutional and organisational addressees on whom political demands are made to do something about an issue in the fields of unemployment politics. Just over half of the acts of claims-making in our sample (52.4%) called upon specific actors as targets. Table 6 shows the share of claims-making which targeted specific types of actors as addressees. Perhaps unsurprisingly two thirds of all claims-making (66.2%) called upon state and executive actors to respond to issue defined within unemployment politics. The other main actor category which appears as an addressee is private companies (19.1%). Once more by distinguishing between claims-making about workers facing unemployment and the unemployed constituency in the second and third columns of Table 6, we see specific differences. Although we saw earlier that private companies have the largest share of claim-making in the field of claims-making over workers (33.3% - see Table 3) and more than state and executive actors, we see nonetheless that it is state and executive actors who are called upon most to act and politically respond to perceived problems in this field (53.9% compared to 30.7% private companies). This indicates that although private companies are the main protagonists in the politics about workers faced by unemployment prospects, it is still governments and the state which is called upon to take responsibility and respond to such problems.

Turning to the problems relating specifically to the unemployed constituency, more than eight tenths of demands with addressees (83.0%) call upon the state and executive actors to do something about the situation. This once more underlines that the field of politics constructed around the unemployed and their interests appears mainly to be a form of client politics built around the central position of the state. Of course, state and executive actors could be those operating at the national, regional and local, European or supra/transnational levels. Another indicator for 'Europeanisation' or supra/transnationalisation of the field of unemployment politics would be if European actors were increasingly called upon by actors to do something in response to unemployment problems in the UK. Table 7 shows the scope of actors who were addressees of claims in our sample of claims-making acts. From Table 7 we see once more that the extent of 'Europeanisation' that we find is somewhat limited, with eight tenths (79.1%) of demands being made on national addressees, and fully six tenths being made on national state and executive actors (58.8%).

#### ***4.7. The Role of the EU in public discourse***

Another focus of investigation of this project is to examine the extent to which political debates about employment in the UK have been 'Europeanised'. In the absence of the development of a European public sphere in any meaningful sense so far, one would expect to



find 'Europeanisation' in national public spheres which remain dominant. One indicator for the 'Europeanisation' of the political debates about unemployment would be finding evidence of European actors as prominent claims-makers within national public spheres. Table 8 shows the geographical scope of the claims-making actors who appeared in the British sample, where it was possible to determine this from the information in the article. We aggregated the sample into five categories regional and local; national; European (EU); supra/transnational (Non European; and unspecified where the scope of the organisation or group was unclear. The supra/transnational category covers all acts by supra-national and foreign actors not including the EU, whereas as European (EU) includes the European Union's supranational institutions, such as the Commission, as well as transnational and bi-lateral actors such as joint statements by the finance ministers of EU countries.

Table 8 shows that three quarters of the actors who make demands political demands are national (75.5%), with a further twelfth (8.6%) sub-national actors. We find that 8.4% are Non-EU supra/transnational, and only 4.9% European. Overall this indicates a limited transnationalisation of the national field of politics over unemployment. The bottom row of Table 8 gives the average position of the claims-making by different actors aggregated actor scope. It is interesting that the supra and transnational actors have an overall position that is strongly against the interests of the unemployed (Non EU -0.57, EU -0.08) when compared to national (+0.31) and especially regional and local actors (+0.61). This indicates that debates carried by supra and transnational actors generally make demands that go against the British unemployed. In addition, we see that most of the non-EU supra-nationalisation comes from private firms (34.5% of claims-making by private firms is supra/transnational non EU). A large proportion of these demands are made by multi-national private companies. This demonstrates that the political cleavage over unemployment has a dimension which relates to economic globalisation. On one side, international private companies act against the interests of the British unemployed, whose interests are defended most strongly by actors at the regional level (+0.61) and then by national actors (+0.31) on the other.

Although the state and executive claims-makers are predominantly national (80.8%), it is worth looking at what European state and executive actors (who account for 5.7% of claims by state and executive actors) do in the unemployment field. A first point is that when aggregated these European state actors have a position that is lower than average (+0.20 compared to average +0.24) relative to the interests of the unemployed. Again it appears that political globalisation does not necessarily bring demands that are supportive of the national unemployed. We do find examples of the EU commission challenging the British government record on employment, such as Employment and social affairs commissioner Pdraigh Flynn presenting a Report on the Future of Social Protection in the EU showing that the British unemployed are worse off than in other main European industrial countries. In addition there joint initiatives like that of the Amsterdam Treaty where EU governments signal their commitment to balance concerns for market economic efficiency with action to combat 'social exclusion' of the unemployed. Also our sample includes the European Commission responding to key national crises about unemployment by fast tracking the provision of aid to South Wales in response to Corus's decision to close its steel plant in the region. There are also stated commitments to the unemployed including a joint declaration by the European Centre for Industrial Relations promising to make an effort to halve unemployment by year 2000. At the same time we also find national politics using the European stage as a forum for making demands, with Labour MEPs lobbying against the closure of the Corus Steel Plant, apparently with support of the national government. In another case, Conservative MEPs call for an EU directive granting temporary workers the same rights as part-time counterparts to

be scrapped. Overall, however, these examples of the ‘Europeanisation’ of politics over unemployment are somewhat limited in number, and for the most part issues of unemployment politics appear to be fought out in the national arenas.

We have also looked at the possibility of the Europeanisation of unemployment politics by looking at the scope of actors making claims, and the scope of addressees on whom demands are made. It is easier to determine the scope of actors than issues, which by definition are less easy to pin down, but in Table 9 we have also included issues which are framed with a European or Non-EU supra/transnational frame of reference. Our objective in Table 9 was to see if there is any discernible trend towards and increasing presence of Europe as an actor, as an addressee, or as a frame of reference, within the debates on unemployment politics. A first point from Table 9 comes from the issue scope. Although we find a greater presence of Non-EU supra/transnational actors and addressees than EU ones, this is not the case for issues, where 5.5% are framed with reference to the EU, and only 1.3% as Non EU supra/transnational. Many of the supra/transnational actors were multinational firms, but the international arena disappears as a focus of issues. In contrast we see that the EU remains. Perhaps this can be seen as an indication that the European Union is seen as a legitimate framework of interpretation for political issues because of the presence of a set of political institutions which are largely absent in the supra/transnational arena, with even organisations such as the WTO being dominated by nation states. However, perhaps the main point to draw from Table 9 is that at least from our data it is not possible to see any discernible pattern of Europe increasingly appearing as an actor, as an addressee, or as a frame of references for issues, over time at least from the debates over unemployment politics.

## **5. Political deliberation in the field of labour market policies**

The structure of public debates outlined above raises the question of whether policy deliberations within the institutionalized arena of policy-making follows similar patterns and cleavages. Is political decision-making and implementation governed by similar actors and interorganizational relations, issues and agendas? And are institutionalised policy deliberations characterized by different forms of social exclusion when compared with the public sphere?

### ***5.1. Interviews with political actors***

This report is based on 39 semi-structured interviews with main national and local actors within the contentious field of unemployment in the UK, focusing on direct action and involvement of actors across the public and policy domains. In particular, interviews have been conducted with a) policy actors and state institutions, b) intermediary actors such as political parties, unions, and employers’ associations, c) non-governmental organisations, welfare associations and pro-beneficiary charities, and d) groups promoting direct mobilisation/participation of the unemployed themselves. The interview schedule for each category of actors has been specifically designed to analyse where these actors locate themselves in relations to other actors within the same field. The interviews have been coded in full and analysed with the use of SPSS software. They include not only qualitative in-depth questions (examining, for example, framing of the issues and ‘perceived’ role of legislative provisions and policies for structuring actors’ demands) but also sets of standardised questions which aim to investigate action repertoires, mobilisation and communication strategies, institutions on which demands are made, as well as relationships of influence, co-operation and disagreement amongst different types of organisations in the field. This analysis

of networks and relationships has been based on the elaboration of closed lists of actors engaged in the multi-organisational field of unemployment in the UK, allowing the employment of techniques of (descriptive) network analysis. It should be emphasised that the questionnaire has also gathered information on how actors across the public and policy domains see the potential influence of increasing European integration in the unemployment field. Interviewees have thus been asked to give more open-ended prognostic statements, thus allowing for comparison of opinions that are expressed by actors of different types.

The selection of actors to be interviewed was first of all tackled through the examination of our claim-making dataset. This dataset was particularly useful to detect crucial policy-makers and intermediary actors in the unemployment field, although it did not provide sufficient information for the selection of organisations representing the interests of the unemployed (including organisations of the unemployed themselves). This problem was addressed through an extensive analysis of practitioners' publications, access to online primary sources, and personal knowledge of the researchers who were involved in the project. Following this process of selection, organisations were contacted via telephone in order to detect spokespersons who could provide answers to the specific questions of the interview schedule. Researchers then contacted these spokespersons via formal letter and arranged an appointment with a final email or phone-call. The final sample of interviewed actors includes 25 national actors and 14 local actors (Table 10). The two interviews with church organisations have been included within the 'local NGOs' since the representatives of the Catholic Church and the Church of England have decided to speak exclusively on behalf of their own local areas. It should also be emphasised that one of our interviewed actors was fully engaged in unemployment mobilisation throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, and hence, could not provide any quantitative data that could be recorded in the following tables. Nevertheless, it made available extensive and valuable in-depth qualitative knowledge on past and recent mobilisation of the unemployed, which was particularly useful for the completion of this report.

## ***5.2. Organisational networks***

Having presented our interviewees with a same list of actors of different types (to which they have been free to add additional names), we have asked them to mention the most influential actors in the unemployment field. Although they have been elaborated on answers given to different versions of the same question (allowing for multiple mentions, three mentions, and one only mention respectively), tables 11A and 11B emphasise the importance of national policy actors, confirming the centralisation and nationalisation of the British unemployment field. In particular, the Treasury and the Department for Work and Pensions emerge as the two most important actors in the field. They are followed by Jobcentre Plus (another national policy actor), and the Labour Party, which, in spite of its 'intermediary' role, is likely to be perceived as a national policy actors, given its hold on government since 1997. Perhaps, it should be noticed that local actors seem to give a more than proportional share of mentions for the Labour Party. This can be explained, however, by the predominance of this party in the local council of our selected local case study, that is, Barnsley in Yorkshire.

In addition, it is important to emphasise that the rank-ordered lists of the most mentioned organisations in tables 11A and 11B is matched by the actors' indication of their main targets in tables 12A and 12B. Indeed, it is just natural that national policy-makers are the most important targets of claim-making in the unemployment field (something which can also be confirmed by the analysis of the claim-making dataset). Table 12A and 12B, however, show

that the order between Treasury and Department for Work and Pensions is reversed. This latter department is now in the first place. Furthermore, the Department of Trade and Industry emerges as a crucial target, although it is hardly mentioned or considered to be influential in the previous table. At the same time, table 12A shows that the Labour Party is a crucial target within the unemployment field. It is clearly its very nature of (influential) intermediary actor between people and institutions which makes this party so important as a target within the unemployment field. Yet, as it has already been noticed in the previous section, table 12B indicates that our local case study crucially impacts on the aggregate data of table 12A, since the local government in Barnsley is under Labour control.

As regards relationships of co-operation, our data crucially show that in general actors in the unemployment field are not interested in co-operation with grassroots groups of the unemployed themselves, with little exception for few non-governmental organisations. Figure 1 includes a graphical representation of the web of co-operative ties between all the actors which have been interviewed, that is, the nodes of the figure. Each tie between two nodes indicates the existence (and the direction) of a relationship of co-operation between a pair of them. The first evident characteristic of this network is its fair density, owing to the fact that a large number of actors are linked to each other. It is graphically clear that some organisations stand out for their activity of co-operation, such as the Trade Unions Congress (TUC) and the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP), while the organisations more 'isolated' interact directly at least with another central actor, and hence, they are no more than a few edges away from any other organisation within the network. Of particular interest, however, is the portion of network amongst non-governmental organisations, whose intervention is in favour/on behalf of the unemployed. The evident characteristic of this portion of network consists of its very low density, with a large number of actors disconnected with each other or merely related through relatively long paths. Although the issue-field is characterised by some good contacts between different types of actors, independent organisations working on behalf of the unemployed appear to be unwilling to forge a broad web of reciprocal linkages of close co-operation, while aiming to keep some basic degree of information exchange within the network.

By contrast, Fig. 1 indicates a good amount of ties across hierarchically different positions, despite the fact that they are not the normative expectation. In fact, the entire field is dominated by the development of extensive linkages which connect organisations across the public and policy domains. It is thus evident that in the unemployment field, different types of organisations aim to access different social positions in order to acquire additional resources. On the one hand, policy-makers are interested in the support which pro-unemployed voluntary organisations can provide in terms of welfare services, production of knowledge, sharing of expertise, and public legitimisation. On the other hand, pro-unemployed organisations obtain in exchange a privileged access to higher political positions and financial resources, thus reinforcing their organisational strength and public acknowledgement. In sum, the entire issue-field is 'vertically' stretched, with increasing competition amongst pro-unemployed actors to reach the top level of the policy domain and gradual detachment of the beneficiaries (the unemployed themselves) at the bottom of the public domain. To complete the analysis of inter-organisational networks, Fig. 2 includes a graphical representation of the web of ties of disagreement between all the actors which have been interviewed, that is, the nodes of the figure. Each tie between two nodes indicates the existence (and the direction) of a relationship of disagreement between a pair of them. It is clear that this network has lower density when compared to the previous web of co-operative ties, due to the fact that a higher

number of organisations have avoided to foster relationships of disagreement with other actors in the field.

### ***5.3. Action forms of actors***

The British national context in terms of action forms is considered to be traditionally more pacified than other European national contexts. As regards the unemployment field, ideological and class conflicts are expressed particularly through competition of organised interests, rather than through direct mass participation and disruptive protest. Direct action in the specific field of unemployment has been used at times during the 1980s and early 1990s, when large mass marches for jobs took place throughout the UK. Yet, it is rather accurate to say that there has been little visible direct protest on this issue during the last ten years, with only limited action initiated by organisations of the unemployed themselves. In addition, the data show that different types of actors make use of a wide repertoire of techniques, with the only exception of court actions. Table 13 sums up the range of strategies that actors use across the public and policy domains. Policy-makers rely on media-related strategies to inform the general public, while they use strategies to directly inform the public to reach practitioners. They can also hire public relations firms, run advertisements, and poll the public. Intermediary actors and non-governmental organisations make a crucial use of their good access to policy-makers, engaging in a good range of techniques to target policy-makers, either directly (lobbying politicians and co-operating with public officials) or indirectly (relying on media-strategies and providing research for consultation).

### ***5.4. The role of the unemployed within unemployment policies***

Although table 13 shows a fair use of strategies which aim to mobilise the public, a more detailed examination of our data indicates that these strategies are often based on techniques which consist merely in direct mail fund-raising. The data show, in fact, that within the public domain all the actors make only a very limited use of protest, with the only exception of a particular unemployed organisation, namely, the Network of Unemployed Centres Combine. In sum, while they have been the objects of crucial restrictive reforms, the unemployed have generally shown only limited capability for direct action. They have engaged in protests against government throughout the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, but they have not voiced their claims beyond the local level during the last decade, mobilising only occasionally and as result of specific industrial disputes. The British unemployed have thus relied on the direct support of pro-unemployed organisations, which have put on the side the recourse to protest action and fully engaged in activities of information, research, dissemination, lobbying, consultation and co-operation with policy-makers.

Certainly, the National Unemployed Centres Combine (CC) also campaigns directly on behalf of the unemployed, linking together various local ‘unemployed workers centres’ across the UK. CC stands out as the main organisation which actually involves unemployed people in its own organisational activities, working for the bottom-up promotion of their interest rather than for the elaboration of top-down solutions to tackle unemployment. Nevertheless, it is crucial to emphasise that this organisation has increasingly reduced scope and intensity of its action since the mid-1990s, facing some major obstacles in promoting the direct involvement of the unemployed. In particular, its network of local centres has gradually shrunk due to increasing funding constraints, halt of street protest, and new political conditions, which have forced groups to demobilise, strengthen their links with the unions, and to adapt to

government strategies.<sup>1</sup> While some of these centres have dealt with the restrictive legislation of three successive New Right governments,<sup>2</sup> other centres have decided to support actively government policies since the election of New Labour in 1997.<sup>3</sup> CC has then worked to strengthen its ties with trade unions, churches and other civil society organisations in order to fill in its distance from the main policy-makers.<sup>4</sup>

### ***5.5. The role of the EU in political deliberation***

Drawing on widespread theses of Europeanisation, trans-nationalisation, and globalisation of social and political processes, it is crucial to assess the extent to which the ongoing processes of European integration and increasing relevance of EU institutions in the field of unemployment policy is linked to strategies and decisions of national actors. A crucial point of this report consists in the analysis of actors across national public and policy domains in order to provide an empirical assessment of contemporary processes of trans-nationalisation, and in particular, Europeanisation. Table 14 sums up the range of strategies that British actors use at the EU level. Following a pattern which is similar to that of table 13 (action repertoire at the national level) the data show that intermediary actors and NGOs employ a good range of techniques to target policy-makers, either directly (lobbying politicians and co-operating with public officials) or indirectly (relying on media-strategies and providing research for consultation). However, two crucial differences should be noticed between distributions of action forms at the national level and EU level across different categories of actors. First, table 14 shows that organisations of the unemployed themselves are almost inactive at the EU level. The only exception consists in some limited action carried out by the Network of Unemployed Centres Combine. The second difference consists in the distribution of 'regular' and 'occasional' forms of actions which are employed. Tables 13 and 14 present aggregate data of both 'regular' and 'occasional' forms of action, but it is important to highlight that many of them are used regularly at the national level and only occasionally at the EU level, as well as the smaller size of action at the EU level. Table 14 also indicates that local actors are proportionally more active in contributing to political campaigns and mobilising the public.

In general, most interviewees are quite sure that the EU is playing an (increasingly) active role in the unemployment field, especially on the specific issue of job creation. Many local actors, for example, have debated at length both the negative and positive aspects of the direct intervention of the EU within the area of Barnsley through programmes such as 'Objective 1' and the 'Territorial Employment Pacts'. It should be emphasised, however, that a substantial number of organisations are explicitly against an increase in European influence in

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<sup>1</sup> Although several centres have continued to engage regularly in forms of mobilisation under the direction of CC, the last significant episodes of direct protest were organised in 1995, when three marches were organised to protest against the introduction of the 'job seekers allowance' by the Conservative government. One took place between Newcastle and Sheffield; another took place between Liverpool and Sheffield; while a local march was organised between Derby and Sheffield.

<sup>2</sup> Accordingly, these centres became providers of services to the unemployed rather than offering the means to organise and mobilise them per se.

<sup>3</sup> For example, the old 'unemployment centre' in Sheffield has changed its name in Centre for Full Employment'. It has accepted to co-operate with the New Labour government in supporting programmes that re-engage unemployed people back into the labour market. In particular, the centre for full employment has taken active part in the Intermediate Labour Market (ILM), employing hundreds of people in project of community value and creating work in the third sector of the economy.

<sup>4</sup> At the end of 2003, for example, postcards reporting article 23 of the UN declaration of Human Rights (stating free choice of employment) were sent to each MP at Westminster, while a CC leader participated to the annual TUC conference in order to lobby on the issue of unemployment benefits and welfare reform.

unemployment politics, as our data in table 15 seem to suggest. In fact, as regards future developments, other data in table 16 indicate that actors are evenly split between those who believe that the role of the EU will increase on the one hand, and those who think that the role of the EU will not be changing on the other. Only few actors think that the role of the EU will become less important compared to the national level. In sum, it is clear that many actors believe that national sovereignties are dealing with an ongoing process of integration which might foster further EU intervention in the wider field of social policy. The very fact that this process appears to be difficult to control is a crucial element which reinforces actors' opposition to an increase in European influence.

## 6. Résumé and conclusion

Focusing on the most relevant findings of this report, it should firstly be emphasised that in the UK public debates over unemployment politics deal with the position of workers or labour groups who are in a position of precarious employment more than with the conditions and position of the unemployed constituencies themselves. Making the distinction between these two types of beneficiaries – 'workers threatened by unemployment' vs. the 'unemployed' – was a useful distinction for the analysis. In addition, it should be highlighted that we have found no clear relationship between objective levels of unemployment and the level of public debates over unemployment.

It appears that in the UK political contention over unemployment issues is generally declining over the period as debates have become pacified. This process of pacification is not directly traceable to a decline in unemployment, but to political factors, and the weakness of the movement of the unemployed and the labour movement mobilising on behalf of the unemployed. In the unemployment field, state policy responsiveness and co-optative strategies of policy-makers have discouraged the employment of visible political action in the public domain, strengthening the role of small specialist organisations that target relevant policy-makers. Indeed, the definite demise of the unemployed protest movement in the public domain has occurred at the same time when the New Labour has taken on responsibility for government. Not only has this 'opening up' of institutional channels of access led pro-unemployed organisations to strengthen their direct forms of institutional involvement in the political process, but it has attracted a wider range of voluntary organisations willing to seize the new resources, and whose input has further weakened the direct efforts of groups of unemployed.

The major conflict lines in British unemployment politics appear to come within the category of socio-economic issues relating to the labour market. Many issues over unemployment are about macro-economic issues which exclude state activities, and these tend to go against the interests of the unemployed. A key component was that a quarter of all demands were about dismissals which of course are strongly against the interests of workers and the unemployed. In the UK a considerable proportion of the debate about unemployment is constructed by economic issues that occur beyond the state's activities and responsibilities. The UK appears to a large extent to be dominated by a free market type discourse focussed on macro-economic issues which shapes the way in which issues about unemployed are mobilised in the public domain. However, there is still some debate about the role of the state within the economy. Overall there is a line of cleavage in the British debate over unemployment regarding the extent to which and how the state should intervene into the economy for the unemployed.

Both claims-making and interview data show that the unemployed are more the ‘objects’ of political discourse and intervention on their condition, and do not feature significantly as protagonists. Indeed, the identification and contact with groups of unemployed was itself a problematic step of the research. State and executive actors dominate political debates and intervention on issues of unemployment, while civil society organisations such as research institutes and think tanks supply the government with information on the topic. Similarly, political parties seem to focus ‘pragmatically’ on the issue of unemployment, avoiding its over-politicisation and deep ‘ideological’ party competition. The unemployment field thus emerges as a very nationalised, centralised and institutionalised political space. All interviewees have mentioned only a very small number of organisations as influential actors, and in particular, the Department for Work and Pension, the Treasury, and the Job Centre Plus. Intermediary actors, welfare organisations and groups of unemployed play only a minor role. The importance of national and central policy-makers has been confirmed by the evaluation of actors’ networks. Indeed, the general trend is that non-governmental organisations are in regular contact with policy-makers, engaging in a direct relationship with institutional actors in order to gain some efficient means to influence formulation, implementation and development of policy.

The role of the EU level is somewhat limited when compared to the national level. We did find some evidence for Europeanisation, with EU actors making demands in the British public domain, but these were as likely to be against the interests of the unemployed as for them. According to our data, political debates and action over unemployment remain for the most part a national affair. There is no clear evidence for an increase in the Europeanisation of the public debates over unemployment, either by an increase in EU actors in the national public sphere, in more issues with an EU frame of reference, or by the EU being increasingly called upon to politically respond. Furthermore, it is crucial to emphasise that if the EU plays a part within the British unemployment field, this is mainly through the action of intermediary actors and policy-makers. In fact, the European dimension seems to play a minor role also from the perspective of non-governmental organisations, which focus mainly at the national level since this is considered to be the central locus where unemployment policy is formulated.



## 7. Appendices

### 7.1. Tables

**Table 1: Constituencies of ‘the unemployed’ whose perceived interests are affected by acts of political claims-making, Britain 1995-2002**

	%	N
<b>Workers’ and Labour force organisations and groups</b>	<b>56.1</b>	<b>421</b>
Working poor	2.4	18
Illegal workers	0.1	1
Employees’/workers’ groups (facing prospective or actual employment)	36.8	276
Other unspecified workers, employees, (facing prospective or actual employment)	16.8	126
<b>Unemployed organisations and groups</b>	<b>43.9</b>	<b>329</b>
Young unemployed	8.9	67
Old unemployed	0.8	6
Women unemployed	1.5	11
Migrant/ethnic minority unemployed	2.3	17
Disabled unemployed	3.1	23
Long term unemployed	2.3	17
Social welfare recipients among unemployed	1.7	13
Other unspecified unemployed	23.3	175
<b>ALL</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>750</b>

**Table 2: Level of Political Claims- making Over Time by Year – UK 1995-2002 (8 years)**

Year	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	All	N
<b>Share of all claims (%)</b>	<b>13.7</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>18.5</b>	<b>7.2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>750</b>
Workers facing Unemployment constituency	8.6	9.0	5.9	12.6	29.9	5.5	24.7	3.8	100.0	421
Unemployed constituency	20.4	4.0	21.0	10.9	13.1	8.5	10.6	11.6	100.0	329
<b>Unemployment rate* (%)</b>	<b>9.8</b>	<b>9.0</b>	<b>7.7</b>	<b>7.0</b>	<b>6.7</b>	<b>6.0</b>	<b>5.6</b>	<b>-</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>N/A</b>

Average number of claims-making acts per annum is 93.75 (12.5% of total)

\*Figures from Labour Force survey (See British National Template p. )

**Table 3: Collective Actors' Share in Political Claims-making by Type, and by Constituency of the Unemployed**

<b>%</b>	<b>Share in All Claims</b>	<b>Share in Claims (Workers' Constituency)</b>	<b>Share in Claims (Unemployed Constituency)</b>
<b>State and Executive</b>	<b>35.3</b>	20.7	54.1
<b>Political Party</b>	<b>4.5</b>	4.5	4.6
<b>Private Companies</b>	<b>19.7</b>	33.3	2.4
<b>Employers' associations</b>	<b>5.5</b>	6.7	4.0
<b>Trade Unions</b>	<b>16.7</b>	22.8	8.8
<b>NGOs for Unemployed</b>	<b>0.8</b>	0.0	1.8
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>0.5</b>	1.0	0.0
<b>Other Civil Society</b>	<b>16.9</b>	11.2	24.3
<b>All Actors</b>	<b>100.0</b>	100.0	100.0
<b>N</b>	<b>750</b>	421	329

**Table 4: Collective Actors' Average Position on 'the Unemployed', by Actor type, and by Constituency of Unemployed**

%	Average Position in All Claims (-1 to +1)	Average Position in Claims (-1 to +1) (Workers' Constituency)	Average Position in Claims (-1 to +1) (Unemployed Constituency)
<b>Private Companies</b>	<b>-0.77</b>	<b>-0.84</b>	<b>+0.50</b>
<b>Employers' Associations</b>	<b>-0.12</b>	<b>-0.14</b>	<b>-0.08</b>
<b>State and Executive</b>	<b>+0.39</b>	<b>+0.37</b>	<b>+0.40</b>
<b>Other Civil society</b>	<b>+0.57</b>	<b>+0.55</b>	<b>+0.58</b>
<b>Political Party</b>	<b>+0.68</b>	<b>+0.79</b>	<b>+0.53</b>
<b>Trade Unions</b>	<b>+0.74</b>	<b>+0.72</b>	<b>+0.79</b>
<b>NGOs for Unemployed</b>	<b>+0.83</b>	<b>N/A</b>	<b>+0.83</b>
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>+1.00</b>	<b>+1.00</b>	<b>N/A</b>
<b>All Actors</b>	<b>+0.24</b>	<b>+0.06</b>	<b>+0.47</b>
<b>N</b>	<b>750</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>329</b>

**Table 5: Issues raised by Claims-making in Unemployment Politics, and average position of the issue to the interests of the unemployed (-1 against, to +1 for)**

	%	Average Position to Constituency	N
<b>Socio-Economic Issues Relating to Labour Market</b>	<b>77.5</b>	<b>-0.17</b>	<b>581</b>
<i>Macro Economic Issues (Non state)</i>	41.7	-0.10	313
Economic change/competiveness (sectoral)	3.9	-0.10	29
Economic change/competiveness (regional)	2.3	+0.65	17
Social dialogue	2.8	+0.90	21
Dismissals (not including state action)	25.9	-0.36	194
<i>Economic Development/Promotion Policy</i>	18.7	+0.43	140
Liberalization, flexibility	3.1	+0.22	23
Economic effects of monetary policies on national economy	5.2	+0.38	39
State subsidies to companies	2.1	+0.25	16
<i>State Policy Relating to the Labour Market</i>	9.5	+0.49	71
<i>State Policy Relating to the Labour Force</i>	2.4	+0.78	18
<i>Working Conditions</i>	1.3	-0.10	10
<i>Targeted/Group Specific Employment Measures</i>	3.9	+0.62	29
<b>Welfare Systems and Social Benefits</b>	<b>7.5</b>	<b>+0.43</b>	<b>56</b>
<i>Unemployment-Insurance System</i>	2.1	+0.44	16
<i>Social Aid/Assistance</i>	4.9	+0.41	37
Minimum Wage/Basic income	2.4	+0.28	18
<i>Other</i>	0.4	N/A	3
<b>(Re)Insertion into the Labour Market</b>	<b>12.5</b>	<b>+0.56</b>	<b>94</b>
<i>Active Measures of (Re)Insertion</i>	9.6	+0.55	72
Targeted/Group specific (re)insertion measures	7.5	+0.50	56
<i>Training and development for unemployed</i>	2.5	+0.53	19
<i>Educational Issues</i>	0.4	N/A	3
<b>Issues Relating to Constituency of Unemployed</b>	<b>1.2</b>	<b>+0.44</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Other Issues</b>	<b>1.3</b>	<b>+0.30</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>All</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>+0.24</b>	<b>750</b>

**Table 6: Addressees of Political Claims-making over Unemployment, and by Constituency of Unemployed**

%	All Actors	Workers' Constituency	Unemployed Constituency
<b>State and Executive</b>	<b>66.2</b>	53.9	83.0
<b>Political Party</b>	<b>2.5</b>	1.8	3.6
<b>Private Companies</b>	<b>19.1</b>	30.7	3.0
<b>Employers' Associations</b>	<b>1.0</b>	0.4	1.8
<b>Trade Unions</b>	<b>4.1</b>	6.1	1.2
<b>Other Civil Society</b>	<b>7.1</b>	7.0	7.3
<b>All Addressees</b>	<b>100.0</b>	100.0	100.0
<b>N</b>	<b>393</b>	228	165

Proportion of claims-making acts with addressee 52.4%

**Table 7: Addressee of Political Claims-making over Unemployment by Scope**

%	Regional and Local	National	European	Supra-transnational Noneuropean	Unspecified
State and Executive	1.8	58.8	4.6	1.0	0.0
Political Party	0.5	2.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Private Companies	1.5	10.7	1.5	5.1	0.3
Employers' Associations	0.0	0.5	0.3	0.0	0.3
Trade Unions	1.0	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
Other Civil Society	1.5	4.1	0.0	1.0	0.5
<b>All Addressees</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>79.1</b>	<b>6.4</b>	<b>7.1</b>	<b>1.0</b>

Proportion of claims-making acts with addressee 52.4%  
N is 393

**Table 8: Scope of Collective Actors making Claims over Unemployment, and Average Position by Scope**

%	Regional and local	National	European	Supra-transnational (Noneuropean)	Scope Unspecified	N
<b>All Actors</b>	<b>8.6</b>	<b>75.5</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>8.4</b>	<b>2.7</b>	<b>750</b>
<b>State and Executive</b>	<b>6.8</b>	<b>80.8</b>	<b>5.7</b>	<b>3.0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>265</b>
<b>All Non-State and Executive</b>	<b>7.4</b>	<b>72.6</b>	<b>4.5</b>	<b>11.3</b>	<b>4.1</b>	<b>485</b>
Political Party	17.6	82.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	34
Private Companies	5.4	49.3	6.8	34.5	4.1	148
Employers' Associations	2.4	90.2	4.9	2.4	0.0	41
Trade Unions	8.8	76.0	6.4	0.8	7.2	125
NGOs for Unemployed	40.0	60.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	10
Other Civil Society	4.7	89.0	1.6	0.8	3.9	127
<b>All Actors Average Position</b>	<b>+0.61</b>	<b>+0.31</b>	<b>-0.08</b>	<b>-0.57</b>	<b>+0.30</b>	<b>+0.24</b>

**Table 9: Geographical Scope of Claims-making Actors, Institutional Addressees, and Issues over time (1995-2002)**

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	All
<b>EU actor scope</b>	6.9	0.0	4.4	10.2	3.5	2.0	5.1	7.5	<b>5.1</b>
<b>Supra/International (Non EU) actor scope</b>	4.0	5.9	11.0	10.2	11.4	7.8	8.8	5.7	<b>8.6</b>
N	101	51	91	88	158	51	136	53	729
<b>EU issue scope</b>	4.9	5.9	5.4	10.1	4.9	5.9	1.4	11.1	<b>5.5</b>
<b>Supra/International (Non EU) issue scope</b>	0.0	3.9	1.1	6.7	2.5	0.0	0.7	3.7	<b>1.3</b>
N	103	51	93	89	163	51	139	54	753
<b>EU addressee scope</b>	7.2	0.0	6.1	7.5	4.9	0.0	8.8	16.7	<b>6.3</b>
<b>Supra/International (Non EU) addressee Scope</b>	0.0	8.3	8.2	11.3	1.9	3.4	17.5	4.2	<b>6.6</b>
N	55	24	49	53	103	29	57	24	394

**Table 10: Distribution of interviewees across actor categories and national/local location<sup>5</sup>**

	<b>National</b>	<b>Local</b>
<b>Policy Actors</b>	3	2
<b>Intermediary</b>	5	4
<b>NGOs</b>	16	4
<b>Unemployed Organisations</b>	1	4
<b>Total</b>	25	14

**Table 11A: List of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor type (multiple options)**

	<b>Policy</b>	<b>Interm.</b>	<b>NGOs</b>	<b>Unemp.</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>HM Treasury</b>	4	11	17	4	36
<b>Department of Work and Pensions</b>	5	8	16	3	32
<b>Jobcentre Plus</b>	4	8	15	3	30
<b>Labour Party</b>	1	11	13	3	28
<b>Local Jobcentre Plus Offices</b>	3	8	12	2	25
<b>The Joseph Rowntree Foundation</b>	3	7	13	1	24
<b>Trades Union Congress</b>	3	5	11	3	22
<b>European Commission</b>	4	6	10	1	21
<b>Institute for Public Policy Research</b>	2	5	12	1	20
<b>Confederation of British Industry</b>	1	5	11	2	19

**Table 11B: List of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor location (multiple options)**

	<b>National</b>	<b>Local</b>	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>HM Treasury</b>	24	12	36
<b>Department of Work and Pensions</b>	23	9	32
<b>Jobcentre Plus</b>	22	8	30
<b>Labour Party</b>	16	12	28
<b>Local Jobcentre Plus Offices</b>	17	8	25
<b>The Joseph Rowntree Foundation</b>	17	7	24
<b>Trades Union Congress</b>	16	6	22
<b>European Commission</b>	15	6	21
<b>The Institute for Public Policy Research</b>	14	6	20
<b>Confederation of British Industry</b>	16	3	19

<sup>5</sup> See Appendix 3 for a complete list of interviewed actors (and abbreviations).

**Table 12A: The ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor type**

	Policy	Interm.	NGOs	Unemp.	TOTAL
<b>Department of Work and Pensions</b>	1	7	12	2	22
<b>HM Treasury</b>	1	7	10	1	19
<b>Labour Party</b>	0	7	7	4	18
<b>Department of Trade and Industry</b>	1	7	7	1	16
<b>Jobcentre Plus</b>	1	5	9	1	16
<b>Trades Union Congress</b>	3	3	7	1	14
<b>European Commission</b>	2	5	4	1	12
<b>Liberal Democrats</b>	0	6	4	2	12
<b>Local Authorities</b>	0	4	6	2	12
<b>Conservative Party</b>	0	3	6	2	11
<b>European Parliament (MEPs)</b>	2	6	2	1	11
<b>Local Jobcentre Plus Offices</b>	0	3	7	1	11

**Table 12B: The ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor location**

	National	Local	TOTAL
<b>Department of Work and Pensions</b>	16	6	22
<b>HM Treasury</b>	16	3	19
<b>Labour Party</b>	11	7	18
<b>Department of Trade and Industry</b>	12	4	16
<b>Jobcentre Plus</b>	14	2	16
<b>Trades Union Congress</b>	11	3	14
<b>European Commission</b>	9	3	12
<b>Liberal Democrats</b>	7	5	12
<b>Local Authorities</b>	8	4	12
<b>Conservative Party</b>	9	2	11
<b>European Parliament (MEPs)</b>	8	3	11
<b>Local Jobcentre Plus Offices</b>	7	4	11

**Table 13: Distribution of action form categories expressed in standardised form by actor scope**

Action form	Policy actor		Intermediary		NGOs		Unemployed	
	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local
<b>Media related</b>	.6	.6	.92	.7	.78	.7	.6	.33
<b>Informing the public</b>	.58	.5	.68	.7	.45	.3	.4	0
<b>Negotiating/lobbying</b>	.88	1	1	1	.87	.83	1	.66
<b>Consultation</b>	1	.66	.85	.31	.84	.56	.75	.33
<b>Court-action</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Political campaigns</b>	n/a	n/a	.33	.66	.04	0	0	0
<b>Mobilizing the public</b>	n/a	n/a	.42	.43	.07	.21	.62	0



**Tab. 14: Distribution of EU action form categories expressed in standardised form by actor scope**

Action form	Policy actor		Intermediary		NGOs		Unemployed	
	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local
<b>Media related</b>	.26	.5	.84	.5	.25	0.1	.06	0
<b>Informing the public</b>	.33	.2	.36	.36	.08	.05	0.2	0
<b>Negotiating/lobbying</b>	.55	0	1	.25	.47	.33	.66	0
<b>Consultation</b>	.77	.16	.65	.12	.34	.25	0	0
<b>Court-action</b>	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Political campaigns</b>	n/a	n/a	.26	.25	.02	0	0	0
<b>Mobilizing the public</b>	n/a	n/a	0.1	.28	.007	0	.25	0

**Table 15. Support for an increase in European influence by actor type**

	In favour	Against	Missing <sup>6</sup>
<b>Policy Actors</b>	1	2	2
<b>Intermediary</b>	4	4	1
<b>NGOs</b>	8	6	6


**Table 16. Estimated future importance of EU policies by actor type**

	Increasing	Unchanged	Decreasing	Missing
<b>Policy Actors</b>	2	2	0	1
<b>Intermediary</b>	4	2	2	1
<b>NGOs</b>	8	8	2	2


<sup>6</sup> A high number of missing values indicates that our interviewees could not tell anything about the position of their organisation. Interviewees were at times simultaneously in favour and against different aspects of European influence.

## 7.2. Figures

**Figure 1: Inter-organisational Relationships of Co-Operation within the Unemployment Field**



**Figure 2: Inter-Organisational Relationships of Disagreement within the Unemployment Field**



### 7.3. List of Interviewed Actors (and abbreviations)

1. Barnsley Council (LocCoun.)
2. Department for Work and Pension (DWP)
3. Department for Trade and Industry (DTI)
4. Jobcentre Plus – Barnsley (JCPloc)
5. Treasury (Treas.)
6. Catholic Hallam (C.Ch.loc)
7. Confederation British Industry (CBI)
8. Church of England (P.Ch.loc)
9. Conservative Party – Barnsley (CPloc)
10. Conservative Party (CP)
11. Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)
12. Labour Party – Barnsley (LPloc)
13. Liberal Democrats (LD)
14. Liberal Democrats – Barnsley (LDloc)
15. Trade Unions Congress (TUC)
16. TUC Yorkshire (TUCloc)
17. Adam Smith Institute (ASI)
18. Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG)
19. Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion (CESI)
20. Citizens Advice Bureau – Barnsley (CABloc)
21. Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB)
22. Employment Opportunities (EO)
23. Fabian Society (FS)
24. Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA)
25. Institute of Employment Studies (IES)
26. Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF)
27. National Youth Agency (NYA)
28. New Policy Institute (NPI)
29. One Parent Family (OPF)
30. National Training Organisation (PAULO)
31. Policy Studies Institute (PSI)
32. Work Foundation (WF)
33. Tommorrow's People (TP)
34. Yorkshire Forward (YF)
35. Centre For Full Employment (CFE)
36. Churches Unemployment Group (CUG)
37. Network of Unemployed Centres Combine (CC)
38. Together for Regeneration (TfR)
39. Vicar Marshall

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## **The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

### **Chapter 4: Final Report for Switzerland**

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#### Table of contents

1. Introduction
2. Basic parameters of the Swiss policy approach
  - 2.1 Historical background and classification of the Swiss welfare state
  - 2.2. General overview of the Swiss political system
3. Unemployment and public policy
  - 3.1. Structure of the Swiss labor market
  - 3.2. The unemployment situation in Switzerland
  - 3.3. Actors in the employment policy field
  - 3.4. National policy instruments to fight unemployment
    - 3.4.1. Passive measures
    - 3.4.2. Actives measures
4. Public discourse on unemployment: the claims-making data
  - 4.1 Basic outline of newspaper analysis
  - 4.2. Media coverage of the Swiss situation
  - 4.3. Public actors: who is involved in the media discourse
  - 4.4. Argumentative structure of the public discourse
    - 4.4.1. Thematic foci: issues of claims
    - 4.4.2. Frames
    - 4.4.3. Targets of claims
    - 4.4.4. Forms of claims
  - 4.5. Role of the unemployed in the public discourse
    - 4.5.1. Probability that a claim aims the unemployed as first object
    - 4.5.2. Probability that a claim has a positive discursive position towards unemployed
  - 4.6. Role of the EU in the public discourse
5. Political deliberation in the field of labor market policies
  - 5.1 Interviews with the main actors
  - 5.2. Organizational networks
  - 5.3. Forms of action
  - 5.4. Role of the unemployed
  - 5.5. Role of the EU
6. Conclusion
7. Appendix : List of interviewed actors

## 1. Introduction

Compared to other European countries, Switzerland has only recently been confronted with the phenomena of unemployment. Until the early 1990s, the Swiss labor market was in a situation of nearly full employment, with an unemployment rate below 1%. This low unemployment rate was partly due to anticyclical employment policies based on foreign workers and women who had been pushed out of or who had withdrawn themselves from the labor market during the economic downturn. Changes in immigration policies and a better integration of women in the labor market made those practices no longer applicable during the recession of the 1990s and thus a much larger part of the population was affected by unemployment. The unemployment rate in Switzerland rose to 4.1%<sup>7</sup> in 2004, and was characterized by large regional differences.

In parallel to the unemployment rate rise, joblessness became a major issue in the public debate, thus implicating institutional, economic and civil society actors. Policy reforms in the domain of unemployment have been undertaken on several occasions, and we can observe a shift in policy orientation and philosophy over the last decade. At the individual level, the fear of becoming affected by unemployment rose as well. In a survey conducted in 2003, unemployment was quoted as the main worry of the Swiss population<sup>8</sup>.

The UNEMPOL research project aims to analyze the public debate of labor market politics by focusing on the contentious politics of unemployment, i.e. the relationship between political institutional approaches to employment policy and political conflicts mobilized by collective actors concerning unemployment in the public domain. It analyzes the ideological and policy positions of the actors and their relationships, taking a specific look at the type of participation the people excluded from the labor market take in the debate.

This report aims to synthesize the main findings of this research in the Swiss case and to reconstruct the public debate on the contentious politics of unemployment in Switzerland. The first part of the report provides a basis to assess the political opportunity structure in the domain of unemployment in Switzerland. Its aim is to give an overview on the political (chapter 2), socio-economic, legal and organizational (chapter 3) aspects of the issue.

The remainder of the report is devoted to presenting the main research results based on the two main primary datasets gathered during project. First (chapter 4), we have studied the media coverage of the public debates on unemployment by presenting the results of the claims-making data collected from a major Swiss newspaper, the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*. Second (chapter 5), we have analyzed the multi-organizational field by presenting the data collected throughout interviews conducted with 42 key actors in the field of unemployment, including core policy actors, intermediary organizations as well as civil society organizations and social movements representing the unemployed. The conclusion (chapter 6) summarizes the main research findings.

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<sup>7</sup> Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2005): Swiss Labor Force Survey 2004.

<sup>8</sup> “Arbeitslosigkeit macht zunehmend Kummer”. In: NZZ Nr. 292, 16.12.2003.

## **2. Basic parameters of the Swiss policy approach**

In order to create a frame for a better understanding of the current debates and reforms in the domain of unemployment policy, we will focus, in the following two chapters of this report, on the political opportunity structures, the situation in the Swiss labor market and the evolution of unemployment as well as on the institutions and actors dealing with unemployment policies and their established policy instruments and strategies. This overview of the development of the Swiss welfare and political system in general provides a basis for international comparisons.

### ***2.1 Historical background and classification of the Swiss welfare state***

The development of the welfare system took place in Switzerland later than in other European countries. The first institutions for national social security were created in the 1960s. Until then, social security was dealt with at the local level, through voluntary actions and private insurance systems. A real welfare state, responsible for all citizens and not only for the marginal needful population, one that plays an active and not only a reactive role, was only developed in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. According to Armingeon (2001: 154), if Switzerland did not establish a welfare state at the same time as the other European countries, it was simply because it did not need one at that time. Indeed, Switzerland has not known the massive urbanization due to industrialization nor the pauperization which this involves. The local social assistance networks had not broken up as fast as elsewhere. The existence and strength of these networks have significantly slowed down the creation of a social security system at the federal level. On the other hand, Switzerland witnessed a growing economy without crises until 1970 and unemployment remained very low until then.

In general, the Swiss social policy is very static as reforms take a long time to find a way through the federal structure and the procedures of direct democracy. Unemployment policies are an example of the late development of welfare policies: a basis for a mandatory unemployment insurance was included in the Constitution in 1975 and the related legislation was implemented in 1982. Important changes in legislation and practice occurred in the 1990s, when the unemployment rate rose significantly and the social security system was subject to economic pressure.

Despite its late start, Switzerland now displays an advanced welfare state, comparable to the continental European welfare state type, with strong liberal traits (Armingeon 2001; Merrien 2000). The Swiss welfare state can be considered to belong to the continental model because of the introduction of a major compulsory welfare system for retired people as well as a compulsory health and unemployment insurance. Contributions to these social systems are not tax-based, benefits are to a large extent related to contributions and the model of the male wage earner dominates the social schemes. Strong liberal tendencies are observed in the so-called second and third pension pillars and the health insurance systems. The administration of these institutions is left to compete with private organizations and is therefore strongly market-oriented.

### ***2.2. General overview of the Swiss political system***

The Swiss political system is mainly based on two fundamental institutions: Federalism, which gives a great autonomy to the 26 cantons (the administrative units), and the instruments of direct democracy. The decision making process is characterized by compromises which

allow the coexistence of the four cultures founding the Confederation as well as its different interest groups.

Federalism: following the principle of subsidiarity, the cantons handle all the competencies which are not specifically attributed to the federal state. All competency transfers towards the national level require a constitutional revision. Switzerland is hence a very decentralized democracy with a weak national state. The development of the social security system is very much influenced by this structure. The cantons have developed different practices. Social aid, for example, is still part of the competence of the cantons. The weak federal state has difficulties in imposing a uniform solution. All legislative changes at the national level require a two step process: in a first act, the competence has to be given to the Federal State before the latter can legislate on a specific issue (Obinger 1999). Also, from the fiscal point of view, the federal state is weak: a major portion of the taxes goes to the communes and cantons. Without a fiscal revision, the federal state does not have the financial means to put up a costly social insurance.

The legislation is largely influenced by the instruments of direct democracy, which are the popular initiative, the compulsory referendum for all modifications of the Constitution and the facultative referendum, which enables citizens to react to legislative changes. The latter is the core institution of direct democracy “as it provides the general public with an immediate voice in policy issues” (Immergut 1992: 192) and “transforms the plebiscite democracy into a negotiation democracy” (Neidhart, quoted in Kriesi 1998: 100). The threat of a referendum weakens the parliament as it introduces an element of uncertainty into the policy process. Even if a majority of the parliament representatives agree on a change of legislation, the conditions for the consensus may be destroyed when the discussion enters the electoral arena. So, from the start of a legislative draft, the opinion of the opposition needs to be taken into account, in order to find a broad acceptance within the population. This provides a lot of influence to well-organized interest groups who are either consulted in the preparatory phase of the legislation or can influence the process by launching a referendum. This last right can also block innovations, as it is often organized by interest groups which wish to preserve the status quo. In the field of social policy, the political left, to give a new direction to the social policy, has often used the instrument of the popular referendum. The initiative is a means to bring up an issue without passing by the pre-parliamentary consultation process, where the financially strong employer organizations have a dominant position. Even if none of these initiatives has ever been finally accepted by the plebiscite, they have had an influence on the setting of the political agenda.

### **3. Unemployment and public policy**

For a long period after World War Two, Switzerland was in a situation of nearly full employment. Bonoli and Mach (2001) point out that the low unemployment rate of the country was due to anticyclical policies that were based on foreign labor force and women, two categories which were pressed out of the labor market when the economic situation worsened. Since the abolition of the seasonal working permit and the development of a better integration of women in the labor market<sup>9</sup>, this solution can no longer be applied. The economic crisis of the 1990s also affected the labor market in Switzerland, where, for the first time, the unemployment phenomena reached larger parts of the population. Even if the recent

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<sup>9</sup> Since the 1970s, women’s participation in the Swiss labour market has increased steadily. The Swiss employment /population ration is today one of the highest among OECD countries.



peak rise of the unemployment rate to 4.1%<sup>10</sup> in 1997 and 4.3% in 2004<sup>11</sup> is still very low compared to other OCDE countries, unemployment has become a major issue in Switzerland and is, according to GfS-research institute in 2003, a major worry to number of Swiss citizens<sup>12</sup>.

### ***3.1. Structure of the Swiss labor market***

Apart from the very low level of unemployment, a number of characteristics relating to the labor market may have an impact on the situation with regard to unemployment in Switzerland. First of all, Switzerland has a liberal and flexible labor market with very few regulatory frameworks. Secondly, the compromises between export-oriented and domestic producers have contributed to the creation of a two-scale labor market: One is orientated towards exportation and is highly competitive. On the other hand there exists a well-protected home market (Bonoli and Mach 2001). Thirdly, the unionization rate is very low. Switzerland has a tradition of cooperation and negotiation between social partners, the so-called labor peace, reached in 1937 between worker's organizations and trade unions. According to this principle, all means of struggle, such as strikes and lockouts are prohibited during the period when collective conventions are in force (Kriesi 1998: 621). Also, working conditions and wages are negotiated between the social partners without intervention of the state.

With 79% of economically active persons aged between 15 and 64 in 2001, Switzerland has a high employment rate<sup>13</sup> (OECD 2002). Since the late 1970s, the employment rate of women is raising and, in 2001, reached a level of 70.4%. But the model of the male wage earner is still very widely spread throughout Switzerland and women are more likely to work part time than men.

### ***3.2. The unemployment situation in Switzerland***

Switzerland, compared to other European countries, has a very short unemployment history. Until the 1990s the Swiss labor market was in a situation of nearly full employment, with less than 1% of the active population registered as unemployed. The unemployment situation changed from 1991 onwards, when the general declining economic situation also affected the Swiss labor market. In 1991, 68'000 persons were unemployed (according to Swiss Labor Force Survey), which corresponds to 1.8% of the active population. A first peak of unemployed was reached in 1997, when 162'000 persons were without a job (4.1%). After a short period of economic recovery, the number of unemployed rose again and reached, in 2004, the highest level so far (unemployment rate of 4.3%).

While the unemployment rate generally rose from 1991 to 2004 in all regions of Switzerland, the French and Italian speaking part were especially affected by the economic crisis. Young

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<sup>10</sup> To insure the international comparability of the unemployment rates, we use subsequently the data collected by the means of the Swiss Labour Force Survey which is conducted by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office and defines unemployment according to the recommendations of the OECD. ("Is unemployed the person aged between 15 and 74 who as not employed during the reference week and was actively looking for a job during the four weeks preceding the reference week and would be able to start working in the four weeks following the reference week?").

<sup>11</sup> Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2005): Swiss Labour Force Survey 2004.

<sup>12</sup> Arbeitslosigkeit macht zunehmend Kummer". In: NZZ Nr. 292. 16.12.2003.

<sup>13</sup> Employment rate according to the OECD: Ratio refers to person aged 15 to 64 years who are in employment divided by the working age population.

people, women, foreigners and low skilled labor were particularly hard hit by unemployment in the observed period.

In parallel to the rate of unemployment, the number of underemployed people has also increased in the observed time period. Where as, according to the Swiss Labor Force Survey, 5% of the labor force were underemployed in 1991, the underemployment rate rose to a level of 9.1% in 2004<sup>14</sup>, of which the underemployment rate among women is more than five times higher than among men. If we sum up those rates, we find that in 2004 13.4% of the labor force was either unemployed or underemployed.

### ***3.3. Actors in the employment policy field***

In the field of unemployment, the federal state plays a major role in developing the laws concerning unemployment insurance, control mechanisms and managing the compensation fund. The major actor at the federal level is the *State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO)*. Part of the Federal Department of Economic Affairs, the SECO, is in charge of employment and unemployment issues at the federal level from a prospective point of view (economic development, employment policy in general etc.) as well as from a reactive one (unemployment insurance, employee's protection etc.). But, due to the federal system as well as the evolution of the unemployment security system, which was first developed at local level with trade unions playing a significant part, a variety of different actors are dealing with the unemployment issue in Switzerland.

The cantons are competent in adapting the federal law within their territory. Cantons define their own employment policies and have their own unemployment funds. With the introduction of the Regional Job Placement Offices and the Active Labor Market Measures in 1995, local actors providing those services gained importance. Inter-cantonal institutions ensure the harmonization of the cantonal practices. Table 1 gives a brief overview of the main actors in the unemployment policy field. In addition to the traditional levels of organization in Switzerland, the federal and the cantonal level, we added the inter-cantonal sphere to point out the coordinating role of these inter-cantonal institutions.

### ***3.4. National policy instruments to fight unemployment***

From an economic point of view, the Swiss employment policy consists mainly in providing favorable economic frameworks to the firms in order to create employment and to provide a suitable assistance system for the unemployed. The *federal law on preparatory measures to fight crisis and provide employment* determines some of the state's duties to provide employment, but without defining its specific tasks. This law, which came into force in 1954 and has remained unchanged since then, hardly appears in the public discourse on employment and unemployment policy.

Regarding the national policy instruments in the field of unemployment, two distinct approaches are combined: On the one hand there are the passive measures insuring an income for people who have temporarily lost their job or who have been excluded from the labor market on the long term. On the other hand, active measures have been introduced in the mid 1990s, with the aim to reintegrate the unemployed into the labor market. In the case of unemployment, both of these measures are based on the *federal law on mandatory*

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<sup>14</sup> Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2005): Key findings of the Swiss Labour Force Survey 2004.

*unemployment insurance and compensation for insolvency (LACI<sup>15</sup>)*. To be eligible for compensation, the insured person must do everything possible to avoid, or shorten the length of, unemployment. To do so, he/she has to actively look for a new job, to register as soon as possible at the regional employment office and to accept any suitable job that could be suggested. The law also requires that the person must attend retraining or refreshing courses, orientation interviews and information meetings the employment office could suggest.

We will subsequently focus, in two separate chapters, on the passive and active measures in order to illustrate the application of these two approaches, but one must keep in mind that they are based on the same legislation.

### 3.4.1. *Passive measures*

Three major institutions including both active and passive measures mark the Swiss unemployment policy. We shall focus in this part on the passive measures. The main institution is the *unemployment insurance*, based on the federal law on mandatory unemployment insurance and compensation for insolvency, which provides compensation in case of unemployment. It is based on mandatory contributions of two percent of the salary, employees and employer paying each half of the contribution. The benefits are proportional to the salary (in general 70% of the last salary). The number of remunerated days depends on the age of the beneficiary and of the period of contribution. It varies between 260 and 640 days. Until the second total revision of the law, the unemployment insurance was mainly a passive allowance. The revision of 1995 introduced active labor market measures and financial support for additional training. This marks a major change in the unemployment policy: priority is given to professional integration. The creation of regional job placement offices, which were introduced in the same revision, allows a better harmonization in the handling of the law and the introduction of sanctions, and thereby points out that the law is clearly orientated against abuses.

Regarding the increasing deficit of the unemployment insurance fund (6.2 billion CHF in 1996) and the on-going economic crisis, the federal council proposed, in 1996d to reduce the unemployment compensation by 3% (1% for lowest incomes), as this reduction should be able to save 70 Mio CHF per year. Against this proposal, the unemployed organization in La Chaux-de-Fonds launched a referendum. The proposal of the federal council was rejected by popular vote in 1997. The referendum against the limitation of compensations represents the most important example of mobilization of the unemployed in Switzerland. The referendum committee collected the signatures without the support of the trade unions or the political parties. After that surprising success, trade unions and the left wing parties took the voting campaign in charge. The popular vote in 1997 marks one of the rare occasions on which unemployment policy turned towards a less restrictive handling.

Other revisions of the law, such as the last revision in 2003, didn't change the basic structure of the insurance but tightened the benefit conditions because of the financial constraints the social security system is facing. Nevertheless, this revision was also challenged by a popular referendum, launched by leftist parties and unions, but this time it was rejected by the voters and therefore the revision was enacted.

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<sup>15</sup> We use in the following part of the text the French abbreviation LACI, that stands for “Loi fédérale sur l'assurance-chômage obligatoire et l'indemnité en cas d'insolvabilité”.

The people who are not insured by the unemployment insurance or who no longer fulfill the compensation requirements are taken in charge by the *social aid*, the second major institution. According to the federal law, the cantons are competent in assisting people living in one of their communes in case of financial distress. A third institution, which is not directly linked to the unemployed, often occurs in discussions about unemployment. It is the *invalidity insurance*, which provides financial compensation in case of invalidity and is organized at the federal level. All these institutions have as a common objective professional reintegration and the prevention of social exclusion. But as they are financed by different sources and organized at different levels, the coordination between these three institutions remains a big challenge for the Swiss social security system.

According to Cattacin and Tattini (1999) one of the major criticisms held against the unemployment legislation is that it doesn't take in charge long term unemployed who do not fulfill the conditions of the unemployment insurance any longer. There is a lack in the actual federal social security system at this level. According to federal law, the cantons are competent to provide an income to persons in need. Once the unemployed is not taken in charge by the federal insurance anymore, the problem is handed over to the cantons. At the federal level, the only means to assure an income for these people is to let them be taken in charge by the invalidity insurance. The borders between these two insurances are not that clear anymore. Often, it is not clear whether an individual doesn't have a job because of health problems or, on the contrary, if the health problems occur because of the loss of the job<sup>16</sup>. During these last years, the number of people taken in charge by the invalidity insurance or the social aid has steadily risen. The number persons allowed an invalidity pension rose from 164'329 in 1990 to 271'039 in 2003. The number of additional pensions paid by the same insurance doubled in the same period and counted 185'476 people in 2003<sup>17</sup>. The Swiss Social Action Institutions Conferences estimates that the number of persons taken in charge by the social aid rose by 10% in 2003<sup>18</sup>. Precise numbers for the whole country do not exist on this issue, as the social aid is part of the competence of the cantons. A coherent policy in the field of unemployment would therefore demand a coordination of these three institutions and their reintegration measures, or an enlargement of the unemployed insurance to enable taking in charge the long term unemployed.

### 3.4.2. Active measures

Faced with increasing unemployment accompanied by major financial problems of the unemployment insurance, the law on the unemployment insurance underwent a second major revision in 1995, which restructured the system deeply by introducing active measures and by giving priority to professional integration. These active measures have been further elaborated in the revision of the law. Active labor market programs are defined as follows: "The insurance encourages, by giving benefits, retraining, improvement and professional integration to insured people for whom it is impossible or very difficult to find a job for reasons inherent to the labor market. (...) Retraining, improvement or integration must increase the ability for placing"<sup>19</sup>.

Specific benefits are given to people taking part in these programs; the maximum number of benefits is independent from the limits mentioned above: They can be paid until the end of the

<sup>16</sup> Hans Peter Burkard, quoted in: "Kooperation zwischen Sozialeinrichtungen". NZZ, 30.1.2004.

<sup>17</sup> Source: Federal Office of Social Insurances, 2003.

<sup>18</sup> "Les responsables de l'aide sociale s'inquiètent d'une réduction de l'AI". Le Temps, 6.1.2004.

<sup>19</sup> LACI Art. 59

two years frame-period of entitlement (520 daily compensations). Among these measures are benefits for a complete training (maximum three years), payment for refreshment or retraining courses, special benefits to encourage an independent activity and temporary employment programs. It is also mentioned that “priority will be given to measures in favor of unemployed young people and women as well as long-term unemployed”<sup>20</sup>. Various actors can provide these services, as the confederation gives subsidies to various non-state institutions to organize these programs, insofar as they meet the purpose of the law. In consequence, at the local level, new actors appear with the introduction of the active measures.

In parallel to the active labor market measures, the revision of the law also introduces sanctions which consist in the suspensions of the payment of benefits during certain periods, if the insured person “is not employed by its own fault”, doesn't follow the employment's office's directives – which include taking part in the active labor market programs-, gives false information or has unjustifiably received entitlement.

The introduction of the active labor market measures, the financial support for people starting an independent activity and the focus on retraining and formation underline some major changes in the unemployment policy. Priority is given to the reintegration of the unemployed in a changing labor market and thus the revision aims to put an end to a passive perception of the unemployment allowance. The question is whether these measures will be interpreted as a help to insertion into the labor market or rather as a punishment for being inactive. Since the Swiss employment compensation system is insurance-based, these moves towards an obligation to furnish a counterpart for the social benefits are the sign of a tightening in the management of unemployment and unemployment control. This phenomenon might announce the beginning of the replacement of welfare by workfare.

#### **4. Public discourse on unemployment: the claims-making data**

The claims-making method allows us to study the public debate concerning unemployment. Thanks to the analysis of the media coverage on unemployment we are able to analyze the structure of the public discourses, as well as the actors, the issues, the frames and the arguments which play a central role in the making of the debate and of the policies, as the public debate both reflects and has an on impact the formulation and the implementation of policy making. We could also, by contrast, study the kind of actors and themes that have been excluded from the public sphere of the media. Before giving the main results of this analysis, we shall expose briefly the method and the data.

##### ***4.1 Basic outline of newspaper analysis***

The method we have adopted to explore the structure of public discourse on unemployment in Switzerland is the analysis of political claims (Koopmans and Statham 1999b), which is an elaboration of the protest event analysis method, which has become popular among students of social movements to gather systematic evidence on the different levels and forms of protest activities. Political claims analysis expands on traditional protest event analysis in at least three ways: (1) by taking into account all types of claims and interventions in the public domain (not only protest events as unconventional actions by non-institutional actors); (2) by considering all kinds of collective actors, both institutional and non-institutional (not only social movement organizations and groups); and (3) by placing the content of the claims at

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<sup>20</sup> LACI Art. 59a

center of the stage through a more detailed description of the thematic focus of the events. In spite of existing limitations, which we must acknowledge (but which exist for every method of data retrieval), newspapers are a good source regarding the coverage of news of national scope and significance, in other words, of information we are particularly interested in (see Koopmans 1998).

The data consists of printed newspaper media coverage of reported acts of political claims-making in Switzerland for the 1995-2002 period. A claim can be defined as the expression of a political opinion by verbal or physical action in the public sphere. If it is verbal, a claim usually consists of a statement, an opinion, a demand, a criticism, a policy suggestion, etc. addressed to the public in general or to a specific actor. A political claim can take on three main forms: (1) political decision (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure, etc.), (2) verbal statement (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention, etc.); and (3) protest action (demonstration, occupation, violent action, etc.)<sup>21</sup>. All claims taking on one of these forms have been coded, provided that they fell in the field of unemployment and employment policy. In addition, claims are by definition politically and strategically oriented, i.e. they relate to collective social problems and imply a policy evaluation. This means that purely factual information is excluded. Similarly, editorial commentaries and simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors are also excluded.

We coded all claims which belong thematically to the issue of unemployment, narrowly defined as follows. Specifically, we coded all political decisions, verbal statements, and protest actions, which deal with the following themes: unemployment, under-employment, joblessness, exclusion from the labor market, measures and provisions for unemployed people (including training courses, financing of unemployment insurance, and workfare), and precarious employment. Claims referring to related fields (i.e. employment policy, economic development policy, and other issues concerning the situation of the labor market or the creation of jobs) were coded only if they explicitly referred to the issue of unemployment. In addition, we coded all claims by organized groups of unemployed, regardless of their thematic focus.

The coding was done by following a sampling procedure. Specifically, we coded all claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, which is the major national Swiss newspaper. The coding covers the period from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 2002<sup>22</sup>. The international, national, and economic sections of the newspaper were consulted (in addition to the front page)<sup>23</sup>. In addition, in order to improve coverage, claims reported in the issues consulted and which took place up to two weeks before or which would take place up to two weeks after the date of appearance of that issue were also coded.

For each claim retrieved, we coded a number of relevant variables. The most important are: the location in time and place of the claim, the actor who makes the claim and its policy position relating to the issue at stake, the form of the claim, the thematic focus of the claim, the target of the claim, and the object of the claim (i.e. the constituency group).

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<sup>21</sup> Of course, political decisions apply only to state actors with binding policy power.

<sup>22</sup> In the Swiss case data are also available for the 1990-1994 period, but were not used in this reports in order to keep the same time frame as in the other countries.

<sup>23</sup> If an issue did not appear on the selected day, the next available issue was taken. If the latter was already part of the sample, the next issue not part of the sample was taken.

#### ***4.2. Media coverage of the Swiss situation***

We start with the most basic and simplest question, namely how has the overall number of acts of claim-making in the public domain developed during the considered period. The distribution of the claims on the matter of unemployment politics over time is shown in figure 1. Although the data does not allow us to infer shifts of the level of activity of collective actors from changes in the absolute number of claims, they suggest that we have witnessed a “cycle of contention” on matters pertaining to unemployment politics.<sup>24</sup> The development over time of the number of claims reflects almost perfectly that of the unemployment rate, which is also shown in figure 1. Indeed, the parallel between the two distributions is striking. This suggests that, at least in the Swiss case, a real national debate on unemployment only arose when the number of unemployed reached a critical level. Similarly, the debate became less salient as unemployment diminished. In other words, there seems to be a close relationship between the seriousness of the objective situation and the intensity of claim-making related to this situation. This relationship does not apply to 2000 and 2001, as during these years the number of claims went up in spite of declining unemployment. In Switzerland unemployment seems to be treated, at least at the beginning of the period under study, like a conjectural phenomenon, as there are debates about it when there actually is unemployment. This is particularly true for the beginning of the 90s’, when full employment was almost achieved and unemployment was almost absent of the mediated public sphere until it started to rise in 1992. As unemployment became more structural, the relationship tended to become less stringent. It can also be argued that the level of public debate can also become more important in relation with policy and institutional changes, but in Switzerland it is difficult to sort out those two aspects, as major policy changes in the field of unemployment usually occur in relation with a worsening of the economic situation and therefore the unemployment rate. (Merrien 2000).

If we now study the objects of the claims, that is, the actors whose interests are affected by the realization of the claim, we can see in table 2 that workers threatened by unemployment are more often the object of the claims than the unemployed themselves. It is interesting to note that the unemployed do not even represent a majority in the debate pertaining unemployment. The large amount of news concerning workers of the same company shows that the risk of unemployment through massive dismissal and company closure are a major source of debates. This is also a sign of the central role that is awarded to private companies in the creation and maintenance of jobs. Except for groups of workers of the same company, most claims concerned unspecified workers or unemployed. We can nevertheless see that within the group of the unemployed three categories emerge that are of central interest: long term unemployed, young unemployed and recent unemployed. The former are often mentioned presumably in relation with the group of workers threatened by unemployment.

#### ***4.3. Public actors: who is involved in the media discourse***

We will now study the type of actors making claims and their importance in debates concerning unemployment. The first important thought is that the number of actors implied in the public debate rose when unemployment first became an issue in Switzerland and then

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<sup>24</sup> Given the nature of the data and the method of data retrieval based on content analysis of newspapers, the relation between the observed number of claims and the actual level of activity of collective actors in the field is at best an indirect one, for we must take into account the selectivity of the press. What we have here is an indicator of the “publicity” of a given issue rather than a measure of the level of mobilization of a given actor as such.

remained more or less constant (table not shown). Perhaps the simplest and most straightforward way to determine the role of the different actors is to look at their presence in the public domain. Here the importance of the actors is measured by their relative weight in claim-making on issues pertaining to unemployment politics. Table 3 allows us to make this simple analysis. Apart from a rather heterogeneous group of civil society actors (which includes various social movement organizations and other intermediary actors), three main categories of actors have played a central role in public debates on unemployment: state actors, political parties and employers' organizations. This is hardly surprising. The state is obviously actively involved in every domain, as it is not only responsible for the legislative and policy-making processes, but is also the principal target of various political inputs (criticisms, demands, etc.). Similarly, parties in liberal democracies are the main form of interest aggregation and expression, and therefore their presence is also quite obvious. Finally, we can easily understand the central role played by employers' organizations in the unemployment political field, but we have to notice that in Switzerland the importance of social partners is very differentiated as unions only represent 8.7 % of claims against 20.7% for employers' organizations.

We should also note the marginal role played by those who are most directly concerned with this political field, that is, the unemployed (0.3). While unemployed organizations and groups face a number of barriers for their mobilization everywhere (Chabanet 2002; Faniel 2003; Piven and Cloward 1979; Richards 2002), the political opportunity structure in Switzerland places them in a particularly difficult situation (Giugni and Berclaz 2003). One would be tempted to say that this is obvious in a country that has one of the lowest unemployment rates in Europe. However, this explanation does not seem very convincing. For one thing, although unemployment in Switzerland is indeed lower than elsewhere, in the 1990s it grew very rapidly and reached a level which made it meaningless to speak of a physiological situation. Furthermore, long-term and structural unemployment is increasingly important, as studies have shown that after a crisis unemployment does not usually fall back to the level it was at before the crisis, and thus the level of structural unemployment tends to rise with every crises. Finally and most importantly, the Swiss population has come to view unemployment as one of the most serious problems of the country and sometimes as the most serious of all.

Another potential explanation lies perhaps in the strong presence of employers' organizations and groups, which are the most important actors together with governments and legislative and political parties (as well as in the minor role played by labor organizations and groups). This largely reflects the characteristics of policy networks and labor relations in Switzerland, which are clearly biased in favor of employers and those parties, which defend their interests in front of a very weak and fragmented union system and a relatively weak left (Kriesi 1995).

In such a situation, the unemployed who manage to get organized not only find little support from political allies within the institutional arenas, but also encounter an unfavorable discursive context to the extent that their collective identity and claims receive little visibility in the mass media, do not resonate with the claims of other collective actors, and have little chances to achieve legitimacy in a public discourse dominated by actors who frame the issue of unemployment mainly in economic rather than in social terms and who tend as well to make claims that are detrimental to the position and rights of the unemployed.

If we now focus on the split in the actors' interest between different objects of claims, the state actors are more interested in the unemployed and the social partners are more centered on workers. If we look at the claims made by the unions, they are much more interested in the constituency of workers/employees (12.9 %) than by the constituency of the unemployed (3.6



%). Clearly, the unemployed do not seem to be a priority for unions. If we also take into account the scarcity and weakness of unemployed organizations, we can see that the unemployed face important barriers to represent themselves or to be represented by unions.

The important role played by the economic circles and the political organizations that defend their interests can also be seen by having a closer look at the claim-making issued by political parties. Table 4 shows the percentage of claims by parties for all claims as well as for claims on workers/employees and claims on unemployed. Here we can see that right and center-right parties dominate the scene (58.9 % against 39.2 % for left parties), although the Socialists are very active. Extreme-right parties are much less active, indeed nearly absent from the public debates on unemployment. The crucial issues for these parties lie elsewhere, most notably in immigration politics and the safeguard of national sovereignty and identity.

#### ***4.4. Argumentative structure of the public discourse***

##### *4.4.1. Thematic foci: issues of claims*

We expect the thematic focus of claims to be the aspect most directly linked to the institutional approaches to unemployment and the related structure of discursive opportunities. Table 5 shows the distribution of claims according to their general and more specific thematic focus. At a more general level, we can distinguish between four main categories of issues: socio-economic regulation of the labor market, welfare state, measures for individual insertion in the labor market, and the unemployed as a social group. Each of these four general categories therefore divide into a number of more specific thematic foci.

If we look at the general categories, the main pattern seems at the same time quite clear and to reflect the principal features seen thus far: socio-economic issues regarding the labor market are by and large the most important thematic focus of claims in unemployment politics in Switzerland (71 % of all claims). Thus, concerned actors tend to locate the problem of unemployment and its solutions in the market and the economy, as we can see with the high proportion of claims concerning macro-economic issues (32.4 %). This does not mean that the state plays a marginal role, but its role is largely seen as consisting in regulating the labor market, as the share of claims focusing on state policy regarding the labor market attests. Claims focusing on welfare systems and social benefits (14.9 %), just as those concerning individual insertion in the labor market (11.9 %), are much less important. Among the former, the lion's share is taken by unemployment insurance, which is little surprising for a country that has a strongly bismarckian welfare model based on the insurance system of compensation. In addition, during the 1990s there have been number of revisions of the law on unemployment-insurance, each time creating a public debate.

The framing the problem of unemployment in mainly socio-economic terms reflects, of course, in part, the crucial role played by the economic circles and the organizations defending their interests in the public debates on unemployment. However, the main point is that this provides the unemployed with a structure of discursive opportunity which gives more visibility, resonance, and legitimacy to claims that focuses on the (labor) market rather than on the group of the unemployed. This can also be seen in the low share of claims focusing on issues regarding the constituency of the unemployed, which, by definition, places this group at the center of the stage. Furthermore, within the general category of socio-economic issues concerning the labor market, claims on state policy regarding the labor market (i.e. the phenomenon of unemployment) are much more frequent than claims on state

policy regarding the labor forces (i.e. the group of unemployed). This indicates a framing of the problem of unemployment that is more economic than social, a framing that puts forward economic regulation rather than social citizenship.

If we focus on the object of the claims, the difference between unemployment as an economic or as a social problem is even more striking. There are three times more claims about workers which focus on macro-economic issues rather than on the unemployed. It would seem as if there were some kind of separation between the two worlds. The unemployed are more represented under an aspect related to the social dimension, precisely the aspect that is less represented in public discourse.

#### *4.4.2. Frames*

These variables indicate the ways in which the issue of unemployment is evaluated by the actors. Diagnostic frames refer to the causes of unemployment as formulated by the actor of the claim. Prognostic frames refer to the solutions to the problem of unemployment as formulated by the actor of the claim. In other words, they represent what the actor thinks should be done to solve the problem of unemployment.

As we can see in table 6, unemployment is mostly considered having economic or technological causes (60.9 %) or also political or institutional causes (30.6 %). Thus, concerning the causes of the problem, unemployment is considered mainly as an economics phenomenon. The framing of unemployment in mainly socio-economic terms once again reflects in part the crucial role played by the economic circles and the organizations defending their interests in the public debates on unemployment. Once more, the economic dimension of unemployment overshadows its social dimension.

On the other hand, as we can see in table 7, the proposed solutions are mostly policy driven (57.3 %). This shows the central position given by actors to the national state to deal with unemployment. Yet we cannot draw any conclusions about what kind of solutions or actions are being asked from the state. This means that the actors asking the state to take action on the situation might have a very wide and sometimes contradictory range of demands as the Swiss compromise in the socio-economic field is currently under threat (Bonoli and Mach 2000)

#### *4.4.3. Targets of claims*

Tables 8 and 9 show the distribution of claims according to their target. Targets are those actors, institutions, or organizations towards which claims are addressed. More precisely, we have differentiated here two types of targets: the addressee (i.e. the actor held responsible for acting with regard to the claim or to whom the claim is directly addressed as a call to act) and the criticized actor (i.e. the actor overtly criticized or mentioned in a negative way in the claim). The same types of actors are dominant in the two categories, but we can nevertheless notice some interesting differences between the addressed and the criticized actors. State and political party actors are obviously the main targets of the claims. Unemployment is a social problem that requires political – indeed, policy – solutions, and the state is supposed to provide such solutions. In this respect, one would have expected even more claims to be addressed to state actors and, in particular, to the governments (both at the federal and regional levels). Social partners are also important targets of claims.

Thus, the most important targets of claims are the very same actors that are the most active in making claims. This is another proof of their central position in the creation of debates pertaining to unemployment and thus reflects the strong power of these groups. However, we must stress the fact that direct democracy gives trade unions and other “weak actors” the possibility to limit the inequality of power relationships. For example, an organization of unemployed was able to launch, in 1996, a referendum against a project of law that was very detrimental to their situation. In spite of this successful effort, we can once again see the weakness of the organizations and groups of unemployed through their absence as claim targets.

If we now look at criticized actors, the state and the political actors tend to become more central. An important difference concerns the social partners, as employers are much more under criticism than the unions.

We also have to underline the relatively low amount of claims that have an addressee and the even lower amount of claims with a criticized actor.

#### *4.4.4. Forms of claims*

In this section, we shall investigate the different forms that actors use to make their claims. Table 10 shows the distribution of claims according to their form. The most striking results in this regard are the small share of protest actions (5.6 %) and the absence of violent actions, while most claims take on the form of public statements (76.2 %). This is due to a number of reasons. First of all, the action repertoire of the social movements, it has been shown, is largely determined by institutional characteristics of the political system such as its degree of openness or reticence towards challengers (Kriesi et al. 1995). In other words, the general opportunity structure has a strong impact on the forms of protest activities. Now, the openness of the Swiss political system towards challengers may account in a large part for the moderate action repertoire in the political field of unemployment. In addition, the virtual absence of the unemployed in the public domain – that is, the group whose interests are most directly affected by changes and policies in this field and which therefore would be the most likely to carry out protest activities – could also contribute to moderate the overall action repertoire.

### **4.5. Role of the unemployed in the public discourse**

We have already shown that the unemployed play a very marginal role as actors in the public debate and also, that they are not even the dominant object of claims. In order to analyze whether the actors argue more in favor of or against the unemployed we created, a position-variable that shows, for every claim, whether the intention is positive. It ranges from -1 to 1 and is meant to provide a general indicator of the rights and of the position of the constituency, of its benefits and opportunities, and of its duties.<sup>25</sup> To be able to measure of the saliency of the public debates, we then made an average of the discursive positions of the various types of actors and parties in each year. Finally, we retained the standard deviations of the overall average positions (i.e. of all the actors together), which give us an indication of the

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<sup>25</sup> The original variable was coded as follows: all claims that imply an improvement of the rights and of the position of the constituency group or an enlargement of its benefits and opportunities have received code 1; claims that imply a decrease of the duties of the constituency have also received code 1; all claims that imply a deterioration of the rights and of the position of the constituency group or a restriction of their benefits and opportunities have received code -1; claims that imply a increase of the duties of the constituency have also received code -1; all neutral, ambivalent, or technocratic claims receive code 0; claims that cannot be classified according to this aspect have received code 9.

range of positions and hence of the degree of polarization of the claim-making in the political field of unemployment.

The general position is not very detrimental towards the unemployed (0.35), but there are important differences between actors and objects.

Table 11 shows that the claims aimed at the unemployed have, in general, a more positive average discursive position than the claims aiming the workers, but this general position is to a great extent influenced by the restrictive average position employers' organizations voice towards the workers. The state actors and the political parties make the most claims aiming the unemployed, but they have, among all the observed actors, the most restrictive positions towards this constituency. The unemployed organizations, the trade unions, the non-state welfare organizations and the employers' organizations are the actors which are, according to the position expressed by their claims, the actors which are the closest to the unemployed. But it is important to note that for the latter three, the unemployed do not constitute the principal object of claims, i.e. these actors make more claims concerning the workers than the unemployed.

We can conclude this part by saying that the unemployed, even if they manage to organize themselves, do not find much support from the state actors or from the political parties. The discourse, being dominated by the economic aspects of unemployment, stays immune to the social aspects of unemployment and to the creation of a collective identity of the unemployed themselves. Claims of the unemployed do not only get little visibility in the public sphere, they also get little legitimacy. The actors that generally take a position which aims at an improvement of the conditions of the unemployed, such as for example the trade unions, speak first for the workers and only then make claims aiming the unemployed. In order to be heard, the unemployed have to share an alliance with actors that only defend their interests in the second place. As we have seen throughout the interviews (see second part of this report), the non-state welfare organizations and groups focus their involvement on the integration of the unemployed into the labor market, whereas their political commitment stays quite weak. Therefore even if these organizations can be seen as potential allies for the unemployed, such an alliance doesn't give much visibility to the claims of the unemployed in the public sphere.

The average position is more favorable if we focus on political party actors (+0.43). However, as shown in table 12, if we compare, we can see that the constituency of workers is better off than that of the unemployed, which is to the opposite of what we have just described concerning all the actors. This difference is mainly due to one specific actor in each category: employers' organizations and groups in the all-actors category and the Free Democratic Party in the party-actors category. Employers' organizations are more aggressive with the constituency of workers/employees. This could reflect their opposition to the trades unions. Furthermore, during the period under study, employers were pushing for a greater flexibility of the labor market. The Free Democratic Party, and to a lesser extent the right in general, appear to be more partial towards workers/employees than towards the unemployed. This can be seen in the entire legislative process during the period considered, when the Free Democratic Party and the right tried, and often succeeded, in several occasions to make the unemployment legislation more restrictive. But as the Free Democratic Party and the employers are closely linked, we should study the possible distribution of tasks among themselves in order to make their ideas advance in both fields.

The next two figures combine on the two axes the thematic focus of the claims (we distinguish between socio-economic issue represented on the abscissa, and issues concerning welfare system and social insertion, represented on the axis of ordinates) with the average position each actor type expresses with its claims towards the constituency (workers or unemployed).

As we can observe in figure 2, the discourse aiming the unemployed as objects of the claims is characterized by little controversy. The discursive positions of the different actor types differ very little. Before concluding from this data that the discourse concerning issues affecting the unemployed is marked by a consensus of opinions, we have to take into account the following point: There are only few claims aiming the unemployed as main objects. As previously discussed, the discourse on the contentious politics of unemployed aims, in the first, place at claims concerning the rights and obligations of the workers. As we can see in figure 3, the average discursive position of the different actor types varies largely when it comes to claims aiming workers as first objects, and this is valid for socio-economic issues as well as for issues concerning the welfare system. On the one hand we can find the trade unions, which form a group with the non-state welfare organizations (in this figure called “pro unemployed organizations”), making claims for an improvement of the conditions of the workers. On the other, the employers’ organizations, which have a very restrictive position towards the workers concerning both thematic fields, are placed on the opposite side of the figure. The political parties and the policy actors are positioned between these two poles.

We might therefore reformulate our conclusion and say that the public discourse on the contentious politics of unemployment in Switzerland is expressed in a discussion around the conditions of the workers. In this debate, the positions of the different actors involved vary considerably. Claims aiming the unemployed are less controversial. We can interpret these findings as another indication that unemployment is, in the public discourse in Switzerland, to a large extent perceived and discussed in its economic dimensions. The unemployed themselves constitute, in this perception, individuals that have temporarily lost their job. This kind of framing gives little space to the creation of a collective identity of the unemployed or to a solidarity movement that focuses on the social and structural aspects of unemployment. In such a framing scheme, the solution to the problem is seen in a good functioning of the labor market, and leaves little space for policy solutions focusing on the individuals already excluded from the labor market.

Basing our analysis on the number of claims aiming the unemployed, we came to the conclusion that the unemployed were not the first concern of most of the observed actors. What are then the factors determining whether a claim aims the unemployed? Is it possible to predict, based on certain variables, the probability that a claim has a positive discursive position towards the unemployed? These are the questions we will focus on in the following part.

#### *4.5.1. Probability that a claim aims the unemployed as first object*

We will first focus on the question regarding which variables are good predictors to see whether a claim aims the unemployed or the workers. Following the analysis discussed beforehand, we will particularly concentrate on the variables *type of actor*, *issue of claim*, *form of claims* and *year*. The latter we use to measure the impact of time and the business cycle. Given the fact that the dependent variable (i.e. the variable *object of claim*, that can be either workers or unemployed) is a dichotomous variable, we are modeling a logistic

regression to analyze these questions. Before testing the full model, including all four independent variables, we will analyze the impact of each variable independently. We chose the following reference categories: 2002 for the variable year (*model 1*); political decisions for the variable form of action, which is the less radical action form coded (*model 2*); non-state welfare organizations for the variable actor type (*model 3*); and issues related to the welfare system as reference category of the variable issue (*model 4*). Table 13 presents the results of the four separate models and of the full model. The table contains the odds ratio for all models and the meaning of the predicted probability of the former models.

The introduction of the variable year (*model 1*), explains around 7% of the variance of the probability that a claim aims the unemployed (Nagelkerke  $R^2=0.071$ ). All categories of this variable are statistically significant. We observe that the first years of our analysis increase the probability that a claim aims the unemployed. This probability diminishes in the last third of the observed period. In the years 2000 and 2001 the probability is smaller compared to the reference category, which is the year 2002. The year 1997, when the unemployment rate reached its peak, is marked by the highest value of the meaning of the predicted probability. We might therefore confirm our hypothesis saying that the public discourse focuses more on the unemployed than on the workers when the unemployment rate is particularly high. It is interesting to note that the probability that a claim aims the unemployed diminishes over the observed time period. This might lead to the conclusion that in Switzerland, the discourse was more focused on the unemployed when the phenomena of unemployment was new.

*Model 2*, which introduces the independent variable *form of action*, explains only 6% of the variation of the predicted probability (Nagelkerke  $R^2=0.062$ ). Again, all categories of the variable are statistically significant. All the categories of this variable diminish the probability that a claim aims the unemployed compared to the reference category “political decisions”. Contrarily to our expectations, the degree of the radicalization of an action does not have a positive impact on our dependant variable.

Knowing what type of actor expresses a claim increases considerably the probability to predict correctly whether a claim aims the unemployed or not, as we can see in *model 3*. The fact that a policy actor or a political party makes a claim increases the probability that the claim aims the unemployed. If the claim is formulated by an employers’ organization or a trade union however, this probability diminishes. This confirms our already discussed observation, saying that the latter two actors focus their claims mainly on workers.

Among the four independent variables, the variable *issue* is the best predictor to estimate whether or not a claim aims the unemployed. *Model 4* explains 47% of the variation of the probability to predict correctly the object of the claim. Claims with issues related to social security or to professional integration most often aim at the unemployed, whereas socio-economic issues rather focus on workers.

Combining all four discussed independent variables in one model (*full model*) once more increases considerably the probability to predict correctly whether a claim aims the unemployed or the workers (Nagelkerke  $R^2=0.528$ ). In this full model, all variables are statistically significant. We can, generally, confirm the hypothesis we tested in the four previously discussed models. Regarding the variable year of the claim, we observe that the first years analyzed increase, compared to the reference category which is the year 2002, the probability that the claim aims the unemployed whereas this probability decreases from the year 2000 onwards. We can conclude from these results, that over the years, people got used

to the phenomena of unemployment and that individuals excluded from the labor market became less the objects of claims.

Regarding the variable form of the claims, which contributes the less to the explanation of the dependant variable, we can't confirm our hypothesis stating that the radicalization of the claim has a positive impact on the fact that the claim aims the unemployed. In the full model, only the category "demonstrations" is statistically significant. But the claims expressed during a demonstration are more often aimed at the workers than at the unemployed. Compared to the non-state welfare organizations, the claims expressed by the policy actors are more likely to aim the unemployed. Our findings confirm that the trade unions and the employers' organizations focus their claims, in the field of the contentious politics of unemployment, on the workers rather than on the unemployed. Compared to the claims concerning welfare state issues, claims concerning socio-economic issues decrease the probability that the objects aimed at are the unemployed.

#### 4.5.2. Probability that a claim has a positive discursive position towards unemployed

In a second time, we are interested in seeing what factors are determinant in observing whether a claim expresses a positive discursive position towards the unemployed. The dependent variable of these models is the *positions towards the constituency*. As we are particularly interested in the factors helping to predict correctly whether a claim is positive towards the unemployed, the dependant variable has been recoded into a dichotomous variable opposing the positive positions to the other positions (negative or neutral). We analyze these questions by modeling two separate logistic regressions, by focusing on the unemployed as first objects (*model 5a*) and on the workers as secondary ones (*model 5b*). Concerning independent variables, we introduce the same variables already used in the first model. Table 14 presents the results of the two models.

The independent variables of the model 5a, which focuses on the claims aiming the unemployed, explain, when assembled, 32% of the variance of the dependent variable. The variables *year* and *issue of claims* are the best predictors) to help estimate the probability of whether a claim expresses a positive discursive position towards the unemployed<sup>26</sup>. The first years taken into account in this analysis increase, compared to the year 2002, the probability that the claims are positive towards the unemployed. The year 1999 has the highest amount of predicted probabilities. We can conclude from these findings, that the discourse became harsher and more closed towards the unemployed in the last years of our observation. The fact is, that a claim which is expressed during a demonstrative protest action increases, compared to the political decisions, the probability that the claim expresses a positive discursive position towards the unemployed. All other action forms are statistically not significant. Claims expressed by trade unions are more likely to be positive towards the unemployed than those expressed by the non-state welfare organizations. These findings confirm that, if the trade unions make claims aiming the unemployed, those claims tend in general, to an increase of the latter's rights. But the number of claims aiming the unemployed stays weak. The impact of the variable *issue* varies considerably if we distinguish between the two different types of object. While this variable doesn't explain if a claim is positive towards the workers (almost

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<sup>26</sup> In order to see the impact of each variable on the model, four logistic regressions have been modeled beforehand, including each one of the four independent variables. The variables *year* and *issue* are the best predictors of the dependent variable. The variable *year* explains 14% of the variance of the probability, the variable *issue* explains 18%, while the variables *form of action* and *type of actor* explain only 2% respectively 3%.

all claims aiming the workers orbit around the socio-economic issue), it is a good predictors to see whether a claim is positive towards the unemployed or not. Issues related to professional reinsertion increase the probability that the claim is positive towards the unemployed with a mean predicted probability of 0.88.

Regarding the claims aiming the workers as first objects (model 5b), the same independent variables explain 43% of the variance of the dependent variables and all variables are statistically significant. The changeable type of actor alone<sup>27</sup> explains already 30% of the variance. Claims made during 1997, when the unemployment rate reached its peak, have, compared to the year 2002, the highest odds ratio. As we could observe regarding the claims aiming the unemployed, the first years we analyzed also seem to be characterized by a discourse favorable to the workers. We can conclude from these findings, that the discourse held during the last years of observations, not only tightened towards the unemployed, but that the discourse in general got tougher concerning issues related to the conditions on the labor market.

Looking at the form of the claims, we observe that the more radical the action form becomes, the more likely it is that the claims express an improvement of the conditions of the workers. The radicalization of the action form doesn't increase the probability that the claim is positive towards the unemployed, as we expected it to be, but it increases the probability in having a positive discursive position towards the workers. This is another sign indicating that the contentious politics of unemployment focus on issues related to the conditions of the workers. Regarding the type of actors, we observe –not surprisingly- that the trade unions speak loudest for the interests of the workers, whereas the claims made by employers' organizations are more likely to deteriorate the conditions of the workers, compared to the claims made by the non-state welfare organizations. As already discussed, the issue of the claim doesn't have a significant impact on the positions.

#### **4.6. Role of the EU in the public discourse**

In this section, we will study the importance of the supranational dimension of the various aspects discussed above. We are particularly interested in seeing whether there are any trends indicating internationalization and, especially, a europeanization of claims making in the political field of unemployment. Let us first look at the actors. As shown in table 15, the most striking result here is the virtual absence of supranational actors, including European ones. While this stems in part from the fact that we are using a national newspaper that emphasizes nationally bounded actors, it also points to the fact that actors located beyond the national state remain for the time being marginal in public debates on unemployment politics. As far as subnational actors are concerned, their nonetheless frequent interventions in public debates stem largely from the decentralized structure of the country and the “federalism of execution” which gives the member units of the federation (the cantons) strong policy implementation powers.

If we turn to the scope of the issues, we see once again that the national level is predominant and that the content of the claims does not shift to the supranational level. These results largely reflect those found for the actors' scope. The national level is by and large the most

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<sup>27</sup> For the claims aiming the workers, the impact of each variable on each other has also been tested. The variable *type of actor* increases the most the probability of predicting correctly the dependent variable (Nagelkerke  $R^2=0.301$ ). The variables *form* and *year* explain both about 14%, whereas the variable *issue* does not even explain 1%.



important one, whereas supranational issues appear in less than 3 % of the claims. The regional and, especially, local level represent a sizeable share of the claims, which stems in part from the decentralization of the political process in Switzerland. The same applies to the addressees of the claims, which are almost entirely located within the national boundaries.

If we look at the development of the scope of actors over time in table 16, we can see that the virtual absence of supranational actors is somewhat challenged by the findings for 2000, which show a significant rise of claims by supranational and European actors. But this trend is not confirmed by the years 2001 and 2002. National and subnational actors remain dominant and from this point of view there is no sign of a significant participation of global or European actors in the Swiss debates surrounding unemployment.

Table 17 shows the development of the scope of issues of claims on unemployment politics over time. The general conclusion that we can draw from these figures is that we cannot speak of a shift from the national to the supranational level. Rather than a trend towards a supranationalization of unemployment politics, a specific issue has produced the rise observed on that year, as the subsequent drop of claims addressing supranational issues attests. However, like for the scope of actors, 2000 might show the beginning of an internationalization trend. If we look at claims with a national scope, we can indeed observe an increasing trend over the period under study. The EU does not seem to have a significant impact in the creation of debates on unemployment, as an actor or as an issue.

### **5. Political deliberation in the field of labor market policies**

The analysis of claims making has given us a picture of the field of unemployment in Switzerland, and the interviews will allow us to compare public debates as they appear in the media with the policy making processes as they are conceived by those taking an active part. We will focus on important actors and issues and also on the type of network that unite and oppose actors of the field.

#### ***5.1 Interviews with the main actors***

We have carried out 42 semi-structured interviews with main national and local actors within the contentious field of unemployment in Switzerland, focusing on direct action and involvement of the actors in the public and policy domains. As shown in table 18, interviews have been conducted with a) policy actors and state institutions, b) intermediary actors such as political parties, unions, and employers' organizations, c) non-governmental organizations, welfare organizations and pro-beneficiary charities, and d) groups promoting direct mobilization/participation of the unemployed themselves. The interview schedule for each category of actors has been specifically designed to analyze where these actors locate themselves in relations to other actors within the same field. They include not only qualitative in-depth questions (examining, for example, the framing of the issues and the "perceived" role of legislative provisions and policies for structuring actors' demands) but also sets of standardized questions which aim to investigate action repertoires, mobilization and communication strategies, institutions on which demands are made, as well as relationships of influence, co-operation and disagreement amongst different types of organizations in the field. It should be emphasized that the questionnaire has also gathered information on how actors from the public and policy domains see the potential influence of increasing European integration in the unemployment field. Interviewees have thus been asked to give more open-ended prognostic statements, thus allowing for comparison of the opinions expressed by actors of different types.

## 5.2. *Organizational networks*

For the analysis of networks and inter-organizational contacts we asked actors to designate, out of a list of actors that was made following a reputational approach and interviewees also had the possibilities to mention other actors that they considered important, which actors they considered to be the most influential, which they have tried to influence, which they have collaborated with or have strongly disagreed with. Results show that the dominant actor is the SECO (State Secretariat of Economic Affairs). This underlines the importance of national policy actors in the management of unemployment in Switzerland. The SECO is the central actor in every domain (influence, collaboration, disagreement).

Table 19 shows that the SECO is particularly important because it is in charge of implementing the law. It also gives directions to the cantons concerning this implementation. So, despite the federal system there is a tendency in Switzerland towards a reinforcement of the role of the federal state on unemployment issues. The federal state plays a major role in elaborating the law concerning unemployment insurance, control mechanisms and managing the compensation fund.

Other important actors are employers' organizations and unions. The two leading employers' organization (UPS) and trade union (USS) are mentioned the same number of times. If we consider all mentioned actors of this type, the distribution remains the same. On the trade union side, we have SIB, and FTMH, that are mentioned 48 times. On the employers' organizations side, Economiesuisse and USAM are mentioned 50 times. This could give the impression of a certain equality among these types of actors, an impression that is not the same as the one given by the claims-making data. In this data, the unions are clearly less present in the public domain. But the evolution through the period under study shows the signs of a progression of the presence of trade unions and maybe also a progression of their power, as part of the balance of power typical of Switzerland in the after war period era is eroding.

Two political parties, one from the right (PRD) and one from the left (PS), also appear to be among the most influential actors in the unemployment field. But, if we consider other parties as well, the next two are right-wing parties. This confirms the impression we had from the claims-making data and also the reality of the electorate, where right-wing parties are more important than left-wing ones, although the Socialist party is among the most important parties in electoral terms.

The unemployed organization that launched the successful referendum in 1997 is still surrounded by the aura of its success, and is quite often mentioned, although not enough to be among the 10 most important actors.

The scope of actors shows that there tends to be a balance between the national and the local level. The regional employment offices are an exception, but this could be explained by the fact that this type of actor is clearly local and was mentioned by almost every local actor we interviewed in the Geneva area, as it plays a very important role at the cantonal level. Regional employment offices are local actors, but the fact that they are institutionalized in all cantons might explain why they also count such a high score among the regional actors.

We will now look at the organizational network among actors in the field of unemployment. The questions and tables refer to the actors those questioned have tried to influence, have collaborated with or have had disagreements with.

Again, the SECO is the most frequent target (table 20). There are several similar patterns with the data shown in the previous section. The regional employment offices are very important in this category of targeted actors. This can be explained by the fact that the implementation of the law is done at the cantonal level and that these offices play a central role in this process. Intermediary actors and NGOs are more active and unemployed organizations mainly try to influence actors that are potential allies (trade unions and the Socialist party), except for the SECO and the regional employment offices. This reflects the fact that the unemployed tend to be represented actors rather than active ones in the field of unemployment in Switzerland.

The distribution of collaborations (table 21) has much in common with that of the targets, with the same actors at the top of the list. The regional offices confirm their central role

Table 22 again shows that the SECO and employers' organizations and unions are dominant actors as they are the actors that are the most disagreed with. It is important to point out that a large number of actors did not want to admit disagreements with other actors and were more at ease with terms like 'divergent opinion' or 'different points of view'. We can see that there is a certain logic linking the assessment of the most influential actors and the patterns of networking: actors that are pointed out as being important are the ones that tend to be most focused on for influence, collaboration and/or disagreement.

### ***5.3. Forms of action***

We have analyzed the types of strategies used by different types of actors and the kinds of activities they used to sign their presence in the field of unemployment. According to their type, scope (national or local) and level of resources, actors tend to use different forms of actions.

The main categories of action forms we used in the interviews are media-related strategies, informing the public, negotiating and lobbying, consultation, court action, campaign contributions and mobilizing the public. Table 23 shows that all categories of actors consider media-related strategies important or very important. Action forms dedicated to the information of the public are also very important but less than media-related ones, as the media are increasingly used as a means of communication with the public. Consultation, cooperation, negotiation and lobbying are commonly used, as the Swiss political system is very open and the pre-parliamentary phase includes an important number of actors. This situation gives access to the political process even to actors that are not very powerful. Court actions are quite frequent, as both state actors and pro-unemployed NGOs sometimes file suits on individual cases concerning the application of unemployment legislation.

The action forms used vary among the different types of actors. Policy actors have easy access to media and use them to communicate about the situation and about their activities concerning unemployment. They make a less frequent use of forms aimed at directly informing the public. Their involvement in policy-making gives them an important role in lobbying and consultation. They also often use court actions in relation to the application of the unemployment legislation.

Intermediary actors (political parties, employers' organizations and trade unions) are very active and tend to use all action forms, mostly on a regular basis. Nearly every actor uses media activities, informing the public, lobbying and consultation. Some differences appear if we look at the frequency of their use.

Differences in campaigning and mobilizing the public are more striking. The use of these activities depends on the level of resources of the actors. Concerning mobilizing the public, there are important differences between left-wing parties and unions on the one hand and right-wing parties and employers' organizations, on the other.

The strategies of pro-unemployed NGOs are strongly related to their level of resources. Most of them do not have the means to engage in costly activities, in terms of both time and money. Furthermore, some of these actors do not really want to have a political role, as according to their philosophy their action aims to help the unemployed directly and they do not want to use their resources at the political level.

#### ***5.4. Role of the unemployed***

Unemployed organizations have to limit the range of their actions due to their poor resources, but they appear to be more active than in the picture we get through the claims-data analysis. For instance, unemployed organizations use media-related strategies, some of them on a regular basis. But this does not appear in the claims-making data. We can wonder why? Do unemployed organizations overstate the importance of their actions? Do the media not react and give access to the public domain to unemployed organizations? We also have to study the type of media unemployed organizations are frequently dealing with, in order to see, for example, whether they have access to "alternative" media coverage. Informing the public does not occur on a regular basis; only one unemployed organization uses this form of action regularly.

Lobbying and consultations are quite frequent, yet not used on a regular basis. Unemployed organizations usually try to influence policy-makers by telling them about the situation faced by the unemployed. Concerning consultations, the government asks the position of the unemployed organizations. Policy actors have made it quite clear that the surprising success of an unemployed organization in launching a referendum against a change in unemployment laws had made their opinion more important and had favored the consultation of this type of organization. They also often use court action on behalf of the unemployed whose compensations have been reduced or suspended. Campaign contributions are quite low and mainly restricted to non-financial forms of contributions due to the scarcity of their resources.

Concerning the mobilization of the public, unemployed organizations are quite active, although not on a regular basis. They are especially active in direct fund-raising and are dependent on this source money to survive and carry on their activities in favor of the unemployed. They also use protest activities. According to the people interviewed, unemployed organizations are much more active than in the portrait we get from the claims-making data. This could show that unemployed organizations have limited access to the public domain through media coverage.

Intermediary actors and NGOs are more active and unemployed organizations mainly try to influence actors that constitute potential allies (trade unions and the Socialist party), except for the SECO and the regional employment offices. As already mentioned, this situation tend

to confirm the fact that unemployed tend to be represented actors rather than active ones in the field of unemployment in Switzerland.

### ***5.5. Role of the EU***

In Switzerland, there has been and there still is a big debate about the role of the EU and the ways the country should deal with European integration. Yet this debate does not seem to have been dealing with the subject of unemployment. The part of the questionnaire concerning the EU did not get many answers, as some actors were neither well informed nor willing to answer questions about the EU. We had an important number of “don’t know” answers or no answers at all to the questions about the EU.

Table 24 shows that the EU has been a subject of discussion, but not an intense one. One third of all actors, mainly pro-unemployed NGOs, have had no discussions about the EU at all. However, an important part of these actors mainly focus on providing direct help to the unemployed and act at a local level. Therefore, they have no interest in politics and policies in general.

For those actors who did engage in a debate about the EU, the subject is mainly limited to the “bilateral agreements”. Concerning the labor market and unemployment, their main focus was about the agreement on the free circulation of people and its consequences on the active population.

If the intensity of the debate on the EU is quite low, the number of actors that are present on the European scene is even lower. We asked actors if they were using any of the action forms mentioned above at the European level. As table 25 shows, only 9 out of 42 actors gave a positive answer to this question.

Most of these 9 actors had only used one or two of the suggested forms of action. Unemployed organizations and pro-unemployed NGOs are not present at the European level, except for the participation of 2 unemployed organizations in meetings and protest activities. However, this participation was more a personal act than a sign of the mobilization of the Swiss unemployed as a social movement. (table not shown)

Intermediary actors and especially policy actors had some presence at the European level, but it was quite restricted and mostly limited to exchanging information or explaining the specificities of the Swiss case with regard to unemployment. Concerning the Geneva area, the collaboration with France can be quite strong, but is limited to the regional level and stems from the fact that the French region across the border is an important source of workers for Geneva. As a result, various political and technical problems have to be discussed between the two regions.

Another sign of weakness of the participation at the EU level is the low organizational involvement in European policies relating to unemployment by type of actor. Only 5 actors out of 42 were involved and only “somewhat” (table not shown).

Another question is whether actors are aware of the European strategies on unemployment. Half of the actors answered yes, but they almost all stressed that, as far as they knew, the EU did not have a proper strategy, and they had been informed of the strategies of some of the

member states. Seen from Switzerland, the social Europe appears very weak, as the member states still deal with these problems according to their national history and traditions.

Finally, two questions dealt with the evolution of the role of European policies in comparison with national ones in the field of unemployment and with the evaluation of that evolution. Table 26 shows that a majority of actors foresee a rise of the role of the EU. They often mentioned that Switzerland already has to pay attention to what is happening in Europe when making its own policies and that this influence would rise in the future. They also said that the bilateral agreements have an impact on Swiss policies and politics and that the agreement on the free circulation of people could have an impact, either positive or negative, on the Swiss labor market. Nevertheless, several actors mentioned that not being a member state tends to lower the influence of the EU.

The evaluation of the impact of the EU in the future is always linked to the form the EU will take. For example, the main trade union, which foresees a growing impact of the EU, is rather against it because it believes that the EU is following the path of liberalization and that this would eventually diminish the social protection. But three employers' organizations are also strongly against it and the fourth rather against it. They argue that the EU, or at least its member states, has already shown its incapacity in fighting unemployment and that, according to the unemployment rate, the Swiss example is better than the European one. Furthermore, they also fear an interventionist and administrative bias. Another fear is that Switzerland might face an inflow of foreign workers and/or unemployed that would be interested in the Swiss level of compensation and that therefore the system must be adapted to become less attractive. But, for other actors, this is just a pretext to justify the lowering of the level of social protection. This also shows that the EU, like globalization, is sometimes used as an argument to justify ideas and actions. Not surprisingly, the UDC, the right-wing isolationist party, is as strongly against any strengthening of the influence of the EU in the field of unemployment as in any other fields.

In sum, as shown in table 27, there are more actors that are in favor of a growing role of the EU, but only one actor is strongly in favor of it, while 5 are strongly against it and these are powerful economic and political actors that have the power to prevent or at least delay any attempt to bring Switzerland and the EU closer to each other.

## 6. Conclusion

The project has allowed us to gather information from two major sources:

- the mediated public debate through the analysis of claims making ,
- the actors that are part of the field of unemployment through the interviews.

Both sources gave us some common trends concerning the Swiss field of unemployment. State and political actors are central, social partners are also important, and employers are more present and more powerful than the unions, even if the interviews give us a less disproportioned impression than the claims making analysis. Another important finding is the quasi absence of the victims of unemployment, as the unemployed only count for 0.3 of the claims and are not among the most important actors according to the interviews. They are not even a majority as an object, as claims focus more on workers. The unemployed tend to be the missing actors in a field of unemployment slightly dominated by institutional, economic and right wing actors. But we also have to underline that the interviews have shown that some unemployed organizations were quite active according to their level of resources. Yet it seems

that they encounter difficulties in gaining access to the attention of the media and also, to a lesser extent, to the political world. According to their weakness' and to the difficulties they meet, the unemployed tend to be represented actors, but they do not represent a priority for the unions and some of the pro-unemployed NGO's are not interested by political lobbying or mediated presence, as they only want to focus on the daily problems of the unemployed themselves. So, if the unemployed are represented actors, they are not always well represented.

Another finding that is confirmed by both sources is the very low level of Europeanization in Switzerland. The analysis of claims making indicates that there are no evident signs of a europeanization of the actors, issues or addressees. And the interviews teach us that national actors look at what is happening in Europe, but not very much, and that they don't participate actively to European activities or debates.

## 7. Appendix : List of interviewed actors

Acronym	Name	English translation
	<b>Policy actors</b>	
SECO	Secrétariat d'Etat à l'économie	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
AOST	Association des offices suisses du travail	Association of the work offices in Switzerland
CDAS	Conférence des directrices et directeurs cantonaux des affaires sociales	Conference of the directors of social affairs
DEEAE	Département de l'économie, de l'emploi et des affaires extérieures GE	Department for economic, work and foreign affairs of Geneva
DASS	Département de l'action Sociale et de la santé du canton de Genève	Department for social affairs and health of Geneva
OCE	Office cantonal de l'emploi GE	Regional Labor Office, Geneva
OOPF	Office de l'Orientation et de la Formation Professionnelle	Office for professional training, Geneva
AMOS A	Observatoire du marché de travail de la Suisse orientale, Argovie et Zoug	Observatory of the labor market, German part of Switzerland
	<b>Intermediary actors</b>	
PSS	Parti socialiste Suisse	Swiss social-democrat Party
PRD	Parti radical-démocratique Suisse	Liberal democratic party of Switzerland
PDC	Parti Démocrate-Chrétien Suisse	Christian democratic party of Switzerland
UDC	Union démocratique du centre	Switzerland's people's party
PRD GE	Parti radical-démocratique Genève	Liberal democratic party of Geneva
PS GE	Parti socialiste Genève	Social-democrat party of Geneva
	Solidarités Genève	Solidarity party of Geneva
PdT	Parti du Travail Genève	Labor party of Geneva
	<b>Employers' organisations</b>	
USAM	Union Suisse des Arts et Métiers	Swiss industry union
	Economiesuisse	Economiesuisse
UPS	Union patronale Suisse	Swiss employers' association
UAPG	Union des associations patronales genevoises	Union of employers' association of Geneva
	<b>Trade unions</b>	
USS	Union Syndicale Suisse	Swiss Labor Union
FTMH	Fédération des travailleurs de la métallurgie et de l'horlogerie	Federation of metal and clock-making workers.
SIB	Syndicat de l'Industrie et du Bâtiment	Trade Union for Industries and Construction
CGAS	Communauté genevoise d'action syndicale	Community of genevan trade unions



	<b>Interregional policy counsellors</b>	
CISAS	Conférence Suisse des Institutions d'Action Sociale	Swiss Conference of Social Aid Institutions
AOMAS	Association des Organisation des Mesures du marche du travail en Suisse	Association of providers of active labor market measures
ARTIAS	Association romande et tessinoise des institutions d'action sociale	Association of social aid institutions, French and Italian part of Switzerland.
	<b>Pro-unemployed NGOs</b>	
	Caritas	Caritas
OSEO	Oeuvre Suisse d'Entraide Ouvrière	Swiss workers relief organization
	Hospice général RMCAS	Social aid & Minimal Income Services
CSP	Centre social protestant	Protestant social centre
	Croix-Rouge genevoise	Red Cross Geneva
	Cebig	Professional competences assessment centre.
	L'Orangerie	L'Orangerie
	Association réalise	Association Realise
	Maison du Trialogue	House of the Trialogue
	Berner Stellennetz	Jobnetwork Bern
	<b>Unemployed organizations</b>	
ADC GE	ADC (Association de défense des chômeurs Genève)	Unemployed association Geneva
ADC NE	ADC Chaux de Fonds	Unemployed association La Chaux de Fonds
ADC BA	ADC Bâle	Unemployed association Basel
ADE VD	ADE (Association des demandeurs d'emploi Lausanne)	Unemployed association Lausanne
	Surprise Strassenmagazin	Street magazine Surprise

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**Table 1: Overview of actors in the employment policy field**

	<b>Employment policy</b>	<b>Unemployment insurance</b>	<b>Interest -groups</b>
<b>Federal Level</b>	Federal Council (government)	Swiss Federal Social Insurance Office	Employers Organizations (economiesuisse, Swiss Employers Union, Swiss Union of arts and crafts)
	State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO)	Commission for the supervision of the compensation funds of unemployment insurance	Trade Unions (Union of Swiss Trade Unions, travail.suisse)
		Parliamentary Committee for Economic Affairs and Taxation	Political parties (Socialist party, Swiss people's party, Free democratic party, Christian-democratic party, Ecology party)
<b>Inter-cantonal Level</b>		Swiss Social Action Institutions Conferences	
		Association of Swiss employment offices(AOST)	
		Association of organizers of active labor market measures (AOMAS)	
<b>Cantonal/ local Level</b>	Cantonal Department of Economic Affairs/ employment offices	Regional Job Placement Offices	Unemployed Organizations
	Cantonal Department of Social Affairs	Active Labor Market Measure's Organizations	
		Tripartite commission	
		Public Unemployment insurance fund	
		Unemployment insurance fund of Trade Unions and Employers Organizations	

**Table 2: Objects of claims (1995-2002)**

<b>Workers/employees</b>	<b>54.8</b>
Working poor	0.5
Precarious workers/employees	4.1
Illegal workers	0.2
Workers/employees of same company	31.0
Other and unspecified workers/employees	18.6
Unions	0.4
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>45.2</b>
Young unemployed	6.2
Old-age unemployed	0.9
Women unemployed	0.5
Migrant unemployed	1.2
Disabled unemployed	0.6
Long-term unemployed	3.6
Unemployed recently made redundant	5.3
Social welfare recipients	2.6
Other and unspecified unemployed	24.3
Total	100%
N	<b>2019</b>

**Table 3: Main actors in public debates (1995-2002)**

	All claims	Claims on workers	Claims on unemployed
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>54.1</b>	<b>40.7</b>	<b>70.3</b>
Governments	13.7	10.5	17.5
Legislative and political parties	26.4	20.5	33.5
Judiciary	1.7	1.4	2.1
State agencies	9.6	5.2	14.9
Other state actors	2.8	3.2	2.3
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>44.2</b>	<b>57.7</b>	<b>27.8</b>
Labor organizations and groups	8.7	12.9	3.6
Employers' organizations and groups	20.7	30.7	8.5
Unemployed organizations and groups	.3	0.0	0.7
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	2.2	1.0	3.6
Other civil society actors and groups	12.3	13.1	11.4
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>1.9</b>
Total	100%	100	100
N	2019	1106	913

**Table 4: Parties involved in claim-making in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

	All claims	Claims on workers	Claims on unemployed
<b>Left parties</b>	<b>39.2</b>	<b>42.0</b>	<b>36.6</b>
Socialist party	32.5	32.6	32.4
Greens	5.4	7.3	3.8
Other leftist parties	1.2	2.1	0.5
<b>Right and center-right parties</b>	<b>58.9</b>	<b>56.2</b>	<b>61.0</b>
Christian-democratic party	11.3	12.4	10.3
Free-democratic party	33.0	29.5	36.2
Swiss people's party	11.3	10.9	11.7
Other right and center-right parties	3.2	0.6	2.8
<b>Extreme right parties</b>	<b>2.0</b>	<b>1.6</b>	<b>2.3</b>
Total	100%	100	100
N	406	193	213

**Table 5: Thematic focus of claims in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

	Whole constituency	Workers constituency	Unemployed constituency
<b>Socio-economic issues regarding the labor market</b>	<b>71.0</b>	<b>96.5</b>	<b>40.2</b>
Macro-economic issues	32.4	47.9	13.6
Economic development policy	12.0	15.3	8.0
State policy regarding the labor market	17.0	20.0	13.5
State policy regarding the labor forces	3.5	3.6	3.4
Work conditions	5.9	9.6	1.5
Targeted employment measures	.1	0.1	0.2
<b>Welfare systems and social benefits</b>	<b>14.9</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>31.1</b>
Unemployment insurance	13.2	0.8	28.1
Social aid	1.3	0.7	2.1
Non-state welfare systems	.1	0.0	0.3
Targeted reactive measures	.2	0.0	0.5
<b>Individual insertion in the labor market</b>	<b>11.9</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>26.0</b>
Active/insertion measures	7.4	0.0	16.3
Training/formation	0.6	0.0	1.4
Educational issues	3.9	0.4	8.2
<b>Issues regarding the constituency of unemployed</b>	<b>1.8</b>	<b>1.1</b>	<b>2.7</b>
Associational life	0.4	0.5	0.4
Individual/psychological attitudes/dispositions	0.2	0.2	0.3
Other issues regarding the unemployed	1.2	0.5	0.0
<b>Other issues</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>2.0</b>
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	2019	1106	913

**Table 6: Causes of unemployment (1995-2002)**

Economic/technological causes	60.9
Political/institutional causes	30.6
Social/demographic causes	2.7
Cultural/psychological causes	1.1
External causes	4.0
Other diagnostic frames	0.7
Total	100%
N	729

**Table 7: Solutions to unemployment (1995-2002)**

Policy driven solutions	57.3
None policy driven solutions	20.3
Unclassifiable	22.4
Total	100%
N	847

**Table 8: Targets of claims (1995-2002)**

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>46.9</b>
Governments	28.8
Legislative and political parties	12.2
Judiciary	0.3
State agencies	1.6
Other state actors	4.2
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>50.8</b>
Labor organizations and groups	15.1
Employers' organizations and groups	17.9
Unemployed organizations and groups	4.7
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	0.3
Other civil society actors and groups	12.7
<b>Social partners and other actors</b>	<b>2.3</b>
Total	100
N	385

**Table 9: Criticized actors (1995-2002)**

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>55.7</b>
Governments	27.5
Legislative and political parties	18.3
Judiciary	1.5
State agencies	4.6
Other state actors	3.8
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>43.6</b>
Labor organizations and groups	9.9
Employers' organizations and groups	32.1
Unemployed organizations and groups	0.8
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	0.0
Other civil society actors and groups	0.8
<b>Social partners and other actors</b>	<b>0.7</b>
Total	100
N	131

**Table 10: Forms of claims (1995-2002)**

<b>Political decisions</b>	<b>10.7</b>
<b>Public statements</b>	<b>76.2</b>
<b>Conventional political actions</b>	<b>7.5</b>
Judicial action	.1
Other conventional political actions	7.4
<b>Protest actions</b>	<b>5.6</b>
Demonstrative actions	4.9
Confrontational actions	.7
Violent actions	.0
Total	100%
N	2019



**Table 11: Average position of actors towards unemployed and workers (1995-2002)**

	All claims		Claims on workers		Claims on unemployed	
	Av. pos.	N	Av. pos.	N	Av. pos.	N
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>1092</b>	<b>0.50</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>0.41</b>	<b>642</b>
Governments	0.55	276	0.55	116	0.54	160
Legislative and political parties	0.47	533	0.59	227	0.37	306
Judiciary	0.32	34	0.27	15	0.37	19
State agencies	0.35	193	0.25	57	0.40	136
Other state actors	0.16	56	0.20	35	0.10	21
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>0.21</b>	<b>862</b>	<b>0.30</b>	<b>638</b>	<b>0.65</b>	<b>254</b>
Labor organizations and groups	0.80	176	0.80	143	0.79	33
Employers' organizations and groups	-0.31	417	-0.53	339	0.63	78
Unemployed organizations and groups	1.0	6	0.00	0	1.00	6
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	0.91	44	0.82	11	0.94	33
Other civil society actors and groups	0.52	249	0.53	145	0.50	104
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>0.69</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>0.83</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>0.53</b>	<b>17</b>
Total		0.35		0.24		0.48
N		2019		1106		913

**Table 12: Parties involved in claim-making in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

	All claims		Claims on workers		Claims on unemployed	
	Av. pos.	N	Av. pos.	N	Av. pos.	N
<b>Left parties</b>	<b>0.68</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>0.58</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>0.78</b>	<b>78</b>
Socialist party	0.67	132	0.54	63	0.80	69
Greens	0.73	22	0.79	14	0.63	8
Other leftist parties	0.60	5	0.50	4	1.00	1
<b>Right and center-right parties</b>	<b>0.28</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>0.51</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>0.80</b>	<b>130</b>
Christian-democratic party	0.46	46	0.46	24	0.45	22
Free-democratic party	0.24	134	0.47	57	0.06	77
Swiss people's party	0.13	46	0.57	21	-0.24	25
Other right and center-right parties	0.54	13	0.86	7	0.17	6
<b>Extreme right parties</b>	<b>0.25</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>0.33</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>0.20</b>	<b>5</b>
Total		0.43		0.54		0.34
N		406		193		213

**Table 13: Odds ratio and mean of the predicted probability of the logistic regression model analyzing the impact of time, form and issue of claim and the type of actor to the probab that a claim aims the unemployed as first objects (dependent variable: object)**

		N	Model 1: year		Model 2: form		Model 3 : type of actor		Model 4: issue		Full model
			Exp(B)	mean pp	Exp(B)	mean pp	Exp(B)	mean pp	Exp(B)	mean pp	Exp(B)
<b>year</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	2019	***	0.45							***
(ref: 2002, N=425)	YEAR(1) (1995)	249	***2.044	0.56							**1.804
	YEAR(2) (1996)	280	**1.547	0.49							1.345
	YEAR(3) (1997)	261	***2.117	0.57							1.467
	YEAR(4) (1998)	219	***1.894	0.54							1.371
	YEAR(5) (1999)	163	***1.914	0.55							**1.875
	YEAR(6) (2000)	197	*0.648	0.29							**0.477
	YEAR(7) (2001)	225	***0.54	0.25							*0.573
	ref. 2002	425		0.39							
<b>form</b>	<b>SFORM</b>	2019			***	0.45					**
(ref: political decision, N=214)	ref. political decision	214				0.71					
	SFORM(1) (verbal statement)	1536			***0.312	0.44					1.157
	SFORM(2) (conventional protest action)	152			***0.282	0.41					0.709
	SFORM(3) (demonstrative protest action)	102			***0.103	0.21					**0.364
	SFORM(4) (confrontational protest action)	15			***0.061	0.13					0.842
<b>actor type</b>	<b>NEWACT3</b>	2019					***	0.45			***
(ref: pro unemployed NGO, N=293)	NEWACT3(1) (policy actors)	559					***1.716	0.60			**1.705
	NEWACT3(2) (political parties)	533					**1.535	0.57			1.296
	NEWACT3(3) (employer organisations)	417					***0.262	0.19			***0.446
	NEWACT3(4) (unions)	176					***0.263	0.19			*0.487
	NEWACT3(5) (unemployed organisations)	6					205.206	0.99			87.321
	NEWACT3(6)(other intermed.actors)	35					1.075	0.49			1.301
	ref. pro unemployed organisations	293						0.47			
<b>issues</b>	<b>TWOISS1</b>	2019								0.45	
(ref: welfare system, N=585)	TWOISS1(1) (socio-economic issue)	1434							***0.025	0.26	***0.031
	ref. welfare system	585								0.93	
	Constant		***0.628		***2.508		0.878		13.996		***9.733
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)		0.071		0.062		0.17		0.465		0.528

Notes: \*\*\* significance at a 0.001 level, \*\* significance at a 0.01 level, \* significance at a 0.05 level

pp: predicted probability

**Table 14: Odds ratio and mean of the predicted probability of the logistic regression model analyzing the impact of time, form and issue of claim and the type of actor to the probability that a claim expresses a positive discursive position towards the unemployed (dependent variable: positions towards constituency)**

		UNEMPLOYED N=913			WORKERS N=1106		
		N	Exp(B)	mean pp	N	Exp(B)	mean pp
<b>year</b>	<b>YEAR</b>	913	***	0.65		***	0.55
(ref: 2002)	YEAR(1) (1995)	140	***7.605	0.76	109	***3.196	0.60
	YEAR(2) (1996)	138	***4.52	0.73	142	***6.648	0.75
	YEAR(3) (1997)	149	***4.04	0.69	112	***7.691	0.75
	YEAR(4) (1998)	119	***5.558	0.76	100	***4.106	0.66
	YEAR(5) (1999)	89	***6.771	0.83	74	***3.407	0.61
	YEAR(6) (2000)	57	1.611	0.49	140	***2.961	0.60
	YEAR(7) (2001)	57	1.823	0.49	168	1.08	0.41
	ref 2002	164		0.38			0.32
<b>form</b>	<b>SFORM</b>	913		0.65		***	0.55
(ref: political decision)	ref. political decisions	153		0.65			0.57
	SFORM(1) (verbal statement)	674	0.987	0.63	862	1.223	0.47
	SFORM(2) (conventional protest action)	63	1.149	0.73	89	**3.322	0.83
	SFORM(3) (demonstrative protest action)	21	*6.809	0.90	81	***6.903	0.94
	SFORM(4) (confrontational protest action)	2	89.085	1.00	13	6.057	0.92
<b>actor type</b>	<b>NEWACT3</b>	913		* 0.65		***	0.55
(ref: pro unemployed NGO)	NEWACT3(1) (policy actors)	336	0.887	0.63	223	0.757	0.58
	NEWACT3(2) (political parties)	306	0.868	0.59	227	1.155	0.72
	NEWACT3(3) (employer organisations)	78	1.557	0.79	339	***0.154	0.20
	NEWACT3(4) (unions)	33	*3.823	0.79	143	***3.328	0.84
	NEWACT3(5) (unemployed organisations)	6	896.164	1.00	0		
	NEWACT3(6)(other intermed.actors)	17	0.654	0.59	18	*5.351	0.89
	ref. pro unemployed NGO	137		0.69			0.69
<b>issues</b>	<b>ISSUE</b>	913	***	0.65			0.55
(ref: welfare system)	SSISS1(1) (socio-economic issues)	367	***2.982	0.67	1067	0.688	0.54
	SSISS1 (2) (individual (re) insertion into the labor market)	237	***9.885	0.88	4	205.421	1.00
	SSISS1 (3) (issues relating to the constituency of the unemployed)	25	**4.384	0.72	13	0.28	0.46
	SSISS1 (4) other issues	0			5	3.558	0.80
	ref. welfare system	284		0.42			0.65
	Constant		***0.21			0.737	
	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup> (Nagelkerke)		0.319			0.432	

Notes: \*\*\* significance at a 0.001 level, \*\* significance at a 0.01 level, \* significance at a 0.05 level  
pp: predicted probability

**Table 15: Scope of actors, issues and addressees**

	Actors	Issues	Addressees
Supranational	1.6	1.0	0.6
European	1.2	0.9	1.3
Multi- and binational	0.3	0.3	0.3
National	55.0	59.1	32.6
Regional	17.4	16.6	11.7
Local	21.2	22.8	10.6
Unknown/unspecified.	3.2	0.2	42.9
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	2019	2019	634

**Table 16: Evolution of scope of actors 1995-2002**

	Year of occurrence of claim								Total
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
Supranational	2.0	.0	.0	.0	2.5	4.6	3.1	1.6	1.6
European	.0	.7	.0	.5	1.8	4.6	2.7	.7	1.2
Multi and bilateral	.4	.4	.0	.5	.0	2.0	.0	.0	.4
National	56.6	57.5	55.2	58.4	49.7	48.7	59.6	52.9	55.0
Regional	14.9	17.5	19.5	18.3	20.9	15.2	15.1	18.1	17.4
Local	20.1	21.4	22.2	19.6	20.9	15.7	18.7	26.1	21.2
unknown/unspec.	6.0	2.5	3.1	2.7	4.3	9.1	.9	.5	3.2
N	249	280	261	219	163	197	225	425	2019
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 17: Evolution of the scope of the issues 1995-2002**

	Year of occurrence of claim								Total
	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	
Supranational	.8	.7	.0	.0	.0	1.5	1.3	2.6	1.0
European	.4	.7	.4	.0	1.8	3.6	1.8	.0	.9
Multi and bilateral	.8	.0	.8	.9	.0	.5	.0	.0	.4
National	55.4	58.6	64.0	61.6	49.1	57.4	60.9	60.9	59.1
Regional	18.5	20.0	13.0	14.2	21.5	17.3	13.3	11.3	15.6
Local	24.1	19.6	21.8	23.3	27.6	18.3	22.2	25.2	22.8
unknown/unspec.	.0	.4	.0	.0	.0	1.5	.4	.0	.2
N	249	280	261	219	163	197	225	425	2019
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

**Table 18: Distribution of interviewees through actor categories and location**

	Local	National	Total
<b>Policy Actors</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Intermediary Actors</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>19</b>
Political parties	4	4	8
Trade unions	1	3	4
Employers' organization	1	3	4
Interregional policy counselors	0	3	3
<b>Pro-unemployed NGOs</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Unemployed organizations</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>
N	22	20	42

**Table 19 Most frequently mentioned influential organizations by actor type**

	Number of mentions										
	Policy		Intermediary		NGOs		Unemployed		Total		
	Nat.	Loc.	Nat.	Loc.	Nat.	Loc.	Nat.	Loc.	Nat.	Loc.	Tot.
State secretariat of economic affairs	3	4	13	5	2	8	0	3	18	20	38
USS	3	2	12	6	2	4	0	2	17	14	31
UPS	2	3	13	5	2	3	0	3	17	14	31
Social democratic party	3	2	11	6	2	4	0	2	16	14	30
Liberal democratic party	3	2	10	4	2	3	0	2	15	11	26
SIB	2	1	9	5	2	4	0	2	13	12	25
Regional employment offices	3	4	4	4	1	8	0	1	8	17	25
Economiesuisse	0	2	9	5	2	4	0	3	11	14	25
USAM	1	2	10	5	2	3	0	2	13	12	25
Christian democratic party	3	2	7	5	1	3	0	2	11	12	23

**Table 20: Most frequently mentioned targets by actor type**

	Number of mentions				
	Policy	Intermediary	NGOs	Unemployed	Total
State secretariat of economic affairs	5	13	4	1	23
Regional employment offices	2	4	4	3	13
UPS	1	8	1	1	11
Social democratic party	1	6	2	2	11
USS	1	5	2	1	9
SIB	0	3	3	2	8
UAPG	1	5	1	0	7
FTMH	0	3	2	1	6
Liberal democratic party	1	5	0	0	6
Economiesuisse	0	6	0	0	6
Christian democratic party	1	5	0	0	6

**Table 21: Most frequently mentioned collaborations by actor type**

	Number of mentions				
	Policy	Intermediary	NGOs	Unemployed	Total
State secretariat of economic affairs	5	7	2	1	15
Regional employment offices	4	3	3	3	13
USS	1	7	1	2	11
Hospice général	3	3	4	0	10
UPS	1	8	0	0	9
Caritas	0	3	5	1	9
FTMH	2	4	2	0	8
SIB	1	4	2	1	8
AOST	4	3	0	0	7
ADC Genève	1	4	0	2	7
USAM	1	5	0	0	6
CSP	0	2	3	1	6

**Table 22: Most frequently mentioned disagreements by actor type**

	Number of mentions				
	Policy	Intermediary	NGOs	Unemployed	Total
UPS	0	9	3	3	15
State secretariat of economic affairs	3	6	3	3	15
USS	0	9	0	3	12
USAM	1	8	1	2	12
economiesuisse	0	8	0	2	10
PDC	0	7	0	2	9
PS	1	6	0	1	8
Regional employment offices	0	3	1	4	8
PRD	0	6	0	2	8
UDC	0	6	0	2	8

**Table 23: Proportion of action forms according to actor type<sup>28</sup>**

	Policy actor		Intermediary		NGOs		Unemployed	
	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local
Media related	1	0.95	.97	.97	1	.55	1	.85
Informing the public	.25	.37	.57	.73	.4	.1	.6	.25
Negotiating/lobbying	.92	.92	1	.94	1	.94	1	.83
Consultation	.67	.92	.96	.79	.75	.4	0	.69
Court-action	.25	.75	0.3	.67	0	.38	1	.75
Political campaigns	n/a	n/a	.56	.72	.5	.04	.33	.33
Mobilizing the public	n/a	n/a	.44	.79	.44	.17	.13	.69

**Table 24: The extent of intra-organizational discussion of the role of the EU through different actor types**

	Discussion about EU			Total
	Lots of discussion	Some discussion	No discussion	
Policy actor	2	6	0	8
Intermediary actor	6	9	4	19
Pro-unemployed NGOs	0	2	8	10
N	8	17	12	37

NOTE: Results missing for the unemployed organizations.

**Table 25: Use of action forms at the European level**

yes	9
no	33
N	42

<sup>28</sup> Table 3 shows the distribution of standardized action form categories through different actor types and aims to capture the relative importance of the different action forms in relation to each other and in a form that is comparable thorough nations. Since the action form categories are comprised of different numbers of action forms and since there are different numbers of actors in each actor type category the values in table 3 have been standardized using the following steps: 1) add up all mentions (regular and occasional combined) of action forms within a category by actor types, 2) divide by the number of action forms in the category, and 3) divide by the number of actors in each actor type.




**Table 26: Estimated future importance of EU policies in the field of unemployment by actor type**

	Increasingly important	Unchanging
Policy actor	5	2
Intermediary actor	10	6
Pro-unemployed NGO's	4	3
Unemployed organizations	0	0
N	19	11


**Table 27: Appreciation of an eventual rise of the impact of EU policies**

	Strongly in favor	Rather in favor	Rather against	Strongly against	Missing	Total
Policy actor	0	2	1	0	5	8
Intermediary actor	0	7	3	5	4	19
Pro-unemployed NGO's	1	3	1	0	5	10
Unemployed organizations	0	1	0	0	0	1
N	1	13	5	5	14	38


**Figure 1: Number of claims and unemployment rate per year**



**Figure 2: Average discursive positions different actor types express with their claims aiming the unemployed, by issue**



**Figure 3: Average discursive positions different actor types express with their claims aiming the workers, by issue**





**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Chapter 5: Final report for France**

**Scientific Responsible: Didier Chabanet**

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction
  2. Basic parameters of the French policy approach
    - 2.1. Historical background and classification of the French Welfare State
    - 2.2. General overview of the French policy model
  3. Unemployment and public policy
    - 3.1. Development and structure of unemployment in France
    - 3.2. National policy instruments to fight unemployment
      - 3.2.1. Calculating unemployment rates
      - 3.2.2. Welfare measures/Workfare measures
  4. Public debates on Unemployment : the claims-making data
    - 4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis
    - 4.2. Media coverage of the French situation
    - 4.3. Public actors : who is involved in the media discourse
    - 4.4. Argumentative structure of the public discussion
      - 4.4.1. Thematic focus of the public discussion
      - 4.4.2. Frames
      - 4.4.3. Targets of claims
      - 4.4.4. Forms of claims
    - 4.5. The role of the EU in public discourse
  5. Political deliberation in the field of labour market policies
    - 5.1. Organisational networks
    - 5.2. Action forms of actors
    - 5.3. Role of the Unemployed
    - 5.4. Role of the EU
  6. Conclusion
- Appendix : list of interviewed actors.

## 1. Introduction

France is the only developed economy in which, over a quarter of a century, the level of unemployment exceeds 9% of the active population, whereas 20% of the potential labour force has been excluded from the labour market, while the participation rate remains the lowest for the whole OECD area (58%, of which 48% for the private sector). The problem of unemployment is examined from a political perspective (how elections can be won or lost over the unemployment question), from an economic perspective (how governments weigh unemployment against other economic objectives), and from a social perspective (the effect unemployment has on ordinary people). The govt. of France successfully brought down unemployment rate from 12% to 9.7% in 2004. However, it still remains higher than other European countries' standard.

The following report aims to analysis the main issues of the public policy debate in France. We also wish to underscore the role and influence of the European Union on French public debates. We are particularly interested in knowing how inclusive or exclusive these public debates are with reference to interests groups (especially precarious groups and unemployed people). Here we present the findings of the French project. First, we give an overview of the unemployment policy field in France. Second, we present our data on claim-making within one of the main French newspaper (*Le Monde*). Finally, using more qualitative interviews, we analyse deeply the political deliberation and the organisational network in the field of labor market policy.

## 2. Basic parameters of the French policy approach

The Welfare State corresponds to an economic and social model in which the state, and more generally the authorities – state, local government, social security bodies – play a major role in regulating the economy and redistributing wealth. Thus the term designates the existing set of social welfare mechanisms created to cover beneficiaries against everyday risks.

### 2.1. *Historical background and classification of the French Welfare State*

In France the first state welfare experiments date from the late 19th century. At that time state intervention was limited to protection for the most vulnerable: women and children at work, trade union organisation, rules of hygiene, etc. State protection outside these domains was negatively perceived as an infringement of freedom, but gradually gained recognition in the light of the effects of industrialisation. The end of World War II in France saw a marked expansion of the Welfare State. In a country with a strong tradition of state intervention – at least since the 17th century and Colbert – this approach gained rapid acceptance, especially as it fitted with the dominant postwar modes of thought: socialism, classically interventionist; Gaullism, with its faith in state action; and Christian democracy, bent on making people the focus of public-sector measures. The state became a core actor in the economy via a series of nationalisations and planning described by General de Gaulle as a "burning obligation". Most importantly of all, from 1945 onwards the Welfare State became for most salaried workers a comprehensive system of social welfare involving health insurance, family allowances, coverage of accidents in the workplace, retirement pensions and, after 1958, unemployment benefits.

Financed by contributions paid by management and labour under state supervision, Social Security initially covered only salary earners. Gradually it was extended to the entire population, with special allowance for individual professions – farmers, tradesmen, etc. Taxation came to play a part in funding and the role of the state increased. Social welfare was born with the shift from work to employment (Castel, 1995). Employment meant having a job that provided security in respect of such hazards as accidents, unemployment, etc. These hazards were at first linked to work – the first

risk insured against, in 1898, was that of the accident in the workplace – and then, increasingly, to social life as well. Social welfare developed within individual professions, progressing more quickly in some sectors – railways, mining – than in others such as farming. The system was one of redistribution, requiring that each person pay contributions to a fund – a company or group of companies – with the money then being distributed according to individual needs.

The Welfare State is now in crisis. The problems of the social welfare system began in the 1970s and now take three forms:

**A financial crisis:** Contributions and benefits are rising, and the budget with them. In 1996 welfare benefits represented one-third of GDP, but it should be pointed out that the proportion of benefits in GDP is larger than that of contributions: this means that spending is exceeding income, the result being a mounting deficit. To overcome these problems, the state must have recourse to taxation: Parliament thus takes on a central role within the system, while that of management and labour is weakened. Welfare benefits have risen considerably. In 1995 they were estimated at a little under 1000 billion francs. Total retirement benefits rise regularly and substantially: in 1995 they accounted for 50% of welfare payments. The proportion of unemployment and RMI benefits is also on the rise. The Social Security budget now represents some 2000 billion francs of public money – more than the central state budget – and is mostly in deficit, even if, for the first time in 25 years, there was a surplus in 1999.

**An efficiency crisis:** Poverty has not been eliminated and is even showing a tendency to increase. At the close of the 1980s there were 52 million poor in the European Union. In France, where the poverty line was 3500 francs per month in 1997, the Minimum Welfare Payment (RMI) currently has 3.5 million monthly recipients. According to recent Ministry of Labour and Welfare statistics, 6 million French people can be considered "socially excluded" and constituting what some call the "fourth world". Of all the factors contributing to the rise of poverty in the wealthy countries, unemployment is doubtless the most significant. France had only 200,000 unemployed in 1972, as against 2 million today. Temporary work, fixed term contracts and apprenticeships and training courses not leading to stable employment are only adding to social precarity.

**A legitimacy crisis:** According to some commentators the Welfare State erodes personal responsibility, benefit payments sometimes running counter to social integration and tending to lock beneficiaries into the aid system. In general and historical terms, social welfare is basically founded on employment. Thus the employment slump jeopardises the welfare system, as some people are increasingly less well protected. When Universal Health Cover was introduced to guarantee health care for all in 1999, 150,000 people had no form of coverage. A shift takes place here from the notion of insurance to that of assistance, a problematical situation in that the underlying principle is no longer reciprocity but dependence.

## ***2.2. General overview of the French policy model***

In his book<sup>29</sup>, Gosta Esping-Andersen identifies three ideal-types. Working from a genetic approach to the construction of the social role of the state in different national configurations, he suggests three main styles of Welfare State functioning, based on three main variables that generate a comparative performance scale: the characteristics of social entitlements (universalist, minimalist/assistance-orientated, insurance based); the effects of redistribution in terms of social stratification; and the kind of linkage between the state/market and the family. The core aspect of his analysis lies in the evaluation of the decommodification, or demerchandising, of work value, i.e. the variable level of freedom market participants enjoy, within different systems, regarding the need to sell their work value on the capitalist production market in order to achieve an acceptable standard of living.

<sup>29</sup> Esping-Andersen, Gosta, *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton University Press, 1990.

The first type of Welfare State is described as socialist, as in Sweden; the second is considered socio-christian, as in Germany; and the third, liberal, as in the United States. Each model has its ultimate goal. For the socialist, individual independence leaves the individual alone in the face of state apparatus; for the socio-christian there is the "conservative, traditional, Catholic principle of subsidiarity" – associated, although not without certain tensions – with the principle of authority; and for the liberal, autonomy within the market context, leaving open the possibility of progressive individual and social trajectories. Esping-Andersen has few illusions about the contradictions within each of these models. In Sweden conflict is developing between the overwhelmingly male employees of the private production sector and the largely female members of the public sector. In Germany the substantial earnings of those in work are sustained by the high productivity of the private sector and thus block entry to the labour market for those still outside it. In the United States he points up racial competition, a marked improvement in the situation of black groups leading him to expect marginalisation of Latinos.

France cannot be readily identified with Esping-Andersen's conservative model. To evaluate the French model solely in terms of its corporative, compulsory insurance aspect is to downplay the model born of the French Revolution ("the rights of the poor over society") and the National Public Assistance model of the Third Republic. The history of "French-style" social security has also shown the extent to which the social security project as conceived in the immediate postwar period was characterised above all by the failure to choose between the two major models then available: Bismarck and Beveridge. This explains why the French model is frequently presented as a mixed system, between Bismarck and Beveridge, seeking to get the most out of each. The Bismarck model is seen as dominant until the late 1980s with, since then, a mounting Beveridge tendency illustrated by: recourse to taxation for coverage of certain risks – "family welfare" or "dependency", for example; efforts in favour of a universal system, in the health field; and enhancement of the part played by optional and private insurance.

Identification of France with the German model likewise runs into trouble on the issue of administration of funds by those who finance them – employers and workers – since the state's role is clearly becoming steadily more central. Other points of difference exist between the two countries, such as their policies on intervention in respect of families and demography, with the impact these have on families and women. In terms of policies supporting working women via child care, France is perhaps closer to Sweden than to Germany.

The French Welfare State is generally seen as matching no single type, but rather as combining conservative and social-democratic elements, although with the emphasis on the former. Certain characteristics should be highlighted. For example, health spending represents 9% of France's GDP. Administration of social security is centralised. The debate over Universal Health Cover (CMU) turned on the two million people not covered by the health section of the system – some 3% of the population. The "family risk" was covered until recently by a universal-type programme – family allowances – while the "unemployment risk" is covered by an insurance-based one. There is no clear distinction between assistance and insurance. Use of taxation to meet welfare costs – with the creation and extension of the CSG contribution, for instance – tends to link insurance and solidarity.

### **3. Unemployment and public policy**

For the last three and a half years unemployment in France has been falling substantially and continuously. This change allows for an optimistic approach to the new millennium and – plausibly – the issue of full employment. As the year begins a summary of the distribution of the benefits of the fall in unemployment points up the broad nature of this improvement. The young are the first to have benefited from economic recovery, but the decrease affects all categories to a greater or lesser

extent, whatever their sex, age, educational level, social class or area of residence. Even the long-term unemployed have benefited, to the point where the proportion of job seekers they represent has declined. More generally, the improvement on the labour front has brought a reduction of another form of under-use of human resources: forced part-time work.

The picture contains, however, a number of grey areas that make prospects of a continued fall in unemployment uncertain. Some disparities have been cut back, but many remain, and these indicate inequality in respect of unemployment, especially where the level of education is concerned. Unemployment among the oldest groups shows very little improvement, in spite of continuing incentives to retirement. Another issue is that of the permanence of the jobs found, in particular by young people, and the prospects for those most enduringly excluded from the labour market.

At the end of December 2000 the number of unemployed persons (I) in France stood at 2,400,000, or 9.2% of the working population. This figure is considerably higher than those observed, at the end of November 2000, in the United States (4.0%), Japan (4.7%) and most of our European neighbours (an average of 8.1% for the Europe of 15)<sup>30</sup>. In Europe only Italy (10.0% in October 2000) and Spain (13.6%) have a higher rate of unemployment than France. The French rate nonetheless is something of a feat, given the magnitude of the reduction required to get below the symbolic 10% threshold in April 2000. In addition, this encouraging change, the outcome of strong growth and a dynamic employment policy, extended to all regions of the country, without exception.

It should be pointed out that in June 1997, the number of unemployed reached a historic level: 3,230,000 people, or 12.6 of the working population. Since then, however, unemployment has been falling almost continuously, apart from shortlived rises in August 1998, May and August 1999 and July 2000. In three and a half years the number of unemployed has dropped by 830,000 and the unemployment rate by 3.4 points. This decrease is remarkable in terms both of duration and rapidity, and we have to go back to the late 1980s to find a period of decline almost as long. Between March 1987 and May 1990 the unemployment rate fell by 1.9 points, from 10.7% to 8.8%. Unemployment had also fallen, temporarily, between May 1994 and July 1995, with 275,000 people fewer out of work and a drop of 1.1% in the unemployment rate.

The current rate of decrease is also a feat in international terms. In a year, from November 1999 to November 2000, France's unemployment rate fell by 1.7 points, on average twice as fast as for its main European partners (-0.8% for the Europe of 15). Thus France is currently leading Europe in reduction of the unemployment rate, ahead of Spain (-1.4 points in a year), Italy (-0.8 points) and the United Kingdom (-0.5 points)<sup>31</sup>.

### ***3.1. Development and structure of Unemployment in France***

The pronounced fall in unemployment over three and a half years mainly reflects a return to sustained economic growth in France. For the period 1997-2000 the Gross Domestic Product rose on average by almost 3% per year, compared with around 1% for the period 1991-96, notably affected by the 1993 recession. This new dynamism brought with it a remarkable rise in employment: 230,000 jobs were created in 1997, 392,000 in 1998, 450,000 in 1999 and, according to the latest INSEE estimates, no fewer than 560,000 on 2000. Thus in four years the number of persons in employment rose by over 1.6 million. This is almost twice as many for the period 1987-90, when, despite stronger average growth, employment had risen only by 900,000. This reflects the fact either that growth generated new jobs over the recent period or that the apparent rise in productivity slowed down.

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<sup>30</sup> Source: Eurostat.

<sup>31</sup> Source: Eurostat.



This growth-induced increase in the number of jobs is partly attributable to employment policy, much more dynamic in recent years than at the time of the recovery phase in the late 1980s. A range of measures was implemented, aimed at creating jobs via work-sharing and reducing the cost of work. Thus the measures for reducing employer contributions on low salaries, gradually put into effect since 1993, appear to have allowed for creation of at least 100,000 jobs since 1997. This cost-reduction measure has notably proved advantageous, at least initially, for employers of part-time workers. Moreover, part-time hiring with entitlement to reduced employer contributions has risen markedly in recent years, involving 440,000 persons by the end of 2000. These incentives have accentuated the trend to shorter working hours, the proportion of part-time workers in the competitive sectors having risen from 11% to 15% between 1993 and 2000. However, a slowdown began in 1998, when exoneration from employer contributions began to become less attractive<sup>32</sup>. The measures in favour of part-time work were gradually supplanted by others from Robien (in force in 1996-98) and Aubry, designed to reduce the working week to 35 hours. These latter can be seen as having generated almost 210,000 jobs in four years.

The fall in unemployment is appreciable both in its extent and its across-the-board character: all groups of unemployed persons have benefited. Admittedly, major inequalities persist in terms of vulnerability to unemployment, but some of them – relating to age and social class – have tended to decline, a result partly due to employment policy provisions specifically aimed at the youngest and least qualified persons. In addition to the drop in the number of unemployed, the benefits of an improved labour market are also reflected in the decline of under-employment for those working part-time.

The number of unemployed has fallen markedly, but what of the quality of the new jobs in question? Over the period 1997-2000, the proportion of temporary and fixed-term contracts has continued to rise, from 8% to 9.6% for competitive employment. The proportion of fixed-term contracts has remained almost stable at around 5.5%, but the use of temporary workers has risen considerably, from 2.6 to 4%. Thus temporary jobs represent 27% of the rise in competitive jobs (excluding state and local government posts). These kinds of changes raise questions about the lasting character of the benefits of reduced unemployment.

Even if the improved employment context has benefited all categories of workers, inequalities still exist that raise questions about the future of the labour market and, especially, the likelihood of changes in what is called "structural" unemployment. These persistent gaps – some of which have been reduced, however – point up a disparity between available labour skills and the type of work being offered, the effects of queuing and the existence of social discrimination. By 2000, after three years of falling unemployment, some categories of the population were very close to full employment: management, the professions and intermediate occupations and people with a post-baccalaureate diploma, degree or postgraduate qualifications. At the same time the categories most exposed to unemployment are still the least educated, the least qualified, young people, women and immigrants.

The statistics on long-term unemployment (one year or more) are particularly important, for they allow an appraisal of the extent to which the combination of improvements on the labour market and employment assistance policies have led (or failed to lead) to inroads into hardcore unemployment. The various indicators available are unequivocal as to the fall in long-term

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<sup>32</sup> On the one hand, where the policy of an overall reduction of labour costs is concerned, the lowering of contributions is calculated pro rata according to the time worked since 1 January 1998. On the other hand, within the framework of the second law on reducing working hours (January 2000), the entitlement to reduction ceases after a transitional period of a year, starting from the date when the legal working week was reduced to 35 hours.

unemployment, but do not agree as to its extent. According to the French statistical institute INSEE, between the high point of March 1998 and March 2000, the number of long-term unemployed rose in terms of ILO criteria by 200,000. Their proportion of all unemployed fell in those two years from 41% to 40%, but for the oldest – the 50+ age bracket – there was no fall: between the two dates the rate rose from 60% to 61%.

However, the statistics provided by the French national employment agency ANPE show a far more spectacular fall in long-term unemployment. After peaking at 1.2 million in January 1998, the number of category 1 long-term unemployed is described as having fallen by 470,000. Their proportion among category 1 job seekers is said to have peaked at 40% in June 1998, then fallen by 7 points to 33% in December 2000.

Apart from the uncertainties about the future, the picture in terms of lower unemployment since 1997 seems positive. No category of the population was really excluded from the labour market pickup, and in three and a half years the number of unemployed fell by more than a quarter. Thus between March 1997 and March 2000, 440,000 fewer households were affected by unemployment.

### ***3.2. National policy instruments to fight Unemployment***

To receive unemployment benefit, the applicant must meet one of the following criteria: have been dismissed (including for serious offences) ; have had his contract interrupted by his employer during the trial period. Other situations giving rise to entitlement: the end of a retraining agreement; the end of a fixed-term contract

Benefit entitlement: the full rate is 40.4% of the daily base salary, plus a fixed payment of 9.94 euros per day. Benefit cannot be lower than 24.24 euros per day or 57.4% of the daily base salary. It cannot exceed 75% of the daily base salary (amounts since 1 July 2002). Benefit is paid on a sliding scale: it gradually decreases – after a period of payment varying according to age and length of contribution period – by six-month periods. Minimum benefit is 17.37 euros per day (528,34 euros per month) or 21.77 euros per day for unemployed persons over age 52 and meeting certain criteria (amounts since 1 July 2002).

Financing of unemployment insurance comes from contributions paid by employees and employers. This is a joint system run by the Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce (UNEDIC). The so-called solidarity fund, fully financed by the state budget, takes over from the insurance system when the latter does not apply or ceases to apply.

The new UNEDIC agreement, was proclaimed on 6 December 2000 with a validity of 3 years (31 December 2003). Its application, which modifies considerably the unemployment insurance system, took effect on 1 July 2001. Transitional measures were included for unemployed persons receiving benefit on 31 December 2000, those accepted until 30 June 2001, and long-term seekers of employment. A new system known as the Assisted Return to Employment Plan (PARE) went into operation on 1 July 2001. It is based on the principle of personalised assistance for the applicant: evaluation of professional capacities, definition of training needs, etc. The other modifications of the preceding agreement mainly concern payments to and follow-up of unemployed persons, assistance granted and the lowering of contributions. Persons admitted before 1 July 2001 may opt for the new set of regulations, in which case the amount of their benefit will be that applying the day before they took this option. Persons not taking the option will remain subject to sliding scale unemployment benefits and will not have access to the Personalised Action Project.

Benefits for the unemployed are extended, notably including – since 1 January 2001 – inclusion of workers in insecure jobs who can provide proof of 4 months' work over the preceding 18 months. In addition, the delay before the first payment is reduced to 7 days instead of 8 and does not apply in cases of readmission after a period of less than 12 months since the previous admission. New forms of assistance for reintegration are planned: assistance with training and geographical mobility, and sliding-scale assistance to employers hiring a person unemployed for 12 months or more.

The work of the ANPE national employment agency has been important over recent years, with the number of job offers collected increasing threefold between 1992 and 2000 (3.2m offers) and permanent employment contracts up by 19% in 1999-2000. Additional facilities were provided by the state as part of the Progress Contract 1999/2003: 1900 extra posts were created to implement the "New Departure" programme. Further facilities are planned by the UNEDIC, corresponding to the increased workload for staff involved in creating and monitoring the Personalised Action Projects (PAP). Included in the 2002 state budget, these provisions are intended to cover the French National Plan of Action against Poverty and Social Exclusion. They involve a staff increase of some 25% and an ANPE budget increase of around 50% by the end of 2002. All new job seekers signing on (current total approx. 3.5 million) will be entitled to a PAP each year; to these must be added for 2001 and 2002 job seekers already signed on and also wishing to benefit from a PAP. All in all the agreement anticipates recruitment of 3650 persons by July 2002.

Since being set up the PARE continues to expand: 700,000 new admissions and 400,000 unemployed persons already identified are now on the new track. A year from now all those receiving the Minimum Welfare Payment will be concerned. Disengagement by the UNEDIC has created certain funding problems and this has forced the state to intervene.

In the PARE signed at the time of signing on, and together with the request for benefit, the ASSEDIC undertakes to pay benefit if the claimant meets the obligations regarding seeking employment as laid down by the Labour Code, and to facilitate reclassification of job seekers in partnership with the ANPE. The job seeker commits him or herself to an in-depth interview with the ANPE in the months following signing-on, as a preliminary to setting up the PAP. The ASSEDIC regularly monitors such undertakings, with closer checks if there is no return to employment at 6 and 12 months.

The interview provides the chance to evaluate the job seeker's autonomy in looking for work. For those likely to run into difficulties in finding a job, a check is run on their overall professional capabilities. The job seeker may request this check if it is not offered. Results are confidential. The in-depth interview leads to the signing of a PAP, which determines: the kinds of work matching the applicant's qualifications and capabilities, at the prevalent wage and in the geographical area concerned; the kind of work the applicant would be willing to be retrained for; the training needed to find a job that fits with the Project, priority being given to training carried out as part of a contract. An out of work wage earner who takes acceptable personal steps in this direction is regarded as having fulfilled his commitments.

If the person concerned has not found work after 6 months, the PAP is updated, finally leading to an in-depth summary of skills. If no appropriate job has been offered after 12 months, the measures needed to reclassify him or her in respect of other, normally paid work are reinforced. Sliding-scale assistance to the employer is one such measure.

Rights and back-up for beneficiary during the PARE: obtaining of the ARE, within the limits provided for, plus assistance with geographical mobility and training if necessary, for persons

unemployed for 12 months and longer; sliding-scale assistance to the hiring employer; appraisal of professional capabilities; in-depth skills summary; training programmes as laid down in the PAP. The ARE is to be paid during periods of unemployment and of training, replacing the former AUD and the reclassification allowance (AFR). If the job seeker observes all the administrative rules, he may draw the ARE for a maximum of 30 months, with an extension for those over 50. PARE benefits do not decrease over time.

### *3.2.1. Calculating Unemployment rates*

Measuring unemployment is a complex business and generates considerable controversy. It would seem that calculation of rates has involved more or less well intentioned improvisation and that official figures no longer reflect the true situation. The two main bodies publishing unemployment data are the ILO (International Labour Office) and the ANPE (French National Employment Agency). The ILO uses the employment survey carried out annually – usually in March – by the INSEE (National Institute of Statistics), while the ANPE uses the DEFM (End-of-Month Demand for Employment). The INSEE survey used by the ILO is based on a representative choice of households. The interviewer fills out a questionnaire from answers provided by a member of the household. Since 1968 a survey has been carried out each year in March, except in census years, when the Employment Survey takes place some two months later than usual. With each census the sample group is changed and the questionnaire is modified, factors which make it difficult to establish a connection between successive series of surveys.

On 31 October 2001 the INSEE announced that it would adopt a different method of calculation of official unemployment figures for France from 16 November 2001. Two days earlier the OFCE economic research unit had voiced criticisms of the existing method and called on the INSEE to make changes. Unlike many foreign institutes of statistics, which use monthly or quarterly employment surveys aimed at a representative sample of the population, the INSEE uses an annual survey carried out in March. For the other months the unemployment rate is calculated in the light of changes in the number of job seekers in the ANPE's categories 1 to 6, with correction based on two other variables: employment shifts in the temporary field (monthly information provided by the UNEDIC) and company formation.

The INSEE is going to use a new series to calculate the unemployment rate month by month: this is the total of category 1, 2 and 3 end-of-month job seekers registered with the ANPE, but excluding all persons having had reduced employment in the course of the month, i.e. having worked at least an hour in the preceding week. Measurement of unemployment using only category 1 was long criticised, for successive governments were able to transfer unemployed persons from this to other categories by giving the necessary instructions to ANPE agents. We can conclude that on average temporary workers working less than half-time are going to be eliminated from the new INSEE calculations. This should allow the INSEE to produce an unemployment rate stabilised at 9%, rather than one close to 11% and, especially, likely to rise rapidly. For with the downturn, it is temporary workers who are likely to be hit first.

ANPE calculations: At the end of each month the total count is made of job seekers registered with the Agency who have not found work or have signed off. The basic measure is the "End-of-Month Demand for Employment" (DEFM) for category 1: unemployed persons, immediately available, in search of permanent, full-time work. Since March 1983 the DEFM for other categories have also been published: the DEFM for categories 2 and 3 – respectively seekers of part-time and seasonal or temporary work – allow for the rounding out of unemployment calculation.

To be counted as unemployed in the ILO sense, one must "not have worked even an hour during the reference week". So in the first three DEFM categories, we must single out those who have done no work whatsoever in the course of the month if we are to get close to the ILO concept of unemployment. Categories 6, 7 and 8 were created in June 1995: until then the ANPE made no distinction between job seekers who had worked more than 78 hours and the others.

There also exists an effective method of bringing unemployment figures down: used by certain politicians, it is known as "statistical camouflage" and can involve creation of "emploi jeunes" jobs for the young, and a hike in the number of fixed-term contracts. These contribute to a temporary fall in unemployment – often just before an electoral period.

### 3.2.2. *Welfare measures/Workfare measures*

Social welfare in France is a reaction to social exclusion. Here the "Durkheim conception of reality" determines the way in which society perceives itself: the emphasis is on unity of the social body, as filtered through the concept of integration. Many observers have demonstrated that French theorisation of social differentiation had undergone a shift from analysis in terms of class to one in terms of inequalities, the outcome being the social exclusion paradigm. France sees poverty as a matter of exploitation and power, rather than as an issue of identity and morality.

This view of things takes the form of a common cause approach, via the notion of social integration. Integration is a transversal notion and part of all public policy: access to employment, to rights such as health care and accommodation, and "neighbourhood policy". The Minimum Welfare Payment (RMI), which embodies this view of national solidarity, is based on two major innovations: it rejects the split between groups fit to work and those not – in this it also rejects the standard notion of deservingness – and recognises the right to assistance and to social integration. The RMI is not just another programme, brought in to round off the existing range of benefits; it is part of a recasting of the methods and techniques of social intervention. The entire nation being involved, the same rules should apply, more or less, throughout the national territory.

By contrast "workfare", whose modes of application are determined locally, is considered a duty for welfare recipients. It is the "payback" demanded by society in line with the twin aims of restoring the work ethic and cutting welfare costs. It is a category-based duty, however, as it applies to those of the poor who receive financial assistance and are socially recognised as employable. The person fulfilling these two criteria is the single mother, workfare's favourite category being the family. Workfare is also a tool of family policy, being used to restore "suitable" domestic structures.

These two models – the RMI and workfare – highlight two different versions of the beneficiary. The RMI exists to achieve reintegration of socially excluded persons seen as the unwilling victims of current social change. As a result the integration process, far from being limited to the margins of society, involves society in its entirety: it is a national imperative, a question of active citizenship. Integration is the social institution that allows the body politic and society to win the battle against anomie. Workfare, by contrast, seeks to "treat" passively dependent individuals by modifying their dysfunctional values and behaviour. The goal of workfare is the return of dependent persons to the mainstream after a battle involving not society against itself, but society against its poor. This emphasis on their differences, however, should not mask the fact that the two systems insist on the importance of work as a tool for helping the poor. Workfare and integration reveal the gradual overlaying of the work ethic on that of the Welfare State. In both cases the interpretative approach and the concepts utilised can be the same: interest is taken in work within the framework of an institution whose specific function is the treatment of poverty.

## 4. Public discourse on Unemployment : the claims-making data

From the outset a number of general indications can be drawn. Firstly, despite substantial quantitative differences from one year to the next, the number of claims is always high, which indicates that the subject is a constant feature of public debate. Basically the relative persistence of claims can be explained by anxieties linked to the economic and political situation in France. Obviously one vital question is whether or not the number of claims in France is directly linked to shifts in unemployment. It would be logical to see a connection between the two phenomena, as indicated by work of a historical bent (Richards, 2002) or focusing on more recent periods (Giugni and Berclaz, 2003). The connection is not automatic: it also – very largely, in fact – depends on national political circumstances and opportunities. Looking beyond the strictly political field, the number of claims also depended on public debate about proposed changes to the length of the working week. From 1997 onwards a large number of claims had to do with this issue and with suppositions as to the effects of a 35-hour week on employment. Similarly, any change to the way unemployment rates are calculated or benefit paid – as in 1995 – provokes reactions and a consequent increase in claims.

#### ***4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis***

We present the results of the coding of public political claim making on issues pertaining to unemployment and employment policy. Claims referring to related fields (i.e. employment policy, economic development policy, and other issues concerning the labour market situation or the creation of jobs) were coded only if they explicitly referred to the issue field of unemployment. The data consist of newspaper print media coverage of reported acts of political claim making in France for the period 1995-2002. A political claim can take three main forms: 1. Political decision (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure, etc.); 2. Verbal statement (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention, etc.); 3. Protest action (demonstration, occupation, violence, etc.). All claims taking one of these forms have been coded, provided that they fell within the field of unemployment and employment policy. Purely factual information, editorial commentaries and simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors are excluded. Specifically, we coded all claims reported in the Thursday and Saturday issues of *Le Monde*, the major French national daily. The entire newspaper was coded, but its supplements, especially *Le Monde économie* and *Le Monde emploi-initiatives* were excluded.


The total number of claims for the period under consideration is 687. Relatively low – compared to the results of other Unempol research partners – this figure can in large part be explained in terms of method. A collective decision was taken not to include the claims contained in the weekly *Le Monde* supplements *Le Monde économie* and *Le Monde emploi-initiatives*, in which a large number of subjects relating to unemployment and the labour market are examined.

#### ***4.2. Media coverage of the French situation***

Since the late 1970s and the beginning of the slump, problems to do with employment have always been considered by most French people as the first or second (after crime) major concern. Overall, attention to the issue of employment and countering unemployment has been increased by the fact that the results obtained are not particularly satisfying, especially for the periods 1995-97 and 2001-02. Basically the relative persistence of claims can be explained by anxieties linked to the economic and political situation in France. 1995 was an important date in this respect, as it brought together several factors likely to foment anxiety and affect the stances on unemployment taken by French actors. The year was above all marked by the social upheavals of November-December, the largest-scale mobilisation since May 1968 and an active reflection of multiple dissatisfactions. In this case a feeling of unease – due to the decline of the labour market, increasing job insecurity, uncertainty

about retirement benefit levels and public services, and more generally the lack of job prospects for an increasingly large number of people – found very clear expression. This time of crisis – together with the resultant demands – can be put down to the conjunction of macroeconomic and political factors that unambiguously raised the issue of unemployment and changes in the labour market.

Obviously one vital question is whether or not the number of claims in France is directly linked to shifts in unemployment.



It would be logical to see a connection between the two phenomena, as indicated by work of a historical bent or focusing on more recent periods. At the same time it is known that actors generally do not mobilise when problems are reaching their culmination, but much more so according to their perception of the problems, the frustrations they feel and what they see as possible ways out of the situation (Gurr, 1970). The table above confirms this analysis. The connection is not automatic: it also – very largely, in fact – depends on national political circumstances and opportunities. In this respect the election of a right-wing government in 1995 marked an exceptional period, characterised by a rapid, massive rise in unemployment and a worsening of political and industrial conflict. A rise in claims can also be observed during electoral campaign periods – well before the date of the elections – and especially in the case of a presidential election.

The national political and industrial relations context is indisputably largely responsible for the number of claims. At the same time, however, we must emphasise the importance of local contexts, especially in the South of France, in areas where unions are strong and unemployment is high. Over the period under consideration, unemployed workers organisations and some unions demanded that the ASSEDIC pay a "Christmas bonus" to the unemployed. Every year, between November and December, there is a slight increase in the number of claims.

To sum up, it should be noted that despite clear variations, the number of claims for the period remained relatively high. This seems to be related as much to national political debate and the configuration of actor-systems in the public arena as to the shift in unemployment rates. The

number of claims is certainly not independent of the economic situation, and in specific periods those involved in public debate must tackle the issue and give it meaning.

#### **4.3. Public actors : who is involved in the media discourse**

The government, the political parties, the trade unions, employer associations and unemployed worker groups are responsible for most of the stands taken regarding unemployment. The actors involved in putting these claims can be grouped, in descending order, in the following categories.

Workers' organisations and groups come in first (23,6%), with unions alone accounting for 20.1%. This illustrates the significance of union bodies in public debate. While France is the least unionised country in the EU, its unions enjoy considerable standing as institutional actors. Not all the unions have the same status, however, the CGT ranking much higher than the CFDT. This difference is explicable in terms of their highly contrasting strategies, the CGT having opted for vigorous challenge to liberal policies and support for unemployed workers organisations. The CFDT, on the other hand, has taken a less strong line on these issues and suffers from major internal difficulties that have hampered its capacity to make its voice heard.

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>37.8</b>
Governments	19.9
Legislative and political parties	15.1
Judiciary	1.5
State agencies	0.5
Other state actors	0.8
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>60.2</b>
Labour organisations and groups	23,6
Employers' organisations and groups	11.2
Unemployed organisations and groups	14.2
Non-state welfare organisations and groups	3.8
Other civil society actors and groups	7.7
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>1.7</b>
Total	100%

Employer groups and organisations represent 11.2% of all actors. In this category the CNPF (later to become the MEDEF) plays a dominant part. It is logical that these bodies should be less visible than workers' organisations, as they do not on the whole seek public involvement, preferring more discreet forms of action (Balme, Chabanet, Wright, 2002). At the same time they cannot be ignored in the French arena and their role is a considerable one.

Among state actors (37.8%), the government weighs in at 19.9%. Here we have confirmation of one of the main features of French political life in general, and one relevant to the employment issue: the central role of the executive. By contrast, the legal, legislative and administrative bodies dealing specifically with employment are very poorly represented (in all, 2.8%). This situation can be seen as indicating the importance of the employment problem, publicly dealt with by the highest authorities, and of the specifically political treatment it generally receives. If we look more closely, those who express themselves the most on the matter are the prime minister, the minister for employment, the President and government members in general – the highest ranking state figures.

Unemployment is indisputably a national priority, whatever the government. The treatment accorded it by the legislature and the political parties is of the same order (15.1%). The types of actors making claims varies according to the party in power and the major themes adopted by the



opposition. This means that claims come massively from left-wing parties when these are in opposition, and primarily from the unions when the opposite is the case. The left in opposition tends to appropriate industrial problems, while the right in opposition tends to espouse such liberal causes as competitiveness, crime and economic freedom.

The place occupied by unemployed worker groups and bodies is smaller (14.2%), but of significant proportions. This situation lends itself to a range of commentary. Drawing on a substantial literature (Lazarsfeld, Jahoda and Zeisel, 1981), one can put the emphasis on the invisibility of the actors concerned, their lack of resources and their difficulty in making their voice heard. At the same time it can be stressed that in spite of these handicaps they succeed in intervening publicly (which does not necessarily guarantee them real influence) to a greater extent than the powerful employer organisations.

The non-state social welfare bodies and groups (3.8%) and the other civil society organisations (7.7%) make claims in only a marginal or random way. It would be interesting to compare these figures with data from other countries, to see if this is a specifically French feature. It seems very likely that these actors suffer from the fact that the structure of the labour market is so highly regulated by the state in conjunction with management and labour.

#### ***4.4. Argumentative structure of the public discussion***

The public discussion involves the thematic focus around which the debates are organized, the frames (diagnostic and prognostic, that is the cognitive categories of argumentation), the targets and, finally, the forms of the claims.

##### *4.4.1. Thematic focus of claims*

Claim-making and political expression in the public arena on the topic of unemployment, can be divided into 4 distinct subject categories.

<b>1. Socio-economic issues regarding the labour market</b>	<b>37</b>
<b>2. Welfare systems and social benefits</b>	<b>35.8</b>
<b>3. Individual insertion in the labour market</b>	<b>14.1</b>
<b>4. Issues regarding the Unemployed groups</b>	<b>11.6</b>
<b>5. Other issues</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>100%</b>

The issues are unevenly spread over the four groups because the first two account for 72.8% of the coded claims. Initially this demonstrates that unemployment is very often seen not as a category problem but as a general, transversal one. The social and economic situation relative to the labour market emerges as the dominant theme with 37% of claims, followed by the role and place of the Welfare State, notably including the unemployment insurance system (35.8%). On the other hand unemployment is the subject of demands, analyses and decision-making that are not often specific or individualised (14.1%). Nor is it reduced to the existence of groups of unemployed persons whose behaviour and attitudes might constitute a major explanatory factor (11.6%), even if political mobilisations by groups of unemployed people were generously covered by the media for the period concerned (1995-2002).

Nonetheless, attention should be paid to the surprising extent of the articulation of political positions on unemployment and of those relative to the state and its social welfare system. More

<b>4. Issues regarding the make up of unemployed groups</b>	<b>11.6</b>
Functioning of unemployed associations in general	0.5
Political mobilisation	3.4
Other specific issues related to functioning of unemployed associations	0.5
Attitudes and psychological dispositions of the unemployed	5.3
Other issues relating to the composition of unemployed groups	1.9

than a third of the claims noted are concerned here, which is not the case in all the countries taking part in the study. In this respect France's political culture remains strongly marked by forms of market regulation that call on the state to intervene at least as arbitrator (the unemployment insurance system) and sometimes as protector (basic income support). This does not mean that recent years have been free of liberalisation and deregulation measures in the labour market area – in fact, the contrary is true. Many claims point up what some might see as a retreat on the part of the Welfare State.

Political points of view covered the composition of unemployed groups, their participation in associations and the mobilisation of these groups (3.4%) on the one hand, and the attitudes and psychological tendencies attributed to them on the other (5.3%).

**Unemployed groups.** The claims bearing specifically on unemployed groups/associations generally match with reactions to such collective mobilisations as the "unemployed marches" and the protests against factory closures first seen in 1995. Most of the claims date from the period 1995-97. Some of the criticism coming from political and trade union actors had to do with the legitimacy of these associations as bodies representing a transversal socioprofessional category. Some unions – the CFDT for instance – raised the possibility of creating an internal representation cell for the unemployed as a way of channelling this rising tide of mobilisation. In respect of the existence of unemployed associations, the question that arose was that of recognition for such groups as political actors and/or "welfare agents", and the need to give them official representation in the public institutions in charge of managing unemployment: ANPE, UNEDIC, etc.

**Attitudes and psychological dispositions of the unemployed.** This claims category was the major one in respect of the composition of unemployed groups, and became more so over time. Involved here are political points of view related to the development of workfare approaches. The tendency here is to see work as the core of social relationships, and this sits badly with policies like large-scale reduction of working hours and various passive employment measures. Generally speaking it is representatives of right-wing parties and employer bodies that we find expressing concern about the lack of real motivation of some unemployed people, the disastrous psychological consequences of assistance measures, and the "welfare trap" these measures are alleged to create: lock-in situations which, in the short term and from an economic point of view, the unemployed have no incentive to break out of. When the new unemployment insurance agreement was drawn up in 2001, this workfare-based view was visible in various proposals, some of them drawing on the English "Job Seekers Agreement", in favour of stopping benefit when a job is refused. Never used in France, this measure is regularly called for by the CNPF and the MEDEF, the largest employer organisation. Workfare finds its justification in the view that the unemployed need to be motivated by reductions in social assistance, and in an analysis of their capacities – of an employability that tends to diminish in line with the duration of the period of unemployment.

#### 4.4.2. Reasons of Unemployment and proposed solutions

The diagnostic frameworks refer to the causes of unemployment as formulated by the actor of the claim. In other words, they are the attribution of the blame or responsibility for the problem or situation.

Economic/technological	49.7
Political/Institutional	33.2
Social/Demographic	6.5
Cultural/Psychological	4.5
External	5.8
Other	0.3
Total	100%

The elements of the diagnosis are extremely varied and reflect the complexity of the unemployment phenomenon. Nonetheless, the economic/technological factors emerge clearly (49.7%) and represent close to half all causes. The fact that this category outstrips that of political/institutional causes (33.2%) is highly instructive. After more than 25 years of slumps and mass unemployment, most actors see unemployment as due to dysfunctions that are not political and so, in other words, are beyond the power of politicians to control. This belief is reflected in the view that all policies for combating unemployment, on the Right and on the Left, have totally failed. This kind of diagnosis generally goes hand in hand with the idea that unemployment is very much a long-term phenomenon and more or less contingent on modern economies.

The political/institutional causes are of a different order and usually involve politicians. The argument is double-edged, stressing both the responsibility of the decision-making actors and their capacity to modify the situation. Advocates of this point of view often foreground what they see as the specific characteristics of "French-style unemployment", notably a high average rate and large-scale youth unemployment. They often explain this contrast with France's European partners in terms of the role of government policy.

The three other possible grounds for diagnosis are much less mentioned. Among the demographic causes (6.5%), one idea recurs frequently: unemployment evolves almost mechanically in line with the age pyramid, and thus according to labour market entries and exits. It should be noted that cultural and psychological causes are seen as marginal (4.5%). In particular, the argument that the situation of the unemployed can be explained in terms of a lack of motivation is rarely advanced. Unemployment is now an enduring collective phenomenon – at management level as well – and one with no relationship to the characteristics of the persons concerned. Lastly, external causes are suggested in 5.8% of cases: globalisation and the overlap of world economies, relocations, competition (perceived as more or less unfair) from the emerging countries, and/or a lack of protection at European level.

The prognosis frameworks refer to the solution for the unemployment problem put forward by the actor of the claim. They represent what the actor thinks should be done to solve the problem of unemployment

Policy-driven solutions	85
Non-policy-driven solutions	15
Total	100%

In their vast majority the solutions envisaged are political in character (85%). Even in the case of liberals, the actors advancing economically-based diagnoses call for political measures. According to the period, outlook and analysis can be totally different. In mid-2000 the ongoing fall in unemployment made a return to full employment seem a justifiable hope, whereas this kind of optimism is now very rare. One hypothesis that seems to be emerging is that of structural unemployment – a way of saying that France must get used to the idea of a fringe of its population being permanently without work. Far from justifying the notion of state disengagement, however, this implies a need for improved policies of social assistance so that all, including the unemployed, may enjoy the guarantee of a decent standard of living.

#### 4.4.3. Targets of claims

This type of claim specifies the actor who is held responsible with regard to the claim or at whom the claim is directly addressed as a call to act. In other words, this is the actor to whom a demand is explicitly addressed.

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>63.5</b>
Governments	53.4
Legislative and political parties	6.8
Judiciary	0.4
State agencies	2.1
Other state actors	0.8
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>33.8</b>
Labour organisations and groups	10.6
Employer organisations and groups	17.8
Unemployed organisations and groups	3.5
Non-state welfare organisations and groups	0.2
Other civil society actors and groups	1.7
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>2.7</b>
Total	100%

The actors addressed by these claims are identified, rightly or wrongly, as having an influence on or being responsible for the employment situation. The challenge is more or less direct and more or less explicit. In other words, the challenge is mainly determined by the perceived action.

One category stands out: state and party actors (63.5%) and more particularly the government executive (53.4%). This prominence points up the fact that on the labour market almost all the decision-making actors, considered as having a major capacity for intervention and regulation, are from the state sphere. Several interpretations are possible here. This result doubtless has to do with the relatively interventionist policy of the state where the labour market and labour legislation are concerned; as such, it is the outcome of government involvement in combating unemployment. It needs to be remembered here that in France one unemployed person in every two is receiving benefit not from the UNEDIC but from the state. Given this, the fact that the majority of claims are addressed to state and party actors puts the emphasis on the political will of the various actors concerned by employment policy.

Also to be noted is the extremely small proportion of claims addressed to the judiciary (0.4%). Once again this testifies to the limited legal scope of the debate: these actors are not considered relevant participants. Equally deserving of emphasis is the paucity of claims addressed to the legislature and political parties (6.8%). In a representative parliamentary system this can mean that parliamentarians are seen as powerless: either they are in opposition and have no means of

influencing government policy, or they are in the majority and stick closely to the party line. In neither case are they seen as decisive actors. The same would seem to be true of the political parties.

Civil society actors (33.8%) are much less often targeted than state and party actors, but their proportion is very significant, especially in a country like France where there is little receptivity towards civil society. On their own, labour organisations and groups and employer organisations and groups make up over 28% of the targets. While significant, this figure is hardly surprising. The social welfare and unemployment benefit system is a tripartite one: employer organisations, the unions and the state jointly manage the ASSEDIC and UNEDIC and the system of unemployment cover and benefit is directly in their hands. Thus it is logical that a substantial part of the claims be addressed to them.

These statistics can also be seen as indicating the influence of the protest movements the unions have taken part in and, more generally, as a sign of their politicisation. Many of the positions expressed regarding unemployment are aimed at management and the unions because, far from being mere "social agents", they play a vital decision-making and political role. At this level the contrast with the political parties, targets of very few claims, is striking.

Lastly, it should be said that the claims aimed at unemployed organisations and groups are few (3.5%) and have little to do with their place as actors in public debate. In other words, the unemployed have a higher profile as actors than as targets for criticism. Once again, this is not surprising. The positions expressed focus above all on actors with a certain decision-making power, which is clearly not the case for this category.

#### 4.4.4. *Forms of claims*

<b>Political decisions</b>	<b>4.6</b>
<b>Public statements</b>	<b>51.7</b>
<b>Conventional political actions</b>	<b>9.9</b>
Judicial action	0.8
Other conventional political actions	9.1
<b>Protest actions</b>	<b>33.8</b>
Demonstrative actions	23.6
Confrontational actions	8.3
Violent actions	1,9
Total	100%

Bringing the results together in four major categories, we see that the public statement is by far the most frequent gambit (51.7%), ahead of protest actions (33.8%), conventional political action (9.9%) and political decisions (4.6%).

Over a period as long as this one, it is significant that forms of protest, whatever their level, enjoy such continued prominence. This confirms that conflict resolution often takes non-pacific avenues, in line with the tradition of the "French exception", even if legal, non-violent protests and demonstrations are dominant in this category. In spite of a general trend towards deconflictualisation of claims regarding to work, the forms of action taken where unemployment is concerned testify to the hard-line character of the stands and differences involved and to the limitations of social dialogue. Worth noting is the very restricted part played by judicial action (0.8%), illustrating how little discreet modes of conflict resolution are used in France, in contrast with other countries. While among France's neighbours – Germany in particular – management and unions play a joint-management role and so are less likely to opt for active mobilisation, in France

they have a much greater tendency to stress their differences and demand state intervention as a means of resolution.

Moreover, the period 1995-2002 was characterised by industrial conflict of striking extent, duration and implacability, which doubtless exacerbated this tendency. It is a known fact that a decline in unionism often generates more radical action: the relative weakness of a union can lead it to compensate its lack of institutional standing, representativeness and legitimacy by taking tougher stands and becoming less amenable to negotiation. A further factor is that the mid-1990s saw the emergence of new, aggressive actors who drew others in their wake and influenced the range of action (Tilly, 1984) taken by other organisations.

To sum up, the forms of action taken draw on two main registers: verbal positioning and protest action. Although the radicality of the second category should not be exaggerated – it remains more inclined to legality and non-violence than the contrary – it does point up the overall tone of debate on unemployment issues in France: contestation is the name of the game.

#### ***4.5. The role of the EU in the public discourse***

There is very little indication that public debate on unemployment-linked issues is likely to go European. The EU accounts for only 3.6% of the scope of first actor, i.e. the actors involved in public debate are in the vast majority of cases national. In 2.7% of cases the scope of first addressee involves the EU, but the addressee is not generally considered a relevant actor to whom claims might be addressed. In the rare instances in which actors address themselves to the EU, it is mainly in order to criticise. All the studies of European issues make it clear that the EU suffers from an identity shortfall, and in respect of the labour market, as in many other spheres of public action, its effective role is often not perceived by public opinion. One figure, however, indicates a slight Europeanisation of debate: in 8% of cases the scope of first issue is European. Thus the European aspect of the pro-employment, anti-unemployment question is showing slight integration into current issues as a whole.

What are we to learn from these results? Clearly the EU occupies only a marginal place in public debate on the unemployment issue, with employment policy still the exclusive prerogative of the member states, including France. Integration has had much less impact here than in such other sectors as agriculture, which is directly confronted with the effects of the making of Europe. A factor as crucial as the unemployment benefit system depends entirely on the French Welfare State. Obviously this is not to say that the EU's economic agenda has no influence on the state of the national labour market, but the effects are indirect – and not always perceived – and do not replace the national framework, which remains dominant. It is clear that Europe's importance as an actor indirectly involved in employment policies in France is underestimated, and the EU's system of deliberation, characterised by low visibility and little politicisation of debate is doubtless a contributing factor here.

Furthermore, Europeanisation of debate is considerably hampered by France's institutional actors and trade unions. On the whole the political parties are still little interested in European questions and the same is true of the unions, with their traditional leaning towards a national emphasis: notable here is the relative absence from debate in France of the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the two European employer organisations, the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the Centre Européen des Entreprises Publiques (CEEP).

Without invalidating this overall observation, we can, however, pinpoint a few timid signs of Europeanisation. Firstly, the EU as a region represents close to 11% of claims – a not inconsiderable figure. The positions taken by French actors at the European summits and/or those of EU actors on the employment/anti-unemployment issue enjoy a certain visibility. In addition, it is in a context of protest that the EU represents an element in the debate. A number of national actors, most of them politically marginalised, make a specialty of denouncing European policy in the employment/anti-unemployment field. Most important is the "altermondialist" movement that began in 1997 and developed in large part under the impetus of French unemployed people.

## 5. Policy deliberation in the field of labour market policies

Our sample includes 12 local and 26 national actors. The interviews at the local level were conducted with actors from the Beziers region. This is justified by the fact that we decided to focus on Beziers and the Region of Hérault for the local study because it is one of the regions with the highest unemployment rate in France. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and two hours for an average of 50 minutes. Unemployment and some pro-unemployed organisations were very eager to talk about their activities and their perspective of the field.

### 5.1. Organisational networks

The scope of actors shows that some actors are considered to be very influential both at the local and national level. It is the case for the Ministry of Employment, the ASSEDIC, The European Union and the MEDEF. In a way it proves once more that France is a very centralized and concentrated country. Even in a local region, national and/or supranational actors are the most important ones. Saying that, we must add that the General Council and the Regional council are also influential actors at the local level. All these results appear to be very logical.

#### The most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor type

French Case	Number of mentions				TOTAL
	Policy	Intermediary	NGOs	Unemployed Org.	
<b>Ministère de l'emploi - DGEFP</b>	6	16	9	4	35
<b>ASSEDIC</b>	5	14	6	2	27
<b>European Union</b>	5	12	7	2	26
<b>MEDEF</b>	4	11	7	3	25
<b>ANPE</b>	4	10	4	1	19
<b>CFDT</b>	4	10	3	2	19
<b>CGT</b>	4	7	3	2	16
<b>PS</b>	1	6	5	4	16
<b>UMP</b>	0	8	5	3	16
<b>DDTEFP</b>	5	8	0	2	14

We look at the organisational network among actors in the field of unemployment. The questions refer to the actors that the organisations interviewed had tried to influence, have collaborated with or had disagreements with.

The Ministry of Employment is the most targeted actor. This is all the more logical because the employment policy is a national one (even if there are some adaptation at the local level). So the

main political actor is the main targeted. We can also notice that the political parties (PS, UMP and PCF) which were not considered as the most influential actors are very often targeted. Here there is a dichotomy between administrative institution (ASSEDIC, ANPE) which are very influential but not very present in the public debate and political parties which are always at the center of the public and political arena. Moreover, the PS, the UMP and the PCF have had representatives in the government during the period e study. In these circumstances, they have close links with the policy makers and therefore are targeted. It is very interesting to underline that each category of actor tend to target his on category of actor. Or actors who are likely to support them. For instance, the unemployed organisations target the socialist party and ATTAC (two allies, at least potentially). On the contrary, they hardly never target the Ministry of Employment. Two reasons can be advanced. The first one is that they lack political resources. The second one is that they know that they have no chance to be heard. This result suggests that the public action policy of unemployment is in a way fragmented. It is not a random process in which all actors develop relationships within each other. even if by regions).

National actors are much more likely to try to influence others actors and are more likely to be targeted even by local actors. The political game at the national level seems to be more concentrated (between 5 actors : Ministry of Employment, PS, EU, UMP and PCF) whereas at the local level lots of different actors are targeted. We can make the hypothesis that at the local level, the articulation between all the actors taking part into the policy field is well known and identified. It is also because we have chosen the region of Béziers, which is one of the most contentious area (concerning the mobilisation of the unemployed). In that circumstances, unemployed and intermediary actors are frequently targeted.

### **Most frequently mentioned disagreements by actors type**

The UMP is the organisation that has most disagreements with the other actors (17), just before the Ministry of Employment (16), the socialist party (14), the MEDEF (13) and the ASSEDIC (11). The figures are very logical because all those organisations are the most important, both in political and institutional terms. The fact that they are central actors explains the high number of disagreements. Also the fact that some of them are political actors which implies that they take hard position and don't hesitate to express very strong point of view. It is important to note the absence of the communist party, which is a sign of his decline. For sure, the situation would have been very different 20 years ago.

The unemployed organisations have much more disagreements with the institutional actors and policy makers than with pro-unemployed organisations.



### Most frequently mentioned disagreements by actor type

French case	Number of mentions				
	Policy	Intermediary	NGOs	Unemployed Org.	TOTAL
UMP	0	5	5	7	17
Ministère de l'emploi	0	8	5	3	16
PS	0	4	5	5	14
MEDEF	0	5	3	5	13
ASSEDIC	0	3	5	3	11
CFDT	0	3	1	5	9
EU	0	2	4	3	9
FN	0	4	0	5	9
UDF	0	4	0	4	8
ANPE	0	3	0	2	5
CGT Chômeurs	0	3	1	0	4
Conseil Général	1	1	1	1	4
Conseil Régional	2	2	0	0	4

#### 5.2. Action forms

We can see that media relations strategies are very important for all categories of actors, both on the national and local level. Negotiating/lobbying is also very important, but more for policy actors (100%) and intermediary actors (100%) than NGOs (88.9%) and Unemployed (42.9%). Informing the public is also very important, but more for intermediary actors (100%), NGOs (100%) and Unemployed (100%) than policy actors (83.3%). These results show clearly that the less institutionalized and powerful an organisation is the more she needs the support of the public.

Consultation is important for all categories of actors but not in the same way. Policy actors tend to consult government bodies (83.3%) whereas Unemployed supply information to policymakers (71.4%). We can notice that unemployed are less frequently consulted than other actors by government bodies (14.3% against 83.3 for the policy actors, 75% for the intermediary actors, and 66.7% for the NGOs). The access to the political sphere is relatively open for the two categories but in a very different manner.

One very interesting result is the high number of court action launched by the Unemployed (85.7%), against 50% for the policy actors, 43.8% for the intermediary actors, and 33.3% for the NGOs. The interpretation of this finding is a little ambiguous. We can conclude that weak actors in the decision making process try to use alternative action in order to compensate their political disadvantage. It proves that the field of Unemployment policies as a whole is quite open to court action. It is significant to remark that court action (85.7%) is more than twice important than negotiation and lobbying (42.9%) for the Unemployed. It obviously shows the degree of contentiousness of their action. The high number of court actions can be explained by the fact that an important number of actors use these actions for individual cases of unemployment compensation, using this mean to defend an unemployed person whose compensation has been temporarily suspended following an alleged misconduct.

Campaign contributions are globally not important, except for the unemployed who ask for support and money from the public. The poorest organisations are looking for public contribution whereas the richest organizations are looking for internal or political resources.

Finally, we can notice that protest actions are used mainly by the Unemployed (85.7%), which is not surprising and, to some extent, by intermediary actors (37.5%) and NGOs (22.2%).

**Policy actors** are doing lots of different actions. Because they have money and power, they can reach different strategies at the same time. Policy actors are very active in media-related strategies because they want to inform and to convince the population about their activities and decisions in the policy field of unemployment. Especially in France, where policy actors play a central role, the media tend to focus on them. Policy actors inform the public less than intermediary actors (83.3% against 100%). This could partially be explained by the fact that policy actors are in charge of making and implementing unemployment legislations and their decisions can create a debate, but they do not directly address the public.

**Intermediary actors** make use of all actions forms and this mostly on a regular basis. They are particularly media-related because they have to react to decisions taken by policy actors and because they want to convince the public about their position. Public speeches are used on a regular basis (68.8%). They are also very active in negotiation/lobbying and consultation, as they are crucial actors in the policy domain, in particular in economic and social policy issues related to unemployment. They are also quite active in mobilizing the public (75%), especially public assemblies / meetings (62.5%) and petitions (43.8%). But they use a very large range of mobilizing actions. Of course, manifestations, boycott and strikes are likely to be used more by unions than by employers' organisations. Concerning political parties, we have the same kind of difference between right-wing and left-wing parties.

**Pro-Unemployed NGOs.** This category is very broad and that's the reason it may be somewhat difficult to find common trends. They are very public and media oriented (100% both). They don't try - or they can't ! - change the law (33%) or fight the system. Most of these organisations do not consider that they have a crucial political role, but a direct social role by helping unemployed. Furthermore, most of them have only few financial and human resources, which they use more for information (100%) than for negotiating/lobbying (88.9%). The difference between the contact with the Parliament and the Government is striking (88.5% against 55.5%) showing that the access to the executive sphere is much more difficult than the deliberative arena. Compared to the intermediary actors, pro-unemployed NGOs do not supply information to the policymakers (93.8% against 33.3). The political actors do not consult pro-unemployed NGOs on a regular basis. Even if they have a very good knowledge of the unemployment field and policy, the relationships seem to be rather weak. Their capacity of negotiation/lobbying (88.9%) and consultation (77.8%) is not so bad. It can be interpreted as a sign of the integration of the unemployment policy field : lots of NGOs deal with policy actors and policy-makers and take part in the public action of unemployment.

**Unemployed organisations.** Even if they are usually weak, unemployed organisations seem to be quite active. They use media-related action and they inform the public on a regular basis (both 100%). Those are crucial activities for actors who have no strong political support. They exist in the public arena only if they reach to catch the attention of people. We can see the importance of direct communication (giving interviews and public speeches) which are the easiest - but relatively inefficient - way to contact people. Lobbying is not so frequent (42.9%) but not inexistent. The figures show that the unemployed organisations have difficulties to have access to the political sphere. When they managed to do that, it is mostly with public officials (42.9%) and less frequently with government (14.3%). Consultations are quite frequent (85.7%). Unemployed organisations usually try to influence policy-makers by telling them about the situation faced by the unemployed (71.4%). Concerning the mobilization of the public, unemployed organisations are quite active (85.7%). They mainly use petitions, public assemblies/meetings, and protesting or demonstrating (85.7%), which is normal regarding their limited access to the public and political domain.

In sum, we can draw the classical situation of political and institutional actors who use conventional actions whereas the challengers try to get the support from the public and tend to use more contentious forms of actions.

### 5.3. *Role of the Unemployed*

Our approach here is founded on a qualitative analysis of the protest actions carried out by unemployed groups and organisations. This choice on our part is justified by the importance of these groups as actors in the debate in France and the determination of the Unempol research unit to emphasise the mobilisation of these categories. The rationale of unemployed protest goes back to May 1994, when AC! organised marches converging on Paris from the provinces. For several weeks unemployed people were on the road, passing through towns and villages, being given accommodation and discussing with unionists and organisation militants. Twenty thousand people ultimately met up at the Bastille in Paris, for a demonstration that concluded with the requisitioning of an empty building.

This triggered a movement that grew as the months passed. December 1994 saw the occupation of the building in the Rue du Dragon taken over by the right to housing group DAL. Here, for the first time, unemployed groups took an active part, with workshops being organised for unemployment association members, unionists, researchers and teachers. The questions came from the young members of the CDSL committee for the homeless: how do you live when you have no job and cannot claim the Minimum Welfare Payment (RMI)? The sole certitude for those involved in these debates was that changing the relationship between work and income was not something to be left to the state. Every December since 1994 has seen radical measures: for people living on the barest of welfare, the buying craze that sweeps through the population is more provocation than they can bear.

In December 1995, with the railway employees' strike at its height, the Droits Devant (DD) group organised a major protest event. This was a key date. Many of the unions most active in the rail strike were present at the plenary session, and the mode of expression was innovative: what became dominant was the notion of rights – civil, political and social – and its negative equivalent, the deprivation of rights and loss of eligibility. What had been no more than an embryonic movement – a few unionists working in association with militant organisations – suddenly found its concerns being echoed by wage earners. Among the host of initiatives that followed were further housing requisitions by DAL and the CDSL; job requisitions by AC!, the National Movement of Unemployed and Precarious Workers (MNCP) and the Association for Employment, Insertion and Solidarity (APEIS); action for free public transport, etc.

With May 1997 came the occupation of the Bank of France, symbolic heartland of investment capitalism. Eventually received by Bank's directors, the unemployed associations, the CFDT bank federation, the CGT's finance federation, the National Taxation Union, the Group of Ten, DAL and DD raised the issue of over-indebtedness.

On 15 December 1997 militants of anti-exclusion, anti-precarity associations were joined by unionists for a "Social Urgency" action week, which began with the occupation of the Pyramid at the Louvre and debates organised in the Salle du Carrousel. The week concluded with the "Call from the Louvre", signed by many different organisations and demanding, among other things, an upgrading of basic income support and the Christmas Bonus for the unemployed. In addition, all concerned took up the struggle of the "Sans-papiers". Within the movement were people devoting their attention to the issue of rights and how they were to be exercised. Just as the right to a roof over one's head became a major issue and a means of vindicating occupation actions, the unemployed marches and other similar measures ultimately acquired their own legitimacy. The sporadic occupations of ASSEDIC offices served to call attention to a place where those who did not take part in demonstrations could at least make contact.

The action taken by the unemployed raised the issue of an income sufficient to live on. Despite the creation of the RMI and an overall rise in the number of welfare beneficiaries, the proportion of public spending on basic income support had not budged from its 1982 figure of 1%. Thus the amounts represented, at best, between 30% and 40% of average disposable income; and at worst, between 20% and 30%, substantially below any definition of the poverty threshold. Payments barely allowed maintenance of purchasing power and some beneficiaries actually saw their purchasing power diminish: by 10% for recipients of the ASS, paid to unemployed persons with no further entitlement to unemployment insurance, and by 20% for recipients of the insertion allowance paid to single parents and political refugees; in addition, the latter was abolished for persons under 25.

Three concrete demands have brought unity to the movement, and central to all of them is the issue of a guaranteed income: an immediate grant of 3000 francs for all and an increase in basic income support. The principle of a guaranteed income found expression in autumn 1997 with the demand for an immediate 1500-franc rise in all basic income support. Like the granting of full civil status to the Sans-papiers, a rapid and equal hike in basic income support is seen by the unemployed organisations as a necessary step towards regulation of the labour market in the interest of wage earners. This would result in a monthly RMI of 4000 francs without work, and would, according to the unemployed organisations, force employers and the state to raise most salaries – especially the minimum wage – and with it all indexed benefits. It would also mean the right to an income – especially the RMI – for people under 25. The demand for extension of basic income support to this group is fundamental, young people currently being obliged to accept fixed-term contracts at low wages with no possibility of welfare back-up during periods of unemployment. AC! introduced its guaranteed income campaign with the slogan "A job's your right! A revenue's your due!", which was rapidly co-opted by the CGT. AC! now says, "Job or no job, an income's a right!" It must be emphasised that the unemployed associations gave their support to the 35-hour week legislation, in spite of their marked reservations concerning the role it included for "flexibility".

#### ***5.4. Role of the EU in political deliberation***

For many years, the debate in France about the European process integration was nearly confidential. During the last years, we see a change and there is now an important debate about the role and the impact of the EU and the benefits (or not) for France to respect the EU orientations. The different categories of actors involved in the unemployment field are relevant to this trend. 22 actors estimated that there is lots of intra-organizational discussion on the role of the EU; 13 some discussion; and only 3 no discussion. This result is very coherent with the others concerning the EU.

### The extent of intra-organizational discussion of the role of the EU across different actor types

Discussion about EU				
French Case	Lots of discussion	Some discussion	No discussion	Total
Policy Actor	3	2	1	6
Intermediary Actor	11	3	2	16
Pro-unemployed NGOs	4	5	0	9
Unemployed organisation	4	3	0	7
<i>Total</i>	<i>22</i>	<i>13</i>	<i>3</i>	<i>38</i>

This table shows that the EU has been a subject of discussion (lots of discussion + some discussion = 35). Only 3 actors answer that the EU has not been discussed. Of course, it does not mean that these actors are agree with the EU policy. Usually, the unemployed organisations fight against the European commission and the economic orientation the EU tries to promote. Policy and intermediary actors and pro-unemployed NGOs are more pluralist on this subject. They all know that the EU is one of the key actor in their field. Some of them advocate the role of the EU. The most institutionalised actors trust the EU and support his action whereas organisations who defend the interest of the unemployed don't.

Use of actions forms at the European level

We asked actors if they were using any of the action forms mentioned above at the European level. The result is quite interesting, showing that half of the total intervene at the EU level. It is not surprising that the main political and administrative actors intervene at this level, but this is also the case of national unemployed organisation. Through some European confederation, they have - albeit a weak and indirect - access to the EU level. It confirms the emergence of a European civil society, and the capacity of actors from the civil society to claim towards the European institutions.

Use of actions forms at the European level	
	Nombre of actors
Yes	19
No	19

This table shows that forms of actions at the European level are very different from one category of actor to another. One of the most striking result is the high implication of the unemployed organisation. In this regard, the historical context in France is very particular. Since 1997 and the first european march of the unemployed against unemployment and insecurity, the activity of such organisations at the EU level is very intensive. They use at various degree the four mains categories of actions (media-related : 28.6% - informing the public : 42.9% - consultation, court action and mobilizing the public : 28.6%), but they don't lobby or negotiate. Judging from this figures, they can be considered at the same time as insiders (they have access to the EU level) and weak actors (they are unable to get into touch directly with policy-makers).

Intermediary and pro-unemployed NGOs had some important presence at the EU level, which is not limited to the public and the media (for instance, negotiation and lobbying : 43.8%).

## 6. Conclusion

In sum, we can draw from this table the classical situation of political and institutional actors who use conventional actions whereas the challengers try to get the support from the public and tend to use more contentious forms of actions.

Even if actors are investing time and resources in media related forms of actions, they are globally more oriented toward policy-makers. When it is possible, direct contact with policy makers are likely to be more efficient than public information campaign which are still difficult to anticipate. On the other way round, intermediary actors, pro-unemployed NGOs and unemployed organisations find public information more important than contact with policy makers. Concerning intermediary actors, the reasons are very clear : political parties and trade unions, for instance, are major actors in the public debate and they do lots of efforts to inform the population. For the last two categories, the reasons may be a little different and can be interpreted as a sign of their exclusion from the political sphere. In such a situation, they aim at convincing the public that their position are the good one. The more organisation are distant from the center of power, the more they use the support of the public. Here again, we can analytically identify two different - and to some extent - opposite strategies.

The figures concerning influential actors show that the Ministry of Employment is considered as the main influential actor. As it is very well known, France is a old centralized country. The role of the Ministry of Employment is particularly important because it is in charge of the implementation of the law. It also give orientations and orders the local political spheres on unemployment issues. The state plays a major role in elaborating the rules concerning unemployment insurance and compensation funds.

It is remarkable to stress the relative weakness of the political parties (both the socialist party and the UMP). Unemployment in France is not really considered as a political issue. It can be surprising taking into account the rate of unemployment and the importance of this issue. But most of the time it is very difficult to identify political discourse on the unemployment field. Maybe because the left and the right wing has failed in their attempt to fight the unemployment, each political board is very caution and in a way very discret. The idea that the political will is not enough and is not effective against the unemployment is very common amongst the population.

We look at the organisational network among actors in the field of unemployment. The questions refer to the actors that the organisations interviewed had tried to influence, have collaborated with or had disagreements with. The Ministry of Employment is the most targeted actor. This is all the more logical because the employment policy is a national one (even if there are some adaptation at the local level). So the main political actor is the main targeted.

For many years, the debate in France about the European process integration as nearly confidential. During the last years, we see a change and there are now important debate about the role and the impact of the EU and the benefits (or not) for France to respect the EU orientations. The different categories of actors involved in the unemployment field are relevant of this trend. 22 actors estimated that there is lots of intra-organizational discussion on the role of the EU ; 13 some discussion ; and only 3 no discussion.

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unemployed organisations fight against the European commission and the economic orientation the EU tries to promote. Policy and intermediary actors and pro-unemployed NGOs are more pluralist on this subject. They all know that the EU is one of the key actor in their field. Some of them advocate the role of the EU. The most institutionalised actors trust the EU and support his action whereas organisations who defend the interest of the unemployed don't.

## 7. Appendix : list of interviewed actors

	<b>POLICY ACTORS</b>
	Préfecture du Languedoc Roussillon
INTEFP	Institut National du Travail, de l'Emploi et de la Formation professionnelle
DGEFP	Ministère du Travail et de la Solidarité – Direction Générale à l'Emploi et à la Formation Professionnelle
	Conseil Général de l'Hérault – Direction de l'économie solidaire
DGAS	Ministère du Travail et de la Solidarité – Direction Générale de l'Action Sociale
	Mairie de Béziers
	<b>INTERMEDIARY ACTORS</b>
	Association Union Régionale Midi Pyrénées
AIRDIE	Association interdépartementale Régionale pour le Développement de l'Insertion par l'Economique
FO	Force Ouvrière
OFCE	Observatoire Français des Conjonctures Economiques
IFAD	Institut de Formation des Adultes et de Développement - Hérault
SNC	Solidarité Nouvelle Face au chômage
	Réseau d'accompagnement à l'Insertion professionnelle en milieu rural
UNAF	Union Nationale des Associations Familiales
UNEDIC	Union nationale interprofessionnelle pour l'emploi dans l'industrie et le commerce
MEDEF	Mouvement des Entreprises de France
CFDT	Confédération Française Démocratique du Travail
PCF	Parti Communiste Français
PS	Parti Socialiste
	Les Verts
UNIOPSS	Union Nationale Interfédérale des Œuvres et Organismes Privés Sanitaires et Sociaux
UMP	Union pour un Mouvement Populaire
	<b>PRO-UNEMPLOYED NGOS</b>
	ATD Quart Monde
	Emmaüs France
	Armée du Salut
CORACE	Fédération de Comités et d'Organismes d'Aide aux Chômeurs par l'Emploi
FAPE	Fondation Agir Pour l'Emploi
ATTAC	Association pour la Taxation des Transactions pour l'Aide aux Citoyens
FNARS	Fédération Nationale des Associations



	d'Accueil et de Réinsertion Sociale
CCSC	Comité Chrétien de Solidarité avec les Chômeurs
	Secours Populaire
	<b>UNEMPLOYED ORGANISATIONS</b>
MNCP	Mouvement National des Chômeurs et des Précaires
AC !	Agir contre le chômage !
AC ! Hérault	Agir contre le chômage - Hérault
APEIS	Association Pour l'Emploi, l'Information et la Solidarité des Chômeurs et des Précaires
APEIS local	Association Pour l'Emploi, l'Information et la Solidarité des Chômeurs et des Précaires
CGT	Confédération Générale du Travail
	Association Partage



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

**Chapter 6: Final Report for Italy**  
**Scientific Responsible: Donatella della Porta**  
**Research Assistants: Simone Baglioni and Paolo Graziano**

Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Basic Parameters of the Italian Policy Approach
  - 2.1 The Italian welfare state
  - 2.2 Overview of the Italian labour system
  - 2.3 Actors
3. Public Debates on Unemployment
  - 3.1 The Basic outline of the newspaper analysis
  - 3.2 The actors involved in claim-making in unemployment politics
  - 3.3 forms of claims
  - 3.4 Thematic focus of claims: an aggregated view
  - 3.5 Thematic focus of claims, a disaggregated view: what is in the newspaper?
  - 3.6 Targets and objects of claims
  - 3.7 Towards Europeanization? Not yet (at least, not in the public sphere)
4. The field of Labour Policy
  - 4.1 Political deliberation in the field of labour policy
  - 4.2 Influential organizational actors in the issue field of unemployment
  - 4.3 Organizational networks and inter-organizational contacts
  - 4.4 Action forms of actors
  - 4.5 Role of the EU
5. Concluding Remarks
- Appendix 1
- Appendix 11
- References

## 1. Introduction

For several decades, unemployment has been a crucial issue in the Italian political, social and economical debate. Until few years ago it was considered however a major problem circumscribed to Southern Italy; in the 1990s, instead, the process of de-industrialization that has invested the whole country, including its ‘developed’ north in the last ten-fifteen years has showed that there are not ‘safe’ areas anymore. All regions are exposed to the risk of mass unemployment, due to dismissals in major companies as well as to the traditional underdevelopment and lack of infrastructures. The analysis of the current public policy debates allows us to portray those agendas, concepts and strategies, introduced and discussed by experts, politicians and interest groups as pillars of a new edifice of public policies. Although other sources are more complete in presenting the policy-making process on unemployment issues, our focus on the public debate in the mass media reflects an interest in the discursive interactions between the symbolic images promoted by different actors.

The following report aims to synthesize the main findings of this analysis for the Italian case. Amongst others, it strives to reconstruct the main strands of public contentions in regard to issues, participating actors and debated policy solutions. It also aims at singling out the role of the European Union and its potential impact on Italian public debates. In particular, we are interested in learning how inclusive these public debates are with reference to weakly-represented interests and precariously organized groups (in particular, the unemployed). To this end, we will present the findings of the Italian project in three steps. First, we will give a picture of labour policies in Italy and describe the established policy instruments and strategies – as a frame for better understanding the role and direction of current policy debates and reforms. Second, we will reconstruct the structure of mass mediated public debates by presenting our data on claims-making on unemployment within a leading Italian newspaper, with a centre-left leaning (*La Repubblica*). Finally, institutionalised policy deliberations within public administration and parliaments will be analysed using interviews conducted with relevant collective actors in the selected policy field.

## 2. Basic parameters of the Italian policy approach

The fight against unemployment has been a central focus of Italian public policies since a long time, with the development of specific approaches in dealing with the unemployed. To better understand the current debates and policy reforms, it is thus beneficial to reflect this Italian policy style before entering the specifics of our findings.

### 2.1 *The Italian welfare state*<sup>33</sup>

The Italian welfare state, like the Swiss, the Dutch and the Irish ones, is characterised by a mixture of occupational and universal schemes. In these countries welfare regimes were created as occupational models: in fact the schemes of social protection or insurance were based on the principle of the participation in the labour market. In time, they acquired some universal characters at the point that today, in each of these countries, at least one of the welfare sectors (either health care or pension) has a national covering. This means that the insurance system is not based any more on a working position, but on the principle of citizenship (See table 1 for the evolution of the welfare systems in Italy and in Switzerland).

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<sup>33</sup> For this overview of the Italian welfare system we have mostly relayed upon Ferrera (1993, 1998).

**Table 1: evolution of the Swiss and the Italian welfare systems from an occupational regime to a mixed one**

	Pension Insurance	Health Insurance
<i>Switzerland</i>	1946 the whole population (basic pension) 1982 dependent and independent workers (integrative pension)	1916 first cantonal insurance
<i>Italy</i>	1919 dep. (income threshold) 1950 dep. (abolition of the income threshold) 1957 peasants 1959 artisans 1966 traders 1969 over 1965 (income threshold)	1928 dep. (semi-compulsory) 1939 worker to provide for the whole family 1954 peasants 1955 retired 1956 artisans 1959 traders 1966 unemployed 1969 over 65 (income threshold) 1978 the whole population

Source: Ferrera, M., *Modelli di solidarietà, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1993 (p.91)*.

In Italy, the pension and the health care systems received an occupational imprint since their creation. After the second world war, the first attempt to reform the pension system on a universal base (thanks to the work of the D'Aragona Parliamentary commission) failed, like all the other endeavours of change of the system made by the centre-left parties and coalitions ruling the country during the '60s. The result is that, today, the pension regime still remains fragmented amongst occupational categories, often characterised even by different norms and rules. On the contrary, in the health insurance domain, an health national service (Servizio Sanitario Nazionale) has been established in 1978, abolishing the occupational differentiations present in the health insurance sector (ibid.: 93).

The introduction of some elements of universalism in the Italian welfare state has been fostered by three elements:

- 1) constitutional predispositions and the creation of regional governments, which has contributed in encompassing the barriers of organisational fragmentation;
- 2) the formation, in the labour arena, of a constellation of actors convinced of the interest to form a unique community of risk, sustained and guaranteed by the State;

A temporary convergence among the most relevant political actors. The divisions in the center-left coalition (and especially in its major party, the Christian Democracy) have however interrupted the reform programme. The dominant tradition in the welfare state is based upon the bread-winner model, focusing on the protection of the male capofamiglia, and relies upon the family as provider of services to its members in need. Moreover, the limited "injection" of universalism in the health system has been brought into a country, like Italy, suffering from a deficit of stateness (i.e. the absence of a professional administrative apparatus), which has facilitated the clientelistic tendency well developed in its party system.

## 2.2 Overview of the Italian labour system<sup>34</sup>

Italian labour policies represent an example of the Southern European model of employment policies, which includes, beside Italy, Spain and Greece (Ferrera, 1993). This model is characterised by: the prevalence of passive policies; dramatic occupational gaps among different regions in the same country and an impressive record of youth as well as long term unemployment.

The most relevant pillars of the Italian model of labour policies, mainly developed during the '40s and consolidated during the '60s and '70s, are:

- 1) A compulsory insurance system against unemployment provides unemployed, who have worked before, with a modest cash benefit, not calculated on their previous incomes but considered as a benefit for a minimum survival. Until the mid-1950s, this provision was limited to workers of the industrial sector.
- 2) A salary integration for partial unemployment (in cases of reduction of the working time) which corresponds to 80% of the salary for a period, unlimitedly renewable, of 6 months. For many years, also this subsidy has been reserved to industrial workers. Industries remain responsible for workers social security tax. The whole system is managed by a state-controlled agency, INPS.
- 3) A public system of employment services. Special local offices (*uffici di collocamento* now *centri per l'impiego*), established public lists of job seekers from which employers had to take their employed following the order of names in the list. Unemployed with previous working experiences were excluded from this mechanism. The system has changed in the 90s when industries have been allowed to engage workers by nominal appointment.

Such a system has generated discriminations between people looking for a job but having past working experiences and those who were searching a job for the first time, since the latter were not entitled to any unemployment subsidy or benefit. The institutionalisation of this original model of labour policies has provoked relevant consequences which still mark the Italian socio-economic landscape: a very high youth unemployment rate (see table 2); gender discrimination (Reyneri 1996, 130-38); the impressive diffusion of different forms of irregular employment (*sommerso*, in Italian) which has been calculated to represent 15-20% of GIP and to concern 3 millions working people; the tendency of young Italians to leave home much later than their European homologues and to depend longer on their families to survive. Indeed, in Italy, in line with the general features of the South European Welfare State model, family is the "institution" which has played, more than others, the role of social shock absorber (*ammortizzatore sociale*) for generations of young people struggling to find a regular (or irregular!) job. Moreover, unemployment (especially in its long-term forms) was especially widespread in the South (Pugliese 1993, 245).

This model has evolved and has been modified in the '90s both by extending benefits and subsidies to categories other than industrial workers as well as by introducing new forms of work such as part-time, social useful jobs and other contracts which foster training and formation of young workers (i.e. more active labour policies).

In general, passive policies (such as the *Cassa Integrazione Guadagni*) have been preferred to active ones by Italian policy makers (table 3). Especially worth noticing is that Italy, with its 1.96 of the GIP, is under the mean of the EU public expenditures for labour policies, which rates 3% of the GIP.

<sup>34</sup> For this overview of the Italian labour policy model we have mostly relayed upon Gualmini (1995, 1998).

**Table 2. Unemployment rates by class of age, geographical distribution and gender. Year 2000, percentages.**

CLASS OF AGE	15-24	25-34	35-54	55-64	65 and more	Total
<b>NORTH-WEST</b>						
Men	12.4	4.0	1.6	2.9	0.9	3.4
Women	20.2	8.4	5.3	4.2	6.0	8.0
Men and Women	16.1	5.9	3.0	3.3	2.4	5.3
<b>NORTH-EAST</b>						
Men	7.6	3.1	1.2	1.6	0.4	2.4
Women	12.9	6.4	4.2	2.7	4.6	5.9
Men and Women	10.1	4.6	2.4	1.9	1.5	3.8
<b>CENTRE</b>						
Men	21.0	9.6	2.6	3.5	1.2	6.1
Women	32.4	14.8	6.8	3.2	5.2	11.6
Men and Women	26.3	11.9	4.2	3.4	2.2	8.3
<b>SOUTH</b>						
Men	49.3	22.0	8.1	7.1	1.8	16.3
Women	63.1	40.6	17.1	7.6	8.5	30.4
Men and Women	55.0	28.6	11.0	7.2	3.7	21.0
<b>ITALY</b>						
Men	27.6	10.8	3.9	4.4	1.1	8.1
Women	35.4	17.5	8.6	4.7	6.2	14.5
Men and Women	31.1	13.6	5.6	4.5	2.5	10.6

Source: Istat, *Rapporto sull'Italia. Edizione 2001*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2001 (p. 40).

**Table 3: Public expenditure for labour policies as GIP percentages**

	% of GIP
Measures for employment agencies	0.08
Formation and training	0.02
Measures for juvenile employment	0.83
Unemployment benefit	0.71
Anticipated retirement	0.32
Total	1.96
Active policies	0.93
Passive policies	1.03

Source: OECD, *Employment Outlook*, 1996 (Cit. in Gualmini, Elisabetta, *La politica del lavoro*, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1998, p.81).

In table 4 we can see how public expenditure is shared between different forms of active policies. Considerable resources are focused on training programs as well as occupational incentives capture. However, the national government has also directly created new work opportunities such as the social and public useful jobs (for a detailed chronological overview of passive and active labour policies in Italy, see the appendix).

**Table 4**  
**Labour active policies in Italy: structure of the expenditure (billions of ITL in 1999)**

Training	7.600
Occupation incentives	5.750
Direct creation of jobs (socially useful and public useful jobs)	1.400
Entrepreneurship incentives	900
Other active policies	60

*Source:* Ministero del lavoro, *Rapporto di monitoraggio sulle politiche occupazionali e del lavoro*, Roma, giugno 2000 (cit. in Lunghini, Giorgio, Francesca Silva and Renata Targetti Lenti, eds., *Politiche pubbliche per il lavoro*, Bologna, Il Mulino, p.25).

### 2.3 Actors

Political parties, trade unions and employers organizations are the most relevant actors bargaining with the State in the Italian labour policy making. In this sense, policy-making on unemployment reflects the typical characteristics of distributive policies, with a strong presence of few, well organized interest groups. However, the Italian case presents some specificities linked to a traditionally pluralistic system of interest representation, fragmented along ideological lines.

Indeed, the Italian union movement was shaped as unitary and democratic after the second world war, when the three major parties having struggled against fascism (Christian-democratic party, Communist party and Socialist party), signed an agreement of union unity. Despite that, after three years, such a unity broke down and the union movement took the fragmented forms it has nowadays. CGIL is the biggest national trade union, politically affiliated to the left parties; CISL is the one considered as the Catholic and Christian-democratic employed organisation and UIL is the expression of the smaller non religious parties. While labour rights were late to develop, in the 1950s and the 1960s the activities of the CGIL were repressed inside and outside the factories. However, the events of 1968 and 1969, which connected the union's struggle to the students protests, led trade unions to play a more autonomous role vis-à-vis political parties. Trade unions, then, started strengthening their position, also because of their increasing membership which, indeed, doubled between 1968 and 1977 (Accornero, 1992). The three major trade unions were then recognized as partners of negotiations which involved the business associations with the relevant Ministries. Decisions over industrial policies became object of political exchanges between government and interests groups, with a frequent use of public resources in support of crucial economic sectors. Concertational decision-making became more widespread in the 1990s, when trade unions substituted political parties in providing the government with a consensual social basis for the structural economic reforms needed to enter the European monetary space. Political parties' role and strength had indeed been dramatically reduced by the discovery of the corruption system, and the 'technical' (non-political) government that was established in 1993 found in the trade unions the political actor able to provide it with the necessary social consensus. The three most relevant trade unions had to assume a full political role (literature speaks about a new political subject: the trade union-party) and thus their role in the national policy making became even more important than before (Mania and Sateriale 2002). Especially after the Maastricht Treaty, social pacts were oriented to a consensual acceptance of restrictive economic policies. Triggered by large public deficits and external constraints, the attempts at concertation were often jeopardized by the mentioned fragmentation in interest representations. Discontinued by right-right governments, they are however also more and more criticized from within the labour organizations. This mix of strengths and weaknesses of the Italian unions can explain their focus on the protection of the

workers of the large factories and the public sectors, but also the lack of success in extending the protection to the weaker segments of the labour market.

Even in the case of **employers organisations** we can notice a certain fragmentation as industries and firms are organized in different bodies depending on their sector of activity, size and the nature of their ownership (Gualmini, 1995). The most relevant peak employers organisation is *Confindustria*, the organisation of Italian industrialists, which has been created in 1944 with the aim of representing “capital” both in the promotion of economic policies and at the negotiating table with trade unions. The **State** has been an important player in labour policies. After the second world war and until the first center-left government in the early 1960s, the Italian governments have delayed the building of a modern system of industrial relationships (eventually recognized by the Statuto dei Lavoratori in 1970). Later on, national governments and parliaments developed a system of political exchange, offering public intervention in support of some economic sectors. While Italy remained within its pluralistic tradition and the main union, the CGIL, was still mistrusted as too near to the Communist Party, tri-party negotiations became more common. After the D.Lgs 467/97, regions have gained new powers in the regulation of labour policies, in particular with respect to employment services (counselling, matching labour demand and supply, etc.). Public spending in the field is however quite low.



### 3. Public debates on unemployment

#### 3.1 *The basic outline of the newspaper analysis*

We can expect that the number of claims linked to unemployment, or in general to labour issues, tends to increase when unemployment rate grows. When the number of jobless people starts to increase, governments and politicians on the one side and labour organizations, employers representatives and unemployed groups on the other, are more likely to express concerns and act on them. And, as a consequence, the newspapers end up paying more attention to this phenomenon, especially when it assumes dramatic dimensions. This has been confirmed by historical researches (Richards 2002) but also by recent findings within Unempol itself (Giugni and Berclaz 2003).

As can be seen from figures 1 and 2, Italy both confirms and disavows these previous findings. Indeed, the number of claims made in the labour domain in the period considered for the newspaper analysis (1995-2002) follows the number of unemployed until 2001. That is, the more the unemployment rate increases the more numerous are the events linked to unemployment that we were able to find out in the analysis of *La Repubblica*. However, starting from 2001, the claims increase substantially notwithstanding the fact that the unemployment rate decreases. This suggests that claims-making in the field of labour depends also from other circumstances.



**Figure 1: unemployment rate (percentages) by year in Italy (source: Istat, serie storiche)****Figure 2: number of claims in unemployment politics by year**

Some of the peaks of attention to unemployment are however related to political opportunities. For instance, the increase in attention in 1998 can be understood as related with the entrepreneurial role played by the left-wing party *Rifondazione Comunista*, whose support was pivotal for the survival of the center-left coalition, elected in 1996 and led by Romano Prodi, including the most important left-wing party, *Democratici di Sinistra* (the former Italian Communist Party, PCI).. Labour issues are a considerable ingredient of RC's DNA as this party continues to conceive itself basically as a working-class party. Moreover, the relevance employment issues have in *Rifondazione*'s agenda emerges very clearly from this entire claims analysis. From a quantitative point of view, notwithstanding its relative electoral weight (it obtained 5% of votes during last political national elections, in 2001) this party, in the field of unemployment and labour policy, is the third most important actor among political parties (14.2 of parties claims have been made by RC). From a qualitative perspective, the analysis of its aims (for more details see further) shows even more clearly than the quantitative one, how much this party has influenced the debate in the labour domain. This said, it is understandable that the support guaranteed to Prodi's government by *Rifondazione Comunista* depended mostly on the adoption of policies aiming to fight unemployment. In particular, RC was strongly in favour of the reduction of collective labour time (the French case of the "35 hours" law was the model to be followed) and in general, it encouraged the government to intervene against unemployment through the adoption of expansive economic policies and through the direct creation of jobs. But the government was unable to adopt expansive policies because its main target was to meet the rigid criteria established by the Maastricht Treaty.

Moreover, Prodi's coalition was not very homogeneous. Indeed, beside Rifondazione, that was against flexibility in the labour market and against state subsidies to private companies, there were other allies, such as the Popular party or the social democratic ones (Democratici di Sinistra, and Socialisti Democratici Italiani) that were strongly in favour of flexibility and also of state subsidies to private industries. These different conceptions of labour policies fostered a long contentious policy making (appreciated by the media, as we have seen) in which Rifondazione made several proposals almost entirely rejected by its governmental partners. The result of this contention was that RC often threatened to withdraw its support to the government. Finally, in late 1998, the conflict within the majority exacerbated at the point that Prodi was obliged to resign, when Rifondazione Comunista actually withdrew its support to the government.

So, it seems plausible that the high number of claims found in the newspaper in the period between 1997 and 1999 finds its explication not only in the increasing unemployment rate but also in the fact that the government was irreconcilably split on the actions to adopt in this field. This division polarized the political debate and gained the attention of the media, that were conscious that the future of the government would depend on choices to be made in the labour domain.

For what it concerns the relevant number of claims found in 2002, when the unemployment rate was relatively low, this can be read as an effect of two different causes: on the one hand, the Fiat crisis threatening thousands of workers with the possibility of unemployment. On the other, we have to mention some more political reasons: first of all, the right-wing neo-liberal approach to labour market that provoked strong reactions by both trade unions and civil society groups and the opposition parties. Moreover, the same government has put an end to the consensual policy-making system, engendering, again, strong social protests, as we will see further.

### ***3.2 The actors involved in claim-making in unemployment politics***

Political parties, trade unions and employers' organizations are the most relevant actors bargaining with the State in the Italian labour policy making. In the period concerned by our study the Italian labour policy making has been defined with the word "*concertazione*" that is a decision making process which actively engages peak employers representatives, peak unions and the government. It is not just a bargain, since the decision is made with the agreement of all the three components, usually with the State acting as a mediator between workers and employers (Gualmini 1995, 1998). The results of this "action in concert" are labour policies which have to be agreed upon by all actors present at "concertation table". Often this mechanism entails that decisions are delayed and that implementation is not always adequate.

**Table 5: Actors involved in claim-making in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

	%
<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>53.7</b>
Governments	31.7
Legislative and political parties	16.5
Judiciary	0.2
State agencies	4.9
Other state actors	0.4
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>46.3</b>
Labour organizations and groups	23.1
Employers' organizations and groups	15.2
Unemployed organizations and groups	1.6
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	--
Other civil society actors and groups	5.9
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>0.5</b>
Total	100%
N	950

The results of the newspapers analysis fit quite well with the consensual model described by the literature focused on Italian labour policies. Indeed, as table 5 shows, State and party actors as well as civil society actors are almost equally represented in the public debate on unemployment: 53.7% of all claims are made by the first one and 46.3% by the second. The government is the most relevant actor: 31.7% of all claims are made by governmental representatives. This is nothing but a confirmation of the crucial role played by the State in labour policy making. Moreover, the fact that, in the Italian case, the State is important because of its role of mediator between strong interests (trade unions and employers groups) emerges from another important finding: the weight occupied in the public debate by labour organizations and groups (23.1% of claims) and employers organizations (15.2%).

On the contrary, unemployed organizations are weakly represented in the newspapers (1.6%): this is due perhaps to the absence of this kind of organizations at the national level –the analysis is done only on the national pages of *La Repubblica*- whereas unemployed organize almost exclusively at local level. Moreover, the strength of the trade union movement, representing workers more than unemployed, can be weighted on the protection and guarantees the Italian welfare system offers to workers in comparison with those provided for unemployed people. Moreover, the fact that unemployment is diffused mainly in Southern regions helps to understand as well why it has been so difficult for jobless people to build national organizations.

Civil society is represented in the labour national debate also by research institutes, experts, church's representatives, pro-unemployed groups such as local social forums (Other civil society actors, 5.9%). For what it concerns political parties, their presence in the collective discussion on unemployment varies according to the party. Table 6 presents the data concerning claims made by political parties in the period between 1995 and 2002. The last (third) column of this table presents parties' scores at 2001 elections. Parties of the left-wing (or the centerleft, "Olive Tree" coalition) predominate: indeed 81.7% of the claims made by political representatives come from the left or the center-left, whereas the parties of the right-wing are really less engaged in the debate on unemployment as the claims associated to them are 18%. On the left or center-left side, the social democratic party (*Democratici di Sinistra*) is the most active one (37.4% of claims), but its Christian democratic allied, the Popular Party (PPI) is also well engaged in the labour debate, with a share of 16.8% of all of the party claims. As we have already mentioned, Rifondazione Comunista

is an important actor too, with 14.2% of claims (this becomes even more relevant if we bear in mind that RC never occupied seats in the national Government). Then, la Margherita (which is a new party assembling different parts of the Olive Tree coalition: Popular Party, Prodi's list "I Democratici" and Mr Dini –a former Minister in both right-wing and left-wing governments- List is also well represented in the media (6.4%), and this is due to the fact the one of the most influential Minister in charge of Labour issues for a long period in the years considered, Mr. Treu, was a member of this party. He has been the mastermind of a deep political reform in the unemployment domain that introduced in Italy the new contractual forms of flexible work.

On the contrary, parties of the right-wing are weakly active in this domain (or at least, weakly reported by the center-left La Repubblica), as the second part of table 6 shows. For instance, Forza Italia, Mr. Berlusconi's party, that is the most relevant party in terms of votes obtained in the last national elections (29.5%), made only 6.7% of claims. Similar results are presented also by Alleanza Nazionale (4.9%) and by the Lega Nord (4.6%).

**Table 6: Distribution of claims in unemployment politics by party (1995-2002) compared to parties' strength in terms of votes at national elections.**

Parties	Claims	Votes at 2001 elections, Camera dei Deputati
<b>Left and center-left parties (Olive Tree)</b>	<b>81.7</b>	<b>43.7</b>
DS – PDS (Democrats of the Left, social-dem.)	37.4	16.6
PPI (Italian People's Party, Christian-demo.)	16.8	14.5
Margherita (PPI+Democrats+Lista Dini, etc..)	6.4	
Olive Tree coalition	5.5	
Verdi (Green party)	0.9	2.2
SDI (Italian Democratic Socialists, social-dem.)	0.3	
Comunisti Italiani (Party of Italian Communists)	0.3	1.7
Rifondazione Comunista (Communist Re-foundation)	14.2	5.0
<b>Right and center-right parties (House of Freedom)</b>	<b>18.0</b>	<b>45.4</b>
Forza Italia (Forward Italy, conserv.)	6.7	29.5
AN (National Alliance, post-fascists, nationalist)	4.9	12.0
Lega Nord (League North, nationalist)	4.6	3.9
CDU+CCD (Christian Democratic Centre, Christi. Dem.)	1.5	3.2
PRI (Italian Republican Party)	0.3	(with Forza Italia)
I radicali (Radical party, liberal)	0.3	2.2
Total	100.0 n 345	

More in general, notwithstanding the fact that unemployment in Italy is an extremely relevant problem, at least for Southern regions that had an average unemployment rate of 21% in the year 2000 (Svimez 2002:38), we have to note that media coverage does not correspond to the mediatic relevance of the issue. Indeed, as we have seen, we could find 950 claims in 8 years, which is a quite small number for the dimension of the problem.

### 3.3 Forms of claims

The claims we have coded in this research are of different types. Public statements represent the most common form of claims reported in the newspaper (see table 7), and among these, declaration in the media, written statements and direct information to the public are the most common forms. 12% of all claims are made through political decisions (most of them as proposal or adoption of new legislation) and only 2.2% are conventional political actions (such as judicial action, 0.2% or participation to committees/consultations/negotiations, 0.6%). But this table reveals also a relevant (7.8%) part of claims made through protest actions, in particular: 2.7% of these actions are demonstrative (public rallies, protest marches); 4.9% are confrontational (occupation, boycott, self-imposed constraints, perturbation of actions by others); 0.2% are violent (violent demonstrations, limited destruction of property).

**Table 7: Forms of claims in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

<b>Political decisions</b>	<b>12.0</b>
<b>Public statements</b>	<b>77.9</b>
<b>Conventional political actions</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Judicial action	0.2
Other conventional political actions	2.0
<b>Protest actions</b>	<b>7.8</b>
Demonstrative actions	2.7
Confrontational actions	4.9
Violent actions	0.2
Total	100%
N	950

But, how are protests actions diffused across the different categories of actors? Is this type of activity used only by unemployed and civil society groups or does it appear also in the repertoire of action of other types of actors? Table 8 presents interesting findings. As it could have been easily guessed, violent actions (first line of the table starting from the bottom) are set up only by unemployed groups, and indeed, this kinds of action are really rare, just 2 cases on 950 (these cases refer to the protest of Neapolitan unemployed). It is also not surprising that labour groups and organizations, such as precarious workers, people recently made redundant or trade unions, represent the actors that have used more intensively demonstrative and confrontational actions. Neither is surprising that we do not find in this table employers organizations, since their repertoire of actions does not usually include the protest. Less expected is the important presence of other civil society actors, such as church's representatives or citizens local committees (19.2% of demonstrative actions and 12.8% of confrontational ones are made by these actors). For what concerns state actors, the cases of protest we found refer to two mayors that took the defence of recently made redundant workers of a big industry, Fiat.

**Table 8: the use of protest by the different actors**


Type of action	State actors	Political parties	Labour organizations and groups	Unemployed organizations and groups	Other civil society organizations and groups	Total
Demonstrative actions	3.8%	3.8%	46.2%	26.9%	19.2%	100.0% 26
Confrontational actions	2.1%	--	74.5%	10.6%	12.8%	100.0% 47
Violent actions	--	--	--	100.0%	--	100.0% 2

In the first case, the mayor of Termini Imerese, in Sicily, started a hunger strike as a sign of protest against dismissals decided by Fiat in the local factory. In the second case, the mayor of Turin, took part to a public rally to protest against Fiat dismissals as well. Civil society actors seem to use a repertoire made of: hunger strikes (several cases of priests protesting against dismissals or against governmental inactivity vis-à-vis unemployment); occupations (some cases of the new global groups that occupied Fiat offices as a sign of protest against the firm's decision to fire workers); public rallies and marches (several cases of the so called "girotondi" –groups of people adopting a particular way of opposing government policies: dancing hand in hand around public buildings, i.e. for the case of justice, around tribunals- performing in favor of Fiat workers in Turin). Finally, the only political party that has used a demonstrative form of action is Rifondazione Comunista, that organized a protest march against unemployment.

We can now move to the analysis of the diffusion of protest techniques across the years. This is visible from figure 3, that shows that protest claims tend to follow unemployment rate (see figure 1): the use of protest augments when unemployment grows. But, also that the protest increases dramatically between 2001 and 2002. To understand this result we have to take into consideration two other events that have polarized the unemployment domain in those two years. First of all, the crisis of the cars' industry Fiat, that had tremendous consequences for thousands of workers that have been made redundant in different localities (in Turin, where Fiat's headquarters are based, but also in Termini Imerese, and in Melfi). Fiat workers have struggled to save their jobs and have used also a repertoire of protest. Several other actors, as we have already mentioned, have protested in their favour.

The second reason that helps to explain the concentration of a large number of protest claims in the period between 2001 and 2002 is the labour policy inaugurated by the right-wing government elected in 2001. The second Berlusconi government has indeed interrupted the "concerted" labour policy making inaugurated in early 1990s. Indeed, it has excluded from the consultation procedures (and from the bargain process) several representative organizations, among which there is the most important trade union, CGIL, (Italian General Labour Confederation). This has paved the way for a season of social conflicts during which protest has been often used to push the government to change its attitude. Moreover, the same government continued the turn towards more flexibility in the labour market, that had already be part of the center-left policy. In particular the (aborted) plan to abrogate an article of the workers' statute (the article 18), protecting workers against unjust dismissals, that has provoked a widespread and deep mobilization led by trade unions and by the opposition parties, but also by civic groups—an opposition that succeeded in its major aim.

This leads us to mention a third explanation for the peaks of events on unemployment. As other type of collective action, they tend to intensify during protest cycles, with alliances between different oppositional actors and movements.



Protest events: sum of demonstrative, confrontational and violent actions

### 3.4 Thematic focus of claims: an aggregated view

One of the most important parts of claim analysis deals with the content of the events reported in the newspapers. The discussion of the aims and the issues, that polarize the debate or around which different actors either make a proposal or take a position, leads us to the very "heart of the matter". With our data, this analysis can be carried out both with quantitative and qualitative methods. We can start by taking into consideration the most relevant issues that animated the Italian debate on labour policy during the years 1995-2002, and then, we can go more in depth in understanding the different actors' positions/proposals vis-à-vis the various issues.

Table 9 presents the results concerning the different issues of the Italian debate on unemployment policies. The most important one is "economic development policy" which 42.4% of all claims are focused on. This outcome is well explained by the Italian situation, where unemployment is concentrated in the southern regions, the less developed part of the country. Most of the issues deal with proposals/requests to foster economic development of southern regions. The ideas on how to promote such an economic change are different as they depend on the actor whom they come from, and the qualitative analysis will be useful to understand this point. Connected with this first issue, there is another one also very important: "state policy regarding the labour market" (28.4% of all claims). Even this issue concerns the debate about southern development and it is mainly based on claims on the creation of jobs by the state, as well as part-time employment, other forms of flexible work, and the lowering of the employment costs. Here as well, positions diverge amongst actors, as we will see below. Two other findings deserve, in particular, our attention. First of all, the marginal role played by the issues included in the category "welfare systems and social benefits", representing only 5.3% of all claims. This shows how in Italy the debate on the welfare in general is underdeveloped as compared to other countries. Indeed, a public discussion on welfare reforms has emerged just very recently in the country: this explains why there are so few claims dealing with such a kind of issues in the years considered.

**Table 9: Thematic focus of claims in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

<b>Socio-economic issues regarding the labour market</b>	<b>91.1</b>
Macro-economic issues	17.1
Economic development policy	42.4
State policy regarding the labour market	28.4
State policy regarding the labour forces	1.2
Work conditions	1.9
Targeted employment measures	0.0
<b>Welfare systems and social benefits</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Unemployment insurance	1.4
Social aid	1.9
Non-state welfare systems	0.0
Targeted reactive measures	0.0
<b>Individual insertion in the labour market</b>	<b>4.3</b>
Active/insertion measures	1.0
Training/formation	1.0
Educational issues	2.3
<b>Issues regarding the constituency of unemployed</b>	<b>1.3</b>
Associational life	0.6
Individual/psychological attitudes/dispositions	0.1
Other issues regarding the unemployed	0.6
Total	100%
N	950


The second observation concerns this same category of welfare systems and deals with the small percentage of claims focused on "unemployment insurance" (1.4%). Indeed, this is another typical result of the Italian system in which insurance and benefits for unemployed are really poor and a discussion on them is marginal. There are only few claims focused on unemployment insurance: part made by unemployed, and part presented by right-wing political parties. The emphasis put on flexibility and (less) on training as active policy have indeed for a while discouraged discussion of measures stigmatised as following the "passive" model of the past. More recently, however, the discussion re-opened on the *ammortizzatori* which should accompany the flexibilization of the labour market in order to avoid its more dramatic social effects. Even though social movement organizations and some unions pressed for a *salario sociale garantito*—or form of unemployment benefits—they had little resonance in the mass media.

### **3.5 Thematic focus of claims, a disaggregated view: what is in the newspaper?**

To examine in detail the focus of claims, we analyse the most important issues raised by the diverse actors. We start looking at the differences between political parties, and then we turn to civil society groups.

Rifondazione Comunista –RC- (Communist Re-foundation): as we see from figure 4 the claims carried out by this party are particularly relevant in the period 1996-1997-1998: the years characterized by a sharp unemployment rate increase, but also by Prodi's center-left government. As we have already mentioned, Prodi's government depended a lot upon the unemployment debate and upon Rifondazione's approval. Once that period ended, the claims made by RC and reported in the media decreased considerably.



**Figure 4: communist re-foundation claims in the years 1995-2002**


The claims of Rifondazione Comunista are based on several issues:

- 1 The reduction of collective labour time: this is the most important issue for the party, and it has polarized the debate on labour policies for years. This proposal has been contrasted by employers organizations, by right-wing parties but also by some of the representatives of left-wing parties. For instance, the Ministry of Labour of Prodi's government, Mr. Treu, declared that a general reduction of collective labour time would not have fitted the Italian employment structure because in northern regions (that reached almost the full employment), the reduction of labour time would have increased the use of machinery instead of people. Peak trade unions were split on this proposal: the left-wing trade union CGIL was in favour of it, whereas the Christian-democratic one, CISL was against: for instance, its leader, S. D'Antoni declared to consider such a proposal absolutely not useful. However, 16% of claims made by Rifondazione concern the idea of fostering employment by reducing collective labour time (but not salaries). Typical claims on this are: "by reducing collective labour time we will create one million of new jobs".
- 2 Another important issue concerns the proposal to introduce a minimum wage; there are also claims where the proposal becomes more specific: "we need to establish a social salary for young unemployed" or "we should pay 1 million [Italian lira...! that is 500 €] per month to all those young people that have been in the list of the placement *bureaux* (uffici di collocamento, now centri per l'impiego) since two months and still did not get a job".
- 3 Policies against flexibility in the labour market represent another important point in this party's claims (12% of all claims are focused on that). Rifondazione's position on this matter is clear and well known in the country: neo-liberal policies have to be contrasted as they foster human exploitation and they provoke unemployment on a global scale. Claims typical in this area are: "we lack jobs because neo-liberal policies are spread all over the world", "flexible salaries for southern regions do not foster job creation".
- 4 Linked to RC criticism of neo-liberal policies are those claims that denounce the economic depressive effects caused by the Maastricht Treaty that forces EU countries to apply restrictive economic policies. Rifondazione asks the government to adopt more expansive policies even if this would mean not to respect the treaty provisions. Claim-type: "the respect of Maastricht criteria impedes to fight against unemployment".
- 5 Finally, and more in general, most of this party's claims aim to push Mr. Prodi's government to "dare more" on employment policies. There is a real evolution in these claims: they begin by saying "the first goal of this government [Prodi's] must be the fight against unemployment", they change in "the government will survive if it will begin to subsidize

policies against unemployment" and they end up by declaring the end of the government "Rifondazione votes have served to maintain a government that has increased poverty and unemployment".

**Center-left coalition parties (Olive Tree):** as in the case of Rifondazione, the claims of the parties that belong to the center-left coalition concentrate in the years 1996-1997-1998 (see figure 5), and the reasons for this are the very same as those described for the previous case.

**Figure 5: claims made by center-left parties in the years 1995-2002**



Moreover, in this case, we can note that the claims tend to increase (or be more visible in the printed media) when the parties are in government (and we will have similar results for the center-right parties, as it will be discussed later). It seems that the themes of unemployment and labour policies in general become important for the parties' agendas almost only when they govern, or at least that their claims are more reported in the media when they are in government.


The most important issues are as follows:

- 1 An important role is played by claims that support the idea that in order to promote employment in the South of Italy the State has to develop of infrastructures (12.8% of all their claims) and subsidize companies (11.6% of claims) that invest in the less developed regions (usually this subsidies take the form of fiscal benefits). Claim-type: "we have to help private companies that invest their money in the South with fiscal benefits" (P. Bersani, Ministry of Industry in Prodi's government).
- 2 Linked to the issue of economic development in the South is the question of flexibility (8.2% of claims). There are several claims that support the introduction of flexible forms of work, such as the part-time: "we have to increase employment rate by encouraging part-time and temporary jobs" (R. Prodi, head of the government); "we need more flexibility of salaries in Southern Italy to create more jobs" (M. D'Alema, head of the social-democratic party, DS); "the flexibility is a fundamental means to create new jobs" (P. Fassino, Minister in charge of foreign trade). However, within the coalition, there are also claims against the flexibility in the labour market. For instance, the head of another communist party, Partito dei Comunisti Italiani, A. Cossutta, declared: "flexibility by itself does not produce employment".
- 3 Among claims made by these parties, several underline the importance of social dialogue: "we have to include trade unions in the elaboration of employment policies for the South" (R. Prodi).

- 4 A series of events refer to the European Union. In particular there are claims that insist on the possibility to include indicators of employment among the parameters of Maastricht. There are also claims underlining that unemployment can be contrasted only at the European level: "the fight against unemployment must be added to the EU priorities list" (R. Prodi), "unemployment must be contrasted with a common agreement between EU member-States to create investments, infrastructures and subsidies to companies" (idem).
- 5 Finally, there are also a few claims inspired by the reformist tradition of some of these parties: it is important that labour policies are accompanied by social or welfare reforms that introduce social-shock absorbers (the so-called "ammortizzatori sociali"). Claim-type: "we have to be reformist and to re-plan social-shock absorbers because if today someone lose a job there is nothing that can help or sustain her/him" (M. D'Alema, president of DS).

**Center-right coalition (House of freedom):** the parties belonging to the center-right coalition are rarely present in the claim making reported by La Repubblica. Indeed they represent the source of only 17.7% of claims made by political parties. The diffusion across the years of the events related to these parties (figure 6) shows that claims increase considerably in the last two years (2001 and 2002), that coincide with the creation of the second government of Mr. Berlusconi, the leader of this center-right coalition. Again, being in government seems to increase the level of attention these parties dedicate to unemployment-labour themes, or at least their access to the mass media..

**Figure 6: claims made by center-right parties in the years 1995-2002**



The issues that the parties of the "House of freedom" have raised concern:

- 1 flexibility in the labour market (31.1% of their claims). There is a favourable unanimous position vis-à-vis this issue among these parties. Several claims consist of simple statements about the need to make the labour market more flexible: "unemployment must be contrasted with massive quantities of flexibility" (M. Follini, head of the CCD, Christian-democratic party). In order to strengthen the approach pro-flexibility, the center-right parties have proposed and approved an amendment to an article of the workers' statute (art.18 providing guarantees for workers fired without a justified reason). A large number of these parties claims focuses on this aspect. What is interesting to note is that the discourse about flexibility is made in the name of the unemployed: the center-right coalition tries to "sell" its requests to make the labour market more flexible as policies that are in favor jobless people and that are contrasted by trade unions whose interests are focused only on those who do not have a job yet. Claim-type: "the labour market reform promoted by our government is useful for those that have not yet a job, not to guarantee that the trade unions maintain of their membership" (R. Maroni, Ministry in charge of Labour issues); "there are things more

important than art.18 to be discussed among social partners, for example training courses for unemployed or subsidies to unemployed" (R. Buttiglione, Ministry in charge of European policies).

- 2 Moreover, it is interesting to note that there are several claims in favour of unemployed such as: "those who loose their job can not be let alone, there must be a subsidy or paid training courses that can help them to find a new work" (M. Baldassarri, deputy Minister in charge of economic issues). There are also claims that condemn police repression of unemployed protest. For instance, in 1997, Mrs. Mussolini, a parliamentarian of Alleanza Nazionale, asked Mr. Prodi's government to respond of the violence used by the police to stop protest marches and rallies of unemployed in Naples. The same party's leader, Mr. Fini, appeared in the newspaper to propose "to increase the subsidy for unemployed". However, as we see, within this center-right coalition, claims in favour of unemployed come mainly from Alleanza Nazionale (post-fascist party) and not from Berlusconi's Forza Italia. There are different reasons for this. On the one hand, Alleanza Nazionale has a tradition of social struggles coming from the fact that it is rooted in popular social strata (an influential component of this party is called "destra sociale" – social right-wing- that indicates the interest of this party to social economic issues). On the other, we have to consider that Forza Italia is strongly linked with peak employers organization and its branches; moreover, its electoral base rely more on bourgeois and petit bourgeois votes than Alleanza Nazionale.
- 3 A consistent part of the center-right coalition's claims concerns the crisis of Fiat (14.8%). In this case, they address the industry, asking for a plan of industrial re-assessment that could avoid massive cuts of jobs.


### **Trade unions, peak employers and other civil society groups issues.**

Trade unions represent the second most relevant actor in claims making (23.1% of all claims are carried out by this type of actor). Their discourse concerns first of all the struggle against dismissals (26% of their claims are devoted to this issue), most of which come from the crisis at Fiat. Indeed, as figure 7 shows, a consistent part of the events made by trade unions happened in the year 2002, when the Fiat crisis reached its peak. But a relevant part of those events (2002) concerns also the fight of CGIL (the social-democratic peak union) against the governmental proposal to amend a part of art. 18 of the workers' statute and, more in general, this peak trade union's opposition to flexibility in the labour market (23.3% of all claims). Vis-à-vis this latter policy, the position of trade unions are not unanimous: there are those who declare to be in favour of it, for instance CISL, the Christian democratic peak trade union, whose leader S. D'Antoni said that: "to create job opportunities in the South of the country it is useful to foster flexibility in the labour market", or "flexibility in salaries between southern and northern regions is important to increase employment". And then, there are those who are against flexibility, such as CGIL that argues that more flexibility in the labour market would just mean less guarantees for workers: "the labour policies of the center-right government will lead the country towards a situation where workers' rights will not longer be guaranteed" (S. Cofferati, leader of CGIL), or "differentiation of salary between north and south is an heresy" (idem). CGIL fears that flexibility would also mean freedom to fire workers: this is another argument by which they motivate their opposition to flexibility.

Employers organizations are important claims-makers too (representing 15.2% of all claims). Their action is substantially devoted to convince public opinion and other actors of the efficacy of fostering flexibility in the labour market to create more jobs. To flexibility are devoted 28.5% of all these actors claims and the employers organizations are unanimously favourable to the introduction

of more flexibility in the Italian labour market. Another important part of their activities concerns the struggle against the proposal to reduce collective labour time (11.1% of their claims). Finally, another relevant part of employers claims is dedicated to ask a reduction of employment costs (8.3% of claims). Claim-type: "youth unemployment can be contrasted by introducing salaries flexibility and by lowering employment costs", (P. Cantarella, Fiat general manager); "if we do not lower employment costs, Italian firms will soon be out of market" (G. Guidi, deputy president of the peak employers organization).

**Figure 7: claims made by: trade unions, employers organizations and other actors of civil society 1995-2002**




**The other groups of civil society** representing 5.9% of all claims consist of:

- 1 experts intervening on very different subjects, such as flexibility, economic development of southern regions, etc;
- 2 church's representatives, in particular, the archbishop of Naples appears quite often in the media denouncing the lack of governmental action to contrast unemployment. For instance he stated that: "the government does not pay enough attention to the problem of unemployment"; "to keep young people away from criminality the government must create more work opportunities";
- 3 representative of the new global movement intervening in favour of Fiat workers made redundant, both verbally but also by protesting (i.e. they occupied Fiat spaces, like Agnelli's –the family that owns Fiat- museum of fine arts, in Turin).

**The Unemployed:** the organizations of unemployed capture media attention only in few cases (indeed, they represent 1.6% of all claims). Their presence in the newspaper across the years can be seen from figure 8. Their reported claims are concentrated in the years 1997-1998 when unemployment rate increased.

The claims of unemployed refer all, apart from one case, to the Neapolitan movement. Moreover, all these claims consist of protest events: occupations (i.e. the occupation of the cathedral of Naples), sit-in, streets blocks. It seems that the unemployed interviewed in Naples during the field work are correct when they affirm that they are taken in consideration by the newspapers only when they protest or when their action becomes violent.

**Figure 8: unemployed claims in the years 1995-2002**

### 3.6 Targets and Objects of claims

The large majority of claims are addressed to State representatives: 72.6% of all claims ask the government to intervene or to take a position vis-à-vis certain issues (see table 10).

**Table 10: Targets (addressees) of claims in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>77.4</b>
Governments	72.6
Legislative and political parties	3.1
Judiciary	-
State agencies and other state actors	1.7
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>19.5</b>
Labour organizations and groups	2.0
Employers' organizations and groups	16.6
Unemployed organizations and groups	0.6
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	-
Other civil society actors and groups	0.3
Social Partners	3.1
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>-</b>
Total	100%
N	460

This confirms the country's policy making where the State plays a crucial role not only as a mediator between social actors but also as source of opportunities for economic development. The State is the first subject to whom labour, employers and unemployed organizations as well as other civil society actors (i.e. the church) address their demands concerning unemployment and its remedies. It emerges also that after the State another important actor to whom claims are addressed are the employers and their organizations (16.6%): labour organizations addressed several requests to employers representatives; workers recently made redundant addressed their firms the request to

be re-integrated in their positions, and similar requests are often carried out by civil society groups in the name of those workers.

For what concerns the objects of the claims, (table 11) two groups polarize the attention of claims makers: workers and unemployed. The former represents the objects of 31.6% of all claims, and this is due mostly to the high number of dismissals (Fiat, Olivetti, Alitalia, etc..) that have occurred in the period considered for the analysis. The latter represent 68.4% of all claims.

What it is interesting to note about this last finding is the fact that in the public debate, when there is a reference to the constituency of unemployed this is made in the name of "unemployed" tout-court. Indeed, in the selected newspaper there is almost no reference at all to young unemployed, old-age unemployed or migrant unemployed. Claims are made in the name of generally conceived "unemployed" or have as their object the "unemployed" category as a whole. This can also be interpreted as a scarce knowledge about the "category" or about the situation of being unemployed.

**Table 11: Object actors of claims in unemployment politics (1995-2002)**

<b>Workers/employees</b>	<b>31.6</b>
Precarious workers/employees	2.2
Workers/employees of same company	9.5
Other and unspecified workers/employees	18.2
Working poor	0.3
Illegal workers (lavoratori al nero)	1.3
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>68.4</b>
Young unemployed	5.5
Old-age unemployed	-
Women unemployed	0.1
Migrant unemployed	0.1
Disabled unemployed	-
Long-term unemployed	0.2
Unemployed recently made redundant	0.2
Social welfare recipients	-
Other and unspecified unemployed	62.3
<b>Other and unknown objects</b>	<b>0.1</b>
Total	100%
N	950

### ***3.7 Towards Europeanization? Not yet (at least, not in the public sphere)***

One of the aims of our research is to study if and how the public discourse on unemployment as well as on labour policies is, in some way, undergoing a process of Europeanization. That is, we would like to understand if the European dimension has become relevant in this domain. In order to seize this aspect, our data offer us several possibilities of analysis. The first step consists in the discussion of the scopes (geographical or political extension) of actors, issues, addressees and objects.

**Table 12: scopes of actor, issue, addressee and object**

Scopes	Actor	Addressee	Object	Issue
Supranational/transnational (except EU)	2.6	--	0.3	0.2
European	3.9	10.9	8.3	7.9
Bilateral	--	--	0.5	0.6
National	84.3	84.0	70.0	70.5
Regional	1.6	0.9	14.3	13.6
Local	7.5	4.3	6.5	7.2
Unknown/unspecified	.1	--	--	--
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
N	(950)	(349)	(950)	(950)

As we can see from table 12, although the policy choice reflects the general fascination of flexibilization of the labour market and “active” policies (such as training), the European dimension is not very important in the public discourse, as compared to the national one: only 3.9% of claim makers have a European scope and 7.9% of issues are raised at the EU level. However, it is interesting to note that for what concerns the addressee (the subject to whom a request of intervention is made), the European level is mentioned much more often than the regional and local ones (respectively 10.9%, 0.9%, 4.3%): considering the important role played on the labour field by local political institutions, especially the regional government, we could have expected a different result. This, especially in the light of our interviews, from which it emerged that the EU level was important, but for sure not as much as it was the regional one. Interesting is also the result concerning the object of claims. Indeed, 8.3% of them have a European dimension: a score higher than the local level.

But, which actors address the EU level ? For which actors is it relevant to ask an intervention of EU institutions on labour issues ? Table 13 presents the results of an analysis crossing the actor scope with the scope of the addressee. In this table we find a confirmation of our interviews at local level: where the actors interviewed declared that although the EU was important to give directive-lines -- and some of them admitted that the EU was important also for the resources it could deliver in the field of unemployment-- the majority sustained that the most relevant institutional levels to work with remained the national and the local (regional) ones. Indeed, as it emerges from this table (10), local actors seem to ignore the EU level as a level to whom it is possible to address a request. The European level is acknowledged as an actor that can be called to be active on unemployment policies by national actors, 10.9% of which have made claims asking EU intervention.



**Table 13: scope of addressee by scope of actor**

Scope of actor	Scope of addressee				Total
	European	National	Regional	Local	
Supranational/transnational (except EU)	25.0%	75.0%			100.0% 12
European	33.3%	66.7%			100.0% 18
National	10.9%	87.6%		1.5%	100.0% 266
Regional		90.9%	9.1%		100.0% 11
Local		68.3%	4.9%	26.8%	100.0% 41
Unknown/unspecified		100.0%			100.0% 1
	10.9%	84.0%	.9%	4.3%	100.0% 349

Other data suggest that the public discourse on unemployment does not seem to take a European dimension. Or, better, that the national level does not lose its importance as compared to other levels. Table 14 presents a diachronic evolution of issue scopes: it emerges quite clearly that if there is a trend at all, this does not go towards any "Europeanization" of the discourse. On the contrary, it seems to go towards its "nationalization". Indeed, the national level not only does not lose weight, but it gains importance through the years, whereas the European level seems to become less relevant in the last period (2000, 2001, 2002).

**Table 14: diachronic evolution of scope of first issue**

Year	Scope of first issue						Total
	Supranational/transnational (except EU)	European	Bilateral	National	Regional	Local	
1995			2.9%	58.0%	24.6%	14.5%	100.0% 69
1996	.9%	13.9%		59.3%	24.1%	1.9%	100.0% 108
1997	.8%	14.6%	.8%	71.5%	4.6%	7.7%	100.0% 130
1998		7.0%	.7%	67.5%	17.7%	7.0%	100.0% 271
1999		14.3%	1.1%	<b>72.5%</b>	7.7%	4.4%	100.0% 91
2000		1.9%		<b>87.0%</b>	7.4%	3.7%	100.0% 54
2001		1.7%		<b>82.8%</b>	6.9%	8.6%	100.0% 58
2002		4.1%		<b>76.3%</b>	10.1%	9.5%	100.0% 169

N (950)

## 4. The field of labour policy

### 4.1 Political deliberation in the field of labour policy

The following part of the report is dedicated to the illustration of the results of 39 semi-structured interviews that were conducted between November 2003 and September 2004, for the national level, and between April and October 2003 for the local level. The former were carried out mainly in Rome - where all the national organizations interviewed have their national headquarters, whereas the latter were realized in Naples, the town chosen for the local-case study. Even more than expected, it was quite difficult to arrange the interviews in Rome – due to the relevant institutional or organizational role of the people selected for interviews. Nevertheless, among the interviewees there are the representatives of the main Italian political parties, all the three most important national trade unions, two of the most unemployed-friendly autonomous trade unions, two of the most relevant ministerial experts involved in unemployment policy in Italy and three associations that have somewhat been close to unemployment issues from the unemployed and social economy point of view.

At the local level too, the policy actors we interviewed are key-persons, as their offices are endowed with substantial powers in the field of unemployment policy: the member of the provincial government in charge of employment issues (the province has gained important responsibilities with the recent reform of the labour market); and the member of the regional government in charge of the same issues (the regional level is also important because of both its power in the delivery of financial resources and its links with the EU). Together with this member of the regional government, we interviewed also the executive director of the regional governmental department for job creation. On the side of intermediary actors we interviewed five parties representing different positions in the political spectrum (the communist party, *Rifondazione Comunista*, which plays a crucial role in the public debate on unemployment –see above; the most important social democratic party, *Democratici di Sinistra*, *DS*; the green party, *I Verdi*; the most relevant center-right party, *Forza Italia*, and the most important right-wing party, *Alleanza Nazionale*). For all these parties we have asked for an interview with the responsible for labour issues: in some cases this has been possible (*Rifondazione*, *DS*, and *I Verdi*), whereas in the other cases the parties did not have one single person responsible for the matter (notwithstanding Naples unemployment rate of 28%). In the case of *Forza Italia*, anyway, the person we interviewed can be considered a highly qualified party representative, as he is the head of the group of *Forza Italia* in the City Council (which means that he is the leader of the opposition in Naples City Council) and a member of the National Parliament. Also for what concerns *Alleanza Nazionale*, we have been able to find a well-informed interview partner.

Among intermediary actors, an interview has been realized with the most relevant trade union, *CGIL*: we were able to speak with the person in charge of the labour department for many years: a good witness of the Neapolitan situation. Moreover, the representative of this union has suggested us to meet a police officer, as he was an expert of the whole sector of the organizations of the unemployed. We interviewed the officer and we could gain from him an interesting institutional perspective.

On the pro-unemployed/NGOs/grassroots field we made three interviews: one with the leader of the southern Italy no-global network; another with a representative of a local squatted social centres that for the past few years has been a leader of both the unemployed and the squat movements; and a third with a small political group close to the unemployed movement. These interviews, especially the first one, have been extremely useful. Indeed, from the former we obtained not only an up-dated

inventory of the unemployed organizations of and several additional information. In some cases, it was thanks to this person that we could get in touch with the unemployed organizations and that indeed we could approach their leaders.

Finally, we interviewed eleven organizations of unemployed, which represent a multifaceted reality, as we will discuss later. In these cases the groups representatives (*delegati*) have been interviewed in the headquarters of their organizations, apart from two cases, in which the interviews took place in the occasion of a protest event (march and sit-in). Sometimes the interviews with unemployed groups have been combined with participant observation. Moreover, to capture more in depth the dimensions of the unemployed organized struggle, we decided to carry out, beside the Unempol-requested interviews, a few life-stories interviews with militants of different groups.

Each interview lasted about 1h30, and it was not always easy to keep the interviewees ‘on track’. Those who made themselves available for the interview were very interested in it, and almost all of them asked to have a copy of the final research report.

The local level resulted to the most adequate to study unemployed organizations in Italy. A part from an announcement regarding the creation of a national association of precarious workers and unemployed, appeared on the web at the beginning of 2003, which, ever since has remained just an "announcement", no national organization seems to exist behind the web. On the contrary, Naples shows a tradition of organized unemployed dating back to the seventies.

**Table 15. Distribution of interviewees across actor categories**

<i>Actors</i>	<i>Number of interviewees</i>	
	<i>National level</i>	<i>Local level</i>
Policy Actors	2	3
Intermediary	10	7
NGOs/grassroots	3	3
Unemployed Orgs	-	11
<b>Total</b>	<i>15</i>	<i>24</i>

#### **4.2 Influential organizational actors in the issue field of unemployment**

With respect to the most influential actors at the national level, in Table 16 it is not surprising that the most cited organizations are the trade unions (and in particular CGIL, CISL and UIL – the three ‘big’ trade unions) and Confindustria, the association that represents Italian large companies. The literature dedicated to labour policy in Italy has shown clearly that during the ‘90s Italy developed some institutions of bargaining and negotiation between some unions, business representatives and the government. The Ministry was considered a key actor in formulating labour policy during the past decade and even more during the last few years. In the past it seemed that the government was somehow trying to limit social conflict, looking for socially painless (but expensive) solutions in order to avoid mass dismissals. After 1992, in the new context of budgetary constraint the government has become a relevant actor in pre-selecting the policy options on which trade unions and business associations were called to express their opinion. And such new phenomenon is becoming more and more visible: for instance, the new L. 30 – passed in February 2003 – was ‘imposed’ by the government on reluctant trade unions and (less reluctant) business associations. In fact, according to the unions, the new government is in line with the political demands of Confindustria and therefore the old trilateral pacts<sup>35</sup> (when the unions were united) are now replaced by new agreements prepared by the government – with the help of Confindustria – and

<sup>35</sup> See national template for details.

with the consensus of only two of the ‘big three’ trade unions, leaving aside the most important one: CGIL. Such new phenomenon emerges also from the interviews, since some interviewees think that in recent times only CISL and UIL have been influential in labour policy, whereas nobody mentions the CGIL as a influential actor in its own right. Furthermore, due to the new (from 2001) center-right government, minor, right wing oriented unions such as UGL have gained importance. Finally, there are other actors which are mentioned but only once (such as *Lega delle Cooperative*, *Compagnia delle Opere*, etc.; see annex 2 for further information on the organizations) and therefore they might be considered of marginal relevance if we look at the overall picture.

**Table 16. A rank-ordered list (total counts) of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organizations by actor type, national level.**

<i>Organizations</i>	<i>Number of mentions</i>				
	<i>Policy actor</i>	<i>Intermediary actor</i>	<i>NGOs</i>	<i>Unemployed Orgs</i>	<i>Total</i>
Trade unions together (CGIL, CISL, UIL)	2	8	3	-	13
Confindustria - Business associations	2	10	1	-	13
Labour Ministry	1	7	2	-	10
UGL – Trade Union	0	3	-	-	3
CISL	0	3	-	-	3
UIL	0	2	-	-	2
CGIL	0	1	1	-	2
Compagnia delle Opere	0	1	1	-	2
Lega delle Cooperative	0	1	-	-	1
CNA	0	1	-	-	1
Confagricoltura	0	1	-	-	1
Confcommercio	0	1	-	-	1
Cobas	0	1	-	-	1

At the local level the situation found is comparable to the national one (cfr. Table 17). Indeed, the answers to the sequence of questions dealing with influential actors show that the "classical" model of labour policy making developed at national level has been replicated at the local one. Policy actors indicate professional organizations and trade unions as very influential. The results are the same when we turn to political parties. Indeed, the regional government is indicated as the most influential actor, together with peak employers organizations and trade unions. The right-wing parties criticize the role played by the trade unions. They argue that it is thanks to the unions' strength that the labour market is so underdeveloped in the city. The right-wing parties ask for more power for industries and their representatives. Almost none of these actors indicates unemployed organizations or pro-unemployed groups as influential. These latter declared that the regional government has as much influence and power on the labour field as trade unions (with whom the unemployed have very contentious relations) and employers associations.

**Table 17. A rank-ordered list (total counts) of the most frequently mentioned influential organizations by actor type, local level.**

<i>Organizations</i>	<i>Number of mentions</i>				
	<i>Policy actor</i>	<i>Intermediary actor</i>	<i>NGOs</i>	<i>Unemployed Orgs</i>	<i>Total</i>
Trade unions together (CGIL, CISL, UIL)	3	7	3	11-	24
Confindustria - Business associations	3	7	3	11	24
Labour Regional Ministry	3	7	3	11	24
Labour Provincial Ministry	3	5	3	11	22
Unemployed	0	1	2	9	12

### 4.3 Organizational networks and inter-organizational contacts

In general, the answers to the question regarding this section (see table 18) reflect the previous section since the actors try to establish contacts with those organizations that they think are more influential. Nevertheless, there are some differences that deserve our attention. At the national level, to begin with, the main target of trade unions – as expected - is the Ministry. What is somewhat surprising is that CGIL, the largest trade union, is also interested in influencing Confindustria, the business association – traditionally the counterpart. The idea behind such behaviour seems to be that there is need to share common goals in order to maintain Italian productive sectors competitive in the increasingly competitive international business environment. Furthermore, within the Ministry the policy actors interviewed – experts working at the Prime Minister staff level – seem to devote time to influence their own Ministry, in order for their ‘expertise’ to come through and become a fully fledged policy. Finally, the parties – in particular those who are currently in the government – have no targets: since they have the power, representing the majority of the population, they feel that they do not need to influence any other actor. Nevertheless, the representative of Forza Italia clearly stated that within its own party – and within the government – there are various lines of thought: there are those who believe in the need and relevance of a continuous social dialogue (i.e. those who are directly involved in labour policy-making) and those who are part of the governmental coalition but are not engaged directly in labour policy-making and therefore think that social dialogue is unnecessary.

**Table 18. A rank-ordered list (total counts) of the ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor type.**

<i>Organizations</i>	<i>Number of mentions</i>				
	<i>Policy actor</i>	<i>Intermediary actor</i>	<i>NGOs</i>	<i>Unemployed Orgs</i>	<i>Total</i>
Labour Ministry	1	7	3	-	11
Trade unions (CGIL, CISL, UIL)	2	6	2	-	10
Business associations	2	6	0	-	8

In the words of the Forza Italia representative: “when we won the elections, I remember hearing in a national conference one of the most influent people in Forza Italia’s leadership with respect to labour policies, and the message was that since we have won the elections, then we did not need any social ‘intermediation’. We were legitimised by the people and therefore we did not need to search for support of social partners. I personally though – and still think - that such idea was – and is - absurd” (interview n. 8, N.L.). In other words, with the new government a shift in labour policy-

making has been made: although not as isolated as it could have been, the government seems to work without solid contacts or ties with trade unions or business associations. The idea behind such approach seems to be the one expressed by Berlusconi (half joking, half not) in one of his first public statements as Prime minister: “ghe pensi mi”, that sounds more or less like “I’ll take care” in Milanese<sup>36</sup> dialect.

All the parties belong to international party federations, and most of them cited the increasing relevance of the European party dimension. Likely, trade unions are part of international (and especially European) federations that have increased their activity over the past twenty years.

If we now turn to the governmental agencies to which the actors devote much of their time it emerges quite clearly that although the Parliament (and in particular, the parliamentary Commissions) remains a key target, during the past decade the governmental bodies (Ministries and ministerial commissions) have become more and more relevant as power loci. Looking at the actors with whom major collaborations have taken place, we see that the trade unions and the Labour Ministry have played a key role during the ‘90s, whereas all the other organisations have been somewhat placed in the background of the policy process.

**Table 19. Most frequently mentioned actors the respondents have collaborated with (top ten)**

<b>Organizations</b>	<b>Number of mentions</b>
Trade unions together (CGIL, CISL, UIL)	13
Labour Ministry	12
Confindustria - Business associations	4
CISL	3
CGIL	2
UIL	1
Compagnia delle Opere	1
Lega delle Cooperative	1
CNA	1
Confagricoltura	1
Confcommercio	1

Finally, if we look at the major disagreements that have emerged over the years, the Labour Ministry seems to be the main actor with whom our interviewees have disagreed. For the government, on the contrary, trade unions have been a source of disagreement and in particular the CGIL trade union. In fact, the Berlusconi II government has tried to divide the ‘three big trade unions’, in order to gain support from CISL and UIL, and has managed to do so with the separate signature of the Patto per l’Italia<sup>37</sup>; therefore, one of the main ‘enemies’ of such design was the CGIL – that nevertheless managed to organize a 1.000.000 people demonstration against the government on March 23, 2002.

<sup>36</sup> Berlusconi was born in Milano, the most important industrial and financial city of Italy.

<sup>37</sup> See national template.

**Table 20. Most frequently mentioned actors the respondents have had disagreements with (top 10)**

Organization	Number of mentions
Labour Ministry	8
Confindustria - Business associations	7
Trade unions together (CGIL, CISL, UIL)	3
CISL	3
UIL	3
COBAS	2
CGIL	1

Now we can turn to the local case and focus on the organizational network established by the unemployed, because for the other local actors the findings are similar to the national ones. The density of the networks set up by the organizations of unemployed depends on the type of organizations. There are groups that have developed an intense net of contacts whereas others are more isolated. This diversity is due to different conceptions of organizing the jobless. The groups that are more endowed with social links conceive their organization not only as a means to get a job, but as a "movement" whose claims, while encompassing the basic request for a work, embrace a richer range of issues (safe home, respect for the environment, workers rights). In such a perspective, the struggle of the unemployed is seen as a component of the larger struggle against social exclusion, struggle that needs to be reinforced by the establishment of links with other groups and other experiences. The majority of the groups interviewed belong to this kind of organization. Two of them (*Movimento Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra*, and *Coordinamento per il Lavoro di Napoli*) are part of the new global network (see figure 9): they are connected with a vast range of social actors, i.e. squats (*centri sociali*), communist groups, critical unions (*cobas and sincobas*). These two groups of unemployed have set up a very robust network, at the point that they consider themselves as two branches of the same movement of the unemployed.


But the ability of establishing links with other groups characterizes also the unemployed organizations considered "right-wing". For instance, three of them, *Lista Flegrea*, *Forza Lavoro Disponibile* and *Lista Storica*, are well connected with each other (interesting to notice that between left and right wing groups the denomination chosen is different: the left-wing organizations usually call themselves "movement", whereas the right-wing ones use the word "list"). They organize joint actions, march together, jointly attack public institutions. For instance, they were campaigning together in the period of our interviews in Naples, when they posted up home-made posters everywhere in tow against both city and provincial governments.

Then, there are groups that conceive the struggle of the unemployed organizations essentially as a pure dispute engaged with public institutions to obtain a job for the organizations members. These are the groups that present the narrowest range of contacts. Indeed, they do not act together with other groups (in figure 1, we named them "outsiders")--a part from particular circumstances, when almost all groups marched together. This is the case during national general strikes or when they protest against the repression of the police vis-à-vis their action, or, again, when they decided to support the proposal of Rifondazione Comunista to

**Figure 9: Networks of unemployed organizations in Naples**

Left-wing unemployed network

Right-wing unemployed network



introduce a social salary in the region Campania. In this last case, even the right-wing lists joined the other groups to sustain Rifondazione's proposal.



Finally, there is an organization of unemployed (*Eurodisoccupati*) that has established good relations with both the left and the right wing organizations. This group is able to march one day with one side of the constellation of the unemployed movement, and the day after with the opposing side.

#### 4.4. Action forms of actors

Italian social and political actors traditionally have used a limited set of form of actions. In general, in the Italian case ‘court strategies’ are (moderately) relevant only for the trade unions, whereas for the other actors much more attention and energy – in particular with respect to the ‘intermediary actors’ – has been devoted to mobilizing the public and ensuring sufficient ‘internal communication’ within each organization. As several authors have pointed out, Italian labour policy-making has been characterized until the beginning of the ‘90s by the presence of strong unions (CGIL, CISL and UIL – that all together represent about 20% of the Italian population, almost 40% of the working population), fairly strong business associations and ‘weak’ governments that often were easily influenced by social partners. Such actor constellation gave the opportunity to the unions to frequently use public mobilization of affiliates and workers in order to effectively lobby the government. Also, limited ‘unionised’ attention has been given to the ‘media strategies’ since - as the representative of the biggest trade union organization, CGIL, states in our interview - “we do not need a media strategy; journalists come to us if the government make any proposal”.

Also, in the past the government has limited its institutional communication with respect to unemployment issues; in fact, quite often until the beginning of the ‘90s the ‘quality’ of the information available regarding labour policies was very poor since the data was sometimes not even available for the decision-makers themselves. Just to give an example: in the second half of the ‘90s, one of the most relevant policy was the so called LSU (*Lavori socialmente utili*, socially useful jobs) programme. For several years, the government did not know exactly how many people were benefiting from the programme, and this was also the case for numerous other labour policies. Therefore, the only information that was regularly passed by the government was related to unemployment or employment rates, since other sources of information were not always available.

Therefore, taking a look at table 20 we should not be surprised if media related activities are only occasionally used by policy actors, whereas intermediary actors and even more the NGOs dedicate more attention to and are more appealing for the media, since in Italy trade unions - one of the most relevant intermediary actor - are seen as the most important actors in labour policy-making. Moreover, a look at the columns of local actors of these same tables shows how important are media related strategies for the unemployed. Indeed, for unemployed organizations, working with the media and public information and working with the policy makers are two sides of the same coin. The attention of the media vis-à-vis their action is extremely important to make them successful (as pointed out by the literature, media are one of the rare resources unemployed can use to strengthen their action): they can work with policy makers as long as these latter consider the unemployed as socially representative actors. In order to become such, the organizations of unemployed rely mostly on the media coverage of their action. This explains also the fact that their repertoire of actions is always very creative and sometime violent.

If we turn to the consulting functions, we see that social partners and parties do play a key role in defining policy goals and instruments, since they quite often take part – more or less informally – in the decision-making process. As expected, at the national level only in very special occasions are the Courts involved in labour policy regulation or implementation, even though in the past a major role has been played by Courts that were asked to intervene by the trade unions for specific matters. Nevertheless, political parties have not tried to use the judiciary in order to make their voice heard,

preferring either the Parliamentary arena (for the governmental parties) or the street (for oppositional parties).. Finally, the activity of lobbying and trying to establish direct contacts with parliamentary and governmental bodies is of great relevance for both parties and trade unions. But, at the local level, courts are used by policy actors to contrast unemployed organizations protests, suggesting the new (and contested) typology of "extortion to the public administration" referring to the unemployed organizations requests of a privileged access to state-subsidized jobs.

**Table 20. The use of major action form categories expressed in standardized form, by actor scope (taking into account different number of actors per actor type category and different number of items per action form category)**

<i>Action form</i>	<i>Policy actor</i>		<i>Intermediary</i>		<i>NGO</i>		<i>Unemployed</i>	
	Nat.	Local	Nat.	Local	Nat.	Local	Nat.	Local
Media related	.7	.79	.82	.71	.1	.33	-	.41
Informing the public	0	.4	.54	.65	.53	.04	-	.56
Negotiating/lobbying	.75	.66	.80	.82	.75	.08	-	.84
Consultation	.87	.41	.85	.67	.92	.25	-	.18
Court action	0	.66	.50	.14	.33	.0	-	0
Political campaign contributions	n/a	n.a.	.70	.71	.33	.66	-	.66
Mobilizing the public	n/a	n.a.	.74	.67	.67	.83	-	.75
<b>N</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>		<b>11</b>

The limited attention devoted to media and public information strategies in Italy emerges also in the analysis of table 4: for 70% intermediary actors and for 100% of policy actors and NGOs interviewed media-related and public information strategies are less important – often much less important – than working directly with policy-makers. Whereas for the ‘policy actors’ the reason is to be founded in their ‘technical’ role<sup>38</sup>, for political parties ‘internal communication’ is more important and easier to obtain. It might be of some interest to note that the representative of Forza Italia, the party lead by the media tycoon Silvio Berlusconi, stated that “since the important media and intellectuals are left-wing we have to concentrate on our affiliates and make them ‘spread out our word’ in order to counterbalance the mediatic power of the ‘left-wingers’” (interview n. 8, N.L.). The trade unions are even more interesting since their answer was more nuanced, and both representatives answered that they currently find media-related strategies more important, but for specific reasons: “since the current government does not listen to us, we need to reinforce our channels of communication with the media and with our members in order to be heard also by the government” (Interview n. 7, N.L.).

<sup>38</sup> “Since our office is a technical body, we are not interested nor do we have the competencies to inform directly the public or the media”, Interview n. 4 (see annex 1).

**Table 21. The importance of media and public information strategies in relation to direct contact with policy makers across different actor categories.**

Actor	Media strategies		Public information	
	More %	Less %	More %	Less %
Policy actor	0	100	0	100
Intermediary	30	70	30	70
NGOs	0	100	0	100
Unemployed	-	-	-	-

If we focus now on the unemployed organizations we see that their most relevant form of action consists mainly of protest events, but they are involved also in consultation/negotiation activities. Table 5 presents the types of unemployed protest we have found in the local case. The first column shows the three levels at which the unemployed organize their protest. The first level, the local one, is the most relevant as the large majority of protest events realized by these groups takes place in Naples. In this sense, protesting at local level is ordinary: the mayor has formally prohibited more than two marches per week but the unemployed have found the way of bypassing this *ordinance*: they march once a week for labour issues but then they march in the name of other causes: homes, immigration, war, etc. The most important aims of their claims at this level are the request for a work and the demand for a safe home. The addressees are usually the three levels of the local government: the city administration, as well as the provincial and the regional ones.

**Table 22. Levels and types of protest actions of the unemployed organizations of Naples**

LEVELS	FREQUENCY OF USE	CLAIM'S AIMS	ADDRESSEES
Local	High frequency	Jobs, Home	Local governments; National government
National	Occasionally	Jobs, Home, Social salary, against repressive attitudes	National government; EU institutions
Supranational/ European	Very rare	Jobs, Home, Social salary, No to repressive attitudes: a different world is possible	EU institutions, National governments

The second level of the organization of protest is the national one. At this level the Neapolitan groups occasionally organize or take part to national events in Rome or in other cities of the country. The range of aims widens at the national level: beside jobs and home, the groups mobilized for a social salary (i.e., Rome, November 2003) or against repressive actions vis-à-vis the southern social antagonists groups (i.e., Cosenza, winter 2002 and autumn 2003). In these cases their addressee was mainly the national government, but some reference was also made to the European Union (interviews n. 11, 12, 14,15, LL.).

Mobilization at the European level, or at least in occasion of supranational events, is rare. However, the unemployed of Naples took part to the protest against the G8 in Genoa in the summer 2001 or to the one occurred in Evian in the summer 2003. In these cases, their action was motivated not only by the right to work or to have a safe home. More generally, in the name of a different world. The addressees of their request have been national governments, but also supranational institutions, like the EU or the UN but also the IMF and the WTO. Mobilization at supranational level still remains rare basically for the costs it demands. Moving resources-deprived people from southern Italy to Evian or to Brussels is hard and expensive (interview n. 11, L.L.). But not impossible, as some of these groups show.

From the interviews carried out with the unemployed, it seems clear that the importance for them to take part to such events can not be measured on a purely quantitative way (how many participate) but on a more qualitative and complex manner (what does the participation mean for these groups and for the conception –framing- of their struggle?). Indeed, notwithstanding the fact that only a restricted number of militants took part to international events, not based in the country, most of the interviewed defined these events as crucial steps for the creation of their collective identity.

#### 4.5 Role of the EU

For all the interviewees at the national level the European dimension is becoming increasingly relevant with respect to labour policy. In fact, all of them – except for one that says there is ‘some discussion’ - have indicated that there is a ‘lot of discussion’ in their own organization regarding the EU and the European Employment Strategy. Nevertheless, the European dimension has specific peculiarities with respect to the national one.

**Table 23. The extent of intra-organizational discussion of the role of EU across different actor types.**

<i>Actor</i>	<i>Discussion about the EU</i>		
	<i>Lots</i>	<i>Some</i>	<i>None</i>
Policy actor	1	1	0
Intermediary actor	9	1	0
NGOs	2	1	0
Unemployed Orgs	-	-	-

More in detail, there are major differences between the two levels of government. To begin with, at the European level much less attention is devoted to media-related strategies and to mobilizing and informing the public, whereas the same (full) attention is dedicated to lobbying or contacting key political actors within EU institutions. In other words, the European Union is increasingly important but still has not become comparable to the national dimension: less communication and mobilization is going on, since the political space is not as developed as the national one. And such observation is valid for all the actors interviewed: political parties, social partners, governmental staff.

**Table 24. Distribution of action forms for action at the EU level across different actor categories, by actor scope.**

<i>Action form</i>	<i>Policy actor</i>	<i>Intermediary</i>	<i>NGO</i>	<i>Unemployed</i>
	National	National	National	National
Media related	0	.40	.27	-
Informing the public	0	.52	.42	-
Negotiating/lobbying	.50	.45	.50	-
Consultation	.50	.52	.42	-
Court action	0	0	0	-
Political campaign contributions	n/a	.63	.20	-
Mobilizing the public	n/a	.23	.29	-
<b>N</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	

Furthermore, of great interest is that - although there is a limited capacity to express 'voice' in the supranational arena - the evaluation of the European Employment Strategy (EES) is generally very positive. The shared idea - also by *Rifondazione Comunista* and the *CGIL* - is that thanks to the European Union the importance of activation policies is better understood and that the relevance of labour policies' data collection and evaluation has become much more evident than in the past. Nevertheless, some nuances start to emerge: for instance, the *Gruppo di monitoraggio* representative points out that the EES does not sufficiently take into consideration the specificities of Italy, being too rigid in the selection of the European guidelines and policy goals; the representative of *Rifondazione Comunista* argues that no EES can be effective without a broader Keynesian re-orientation of macroeconomic policy at the European level. In sum, the actors involved in Italian labour policy recognize that there has been an influence derived by the development of a supranational policy and political arena, but specific national traits of labour policy-making remain and probably will remain in the future, maybe in a more ample (i.e. European) labour market regulation setting.

The importance of EU in the labour policy domain is acknowledged also by all the actors we have interviewed at local level. However, the importance of this institution is described with different nuances. Policy actors admit that EU is relevant for the financial resources it can deliver to regional governments, but they say that this supranational institution gives guide-lines but it is up to regional governments then to take the right political choices to make these lines concrete and efficacious.

Political parties too appeared convinced of the power of the EU in the labour domain. The social democratic party, *Democratici di Sinistra*, declares that EU funds are crucial to strengthen education and training programs and to intervene in the production structure of the region to make it prone for economic development. Moreover, the representative of the same party told us that EU intervention becomes even more important with the current national government of center-right that does not care about southern regions. In this sense, the EU presence can substitute the lack of State intervention in the creation of job in the less developed areas of the country (interview n. 5, L.L.). According to the same party, the Territorial Employment Pacts (that were at the basis of the choice of local case studies within Unempol) have been one of the more efficacious EU tools in promoting local economic development.

For what it concerns unemployed organizations, some of them recognize the importance of EU, others do not. For the former groups, EU is important not only for it is now the place "where the

money is and comes from" but also because the EU represents the level to whom demands can be addressed to, given the fact that the other levels of power (local or national) refused to answer. For example, one of the group interviewed, *Sindacato Azzurro*, told us that if their attempt to reach the national government had failed they would have marched to Brussels for two main reasons: first to ask the EU the fulfilment of their right to work. Second, to denounce at that level the lack of action of the Italian national government in the labour domain (at the time of the interview the government was the actual one, headed by S. Berlusconi) (interview n. 10, L.L.).

Another organization of unemployed (a right-wing one: *Lista Storica del Collocamento*) was so convinced about the new opportunities offered by the EU that the European flag hung on the wall of its headquarters (a re-painted garage in a poor area of the town) just behind the chief desk. However, other organizations were more sceptical vis-à-vis the importance of EU. For instance, one of the older and more influential organization, the *Movimento Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra*, thought that the most powerful institution in the field of unemployment still remained the regional government and that the EU is not a good target for their action.

At present, despite the general acknowledgment of the importance of EU, all local actors (apart from policy actors) do not seem to be really engaged, with action and with internal discussion (very rare), at this level. They limit themselves to be aware of the role this supranational institution can play, they announce they may eventually reach that level in their future activities, but still they prefer to focus their discourse and their action on local and/or national institutions. Concluding, as far as the interviews are concerned, some main findings can be summarized. First of all, almost all the interviewees pointed out that the national level is increasingly in the middle of two 'growing' dimensions: the supranational and the regional one. The interviews conducted at the national level confirmed that in the Italian labour policy setting very little room is left for unemployed associations or unemployed interests' representation, and no association specifically dedicated to the protection of unemployed people's interest exists at the national level. Moreover, very limited attention is devoted to the unemployed by the other, more 'traditional' actors (such as political parties and trade unions), with the exception of *Rifondazione Comunista*. Thus, having included in the analysis a local focus has allowed us to seize the richness of actors involved in such a policy domain. In particular, the choice of a local case allowed to approach and to study the organizations of unemployed that, despite the fact that they do not exist at national level seem to be so important in the dynamics of labour policies in Naples and in its surrounding areas.

## 5. Concluding remarks

The analysis of the claims-making as well as the interviews with public and private organizations involved in policy making on labour policies offers a quite complex picture on the actors, targets, strategies and frames used to discuss unemployment, its causes, consequences and possible remedies in Italy. We can summarize here some of the main findings.

- *The frequency of claims-making on unemployment.* It is no surprise that debates on unemployment develop in period of job scarcity. However, our research confirms that the "objective" relevance of a grievance does not alone explain how people feel it and how the act on it. Indeed, our data indicated an intensification of claim-making on unemployment as related with two additional dimensions: a) the presence of political entrepreneurs and their visibility (see the role of *Rifondazione Comunista*); b) the development of claims on multiple issues during cycle of protest (in particular, opposition to right-wing government).
- *The actors that make claims on unemployment.* Our data confirm, as it is often the case in distributive issues, the dominance of an "iron triangle" of well structured organizations of business and labour, interacting with representatives of the relevant national ministries. This dominance is indeed reflected in the debate in the media, where however some visibility is

gained also by other societal actors (such as voluntary associations and social movement organizations). The unemployed themselves have little say in the public discourse and policy making on issues that concern them directly—with the exception of some local situations.

- *The forms of claims-making on unemployment.* As in other fields, verbal claims dominate the mediatic debate on unemployment. Protest, however, is also present. At the national level, its visibility increases especially when trade unions oppose massive dismissals, sometimes finding alliances among the local governments and church-representatives. At the local level, we found some instances of protest of long-term unemployed, supported by voluntary associations and movement organizations.
- *The issues discussed in claims-making on unemployment.* Italy confirmed the general European trend towards a (not only discursive) shift from (nowadays stigmatised) passive to (widely supported) active policies, oriented towards the EU-sponsored model of “flexsecurity”. In the Italian debate, however, the largest number of claims concentrated on the conditions of the labour market, with a convergence of center-left (with the exception of Rifondazione Comunista) and center-right politicians in support of a flexibilization of the labour market. Little attention was paid on the qualification of labour. The debate focused moreover on the issue of unemployment, more than on the conditions of the unemployed (let alone of specific groups of unemployed).
- *The scope of the targets in claims-making on unemployment.* In the public discourse, the target of claims-making on unemployment remains the nation state, with limited reference instead to the European level (that political and social actors recognize instead as a more and more relevant player on labour issues). European institutions are however addressed on unemployment more often than in other issue domains (such as immigration) where the formal competences of the EU are more relevant (della Porta and Caiani 2005). The EU control on the relevant leverage of monetary policy, as well as dynamics of “externalization” of protest (Chabanet 2002) might explain this finding.

Many of these characteristics might be explained by national political opportunities. First of all, we have mentioned a Southern European model of welfare, based upon the protection of the bread-winner *pater familias* and clientelistic distributions of small subsidies. This interacts with the specific structural conditions of unemployed (mainly concentrated among young people, women and in the Southern regions). Additionally, from the point of view of labour politics, Italy has an *exclusive* tradition (reflected in the division in the labour movement), with a later development of political exchange (oriented towards the protection of the “stronger” economic sector) and more recent, and interrupted attempts at concertation.

**Appendix 1.**

<b>Actors interviewed at the National Level</b>
<p><b>POLICY ACTORS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- Gruppo di monitoraggio delle politiche occupazionali, Presidenza del Consiglio – responsible of the monitoring and evaluation unit within the Prime Minister staff, interview n. 4;</li> <li>-- Comitato per il coordinamento delle iniziative occupazionali, Ministry of Labour – responsible of the national Committee for the co-ordination of labour policies, interview n. 1;</li> </ul>
<p><b>INTERMEDIARY ACTORS</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, Democratici di Sinistra party, interview n. 2;</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, Rifondazione Comunista party, interview n. 3;</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, Forza Italia party, interview n. 8;</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, Alleanza Nazionale party, interview n. 5;</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, Margherita, interview n. 9</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, CGIL (trade union), interview n. 7;</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, UIL, (trade union) interview n. 6;</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, CISL, (trade union) interview n. 10</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, CUB, (trade union) interview n. 11</li> <li>-- Spokesperson, COBAS (trade union), interview n. 12</li> </ul>
<p><b>NGOs/grassroots</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-- Spokesperson, Forum del Terzo Settore, third sector association, interview n. 13</li> <li>-- Responsible for labour market issues, CARITAS, third sector association, interview n. 14</li> <li>-- Member of National Board, ARCI, third sector association, interview n. 15</li> </ul>



<b>Actors interviewed at the Local Level</b>
<p><b>POLICY ACTORS</b></p> <p>--Assessore provinciale al Lavoro (Member of the provincial government), interview n.1;</p> <p>--Assessore regionale al Lavoro e Politiche Sociali (Member of the regional government) <i>interview n.2</i>;</p> <p>--Head, Job Creation Department, Regional minister for labour and social affairs, <i>interview n.3</i>.</p>
<p><b>INTERMEDIARY ACTORS</b></p> <p>--responsible for labour issues, Rifondazione Comunista, interview n.4;</p> <p>--responsible for labour issues, Democratici di Sinistra, interview n.5;</p> <p>--responsible for labour issues, I Verdi, interview n.6;</p> <p>--responsible for labour issues, Forza Italia, interview n.7;</p> <p>--responsible for labour issues, Alleanza Nazionale, interview n.8;</p> <p>--responsible for labour issues, CGIL, interview n.9;</p> <p>--Isp. Digos (Naples political police: the person in charge of unemployed "surveillance"), interview n.10</p>
<p><b>PRO-UNEMPLOYED</b></p> <p>--spoke-person, the new global Southern Italy network, interview n.11;</p> <p>--squat SKA, interview n.12;</p> <p>--communist group "Che fare?", interview n.13</p>
<p><b>UNEMPLOYED</b></p> <p>1-Coordinamento di lotta per il lavoro, interview n.14</p> <p>2-Movimento Disoccupati Autorganizzati di Acerra, interview n.15</p> <p>3-Movimento di lotta LSU, interview n.16</p> <p>4-Movimento di lotta per il lavoro zona est, interview n.17</p> <p>5-Movimento di Lotta Sedile di Porto, interview n.18</p> <p>6-Disoccupati Uniti per il Lavoro, interview n.19</p> <p>7-Forza Lavoro Disponibile, interview n.20</p> <p>8-Lista Flegrea, interview n.21</p> <p>9-Eurodisoccupati italiani, interview n.22</p> <p>10-Sindacato Azzurro, interview n.23</p> <p>11-Unione Disoccupati Napoletani –UDN- , interview n.24</p>

## Appendix II

### Employment and labour policies in Italy.

	<b>1919-1967</b>
Passive policies	- unemployment benefit (1919); -ordinary salary integration (1945); -extraordinary unemployment benefit (1946)
Active policies	-Public system of employment (collocamento pubblico) (1949); -Apprenticeship (1955)

	<b>1967-1979</b>
Passive policies	-cassa integrazione straordinaria (1968); -extraordinary unemployment treatment (1968); -facilities for anticipated retirement (1968); -Reform of the agricultural “collocamento”(1970); -domiciliary work law (1973); -changes in the ordinary un. Indemnity (1975); -re-assessment of the salary integration(1975).
Active policies	-youth employment measures (1977); -extra-industries mobility (1977); -law on professional training (1978).

	<b>1980-1988</b>
Passive policies	-Anticipated retirements (1981); -contracts of internal solidarity (1984); -re-assessment of ordinary un. Indemnity (1988).
Active policies	-contracts of formation and training (1984); -part-time contracts (1984); -contracts of external solidarity (1984); -nominal appointment facilities.

	<b>1988-1995</b>
Passive policies	-mobility indemnities (1991); -change of the extraordinary salary integration (1991); -revision of the ordinary un. Indemnity (1993); - revision of the contracts of solidarity (1993).
Active policies	-nominal appointment (1991); -social useful jobs (1994); -fiscal facilities for companies employing unemployed (1994); -incentives to contracts of formation and training (1994).

Source: Gualmini, Elisabetta, *La politica del lavoro*, Bologna, Il Mulino,1998, p.163.

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## **The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

### **Chapter 7: Final Report for Germany**

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#### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. Basic parameters of the German policy approach
  - 2.1. Historical background and classification of the German welfare state
  - 2.2. German policy model
3. Unemployment and public policy
  - 3.1. Development and structure of unemployment in Germany
  - 3.2. National policy instruments to fight unemployment
    - 3.2.1 Passive measures
    - 3.2.2. Active measures
4. Public debates on unemployment: the claims-making data
  - 4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis
  - 4.2. Media discourse on German unemployment
  - 4.3. Public actors – who is involved in the media discourse
  - 4.4. Argumentative structure of the public discussion
    - 4.4.1. Thematic focus of the public discussion
    - 4.4.2. Reasons of unemployment and proposed solutions
    - 4.4.3. Targets of public criticism
  - 4.5. The role of the unemployed in public discussion
  - 4.6. The Role of the EU in public discourse
5. Political deliberation in the field of labour market policies
  - 5.1. Interviews with political actors
  - 5.2. Organisational networks
  - 5.3. Action forms of actors
  - 5.4. The role of the unemployed within unemployment policies
  - 5.5. The role of the EU in political deliberation
6. Résumé and conclusion
7. Appendix: List of interviewees
8. References

## 1. Introduction

Unemployment is a highly prioritised topic in German public debate. Currently, more than 5 million people are without a job – a number unprecedented in German history. The unemployment issue has thus attained high priority on the agenda of both mass media and public administration, having instigated a vivid discussion about necessary policy reforms for more than a decade. According to these debates, almost all instruments and strategies traditionally used to combat unemployment in Germany are under review and at the disposal of major shifts in policy orientation and philosophy. The initiatives of the European Union, amongst them particularly the European Employment Strategy, have contributed to this situation by promoting international comparison and an exchange of ideas and practices. German public policies thus resemble a major building site. In this context, it is of great interest to analyse the current public policy debates, because they allow us to portray those agendas, concepts and strategies, which are introduced and discussed by experts, politicians and interest groups as pillars of a new edifice of public policies.

The following report aims to synthesize the main findings of this analysis for the German case. Amongst others, it strives to reconstruct the main strands of public contentions in regard to issues, participating actors and debated policy solutions. It also wishes to underscore the role of the European Union and its potential impact on German public debates. In particular, we are interested in learning how inclusive these public debates are with reference to minoritarian interests and precariously organized groups (in particular, the unemployed). To this end, we will present the findings of the German project in three steps. First, we will give a picture of unemployment in Germany and describe the established policy instruments and strategies – as a frame for better understanding the role and direction of current policy debates and reforms. Second, we will reconstruct the structure of mass mediated public debates by presenting our data on claims-making within a leading German newspaper (the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*). Finally, institutionalised policy deliberations within public administration and parliaments will be analysed using interviews conducted with important political actors.

## 2. Basic parameters of the German policy approach

The fight against unemployment is part and parcel of German public policies since a long time. Moreover, we can identify a specific approach to combating unemployment and dealing with the unemployed. To better understand the current debates and policy reforms, it is thus beneficial to reflect this German policy style before entering the specifics of our findings.

### *2.1. Historical background and classification of the German welfare state*

Germany was the first of the Western European countries that implemented a social security system. The German model was conceived as an insurance system that was to compensate for the loss of income due to illness, the loss of a job or other hardship. Thus in the beginning it was directed towards workers as a compulsory insurance. In detail the following three social insurances were introduced: the law concerning health insurance for workers (June 15, 1883), the law concerning accident insurance (July 6, 1884), and the law concerning disabled and old-age insurance. (Lampert, 1994). In the further developments the social security systems were extended concerning more population groups, covering 24.5% of the population by 1890, 48.8% in 1925, 73.3% in 1955 and 81.8% in 1975 (Schmid, 1996, 119). Also service types were extended. Thus it came to a change from a workers insurance to a widespread social security for the whole population, particularly after the second world-war (Alber 1982, 59).

According to Esping-Andersen (1998) the German welfare state can be characterised as a conservative-corporatist state due to the fact that the social security systems is mainly based on the principle of equivalence. The significant feature of this principle is that the benefits vary by the amount of contribution. Further aspects that argue for a typing as a conservative-corporatist system are: social services take an inferior position compared to monetary transfers; the status of the worker is stabilised but not the one of the citizen; and the main institutions are not directly state-controlled but self-administrated corporations or private organisations acting on the principle of secondary liability or subsidiarity.

Following the principle of secondary liability or subsidiarity, the state only gets active if other mechanisms, like the family, established welfare organisations and charities cannot help. Traditional ways of support within the family and organised welfare are stressed because of the strong influence of the church.

## 2.2. German policy model

The German welfare state can be classified as a "neo-corporatist" one. It can be attributed as "neo-corporatist" first of all because of the strong concentration of societal interests in a limited number of peak associations. To represent the interests of the employers there exist three 'peak associations of the German industry': the 'Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände' (BDA) and the 'Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie' (BDI) and the 'Deutscher Industrie- und Handelskammertag' (DIHK). The members of these peak organisations are branch specific employers organisations. The unions on their part differentiate into different branches with unitary unions as well, while being all represented by the peak union, the *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund*.

The neo-corporatist element of this welfare mix can be not only attributed to the strong concentration of societal interests in a limited number of peak associations, but also on the intense co-operation between state and 'organised' society (via these peak associations).

This is not only true for the industrial relations between capital and labour and the state, but applies also to the realm of social welfare services (Schmid, 1996: 121-125): on the one hand, the principle of subsidiarity makes the welfare organisations responsible for the practical delivery of services, while they are financed by and large via the state and/or the social insurance mentioned above; on the other hand, the state controls and supervises the field of welfare services by an (increasing) number of laws and administrative provisions, while including these welfare organisations into the process of policy deliberation and decision-making.

Furthermore German politics are said to be consensus-oriented (Germany being a consensus-democracy), which implies that the state engages not only into consultation but, more than that, into concertations. Political measures are to be decided 'in concert', even to the point that this enables the state not to take a decision, as far as the 'partners' commit themselves to take action. On the other hand, capital and labor are regarded as partners to solve their particular problems and/or conflicts autonomously and also independently from the state.

This neo-corporatist structure of industrial relations does not relate automatically to our policy field: i.e., unemployment issues. In fact, the neo-corporatist relations between capital and labor centre primarily on issues of mutual interest for employers and employees, i.e., wages, working conditions, training and the like. However, it is very indicative of the German case that neo-corporatist arrangements have been used recurrently to address and/or solve problems of unemployment. That is, neo-corporatism is a valued institution, particularly amongst social democrats (and the representatives of unions and the employers' association); supporters will

assume that they are a very powerful and effective instrument for solving political problems. The most renowned attempt is the Alliance for Employment, Formation and Competitiveness (the 'Bündnis für Arbeit, Ausbildung und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit') that has been promoted by the 'red-green' government from 1998 on, but is replicated on the regional level in a number of Laender.

To sum up, the policy field of unemployment policies in Germany differentiates into various arenas or 'rims' of action: the arena of 'institutional' political deliberation and decision-making in the strict sense; the arena of 'institutionalised' neo-corporatist negotiations or 'private interest governments' in the sense of Streeck & Schmitter (1985) with a facilitating and semi-absent state; and the arena of social welfare provision in private hands with an ordering and controlling state.

### **3. Unemployment and public policy**

Unemployment is not a new issue. However, the current situation implies increased challenges to the political order, because the ever growing mass unemployment is raising doubts that the established policy strategies are unable to tackle the problem in a sustainable manner. We should therefore take a look at the situation of employment in Germany more closely.

#### ***3.1. Development and structure of unemployment in Germany***

Germany's labour market has been marked by an imbalance of supply and demand since the 1970s. During the 1990s the gap between those looking for a job and the number of vacancies became even more significant, surpassing the symbolically meaningful mark of 4 million unemployed in 1997 and of 5 million jobless in early 2005. Especially the New Laender faced considerable problems in the field of labour market policy after 1989, due to the transition from planned to market economy.

The development of the last forty years can be summarised as follows. At the beginning of the 1960s full employment was attained, that is the number of unemployed people did not exceed the number of vacancies. Since 1974, however, the average number of unemployed people per year has been much higher than the number of vacancies. In 1975 there were, on average, more than one million unemployed men and women. From 1982 to 1988 the labor market situation was aggravating. At the beginning of 1985 2.6 million jobless people were already registered. At the end of 1988 and at the beginning of 1989 the labor market situation improved temporarily. In May 1989 the number of unemployed people dropped for the first time below the 2 million threshold: approximately 1.7 million people were looking for a job in 1991. This was the lowest figure since 1982. The declining economic development from 1992 onwards caused an increased number of unemployed (i.e., 1.8 million), and this situation aggravated continually until 1997, where the number of unemployed people exceeded the 3 million threshold for the first time. The unemployment rate was thus about 11%. In 1998 there was a slight improvement, which continued in 1999. This improvement was mainly caused by the beginning economic stimulation of 1998. The 1999 unemployment rate dropped to 9.9%.

After German reunification the problem of unemployment also reached the New Länder – where the problem did not exist before officially or was not allowed to exist. In 1990 there were about 433,000 people unemployed, which makes an unemployment rate of 4.9%. There were, however, only 25,000 vacancies. By 1991 the unemployment rate had more than doubled (10.3%) and rose to 16% (1.14 million) in 1994. In 1995 the number of unemployed decreased for some time; from 1996 on it worsened again noticeably. In 1999 the unemployment rate was 19%. In contrast to Western Germany there was a decrease in the number of vacancies of 67,000 or 6%.

Apart from regional differences in unemployment rates, there is a number of demographic groups that are particularly exposed to joblessness: these are primarily younger and older people, women, foreigners and seriously handicapped persons. Moreover, German data disclose that we are dealing not only with an increasing number of unemployed people, but that they tend to be without a job for a longer time. For instance, the proportion of people being unemployed for one year or longer rose from 32% in 1991 to 50% in 2002. In the New Länder the problem of long-term unemployment is more distinctive. Especially women in East Germany were affected by long-term unemployment in 2002, two thirds of whom were without a job longer than one year. Finally, unemployment affects primarily those being badly qualified. In April 2002, 26% of the unemployed did not feature a completed professional or industrial training.

### **3.2. National policy instruments to fight unemployment**

In Germany two distinct approaches are combined in the fight against unemployment. On the one hand there are passive measures that are to help the unemployed in financial terms. On the other hand active measures of employment policy exist to bring unemployed back into work. Both types of measures have been shaped within the current policy reforms in order to move the unemployed more systematically into taking up jobs within the (primary and secondary) labour market. In fact, 'work' is the main goal of all measures, and this orientation is apparent already in the official treatment of the unemployed. Those searching help from the state need to declare themselves unemployed; additionally they must be looking for a job and need to be at the job centre's disposal.

#### *3.2.1 Passive measures*

The main instruments of this type of measures is the unemployment insurance and the social assistance.

*Unemployment insurance:* The main objective of the unemployment insurance is to substitute for lost income, that is to secure the financial existence of those workers becoming unemployed. The unemployment insurance is conceived as a compulsory insurance for all employed people, i.e. all those employed up to the age of 65 must pay in. The unemployment insurance is financed by graded contributions depending on the income level of the insured person. At the moment the contribution rate is 6.5% of the gross income (earning ceilings see below). Both, employer and the employee pay half of the contributions each. Not liable for contributions are civil servants, pupils, students and employees working less than 15 hours a week and earning less than 1/7 of the average income of all insured in the pension insurance.

The conditions of entitlement to receive dole are so-called reversions ('Anwartschaften'). This means that the unemployed person must have been compulsorily insured (including times of compulsory insurance like parental leave) for at least 360 days during the last 3 years. To receive dole no waiting period is required. However, if the unemployed terminated work himself/herself without a cause, or if he or she is sacked because of misconduct, he or she could be blocked, which means that he or she will get no dole for 3 months or - in cases of hardship - 3 to 6 weeks ('Sperrzeiten'). Until 2003 the duration of benefits depended on the duration of compulsory insurance coverage and on the age of the beneficiary. Since 2005 access to dole has been limited to a maximum of 12 months with an exception for unemployed who are 55 years and older. The latter will receive dole up to a maximum of 18 months.

*Social assistance:* Until 2004 unemployment assistance was granted to those people who were not entitled to the dole, but who have received unemployment insurance benefits during the previous year and/or must be in need in order to be entitled to assistance. The duration of payment was



unlimited. Wages were taken as a basis for determining the benefits, and earning ceilings were the same as for dole calculation. There was also a close relationship between income during employment and in times of unemployment: beneficiaries with children received 57%, beneficiaries without children received 53% of average net wages of the last year of employment. Since 2005 this relationship between income during employment and the protection of income in times of unemployment is only given for the first 12 (or 18) month of unemployment.

From 2005 onward the unemployment assistance and social assistance was merged into 'Arbeitslosengeld II' ('dole II'). As a consequence, unemployment assistance has been cut to the level of social assistance. As the new "dole II" is tax financed as well, the "principle of neediness" is the decisive factor for defining the entitlement. That is, in order to receive this financial assistance one must be poor and unable to live without the benefits. To ascertain that the unemployed is in need he or she has to undergo a "poverty test". The current reforms, finally, recommit passive measures (i.e., unemployment insurance and social assistance) to the objective of an activation of the unemployed. Indeed, the priority is to get people back into the labour market, primarily by limiting entitlements and curtailing financial help. For instance, the duty to accept an offered job is strongly tightened. From 2005 onwards unemployed people have to agree to any job offered by a personnel service agency regardless of the wage paid and the qualification requested.

### 3.2.2. Active measures

Active policy measures aim to solve unemployment by promoting the growth of the labour market and/or by facilitating the unemployed' access into the labour market. The range of potential measures is wide, given the fact that many different regulations might motivate companies to offer new jobs and might move the self-employed to start their own business. In this context, for instance, the effects of taxes and contributions on the development of the labour market are discussed as well as the consequences of wage negotiations, the legal protection against dismissals, the regulation of working conditions and many others. Most complaints demand some kind of deregulation and flexibilization of the labour market.

Still, we can identify a number of public policies, which are linked to active measures in a more strict sense. Here, we can refer to the reform program of the Schröder-administration – the so-called Agenda 2010 – and the subsequent Hartz-reforms I-IV, which emanated from the Commission on "Modern Services on the Labour Market", established by the Schröder government in 2002 and directed by Peter Hartz, management board member of Volkswagen. Amongst others, these reforms centre on the reorganisation of the unemployment insurance and social assistance (see above), the reorientation of individual reinsertion procedures, the permeability of the labour market and the remodelling of employment programmes.

*Individual reinsertion programmes:* Since 2004 the German Federal Labour Office has been re-named into Federal Personnel Agency. This is to symbolise the transition from a public authority to a service provider. To make the placement more efficient the job centres are transformed into personnel service agencies, because their main objective is to bring unemployed faster back into work. This reform was envisioned already by the "JobAQTIV-Gesetz", which was enacted in 2002 and aims to establish a more preventive approach in the dealings with unemployed. On the basis of the unemployed's personal background and professional experiences and qualifications an agreement is reached (the so-called 'Eingliederungsvereinbarung'), which prescribes the specific steps to be undertaken in order to find new employment – and the sanctions to be expected when this agreement is not met.

*The permeability of the labour market:* Another focus of the reforms is to facilitate the access of the unemployed into the labour market. Here, it is argued that jobless people, particularly long-term

unemployed, have problems entering the regular labour market given their low qualifications and/or little work experiences. Hence, a secondary labour market is promoted, which consist of mini-jobs, short-term contracts, lend-work and others, and which is to open a door to the regular labour market for those persons, who need to improve their employability. The Hartz reforms, for instance, introduced in January 2003 mini-jobs (services remunerated with up to 500,- Euro), particularly to legalize services in private households. Since January 2005, recipients of the new ‘dole II’ can be placed in so-called ‘1-Euro-jobs’, which are created in the nonprofit service-sector and are geared to increase the recipient’s employability. Finally, the labour administration aim to promote self-employment as a means to reduce unemployment. Traditionally, jobless people are supported in building up their own business by providing financial help (the so-called ‘Überbrückungsgeld’ or the “Existenzgründungszuschuss”) and training – and these programmes were backed by various Länder. This activation measure was propelled by the Hartz-reforms by introducing the so-called “Ich-AGs” or “Familien-AGs” in January 2005.

*Employment programs and subsidies:* Employment creation measures (‘Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen’) have had an increased importance during the 1980s and 1990s. Here, we are dealing with newly created jobs by means of wage subsidies (between 30% and 75% of the factual wage). These funds are granted for a particular period of time in the expectation that the employer will transform this employment into a regular job. The aim of these employment creation measures is to use social security contributions more productively than by paying unemployment benefits. Employment creation measures are intended for those unemployed who otherwise have no chance to get a job, above all long-time unemployed, unemployed without professional training and handicapped persons. However, ABM have been severely criticized and are being supplanted by other models with a lower rate of state subsidies. Here, we can name models of combined wages, which were started in July 2000 by the German government. There are two different approaches, which either co-finance wages (the SGI-Modell) or rather support the employer’s and employee’s contributions to social insurance (the ‚Mainzer’ Modell). This latter model was taken up by the national government in January 2002 as an instrument of their employment policies.

#### **4. Public debates on unemployment: the claims-making data**

In democratically structured polities the public sphere has a strong impact on the formulation and implementation of public policies. In this sense, it is crucial to investigate whether the portrayed policy debates follow and/or take up debates within the mass-mediated public sphere. Moreover, it is of importance to analyse the structure and dynamic of these public discourses in regard to issues, actors and arguments in order to understand better who influences and/or dominates the public definition of the problem, of the political accountability and of the adequate measures. Likewise, we need to trace back whether public debates exclude specific actors and/or issues, and which effect this exclusion has on the course of public debates. It is to be assumed that public debates are responsive to pressing social problems and public worries, and thus quite inclusive for non-institutionalized actors (e.g., the unemployed).

##### ***4.1. The basic outline of the newspaper analysis***

The newspaper analysis features print media coverage of unemployment issues and related political claims in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* from 1995 to 2002. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* was chosen because it is one of the leading national newspapers in Germany, known as political independent. The analysis used a sampling procedure in the way that all claims reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues (or if one of these days was a holiday, the following issue) of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* were coded. The front page, the political and economic sections of the

newspaper were consulted, thus excluding the local or regional sections as well as non-political sections such as sports, culture and the like. All articles related to the topic of our research project were retrieved using the electronical databasis of the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*. The retrieved articles were printed and coded according to a coding book used by all national teams, partly elaborated for the German case study.

The unit of analysis was the single political claim, broadly defined as a strategic intervention, either verbal or non-verbal, in the public space made by a given actor on behalf of a group or collectivity. Thereby we coded all claims that belong thematically to the issue of unemployment, narrowly defined as follows: unemployment, under-employment, joblessness, exclusion from the labour market, measures and provisions for unemployed people (including training courses, financing of unemployment insurance, and workfare), and precarious employment. Claims referring to related fields (i.e. employment policy, economic development policy, and other issues concerning the situation of the labour market or the creation of jobs) were coded only if they referred explicitly to the issue of unemployment. In addition, we coded all claims by organised groups of unemployed people, regardless of their thematic focus.


In Germany we assembled 2710 articles - split into 3859 claims - dealing with the above mentioned issues, which is almost six times more data than in the other countries.

#### 4.2. Media discourse on German unemployment

The number of articles allows us to paint a picture of the development of news coverage and public debates about unemployment in Germany. Figure 1 gives us a first impression of this development by pointing out that the *Süddeutsche Zeitung* reported quite unevenly about unemployment in the course of the eight years under review: the issue was given highest priority in 1996, lost attention continuously until the year 2000, and regained importance from 2001 onwards. Several explanations can be considered when looking at this development.

First, the evolution of factual unemployment might be the main cause for the ups and downs of public debate, in the sense that the ‘objective problem’ to which the news reports refer determines the course of public debates. When we include the development of unemployment data in our figure, we see that there exists a relationship between both items, even though it is weak: unemployment figures and news reporting tend to increase and decrease in a very loose manner.

**Figure 1: Development of public debate in relation to unemployment rates**



Public debate is exposed to stronger changes than the unemployment rates, and the former seem to anticipate rather than follow the latter. Hence, other explanatory causes need to be considered. First of all political elections had an impact on the news coverage of unemployment issues. This does not apply so much to the elections of 1998, when a coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party replaced Christian Democrats and the Liberal Party in government. Here, elections could only halt the decreasing importance of unemployment issues in the media agenda. It was rather at the elections of 2002, when this issue gained prominence anew. In fact, Gerhard Schröder had announced in 1998 that he would cut in half unemployment figures during his government, and public debate centred on this promise during re-elections. Second, we can argue that it is not the objective problem, but rather the social and symbolic meaning associated with unemployment issues, which tends to direct public debates. Here, we can refer for instance to the climax of news reporting in 1996, when unemployment figures were approximating the threshold of 4 million people.

Having a look at the objects of the public discussion, actors seldom speak about specific groups of workers and unemployed. Table 1 shows that the only exception is youth and long-term unemployment and welfare recipients, who are identified as a specific and particularly pressing

**Table 1: Objects of the Political Claims-Making (in %)**

<b>Workers/employees</b>	<b>33.4</b>
Precarious workers/employees	2.1
Workers/employees of same company	0.5
Other and unspecified workers/employees	30.8
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>58.6</b>
Young unemployed	8.7
Old-age unemployed	1.2
Women unemployed	0.5
Migrant unemployed	0.5
Disabled unemployed	0.4
Long-term unemployed	3.8
Unemployed recently made redundant	0.2
Social welfare recipients	3.5
Other and unspecified unemployed	39.8
<b>Other and unknown objects</b>	<b>8.0</b>
Total	100%
<b>N</b>	<b>4855</b>

(3859 valid cases)

problem. We can interpret these findings by concluding that public debates discuss unemployment issues as a general and abstract social problem rather than as specific issues with tangible constituencies.


#### **4.3. Public actors – who is involved in the media discourse**

The results of our claims-making data provide a survey of the actors' impact on the public debate about unemployment: The most powerful actors are state actors, followed by unions and employers' organisations. Among the state actors, the executive plays the most prominent role with every fifth claim in our data set. Political parties are relegated to a second place, yet the dominance of government actors is underscored even more when we notice that political parties enter into public debate primarily before elections and step aside when governments are in place. When we speak of non-state, civil actors, we actually mean social partners (i.e., representatives of capital and labour)

and research institutes or think tanks, which are subsumed to the category of ‘other civil society actors or groups’ and make up 8% of all claims.


Figure 2 gives an impression of the fact that welfare and unemployed organisations as well as churches hardly have any influence on the course of the public discussion about unemployment policies. They have no say and have concentrated their public appearances primarily on 1998, when electoral campaigns provided a strong opportunity to raise their issues.

**Figure 2: Main actors in public discussion**



These findings underscore the assumption that public discourse in Germany is dominated by neo-corporatist discourse communities. On the one hand, this means that public debates are not state-dominated. In fact, the state plays a prominent role. However, labour and employers' associations are as present in public debates as the executive and much more relevant in day-to-day politics than political parties. On the other hand, public debates tend to be restricted to neo-corporatist discourse communities because unions and employers' associations are the pillars of the so-called social dialogue, which is a quasi institutionalised form of governance in Germany and grants these actors a high degree of public attention and recognition. In fact, claim-making is monopolized largely by the state and the social partner, to the detriment of social NGOs (e.g., welfare organizations) and non-organized interests (e.g., unemployment initiatives).

Regarding not only organisations but the actors' membership in political parties we can see that it makes a decisive difference whether or not a party is in power (see figure 3): Christian Democrats dominated public debates until 1997, while Social Democrats took over in 1998. It is interesting to note that this baton changing proceeds smoothly, as if media coverage became more inclusive in view of a new potential government. In fact, these figures unveil that it is not party affiliation which makes a difference within public debates. Media coverage (and public debates) are rather state-centred, or better: government-centred.

**Figure 3: Party Affiliation of Claimants in the Course of Time (in %)**

(115

9 valid cases)

#### 4.4. Argumentative structure of the public discussion

##### 4.4.1. Thematic focus of the public discussion

To make the data of the different countries of our research more comparable we pointed out the thematic focus of the public discussion by summarizing the issues into five broad and 18 sub-categories.

Table 2 shows us that in four out of five claims unemployment is related to socio-economic issues. More precisely, every fifth claim discusses the problem of unemployment in reference to the situation of the national economy and its prospects, competitiveness, flexibilization and liberalization issues, while pending or factual dismissals on the level of individual companies are named in 13.4% of all cases. Social dialogue is associated with unemployment issues in a small yet significant number of cases (9.4%), in the sense that negotiations between capital and labour are potential causes and/or solutions to be discussed. A further and important portion of claims relates unemployment to political measures in the realm of economic, fiscal and/or active labour market policies (32.5%).

**Table 2: Thematic Focus of Claims in Unemployment Politics (in %)**

	Share in all claims	Workers constituency	Unemployed constituency
<b>Socio-economic issues regarding the labour market</b>	<b>79.8</b>	<b>95.7</b>	<b>69.5</b>
Macro-economic issues	19.7	14.5	22.7
Dismissals	13.4	36.4	0.3
Social dialogue	9.4	8.5	10.3
Economic development policy	11.9	9.9	10.4
State policy regarding the labour market	16.2	12.5	19.4
State policy regarding the labour forces	3.2	2.8	3.1
Work conditions	4.8	11.0	1.2
Targeted employment measures	1.2	0.1	2.1
<b>Welfare systems and social benefits</b>	<b>6.9</b>	<b>1.4</b>	<b>9.8</b>
Unemployment insurance	4.5	0.9	6.1
Social aid	2.2	0.5	3.4
Non-state welfare systems	0.1	-	0.1
Targeted reactive measures	0.1	-	0.2
<b>Individual insertion in the labour market</b>	<b>10.6</b>	<b>1.5</b>	<b>17.3</b>
Active/insertion measures	3.7	0.3	5.9
Training/formation	1.0	0.7	1.3
Educational issues	5.9	0.5	10.1
<b>Issues regarding the constituency of unemployed</b>	<b>1.7</b>	<b>0.8</b>	<b>2.5</b>
Associational life	1.2	0.7	1.7
Individual/psychological attitudes/dispositions	0.3	-	0.5
Other issues regarding the unemployed	0.2	0.1	0.3
<b>Other issues</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.9</b>
Total	100%	100%	100%
<b>N</b>	<b>3859</b>	<b>1408</b>	<b>2179</b>

In less than 20% of all cases unemployment is discussed with reference to the situation of the unemployed and the political implications in terms of social security, welfare programmes as well as individual reinsertion measures.

These findings illustrate that unemployment is placed into a particular thematic context: it is associated and thus defined as an economic problem, which calls for a favourable political framework that is permissive to economic development and its positive effects on the labour market. In secondary terms unemployment is dealt with as a political problem that calls for an active intervention of the state in terms of activating labour market policies. Moreover, unemployment is discussed rather on a macro-level in terms of ‘the economy’ or the ‘welfare institutions’ than on a micro-level.

In this connection we need to highlight that issues vary also according to the various types of participating actors. In fact, it is to be assumed that different organizations raise different issues when speaking about unemployment. For instance, executive and legislative actors stress public policies related to economic development and the labour market more often than others, while

unions and employers' associations readily address problems and potentials of the social dialogue. Macro-economic issues are raised very often by state agencies (e.g., the Federal Labour Office), other regulatory state actors as well as think tanks (see 'other civil society actors'). Welfare organizations underscore state policies and individual insertion measures, while the unemployed organizations primarily voice issues related to the unemployed themselves.

#### 4.4.2. Reasons of unemployment and proposed solutions

Table 3 summarizes the reasons for mass unemployment named by the actors. These explanations were stated in every third claim and refer, above all, to economic causes and, in second place, to political, institutional or legal factors. In other words, unemployment is an economic and/or political problem, in the sense that the economy and/or the state is unwilling or unable to generate more jobs or is (involuntarily) responsible for aggravating the problem by preventing job creation or spurring dismissals. Social, educational or demographic reasons are mentioned as rarely as external causes (e.g., international factors or seasonal effects). Particularly cultural and individual reasons (e.g., motivational causes) can be neglected as significant explanations of unemployment; and this suggests that the problem is not defined as an individual but rather a collective challenge to society.

Table 3: Reasons and Causes for Unemployment (in %)

Economic and technological causes	43.1
Political and institutional causes	36.9
Social and demographic causes	5.2
Cultural and Individual causes	3.1
International causes (e.g. globalisation)	5.5
Other external causes (e.g. climatic, seasonal causes)	4.2
Other diagnostic frames	2.0
Total	100%
N	1432

(1240 valid cases)

We can add to these findings that state and party actors, as well as unions, welfare organizations and the unemployed organizations stress political causes in every second claim, while the employers and think tanks rather refer to economic and technological reasons in half of the cases. We therefore have two competing explanatory paradigms, which also predetermine the policy orientation of these actors.

When we move to the solutions proposed (Table 4), we see in the first instance that most actors trust in politics to overcome mass unemployment. Even though only a smaller number of claims state that the problem is a political one, the vast majority of claims indicate that policy measures might help to solve economic *and* political causes of unemployment. In particular,



**Table 4: Proposed Solutions (in %)**

<b>Policy driven solutions</b>	<b>78.1</b>
Economic/technological policy solutions	14.7
Political/institutional/legal solutions	44.3
Social dialogue, partnership	16.6
Educational policy solutions	2.5
<b>Not policy driven solutions</b>	<b>17.6</b>
Cultural/individual solutions	0.5
Societal solutions	1.3
Market solutions	12.7
External solutions	3.1
<b>Other/unclassifiable solutions</b>	<b>4.3</b>
Total	100%
<b>N</b>	<b>2057</b>


(1713 valid cases)

almost every other claim indicates that new laws, administrative structures and political constellations will contribute to an improvement, while still 20% consider the social partnership an effective instrument for remedial action. Other non policy driven solutions play a far less important role in public debates. Merely the market based solutions can be named as a significant alternative to policy interventions.

Against this backdrop we can now ask whether the solutions proposed change in the course of time. In fact, Figure 4 illustrates that there are significant changes in the public debate about unemployment. The main categories (economic and technological policies as well as administrative or legal solutions) are subjected to some fluctuations, which do not limit their importance and might be explained by the election process in 1998, which tended to overshadow (new) political initiatives. More interesting is the fact that the social dialogue is being discussed less and less as a possible governance instrument, while market solutions become the new second most often favoured problem-solving strategy. This is right until the year 2000, than these solutions do not play a popular role any more.

**Figure 4: Proposed Solutions in Temporal Perspective (in %) – 1995-2002**

(1713 valid cases)



These findings illustrate that political solutions still play a prominent role in public debate, however, neo-corporatism is being substituted gradually by a more neo-liberal paradigm of overcoming mass unemployment. This seems to suggest that think tanks and employers' organizations are quite successful in redefining the nature of the problem and the adequate problem-solving strategies.

#### 4.4.3. Targets of public criticism

One important element of political discourses resides in the fact that actors speak with each other, meaning that they refer to the statements or actions of other organizations, blame them for particular problems and/or call them into action. However, only one out of five claims name explicitly an addressee, although addressees are implicitly insinuated much more often when actors demand certain measures. Table 5 exposes that governments are most often asked to take remedial action, although almost every other claim is addressed to a non-state actor, most of them unions and employers. Here we have to consider that 10.9% of claims under the rubric of "employers' organizations and groups" are directed at private companies in the context of disputes about pending dismissals.

**Table 5: Addressees of Political Claim-Making (in %)**

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>57.1</b>
Governments	45.0
Legislative and political parties	7.1
Judiciary	0.2
State agencies	2.6
Other state actors	1.7
Independent regulatory bodies	0.5
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>39.0</b>
Labour organizations and groups	8.8
Employers' organizations and groups	25.2
Unemployed organizations and groups	1.1
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	0.1
Social partners	3.6
Other civil society actors and groups	0.2
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>3.9</b>
Total	100%
<b>N</b>	<b>868</b>

(771 valid cases)

We therefore see that responsibility is divided into two different groups again: governments are enquired for setting up a legal and political framework that helps to overcome mass unemployment, while the social partners are asked individually (in 23.1% of the cases) and collectively (in 3.6%) to create jobs and/or prevent further dismissals in economic and social terms. Particularly the employers are asked to take remedial actions both by governments and unions in almost every second of those claims that named explicitly an addressee.

With regard to public criticism we only have a minority of claims criticizing a particular actor, i.e., one out of four public interventions accuse political actors. Table 6 demonstrates, on the one hand, that state actors (here: primarily governments) are the actors most often criticized in public debates. This is predictable because governments are politically accountable for public policies, moreover, the dissent with governments is institutionalized in democracies by means of party opposition in parliament. This also explains why parties are exposed quite regularly to public criticism.

Moreover, we perceive that unions and employers' associations are equally held responsible for part of the problem in one of ten claims each.


**Table 6: Criticized Actors – Who is Accused? (in %)**

<b>State and party actors</b>	<b>63.4</b>
Governments	49.5
Legislative and political parties	11.5
Judiciary	0.2
State agencies	1.6
Other state actors	0.3
Independent regulatory bodies	0.3
<b>Civil society actors</b>	<b>35.7</b>
Labour organisations and groups	10.5
Employers' organisations and groups	22.2
Unemployed organisations and groups	0.6
Non-state welfare organizations and groups	-
Social partners	0.7
Other civil society actors and groups	1.7
<b>Other and unknown actors</b>	<b>0.9</b>
Total	100%
<b>N</b>	<b>1073</b>

(958 valid cases)

#### 4.5. *The role of the unemployed in public discussion*

As already determined before the unemployed themselves as well as their situation hardly play any role in the public discussion. Analysing whether the actors argue more in favour or disfavour of the unemployed we created a position-variable that shows for every claim if the intention is positive, negative or technocratic from the unemployed's point of view. Figure 5 illustrates that there are a number of potential advocates of the unemployed: particularly the unemployed organisations themselves (+0.81), the churches (+0.95, as part of “welfare organisations”), but also labour organisations (+0.56) and, finally, governments and parties (+0.38 and +0.36) argue positively in sense of the unemployed. Except for the judiciary (in a small number of cases where restrictive judicial decisions were at stake) clear opponents cannot be identified. Only employers are less supportive of the unemployed, particularly individual employers (+0.03). Their claims are more critical of established unemployment policies, e.g., by stressing the duties of workers and the unemployed rather than their rights. However, we need to keep in mind that claim-making is rhetorically quite supportive of the unemployed or at least technocratic. This might be determined by strategic considerations, in the sense that actors perceive the public as being against overtly critical statements. Moreover, we are dealing with average positions that level out extreme positions between various actors or claims.

**Figure 5: Positions of actors towards unemployed (in means)<sup>1</sup>**

1.00 = in favour of the rights of the unemployed; 0.00: neutral or technocratic; -1.00 = against the rights

Unveiling whether party affiliations change the general attitude towards the unemployed we can see that this is indeed the case. The following table illustrates that proponents of the unemployed's rights are above all the Party of Democratic Socialism, the Greens, and finally the Social Democrats. This advocacy position of the two smaller leftist parties is even more pronounced when claims focus the issue of unemployment in a strict sense. Conservative parties are moderately in favour, however, it is the Liberals which are critical of the unemployed, particularly in those claims speaking specifically about unemployment and/or the unemployed. Political orientations are thus good explanatory factors to delimit advocacies or opposition towards the unemployed.

**Table 7: Actors' Party Affiliation and Position towards the Unemployed (in Means)<sup>1</sup>**

	Average discursive position	Average discursive position: workers' constituency	Average discursive position: unemployed constituency
<b>Left parties</b>	<b>0.45</b>	<b>0.39</b>	<b>0.46</b>
Social Democratic Party	0.43	0.36	0.44
Alliance 90/ The Green Party	0.57	0.53	0.62
Party of Democratic Socialism	0.57	0.50	0.56
<b>Right and center-right parties</b>	<b>0.24</b>	<b>0.38</b>	<b>0.20</b>
Christian Democratic Party	0.29	0.41	0.26
Liberal Democratic Party	0.01	0.28	-0.08
Total	0.30	0.39	0.34
N	<b>1128</b>	<b>190</b>	<b>831</b>

<sup>1</sup> 1.00 = in favour of the rights of the unemployed; 0.00: neutral or technocratic; -1.00 = against the rights (analysed "party1")

#### 4.6. The Role of the EU in public discourse

The claim-making in Germany is still strongly nationalized and/or exposed to a gradual ‘Europeanization’. In fact Europe does not really play an important role, neither with regard to the actors or addressees nor to the issues (see table 8). Only recently, new European initiatives and instruments of coordination and common policy definition are under way. If at all, we would expect a gradual shift to the European level in the most recent years.

In sum, we can conclude that the ‘Europeanization’ of public claim-making is as weak as expected. Europe has no substantial competences in the field of labour market and social policies, and only slowly is a cooperation of member-states and a common policy strategy evolving on the level of the European institutions.

**Table 8: Scope of Actors, Issues and Addressees (in %)**

Scope of	actor	issues	addressees
Supranational and transnational	6.2	1.7	3.2
European	2.1	2.9	2.6
Multi- and binational	0.4	0.7	0.3
National	78.6	79.3	88.6
Regional	7.7	10.5	2.9
Local	3.1	4.3	1.5
Unknown	1.9	0.6	0.9
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	<b>4332</b>	<b>5812</b>	<b>868</b>
	(analysed "actscop1-3"; 3859 valid cases)	(analysed "isscop1-3"; 3859 valid cases)	(analysed "adrscop1-3"; 771 valid cases)

### 5. Political deliberation in the field of labour market policies

The structure of public debates outlined above raises the question of whether policy deliberations within the institutionalized arena of policy-making follows similar patterns and cleavages. Is political decision-making and implementation governed by similar actors and interorganizational relations, issues and agendas? And are institutionalised policy deliberations characterized by different forms of social exclusion when compared with the public sphere? In principle, we would expect from the German policy model that neo-corporatist patterns of concertation and negotiation remain in place – under the assumption that the institutionalised arena of policy-making and implementation is relatively secluded from the public sphere and thus remains detached more the more embattled field of public contentions and debates.

#### 5.1. Interviews with political actors

The German team conducted 38 interviews, each of which taking between 45 and 90 minutes. All interviews have been tape recorded, transcribed and entered into a SPSS data mask. 27 interviews were conducted with organisations' representatives on national level, 11 interviews took place at the local level in Bremen. Whether organisations were important to be interview we decided on the basis of the newspaper analysis and with the help of expert knowledge. The latter was above all needed on the local level, because that level is not covered by the newspaper analysis.

Table 9 shows the distribution of the interviews concerning the following four categories of organisations: Policy actors as state actors including state agencies, intermediary actors comprising unions, employers' organisations as well as political parties. Under the category NGOs and grassroots church and welfare organisations are named. The fourth category subsumes the organisations of and on behalf of the unemployed.

**Table 9: Distribution of interviewees across actor categories and national/local location**

	Local	National
Policy Actors	3	2
Intermediary	3	15
NGOs/grassroots	3	6
Unemployed Orgs	2	4

(for the complete list of interviewees see appendix 1)

The interviews were conducted half-standardised. The standardised parts first of all are to allow comparison with the other five countries' research. The additional questions are more important to elaborate the specifications of the German case.

## **5.2. Organisational networks**

To find out about who are considered the most influential actors in the field of unemployment the interviewees were asked for their judgement. Table 10 shows which organisations are mentioned predominantly as influential in decision making in the political field of unemployment.

All interviewees name only a very small number of organizations as influential actors. That illustrates that political deliberations in the field of labour market policies are highly exclusive. It is obvious that the most important actors come from the political parties in power and the main opposition party in government. Further the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour and the chancellorship are considered especially important. The main employers associations as well as the main unions are considered very important actors. The welfare organizations and churches seem to have some importance, but not as much as the other groups.

**Table 10: A rank-ordered list (total counts) of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organizations by actor type.**

Organziations	Number of mentions										
	Policy		Intermediary		NGO's		Unemploy ed		Total		
	nat.	local	nat.	local	nat.	local	nat.	local	nat.	local	All
SPD	1	2	13	2	4	3	3	2	21	9	30
BMWA	2	1	13	2	2	3	3	2	20	8	28
CDU/CSU	-	2	12	2	4	3	2	2	18	9	27
DGB	2	1	12	2	3	2	2	2	19	7	26
BDI	1	2	11	2	3	2	3	1	18	7	25
BDA	2	1	10	2	3	2	3	1	18	6	24
Bündnis 90/Die Grünen	1	2	11	1	2	3	2	2	16	8	24
Bundeskanzleramt	2	-	13	2	1	3	2	-	18	5	23
Bundesagentur für Arbeit	1	1	11	1	4	3	-	2	16	7	23
IG Metall	1	1	12	2	1	2	1	2	15	7	22

organizations at the European level have some importance (12% of all mentions), although they did not appear in the top-ten list. The unemployed and their organisations are considered quasi not influential at all. It is noticeable that this evaluation corresponds to the list of the actors that appear most frequently in the newspaper analysis.

Table 11 shows the ten most mentioned organizational targets of the organizations interviewed. In this top ten list we find the same parties and state actors like in the list of the most important actors. The national labour office is the target mentioned most. This can be explained by its role in converting new regulations into practice. At the European level the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Commission are important targets.

The same picture of a small policy community emerges when we ask for those organizations that the interviewees cooperate with. Here we find an advocacy coalition of employers, Christian Democrats and the think tank “Ifo” on the one side, and a coalition of unions, Social Democrats and the think tank “WSI” on the other side. Welfare organizations and the unemployed are only loosely attached to the second coalition.

**Table 11: A rank-ordered list (total counts) of the ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor type**

Organizations	Number of mentions				
	Policy	Intermedia ry	NGO's	Unemploye d	Total
Bundesagentur für Arbeit	1	11	4	1	17
BMWA	1	12	2	1	16
SPD	1	8	4	1	14
Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen	-	7	3	1	11
CDU/CSU	-	7	3	1	11
Bundeskanzleramt	-	9	-	1	10
EWSA	-	4	3	1	8
DGB	-	5	2	1	8
Europäische Kommission	-	5	1	1	7
FDP	-	4	2	1	7

Looking at the number of mentions (see table 12), unions seem to be those actors most of our interviewees collaborated with. This can be explained by their access to all kinds of political consultations and working groups, and by their important role in industrial relations (which explains also the employers' organization being part of the top ten). Welfare organizations are in close contact to the churches and maintain some links to the organizations of the unemployed. The organizations of the unemployed (try to) establish alliances not only with the unions as a strong partner. Some also stay in close contact to the Party of Democratic Socialism.

**Table 12: Most frequently mentioned actors the respondents have collaborated with (top ten)**

Organizations	Number of mentions
DGB (peak unions' organization)	16
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft u. Arbeit	13
Bundesanstalt für Arbeit	12
IAB	10
IG Metall	10
Verdi	10
IG BCE	10
BDI	9
BDA	9
WSI	9
Deutscher Caritasverband	9
Koordinierungsstelle	9

Contact to organizations outside the nation is mainly established by the international department of the organizations. There are different networks, like UNICE, the European Federation of Trade Unions, the International Federation of Trade Unions, The European Anti-Poverty Network etc.



By answering the question with which organisations the interviewees have had main disagreements in the last years (see table 13), the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour and the main governing party are on top of this list because of their recent labor market reforms. The employers' organizations and the conservative party are mentioned by many interviewees because of their claims for cutting expenses on the welfare-state and for deregulation of the labor market.

**Table 13: Most frequently mentioned actors the respondents have had disagreements with (top 10)**

Organization	Number of mentions
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft u. Arbeit	13
SPD	11
CDU/CSU	11
BDI	11
Gesamtmetall	11
BDA	10
ZDH	9
Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen	9
Bundeskanzleramt	8
FDP	8

There are the main cleavages which emerge when summarizing the various disagreements: On the one hand there are the unions, the churches, the welfare organizations, the organizations of the unemployed and the left parties who stand in opposition to the employers' organizations and the conservative parties on the other.

### 5.3. *Action forms of actors*

As we have seen in the previous chapters Germany can be characterised by neo-corporatist traditions and public discourse coalitions. We are dealing with very exclusive and quasi-institutionalised discourse coalitions or communities, which have the power to delineate and define policy fields. Non-organised actors (e.g., the unemployed) find much less access to public debates than corporative actors do. Consequently these actors do not have access to 'consultation' and use strategies belonging to the field of 'lobbying' far less frequently. Policy deliberations are organised 'rationally' according to different policy issues and fields. Hence, interest groups engage into a division of labour.

German organizations favour a number of action forms: they tend to concentrate their activities on the mass media and on consultation routines. Non-state actors also name lobbying very often. In contrast, litigation is of little importance. Moreover, mobilization strategies are rarely used. Hence, political contentions are strongly pacified and institutionalised within conventional arenas of political deliberation: the mass media and state politics.

However, the action repertoires of the various actors seem to be determined by varying opportunities and diverse orientations. State actors are primarily interested in consultation and in informing the public. The latter applies also to political parties. Employers' associations work intensively with policy actors and additionally engage into public information and media work in order to generate public pressure. The same is true for the unions, who, however, see a major

difficulty in transmitting their views to the media and thus highlight more strongly mobilization-oriented strategies. Welfare organizations and unemployed organizations have little access to the media and thus centre on consultations (amongst the former) and on mobilization attempts (amongst the latter).

Table 13 summarises the range of strategies that political actors in the field of unemployment use. Among others it demonstrates that action forms are ranked by all non-state actors in a similar way: first comes the work with mass media, second lobbying and consultation, third the information of the public. Intermediary actors and NGOs engage into political campaigns, while the unemployed organizations mobilize the public more often. Finally, it is evident that unemployed organizations are much less integrated into consultation processes.

**Table 13: Proportion of action forms according to actor type (taking into account different number of actors per actor type category and different number of items per action form category):**

<u>Action form</u>	Policy actor		Intermediary		NGO		Unemployed	
	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc	Nat	Loc
Media related	.9	.87	.95	.67	.9	.87	.95	1
Informing the public	1	.33	.64	.27	.57	.33	.4	.4
Negotiating/lobbying	1	1	.93	.44	.89	1	1	1
Consultation	.5	.78	.9	.08	.88	.58	.69	.33
Court action	0	.33	.33	1	.33	1	.5	.5
Political campaign contributions	n/a	n/a	.42	.39	.5	.33	.25	.17
Mobilizing the public	n/a	n/a	.31	.49	.38	.38	.69	.56

Moreover, action forms are dependent on the access to the political decision making process and on the way the organisations would like to be seen by others. Welfare and Church organisations (category NGOs), for example, do not attach great importance to using media strategies. They rather use their good access to the political decision makers and specialists in the field. Unions on the other hand use media strategies and public mobilisation as a strategy to increase the pressure for discussion about their demands. Employers' organisations do not use mobilisation because they cultivate their image of being a rational actor (in contrast to the unions).

#### **5.4. The role of the unemployed within unemployment policies**

According to a study on the organisations of the unemployed, there were about 1500 organisations or initiatives for the jobless in 1992 (Wolski-Prenger, 1996, 30), but only 0.5 – 3% of all registered unemployed were organised in such projects (Rein et al., 1993, 1). Many of these initiatives and groups are affiliated to German unions or run by these unions. Since the 1980s, we witness a gradual organisation of the unemployed on the national level. In 1982, the first nationwide congress of the unemployed was held in Frankfurt, and a first loosely structured federation of unemployment organisations was set up at the national level (Rein, 1993, 1). In 1984 then, the *Förderverein gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosenarbeit e.V. Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosenarbeit (KOS)* was founded in order to better coordinate the activities of the different initiatives at a national level. Later on a 'roundtable of the unemployed' (*Runder Tisch der*

*Erwerbslosen*) was set up, which included also representatives from the churches, charities and left parties. This roundtable, however, has never raised any substantial public awareness.

Nevertheless the mobilisation of the unemployed is a very improbable phenomenon. Indeed, the unemployed belong to those groups that are difficult to organize and mobilize. Scholarly writing gives several reasons for this structural hurdles. First of all we are dealing with a very heterogeneous group of people with different biographies, diverse interests and a range of identities and belief-systems (Ruckstuhl, 2001). Mobilisation is further hindered by the public stigmatisation of the unemployed (Wolski-Prenger, 1996, 20; Zoll et al., 1991). Through stigmatisation the unemployed are blamed for being part of the problem; i.e., unemployment becomes a personal and individual stigma, not a collective and political problem (Piven & Cloward, 1986). This stigma impedes the formation of collective mobilisations and leads rather to social isolation. Finally, the greater fluctuation amongst unemployed complicates the formation of stable networks, memberships and organisations. It affects negatively material and ideological resources as well (Wolski-Prenger, 1996). Successful mobilisation seems to be restricted to the long-term unemployed, who become organized more readily than other groups of jobless, given the fact that they rather build up stable networks and memberships and engage into confronting stigmatisation and the prevalent strategy of individualized problem-solving.

The interviews conducted within the project UNEMPOL empirically show growing difficulties of mobilizing the unemployed in Germany after 1998. According to several activists of unemployment organisations mobilising had been especially difficult after 1998 because of the experience that although having successfully protested for a change in government, there had been no change in policies. Further the discrimination of the unemployed in politics and in the media increased after 1998 and the support of third actors like the unions was rather weak. Another explanation for the decline in protest activities after the elections in 1998 is the hope of many unemployed for a change in policies with the Social Democrats. Demonstrations could not be reactivated although the policies of the new government did not change anything for the unemployed. Although there has been a lot of political decision-making cutting the rights and benefits of the unemployed this group was not able to articulate their position in public.

### **5.5. *The role of the EU in political deliberation***

In general, most interviewees are quite sure that the European Union is playing an increasingly important role in the realm of social and labour market policies. According to them, European integration attained a new quality with the Amsterdam treaties of 1998, which integrated the issue of employment as an area of a common European engagement. As the representative of ver.di put it, the EU stopped to be governed solely by economic, financial and monetary policies, but integrated social and labour market policies as a counterweight. At the same time, however, most intermediate actors underlined the fact that the nation state remains the primary arena of policy-making and thus the primary focus of their work. German organizations point to the fact that the EU has little competencies in this field and has brought forward few initiatives to develop common policies and/or harmonize national legislations. A strict European labour market policy is therefore not in place.

This being said, most actors stress that the EU is influencing national policies indirectly and implicitly. At the one hand, the EU is having an indirect impact on the German policy field. This is the case, first of all, due to the availability of European money, here primarily the Social and Regional Funds. This argument is introduced primarily by local actors, because the EU makes a very palpable contribution to their day-to-day work. In the case of the state of Bremen, for instance, the implementation of active labour market policies is strongly dependent on European money (interview Senat Bremen). This impact is not merely a material one, because European funds are linked to specific priorities and eligibility criteria, which shape policy goals and ideas as well

(interview AWO). A further indirect influence on German employment policies is attributed to the economic and monetary policies of the EU (interview FDP and Deutscher Verein). Particularly the Maastricht criteria are constraining the German state into a budgetary discipline and demand oriented economic policy paradigm that is restricting passive employment policies in particular, and welfare state provisions and programmes in general (interview BAG-S, PDS and AWO).

These arguments reveal that the EU is having, on the other hand, an implicit influence on German policy making that is quite remarkable. In fact, almost all organizations point to the fact that the EU is quite successful in defining common policy agendas, goals and priorities that are then followed through by the various national governments.

According to our data most organizations admit that Europe is playing a greater role in the field of labour market policies. Nevertheless, they still underline the predominance of the national level and are thus not ready to alter their activities and alliances substantially towards a stronger Europeanization. This is also the case because most of them are – for quite different reasons – moderately opposed to a further Europeanization of labour market policies: e.g., while employers fear the European regulatory approach, unions are afraid of a race to the bottom. In this field, we can thus detect a conflicting yet strongly integrated national policy domain.

That is why German actors are mostly opposed to enlarged regulatory competencies of the EU. This might be the reason why most interviewees argue that the EU has not altered their organizations a lot, both in their structure and their strategies. In general, they point out that work has become more complicated (interview DGB); some organizations mention funding programmes of the EU that have an effect on a gradual bureaucratisation of NGOs (interview KOS) and might affect others due to changing funding priorities in an enlarged EU (interviews Senat Bremen and ALV).

## **6. Résumé and Conclusion**

Do we look at the public discussion on the one hand, and the political networks within the arena of institutionalised policy-making on the other, a similar picture emerges: political deliberations in both arenas are highly exclusive. We are dealing with quasi-institutionalised discourse coalitions or communities, which have the power to delineate and define policy fields important to the interests of the unemployed.

Our research shows that the employers' associations, the liberal and the conservative parties have been quite successful in defining policy agendas. In general terms we can observe that the employers' associations, the unions and the political parties centre their attention more and more on labour market policies, while welfare and unemployed organisations more likely focus on social security issues. Unions and leftist parties are still quite receptive for the latter agenda, as they consider them to be important relief programmes that help people to overcome hardships in their lives, primarily to compensate for the loss of their job and income.

However, the newspaper data as well as the interviews demonstrate that social security is by now a secondary issue that is subsumed to the debate about adequate labour market policies. In this sense, social benefits are debated implicitly or explicitly in terms of costs, primary economic costs, but also social and moral ones. Therefore welfare organisations and unemployed groups do not see much room to discuss their more encompassing issues, neither in the public nor within the political institutions.

On the level of national mass media, we can confirm the political marginalisation of the unemployed within the public debate quite clearly. This marginalisation can be illustrated by the news coverage of the mass media. Do we look at coverage within the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, we find

a nearly complete absence of the unemployed as political actors. The same phenomenon can be illustrated by the interviews: The unemployed organisations in Germany lack political influence and are financially weak. Because of this disadvantageous protest actions are considered important strategies. A further difficulty for the unemployed organisations is that the unemployed are a group that is hard to mobilise.

## 7. Appendix: List of interviewees

### 7.1. Actors at the national level

- Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO) (Bonn) – *Workers' Organization; part of the labour movement, with the target to fight for a "fair society"*
- Arbeitslosenverband Deutschland e.V. (ALV) (Berlin) - *Association of Unemployed in Eastern Germany*
- Bundesanstalt für Arbeit (BA) – *The Federal Labour Office*
- Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Erwerbslose (Frankfurt) (BAG-E) – *Federal Committee of Independent Initiatives of Unemployed*
- Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft Soziale Brennpunkte (Frankfurt) - *Federal Committee of independent welfare initiatives*
- Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Arbeit (BMWA) – *The Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour*
- Bundesgeschäftsstelle der SPD (Fraktion) - *Headquarters of the Parliamentary Social Democratic Party*
- Bundesgeschäftsstelle der CDU/ CSU (Fraktion)- *Headquarters of the Parliamentary Christian Democratic Party*
- Bundesgeschäftsstelle der FDP (Fraktion) - *Headquarters of the Parliamentary Liberal Democratic Party*
- Bundesgeschäftsstelle Bündnis 90 / Die Grünen (Fraktion) - *Headquarters of the Parliamentary Green Party*
- Bundesgeschäftsstelle der PDS (Fraktion) - *Headquarters of the Party of Democratic Socialism*
- Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie (BDI) - *Federation of German Industries; member of the German Alliance for Employment*
- Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände (Berlin) (BDA) - *Confederation of German Employers' Associations*
- Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (Berlin) (DGB) - *Federation of German Trade Unions*
- Deutscher Verein für öffentliche und private Fürsorge (DV) (Frankfurt) - *German Association of Public and Private Welfare Organizations*
- Diakonisches Werk der EKD (Stuttgart) - *Association of the Protestant church, with the aim to support people who are deprived or in (financial) distress*
- Gesamtmetall – Vereinigung der Arbeitgeber der Metallbranche - *Employers' association for the metal and electrical industries*
- Institut für Arbeit und Bildung (IAB) – *Institute for Employment Research, operating in cooperation with the German Federal Labour Office*
- Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (Ifo) - *Institute for Economic Research*
- Katholische Arbeiterbewegung (Köln) (KAB) – *Catholic Workers' Movement, also working on behalf of the unemployed*
- Kolpingwerk Deutschland (Köln) - *Action Group of the Catholic Church; amongst other things aiming at adult education and reintegration of disadvantaged young people into employment*
- Koordinierungsstelle gewerkschaftlicher Arbeitslosenarbeit e.V. (KOS) (Berlin) - *Institution which coordinates union activities on behalf of the unemployed The interviewee is at the same time responsible for the unemployed in the union IGM*
- Paritätischer Wohlfahrtsverband (Erfurt) – *Welfare Organization*
- Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di) - *Combined Union of the Tertiary Sector*
- Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IGM) – *Metal Union*
- Zentralverband des Deutschen Handwerks (ZDH) - *Confederation of Skilled Craft and Small Business*

Wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftliches Institut in der Hans-Böckler-Stiftung (Düsseldorf) (WSI)  
- *Institute for Social Research*

## 7.2. *Actors at the local level*

Aktionsgemeinschaft arbeitsloser Bürgerinnen und Bürger e.V. (AGAB) - *Oldest Action Group of Unemployed in Bremen; information centre and meeting point*

Arbeit und Zukunft für Bremen-Nord e.V. – Beratungszentrum für Arbeitslose, Arbeitssuchende und ihre Angehörigen - *Information centre and meeting point for unemployed; district based work*

Arbeitsamt Bremen - *Job Centre Bremen*

Arbeitskreis für Arbeitslose im DGB Kreis Bremen - *Working committee for unemployed unionists*

Arbeitslosenzentrum Tenever (Bremen) - *Information centre and meeting point for unemployed; district based work*

Bremer Arbeit - *Centre for supervision of the projects for the unemployed and distribution of funds in Bremen*

Diakonisches Werk Bremen e.V. - *Association of the Protestant church, with the aim to support people who are deprived or in (financial) distress*

GEW Bremen – *Union responsible for the area of education, in earlier times very active on behalf of the unemployed due to high unemployment amongst teachers*

IG Metall Bremen – Arbeitskreis „Erwerbslose i.d. IG Metall“ - *Metal workers' union, working committee „unemployed“*

Kirchlicher Dienst in der Arbeitswelt (KDA) – *Arbeitslosenprogramm der bremischen ev. Kirche - Programmes against unemployment by the Protestant church*

Senator für Arbeit, Frauen, Gesundheit, Jugend und Soziales, Bremen - *Senator for Labour, Women, Health, Youth and Social Welfare*

Solidarische Hilfe e.V. – Beratungsstelle Bremen - *Information centre for unemployed and welfare recipients*

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## **The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

### **Chapter 8: Final report for Sweden**

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#### Table of Contents

1. Introduction
2. The Swedish Welfare State
  - 2.1. Historical background of the Welfare State
  - 2.2. The Context of Swedish Policy Making
  - 2.3. Labor Market Interest Groups: Parties, Unions, and Employers
3. Labor Market Policy and Unemployment in Sweden
  - 3.1. Historical Background to Swedish Labor Market Politics
  - 3.2. The Organization of Swedish Labor Market Policy
  - 3.3. Labor Market Programs
    - 3.3.1. Active Measures Directed at the Unemployed
    - 3.3.2. Active Measures Directed at the Employers
    - 3.3.3. Passive Measures: Unemployment Insurance
  - 3.4. Unemployment in Sweden
4. Contentious Politics around Unemployment: Claims-making in Sweden
  - 4.1. The Basic Outline of the Claims-making Analysis
  - 4.2. Forms of Claims in the Public Debate
  - 4.3. Participants in the Public Debate: Actors, Targets, and Objects
    - 4.3.1. Actors Making Claims
    - 4.3.2. Targets of Claims in the Public Debate
    - 4.3.3. Objects of Claims
  - 4.4. The Content of the Public Debate: Issues, Positions, and Frames
    - 4.4.1. Issues
    - 4.4.2. Positions
    - 4.4.3. Frames
  - 4.5. The European Dimension in the Public Debate
5. Political Deliberations in the Field of Labor Market Policies: Organizational Interviews
  - 5.1 Interviews with Political Actors
  - 5.2. Forms of Action: How Actors Participate in the Policy Field of Unemployment
  - 5.3. Actors and Networks in the Field of Unemployment
    - 5.3.1. Influential Actors
    - 5.3.2. Organizational Networks and Inter-organizational Contacts
    - 5.3.3 Organizational Interests and Involvements in Issues
  - 5.4. The European Dimension in the Organizational Field
6. Conclusion
- Appendix: List of Interviewees
- References

## 1. Introduction

Full employment has been an active policy goal of the Swedish government for more than half a century. This goal has produced a labor market policy organized around a range of active measures aimed at reinserting the unemployed into the labor market. Having narrowly escaped the unemployment consequences of the economic crisis of the 1980s, Sweden encountered sudden and high unemployment for the first time in the early 1990s when the unemployment rate tripled in a few years. This study enters the unemployment debate in 1995, just as the labor market is beginning its slow recovery. At the end of the period (2002), the unemployment rate, while still higher than at the beginning of the crisis, has declined significantly.

After a brief summary of the context in which political actors formulate opinions, policy goals, and action repertoires – this context includes the structure of the welfare state, the organization of labor market policy, and the legacy of previous debates - this report traces the participation of various Swedish actors in the debate over unemployment. According to the theoretical assumptions guiding the study, we suspect that this context will influence the debate over and policy responses to unemployment to a greater extent than will either the magnitude of the crisis or general market forces.

## 2. The Swedish Welfare State

### 2.1 *Historical background of the Welfare State*

The foundation of the Swedish welfare state was laid in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century (Baldwin 1989; Castles & McKinlay 1979). Once in a stable position of power, the social democratic party, backed by a strong and cohesive labor movement (Korpi 1978), used this foundation to transform Sweden from one of Europe's poorest to one of the wealthiest and most advanced welfare states in Europe (Carlson 1990; Dahlgren et al. 1994; Koblík 1975). According to Esping-Anderson's classification of welfare states (1993), Sweden falls into the "social-democratic" regime type (based on an evaluation of the following criteria: social rights, social stratification, and the relationship between state, market, and the family). What characterizes this type of welfare state is a programmatic effort to reduce the inequities produced by the market through a series of programs and benefits that are de-commodifying and universal in nature, but also adjusted for individual earnings. The social democratic welfare state reaches far into the lives of its citizens, providing insurance, education, childcare, elder care, and, most prominently perhaps, fuses welfare and work, making full employment an integral part of the state's commitment to its citizens (Olsson 1990). To account for the success of the Swedish welfare experiment, several scholars have pointed to the strong tradition of consensus-oriented policy-making in Sweden (Elder et al. 1982; Esping-Andersen 1985, 1993; Kitschelt 1986), which has both cultural and structural roots (Heclo and Madsen 1987; Kelman 1981; Samuelsson 1975) Other scholars have emphasized the strength and peculiarity of the labor movement, both institutionally and ideologically (Berman 1998; Korpi 1978), and yet others have pointed to the absence of a strong party on the right in Sweden as an important factor in the development of the Swedish welfare state (Castles 1978). Scholars focusing on the organization of the state sometimes identify Sweden as a particularly good example of what a strong, centralized and well-organized state can accomplish in the area of social welfare (Heclo 1974; Weir & Skocpol 1985), including in the area of active labor market policy (Rothstein 1996; Wood 2001). Sweden's position as a strong welfare state was shaken but essentially sustained through the economic crisis of the 1980s (Olsson 1991; Therborn 1986). It was not until the unemployment crisis in the 1990s that Sweden lost its position as a seemingly invincible welfare state and, like other nations, started to cut down on benefits. During the last few years, efforts have been made to restore at least some of those benefits to pre-crisis levels.

## 2.2. *The Context of Swedish Policy Making*

From a political perspective, representation in Sweden is proportionate; thus, the governing party, or party coalition, also dominates the parliament (*riksdagen*). The judicial system has no important policymaking role. Institutionally, the government is assisted in its policymaking and policy implementation duties by some 300 central government agencies. Although regulated by the government, these agencies operate relatively independently but report to the ministry under which it is organized. Labor market and unemployment issues fall under the responsibilities of the Ministry of Industry, Employment and Communications. The system of relatively small ministries and large government agencies, which serves to strengthen the links between political and administrative leadership, is one of the characteristics that makes the Swedish system unique (Heclo & Madsen 1987). Another is the extensive system of government appointed commissions—several hundred per year—to deal with and process all major reform initiatives, and yet another the institutionalized system of interest group relationships that characterize the policymaking process in Sweden (Ibid.). Adding to the stability of the government (and state) and its institutionalized relationships is the tradition of long-lasting leaders, carefully groomed by the party- or interest groups they lead. This pattern is especially noteworthy when it comes to the social democratic leadership; since its inception in 1889, the party has had no more than six leaders.

At the regional level, Sweden has 18 county councils (headed by a governor appointed by the national government) that are responsible for, above all, the provision of medical care, but are also involved in issues involving regional growth and development. At the local level, involving some 289 municipalities, the municipal councils deal with education, social services, elder care, etc. Although Sweden has a long tradition of local self-governance, and the local and regional governments have real policymaking functions and set the local tax rates, the national government nevertheless penetrates the regional and local levels in multiple ways. Many of the tasks that fall under the responsibility of the regional and local authorities are subject to national regulations and are supported, at least in part, by national funds (e.g., education, health care).

## 2.3. *Labor Market Interest Groups: Parties, Unions, and Employers*

Swedish politics during most of the twentieth century has been dominated by five parties: the Left (*Vänsterpartiet*), the Social Democrats (*Socialdemokratiska Arbetarpartiet*), the Liberals (*Folkpartiet*), the Center party (*Centerpartiet*), and the Conservatives (*Moderate Samplingspartiet*). These parties are firmly anchored in distinct social groups with fairly strong party loyalties (Andrén 1968; Holmberg 1975), albeit weaker today than a few decades ago (Granberg & Holmberg 1988). During the last few decades a few additional parties have emerged on the parliamentary scene, including the Greens and the Christian Democrats, but otherwise Swedish politics still follow a general left-right pattern, including in the area of unemployment politics (with the left favoring an interventionist state and active policies and the right a hands-off state and industrial flexibility).

The trade union movement in Sweden has long been a significant force in the political life of Sweden; in fact, Sweden has one of the highest unionization rates in the world (Fahlbeck 1999). All sectors of the labor market are heavily unionized (with some variation, of course)—blue collar as well as white collar, public as well as private (higher in public), typical as well as atypical work, full time as well as part time work (part time slightly higher), temporary as well as regular work, small businesses as well as large ones, cities as well as smaller towns (higher in towns), women as well as men (slightly higher among women). The Swedish union landscape is dominated by three major union federations; first, the Federation of Labor (*Landsorganisationen*, LO), established in 1898, which represents blue-collar workers; second, the Federation of Salaried Workers (*Tjänstemännens*

*Centralorganisation*, TCO), established in 1944, which represents white-collar workers in both public and private employment; and third, the Central Organization of Swedish Professionals (*Sveriges Akademikers Centralorganisation*, SACO), established in 1947, which represents a wide range of academically trained middle-class professionals.

Employers in Sweden do not actively resist unions; the collective bargaining compromise reached already in 1906 paved the way for the highly institutionalized bargain arrangements that have characterized union-employer relations ever since. For bargaining purposes, unions from different federations occasionally form industry-wide bargaining bodies. The first federation of Swedish employers (*Svenska Arbetsgivareföreningen*, SAF) was formed in 1902. Since 2001, employers are represented by a new organization, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise. After having long been a driving-force, together with LO, for collective bargaining in Sweden, the Employer Federation has recently shifted its interests in the direction of decentralized bargaining. This shift is linked to a broader challenge of Swedish labor market politics which includes privatization, deregulation, and greater EU involvement.

### 3. Labor Market Policy and Unemployment in Sweden

#### 3.1 Historical Background to Swedish Labor Market Politics

During the latter half of the nineteenth century, when industrial unemployment in Sweden was on the rise, the dominant understanding of unemployment was rooted in a more general social conservative approach to social policy, in which various social ills were reduced to personal failings and solutions attached to the system of local poor relief. (Rantakeisu 2002). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, the new political climate of liberalism and ascending socialism led to a series of early policy decisions shifting part of the burden of poverty and unemployment to employers and the state (Olofsson 1996).

The first specific steps towards a distinct Swedish labor market policy were taken in the early twentieth century with the erection of local employment offices. In addition to facilitating employment and providing some measure of financial assistance, the early policy towards unemployment also included emergency employment (Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen 1992), state subsidies to voluntary unemployment benefit societies, housing subsidies, and various other family benefits. While still quite modest in scope, these early policy initiatives set the stage for the subsequent "labor line" (*arbetslinjen*), which eventually came to characterize Sweden's approach to unemployment. The basic principle underlying this approach was that assistance to the unemployed should be of an active nature (e.g., work or education), and only involve direct cash assistance in exceptional circumstances. This policy development was obviously part of the growing dominance of the social democratic party in Swedish politics. In general terms, then, what previously had been looked upon as personal troubles increasingly became viewed as social issues, requiring the active intervention of the state into social life; that is, individual misfortunes increasingly became understood as failures of the social organization of the nation. From this perspective, then, the goal of labor market policies should be low unemployment, and the recipe one of targeted labor market and mobility policies, an emphasis on wage solidarity, and, in addition, preparatory work opportunities and employer incentives. It was during the economic bust towards the end of 1950s that this active labor market model had its breakthrough, even if the volume of measures was still modest in comparison with what would come (Lewin 1992). Central to the realization of these goals was a flexible Labor Market Board with enough autonomy to, on short notice, initiate (and fund) new programs that it deemed necessary (Rothstein 1996).

The long period of economic growth that followed the war came to an end during the late 1960s. The result was a shift in the labor market policy during the recession prone 1970s, away from the

dynamic labor facilitating policies of the previous decades and towards an emphasis on keeping unemployment at bay through efforts at protecting work and preventing nation-wide downsizing. In this new environment, policies geared towards employers took on a new importance; measures included various state-monitored investment schemes, and support for employer-sponsored education and training, especially for persons at risk of losing their jobs. But also individual-level measures (especially education and work fare) gained in significance. The labor market interventions were so extensive that the trend towards increased unemployment was reversed. When the economic cycle turned in the mid-80s, labor market initiatives followed suit and became increasingly focused on supply-side efforts (e.g., labor market education). Motivating this shift was the assumption that the dominant problem with the labor market was a lack of appropriately qualified employees (or, a poor fit between what employees had to offer and what employers wanted). Thus, a central concern of labor market education measures was to eliminate bottlenecks and produce qualified personnel to some of the worst hit sectors, including healthcare. These new emphases also changed the ways in which the employment offices operated; new specialty offices were developed, for example, and more work was directed at facilitating mobility for the urban workforce.

The unemployment crisis of the 1990s expanded the scope of labor market politics substantially (SOU 1996:34). Overall, approximately half of the working-age population was, at one point or another, involved in various labor market efforts during the 1990s. In general, however, the traditional emphasis on active measures to keep the jobless active and to facilitate their reentry into the labor market persisted in the 1990s (albeit with many new initiatives). The labor market policy of the 1990s yielded lower rates of open unemployment but also fewer jobs. And yet, it certainly was no miracle cure against unemployment. Studies of the labor market education measures of the 1990s have failed to demonstrate unequivocally that participation in these measures facilitated the transition to a regular market job (Ackum Agell & Lundin 2001; Calmfors et al. 2002; Harkman et al. 1999; Johansson 2002; Näringsdepartementet 2000). Viewed from a comprehensive employment perspective, moreover, there is evidence to suggest that subsidized employment has stifled the creation of new regular jobs. This is so especially with regards to measures directed at youths (Calmfors et al. 2002). Thus, the labor market policies of the 1990s, while no doubt contributing to a lowering of the open unemployment rate, did not generally improve the functioning of the labor market (Ackum Agell et al. 2002). Through the retention of people in various labor market measures, however, it is possible that (as intended) the policies contributed to the readiness of people to enter the regular labor market once it opened up towards the end of the 1990s. Other recent challenges to Sweden's "negotiated economy" (Swenson & Pontusson 2000:78) include a move by employers to decentralize wage bargaining (Martin 2000), increased privatisation and deregulation, Sweden's membership in the European Union (Ackum Agell et al. 2001; Fredriksson & Runeson 2001; Sundström & Runeson 2001; Åslund & Runeson 2001), and a greater participation of regional and local communities in the development of labor market policies (Lundin & Skedinger 2000; Ackum Agell & Lundin 2001). The consequences of these changes are as of yet not well understood, but they could very well lead to new political alignments, more municipal initiatives, greater variations across regions, and an increased polarization between advantageous and weak labor market groups (Levin 1998; Lundin & Skedinger 2000).

### **3.2. *The Organization of Swedish Labor Market Policy***

The Swedish Labor Market Administration (*Arbetsmarknadsverket*, AMV) is responsible for translating Swedish labor market policy into practice. The labor market administration is comprised of labor market boards at the national and county levels, municipal employment offices, and working life services. The National Labor Market Board (*Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen*, AMS) is the central authority that issues guidelines and instructions to the County Labor Boards, allocates

resources, and monitors activities at the county level. The steering committee of the National Labor Market Board is composed of an external chair (a civil servant) and ten members representing various interest organizations (e.g., unions, employers, parliament). The strong Swedish emphasis on active labor market measures has cemented a policy approach that, in addition to matching job seekers with available jobs, aims to (1) prepare individuals for the labor market, either through education, employment experiences, or entrepreneurial support, and (2) provide incentives for employers to retain its employees and to employ the unemployed. Exactly how these aims are translated into actual programs has varied across time, and continues to vary across different groups of unemployed as well as across different kinds of labor market concerns, but the basic program outline has remained the same.

The County Labor Boards (*Länsarbetsnämnden*, LAN) are responsible for general labor market affairs at the county level, including employment offices and Working Life services. An executive Board chaired by the County Governor heads each County Labor Board. The County Labor Board has a local employment services committee – a joint body with the responsibility to shape and adjust labor market policy according to local conditions – in every municipality. Each LAN also has an advisory delegation for vocational rehabilitation and other labor market programs for persons with functional impairments.

There are employment offices in nearly all municipalities. Many of the larger cities and towns have specialized employment offices catering to specific occupational categories, such as technology, industry, health care, economics, and the arts. Employment Service amenities are available not only to the unemployed, but also to persons who are employed but want a change of occupation, for example, or employers seeking help with recruitment. Finally, Working Life Service is a self-financing branch of the Labor Market Administration that offers vocational rehabilitation on a consulting basis to companies, organizations, and public authorities. Working Life services are represented in every county.

### **3.3. Labor Market Programs**

The unemployment crisis in the 1990s caused a major reevaluation of existing labor market programs, and led to the discontinuation of some old programs and the creation of new programs. Many of these new programs were discontinued or reorganized after only a few years (AMS 2002). Adding to the program upheaval during this period is a new set of labor market directives from EU in 1997 (the Amsterdam Treaty). Despite this program confusion, however, a relatively consistent pattern of active labor market measures is discernible (AMS 2002; Bergeskog 1999; Forslund & Holmlund 2003; SOU 1996:34; Sweden 2000; Sweden 2001). In addition to the active measures directed at the unemployed themselves there are also programs directed at the employers. Passive measures are dominated by the unemployment insurance.

#### *3.3.1 Active Measures Directed at the Unemployed*

Since January of 1999, the programs in this category are termed labor market policy activities (*arbetsmarknadspolitiska aktiviteter*), and include employment training, computer/activity centers, work placement schemes, work rehabilitation, and start-up grants. The common goal of the activities in this category is to improve the possibilities of individuals to secure real jobs without thereby shrinking the pool of available real jobs. In general, these kinds of activities require full-time participation. Compensation is comparable to unemployment compensation (with a minimum of SEK 240 per day), provided the person satisfies the requirements for receiving unemployment compensation or has reach the limit of such compensation.

Employment training/education programs are primarily aimed at giving the unemployed vocational/professional training, but also included is general education as preparation for such training (including education for immigrants, albeit not basic language training). For the most part, these programs are organized at the regional level by the county labor boards. Unemployed immigrants who have been registered for at least two years, as well as unemployed persons who are 'work handicapped' and who lack primary education, can be assigned to primary and secondary education within the regular education system. Regular post-secondary education can be assigned as employment training/education provided that the course duration is no more than 40 weeks and the course is not part of a longer post-secondary education. The duration compensation for training/education is, in principle, unlimited.

Computer/activity centers, organized by the county labor boards in collaboration with the municipalities, are aimed at educating and training individuals in the use of modern computer technology these centers are. The program involves half-time training and half-time participation in other projects and/or job seeking activities. Participation in this program is limited to 3 months.

Work placement schemes (for up to six months) involve labor market practice at a real workplace. For certain vulnerable groups (immigrants and 'work handicapped') the period can be extended an additional six months; for 'work handicapped' youth there is no time limit. The program category named Work Rehabilitation includes a range of activities aimed at guiding, rehabilitating, and preparing for work those unemployed who need more support than the unemployment offices can provide. These programs are organized by AMS and coordinated by the labor market institute (AMI). The objective is for job seekers to find, get, and retain jobs in the ordinary labor market. There is no time limit on participation in these programs.

AMS has recently proposed a new labor market policy program called the labor pool. The target of this program is the fairly large group of unemployed (approximately 100,000 people) who have sought work for many years, and who have participated in numerous labor market measures, but who have never held a regular job during this period. Without special assistance, the members of this group, comprised mostly of older men, are unlikely to find a new job. Thus, the objective is to systematically develop the unemployed person's competency and employability in accordance with carefully worked out individual job seeking plans. A trial program started in Värmland in 2000.

Another program provides start-up grants to unemployed persons who want to start new businesses (in some depressed regions these grants are available to persons other than the unemployed as well). The duration is typically six months, with the possibility of a six months extension if the business is conducted by vulnerable groups (e.g., immigrants, women) or is located in certain rural areas.

Tables 1 and 2 give brief glimpses of participation in these various labor market measures. Table 1 shows that the destination of people leaving unemployment during the crisis years, whereas table 2 gives an overview of the distribution of participants across different kinds of labor marker programs in 2002 and 2003.

**Table 1: The destination of people leaving unemployment each year, 1992-1997 (%).**

Year	Work	Measure	Other/unknown <sup>1</sup>
1992	37.0	35.0	28.0
1993	34.0	37.0	29.0
1994	37.0	36.0	27.0
1995	35.0	37.0	20.0
1996	27.0	39.0	34.0
1997	27.0	36.0	38.0

Source: Harkman et al., 1998.

<sup>1</sup> Includes education

**Table 2: Number of participants in various labor market programs, January 2002 and January 2003.**

Type of Program	2002	2003
Labor market education	29,688	32,665
Work experience	21,196	16,450
Employment subsidies	17,150	15,119
Labor market rehabilitation	6,599	6,897
Municipal program, youth under 20 yr	4,550	4,014
Youth guarantee, 20-24 yrs	5,140	5,157
Start-up grants	6,638	7,505
Counseling & job mediation)	22,082	23,606
Other	6,481	6,917
TOTAL	119,526	118,330

Source: Arbetsmarknadsverket

### 3.3.2. Active Measures Directed at the Employers

In general, these efforts encourage employers to hire the unemployed through a range of different incentives, including especially recruitment incentives but also compensation for employee training.

Different kinds of Recruitment Incentives target different groups of unemployed (e.g., older workers, long- and longer-term unemployed), but they all share the objective of securing work for those who have difficulties finding a regular job, especially the long-term unemployed. Employer compensations vary across the particular programs but range from 25 to 75 percent of the wage cost. Educational Compensation programs aim to prevent the elimination of employees who lack required skills, or, alternatively, to encourage new recruitments. Compensation is paid for the education of new personnel and for competence enhancing activities targeting existing personnel. Compensation is provided for at most 920 hours per participant during a two-year period.

### 3.3.3 Passive Measures: Unemployment Insurance

In this section we briefly review the unemployment insurance system in Sweden (Arvidsson 1999; Bergeskog 1999; Swedish Institute 2004). After a long history of successive benefit increases, the early 1990s saw an erosion of the benefits; some of these benefits have since been partly restored. For example, the compensate rate was reduced from 90 to 80 to 75 percent, and the compensation



ceiling was lowered in 1993 (Forslund & Holmlund 2003). The effects of different compensation arrangements have generated quite a bit of research, with some arguing that generous compensation might lower the incentive to look for work (Harkman et al 1997), and others that there is no such relationship (Magnusson 2000).


Unlike other social insurance schemes, the unemployment insurance in Sweden is administered by member funds (*a-kassor*), usually affiliated with a trade union, but supervised by the Labor Market Board (AMS) and for the most part publicly financed (only about 7% comes from member contributions). Union members are automatically members of an unemployment fund, but it is possible to be a member of a fund without being a union member—most members, however, are also union members. About 90% of all employees belong to an unemployment fund. In order to become a member of a fund a person must have been working an average of 17 hours per week for at least four weeks under a continuous five-week period.

There are two different kinds of unemployment compensation. Basic compensation is geared towards those who are not members of an unemployment fund or do not satisfy the requirements for receiving income-related compensation, whereas compensation for the loss of income is geared towards those who have been members of a fund for at least twelve months and who have satisfied the work requirement during the membership period (during the twelve months prior to unemployment, the job seeker must have worked at least 70 hours per month for at least six months). Work in this context includes vacation time, sick leave, military conscription, and parental leave (not included are subsidized work, relief work, and starting a business). For people who need to re-qualify for a new period of unemployment compensation, participation in various labor market measures counts towards the work requirement.

For people under 57 years of age, unemployment compensation is available for 300 days (with the possibility of a 300 day extension); for those older than 57 the maximum duration is 450 days. Beyond the age of 65, no unemployment compensation is available. The rate of compensation is 80 percent of previous income from work, with a minimum of SEK 240 and a maximum of SEK 580 per day.

### 3.4. *Unemployment in Sweden*

After a long period of very low unemployment rates, the unemployment rate in Sweden increased drastically and rapidly in the early 1990s, doubling from a total rate of 5.2 (1991) to 10.7 (1992) in a single year, and reaching a high of 15.7 in 1994. While the crisis hit all sectors of the labor force, some groups were harder hit than others, especially youths and immigrants. Moreover, some regions were harder hit than others. At the start of the new century, the unemployment rate had declined significantly, albeit not uniformly in all sectors and for all for all groups. The current unemployment rates of 4.2 (official) and 6.8 (total, including measures), while significantly lower than in the mid 1990s, are considerably higher than most political actors prefer. See Figure 1.



Source: Statistiska Centralbyrån

The unemployment crisis in the 1990s hit men and women about equally (if anything, men were hit worse), and the subsequent improved employment outlook has benefited men and women about equally. There is some evidence to suggest that the unemployment crisis, at least initially, hit those with high and low education in about equal proportions (Harkman 1999).

When it comes to the unemployment picture for differently aged employees (or potential employees), however, it is evident that the young were much harder hit than older and more experienced employees (SOU 1997:40). The open unemployment rate for 16-24 year olds was close to 20% in 1993. Although the unemployment picture for the young has improved, just like for all ages, they still lag considerable behind other age groups.

Other groups that have faced major labor market obstacles are migrant workers. Migrants born outside of the Nordic countries were particularly hard hit by the unemployment crisis in the mid 1990s. While the labor market prospects for this group have improved during the last few years, its members still lag far behind native-born workers. Not surprisingly, the most recent immigrants have faced the greatest hardship, but also naturalized immigrants who have spent more than five years in Sweden have had significantly worse experiences on the labor market than native-born Swedes (Martinsson 2002; Pekkari 2000).

#### 4. Contentious Politics around Unemployment: Claims-making in Sweden


According to the definition employed in this project, a political claim is a strategic intervention in the public space, either verbal or non-verbal, which bears on the interests of particular groups or collectivities. Thus, political claims-making around unemployment is pursued by multiple actors (e.g., government, unions, welfare organizations) in multiple venues (e.g., parliament, demonstration, organizational decision), and take many different forms (e.g., political decisions, public statements, protest actions). While research addressing various labor market policies is plentiful in Sweden and elsewhere, little is known about the causes and/or consequences of different claims-making patterns.

##### 4.1. *The Basic Outline of the Claims-making Analysis*

In order to gain a picture of unemployment claims within the national context, and also to gather data to be used comparatively, we collected systematic claims-making data from a major newspaper in each nation. Although newspapers do not report on the claims-making activities of all actors at all times, they do typically cover national-level debates and political conflicts. Hence, while different newspaper reporting styles might influence frequency, depth, and length of articles addressing political claims-making around unemployment, and while the political sympathies of a

newspaper might influence journalists' analyses of claims and editorial decisions regarding the inclusion of debate articles addressing particular political positions, it is likely that major instances of claimsmaking (e.g., political decisions, protest actions) get reported in the national newspapers.

For the case of Sweden, data was collected from *Dagens Nyheter*, a national newspaper housed in Stockholm, but with national distribution. Politically, *Dagens Nyheter* is independent/liberal. Claims were collected from three issues per week (Monday, Wednesday, Friday) for the period 1994-2002. Only claims overtly addressing unemployment were included in the analysis. Each claim was coded in terms of actor, form, target, issue, object, scope, aim, and frames. In an effort to reduce data biases originating in the newspaper itself, claims reported in the local and regional sections of the newspaper were excluded from analysis, as were claims presented in opinion pieces, editorials, and letters to the editor. These selection procedures generated a total of 585 claims. Figure 2 shows the distribution of claims in relation to the unemployment rate over the eight years included in the study.



As is evident from the figure, claims about unemployment do not follow fluctuations in the unemployment rate very closely (the correlation of .57 is not statistically significant given the small number of data points). Nevertheless, more than half of all claims were recorded for the years with the highest unemployment rates. The peak of claims in 1996 reflects, in part at least, a growing dissatisfaction among the larger labor movement with the Social Democratic government's handling of the unemployment crisis, as it was usually referred to as. However, this dissatisfaction did turn into a marked electoral advantage for the opposition since the election year of 1996 brought neither an increase in unemployment claims nor a new government; in fact, 1998 yielded the fewest number of claims for the whole period. The marked increase in claims for 2002 (another election year), when the unemployment rate hit its lowest point during the period considered, is in large part a consequence of the debate around the reorganization of the National Labor Market Board (*Arbetsmarknads-styrelsen*) in conjunction with the appointment of a new Chair.

#### 4.2. Forms of Claims in the Public Debate

All claims were coded for the form in which they were presented, including political decisions, verbal statements and protest actions. Political decisions cover all state-level decision-making activities, including bills, propositions, policymaking, and various administrative decisions. Verbal statements include such varied forms as parliamentary debates, decisions by non-state actors, press conferences, resolutions, written reports, and advertisement. Protest actions cover all forms of conventional (e.g., lobbying), demonstrative (e.g., public rally), confrontational (e.g., strike), and violent (e.g., sabotage) protest actions. Table 3 provides an overview of the forms of claims made by the different actor categories in Sweden.

**Table 3: Form of claims by actor category (%) [other actors (1.4%)].**

Form	State	Party	Labor	Employer	Unemployed	Welfare	Experts	Total
Political decision	15.4	6.9	1.2	-	-	-	-	9.4
Verbal statements								
Media declaration	58.5	56.9	57.1	83.3	70.0	50.0	42.4	57.8
Other verbal	24.2	34.7	22.7	9.9	10.0	25.0	52.6	27.4
Protest action	1.9	1.4	19.0	6.7	20.0	25.0	5.1	5.5
TOTAL	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1
N	318	72	84	30	10	4	59	85


Verbal statements is the dominant form of claims made by all actor groups in the Swedish debate; more than 90 percent of all claims made by parties, employer organizations and experts were made in the form of verbal statements. Political decisions, not surprisingly, is used much more frequently by state actors than any other actor group. Of particular significance is the low incidence of protest actions (5.5%) – none of which involves violent actions - and the high incidence of verbal statements (85%), especially media declarations.

When it comes to protest actions, which is overall the least commonly used form of claims-making (5.5%), it is not surprising that labor organizations are more likely than other major actors to use them (19%) – labor unions in Sweden not only have a long history of presenting their claims in large public rallies and protest marches, but also of lobbying or otherwise putting pressure on the government, especially when the social democratic party is in a governing position. The unemployed organizations (20%) and welfare organizations (25%) are the most likely to present their claims in the form of a protest action, which is what one would expect given their institutional outsider statuses, but considering how few actors comprise those two categories, this finding must be approached with a great deal of caution. The link between status in the political system and form of claims is further illustrated by the fact that regional and local actors are more likely to engage in protest actions than other actors. Given the dominance of national-level state actors in the Swedish debate, in conjunction with the centralized nature of the Swedish policymaking apparatus, it is not surprising that local actors occasionally choose non-institutionalized means of exerting political pressure; in fact, more than 28 percent of all protest actions were made by local actors (table not shown).

### **4.3. Participants in the Public Debate: Actors, Targets, and Objects**

#### *4.3.1 Actors Making Claims*

As is evident from Figure 3, state actors dominate claims-making around unemployment in Sweden (54%), followed by labor organizations/unions (14%), political parties (12%), and various experts, including think tanks, research units, and university professors (10%). All other claim-makers combined (employer organizations, unemployed organizations, welfare organizations) are responsible for less than 10 percent of all claims.



While persistent across time, the dominance of state actors is somewhat less pronounced during periods of increased debate and contention, as is evident in 1996 and 1997, for example, when many labor unions mobilized against the social democratic government, especially with regards to its unemployment politics. Among the state actors (table not shown), the single most dominant claim-maker is the National Labor Market Board (AMS) (15% of all claims) followed by the Government (6%), Parliament (2.4%) and the Prime Minister (2.4%). Among the Labor Organizations, it is the peak unions that dominate the claims-making picture: the Federation of Labor (LO) made 5% of all claims (and 36% of all union claims), followed by the Central Organization of White Collar Workers (TCO) (1.7%) and the Central Organization of Swedish Academics (SACO) (1.4%). Considering the prevalence of claims made by labor organizations, it is noteworthy that employers and their organizations produced no more than six percent of all claims. Apart from confirming the central role of labor organizations in the Swedish welfare state, this finding could indicate that the political influence of employers is less publicly visible than that of labor organizations. With regards to political parties, the social democratic party was in the government position throughout the period considered here, which means that when party members who occupied official positions made claims they were coded as state actors. Thus, among party actors, social democrats are less prevalent than conservatives and leftists even though actors with social democratic affiliation, not surprisingly, are much more numerous than those with other affiliations

The relatively high proportion of experts and professionals (10.1%) among claims-makers, points to the close association between the policymaking centers of the state and the research community. In fact, the 10% figure (figure 3) underestimates this association since much of the expert knowledge brought to bear on the question of unemployment is produced under the direct auspices of the state. Moreover, unions, employers' organizations, and other major interest groups typically have their own well-staffed research departments. Thus, expert actors who make claims through the research they produce in these more "dependent" settings are coded not as independent researchers and experts but as state, union, employer, etc.

Regarding the unemployed themselves, Figure 3 shows that they have but a small presence in the Swedish debate (1.7%). To clarify this finding, only claims made by members of unemployed organizations were coded here, not statements made by individual unemployed in articles addressing things like hardship due to unemployment, experiences of various programs, or the problem of relocation. The largest proportion of claims by the unemployed was in 1997 (4.7%), the year when a national organization of the unemployed was formed.

Looking at the scope of actors who make claims, it is clear that national level actors centered in the capital, Stockholm, dominate Swedish claims-making (tables not shown); 70 percent of all claims were made in Stockholm and only about 13 percent in regional locations, and close to 77% of all claims were made by national-level actors, compared to about 15% by regional and local actors, and about 6% by actors at the European or greater level. Examined over time, however, it is evident that regional and local actors accounted for a greater proportion of claims during the early part of the period (with the exception of 1996). This is not altogether surprising considering that the dramatic increase in unemployment hit some regions particularly hard, and that some of the initiatives directed at administrative reorganization of unemployment services were formulated with local and regional markets in mind.

#### 4.3.2 *Targets of Claims in the Public Debate*

Considering the centrality of state-level actors in the Swedish debate, and the commitment to policy/administrative solutions to the unemployment problem (see below), it is not surprising that state actors emerge as the dominant target, or addressee, of claims-making. More than 60% of all claims are directed at the state, whereas claims against employers (3.8%), parties (2.4%), and labor organizations (2.9%) are much less prevalent. That is, few claim-makers in Sweden expect actors other than the state to be able to address their issues. In this context, the sizeable portion of unknown addresses (about 30%) probably signals the taken-for-granted assumption that claims about unemployment are directed at the state, even if no particular state-level actor is identified. The absence of employers as major visible claim-makers, and the dearth of public claims identifying employers and their activities as targets (only 3.9%), confirms the central position of the state in unemployment politics. It also suggests that the contested relationship between unions and employers, while absolutely critical for the field of employment, is not carried over into the field of unemployment; that is, industrial conflicts in Sweden are not typically treated in the public debate as part of the field of unemployment.

A bit more surprising is the fairly large proportion of claims directed at the unemployed themselves (5.3%). The actors addressing their claims to the unemployed are almost all state actors, predominantly from the government (table not shown). Most of the claims addressed at the unemployed relate to their reinsertion into the labor market. When examined across time it is evident that very few claims targeted the unemployed during the first few years of the unemployment crisis, thus indicating that the steep and sudden increase in the number of unemployed suppressed claims directed at the unemployed (i.e., asking the unemployed themselves to do something about the problem). Considering that the claims targeting the unemployed are relatively few in any given year, this conclusion must be treated with caution.

As a complement to the addressee variable, we also coded the actors that were criticized by the claim-makers. While we expected considerable overlap between addresses and criticized actors, the addition of a criticized actor who is not the direct target of a claim has the potential of adding information about the positioning of claim-makers in the larger field of unemployment politics. Findings confirm that, although there are fewer criticized actors than there are targets, the most frequently criticized actors are state actors (37.9%), followed by employers (2.4%), parties (1.9%), and labor organizations (1.7%).

#### 4.3.3 *Objects of Claims*

Taken together with the analyses of actors, addressees and criticized actors, the findings regarding in whose behalf claim-makers act add useful information to the understanding of links and relationships among actors in the field of unemployment. In general terms, the object of claims

refers to the constituency of actors whose interests are most directly affected by the claims. Considering the project focus on unemployment, and the particular interest in the unemployed themselves, we limited the coding of objects to groups that are most immediately affected by changes in the unemployment rate and by various efforts to solve the problem of unemployment; these groups include the unemployed, the working poor, the precariously employed, and labor organizations.

In Sweden, the overwhelming number of claims in this policy field has the unemployed as their object (91.7%). A modest number of claims identify particular groups of unemployed, such as migrants (7.9%), youths (5.7%), and the long-term unemployed (5.3%), but most simply refer to the unemployed as a generalized constituency (64%). Workers and labor organizations, in comparison, only rarely appear as the objects of unemployment claims (8.3%). This finding should not be taken as a conclusion that the precariously employed are absent from the Swedish public debate; rather, it suggests that industrial conflicts are negotiated and debated in terms that are not always clearly linked to the issue field of unemployment. Moreover, unemployed who have recently lost their jobs rarely appear as objects. Considering that numerous workers were laid off during the period considered here, their absence as objects probably signals both the tendency among Swedish claims-makers to discuss unemployment in general terms, and the distinction between unemployment and industrial conflict in the Swedish debate. A similar conclusion applies to social welfare recipients (who do not receive unemployment insurance); that is, they very rarely appear as objects of claims (1%), suggesting that the debate over unemployment almost never intersects with either the more general debate over social welfare or the more particular debate over social welfare recipients.

An examination of the relationship between claim-makers and objects reveals that state actors (51.6%), parties (77.8%), employer organizations (56.7%), and experts (55.9%) are somewhat more likely than other claim-makers to speak on behalf of the unspecified unemployed, whereas unions and unemployed groups are more likely to address the interests of labor or particular unemployed groups. While these findings are not surprising, it is nevertheless significant that all interest groups are more likely to frame the debate in terms of unemployment in general rather than according to more specific constituency interests. It is particularly noteworthy considering the wide range of employment groups that are captured under a generalized unemployment heading.

#### **4.4. *The Content of the Public Debate: Issues, Positions, and Frames***

In an effort to understand the substance of contention over unemployment, we recorded the aim of every claim (in a string variable), and then coded it for its issue content, its position (positive or negative) in relation to both the issue and the constituency of the unemployed, and its frame content, that is, the interpretive evaluation of unemployment in terms of its causes and solutions.

##### *4.4.1. Issues*

The issue of claims refers to the thematic focus of claims and was coded with the help of some ninety different categories covering a wide range of issues pertaining to the field of unemployment. Table 4 shows the dominance and persistence of issues relating to the labor market in socio-economic terms. It is the major category overall, taking all mentioned issues into account (52.8%) and it is the largest issue category throughout the period, with a proportion ranging from 50 to 62 percent of all claims.

**Table 4: The issues of claims (issues 1, 2, and 3 combined) – general issue categories.**

Issue category	Total	
	N	%
Socio-economic labor market	477	52.8
Welfare system & social benefits	185	20.5
Individual. insertion into labor market	207	22.9
Other issues	35	3.9
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>904</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Looking at the issues in these general categories in greater detail it is evident that state policy relating to the labor market dominate the Swedish debate (25%), followed by unemployment insurance (18.2%), specific active measures (13.9%), and economic development (12.5%). These issues are not equally prominent across time, however. Claims concerning economic development, for example, were particularly prevalent during the early period of the analysis, when the unemployment rate was still very high, whereas the claims addressing particular active measures are more prominent in the later years, when the unemployment rates are going down at the same time as the long-term unemployed emerge as a new group of concern. These two examples indicate that the issues content of the public debate around unemployment shifts as the contours of the unemployment crisis shifts. Other issues, like the unemployment insurance, are more directly affected by shifts in the policy debate than by market changes. During the period considered here, the organization of the unemployment insurance system was scrutinized by many policy actors and subject to several different proposals of change, some of which were eventually implemented (such as the ‘outer parenthesis’).

Also of interest is the *low* priority given to some issues in the public debate. In the Swedish case, the relative unimportance of general macro-economic concerns (e.g., economic change, state of the economy, dismissals) is indicative of the traditionally dominant role played by the state in field of unemployment. Concerns linked to more specific economic development, which is a category of issues approximately twice as important as macro-economic issues, are almost all policy oriented, involving issues like state subsidies, flexibility of rules, and taxation. Corresponding with one of the finding above (regarding objects) that general social welfare recipients rarely appear as the objects of claims, issues relating to social assistance (apart from the unemployment insurance) almost never appear in claims about unemployment.

Looking at the relationship between actor types and issues, it is evident that state actors (7.2%) are much less likely to make claims about economic development issues than parties (30.6%), employers (26.7%), and labor organizations (18.3%); that is, claims that involve state subsidies, eased regulations, and taxation concerns – issues that are overwhelmingly addressed to the state – are more likely to be raised by intermediary actors than state actors themselves. With regards to issues concerning social benefits, labor organizations, not surprisingly, are more likely to raise them than are other actors. Finally, concerning issues relating to individual insertion into the labor market; both state actors (23.9%) and experts (23.7%) are significantly more likely than other actors to make claims about these issues. This is also not surprising considering the efforts by the state to emphasize active measures (to keep the unemployed busy and trained and to facilitate their reentry into the labor market), and the efforts by experts to evaluate the effects of those measures.

An examination of the scope of issues reveal that most issues are national in scope (78.8%), followed by regional/local (12.7%), and European (4.8%) issues. The dominance of the national level is evident across time as well, but it is interesting to note that over 60% of European level issues were raised during the first two years of the period (1995, 1996), which is not altogether



surprising considering that Sweden joined the EU in 1995. During those two years, moreover, regional/local issues made up only a small proportion of all issues; during later years, regional/local issues fluctuated between 11 and 25 percent of all issues. While national level issues dominate the debate, it is nevertheless true that issues involving insertion into the labor market are more likely to be of a local/regional scope (21.7%) than issues in the other major categories, suggesting that insertion issues are particularly urgent concerns at the local level. As expected, issues involving social benefits (mostly unemployment insurance) are almost entirely national in scope (94%), which is not surprising considering the centralized system of unemployment insurance and other social benefits. In general, however, national-level issues dominate the Swedish debate.

#### 4.4.2 Positions

In an effort to capture the general climate for the unemployed in the public debate, we coded each claim for its position (positive, neutral, negative) towards the constituency, or objects. As a general indicator of the extent to which claims imply an improvement of the rights and positions of the objects, this variable captures, at least to an extent, how favorably the claim (and the claims-maker) portrays the objects of claims. Since the variable is coded on the basis of the content of claim, not the coders' evaluation of the extent to which a claim implies a positive or negative position, these findings must be approached with caution. Most claims (50.9%) take a positive position towards the objects (all objects combined), and relatively few take a negative position (13.8%), thus suggesting that claim-makers in general take care to frame their claims in terms that emphasize positive consequences for the unemployed and other objects. Nevertheless, an examination of the average position towards objects by different actors reveals that some actors are less favorable than others (see [table 5](#)).

**Table 5: Mean position of claims toward constituency by actor (others and unknown excluded).**

Actor	Position	N	Std. deviation
Unemployed groups	.90	10	.316
Labor organizations	.77	83	.667
State actors	.40	318	.726
Parties	.38	72	.680
Experts & professionals	.20	59	.689
Employer organizations	-.13	30	.730

As would be expected, the unemployed themselves (.90) are most favorable, followed by labor organizations (.57), state actors (.38) and parties (.38). Employer organizations constitute the only group of actors whose average position towards the constituency is negative (-.13). Among the parties, the conservative parties take the least positive position (.0) whereas the left (.56) and center (.50) parties generally take a positive position (table not shown).

#### 4.4.3 Frames

The frames of claims refer to components of interpretation, or meaning construction; that is, to the ways in which claims display particular understandings of how the world works. For the purposes of this project, we coded two types of frames, diagnostic and prognostic. Diagnostic frames refer to the formulations actors use to diagnose the causes of unemployment; as such, these frames illustrate who or what actors hold responsible, or blame, for unemployment. Prognostic frames, instead, refer to the formulations actors use identify solutions to unemployment. Both sets of frames, in other

words, capture some of the range of interpretations, or understandings, that actors use and/or are guided by in the public debate.

Considering the difficulties involved in identifying especially diagnostic frames, but also the prognostic ones, without coder evaluations being superimposed on the data, only a small portion of claims could be coded with any degree of confidence. Even so, the findings do show some significant patterns, most of which correspond well with the findings reported above.

**Table 6: The diagnostic Frame of Claims.**

Frame	Frequency	Percent
Economic/technological causes	16	12.9
Political/institutional causes	52	41.9
Social/demographic causes	24	19.4
Cultural/psychological causes	13	10.5
External causes	1	.8
Other causes	18	14.5
TOTAL	124	100.0

As table 6 shows, the category of diagnostic frames identified as political/institutional causes dominate the debate over unemployment in Sweden (41.9%), followed by social/demographic causes (19.4%), economic/technological cause (12.9%), and cultural/psychological causes (10.5%). This means that most claims containing an identifiable evaluation of the causes of unemployment point in the direction of political institutions; that is, Swedish claim-makers are significantly less likely to blame unemployment on factors such as the market or the nature of the labor force than they are to identify the political and regulatory administration of unemployment as a cause of the problem. This finding should not be taken to mean that the state/government is directly blamed for causing the steep rise in unemployment in the early 1990s, but instead that it is blamed for not responding appropriately to the crisis. Looking at social and demographic causes in greater detail, it is evident that issues involving education and training are the most significant contributors to the problem according to claim-makers. In cases when the unemployed themselves are identified as part of the problem (10.5%), the claims are almost exclusively delivered by state actors. No labor or unemployed organizations blame the unemployed themselves for the problem of unemployment.

Regarding the solutions identified by claim-maker, table 7 shows that political/institutional solutions dominate the Swedish debate (67.2%), followed by economic/technological solutions (14.0%), cultural/individual solutions (5.5%), and societal solutions (5.1%). Thus, policy-driven remedies account for more than 85 percent of all identifiable prognostic claims. These findings correspond well with those pertaining to diagnostic frames; that is, similar factors, especially policy and administration, are identified as both causes and solutions to the problem of unemployment in Sweden.

**Table 7: The prognostic frame of claims.**

Prognostic frame	Frequency	Percent
<i>Policy-driven solutions</i>		
Economic/technological policy	33	14.0
Political/institutional	158	67.2
Other policy solutions	12	5.1
<i>Non-policy Solutions</i>		
Cultural/individual	13	5.5
Societal	12	5.1
Other solutions	7	1.2
TOTAL	235	100.0

#### 4.5. *The European Dimension in the Public Debate*

Sweden has long been on the forefront of nations trying to secure the labor market via policy making and various active measures to increase the fit between the labor force and the job market; that is, full employment has been an overt goal of the social democratic welfare state since the middle of the twentieth century. Nevertheless, Sweden's entry into the European Union (1995), which fell on the heels of the rapid and steep rise in the unemployment rate in the early 1990s, has had some consequences for the policy field of unemployment, certainly in the area of administration and categorization, but also in a more programmatic sense. Some of the influence is not readily visible from the claims-making data analyzed here, since it refers to initiatives linking the local and European levels that do not always implicate the national level.

**Table 8: The European scope of actors, addresses, criticized actors, objects, and issues over time (%), as proportions of the total number of claims (N).**

European scope	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	Total
Actors	4.8	2.8	6.3	11.1	2.2	10.3	3.8	1.2	4.6
Addresses	2.9	3.5	7.8	11.1	4.4	8.6	5.8	2.4	5.0
Criticized actors	1.9	1.4	5.6	5.6	4.4	5.2	3.8	-	2.4
Objects	9.5	7.0	4.7	8.3	8.9	5.2	3.8	1.2	6.2
Issues	10.5	6.3	1.6	5.6	4.4	-	5.9	-	4.8
TOTAL N	105	142	64	36	45	58	52	83	585

What the claims-making data do show is a fairly modest penetration of Europe in unemployment politics. It is evident from table 8 that the European presence in terms of actors (4.6%), addressees (5.0%), criticized actors (2.4%), objects (6.2%), and issues (4.8%) is persistent but small. Examined over time, some variations are evident, but in no case does the data show a growing presence of Europe in the debate over unemployment. On the contrary, the European dimension was proportionately more important during the first four years of membership than the following four years. This finding is especially noteworthy for issues, with 82.1% of all European-level issues appearing during the first four years; for objects, with 72.2% of all European-level objects appearing during the first four years; and actors, with 63% of all European-level actors appearing during the first four years.

Looking at the European-level issues, objects, and actors in greater detail (tables not shown), it is evident that issues with a European scope fall almost exclusively in the category of socioeconomic

labor market issues (89.3%), especially state policy toward the labor market. Object with a European scope typically refer to unspecified unemployed (75%) (e.g., unemployment in general), and actors with a European scope are almost always state actors (85.2%). Regarding European-level actors, only two claims by European labor organizations and only one claim by a European-level employer's organization appear in the Swedish data.

## 5. Political Deliberations in the Field of Labor Market Policies: Organizational Interviews

Recognizing the limitations of the newspaper data when it comes to understanding how the policy field of unemployment is organized and how participation in the public debate translates (or not) into influence, we also conducted interviews with several key organizational actors in the field. More specifically, through the interviews, we tried to uncover the channels of political influence between core political actors, political parties, trade unions, employment associations, on one side, and civil society organizations and social movements representing the unemployed (including the unemployed themselves), on the other.

### 5.1. Interviews with Political Actors

The identification of organizations to be included in the interview study was accomplished through a multi-faceted approach. Specifically, (1) we used the newspaper claims-making data to identify the most important claimsmakers in the field of unemployment at the national level; (2) actors at the local level were identified by the team members based on local knowledge and previous contacts; (3) unemployed organizations were identified through newspaper and internet searches; (4) pro-unemployed organizations (NGOs) were identified in part through local contacts, and in part through their links to some of the unemployed target groups (youths, immigrants, older workers, and workers mobility impairments); these were the most difficult organizations to identify, in large part because the non-profit sector does not have a major presence in the issue of unemployment in Sweden. A total of 40 organizational actors were interviewed in Sweden. Table 9 shows the distribution of organizations across different actor categories.

**Table 9: Distribution of interviewees across actor categories and national/local location.**

	National	Local	Total
Policy Actors	3	4	7
Intermediary	9	12	21
NGOs/grassroots	3	4	7
Unemployed Orgs	4	1	5
TOTAL	19	21	40

The organizations we approached were generally responsive to the interview request – only a handful of organizations (5-6) had to be abandoned for lack of responsiveness, and replaced by other organizations. Interviews lasted from 40 minutes to more than 2 hours. Most interviews were conducted in person (26), but some were conducted over the telephone (13), and one over email. The interview was semi-structured; that is, comprised of both fixed-answers (for comparative purposes) and open-ended questions.

### 5.2. Forms of Action: How Actors Participate in the Policy Field of Unemployment

The labor market policy field in Sweden, of which unemployment is a part, is highly institutionalized, with large and established interest groups engaging in structured negotiations and

interactions. There is little historical precedent in Sweden for grassroots mobilization among the unemployed outside of the structure of labor unions. Moreover, the field has been a major preoccupation of the (social democratic) government since at least the 1950s, thus skewing action in the direction of the state. Nevertheless, since actors are differently situated in relation to the state, we expect that they use different strategies to seek influence. To gain information about the action forms used by the organization we interviewed, we presented the respondents with lists of action forms containing some 29 action forms organized under 7 major headings (e.g., media related, mobilizing the public).

The analysis of these data reveal that all organizational actors in Sweden rely heavily on media related strategies to get their positions across and/or to influence public opinion – this is true for both national and local actors, albeit slightly less so for local ones. Supplementing media strategies are actions aimed at informing the public directly, or getting informed about the public's positions (e.g., opinion polls). Informing the public is an important strategy for all actors, but more so for national actors than local ones. As expected, given the consultative policy making process in Sweden, participation in the policy making process either as consultants or negotiators is common across all actor categories, at both the national and local levels. When it comes to 'supplying information to policy makers,' local actors are more likely to report that they do so than national actors. Contributions to political campaign are relatively rare as strategies in this policy field, except for parties and unions, especially at the local level. Although it is not possible to determine with any degree of certainty if this is a real difference or one associated with the particular cross-section of organizations we interviewed, one could speculate that local organizations have an easier time anticipating the consequences of supporting particular political campaigns and candidates at the local level than national organizations do at the national level (we do not know for certain, however, that it is local campaigns that have been supported by local actors). Direct mobilization of the public is relatively unusual overall, but it is noteworthy that these types of strategies are the second most used by unemployed organizations. Also noteworthy is that intermediary actors (primarily parties and unions) are more likely to mobilize the public at the local level than at the national one. Courts/judicial actions, which traditionally have played very minor roles in political conflicts in Sweden, not surprisingly, have not been used by any of the organizations interviewed.

In order to capture the relative importance of the different action forms in relation to each other we standardized the action form categories across different actor types. This analysis is presented in table 10. The maximum number in each cell is 1, which would mean that every organization within a particular actor type have used each of the action forms within a category. The findings presented in this table, largely confirms the findings reported above, with a few exceptions. Most noteworthy, perhaps, is the finding that for intermediary actors at the local level, strategies involving negotiating with and lobbying public officials are used more often than media related action forms.

**Table 10: The use of major action form categories expressed in standardized form, by actor scope.**

Action form	Policy actor		Intermediary		NGO		Unemployed	
	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local	National	Local*
Media related	.93	.80	1	.82	1	.85	.90	-
Informing the public	1	.69	.89	.62	.53	.30	.20	-
Negotiating/lobbying	1	.58	.56	.92	1	.83		
Consultation	1	.50	.83	.60	.83	.56	.31	-
Court action	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	-
Political campaign contributions	n/a	n/a	.22	.39	0	.17	0	-
Mobilizing the public	n/a	n/a	.36	.49	.54	.28	.53	-

\* Considering that there is only one organization in this category, it has been omitted from this table.

While providing an overview of the most commonly used actions in the field of unemployment, the distributions within and across actor categories do not in themselves tell us why organizations use the strategies they do. While some of the strategies are more or less routinized aspects of business-as-usual, others may be subject to a more evaluative decision-making process. Moreover, as several of the organizations pointed out, not only do different questions generate somewhat different strategies but also different phases of a question might require different strategies.

In an attempt to get organizations to think about the extent to which some strategies are more important than others, we asked them to compare two types of strategies (media related, and informing the public) to working directly with policymakers. The result is shown in table 11.

**Table 11: The importance of media and public information strategies in relation to direct contact with policy makers across different actor categories.**

Actor	Media strategies		Public information	
	More %	Less %	More %	Less %
Policy actor	40	60	33	67
Intermediary	75	25	56	44
NGOs	29	71	50	50
Unemployed	50	50	50	50

As is evident from table 11, there is no clear pattern regarding the relative importance of these strategies in comparison with working directly with policy makers. In light of the dominance of media related strategies among Swedish actors, it is interesting to note that relatively few actors, overall, deemed such strategies more important than working directly with policymakers. Among the intermediary actors, however, more respondents indicated that media strategies were more important than working directly with policy makers. When it comes to informing the public, the responding organizations were about equally likely to deem those strategies either more or less important than working directly with policymakers. Generally speaking, however, and taken into account the low response rate on this question, the organizations we interviewed were reluctant or

perhaps unable to evaluate the importance of these strategies in relation to each other. We interpret this reluctance in substantive terms to indicate that organizations use a range of strategies, both in their ongoing work as organizations and in direct response to particular issues.

### 5.3. *Actors and Networks in the Field of Unemployment*

While the claims-making data provide evidence of the presence and visibility of different actors in the public debate over unemployment, it does not necessarily correspond with the evaluations that actors themselves place on the importance of particular actors in the field of unemployment. Moreover, the claimsmaking data is not a good source for understanding how different actors relate to each other in this field. In an effort to understand not only how actors in the field evaluate importance, but also what, if any, their connections to other actors are, we asked the respondents to rate a list of forty organizations in terms of importance (they were also given an opportunity to add to the list, of course, which several respondents did) and to indicate the extent to which they have interacted with these organizations (e.g., collaborated or disagreed with).

#### 5.3.1. *Influential Actors*

When it comes to importance, there is a fair amount of agreement among the organizations we interviewed about who are the most important actors in the field of unemployment. This is true across different actor groups as well as across different actor locations. Among the top ten actors are four major state institutions in the labor market field (*AMS, Näringsdepartementet, Länsarbetsnämnden, Arbetsförmedlingen*), three major union federations (LO, TCO, SACO), the major association of employers (*Svenskt Näringsliv*), the governing Social Democratic Party, and one additional party, the Left. The most frequently mentioned organization, AMS (The National Labor Market Board), is mentioned as important by an overwhelming majority (78%) of all respondents. The major union federation (LO), similarly, is mentioned as important by 75% of all actors.

Of the most mentioned influential organizations, the only surprise is the Left party. The Left party's position as one of the ten most influential organizations is probably linked to the critical role it often plays as the coalition party of the social democrats. This is especially true when the balance between the left and right blocs is very close. And yet, the importance of the presence of the Left on the top ten list should not be overstated since the other parties follow relatively closely. While not on the list of the ten most frequently mentioned organizations, it is still significant that five respondents placed the EU-organizations among the three most important actors, and two respondents identified EU-organizations as *the* most important actor in this field. It is interesting to note, moreover, that only two of the organizations we interviewed ranked themselves among the three most important organizations (Ministry for Industry, Labor and Communication; the Conservative party) and only one organization picked itself as the most important actor (Ministry for Industry, Labor, and Communication). Moreover, no organization added itself to the list of important actors.

While it is clear that there is fairly strong agreement among the organizations we interviewed concerning the most influential organizational actors in the field of unemployment, it is also clear that the organizational field of unemployment politics is quite complex. When asked if there were other important organizations than the forty we had asked them to evaluate, 26 of the organizations said yes. Most of these organizations (20) mentioned only one additional actor, and only two added more than 2 actors. Of the added organizations, only three got more than one mention (all got three mentions): churches, Region Värmland (a regional development initiative), and the universities. It is also important to note that no interviewee added the unemployed organizations to the list of

important and influential actors. Thus, although we conclude over-all that there were no significant omissions on the list we presented the interview respondents with, it is evident that the field of influence is somewhat fluid, especially across regions but also across different actors and probably across different issues.

### 5.3.2. Organizational Networks and Inter-organizational Contacts

This section addresses the extent to which organizations in the field of unemployment come into direct contact with each other, either as targets, collaborators, or opponents. The patterns that emerge of organizational interactions among and across our actor types should help us better understand the policy domain. Table 12 gives a brief overview of the position of different actors in the field of unemployment.

It is evident from table 12 that relatively few actors dominate the organizational field, especially the National Labor Market Board (AMS), the Regional Labor Market Board (LAN), and the Ministry for Industry, Labor, and Communication (*Näringsdepartementet*). The most surprising finding regarding targets is probably the appearance of the Employment Office as the second most mentioned target. The Swedish Employment Office is part of the centralized state bureaucracy regarding labor issues, but is organized regionally under the Regional Labor Market Boards. Since the Employment Office has no direct policy making functions, it is reasonable to assume that efforts to influence are directed either at the implementation of policy or at local arrangements and initiatives. Also noteworthy is the presence of the three smallest parties on the list of the most prominent targets. The only explanation for why they appear on the top-ten list is

**Table 12: Top 10 Targets, Collaborators, and Opponents in the Field of Unemployment (number of mentions).**

Actors	Target	Collaborator	Opponent
Labor Market Board (AMS)	21	11	8
Employment office	18	13	5
Regional Labor Market Board (LAN)	15	12	5
Ministry for Industry, Labor, and Communication	14	9	8
Labor Union Federation (LO)	16	13	7
White-collar Union Federation (TCO)	-	10	-
Professional Union Federation (SACO)	-	7	-
Confederation of Swedish Enterprise	-	-	8
Social Democratic Party	15	-	6
Conservative Party	-	-	9
Liberal Party	-	-	9
Center Party	-	-	7
Green Party	13	7	-
Left Party	13	7	-
Christian Democratic Party	13	-	8
Local Communities	13	13	-

that they serve as potential swing votes in an otherwise fairly stable system of party blocs. Less surprising is the finding that local actors are much less likely to try to influence AMS and the Ministry for Industry, Labor and Communication than national actors are, but much more likely to try to influence local communities and, but less pronounced, the regional Labor Market Boards.



When it comes to collaborations in the field of unemployment, the major union federations emerge as particularly significant. Most of the organizations that have collaborated with local communities are themselves local actors, and most of the actors having collaborated with the union federations are themselves intermediary actors, but not all of them union organizations. Once again the Left party and the Green party appear on the top ten list, supporting the speculation that these parties play important roles in the policy making process – the Greens as a somewhat independent middle party and the Left as a monitor of sorts of the social democrats.

The list of actors that the respondents have had disagreements with is, not surprisingly, perhaps, dominated by political parties (five of the ten are political parties). Political parties are the primary repositories and generators of political ideas, and hence more easy to disagree with than administrative units. Remaining organizations appear on all top ten lists concerning organizational interactions, except the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise (*Svenskt Näringsliv*), which is the primary association of Swedish employers. Thus, although organizations do not typically try to influence the employer association directly, many still disagree with its positions – half of the once who disagree with the employer associations, not surprisingly, are union actors. A separate analysis of the links between collaborators and organizations the respondents have had disagreements with shows no distinct patterns; that is, in some cases organizations have disagreements with close collaborators, whereas in other cases the two different types of organizations are clearly distinct. Among the organizations that are both collaborators and sources of disagreements are the social democrats, the Green party, and the Left party.

### 5.3.3 *Organizational Interests and Involvements in Issue*

In an effort to complement the claims-making data and to understand better how different organizational actors situate themselves in the policy field we asked the respondents a series of questions about their engagement (interests and actions) with two major issue categories (job creation and social benefits) in the field of unemployment.

The overwhelming majority of the organizations we interviewed have had some involvement in both issues. Seeking to specify the organizations' involvement further, we followed up with a series of questions about involvement in policy options around these two issues, at what political level, and whether the responding organization had undertaken any actions pertaining to the two issues in the parliamentary or administrative arenas. More than half of the organizations we interviewed have been involved in the development of policy options. Noteworthy enough, the only actor type category where more of the organizations had *not* been thus involved is the policy actor category. Since many organizations in this category are organized around implementation rather than policy development, this finding should not be altogether surprising. Also noteworthy is the finding that most of the unemployed organizations had been involved in policy development. Further, most organizations have undertaken specific actions on the two issues under consideration. Asked about the effectiveness of the actions they had undertaken, most of the respondents who answered these questions thought their actions had been very or rather effective (table not shown). Thus, in general, organizations seem satisfied that they have an impact on the policy sphere.

The questions of whether or not the organizations had had any involvement in job creation and social benefits, and at what level, do provide some insights into organizational activities, but do not, of course, tell us anything about what, if anything, the organizations want to accomplish in these areas. To that end, we asked respondents to elaborate on the activity questions, including identifying policy position and specific actions taken in support of those positions. The answers to these questions provide substantive content and direction of the policy goals of the organizations we interviewed. For the most part, however, the position statements are quite general and do not give a

particularly clear picture of organizational divergence in these areas. When it comes to job creation, for example, most respondents express a commitment to job creation but few identify specific policy positions. A similar pattern is evident when it comes to the respondents' positions on social benefits around unemployment as a public issue; most of the position statements, most of which refer to unemployment insurance, are general in character and framed in non-controversial terms.

We also asked a few questions about the links between the work of the organization (regarding job creation and social benefits) and the general public. More specifically, we asked about actions aimed at informing the public, about the respondents' evaluation of the extent to which the public thinks job creation and social benefits important issues, and about the respondents' evaluation of the correspondence between the public's and the organization's positions on the issues of job creation and social benefits. It is evident from this analysis that very few respondents think these are unimportant issues to the public, and also that very few think their own organization is out of sync with the public. Judging from the open-ended elaborations of these questions, most respondents based their evaluations of public opinion not on hard data (only one respondent referred to opinion polls), but instead on experiential and anecdotal forms of data, or simply on gut beliefs/feelings. This is true for all actor types.

Asked what the organizations do to communicate with the public (informing, mobilizing) regarding the issues of job creation and social benefits, respondents offered a range of techniques. More importantly, while most respondents (22) indicated that they do undertake specific actions to communicate with the public on the issue of job creation, only a handful of respondents (5) said they did so on the issue of social benefits. It is difficult to know if this finding indicates a real and enduring difference in the kinds of strategies the two issues inspire (or perhaps require), or if it reflects a bias in the direction of current activities (e.g., unemployment insurance was more actively debated at the tail end of the unemployment crisis than it is today). This pattern is repeated for specific actions in the parliamentary arena, which were much more likely to involve the issue of job creation (24) than social benefits (11).

#### 5.4. *The European Dimension in the Organizational Field*

We concluded the interviews with a series of questions referring to European integration. As is evident from table 13, very few respondents have been actively engaged at the EU level. Otherwise the patterns of strategic choices across actor types are similar at the EU-level to those that emerge at the national level; that is, media related strategies constitute the dominant action form of political actors in Sweden. There is one significant difference, however; actions aimed at mobilizing the public are much less significant at the EU level than the national level.

**Table 13: Distribution of action forms for action at the EU level across national and local actors (number of mentions).**

<u>Action form</u>	National	Local
Media related	40	7
Informing the public	27	11
Consultation	21	10
Court action	---	---
Negotiating/lobbying	24	14
Political campaign contribution	3	6
Mobilizing the public	11	8

An examination of the distribution of EU-level tactics across local and national actors reveals that national actors are considerably more likely than local actors to engage in political action at the EU level. Moreover, when it comes to local actors, media related strategies at the EU level are less frequently engaged in than other forms of action. This is in stark difference to national actors.

To get a better sense of the extent to which the European level plays a role in national politics, we asked the respondents about organizational engagement with, involvement in, and evaluations of the impact of European level politics relating to unemployment. Regarding organizational level discussion about EU, it is noteworthy that only a few organizations at either the national or local level have had no discussion at all about the role of EU; that is, the overwhelming number of organizations has had lots (16) or some (15) discussion about EU.

Regarding organizational involvement in EU level policies, it is evident that very few organizations report a lot of involvement; those who do, however, are exclusively national actors (otherwise no differences between national and local actors). A fair number of organizations (13), at both the national and local level, report being somewhat involved in EU-level policies. Of these organizations, more than half indicates that, in their own estimation, the involvement is “not enough,” whereas remaining organization think they are “enough” involved. Of the 13 organizations that report no involvement at all, 6 are national-level actors and 7 local.

Probed about the relative future importance of European policies around unemployment, in comparison with national-level policies, most of the organizations that responded to the question (28 in all) speculated that EU policies would gain in importance. Only a handful of organizations thought EU would become less important. There were no significant differences between national and local actors regarding this issue. Asked to think about the extent to which they favored an increasing EU influence over unemployment policies, most respondents say they favor such involvement, except the unemployed organizations, which are much less likely to say so. Looking at this question from the perspective of actor scope (national or local) no significant findings emerge; that is, national and local actors are about as likely to say that they favor an increasing EU influence.

## 6. Conclusion

The findings presented in this report support the general expectation that contentious politics around unemployment, to a large extent, is influenced by the structural and organizational context in which it takes place. The organization of the Swedish welfare state in general, and the organization of labor market policies in particular, are heavily dependent upon both a strong and interventionist state and a deeply ingrained universalist policy approach. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the public debate is dominated by nation-level state actors. This finding is confirmed in both the claims-making data and the interviews of organizational actors. Moreover, the consensus oriented policy approach in Sweden is evident, first, in the claims-making analysis through things like the relatively heavy participation of experts in the public debate and the evident reluctance of claims-makers to deliver overt criticisms in the public forum, and, second, in the interview data through the many qualitative comments indicating direct personal interactions with policy makers and bureaucrats.

Of particular interest is the minimal mobilization and participation of the unemployed themselves in the Swedish context. The formation of a national unemployed organization in 1997 was widely anticipated and received quite a bit of attention in the media as well as by the political elites, but when internal pressures forced an organizational split within a few months, the public attention began to subside. Generally speaking, however, the unemployed are closely affiliated with the larger labor movement and, for the most part, remain union members; in fact, union membership

rose to record levels during the early faces of the unemployment crisis (Linders and Kalander 2003). Thus, it is not altogether surprising that the unemployed occupy a marginal position in the public debate and, as organizational actors, work in semi-obscurity.

Regarding the influence of the European Union on the Swedish debate, it is impossible at this time to say with certainty that the presence of Europe has become more prominent over the time period analyzed here. In some respects, Europe was a more overt aspect of the debate during the first few years, which is not altogether surprising considering both the timing of Sweden's recent entry into Europe and the timing of the European Labor Market initiative. Nevertheless, the fact that local actors as well as national actors are involved in European-level issues and networks suggests that Europe is penetrating its member nations in ways that do not always involve the national government. Moreover, EU's involvement in labor market policy almost inevitably will influence national-level policy initiatives and responses.

**Appendix:** List of actors interviewed, followed by approximate English translation, and actor type (P=policy; I=intermediary; N=NGO;U=unemployed org)/actor location (N=national; L=local)

1.	Landsorganisationen (LO)	Swedish Trade Union Confederation	I/N
2.	Näringsdepartementet	Ministry of Industry, Labor and Communication	P/N
3.	Arbetsförmedlingen, Malmö	Malmö unemployment office	P/L
4.	Metall	Metal workers' union	I/L
5.	Kommunal	Municipal workers' union	I/L
6.	TCO	White-collar employees union	I/L
7.	TCO	White-collar employees union	I/N
8.	SACO	Union of professionals & academics	I/N
9.	Företagarnas riksorganisation	Federation of Private Enterprises	I/N
10.	Forum 50+	Organization for those 50 and over	N/N
11.	Pappers	Paper workers' union	I/L
12.	TRU	Joint committee of local and county auth.	I/N
13.	Verdandi	Social justice org against drug/alcohol abuse	N/L
14.	Trygghetsstiftelsen	Job Security Foundation	I/L
15.	Integrationsverket	Integration Board	P/N
16.	LO Värmland	Trade Union Confederation, county level	I/L
17.	Moderaterna	Conservative party	I/L
18.	Socialdemokraterna	Social democratic party	I/N
19.	SIF	Union of white-collar workers in industry	I/L
20.	Arbetsmarknadsstyrelsen (AMS)	Labor Market Board	P/N
21.	Communicare	Organization focusing on youths in Värmland	N/L
22.	Stadsmissionen	Christian welfare organization	N/L
23.	Arbetsfri och Glad	Virtual network of unemployed	U/N
24.	Vänsterpartiet	Left party	I/L
25.	DHR	Organization for the mobility impaired	N/N
26.	Region Värmland	Regional development project	P/L
27.	Kylos	Helping unemployed foreigners (church linked)	N/L
28.	Miljöpartiet	Green party	I/L
29.	Länsarbetsnämnden, Värmland	County Labor Market Board	P/L
30.	Kommunal	Municipal workers' union	I/N
31.	Svenskt Näringsliv	Confederation of Swedish Enterprise	I/L
32.	Svenskt Näringsliv	Confederation of Swedish Enterprise	I/N
33.	Moderaterna	Conservative party	I/N
34.	Simba	Org. of African women, focused on work prep	U/L
35.	Dacke	Unemployed org.	U/N
36.	SAK	Unemployed women	U/N
37.	Alliansen för arbete	Alliance for work	U/N
38.	Socialdemokraterna	Social democratic party	I/L
39.	Värmland ESF	European Social Fund, Värmland	P/L
40.	Afrosvenskarna	Organization of Afro Swedes	N/N

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## The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

### Chapter 9: Protest on unemployment: forms and opportunities<sup>39</sup>

Donatella della Porta

In the mid-nineties, France saw the “return of the social question,” with an (uneasy) alliance between public sector, unemployed, and marginally employed. In 1995, the extended strike of the *cheminots* (public transport workers) unexpectedly gained large support in public opinion: it “brought millions into the street in remarkable demonstrations of solidarity across the country, and forged direct organizational and symbolic links between the labour movement and various groups of excluded, including illegal immigrants, unemployed workers, and the homeless, as well as the lycée and university students and an intelligentsia that had been widely dismissed as apathetic and uninterested” (Fantasia and Stepan-Norris 2004: 556). Various marginal groups mobilized in the so-called “*mouvements de sans*” on behalf of the “have-nots”: migrants without legal residence permits, homeless people, the unemployed. Analysts described a coalition between the “moral left” of the middle class that mobilized on human rights, and the “social left” that mobilized the workers. In particular, the unemployed protested in 1997 against a reform that reduced the funding for unemployment compensation and centralized its management. In 1994, the group *Agir contre le Chômage* (AC! Act against Unemployment!) organized five marches converging in Paris from the provinces, asking for a reduction in work hours in order to create new jobs, as well as more investments “against exclusion.” During and after the marches, the unemployed organized at the local and national levels. In winter 1995-96, groups of unemployed staged a campaign of “job requisitions”: with well-publicized blitz-actions, they marched into factories and commercial enterprises having job vacancies, leaving their CVs. The following winter there would be weekly demonstrations and a series of occupations of local employment agencies—the ASSEDICS—as well as of the *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, the *Banque de France*, various town halls, and the headquarters of the Socialist Party, demanding the special Christmas doles that had been abolished by the reform.

The unemployed also protested at the European level: French, German, Spanish, and Italian unemployed converged in the European Marches against unemployment, job insecurity, and exclusion in 1997; two years later, thirty thousand mobilized on the same issues at the EU summit in Cologne, united as the European Network of Unemployed (ENU). The resources for these protests came from a heterogeneous, transnational coalition involving Trotskyite and Catholic groups, new social movements and trade unions—among the latter, the French Confederation General du Travail, the Italian Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro, and the German magazine “Express” (similar to the *Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund*). Notwithstanding the high costs of mobilization, the emerging debate on the social dimension of the EU was perceived as a window of opportunity. With few exceptions, the organizations participating in the march did not reject European integration, but instead asked for a different social and political EU (Chabanet 2002). AC!

<sup>39</sup> A previous draft of this chapter was presented at the UNEMPOL closing conference (Geneva, 1-2 April 2005).

declared: “A ‘social France’ was never given spontaneously by capitalists and governors ... In a similar way, a social Europe will come only from active and united intervention of European workers” (in Salmon 1998: 218).

It was during this cycle of protest that the French unemployed formed collective resources for mobilization. Although unemployed are considered politically apathetic, with very low propensity for collective action, the movement organizations “succeeded in modifying, at least for a certain period, the unemployed perception about their own mobilization potential. They encouraged the unemployed to express collective claims and convinced thousands of them to mobilize” (Royall 1998: 362). In fact, they provided a space for aggregation, socializing people often isolated (Mauer 2001), and increased their relational skills and *savoir faire* (Maurer and Pierru 2001). Mobilization provided a challenge to the image of unemployment as an individual problem and consequently the social stigma attached to it.

Moreover, the unemployed attracted allies. If the traditionally unemployed have found allies on the left of the political spectrum, in the French case they mobilized against what was perceived as “treason” by the left, and by the Socialist national government elected in May 1997, accused of having shifted from “a socialism with a human face to liberalism with an humanitarian undertones” (Bourneau and Martin 1993: 172). Nevertheless, the unemployed succeeded in winning support in public opinion: not only were the Christmas doles reintroduced, but sympathetic media coverage changed the public image of the unemployed: from poor people queuing for charity, to rebels struggling for their rights (Salmon 1998; Maurer and Pierru 2001: 388). Acting in an institutionalized field, with welfare state institutions focusing on the issue of unemployment (Fillieule 1993), the protestors addressed the political issue of the recognition of the unemployed themselves—winning a symbolic battle when their organization was invited to meet President François Mitterrand.

This account of the protest campaign on Unemployment in France, but also beyond, points at some of the main dimensions that have structured the debate on the interaction between societal characteristics and social movements. First of all, it indicates that movements usually refer to a base of reference that, in various ways, is defined by some social features. Although in American social movement research criticism of the breakdown theory, have for long time (and with few exceptions, among which Piven and Cloward 1977, 1992) reduced the attention to structural grievances (Buechler 2004), there is no denying that the socio-economic structure of a society influences the type of conflicts that develop in it. Since the 1970s, indeed, especially European social movement scholars focused on new conflicts in Western democracy: the ecological movement and the women’s movement were the typical object of this stream of research. Social movements have been considered indeed as the bearers of post-materialistic values, while the class cleavage, on which the labor movements had mobilized, seemed to be pacified. The “return” of poor people movements represents a useful starting point for the discussion of the relationship between changes in the social structure and collective action.

Social change may affect the characteristics of social conflict and collective action in different ways. It may facilitate the emergence of social groups with a specific structural location and potential specific interests, and/or reduce the importance of existing ones, as the shift from agriculture to industry and then to the service sector suggests. As the account on the French protest on unemployment indicates, however, structural tensions do not directly translate into mobilization: the misery of the unemployed deters protest, more than facilitating it; and unemployed are usually not considered as a main political base of reference. Societal conditions have also important influences upon the distribution of resources that are conducive to participation in collective action, such as education, and/or facilitate the articulation of interests. The shift to smaller factories and

offshore production of industrial activities has played against workers' capacity to act as a class, while women's increasing access to higher education and the job market has facilitated the development of new ties between them, and their emergence as a new collective actor. Nevertheless, protest on unemployment develops now and then, when some opportunities and resources are available.

In this paper, I shall rely upon the data on claims making collected within the UNEMPOL project, as well as secondary analysis of existing research, in order to single out the forms of and opportunities for protest on the issue of unemployment. For the empirical data collection we used the methodology of political claim analysis (see Koopmans and Statham 1999), a quantitative method that takes individual political claims as units of analysis and use newspapers as a source for the publicly visible part of this claims-making. A claim is defined as an instance of strategic action in the mass-media. It consists of the expression of a political opinion by physical or verbal action, regardless of the form this expression may take (statement, violence, repression, decision, demonstration, court ruling, etc.), and regardless of the nature of the actor (media, governments, civil society actors etc.). The claim analysis approach aims to integrate the two methodological traditions of social movement research: protest event analysis (quantitative) (Tarrow 1989; Franzosi 1994) and frame analysis (qualitative) (Snow et al. 1986; Gamson and Modigliani 1989). By systematically coding discursive dimensions, claim analysis broadens the scope of attention from 'protest' to all forms of claims-making in the public domain, including conventional and verbal actions. Moreover, it locates social movement organizations within a larger 'multi-organizational field' by including institutional and non-institutional actors. The main actors of claim analysis are no longer 'protesters', but claimants, namely the subjects of a strategic action (whether verbal or not) in the mass-mediated public discourse. If the use of the daily press as source of information on protest or public discourse has been criticized on the basis of the selection biases introduced by the rules of journalistic coverage, in our research The risk of selection bias is limited since we are interested specifically in public claims-making<sup>40</sup>.

Selecting one quality newspaper per country, the UNEMPOL project covered Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Germany and Sweden for the 8 years, between 1995 and 2002. The sampled issue were read and searched for claims on unemployment that were coded according to the following main dimensions (Koopmans and Erbe 2002):

WHO (SUBJECT ACTOR)	HOW (FORM)	AT WHOM (ADDRESSEE)	WHAT (ISSUE)	FOR/AGAINST WHOM? (OBJECT ACTOR)	WHY (FRAME)

For each of the main dimensions we distinguished the territorial scope: local, regional, national, bi/multilateral, European, other supranational, etc.

Focussing on the (part of the) public discourse represented in the printed media does not imply that this is considered to be the only arena where claims are presented. In particular, some actors are less dependent upon the mass media, as they enjoy direct access to decision-makers; others are less able to influence the mass media and therefore need to resort to alternative communication channels. Some may choose to address public opinion because their claims resonate with the majority public opinion, others may opt for less visible channels because they have more support among the elite than in the wider population. However, we assume that the printed media is one of the most

<sup>40</sup> Protest event analysis is also criticized because of its description bias (McCarthy et al. 1996), in order to reduce which, besides focusing on quality newspapers (that have to protect their reputation), we based our coding only on the factual coverage of events in newspaper articles, without taking into consideration any potential comments or evaluation made by the journalist.

important arenas of public claims-making, and that most actors will, at one stage or another, use it in order to make their views public.

In what follows, I shall focus on one main dimension of the analysis: the action forms. The several categories of the codebook for ‘action forms’ have been aggregated in the following broad categories: political decision/executive actions, verbal actions (e.g. communication events such as press release etc.), and protest/direct democratic actions, that were at their turn distinguished according to their degree of disruptiveness. This paper focuses on the protest action. After having presented some different forms of protest on unemployment, I shall look first at their characteristics (part 3), and then at the political opportunities for their development (part 4).

## 1. Protest on unemployment: a typology

The French wave of protest on unemployment can be taken as an indication of the existence of protest, even in a fragmented society. The French protest is indeed not the only example of unconventional collective action on unemployment. Consider these additional illustrations, taken from the UNEMPOL database on the Italian case for the most recent covered-year, 2002:

- *20 000 Fiat workers march in Rome against dismissals*
- *Six casual workers in Termini Imerese occupy a Fiat building, asking to be hired*
- *Fiat workers in Melfi picket the factory in order to protest against dismissals*
- *In Naples, 150,000 workers march against the proposed reform of labor right that would make dismissals in small factories easier (art. 18)*
- *In Turin, Fiat buildings are encircled by demonstrators, holding hands (girotondi) in order to protest against the dismissals of Fiat workers*
- *The Italian union CGIL march in Barcelona, Spain, together with other European unions, against a proposal that would increase flexibility in the labor market*
- *CGIL announce a 8-hours strike against dismissals of Fiat workers in Termini Imerese*
- *Workers march against Fiat dismissals in Arese*
- *Disobedients, a coordination of youth squatted center, march in Rome side-by-side with Fiat workers, against dismissals*
- *The Neapolitan No Globals march in solidarity with the Fiat workers*
- *Fiat-Mirafiori workers block the tangenziale road of Turing*
- *Disobedients launch a boycott —“Robin Hood”--campaign against Fiat*
- *Disobedients occupy the Pinacoteca of the (Fiat) Lingotto in order to protest against Fiat dismissals*
- *The European metal workers proclaim a Fiat European Action Day*
- *The Italian metal workers call for a 4-hours strike against dismissals in Fiat*
- *Termini Imerese unions call for a city-strike against the closing of the Fiat factory in that town*
- *The Committee of Fiat workers’ wives occupy the Termini railway station*
- *The mayor of Termini Imerese starts a hunger strike, to be continued until Fiat will re-hire the fired workers*
- *The mayor of Turin express his solidarity to the fired Fiat workers*
- *The Ivrea bishop calls for a vigil of preying and fasting in order to avoid the dismissals at Fiat*
- *The metallurgic union FIM declares the state of agitation against the planned changes to the art. 18*
- *Workers of the ICTA (subcontracting for FIAT) march against the dismissals following the Fiat crisis*
- *Workers of the Arese Alfa factory block the railway station in Milan to defend their job*

- *Workers of Termini Imerese block the activities of the Melfi Fiat factory*
- *Fiat workers block the Palermo harbor in order to protest against Fiat dismissals*
- *Fiat workers block traffic on the highway between Palermo and Catania*
- *Fiat workers block the Termini Imerese factory in protest for Fiat dismissals*
- *Fiat workers block the Casilina road to protest against dismissals*
- *Fiat workers occupy the Milan Malpensa airport to protest against the plan for dismissal (esuberi) proposed by Fiat*
- *Fiat workers occupy the Palermo Punta Raisi airport*
- *Fiat workers organize a mass sit-in in the Colosseum, in Rom*
- *Regional strike in Apulia against the changes to the article 18*
- *The unions organize another 4-hour strike to protest Fiat dismissals*

Among these protest actions, mainly around the wave of Fiat dismissals, we could distinguish different forms of mobilization: from traditional union strikes to boycott, from the moderate vigils to the road blocks, from the action of workers against dismissals to those of long-term unemployed, from the protest of the mayors to those of the Disobedients. In general, I suggest that most protest on unemployment could be grouped in some different constellations, with different combinations of social and political actors, as well as forms of protest and type of demands. Research on the unemployed allows to single out, in particular:

- a) Protest action of long-term unemployed. These are community-based forms of protest that involve NGOs (also religious ones) but also leftwing political activists, make use of direct action (road blocks, etc.) as well as highly symbolic forms of protest (hunger strikes etc.), and are oriented to obtain policies of immediate relief for their constituency.
- b) Protest actions against massive dismissals. These tend to involve the unions, to use a mix of mass protest (marches) and traditional forms of industrial action (from strikes to occupation), and be oriented to political exchange (ad-hoc solution).
- c) Protest actions for “fair jobs” within more general cycle of protest. These are forms linked to general cycles of protest (at national or local level), involve left-wing Social Movement Organizations, but also unions and parties, and use a variety of direct forms of action to push for political solution to labor market problems (reduce flexibility, reduce working time, etc.).

Organizations of the unemployed might collaborate in the different form in the different constellation.

## **2. Who protest on unemployment, how and for what**

Protest on unemployment is considered as a rare event. In the 1990s, this is not completely true—at least, not in all countries and all periods. As can be observed in table 1, indeed, protest amount to 9% of claims making: 4.2% in the form of conventional protest, 3.4 as disruptive protest, 1.3 as confrontational protest and a 0.1% of violent forms of protest.. Protests on unemployment are indeed largely minoritarian in discursive claims, but not lower than protest events in other domains. If we look, for instance, at the Italian data base on another research on carried out with a similar research design (Europub.com), claim makers used protest in only 3.9% of the events coded on agricultural policy, 1.5% on monetary policy, 3.5% on immigration, 1.2% on European integration, 1.6% on pension, and 11.2% on education (della Porta and Caiani 2005). such as education or pensions.

A very quick look suffices to notice that different actors use different forms of actions. We can observe, in particular, that:

- a) Protest takes mainly moderate forms: verbal statements dominate with 84% of all claims;
- b) Rich actors do not need to protest to have their claims covered in the press (see business associations, but also parties): Employers and parties focus almost exclusively on verbal statements.
- c) Unions are very relevant actors in protest on unemployment, using forms of action with different degrees of radicality.
- d) Third sector associations often act as advocate for unemployed.
- e) Unemployed themselves tend to protest less (or at least their protests are less covered), but they are more disruptive when they do so.

There is a small percent of protest—the most radical—that has been organized by the *unemployed* themselves, or at least by groups that represent unemployed. As mentioned in the presentation of the French protest on unemployment, the organization of the unemployed is traditionally considered as particularly difficult. First, unemployed are said to have low self-esteem, and therefore low tendency to build a collective identity around a condition perceived as stigmatized, and certainly unpleasant to live in. As Olivier Fillieule (1993: 128) reminds us, “most research converge in indicating that the loss of a job is translated into a perception of a personal identity considered as shameful, and this jeopardizes the possibility of a collective identification with unemployment (individualizing strategy) as well as the political representation of unemployment (fatalism, sense of guilt, sense of being powerless)”. Being the status of the unemployed stigmatized and stigmatizing, “collective action misses this necessary element which is indispensable for its development that is a claimed or assumed identity” (Galland and Louis 1981: 177). The mobilization of the unemployed demands therefore the development of a collective identity that “relies exclusively on the symbolic and cognitive work developed during the mobilization, and cannot rely upon previously existing schemes” (Maurer 2001: 39). In order to mobilize, an injustice frame has to be created, and responsibility for unemployment have to be assigned to a political authority. Mobilization, as testified by an unemployed, is then an instrument to transform desperation in anger: “This is what the movement gave me. I was angry, but did not know what to do with it and there I saw other angry people that put their anger together, well, you could do both... and even if we were unemployed, that they told us again and again, had nothing to do in the society, well we showed them that we existed... and that we could organize a movement” (*ibid.*, 101). In this sense, activism offers an occasion for not only occupying the “empty” time, but also to give sense to it: participation has been indeed defined as a social, before than political, act (Maurer 2001). The representation offered by the organized unemployed group has a “direct impact on the conditions for the formation of collective action, and this is even more true for unemployed for whom the question of identity stays at the heart of their social situation, social relations in their environment, of their sociability” (Galland and Louis 1981: 175).

The research on the mobilization of the unemployed in France indicates, however, an additional difficulty in the process of the cognitive restructuring of the action fields. As the conditions of the unemployed vary, so do also the experiences of the unemployed—with strong tensions in the definition of a collective identity. Indeed, “unemployed cannot struggle in order to defend their collective identity: the most active among them, would indeed refuse it, and those who adapt to it, they would not want to struggle for a job” (Durand 1981).

The need for individual resources that help building a collective identity explains the dominance of *unions* in carrying out the protest on unemployment, as well as the dominance of protest against mass dismissals versus protest against long term unemployment or even juvenile or female unemployment. Indeed, even in groups of unemployed, an important role is played by former,

unionized workers, that keep an ethic of work. Not only in France (Maurer 2001), but also in Argentina, leaders of unemployed were often unemployed industrial workers with organizational experiences (Petras 2003). In these cases, unemployed perceive themselves as virtual workers, identifying with their previous conditions as workers (Fillieule 1993).

Unions have been indeed an important actors of mobilization, when there have been waves of protest on unemployment. In a comparison of United States and United Kingdom in the 1930s, the very existence of those protests has been indeed attributed to the willingness of the unions to mobilize (Richards 2002). Usually, however, unions have an ambivalent attitude towards unemployed, perceived as an element of weakness of the occupied labor force, if not as potential strikebreakers. Unions are, therefore, potentially more available to mobilize against mass dismissals and factory closing, than in favor of long-term unemployed—who have, on their side, low propensity to join unions. It is indeed especially in periods of sudden massive unemployment that unions appear more active on the issue: for instance, in France in the 1930s the CGTU stated that they organized 10% of the French unemployed—and indeed called in 1933 for the 60,000 people “hunger march” from Lille to Paris (Tartakowski 1997). The Comité chômeurs CGT, founded in 1978 in Marseille after a wave of dismissals of harbor workers took part in the mentioned wave of protest in the 1990s. Marginal until 1989, the Comités chômeurs numbered 500 in the beginning of the 1990s, after the wave of protest against the closure of the docks of the Bouche-du-Rhone. During these struggles, there is a change in the unions’ strategy—with a return to door-to-door mobilization and to actions outside the factory.

As we can see in the table, however, unions are not the only actors that act in solidarity with the unemployed—or help mobilizing them. Another important actor is made of *non-state welfare organizations and groups*. Third sector organizations, NGOs, charities are often involved in the support of marginal groups: immigrants, poor, single mothers etc.. Traditionally, these groups preferred helping poor people by charity. With the welfare state restructuring, much first-help relief to poor people has been contracted out (or, simply, left) to a more and more organized Third Sector. Squeezed between the needs of their constituency and the frustration for cuts in budgets, these organizations have more and more often resorted to advocacy, even in the more vocal forms of protest. An example of these type of organization is the French Syndicat Chômeurs, founded in 1982 by Maurice Pagat, himself unemployed and with experiences in religious associations, such as Emmaus. In the beginning, this group had the support of various religious groups (that help the creation of a Comité chrétien de solidarité avec les chômeurs), that push towards charity forms of action and depoliticization (Fillieule 1993). Nevertheless, in the 1990s, the organization would join the more-politicized AC!

In AC! we see indeed an illustration of the coming together of yet another type of actors mobilized on unemployment: what we put under the label of other civil society organizations, with particular emphasis on *left-wing social movement organizers*. Since the 1960s, indeed, New Left groups started to focus on some marginal groups.<sup>41</sup> Later on, it was especially the movements of the left-libertarian family who started to mobilize on migrants’ rights, but also on various forms and degree of “marginality” in the large cities. In the example quoted in the beginning, the “movement left” is present especially in AC!, founded in 1993 by CFDT unionists that had been expelled or had abandoned that union after its “recentrage” in 1986 (and that had founded in 1989 Coordonner, ressembler, Construire and Solidaire, Unitaire et Démocratique-SUD) (Bérout, Mouriaux and Vakaloulis 1998; Mouchard 2000). In 1996, AC! declared to have already 150 local collectives. Asking in the beginning a reduction of working time (to a weekly 32 hours), AC! moved towards claim of “granted salary” after the entrance of the CARGO (Collective d’agitation pour un revenu garanti optimal), coming from the autonomous groups of the 1970s and rooted especially among the

<sup>41</sup> The role of the activists of the social movements of the 1970s was also noticed in Germany (Rein 1997).



youth precariously employed. Also the list of the Italian protest around the Fiat controversy in 2002 stresses indeed the convergence, during the wave of protest, of the traditional union-led anti-dismissal protest with the No Global networks, formed by youth squatted centers, that had indeed networked with the *Disoccupati organizzati* (groups of long term unemployed) in and around Naples. Also the Italian No Global brought in the movement a demand of a “guaranteed salary”, presented as a way to adapt to a new productive phase characterized by high level of unemployment, but reflecting also a positive attitude towards creative works as well as the non-working time. The Italian activists of the Disobedients would indeed subscribe to the declaration of one of their French counterpart: “we know some lazy people, more or less allergic to the capitalistic productive discipline, capable to strongly commit themselves to associational, militant, artistic, intellectual activities... Jobs are not the only source of social existence” (quoted in Mouchard 2000: 103). In this area, political mobilization is motivated indeed by political consciousness, not generic solidarity (see also Maurer 2001).

Forms of protest are usually quite disruptive. The Italian protester in 2002 blocked railways and highways, and occupied harbors and airports, imitating the Argentinean *piqueteros*, where in August 2001, 100.000 unemployed shut down 300 highways (Petras 2003). Mobilization of unemployed follows in part the tradition of direct action unionism (Chopart et al. 1998: 72): chaining themselves to the gate of major institutions, with flash interventions against eviction, demonstrations, and occupations of public institutions. All these forms tend to break with the tradition of modern industrial action, bringing the conflicts outside the factory, and involving the community in solidarity strikes as well as boycotting (Piven and Cloward 2000).

Our protesters also mimic some protest forms of a quite distant past. As Herbert Reiter (2002.) described in his analysis of the protest of the Florentine unemployed after the Second World War, the protestors resort to a sort of “self-creation of jobs” (or “collocamento simbolico”)—entering in factory and firms and starting to work. This forms of action—taken back by the French unemployed who distributed their curriculum vitae in the FNAC, asking for being hired—follows the tradition of land occupation by jobless peasants.

We can add that the form of claim making change following the issues of the claims. As we can see in table 2, protest actions focus, more than political decisions and verbal statements, on welfare systems and social benefits (such as unemployment insurance systems, social aid and assistance), while political decisions are more focused on individual insertion in the labor market (active measures, training, formation, etc.). Especially demonstrative forms of protest address issues that relate more directly to the constituency of the unemployed. General socioeconomic issues (macroeconomic issues, state policy related to labor market and labor forces) are addressed by actors using all different forms of claim-making.

The French example confirms that the content of claims represents difficult strategic choices in the mobilization against unemployment. First of all, there is a tension between long-term perspectives of economic reform and the needs for immediate relief. In AC!, as mentioned, a fracture emerged between the politicized vanguard and the long-term unemployed (as testified for by the tensions in the French *Agir contre le chômage!* –AC! between the more politicized founders, that demanded a 32-hours week, and the long-term unemployed who later joined the organization, demanding immediate relief schemes—“You are kind, but reducing working time, finding a job, that a too long-time perspectives” (quoted in Mouchard 2000: 97)—pushing the organization to reorient their strategy towards demands for urgent interventions in terms of costs of transport and lodging.

Another difficulty--also in the development of collective actions by the unemployed--is the bureaucratic fragmentation of the unemployed on the basis of the specific policies addressed to

them: women or men, young or not, ethnic specificity, previous labor experience etc.. As Reiter's research indicated (2002), the Florentine unemployed protest of the after-war period weakened when the former-soldiers parted destiny with the "common unemployed", in the hope of getting some special treatment. On these characteristics, previously employed are those who are usually more protected, especially by welfare states that tend to privilege the male adults as family breadwinners. The first task for those who organized the protest of the unemployed is indeed offering to all these groups a common collective identity as unemployed. The success of the French protests was indeed signaled by the capacity of the unemployed, "beyond the diversity of their situation face to unemployment, to show to be able to form a social group capable of challenging any government and break the consensus that dominate the French scene" (Combesque 1998: 187).

On the choice of the issues of mobilization there are often also split between the previously occupied, looking for reinsertion in the labor market, and a new generation, often of juvenile unemployed, who refuses the working ethic. In the France wave of protest, for instance, the younger activists were often characterized by casual work experiences, but also by strong political identities, that help them avoiding the frustration coming from unemployment—"working is, for sure not my passion", "working... is just a way to pay for your food and a roof", "me, the less I work, the better it is" (quoted in Maurer 2001: 75). A similar tension between struggling against unemployment, but also refusing the traditional ethic of work is present in the mobilization of the young, casual workers organized in the Italian campaign of "San Precario" as well as the international campaign on Mayday.

### 3. Protesting: Where and When? The political opportunities for protest on unemployment

Having described the different types of mobilization on unemployment, we have to stress however that the strength of the mobilization is in the networking of the various groups and forms of action—made possible especially during cycle of protest (Tarrow 1989). In fact, if the mentioned organizations bring to the mobilization "the culture of collective action and the knowledge of the militant rituals and practices" (Maurer 2001), they have themselves to mobilize resources for action. More than to individual organizations, the protest of the unemployed in France in the 1990s or of those in Italy in the year 2002 rise from the networking of different, heterogeneous groups (see also Hannington 1938, on the UK unemployed in the 1920s). In France, the pick of the struggle of unemployment follows two waves of mobilization on the "social question": the massive strikes of 1995 against the restructuring of the welfare state (followed by the *cheminot* strike in 1996-1997) and the wave of mobilization of the "mouvement de sans" with the sans-papiers protest against the Pasqua Law in 1993 as well as those of the sans-logis and mal-logés (see Maurer and Pierru 2001; Agrikoliansky, Fillieule and Mayer 2005). In Naples, the first pick of the struggle of the "organized unemployed" coincides with the urban movement of the early seventies; another wave with the recent mobilization of the global justice movement (Remondino 1998). In Argentina, the *piqueteros* allied with the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo and collective of university students, as well as with public employees unions (Petras 2003: 133).

Which are therefore the opportunities for the development of protest on unemployment? Research on social movements has usually linked cycle of protest with the opening of windows of opportunity (Tarrow 1989; Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta 1995). The stress upon political opportunity challenges the "breakdown" approaches that link protest to grievances, assuming instead that, in a complex society in which discontent is always alive, groups mobilize when resources and opportunities for the aggrieved groups are available. However, two caveats have to be added. First of all, on specific issues such as unemployment, historical research has largely indicated that although the amount of protest is not directly correlated with unemployment rates (on

the UK in the 1920s and 1930s, Bagguley 1991: 85; on the USA, 1890-1940, Kerbo and Schaffer 1992)<sup>42</sup>, mobilization on/for the unemployed is indeed sensitive to the *labor market cycles*: a first wave of mobilization on unemployment developed indeed between the two wars, in time of economic depression (see Richards 2002); after the second world war, there was no mobilization on unemployment in France, where there was a large demand for workers (see Tartakowsky 1997), while unemployed mobilized in Italy where unemployment was massive (Reiter 2002). A second caveat refers to the perception of political opportunities as well as of the causes for unemployment: *discursive opportunities* are indeed relevant in defining the forms and amount of mobilization (as Koopmans and Statham 1999 have for instance demonstrated by looking at the mobilization on migration issues).

Our data indicate, first of all, that protest is still mainly oriented towards the nation-state. As we can notice in table 3:

Protest is a very rare event at the supranational level;

Protest is more frequent at the national, but also local level;

Conventional forms of protest are concentrated at the national level:

More disruptive forms of protest happen at the national and, especially, the local level.

That protest (at least, reported protest) does not much address the supranational level is no surprise. Researches on protest events, usually based on newspaper sources, all stress the scarcity of protests that directly target European institutions. Using Reuters World News Service and Reuters Text line, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001) – the first to analyze protest at the EU level – found a very limited number of such protests. Similarly, in Germany, Dieter Rucht (2002) observed a low (and declining) proportion of protests aimed at the international level (the highest levels being reached in 1960-1964) and he concludes that ‘as far as Germany is concerned, the Europeanization and, more in general, Europeanization of protest is a myth’ (*ibid.* 185). Meanwhile Giugni and Passy (2002) noted how rarely protests on migrants’ rights target the EU, notwithstanding the increasing Europeanization of decisions on migration at least in terms of access quotas and border controls. Even environmental action is only very rarely aimed at Brussels: protests with EU targets ranged from 0.8% in Italy to 4.6% in Germany in the last decade, with no discernible, increasing trend (Rootes 2002).

It is however remarkable that, compared with other forms of claims making, protest is indeed only slightly less present at the supranational national level than the other forms of claims-making. Indeed, if we look at the European level—where we have found instances of protest in both of our narrative on France and Italy—conventional forms of protest address that level in 2.4% of the cases, but demonstrative action in 3.9%, and this versus a quite low 4.5 of political decisions and an even lower 2.7% for verbal statements. Given the low EU competencies on employment issues, this significant attention to the EU level can be interpreted as a sort of “pre-emptive” Europeanization. Europeanization of protest has often taken the form of domestication: pressure on national authority in order to redress policies at the supranational (EU) level. In their analysis of protest in Europe<sup>43</sup>, Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001) stressed that most of the EU related events that they singled out (406 out of 490) were cases of domestication, with an increase from about 5% of all protest events in 1992 to 10% in 1997. In our case, instead, a form of *externalization* dominates, since the mobilizations and communications of national actors target the EU directly in an attempt to place pressure on the groups’ own governments (Chabanet 2002). As Didier Chabanet (2002) has suggested, protest on unemployment is indeed an example of *externalization*: the EU is called upon

<sup>42</sup> I’m grateful to Herbert Reiter for this information.

<sup>43</sup>The typology of Europeanized protest, proposed by Doug Imig and Sidney Tarrow (2001), combines the national-international dimension both in terms of the actors engaging in protest and their targets.

as an additional level of opportunity, in order to address issues that are perceived as no longer under control of the nation state (see also della Porta 2003; della Porta and Caiani 2005).

A second, apparently contradictory, observation: protest on unemployment often remains *local*. In France, notwithstanding the star-marches converging upon the Capital, the Comité de chômeurs organized at the local level. In Italy, most of the disruptive forms of protest by the unemployed come from committees of organized unemployed that are deeprooted—as their very names often indicate—in specific neighborhoods (such as the historical Comitato di Vico Cinquesanti). Also research on the unemployed movement in Argentina stressed the role of local communities in supporting the road blocs and city camps organized by the *piqueteros* in quasi segregated, relatively homogeneous barrios hit by massive firing of factory workers and privatization of mineral and energy centers accompanied by closures (Petras 2003: 128).<sup>44</sup>

Our narratives provide some, not mutually exclusive explanations for this tendency towards a “communitarization” of unemployed struggle. First of all, as Fillieule (1993) observes, the movements on unemployment move in a field which is highly structured by state institutions. And welfare institutions are indeed decentralized at the local level—to which in a “dual state” the distribution of subsidies and services is often devolved. In France, the local ASSEDIC have been indeed targets and stages for the protest (Bourneau and Martin 1993: 172) of unemployment associations with a focus on immediate needs. But, as the hunger strike of the Termini Imerese’s mayor indicates, local politicians can offer support to unemployment protest within the community, using them in a double-level game to put pressure upon national authorities. Successes at the local levels (re-hiring of fired workers; special programs for underdeveloped area, training etc.) are at their turn relevant in keeping the mobilization going, spreading the (mobilizing) belief—all the more important for poorly endowed groups—that protesting helps getting material results. In Naples, the hiring of the first groups of organized unemployed as public employees in the local administration or of other groups in the public health, the organization of courses for professional training as well as the reform of the mechanism of job distribution (Pugliese 1998), all contributed to the framing of protest as a successful strategy. Also in France, local actions on immediate relief policies have often been successful: in 1994, the occupation of local ASSEDICs result in the allocation of a special Christmas dole (Salmon 1998: 206). As Royall (1998: 362) observes, “the association in defense of the unemployed... were able, at least for some time, to modify the perception of the unemployed about their mobilization potential. They encouraged the unemployed to struggle for their rights, and convinced thousands of them to mobilize”. In fact, “it was necessary to show to the unemployed that they had real chances for success”.

A cross-country comparison of protest on unemployment also indicates the relevance of *national institutions* in orienting the strategies of collective actors (see table 4).

Table 3 indicates, first of all, that the degree of attention to the issue of unemployment does not reflect upon protest rate. Indeed, even though Germany is a country with dramatically increasing rate of unemployment and strong political controversies on the reform of the welfare, protest of all forms remain limited, in a public sphere where instead verbal declaration are by far dominant. Unions indeed intervene, since at least the 1980s, among the unemployed but in the form of training more than of protesting (Wolski-Prenger 1998). Similar appears, although with less dramatic rate of unemployment, the situation in Sweden. In both countries, neocorporatist assets in industrial relations might have discouraged politics in the street. Protest is also low in the UK, where not only

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<sup>44</sup> An example is the wave of road blocks and camps organized in Salta, where the closure of the petrol company General Mosconi where not only 5000 of the 15000 inhabitants were employed, but which also had built a sort of semi-private welfare state (Dinerstein 2001).

unemployed appear as politically isolated (Bugguley 1998), but also in the period covered the dynamic of the labour market is quite different from that dominating Continental Europe.

We find instead much more protest in the other three countries. France and Italy are indeed characterized by the highest rate of confrontational protest; France and Switzerland by high rates also of conventional and demonstrative protest. The presence of a fragmented union scene in all three countries, with left-wing trade unions especially visible in France (Gallie 1985) and Italy (della Porta 1996) might well explain why protest finds more opportunities in these countries. While, however, in Switzerland the tradition of inclusiveness keep the forms of protest more moderate (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak and Giugni 1995), the disruptiveness of protest in Italy and France reflect instead more polarized, exclusive tradition in both countries.

Political opportunities can also be considered in terms of availability of alliances. Traditionally, the parties of the Left have supported the mobilizations of unemployed. Although unemployed are often stigmatized as *Lumpenproletariat* in some leftwing orthodoxy, in several waves of protest following mass dismissals and economic depression, leftwing-parties offered resources and support. This was the case, for instance, in the 1930s in the US, where protests were organized by Unemployed Councils supported by the Communist Party, the Socialist Party and the Musteite's Committees, and they declined after the desertion of these important allies in the USA (Kerbo and Schaffer 1992; Valocchi 1990). In Naples, the temporary decline of the movement of the organized unemployed in the mid-1970s has been explained by the failure to mobilize support in the Left—"there was the need of more stringent forms of collaboration with the labor movements and its organizations as well as other skills in order to negotiate with the institutional counterpart" (Pugliese 1998: 196). In Italy, Rifondazione Comunista supported a reduction of the working-time as well as a guaranteed salary. In the French mobilization of the 1990s a visible role was played the Association pour l'Emploi, l'Information et la Solidarité, supported by the PCF, that offered material supports to unemployed in their interactions with the welfare institutions (Bourneau and Martin 1993).

We have to add, however, that the hypothesis that mobilization against unemployment would be stronger under right-wing governments, perceived as opponents, and weaker instead under left-wing governments, perceived as allies, does not always hold for the mobilization of the 1990s and the 2000s. In fact, protesters often target attempted reforms even by leftwing governments, reacting to a perceived betrayal—this was indeed the case for the protest in France, oriented against a left-wing government (elected in 1997) that wanted to reduce the budget for urgent relief policies and the tripartite concertation around it. If the socialist-led government was indeed accused of a shift "from socialism with a human face to neoliberalism with humanitarian tunes" (Bourbeau and Martin 1993, 172), this is by far not the only example. Also in Italy, the reform that increased flexibility in the labor market was introduced by a left-wing government, as protestors often stress.

In fact, more than by the support of left-wing party alliances, the availability to protest on unemployment seems more and more related with public opinion support. Again on the French case, a success of the first struggle by the unemployed was their capacity to address, and convince, the public opinion. The mobilization of the public opinion as a channel to reach public decision makers is a traditional strategy of the powerless (Lipsky 1995; della Porta and Diani 2005: ch. 7). The appeal to the public opinion thought strategy of scandalization is indeed visible in the French illustration as well as in the Italian one. In France, a leaflet of the organization Partage reads "against misery, loneliness, desperation that produce suicides always more numerous among unemployed" (in Fillieule 1993: 142) and later on AC! banner would read "How can you sleep when an unemployed commits suicide?".<sup>45</sup> In Italy, the involvements of unemployed wives in

<sup>45</sup> Indeed, in 1995, as many as 62% French asked to invest more in the struggle against exclusions and the media coverage of the wave of protest in 1997-98 will change the public image of the unemployed: from poor souls waiting in

protest activities point at the disruptive effect of unemployment on the moral bases of the society. And of the Argentinean *piqueteros* was noticed that: “From passive sufferers of poverty and social disorganization and clientelistic manipulation they have become active in a powerful solidarity movement, engaged in autonomous grass-roots social organization and independent politics” (Petras 2003: 130). Media coverage also helps “synchronizing local actions, changing the multitudes of initiatives in a movement with national amplitude” (Maurer and Pierru 2001: 388).

#### 4. Conclusions

Although rare, protest on unemployment nevertheless exists. In this chapter, I tried to single out some constellations of protest: the more sporadic and disruptive outbursts of long-time unemployed, the better structured protest against dismissals, the development of more general protest on unemployment during cycle of protest.

I have also pointed at some peculiarities of these different forms vis-à-vis protest on other issues as well as action other than protest on the issue of unemployment.

*Organizationally*, protest on unemployment involve often loose local alliances of unemployed organizations, with either unions, left-wing political groups and social movement organizations, or various type of voluntary associations.

As for their *repertoires*, protest on unemployment tends to assume some typical forms: occupations of working places, occupations of welfare institutions dealing with unemployment, long marches, hunger strikes and other forms of action with high symbolic impact, oriented to stress the “absolute injustice” of the position of the unemployed.

Opportunities for protest on unemployment are indeed influenced by some political characteristics. In general, the status of unions as well as the traditional assets of industrial relations will affect the chances of protest. If left-wing actors are important allies for unemployed, with left-wing parties moving decisively to the right, unemployed turned to the public opinion as a potential ally for their cause.

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**Table 1: Forms of action by type of actor (%)**

	Political decisions	Verbal statements	Conventional Protest	Demonstrative protest	Confrontational protest and violent	Total
State actors	16.0	79.5	3.6	0.7	0.1	3401
Parties	2.3	91.2	5.6	0.8	0.0	1027
Labor	0.7	78.8	5.7	9.3	5.6	1476
Employers	0.2	96.5	3.1	0.2	0.0	1842
Unemployed	1.2	23.2	3.7	56.1	15.8	82
Welfare associations	1.6	64.8	10.2	15.6	7.8	128
Other civil society organizations	0.1	88.8	4.0	5.2	0.1	882
Total	6.7	84.2	4.3	3.4	1.4	8944

**Table 2: Forms of claim making by issue of claims (%)**

	Socioeconomic issues	Welfare and social benefits	Individual insertion in labor market	Issue related to the unemployed constituency	others	Total N
Political decisions	52.5	23.8	21.3	0.8	1.5	596
Verbal statement	77.6	9.2	10.7	1.4	1.2	7539
Conventional protest	68.4	17.3	11.2	1.9	1.4	376
Demonstrative protest	68.0	13.1	3.3	13.7	1.9	306
Confrontational Protest	78.3	13.3	2.5	5.0	0.8	120
Violent protest	85.7	0.0	14.3	0.0	0.0	7
Total %	75.2	10.7	11.1	1.9	1.2	8944

**Table 3: Forms of claim making by scope of the target (%)**

	Supranational	National	Regional/local	Unknown	Total N
Political decisions	5.2	74.5	19.9	0.3	596
Verbal statement	8.1	75.3	14.7	1.9	7539
Conventional protest	3.5	76.3	19.2	1.1	376
Demonstrative protest	5.3	58.2	32.4	4.2	306
Confrontational Protest	3.4	45.8	50.8	0.0	120
Violent protest	0.0	42.9	57.1	0.0	7
Total %	7.5	74.3	16.3	1.9	8944

**Table 4: Forms of claim making by country (%)**

	UK	CH	France	Italy	Germany	Sweden	Total %
Political decision	5.2	10.6	11.9	12.0	2.1	9.4	6.7
Verbal statement	90.3	76.1	65.0	77.9	92.9	85.1	84.3
Conventional protest	2.0	7.5	8.6	2.2	2.6	3.1	4.2
Demonstrative protest	1.9	5.1	9.0	2.7	2.1	2.4	3.4
Confrontational Protest	0.3	0.7	5.4	4.9	0.3	0.0	1.3
Violent protest	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
Total N	750	2019	791	950	3851	583	8944



## **The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

### **Chapter 10: The political mobilization of the unemployed in comparative perspective<sup>46</sup>**

**Marco Giugni**

This chapter aims to explain the mobilization of the unemployed (the main constituency group in this field) following a revised political opportunity approach. Political opportunity theorists maintain that the levels and forms of mobilization by social movements are channeled by certain features of the political context such as the degree of openness or closer of the state, the prevailing strategies of the authorities, and the structure of political alignments. We argue that the mobilization of underprivileged groups such the unemployed is constrained by the political opportunity structures provided by the institutional context of the country in which they act. However, contrary to traditional opportunity theories, we suggest that their mobilization also depends on a set of opportunities specific to the political or issue field most directly addressed by their claims. We propose to look for these specific opportunities in the institutional approaches to unemployment. Following a neo-institutional framework, we further maintain that such opportunities stem largely from the ways in which a given political or issue field is collectively defined. Specifically, we aim to show how dominant conceptions of the welfare state channel the mobilization of the unemployed, as well as, more generally, the political claim-making by collective actors in this issue field. Thus, we propose a theoretical framework for explaining the claim-making by unemployed which stresses three main factors: (1) the general political opportunity structures, (2) the specific political opportunity structures, and (3) the discursive context of claim-making.

#### **1. The political opportunity approach**

We propose a theoretical framework explaining the claim-making by unemployed which follows a revised political opportunity approach. This theoretical framework, which is shown in figure 1, stresses three main factors: (1) the general political opportunity structures, (2) the specific political opportunity structures, and (3) the discursive context of claim-making.

Work on social movements and contentious politics has shown through a variety of empirical researchers (case studies and, more rarely, comparative analyses) the impact of political opportunity structures on political mobilization (e.g. Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi et al. 1995; McAdam et al. 2001; Tarrow 1998; see Kriesi 2004 and McAdam 1996 for reviews). Political opportunities are, in the apt formulation of one of its major proponents, “*consistent but not necessarily formal, permanent, or national signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them to use their internal resources to form social movements*” (Tarrow 1996: 54; emphasis in original). More

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<sup>46</sup> This chapter draws extensively from Chabanet and Giugni (2005).

specifically, they refer to all those aspects of the political system that affect the possibilities that challenging groups have to mobilize effectively. Recently, Koopmans (2004) has redefined them as “options for collective action, with chances and risks attached to them, which depend on factors outside the mobilizing group.”

First introduced by Eisinger (1973) to study the relationship between the degree of institutional access in American cities and the protests that hit the United States in the late 1960s, this concept was then elaborated by various authors and used to analyze the impact of the political context on social movements and other forms of contentious politics, to such an extent a become hegemonic in the existing literature.<sup>47</sup> Such signals to social or political actors, or options for collective action, stems from a number of features of the institutionalized political system.

In an attempt to summarize the various aspects of political opportunity structures McAdam (1996: 27) has identified four main dimensions which have been used by various authors to explain the emergence of social movements, their development over time, their levels of mobilization, their forms of action, or their outcomes: (1) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; (2) the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; (3) the presence or absence of elite allies; and (4) the state’s capacity and propensity for repression (McAdam 1996: 27).

The most comprehensive comparative analysis of the impact of political opportunity structures on the mobilization of social movements in Western Europe made so far remains to our knowledge that by Kriesi et al. (1995). These authors explain cross-national variations in the levels, forms, and outcomes of social movements (in particular, new social movements) in four countries (France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands) during the 1980s as depending on a different mix of facilitation, repression, success chances, and expectations of reform or threat with regard to policy relating to their claims. These “concrete opportunities,” in turn, are derivatives of the general structural setting for political mobilization, as defined by the degree of openness or closedness of the political institutions, by the degree of inclusiveness of the prevailing strategies of the authorities towards the challengers, and by the configuration of power in the governmental and parliamentary arenas.

To simplify a more complex picture, we can say that Kriesi et al. (1995) have shown that social movements display a high level of mobilization and above all a more moderate action repertoire in Switzerland, a country characterized by very open political opportunity structures, while they mobilize less and are more radical in France, where opportunities for mobilization are less favorable. Germany and the Netherlands are intermediate cases in this respect.

In the classical conceptualization, political opportunity structures are of a very general nature and imply a pattern of influence that concerns all kinds of challenging groups in a given political context. In other words, these “classical” political opportunity structures represent a general setting which is assumed to affect all movements in a similar fashion and to a similar extent, as if they could be defined irrespective of the characteristics of specific issue fields and collective actors.

Following a criticism previously made (Berclaz and Giugni 2005), we would like to suggest that this conceptualization of political opportunity structures, in spite of the advances that it has brought to the field, is limited in several respects. We would like to suggest that political institutions do not affect all social groups to the same extent. If we take for example the unemployed, they are probably affected more by the specific legislation pertaining to the welfare state than by the general

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<sup>47</sup> Recent developments pointing to the role of cultural framings, identity, and emotions (see Polletta and Jasper 2001 for a review) are restoring some balance in the social movement literature.

characteristics of the political institutions. Thus, the rights deriving from the social security system will probably have a greater impact on their mobilization, while they probably play no role whatsoever for other groups and movements. More generally, we would like to suggest that for movements formed by people with full (social and/or political) citizenship rights, the general political opportunity structure has a greater impact than for movements formed by what has been variously called “poor people” (Piven and Cloward 1979), the underclass (Katz 1993), or broadly speaking the marginalized and socially excluded. Political institutions are likely to be less important to them, and therefore we expect a weaker impact of the general political opportunity structure and a greater impact of more specific opportunity structures.

## **2. Welfare state and claim-making in the employment political field**

In a recent study on the relationship between political-institutional approaches to immigration and the political conflicts mobilized by collective actors in the public domain on these issues in five European countries, the authors show that prevailing conceptions of the nation and citizenship, as well as their institutionalization in political practices and policies, shape in significant ways the political claim-making in the field of immigration and ethnic relations (Koopmans et al. forthcoming; see also Giugni and Passy 2003, 2004; Koopmans and Statham 1999, 2000). In this perspective, such “configurations” or “models” of citizenship play a crucial role in defining and structuring the socially and politically contested field of immigration and ethnic relations. They form a political opportunity structure for the mobilization of collective actors in this field. These opportunities enlarge or constrain the margin of maneuver for the action of the collective actors that mobilize on issues pertaining to migration and channel their intervention in the public domain, including the migrants themselves.

The specific opportunities defined by the prevailing configurations of citizenship work on two levels. First of all, they work at the institutional level. Citizenship rights define a set of institutional opportunities defining the conditions that impinge upon the costs of different forms of mobilizations and their chances of success (Koopmans 1995; Tilly 1978). However, the mobilization of collective actors in a given political field does not depend solely on a more or less favorable institutional context. It stems also from certain cultural and discursive conditions. The recent literature on social movements has dealt with these aspects by looking at the role of collective action frames (see Benford and Snow 2000, Snow 2004 for a review). It studies the links between existing interpretations of objective facts and events, on the one hand, and participation into social movements, on the other; between the movements’ interpretive and discursive frames and mobilization. In other words, political mobilization also depends on the cognitive processes that underlie the evaluation of a given situation, of possible solutions situations, and motivations for action (Snow et al. 1986), as well as the creation of feeling of identity, injustice, and agency (Gamson 1995).

These framing processes can also be conceptualized in terms of opportunities, as producing a set of discursive opportunities that, in turn, determine which collective identities and substantive demands have a high likelihood to gain visibility in the mass media, to resonate with the claims of other collective actors, and to achieve legitimacy in the public discourse (Koopmans et al. forthcoming). This is the second level on which the specific political opportunity structures work. Here however, we consider this aspect as a separate factor characterizing the discursive context in which claim-making takes place.

A similar reasoning can be applied to the issue field of unemployment. In other words, if the idea that the actors, interests, and collective identities involved in the migration political field depend on opportunity structures that are specific to this field is correct, we may expect other political fields to

be influenced as well by certain characteristics of the institutional and discursive of the field at hand. We draw from these works and look at the relationship between conceptions of the welfare state and the structuring of public debates in the field of unemployment. We argue that the prevailing view of the welfare state specific to a given country impinge in significant ways upon the “contentious politics of unemployment”, that is, the public debates and collective mobilizations pertaining to unemployment. In this neo-institutionalist perspective, dominant conceptions of the welfare state define a political opportunity structure that enlarge or constrain the options for action by collective actors that intervene in this field. In other words, our main argument is that the modalities of the intervention of collective actors in the field of unemployment, including the mobilization of the unemployed, depend on a mix of specific opportunities that, in turn, are influenced by the prevailing “welfare state regime.”

Comparative works on welfare states offers us several typologies to show the differences in the underlying logics of unemployment-insurance and social-aid regimes. Among the most well-known typologies is that proposed by Esping-Andersen (1990) to distinguish between three “welfare state regimes”: the liberal or residual regime, the bismarckian or insurance-based regime, and the universalist or social-democratic regime. Similar distinctions have been proposed by other authors. For example, based on three factor relating to the welfare state which they consider have an impact on the experience of unemployment (the degree of coverage, the level of financial compensation, and the importance of active measures for employment), Gallie and Paugam (2000) distinguish between four “unemployment-providence regimes:” the sub-protecting regime, which provides the unemployed with a protection below the substance level; the liberal/minimal regime, which offers a higher level of protection, but does not cover all the unemployed and in which the level of compensation is weak; the employment-centered regime, which offers a much higher level of protection, but in which the coverage remains incomplete because of the eligibility principles for compensation; and the universalist regime, which is characterized by the breath of the coverage, a much higher compensation level, and more developed active measures.

Gallie and Paugam’s typology bears directly on the employment political field, as it is based on indicators of policies aimed at fighting unemployment. However, it is aimed at inquiring into the effects of the degree and modalities of state protection on the individual experience of unemployment. What we need for our present purpose is typology linking the forms of the institutional approaches to unemployment to the political claim-making by collective actors in this field.

We have started to elaborate a typology of conceptions of the welfare state resulting from the combination of two analytical dimensions (Berclaz et al. 2005): the formal criteria of eligibility to social rights (in particular, the rights concerning the loss or lack of remunerated work) and the obligations relating to eligibility (in particular, the obligations for the recipients of the rights concerning unemployment). The first dimension refers to the criteria that define the conditions of access to social provisions for job-seekers as well as the quantity and “quality” of such rights. The second dimension refers to the obligations attached to the condition of unemployed. On both dimensions, policies can be more restrictive (exclusive) or permissible (inclusive).

The combination of these two dimensions results on a four-fold typology of conception of the welfare state which can be considered as different political opportunity structures for the mobilization of the unemployed (and, more, generally, for claim-making in the field of employment politics). We have called the first type minimalism, as it combines restrictive eligibility criteria and heavy obligations attached to the benefit of social provisions. This situation resembles the Esping-Andersen’s (1990) residual model, in which social benefits are for the most deprived and there is only a minimal level of distributive resources. Corporatism is the second type. Here we find



restrictive eligibility criteria, but less constraints as to the obligations required to benefit from social provisions. The third type is called universalism. Here permissive eligibility criteria are coupled with light obligations for eligibility, in the attempt to enlarge the access and coverage to the largest number of people, imposing at the same time a weak level of obligations. Surveillance is the fourth and final type. This situation is characterized by permissive eligibility criteria, but at the same time heavy obligations for the unemployed in order for them to have right to social provisions.

In our perspective, the dominant conceptions of the welfare state define a political opportunity structure for the claim-making of collective actors in this field, including the mobilization of the unemployed. Again, such opportunities are both institutional and discursive. For example, changes in the law that regulate the unemployment insurance may have an impact on the situation of the unemployed and provide them with new options or motivations to organize and mobilize politically. But above all, cultural notions of social providence and dominant conceptions of the welfare state determine which demands concerning unemployment and the unemployed are considered as reasonable or acceptable, which constructions of the reality of unemployment are considered as realistic, and which claims and collective actors involved in this field are considered as legitimate within the political system. The question is all the more important when we look at deprived groups, such as the unemployed, as they have difficulties to redefine the cultural frames within which the unemployment issue has been socially and politically construed. Such a redefinition is important in order to gain access to the public domain and have their own demands acknowledged as legitimate. As we said earlier, this aspect is treated separately as the discursive context in which claim-making takes place.

### 3. Operationalization

General opportunity structure will be operationalized indirectly, using the typology of the general structural settings for political mobilization proposed by Kriesi et al. (1995: 37). Based on a systematic analysis of the formal institutional structures (strength of the state) and the dominant strategy of authorities towards challengers, they characterized the six countries considered in our study as follows: Britain is a case of informal inclusion, characterized by a strong state (hence a closed opportunity structure on the formal side) and inclusive dominant strategy (hence an open opportunity structure on the informal side);<sup>48</sup> France best represents the situation of selective exclusion (strong state and exclusive dominant strategy); Germany is an intermediate case insofar as it presents an intermediate degree of formal openness together with an exclusive dominant strategy; Italy is a case of formal inclusion (weak state and exclusive dominant strategy); Sweden (the Scandinavian countries in general) is another case of informal inclusion (strong state and inclusive dominant strategy); finally, Switzerland is the best example of integration (weak state and inclusive dominant strategy). The hypotheses derived from these differences in the general structural settings for political mobilizations are discussed below.

Unfortunately, we do not have at our disposal primary data to operationalize the specific political opportunity structure for the employment political field. This is something that we started to do but could not achieve in the project. One of the present authors have proposed a battery of indicators aimed at operationalizing the conceptions of welfare state which may form a specific opportunity structures in the employment political field (Berclaz et al. 2005). The proposed indicators bear on rights and obligations concerning unemployment, and focus above all on legislation and institutions aimed at compensating people who have lost their job. The general goal is to be able, on an empirical basis, to place countries on the two dimensions of the typology and show the relative differences in terms of views and practices of social security. On the first dimension (the formal

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<sup>48</sup> Britain was not part of their study, but the authors they included it in their typology for illustrative purposes.

criteria of eligibility to social provisions) we distinguished between five main aspects: (1) the formal prerequisites for obtaining social provisions, (2) the level of coverage, (3) the extension of coverage, (4) the existence of differentiations among recipients, and (5) the existence of institutional structures favoring the insertion of job-seekers into the labor market. On the second dimension (the obligations relating to the eligibility to social provisions) we distinguished between three main aspects: (1) the general conditions for obtaining social provisions, (2) the existence of counter-provisions asked to the recipients, and (3) the existence of sanctions in case of failed respect of the conditions on the part of the recipients.

In the absence of primary data, for the time being we must resort to existing characterizations of welfare states, such as the Esping-Andersen's (1990) or Gallie and Paugam's (2000) typologies. Our six countries differentiate according to Esping-Andersen's typology. Specifically, Britain belongs to the liberal or residual model; France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland are all examples of the bismarckian or insurance-based model; and Sweden represents the universalist or social-democratic model. Similarly, our countries can only in part be separated on the basis of Gallie and Paugam's criteria. Specifically, Britain is a liberal/minimal regime (as in Esping-Andersen's typology); France and Germany fall into the category of the employment-centered regime; Italy is a sub-protecting regime; and Sweden is a universalist regime (again, as in Esping-Andersen's typology). Switzerland is not considered in their study. Finally, following the typology presented earlier based on the combination of the formal criteria of eligibility to social rights and the obligations relating to eligibility (Berclaz et al. 2005), we can think of Britain as being characterized by a minimalist conception of the welfare state (restrictive eligibility criteria and strong constraints in terms of obligations required to benefit from social provisions); France, Italy and Germany as following a corporatist conception (restrictive eligibility criteria and relatively little constraints in terms of obligations required to benefit from social provisions); Sweden as a case of universalism (loose eligibility criteria and little constraints in terms of obligations required to benefit from social provisions); and Switzerland also as an example of a corporatist conception, but probably closer to a minimalist conception.

To operationalize discursive contexts in both the immigration and employment political fields we can use the data retrieved in the project. We have a raw but nevertheless useful measure of the policy position of claims with regard to the constituency groups which is the ultimate object of claims: unemployed. In other words, what we have here is a general indicator of the discursive position of actors in this political field. This indicator was computed as follows: all claims that imply an improvement of the rights and position of the constituency group or an enlargement of its benefits and opportunities have received code 1; claims that imply a decrease of the duties of the constituency group have also received code 1; all claims that imply a deterioration of the rights and position of the constituency group or a restriction of their benefits and opportunities have received code -1; claims that imply an increase of the duties of the constituency group have also received code -1; all neutral, ambivalent, or technocratic claims have received code 0.<sup>49</sup>

The constituency group in the field of employment politics is usually represented by the unemployed. However, here we also considered labor as a potential object insofar as claims dealing with labor bear on the issue of unemployment. Thus, the indicator has the following meaning: code -1 refers to claims whose realization implies a deterioration in the rights or position of unemployed (or workers with regard to unemployment) and claims that express, verbally or physically, a negative attitude with regard to unemployed (or workers with regard to unemployment); code +1 refers to claims whose realization implies an improvement in the rights and position of unemployed (or workers with regard to unemployment) and claims expressing, verbally or physically, a positive

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<sup>49</sup> Both verbal and non-verbal claims were taken into account to determine their position. Claims that could not be classified according to this aspect have received code 9.

attitude with regard to unemployed (or workers with regard to unemployment); code 0 refers to neutral, ambivalent, or technocratic claims.

Table 1 shows the average discursive positions in employment politics in the six countries, separately for each of the two main dimensions relating to the debates on unemployment (economic and social) and for the entire political field.<sup>50</sup> In addition, we distinguish between positions bearing on all objects (upper part of the table) and positions bearing on unemployed only (lower part of the table). Again, the ranking of countries changes depending to the issue field (economic dimension or social dimension). Furthermore, discursive positions also vary according to whether we look at all objects or at unemployed only as the constituency group of claims. Here, however, we are more interested in the discursive positions concerning the unemployed. In this regard, in fact, cross-issues differences are minimal. Most importantly, we see that, for the entire political field, Italy clearly presents the most favorable discursive context, followed by France. Britain and Switzerland are in an intermediate position. Finally, Germany and Sweden are characterized by the most hostile context.

#### 4. Hypotheses

Based on the comparative assessment of the general political opportunity structures, specific political opportunity structures, and discursive contexts made above, we can now make predictions about the mobilization of unemployed. Hypotheses can be formulated concerning different aspects of their mobilization: the levels of mobilization, the forms of action, and the content of claims. For example, Berclaz et al. (2005) suggest that a minimalist conception of the welfare state favors claims dealing with the access to social provisions, whereas claims made within an universalist conception should focus on the situation of the unemployed. Here, however, we focus on the most basic aspects, namely the level of mobilization or extent of claim-making. In other words, what we are trying to explain is the presence of unemployed in the public domain, and how such a presence vary across countries.

Table 2 summarizes the predictions about the extent of claim-making by unemployed in the four countries. We make predictions separately for each of the three explanatory factors and then an overall assessment combining the three factors following a cumulative logic. First, concerning the general political opportunity structures, according to the typology of Kriesi et al. (1995), the most favorable opportunities for social movement mobilization among our six countries are to be found in Switzerland. France, in contrast, offers a much close opportunity structure which should limit unemployed mobilization. Britain and Sweden also offer rather closed opportunity structures, although to a lesser extent than France. Germany and Italy can be considered as intermediate cases in this respect. Second, concerning the specific opportunities, based on existing typologies of the welfare state, we can expect a low level of mobilization Britain (residual model of the welfare state), an intermediate level in France, Germany, Italy, and Switzerland (insurance-based model), and a high level in Sweden (universalist model). However, we predict a lower level of mobilization in Italy, on the basis of its characterization as a sub-protecting regime, and in Switzerland, as a first cursory comparison of the French and Swiss welfare systems suggests that Switzerland is more restrictive in this respect. Third, based on the average discursive positions shown earlier (see table 1), we hypothesize for the discursive context a the highest level of mobilization in Italy in France and the lowest in Both Germany and Sweden. We also expect a relatively high level of mobilization in France. Britain and Switzerland should stand in between at an intermediate level. Finally, the

<sup>50</sup> The economic dimension include all claims addressing socio-economic issues relating to the situation of the labor market. The social dimension refers to claims addressing welfare systems and social benefits, individual re-insertion in the labor market, and issues relating to the constituency of unemployed. For practical reasons, we also included in the social dimensions claims addressing other issue (including claims by unemployed on issues other than unemployment).

combination of the three explanatory factors yield (cumulating the hypotheses for each factor) the following overall predictions about the mobilization of unemployed in the six countries: a low level of mobilization in Britain, an intermediate level in France, an intermediate-low level in Germany, an intermediate level in Italy, and intermediate-low level in Sweden, and an intermediate level in Switzerland.

## 5. Findings

Table 3 shows the share of unemployed actors claim-making in employment politics. We make a distinction between issue fields. Specifically, the table shows the mobilization of unemployed addressing socio-economic issues relating to the situation of the labor market, welfare systems and social benefits, individual (re-)insertion into the labor market, and a residual category of other issues (which includes protest activities by unemployed that do not pertain to the employment political field). The last row concerns the entire political field.

The most important result for our present purpose concerns the entire field. In this regard, the most striking result is perhaps the low level of mobilization observed in all four countries. The unemployed are clearly not very much present in the public domain. This is due to a variety of reasons, including their lack of organization, and shows that the unemployed face many obstacles to mobilize politically (Faniel 2003). Yet cross-national variations can indeed be observed, and this is what interests us the most here. We expected the share of unemployed claims to be lowest in Britain and more or less the same in the other five countries, perhaps with a higher level in Italy and a lower level in Germany and Sweden (see table 2). Our predictions are confirmed only in part. As expected, the share of claims is lowest in Britain, which presents the most unfavorable opportunity structures and also a relatively unfavorable discursive context. Italy also displays, as expected, a relatively high level of mobilization. However, France displays a higher presence of the unemployed than expected, as compared to the other countries for which we predicted a level of mobilization situated around an intermediate level. Furthermore, contrary to our predictions, unemployed mobilization in Italy and Sweden is more or less the same. Finally, the level of mobilization is higher in Germany than in Switzerland.

The gap between our hypotheses and the empirical findings can be explained in three ways. First, cross-national variations might simply be biased by the very small samples, as we are dealing with a few claims made by unemployed in all four countries. Second, on a theoretical level, our explanatory model might suffer from a specification problem. In other words, the variations observed might be explained by some other factors, most notably by the different situation of the labor market in the four countries, for example in terms of unemployment rates. We will deal with this aspect below. Third, in line with our main argument, the findings may not be confirming the hypotheses because one or more of the factors we included in our explanation. Specifically, we would like to suggest that, unlike other social movements, the mobilization of a minority group such as the unemployed is only to a limited extent influenced by the general political opportunity structures, while they are much more sensible to the specific political opportunity structures. This is a movement composed by marginalized people who often suffer from a lack of social and political integration. As a result, political institutions are less important to them and have a minor impact on their behavior, including their political behavior.

If we give another look at our predictions about the mobilization of unemployed without taking into account the general political opportunity structures (see table 2), we arrive at the following predictions: an intermediate-low level of mobilization in Britain, intermediate-high in France, intermediate-low in Germany, intermediate-high in Italy, intermediate in Sweden, and intermediate-low in Switzerland. More simply, we expect the unemployed to be more present in the public

domain in France, Italy, and to a lesser extent also in Sweden than in the other three countries. Now, this is exactly what our findings indicate (see table 3). To be sure, some of the differences remain unexplained, such as for example the higher level of mobilization in France than in Italy, but the main cross-national variations largely reflect the prediction based on the specific political opportunity structure and the discursive context. Thus, it seems that the political mobilization of a minority group such as the unemployed is more affected by specific opportunity structures and discursive contexts than by general opportunity structures as those stressed by political opportunity theorists.

### **6. Grievances or opportunities?**

Our explanation stresses the political opportunities for the mobilization of the unemployed, in addition to the discursive context in which claim-making takes place (which can also be conceptualized in terms of opportunities). However, there are alternative explanations which focus on other explanatory factors. We must therefore at least address some of the competing theories. A major competing perspective can be summarized with the term of grievance theories. They refer to collective behavior, relative deprivation, mass society, and similar theories which were popular until the 1970s in the social movement literature and stress the impact of grievances, social distress, individual frustration, and the like to explain collective action (e.g. Gurr 1970; Kornhauser 1959; Smelser 1962; Turner and Killian 1957). Briefly stated, grievance theories assume that the more intense the objective condition or problem, the stronger the grievances and hence the more radical or violent the collective response. Opportunity theories, in contrast, assume that violence increases to the extent that alternative opportunities are lacking which may be used to articulate collective interests.

Although grievance theories have lost much of their popularity among students of social movements and have largely been discarded in favor of resource mobilization or opportunity theories, at least in the field of immigration and ethnic relations they are still often used. Such explanatory factors as anomie, unemployment, status anxiety, and other indicators of “objective condition” or the existence of a “problem” are still thought as influencing the levels and forms of the mobilization of certain social groups. We must therefore address this kind of theories.

Table 4 provides us with a simple way to assess the explanatory power of grievance theories to explain the mobilization of the unemployed. It shows a broad indicators of objective condition for the two groups in the four countries of our study: the unemployment rate. This indicator allows us to determine whether higher levels of mobilization by unemployed depend on the greater presence of this group in society. We can see, for example, to what extent the stronger mobilization of unemployed in France results from the fact that unemployment is higher there.

It seems that there is some relation between the unemployment rate and the mobilization of unemployed. The country with the highest unemployment rate (France) is indeed the one in which we find the highest share of claim-making by unemployed and the country with the lowest unemployment rate (Switzerland) has a very low of mobilization of the unemployed. At the same time, however, unemployed mobilization is weaker in Britain than in Switzerland, in spite of the highest unemployment rate in the former country. Furthermore, Germany, on the one hand, and Italy and Sweden, on the other, have comparable unemployment rates, but they do not display similar levels of mobilization of the unemployed. Thus, while the objective condition or at least the presence of a potential for mobilization may well play a role, it seems that institutional and discursive factors must intervene in order for such a potential to transform into actual mobilization.

## 7. Conclusion

The unemployed is an underprivileged group that generally display lower levels of mobilization and political participation. This is partly due to the fact that they face a number of obstacles for their mobilization and, as a result, they have difficulties entering the public domain. However, the unemployed represent the core constituency of a political or issue field that is central to current debates and policy-making in Western Europe: employment policy. It is therefore important to examine the factors improving their mobilization to or, conversely, preventing them to do so.

Although the level of mobilization of organized unemployed (i.e. their presence in the public domain) are low in general, this vary considerably across countries. In other words, the obstacles to the mobilization of the unemployed are context-sensitive and vary from one country to the other. Our aim was precisely to account for such variations following a cross-national comparative approach. Specifically, we compared six European countries which vary in their institutional approaches to unemployment, which we proposed to see as a specific political opportunity structure for the mobilization of the unemployed. In addition, we also examined the impact of general political opportunity structures and of the discursive context faced by unemployed.

Apart from confirming the low participation of unemployed, our findings support only in part the argument that the mobilization of the unemployed depends on the cumulative impact of general political opportunity structures, specific political opportunity structures, and the discursive context. The less favorable context (Britain) is indeed the country where unemployed have mobilized the less, but the most favorable context (Italy), is not the country in which they have mobilized the most. The highest levels of mobilization can be seen in France, also a rather favorable context, but not the most favorable one. However, if we make abstraction of the general opportunity structures, the hypotheses are largely confirmed. In other words, our findings suggest that, for this particular, group or movement, the general institutional setting is much less important than for other movements, and that it is above all the specific opportunity structures resulting from the prevailing conception of the welfare state and the discursive context of claim-making that influence the political mobilization of the unemployed in important ways.

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**Table 1: Average discursive positions in unemployment politics by issue field (1995-2002)**

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy	Sweden	Switzerland
<b>Object: labor and unemployed</b>						
Economic dimension	0.16	0.57	0.30	0.78	0.41	0.29
Social dimension	0.50	0.63	0.30	0.62	0.30	0.47
Unemployment politics (all fields)	0.24	0.59	0.30	0.76	0.36	0.34
<b>Object: unemployed</b>						
Economic dimension	0.48	0.56	0.34	0.92	0.40	0.49
Social dimension	0.48	0.61	0.30	0.76	0.29	0.46
Unemployment politics (all fields)	0.48	0.59	0.33	0.90	0.34	0.48

NOTES: Results are expressed on a scale ranging from -1 to +1. Code -1 corresponds to claims that imply a deterioration of the rights and position of the constituency group or a restriction of their benefits and opportunities. Code 0 corresponds to neutral, ambivalent, and technocratic claims. Code +1 corresponds to claims that imply an improvement of the rights and position of the constituency group or an enlargement of its benefits and opportunities. The economic dimension includes socio-economic issues relating to the labor market. The social dimension includes all other issues. Claims by unemployed are excluded.

**Table 2: Predictions about the extent of claim-making by unemployed**

	Britain	France	Germany	Italy	Sweden	Switzerland
General political opportunity structures	low	low	intermediate	intermediate	low	high
Specific political opportunity structures	low	intermediate	intermediate	intermediate	high	low
Discursive context	intermediate	high	low	high	low	intermediate
Overall	low	intermediate	intermediate - low	intermediate -high	intermediate -low	intermediate

**Table 3: Share of unemployed actors in claim-making in employment politics by issue field (1995-2002)**


	Britain	France	Germany	Italy	Sweden	Switzerland
Socio-economic issues (labor market)	0.2	0.6	0.2	1.4	0.9	-
Welfare systems and social benefits	-	6.5	0.4	-	2.6	1.3
Individual (re-)insertion (labor market)	-	1.1	-	2.6	2.6	0.4
Other issues	-	15.4	21.0	5.9	3.7	2.3
Unemployment politics (all fields)	0.1	2.9	0.7	1.6	1.7	0.3
N	750	791	3851	950	584	2019

**Table 4: Indicator of objective condition (grievance) for unemployed**

	Unemployment rate (1995-2002)
Britain	4.0
France	6.2
Germany	5.0
Italy	5.4
Sweden	4.7
Switzerland	2.2

NOTES: Currently unemployed persons as a percentage of the total population aged 15 years and older. Data from the European System of Social Indicators ([http://www.geis.org/en/social\\_monitoring/social\\_indicators/Data/EUSI/](http://www.geis.org/en/social_monitoring/social_indicators/Data/EUSI/)).

**Figure 1: A theoretical framework for the analysis of the claim-making by unemployed**





## **The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**

Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labour Market

### **Chapter 11: Report on Interviews at level of the European Union**

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#### Table of contents

1. Employment and Social Policy in the European Union
2. Key policies and initiatives
3. Statistics on unemployment in the EU
4. Key EU actors in the unemployment field
  - 4.1 State actors
  - 4.2. Political parties
  - 4.3. Interest groups
  - 4.4. NGOs
  - 4.5. Unemployed groups
5. EU-level interviews
  - 5.1 Introduction
  - 5.2. Action forms
  - 5.3. Importance of media and public-related strategies
  - 5.4. Influential actors
  - 5.5. Inter-organizational networks
  - 5.6. Issue-specific involvement
  - 5.7. The role of the European Union
6. Appendix : List of interviewed actors
7. References

## 1. Employment and Social Policy in the European Union

The main objective of European Union (EU) employment and social policies is to promote a decent quality of life and standard of living for its member states. At present, the four key strands of employment and social policy in the European Union are:

- The European Employment Strategy
- Improving working conditions and standards
- Social Inclusion and social protection
- Equality of men and women

These objectives are achieved by supporting and coordinating national policies and by legislation, enacted in certain areas, jointly by the European Council and the European Parliament. The Union's involvement in social policy translates into setting minimum standards and rights on the basis of which member states can adopt rules and regulations. In this sense, social policy in the European Union continues to be the core responsibility of the member states. National welfare states remain the primary institutions of European social policy, but they do so in the context of a multi-tiered polity (Pierson and Leibfried, 1995 cited in Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 268). In consonance with this, a key aspect of the EU approach to employment and social policy has been the emphasis on local and regional actions plans, which acquired special prominence after 1993.

According to Nielsen and Szyszczak (1997), there are four phases in the development of a European Social Policy, namely, Neoliberalism (1957-1972); Social Action (1972-1980); Stagnation or Crisis (1980-1986); and Optimism (1986-1993). Neoliberalism was a phase characterised by economic boom in the EU, and policies during this time were market-oriented and non-interventionist and laid emphasis on economic and political issues, instead of the social. Also, the activities of the Community in this period were limited to coordination rather than harmonisation. The second phase, Social Action, saw a more active role of the Community in social policy as a result of two developments. One was the rising unemployment, fiscal and economic crises along with imbalances between member states that called for greater intervention by the Community. The other was the questioning of the political and economic role of the Treaty of Rome in the light of the political upheavals of the 1960s. The third phase, Stagnation, was characterised by few social policy legislations as a result of the ideological conflict between the European Community and the UK. The complex policy process, involving intergovernmental negotiations and the need for unanimous decisions within the European Council, brought policy making to a virtual halt. In the fourth phase, Optimism, French President Jaques Delours elevated the role of social policy by linking it with the realisation of the single internal market. The fifth phase, which is the current phase from 1993 onwards has seen a greater involvement of the EU institutions in social and employment policy.

## 2. Key policies and initiatives

A chronological narrative of the history of social and employment policy in the EU begins with the **Treaty of Rome 1957**, in the phase of neoliberalism. The Treaty, which established the European Economic Community and its four main institutions, laid emphasis on economic and political issues in the Community, while social issues came to be seen as hindering the creation of a common market. Only twelve of the 248 Articles of the Treaty (Articles 117-128) had a social policy dimension and dealt with issues like improving working conditions and standard of living for workers, close co-operation between member states on training,

employment, labour law and working conditions, social security, equal pay between men and women and the free movement of labour. The most important aspect of this Treaty with respect to social policy was that it established a European Social Fund (Article 123) which would ‘aim to render the employment of workers easier and to increase their geographical and occupational mobility within the Community, and to facilitate their adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems, in particular through vocational training and retraining.’ (HR-NET, 2003) The Fund was to be administered by the Commission and implemented by the Council.

This period was also a period of economic boom in Europe and member states introduced legal and welfare rights for workers. In 1961, the Council of Europe adopted the **European Social Charter**, which although not legally binding, set up a framework for social objectives concerning fundamental rights for workers and citizens. It was thought of as a social and economic counterpart to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. In addition to this, there were also a number of regulations adopted at the European level. These related to issues like social security benefits for migrant workers who went to work in another member state and a youth exchange scheme to create European awareness and provide training for young workers.

In the second phase, Social Action, the 1972 Paris Declaration of the Heads of State or Government was an important step for social policy in the EU. In 1974, the Council of Ministers announced a **Community Social Action Programme** which concentrated on achieving full and better employment, improving living and working conditions and the increased involvement of management and labour in the economic and social decisions of the Community and of workers. The programme was legitimated on political grounds in that it was proposed as a way of co-operation between member states, especially in terms of labour policy. While only a few concrete legislative measures emerged out of this programme, the 1970s witnessed the emergence of economic and social factors like the recession, widespread unemployment and technological competition from the US and Japan, which called for greater intervention in the social field.

As mentioned earlier, the 1980s, until 1986, were known as the period of stagnation or crisis as they did not witness many legislations in the social field, mainly due to the ideological conflict between the European Union and the UK government. The fact that legislations required unanimous decisions within the Council was one of the main reasons for a stall in European social policies during this period.

A significant step for the EU during this period, which also affected social policy, was the **Single European Act 1986**. In addition to setting the objective of a single European market without internal frontiers for the free movement of capital, goods and people, it expanded the EU’s scope in several areas and improved decision-making procedures. To this end, it slightly enhanced the role of the European Parliament and introduced qualified majority voting into the decision-making process as a precondition to achieving an internal market. Previously, the Council took decisions through unanimous voting.

The period of Optimism (1986-1993) witnessed a shift towards the idea that social policy is a key mechanism facilitating the achievement of the Community’s economic objectives. Thus in 1989, the Community Charter on the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, known as the **Social Charter**, was adopted by the Heads of State or Government at the Strasbourg Summit. Although it was not legally binding, the Charter established the major principles on which the European labour law model is based, and left decisions on implementation procedures to

individual member states. The Charter, signed by 11 member states not including the UK (who refused to sign it), covered the following areas:

- Freedom of movement
- Employment and remuneration
- Improvement of living and working conditions
- Social protection
- Freedom of association and collective bargaining
- Vocational training
- Equal treatment
- Information, consultation and participation for workers
- Protection of health and safety at the workplace
- Protection of children, adolescents, the elderly and the disabled.

While the Charter would be implemented by individual member states, the Commission presented its action programme to ensure that a foundation of minimum provisions common to all the member states was adopted.

The next significant step in EU social policy was **the Maastricht Treaty** or the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) signed at Maastricht in 1992. The TEU amended the Treaty of Rome and the Single European Act 1986 and introduced new power and policy areas, including strengthening the European Parliament. From the point of view of employment policy, the Treaty represents the legal basis for the Community's intervention in training, pre-training, temporary employment aids and other similar activities. The TEU renamed the European Economic Community the European Community with the main aim of moulding member states into a single community embracing every sector of the economy including free movement of goods and workers, freedom of establishment, competition policy, economic and monetary policy, agricultural policy and industrial policy. The Treaty states that by establishing a common market and an economic and monetary union, and by implementing common policies and activities, the European Community shall promote-

- a) Harmonious and balanced development of economic activities
- b) Sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the environment
- c) A high degree of convergence of economic performance
- d) A high level of employment and social protection
- e) The raising of the standard of living and quality of life
- f) Economic and social cohesion and solidarity among member states

As a consequence of the UK's refusal to sign the Social Chapter, it was attached to the treaty as an appended protocol. The Social Chapter allowed the signatories to agree to directives proposed by the Commission on the basis of qualified majority voting in the areas of: health and safety at work; working conditions; the right to information and consultation of workers; equality between men and women; and long-term unemployment. The Chapter also allowed the states to agree on directives on the basis of unanimous decision in relation to social security and the protection of the employed and workers made redundant; conditions of employment for third country nationals; representation and collective defence of workers' and employees' interests; and financial support for employment promotion and creation. While many of these issues had already been identified in the Treaty of Rome, it is the Social Chapter that gave the Commission the right to propose directives in these areas and empowered the Council to adopt them.

While the Maastricht Treaty was a step towards greater coordination of policies and the debate on a European solution to structural policies, it was the White and Green Papers in

1993 and 1994 that closely examined employment at the EU level. One of the main reasons for a renewed debate on employment in the early 1990s was a result of the realisation that the economic and social problems after the oil shocks of the 1980s were a result of policy mistakes at the EU level, including technological pessimism, jobless growth and the fear of globalisation.

The **Green Paper on Social Policy 1993** invited the Social Partners in the European Commission, the government departments, non-governmental and other civil society organisations, the European Parliament and others to participate in defining the social policy agenda for the Commission.

There were two White Papers during this period, both significant with regard to the European approach to employment policy. In the **White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment 1993**, the European Commission linked social policy issues with economic issues like the capacity of EU business to compete in the globalised economy. The Commission blamed the social security systems of member states for the problems regarding employment as many of these systems tended to protect those in paid employment at cost of those engaged in unpaid work. It proposed two policy actions – improving the employability of the labour force and increasing investment opportunities in job creation.

The **White Paper on Social Policy 1994** provided a comprehensive statement of social policy directions and goals. It aimed at establishing the fundamental social rights of citizens as a constitutional element of the European Union. This paper enabled the Commission to make a clear statement about the redefined role of social policy in EU integration in its social action programme of 1995-97. The Commission covered issues like labour law, health and safety, freedom of movement, equality between men and women, social protection and equal opportunities for all. It also focussed on cooperation between member states to create jobs by promoting a labour-intensive pattern of growth, encouraging active labour-market policies and improving access to the labour market, especially for the youth.

Following these papers, the European Council held in Essen in December 1994 drew attention to the urgent need for active labour market policies and identified priorities to stimulate job creation. These included investments in education training especially for young people, improving measures concerning those affected by unemployment and improving the efficiency of unemployment policies by replace passive policies with active ones.

The **Treaty of Amsterdam** was signed in October 1997, by all 15-member states of the EU, including the UK. The Treaty was a culmination of two years of discussion and negotiation between member state government representatives. It came into force in 1999 and is said to have marked a major turning point for European employment and social policy (European Union, 2003).

One of the most significant events surrounding this treaty was that the UK agreed to the Social Chapter which led to the inclusion of the Maastricht Social Policy Protocol and Agreement in the Treaty, thereby increasing the competence of the EU in the area of social policy. This made employment and social policy truly EU-wide. The Treaty also underlined the importance of the Social Partners i.e. trade unions and employers' organisations, in employment and social policy by making them joint decision-makers in the policy process. While the Treaty does not challenge the responsibility of individual member states in their



national employment policy, it entrusts the European institutions with much stronger roles, tasks and tools.

The aims of the Treaty have been described as ‘to create the political and institutional conditions to enable the European Union to meet the challenges of the future such as the rapid evolution of the international situation, the globalisation of the economy and its impact on jobs, the fight against terrorism, international crime and drug trafficking, ecological problems and threats to public health.’ (European Union, 2003)

As regards social and employment policy, the Treaty includes a new chapter on employment which encourages the development of common strategies for employment and the coordination of national policies. This treaty emphasises employment as an issue of common concern and defines a high level of employment as one of the common objectives of the EU. The chapter on employment, included under Title VI, defines the objective of the EU in this area as the development of a “coordinated strategy for employment and particularly for promoting a skilled, training and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change” (eironline, 2003). Another important provision of the Treaty is its emphasis on the need to combat discrimination and strive for equality between men and women. The Treaty also deals with the need for consistent and coherent cooperation between member states on the free movement of people.

The Treaty contains the principle of mainstreaming employment policy, which requires that all policies should provide equal opportunities. This has been referred to as an EU obligation in the Treaty. It also formally empowers the European Court of Justice to ensure the respect of fundamental rights and freedoms by European institutions.

The commitment of the Amsterdam Treaty to coordinate employment policies and to promote the creation of more and better jobs was translated into the European Employment Strategy (EES) by the European Council in the **Luxembourg Jobs Summit 1997**. The EES, also known as the Luxembourg process, is designed as a tool to give direction to and ensure the co-ordination of the employment policy priorities of the member states at the EU level. Member states have agreed on a framework for action to establish a set of common objectives and targets for employment policy. The Luxembourg Summit for Employment therefore provides an institutional framework to co-ordinate member countries’ efforts to develop a more active labour market policy and promote employment. This was the first time that a European Council meeting was dedicated to the issue of how to address the problem of persistent unemployment in the European Union. Below are some of the main decisions reached by the summit:

- Put into effect the employment provisions of the draft Amsterdam Treaty.
- A biannual meeting between Social Partners, the Council (past, present and future Council Presidencies) and the European Commission to review employment policy and the 1989 Social Charter.
- Set up high-level expert working groups to monitor industrial change.
- European Investment Bank funding to SMEs, new technology and trans-European networks.
- Strengthening economic policy coordination between member states.

The European Employment Strategy aims to increase the number of jobs, to improve job quality, to make it easier for people to balance the demands of work with their personal life and to ensure that everyone has an equal chance of employment. The EES has initiated a new

working method at the EU level, known as the ‘open method of co-ordination’. This method, based on five key principles, has been carried forward to the Lisbon Strategy in 2000. The five principles are: subsidiarity (an equilibrium between the role of the EU in setting objectives and member states’ responsibility in deciding action plans), convergence (achieving commonly agreed employment goals through concerted action), management by objectives (use of quantified measurements, targets and benchmarks, to allow for a proper monitoring and evaluation of progress), country surveillance (annual reporting to evaluate and compare progress by member states and identify best practice) and an integrated approach (extending Employment Guidelines beyond active labour market policies, to include social, educational, tax and regional policies).

This open method includes the coordination of national employment policies through:

National Action Plans: Member states have adopted the Employment Guidelines 1998 which require each member state to submit a National Action Plan (NAP) annually to the Commission, tailored to their specific requirements, yet within the general framework outlined by the Commission. The NAPs are to be structured around four “pillars”: improving employability; developing entrepreneurship; encouraging adaptability; and strengthening equal opportunities.

Improving employability relates to active labour market measures such as tackling youth unemployment and preventing long-term unemployment. Developing entrepreneurship entails making it easier to start up and run businesses, exploiting opportunities for job creation and making the tax system more conducive to employment. Adaptability includes modernising work organisation. Reducing gender gaps and promoting the integration of the disabled into working life are a part of strengthening equal opportunities.

Employment Guidelines: Member states also put into effect the special provisions contained in the draft Article 128 of the Amsterdam Treaty on a coordinated employment strategy between member states. As per the 1998 Employment Guidelines, the Summit recommended measures relating to active employment policy, offering a fresh start to people before they reach 6-12 months of unemployment, and opportunities for job creation, among other things. It also recognised that employment policy needs to work in coordination with other policies. The Commission and the Council would jointly examine each NAP and present a Joint Employment Report.

The Luxembourg process also allowed the Council to issue, by qualified majority, country-specific recommendations upon a proposal by the Commission. The European Council also examined ways of involving the Social Partners more closely in the future determination of a coordinated employment strategy.

Another aspect of the EES has been the strong support for local employment development by focussing on the development of a territorial dimension of employment policies. Employment Guidelines have asked member states to enhance the territorial dimension of their employment policies. An important aspect of EU policy that deserve a mention in this context are the **Territorial Employment Pacts** launched by the European Commission in 1997. The Commission selected 89 areas proposed by the Member States to be linked with the mainstream of the Structural Funds. These TEPs aimed at broadening the partnership between major actors at regional and local levels to encourage job creation. The pacts were structured around the objectives of mobilising regional actors in the fight against unemployment,

strengthening structural policies for employment and working on the principles of partnership, integration, innovation and bottom-up approach.

**The Lisbon Strategy**, set out in the Lisbon European Council of March 2000 aims to strengthen employment, economic reform and social cohesion in the EU. The Union aims ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion’ (Lisbon European Council, 2000). It is a ten-year strategy to make the EU the world's most dynamic and competitive economy. Under this strategy, a stronger economy will drive job creation alongside social and environmental policies that ensure sustainable development and social inclusion (European Union, 2003).

In order to overcome the weaknesses of the EU economy, namely, high levels of unemployment, low labour market participation rates (especially among women), underdeveloped services sector and skills gap in the technology sector, the Council decided that the strategy would be implemented by 'an open method of co-ordination at all levels'. This method takes forward the approach followed for the employment strategy since the Luxembourg Summit and reiterates the need for an interlinked economic, employment and social policy (European Union, 2003).

The conclusions of the Lisbon Council highlight the need for action in specific areas like: information society, the business environment, economic reform, education and training, employment (focus on more and better jobs), modernising social protection and promoting social inclusion. The strategy aims to promote a knowledge-based economy and society through research and development, completing the internal market, and better policies for an information society. The Lisbon conclusions lay strong emphasis on the modernisation of the European Social Model by investing in people and developing an active welfare state. For the first time ever, importance has been given to social inclusion and the need for EU activity in this area. The strategy is designed to enable the Union to regain the conditions for full employment and to strengthen regional cohesion in the EU. The Heads of State and Government believe that if the measures retained in the Lisbon conclusions are implemented, an average economic growth rate of around 3% should be a realistic prospect for the next decade. (European Union, 2003)

As regards employment policy, the Commission and the Council aim to look at four main areas: improving employability and reducing skills gap; giving higher priority to lifelong learning; increasing employment levels in service industries and furthering all aspects of equal opportunities. The Council has set two concrete goals, to be achieved by 2010. One is to increase the overall employment rate in the EU from an average of 61% to 70%; and the other is to increase the proportion of women in employment from an average of 51% to 60% (eironline, 2003).

In order to move towards a knowledge based economy, the Council and the Commission decided to prepare an ‘eEurope Action Plan’. They also decided to give special attention to small and medium enterprises, committing member states to focus on small companies and respond to their needs. The Lisbon Strategy also pays attention to the need for an improved level and quality of employment through plans like increasing human resources investment, developing schools and training centres and drawing up a definition of basic new skills, including IT skills, foreign languages, entrepreneurship and social skills (eironline, 2003).

The Lisbon Strategy also supports the idea that the EU in 2000 should adopt a new Social Policy Agenda. The **New Social Policy Agenda** is expected to articulate how full benefits can be taken from the dynamic interaction between economic, employment and social policy. Its major mission will be to initiate a virtuous circle by better linking action on employment, social protection, social inclusion, social dialogue, equal opportunities and anti-discrimination. The actions outlined in this Agenda include:

- creating more and better jobs
- anticipating and managing change and adapting to the new working environment
- modernising and improving social protection
- promoting social inclusion
- strengthening gender equality, combating discrimination
- encouraging mobility of workers
- exploiting the potential of a knowledge-based economy

It will also articulate how the European Social Fund will underpin policy, in particular in the employment strategy (Commission of the European Communities, 2000).

The European Council Meeting at Nice, known as the **Nice Summit**, held from 7-9 December 2000 achieved a consensus on the proposals for worker involvement in the proposed European Company Statute. This summit also saw the adoption of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights by the Council, Commission and Parliament. The charter defined the role and powers of the EU in this area. This made their rights more visible to EU citizens and included the right to life, respect for private and family life, protection of personal data, the right to education, freedom to conduct a business, equality between men and women, fair and just working conditions, the right of collective bargaining and action, access to EU documents and the rights of older people to a life of dignity.

Following the decision in the Lisbon Council for annual Spring Councils to discuss the way forward for the EU to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge based economy, the **Stockholm Council** was held in March 2001 and focussed on employment of older workers and setting intermediate targets for employment levels. The state representatives at the meeting decided to set intermediate employment targets, as a step towards achieving the goals set out in the Lisbon Council. The Stockholm Council proposed an overall employment rate of 67% and a female employment rate of 57% by January 2005. The Council also set a target of increasing the average employment rate among men and women aged 55-64 to 50% by 2010 in view of the fact that the increase in the number of retired people by 2010 would put immense pressure on the social welfare systems. The Council also stressed the need for general basic education, lifelong learning and IT training. Attention was also paid to the quality of jobs, equal opportunities, health and safety and employees' involvement and diversity in the working environment. The Council also stated that active labour market policies should aim to promote social inclusion and that member states should give priority to combating poverty and promoting social inclusion in their NAPs.

The next annual Spring Council was the **Barcelona Council** in 2002, to evaluate progress and identify priority areas for action. Attention was paid to areas like tax system including tax cuts and reducing the tax burden on low wage earners, removing disincentives for female labour force participation and incentives for early retirement and the relationship between wage developments and labour market conditions.

In understanding social and employment policy in the EU, the **European Social Fund (ESF)** plays an important role as it is the main financial tool through which the Union translates its

employment policy aims into actions. Set up by the Treaty of Rome 1957, the ESF has invested, in partnership with the member states, in programmes to develop people's skills and their potential for work. It is the main EU financial instrument underpinning the EES and provides around EUR 9 billion a year, managed in partnership with member states, for helping both young and older workers. The ESF contributes to the following:

- Active labour market policies;
- Equal opportunities for all and promoting social inclusion;
- Improving training and education and promoting lifelong learning;
- Adaptability and entrepreneurship;
- Improving the participation of women in the labour market (European Social Fund News, 2003)

The ESF provides funding for programmes for training and skills that aim at improving the employability of people. It also supports long-term programmes aimed at modernising workforce skills and encourage entrepreneurship in less developed regions so that they attract both domestic and foreign investments that help them develop further.

As can be inferred from the preceding pages, the main actors on employment and social policy in the EU are the European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament (with its Committee on Employment and Social Affairs) along with representatives of business and labour interests. Wallace and Wallace (2000: 45) describe the EU policy process as a pendulum that swings between the national and the EU authorities depending on the policy functions, the purposes and predicaments of political actors and interests and agendas of the EU institutions.

The European Commission has been the most important and central actor in defining a minimum set of uniform standards for member states to follow when drafting national legislations, and also as a step towards constructing a European Social Model (Wallace and Wallace, 2000: 270). It encourages cooperation among member states on matters pertaining to training, social security and health and safety at work. The Commission presents its recommendations to the Council on the basis of which guidelines are issued for states to take into account while formulating their policies. The Council, along with the Parliament, take decisions on spending money to fund pilot projects, promote the exchange of information and best practices and encourage innovative approaches (Pinder, 2001).

One of the main obstacles in the policy making process has been the need for a qualified majority for legislations to be approved. Another issue is that given the importance of social policy, national governments chose to hold on to it and as a result the welfare state still continues to be within the national domain. An appropriate example in this context is the role of the UK which did not sign the Social Charter until the Treaty of Amsterdam, thereby limiting the powers of the EU in field of social policy.

### 3. Statistics on unemployment in the EU

**Table 1. Unemployment rate (unit: per cent of civilian labour forces)**

	France	Italy	Germany	Switzerland	UK	Sweden
1990	8.6	8.9	4.8	-	6.9	1.7
1991	9.1	8.5	4.2	1.9	8.6	3.1
1992	10	8.7	6.4	2.9	9.7	5.6
1993	11.3	10.1	7.7	3.8	9.9	9.1
1994	11.8	11	8.2	3.7	9.2	9.4
1995	11.4	11.5	8	3.3	8.5	8.8
1996	11.9	11.5	8.7	3.8	8	9.6
1997	11.8	11.6	9.7	4	6.9	9.9
1998	11.4	11.7	9.1	3.4	6.2	8.3
1999	10.7	11.3	8.4	2.9	5.9	7.1
2000	9.3	10.4	7.7	2.5	5.4	5.8
2001	8.5	9.4	7.7	-	5	4.9

**Table 2. Unemployment rate, over 25 years (unit: per cent of civilian labour forces)**

	France	Italy	Germany	Switzerland	UK	Sweden
1990	19.2	26.9	-	-	10.5	4.4
1991	20.9	25.5	-	3.3	13.8	7.6
1992	23	26.7	6.2	5	16.1	13.2
1993	27.1	30.1	7.7	6.6	17.4	22
1994	28.7	32	8.4	6.3	16.3	22
1995	27.1	33.3	8.4	5.7	15.3	19.1
1996	28.3	33.6	9.6	5.3	15	20.6
1997	28.4	33.5	10.4	6.2	13.7	20.6
1998	25.7	33.5	9.4	6.1	13.1	16.5
1999	23.3	32.3	8.8	5.9	12.8	13.6
2000	19.7	30.7	8.5	5.1	12.3	11.2
2001	19	28.1	8.2	-	11.9	11.1

**Table 3. Unemployment rate, under 25 years (unit: per cent of civilian labour forces)**

	France	Italy	Germany	Switzerland	UK	Sweden
1990	7	5.4	-	-	6	1.2
1991	7.4	5.2	-	1.7	7.3	2.3
1992	8.2	5.4	6.5	2.6	8.2	4.4
1993	9.3	6.6	7.7	3.4	8.3	7.2
1994	9.8	7.6	8.2	3.4	7.7	7.6
1995	9.6	8.1	7.9	3.1	7.2	7.4
1996	10	8.3	8.6	3.6	6.6	8.2
1997	10.1	8.5	9.6	3.9	5.6	8.6
1998	9.9	8.8	9.1	3.1	4.9	7.4
1999	9.4	8.6	8.4	2.6	4.7	6.4
2000	8.1	7.9	7.7	2.2	4.2	5.1
2001	7.3	7.4	7.7	-	3.8	4.1

**Table 4. Unemployment rate, females (unit: per cent of civilian labour forces)**

	France	Italy	Germany	Switzerland	UK	Sweden
1990	11.3	13.5	-	-	6.4	1.7
1991	11.6	12.9	-	2.6	7.2	2.8
1992	12.4	13	8.2	3.6	7.4	4.4
1993	13.2	14.5	9.4	4.6	7.6	7.3
1994	13.8	15.4	9.8	4.3	7.1	7.8
1995	13.6	16.1	9.4	3.9	6.8	7.9
1996	13.9	15.9	9.5	4	6.3	9
1997	13.7	16.1	10.4	4	5.8	9.5
1998	13.4	16.1	9.7	3.9	5.3	8.1
1999	12.6	15.5	8.9	3.4	5.2	7
2000	11.2	14.3	8.1	3.1	4.8	5.5
2001	10.3	12.9	7.8	-	4.4	4.6

**Table 5. Unemployment rate, males (unit: per cent of civilian labour forces)**

	France	Italy	Germany	Switzerland	UK	Sweden
1990	6.6	6.3	-	-	7.2	1.7
1991	7.1	6	-	1.4	9.6	3.4
1992	8.1	6.3	5.1	2.4	11.4	6.6
1993	9.7	7.5	6.5	3.3	11.7	10.7
1994	10.2	8.5	7.1	3.2	10.8	10.8
1995	9.6	8.8	7	2.9	9.9	9.7
1996	10.2	8.9	8.1	3.5	9.3	10.1
1997	10.2	8.9	9.1	4.1	7.7	10.2
1998	9.7	9	8.6	3	6.9	8.6
1999	9.1	8.6	8.1	2.5	6.5	7.2
2000	7.6	8	7.5	2	5.9	6
2001	7	7.3	7.7	-	5.5	5.2

## 4. Key EU Actors in the Unemployment Field

### 4.1 State Actors

#### 1. Committee on Employment and Social Affairs – European Parliament

The Committee on Employment and Social Affairs is responsible for matters relating to employment and social policy including protection of living and working conditions, including wages and pensions policy; social security and welfare protection; social exclusion and social cohesion etc, and for bodies like the European Centre for the Development of Vocational Training (Cedefop), the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, the European Training Foundation and the European Agency for Health and Safety at Work. The committee also deals with all forms of discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation related to fundamental social rights and to the labour market.

#### 2. European Commission - Directorate General for Employment and Social Affairs

The European Commission plays a key role in promoting positive interaction between economic, social and employment policies to achieve the EU strategic objective of making Europe the world's most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy. It does this by working in the areas of:

- Employment (European Employment Strategy, European Social Fund);
- Structures in the world of work (approximating national legislation regulating the labour market, developing social dialogue at European level, modernising labour relations),
- Social exclusion and social protection (co-operation between Member States, legislation and running programmes to counter discrimination, promoting fundamental rights);
- Equality between men and women (producing and overseeing legislation, programmes to improve equality)



### **3. European Council**

The European Council brings together the Heads of State or Government of the fifteen Member States of the European Union and the President of the European Commission. Although the European Council is not legally an institution of the European Community it nevertheless plays a vital role in all European Union fields of activity whether it be by giving impetus to the Union or defining general political guidelines, or by coordinating, arbitrating or disentangling difficult questions. The Council is the Community's legislative body and for a wide range of Community issues, it exercises that legislative power in co-decision with the European Parliament. It also coordinates the general economic policies of the member states.

### **4. Committee of the Regions**

The Committee of the Regions was created by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, as a representative assembly with the job of giving local and regional authorities a voice at the heart of the European Union. The Treaties oblige the Commission and Council to consult the Committee of the Regions whenever new proposals are made in areas which have repercussions at a regional or local level. The areas are: economic and social cohesion, trans-European infrastructure networks, health, education and culture, employment policy, social policy, the environment, vocational training and transport.

### **5. European Economic and Social Committee**

The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) is a non-political body that gives representatives of Europe's socio-occupational interest groups, and others, a formal platform to express their points of views on EU issues. Its opinions are forwarded to the larger institutions - the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. It thus has a key role to play in the Union's decision-making process. The 222 members of the EESC are drawn from economic and social interest groups in Europe. Members are nominated by national governments and appointed by the Council of the European Union and belong to one of three groups: employers, employees, and various interest groups.

### **6. European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions**

The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions carries out research and development projects to provide data and analysis for informing and supporting the formulation of EU policy on working and living conditions. The Foundation has a network of experts throughout Europe who conduct research on its behalf including assessing the current national situations, the preparation of case studies and national reports and the conducting of surveys. The Foundation is a European Agency, one of the first to be established to work in specialised areas of EU policy. It was set up by the European Council.

#### **4.2 *Political Parties***

### **7. European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party**

The European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party is the liberal and centrist party of the European Union, based on the principles of liberalism. The European Liberal Democrats believe in a Europe based on the fundamental liberal principles of freedom, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, tolerance and solidarity. Their policy work focuses on areas like environment, enlargement, human rights, the future of Europe debate, the Iraq crisis etc.

### **8. The Party of European Socialists**

The Party of European Socialists (PES) is the social-democratic and socialist part of the EU and brings together the Socialist, Social Democratic and Labour Parties of the European Union (EU). It currently has 180 seats in the European Parliament, the second highest after the European Peoples' Party. Its aims include strengthening of the socialist and social democratic movement in the Union and throughout Europe; the development of close working relationships between the national member parties, their parliamentary groups, the Parliamentary Group of the PES and the Party; the definition of common policies for the European Union; and the adoption of a common manifesto for elections to the European Parliament.

### **9. European Peoples' Party**

The christian-democratic and conservative party of the EU, the European Peoples' party currently has 233 seats, the highest number, in the European Parliament. It unites like-minded national parties, in EU Member States and in EU applicant countries.

## **4.3 Interest Groups**

### **10. European Trade Union Confederation**

The European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) was established in 1973 to provide a trade union counterbalance to the economic forces of European integration. At present, it has in its membership 77 National Trade Union Confederations from a total of 35 European countries, as well as 11 European industry federations, making a total of 60 million members. The ETUC seeks to influence European legislation and policies by making direct representations to the various institutions and by ensuring trade union participation with the European authorities, involving its partners in areas such as employment, social affairs and macro-economic policy. The ETUC is also coordinating trade union participation in a number of advisory bodies, including the Economic and Social Committee and the EU agencies for vocational training, living and working conditions, health and safety.

### **11. Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe**

The *Union des Industries des pays de la Communauté européenne* was begun in 1949 by the national industrial federations from the six member states of the European Coal & Steel Community. This body then became the *Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne (UNICE)* in March 1958, to track the political consequences of the community created by the Treaty of Rome. The original aims included uniting the central industrial federations to foster solidarity between them; encouraging a Europe-wide competitive industrial policy; and acting as a spokesperson body to the European institutions. It currently focuses its actions in four major areas: encouraging entrepreneurship; creating space for business; improving labour

market flexibility; and promoting a balanced sustainable development policy. It has 35 members and 4 observers.

## **12. European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP)**

CEEP, whose origins date back to 1961, is an international association consisting of enterprises and organisations with public participation or carrying out activities of general interest, whatever their legal or ownership statute. CEEP is a body responsible for analysis, information, negotiation, intervention and support, whose importance has grown with the economic and monetary developments expected as a result of the enlargement of the European Union. CEEP's main objective as a European Social Partner is to study and represent enterprises and other employers with public participation and of general economic interest vi-à-vis the European institutions. Its mission is both to defend them against proposals or decisions that would undermine them, and to promote them by taking initiatives or tabling innovative proposals.

## **13. EURES – The European Job Mobility Portal**

EURES is a cooperation network designed to facilitate the free movement of workers within the European Economic Area; Switzerland is also involved. Partners in the network include public employment services, trade union and employers' organisations. The network is coordinated by the European Commission. The main objectives of EURES are:

- to inform, guide and provide advice to potentially mobile workers on job opportunities as well as living and working conditions in the European Economic Area;
- to assist employers wishing to recruit workers from other countries; and
- to provide advice and guidance to workers and employers in cross-border regions.

### **4.4 NGOs**

## **14. European Policy Centre**

EPC is an independent, not-for-profit, think-tank, committed to making European integration work. The EPC aims to provide its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality information and analysis on the EU policy agenda. The EPC aims to promote a balanced dialogue between the different constituencies of its membership, spanning all aspects of economic and social life. EPC offers an array of dialogues, policy briefings, conferences and seminars for its members and the wider public.

## **15. European Anti-Poverty Network**

EAPN is an independent coalition of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and groups involved in the fight against poverty and social exclusion in the Member States of the European Union. It's main objectives are:

- to put the fight against poverty and social exclusion on the political agenda of the European Union;
- to promote and enhance the effectiveness of actions against poverty and social exclusion;
- and
- to lobby for and with people and groups facing poverty and social exclusion.

It is a network of 15 national networks of voluntary organisations and grassroots groups active in the fight against poverty within each member state of the EU as well as 26 European

organisations whose main activities are related to the fight against poverty and social exclusion.

### **16. Social Platform – The Platform of European Social NGOs**

Established in 1995, The Platform of European Social NGOs is an association of nearly 40 European non-governmental organisations, federations and networks that are working together to build an inclusive society and promote the social dimension of the European Union. The Social Platform channels the concerns of its members on issues of common interest and represents them to the EU institutions. It seeks to develop and strengthen a civil dialogue between European Social NGOs and the institutions of the European Union and ensures a wide circulation of information on EU activities and policies to its members at the national level.

### **17. International Council on Social Welfare**

The International Council on Social Welfare (ICSW), founded in Paris in 1928, is a non-governmental organisation which now represents national and local organisations in more than 50 countries throughout the world. It's member organisations collectively represent tens of thousands of community organisations which work directly at the grass-roots with people in poverty, hardship or distress. These organisations provide help for a wide range of people who are poor, ill, disabled, unemployed, frail or oppressed. ICSW gathers and distributes information to community groups, other civil society organisations, governments and intergovernmental organisations and ICSW undertakes research and organises consultations to help analyse problems and develop policies.

### **18. European Citizen Action Service**

ECAS was created in 1990 as an international non-profit organization, independent of political parties, commercial interests and the EU Institutions. ECAS focuses on three key activities: NGO guides to EU funding, policies and enlargement and it's mission is to enable NGOs and individuals to make their voice heard with the EU. ECAS' members cover different areas of activity in the EU and applicant countries: civil liberties, culture, development, health and social welfare. It's main aims are: to strengthen the European Strategy of NGOs in member states and applicant countries of the EU; to defend free movement rights and promote a more inclusive European citizenship; and to campaign for transparency and reform of the EU Institutions

### **19. European Small Business Alliance**

The European Small Business Alliance is a major independent free membership based organisation representing small business entrepreneurs and self-employed in Europe. Founded in 1998, it aims to unite all independent small business organisations in Europe in order influence EU officials and Member States authorities to create the right business environment for small businesses and entrepreneurship to flourish. Among its many objectives, it aims to work with European Institutions and other appropriate bodies to create a more harmonious environment for small and medium enterprises that will generate sustainable growth, greater employment opportunities and economic freedom for people.

## 4.5 *Unemployed Groups*

### 20. European Network of the Unemployed

ENU, founded initially in 1982 as the First Western European network of the Unemployed was officially launched as the European network of the Unemployed in Glasgow in 1987. ENU presently comprises national organisations or networks from following European countries: Ireland, Britain, Germany, France, Austria, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Sweden, Finland, Netherlands and Hungary. ENU also maintains contact with unemployed organisations in Denmark, Switzerland, Russia, Poland and the Czech Republic. ENU's main task is to reduce unemployment. It therefore tries to place the issue of unemployment and the relevant employment policies on the European agenda. During the years ENU has been active in organising and supporting public protests by unemployed people and their allies, especially together with European Marches against rising unemployment, poverty and insecure employment. ENU has continued to seek commitments to full employment at the European level and is active in monitoring the National Employment Action Plans emerging from the European Employment Strategy.

## 5. EU-level interviews

### 5.1 *Introduction*

This workpackage addresses the public campaigning and process of policy deliberation at the European supranational and trans-national level through interviews with key policy and civil society actors in the European Union. This part of the study aims to shed light on the multi-level governance of unemployment focusing on relationships between different levels.

Through this part of the project we aim to: 1) assess the extent to which power is located in the institutions of the European Union relative to national ones, and to establish who the important transnational policy actors are; 2) explain the action repertoire of various categories of actors at the EU-level and determine whether the emphasis at the EU-level is on working within the policy-field or influencing it from the outside; 3) show the networks of actors in the field according to three types of relations – cooperation, disagreement and influence; 4) understand the involvement of various types of actors in the development of policy options around the specific issues of job creation and social benefits; and 5) evaluate the impact of the EU on unemployment policy across the EU and determine its importance relative to policies at the national level.

The interviews at the level of the European Union were conducted by the British team, with two contributions from the Swiss team. A total of 21 interviews has been conducted, each between 40 and 70 minutes long. Most of the interviews were conducted face-to-face in Brussels, while a few were conducted in London or over the telephone. The interviewees were classified into four broad groups - policy actors (9 interviews), intermediary organizations, such as political parties (3 interviews) and interest groups of employers and employees (4 interviews), and non-governmental organizations focusing on the claims made by the unemployed (5 interviews). While the selection of policy actors was fairly straightforward, the interest groups and NGOs were selected on the basis of their being mentioned on the EU website or in relevant reports, policy documents and literature on the topic. For the political parties, we managed to secure interviews with three of the five groups within the European Parliament. We managed to do 21 interviews from an original list of 25, as some

organizations refused or their busy schedules did not allow them the time that we needed. To reach this number of interviews with supra- and trans-national organisations has required a considerable amount of logistical and organisational effort and travel, though we are confident of having achieved a sample which contains most of the significant actors in the field at this level. Indeed compared to the national cases, the fewer number of supra- trans-national actors means that we have a more complete sample with respect to the field.

The interview schedule used is similar to the one used for national interviews, to allow for comparisons with national-case data. A few minor alterations have been made, mainly re-wording questions, to customize the questionnaire for interviewees at the EU-level. Feedback from initial interviews was incorporated into the schedule to make it more specific to the EU level.

All interviews have been coded in a scheme that was again as close as possible to that used for national interviews, and the data are held in an SPSS database which allows for quantitative and qualitative analysis. The following pages provide a detailed and comprehensive report on the results of these interviews.

## 5.2 Action Forms

This section examines the action repertoire of various organizations. Respondents were asked to indicate the various techniques that they employ to influence public policy in the EU and at the national level in member states. We divided the action forms into two categories – external and internal strategies. External strategies include all actions directed at informing and mobilizing the public, including media-related strategies. Internal strategies encompass lobbying, participating in governmental consultation procedures, serving on governmental advisory commissions and boards and supplying information to policymakers.

Table 1 clearly indicates that media-related actions like interviews, writing newspaper articles, press conferences, press releases and use of the internet are extensively used by all actors at the EU level. Strategies of mobilizing the public are employed primarily by actors in the public sphere, but they are clearly the least important in comparison to the other tactics. Policy actors were expected to focus on internal tactics, but these actions are also used sparingly by them. Other actors like NGOs, interest groups and political parties use them the most after media work.

**Table 1: Action repertoire at the EU-level**

*Q: Which techniques would you use to influence public policy at the EU-level, and would you use them regularly and/ or occasionally?*

Orgtype	<b>inside lobbying</b> 0=min 1=max	<b>outside lobbying</b> 0=min 1=max	media- related repertoire 0=min 1=max
<i>Policy</i>	<b>.04</b>	<b>.12</b>	.61
<i>NGO</i>	<b>.67</b>	<b>.39</b>	.78
<i>Interest group</i>	<b>.89</b>	<b>.34</b>	.72
<i>Party</i>	<b>.66</b>	<b>.40</b>	.90
Total	<b>.44</b>	<b>.27</b>	.71

Since most of the interviewees, especially the policy actors, operate primarily at the EU level and focus less at the national level on individual countries, the strategies are employed far less at the national level than they are at the EU level. At the national level (table 2), the use of actions forms corresponds to the pattern at the EU level with media related actions the most widely used. They are followed by internal strategies of lobbying and work with policymakers, and then external strategies of mobilising the public.

**Table 2: Actions repertoire at the national level**

*Q: Which techniques would you use to influence public policy at the EU-level, and would you use them regularly and/ or occasionally?*

Orgtype	<b>inside lobbying, 0=min 1=max</b>	<b>outside lobbying, 0=min 1=max</b>	media- related repertoire, 0=min 1=max
<i>Policy</i>	<b>.03</b>	<b>.14</b>	.70
<i>NGO</i>	<b>.68</b>	<b>.36</b>	.67
<i>Interest group</i>	<b>.46</b>	<b>.13</b>	.40
<i>Party</i>	<b>.60</b>	<b>.44</b>	.90
<b>Total</b>	<b>.38</b>	<b>.26</b>	.69

What emerges from the tables above is that all EU-level actors concentrate on media-related strategies in order to influence policy both at the European level and national level of individual member states. This is the main action form for policy actors, while other actors in the public sphere also rely on internal strategies of lobbying, working with policymakers and serving on various governmental advisory boards and commissions, followed by actions of informing and mobilizing the public.

### **5.3 Importance of media and public-related strategies**

The previous section has indicated that media-related strategies are most important for all actors trying to influence public policy at both EU and national levels. However, when the same respondents were asked to compare ‘working with policy makers’ with the use of media in influencing EU unemployment policy in particular, the trend across all groups was more towards working with policymakers than trying to influence them through the media. Over 50 per cent of respondents said that media-related strategies are less important than working directly with policy makers.

**Table 3: Media strategy vs. working with policymakers**

*Q: How important are media-related strategies for your organisation compared to working with policy-makers?*

	Frequency	Percent
much more important	1	4.8
more important	2	9.5
less important	9	42.9
much less important	3	14.3
equally important	2	9.5
missing	4	19.0
Total	21	100.0

**Table 3.1: Media strategy vs. working with policymakers**

Orgtype	much more important	more important	equally important	less important	much less important	missing	total
<i>State</i>	1			4	2	2	9
<i>NGO</i>		1	1	2	1		5
<i>Interest group</i>			1	3			4
<i>Party</i>		1				2	3
Total	1	2	2	9	3	4	21

For NGOs and interest groups together, 66 per cent claimed their media-related strategies were less important than their work with policy makers, with 22 per cent saying that both are equally important. Social Platform, a network of NGOs in the EU, considered their media strategy much less important than working with policy makers, since it is “more important to build long-term cooperation with decision-making people than get the media to influence externally”. The European Trade Union Congress (ETUC), however, considered them to be both equally important, since the media promote its activities, but the ETUC do not influence policymakers through the media.

Policy actors typically claimed that their work with policymakers was more important than their media-related work. Within this, some actors also acknowledged the importance of their media strategy. According to the European Commission (EC), working with other EU policymakers and national policy actors from member states is a more important activity, but at the same time there is a need to disseminate messages, which is done through the media. Among the political parties only the Party of European Socialists (PES) chose to answer this question, saying that media strategies are more important as “we live in a media society”. The other parties chose not to answer as they felt that the two were not comparable.



As it is shown in tables 4 and 4.1 (in the following page), a similar trend is observed when respondents were asked to compare ‘informing/mobilising the public’ to ‘working with policy makers’ in trying to influence unemployment policy in the EU. Over 50 per cent of interviewees consider informing the public to be less important than working with policy makers, followed by 21 per cent who consider them to be equally important.

**Table 4: Informing/ mobilizing the public vs. working with policymakers**

*Q: How important are strategies directly informing and mobilizing the public for your organisation compared to working with policy-makers?*

	Frequency	Percent
more important	3	14.3
less important	8	38.1
much less important	4	19.0
equally important	4	19.0
missing	2	9.5
Total	21	100.0

**Table 4.1: Informing/ mobilizing the public vs. working with policymakers**

Orgtype	more important	equally important	less important	much less important	missing	
<i>Policy</i>	1		6	2		9
<i>NGO</i>	1	3		1		5
<i>Interest group</i>		1	2	1		4
<i>Party</i>	1				2	3
	3	4	8	4	2	21

Looking at NGOs alone, one sees a crucial trend towards an equal emphasis on working with policy makers and informing and mobilising the public, with 60 per cent of organisations considering them to be equally important. However, interest groups have generally emphasised that working with policy makers is more beneficial than trying to mobilise the public. As a spokesperson for the European Small Business Alliance (ESBA) says, “On such topics I don't think the general public has an impact.” As regards policy actors, 86 per cent of interviewees said that informing the public is less important than working with policy makers. According to EURES, the job mobility portal maintained by the European Commission, “We do inform the public, but it's not more important than working with policy makers. Our aim is to provide transparent public information for job seekers and employers in order to support their ability in the European market.” It is important to emphasise that the response from political parties was similar to the previous question. Only one of them considered informing/mobilising the public to be more important, while the other parties said the two strategies could not be compared.

It therefore emerges that in trying to influence unemployment policy at the European level, a large number of actors consider ‘working directly with policy makers’ to be far more beneficial than using ‘media-strategies’ or ‘informing/mobilising the public’.

#### 5.4 Influential Actors

In this section we tried to determine the most influential organisations in European unemployment policy. Our 21 interviewees were presented with a list of 40 organisations. They had to indicate 1) which organisations they considered particularly influential (table 5.1) and then 2) name the three most influential organisations (table 5.2) and 3) the most influential amongst all of them (table 5.3).

**Table 5.1: List of the ten most frequently mentioned influential organisations by actor type (multiple options)**

	Policy	Interm.	NGOs	TOTAL
European Commission	8	7	4	19
Council of the European Union	8	6	5	19
European Trade Unions Confederation	8	5	5	18
German Government	6	6	5	17
French Government	6	6	5	17
UNICE	7	6	4	17
European Parliament	8	5	3	16
British Government	6	6	4	16
National Govts of other EU Member States	6	6	4	16
National trade unions (other than D, F, UK)	6	5	4	15

**Table 5.2: The most influential organisations (three options given)**

European Commission	15
Council of the European Union	11
National Governments of Member States	10
European Parliament	7
European Trade Unions Confederation	3
UNICE	3
Council of Europe	2
ILO	1
National Trade Unions from Member States	1
Local Authorities in Member States	1
Private Commercial Enterprises	1

**Table 5.3: The most influential organisation (only one option given)**

European Commission	7
National Governments of Member States	6
Council of the European Union	5
Local Authorities in Member States	1

As expected, the key EU institutions – European Commission, Council of European Union, and European Parliament - emerge as the most influential actors, alongside with the national governments from member states. These actors are followed by two intermediary organisations (see table 5.2) representing the interest of employers and employees respectively, namely, the Union of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Trade Unions Congress (ETUC). Non-governmental organisations and political parties seem generally to wield little influence, while the mention of local authorities in both tables 5.2 and 5.3 seems to support the focus of those scholars who emphasise the importance of the sub-national level within the European multi-level framework.

### 5.5 *Inter-organizational Networks*

Following the findings shown in the previous section, it is unsurprising that EU core policy-makers emerge as the most important targets of claim-making in the unemployment field. Table 6, however, shows that the order between the European Commission and the Council of the European Union has now changed.

**Table 6: The ten most frequently mentioned targets by actor type**


	Policy	Interm.	NGOs	TOTAL
Council of the European Union	4	7	4	15
European Commission	2	7	4	13
European Parliament	3	6	3	12
Govts of other EU Member States	5	3	4	12
German Government	4	2	5	11
French Government	4	2	4	10
British Government	3	2	4	9
UNICE	4	1	2	7
ETUC	2	1	3	6
Regional Govts of member states	2	0	3	5

It is important to emphasise that regional governments of member states emerge as a crucial target. Although they are not considered to be influential in previous tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3, these tables mention local authorities. The fact that regional governments of member states can be a crucial target (and local authorities are influential actors) within the unemployment field seems to confirm that, whatever the empirical and theoretical arguments against these

of localism and ‘new regionalism’, sub-national authorities have become an established part of political and economic life in Europe, thanks to their strategic role within the multi-level EU framework. Relevant parts of our project have indeed been dedicated to regional and local actors across different member states, thus focusing on the impact of sub-national policies such as regional ‘Objectives’ and ‘Territorial Employment Pacts’.

As regards relationships of co-operation, table 7.1 in the following page includes a graphical representation of the web of co-operative ties between all the actors which have been interviewed, that is, the nodes of the figure. Each tie between two nodes indicates the existence (and the direction) of a relationship of co-operation between a pair of them. The first evident characteristic of this network is its good density, owing to the fact that a large number of actors are linked to each other. In particular, it is graphically clear that some organisations stand out for their activity of co-operation, such as the European Trade Unions Congress (ETUC), the European Commission (EC), and Social Platform (SP), while the organisations more ‘isolated’ interact directly at least with another central actor, and hence, they are no more than a few edges away from any other organisation within the network.

Focusing on different kinds of actors, it is noticeable the relatively broad web of ties which has been forged by political parties, thus showing that these organisations still play a crucial role for the protection of the unemployed and the representation of their interests. At the same time, it is particularly interesting to focus on the (sub)network of ties amongst non-governmental organisations, whose intervention is in favour / on behalf of the unemployed. An important number of these organisations have built crucial linkages of co-operation with policy actors, confirming our previous analysis of action forms (see tables 1 and 2). However, it is also clear that non-governmental organisations have aimed to forge an extensive web of reciprocal ties of close co-operation, while aiming to keep some basic degree of exchange with intermediary organisations such as political parties and interest groups to guarantee some basic information flow. In sum, the entire field is dominated by the development of important linkages which connect organisations across the public and policy domains.

**Table 7.1: Inter-organisational Relationships of Co-Operation**

Further findings can be highlighted through examination with more sophisticated techniques of network analysis. For example, tables 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 focus on the specific analysis of cliques, that is, sub-groups within which all the components share mutual ties of co-operation. The data show a remarkable amount of co-operation between ETUC and the European Commission (which share reciprocal linkages within 16 cliques), and in particular, the configuration of two main networks. On the one hand, there is a subgroup based on the strong relationships between ETUC and Commission, which include the European Parliament, Social Platform and the European Anti-Poverty Network. On the other hand, it is possible to identify a second subgroup, within which the main employers' organisation (UNICE) is strongly linked to the Council of the European Union (CEU) and to the European Policy Centre (EPC).

Table 7.2: Cliques of Co-operation (minimum size = 3)

1:	EC EP EUL UEN ETUC SP EAPN
2:	EC EP EESC EUL ETUC SP EAPN
3:	EC EP EESC ETUC SP ECAS EAPN
4:	EC EP ETUC SP ECAS EPC
5:	CEU EC EP UEN ETUC
6:	CEU EC EP ILO ETUC
7:	CEU EC EP ETUC EPC
8:	EC WTO ETUC
9:	CEU EC UEN UNICE ETUC
10:	CEU EC ILO UNICE ETUC
11:	CEU EC UNICE CEEP ETUC
12:	CEU EC UNICE ETUC EPC
13:	EC EESC UNICE CEEP ETUC SP
14:	EC UNICE ETUC SP EPC
15:	EC UEN UNICE ETUC SP
16:	EC EESC EUL CEEP ETUC SP
17:	EP CE UEN ETUC SP EAPN
18:	EP CE ILO ETUC
19:	EP UEN ETUC EURES
20:	EP EUL UEN ETUC SP EAPN ENU
21:	EP ETUC SP ECAS EAPN ENU
22:	EC EP PES EUL UEN
23:	CEU EC EP PES UEN
24:	EC WTO PES
25:	EP EESC ESBA
26:	CEU EP ESBA

Table 7.3: Actor-by-Actor Clique Co-Membership Matrix


		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
		CE	EC	EC	EP	CE	WT	IL	EE	PE	EU	UE	UN	CE	ES	ET	SP	EU	EC	EP	EA	EN
1	CEU	9	8	0	5	0	0	2	0	1	0	3	4	1	1	7	0	0	0	2	0	0
2	EC	8	19	0	9	0	2	2	4	3	4	6	7	3	0	16	8	0	2	4	3	0
3	ECJ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
4	EP	5	9	0	16	2	0	2	3	2	4	7	0	0	2	12	7	1	3	2	6	2
5	CE	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	1	0
6	WTO	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
7	ILO	2	2	0	2	1	0	3	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
8	EESC	0	4	0	3	0	0	0	5	0	2	0	1	2	1	4	4	0	1	0	2	0
9	PES	1	3	0	2	0	1	0	0	3	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
10	EUL	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	2	1	5	3	0	1	0	4	4	0	0	0	3	1
11	UEN	3	6	0	7	1	0	0	0	2	3	9	2	0	0	7	4	1	0	0	3	1
12	UNICE	4	7	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	7	2	0	7	3	0	0	2	0	0
13	CEEP	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	2	3	0	3	2	0	0	0	0	0
14	ESBA	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
15	ETUC	7	16	0	12	2	1	3	4	0	4	7	7	3	0	21	11	1	3	4	6	2
16	SP	0	8	0	7	1	0	0	4	0	4	4	3	2	0	11	11	0	3	2	6	2
17	EURES	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0
18	ECAS	0	2	0	3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	3	1	2	1
19	EPC	2	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	4	2	0	1	4	0	0
20	EAPN	0	3	0	6	1	0	0	2	0	3	3	0	0	0	6	6	0	2	0	6	2
21	ENU	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	2	2	0	1	0	2	2

Table 7.4: HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX

	E					U																
	U	E				C	N	E	E		E	E										
	E	R	S	W	P	I	E	C	I	E	C	E	E	U	T	A	E					
	C	E	B	T	E	C	L	E	E	C	P	A	S	U	E	E	S	P	N			
	J	S	A	O	S	E	O	P	U	E	C	S	C	L	N	P	C	C	P	N	U	
		1	1				1		1	1	1		1	1		1		1	2	2		
Level	3	7	4	6	9	5	7	3	1	2	9	8	8	0	1	4	5	2	6	0	1	
-----	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
16.000	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	
11.000	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXX	.	.	.	
9.250	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
5.679	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
4.000	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
3.968	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
3.381	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
2.381	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
2.000	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
1.709	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
1.443	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
1.000	.	.	.	XXX	XXX	.	XXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
0.667	.	.	.	XXX	XXX	XXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
0.456	.	.	.	XXX	XXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
0.226	.	.	.	XXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
0.123	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
0.065	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	
0.052	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.
0.000	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.

To complete the analysis of inter-organisational networks, table 8.1 includes a graphical representation of the web of ties of disagreement between all the actors which have been interviewed, that is, the nodes of the figure. Each tie between two nodes indicates the existence (and the direction) of a relationship of disagreement between a pair of them. It is clear that this network has much lower density when compared to the previous web of co-operative ties, due to the fact that a higher number of organisations have avoided to foster relationships of disagreement with other actors in the field. At the same time, this pattern of (low) disagreement seems to match, to some extent, the pattern of co-operative relationships shown in table 7.1, since many nodes which had already emerged as central for their ties of co-operation (such as ETUC and the European Commission) are also characterised by a high degree of disagreement ties. It should also be noticed the remarkable agreement and harmony existing amongst non-governmental organisations, as well as between these organisations and other types of actors.



**Table 8.1: Inter-Organisational Relationships of Disagreement**

In addition, the analysis of cliques of disagreement seem to provide some valuable insights which open space for further research into the correlation between linkages of co-operation and disagreement. In particular, tables 8.2 and 8.3 and 8.4 indicate that relationships of disagreement are stronger between actors that do not share relevant ties of co-operation. Vice-versa, relationships of disagreement are weaker between actors who are linked by relationships of co-operation. Thus, ETUC and the Commission, which are linked by strong linkages of co-operation (as shown in table 7.4), occupy clearly two different subgroups in table 8.4. The same pattern of mutually exclusive co-operation and disagreement characterise the relationship between UNICE and the Council of European Union. This type of data seem to suggest that European actors in the unemployment field have forged a (sparse) web of relationships of disagreement which might still reflect ‘ideological’ and ‘functional’ cleavages dividing competing actors, rather than pragmatic inter-organisational dispute on specific issues.

Table 8.2: Cliques of Disagreement (minimum size = 3)

1: CEU EC EP UNICE ETUC  
 2: EC CEEP ETUC  
 3: CEU ECJ ETUC  
 4: UNICE ESBA ETUC  
 5: EC PES UEN  
 6: CEU EP EUL UNICE  
 7: CEU EP EUL UEN  
 8: CEU EC EP UEN  
 9: UNICE ESBA ECAS

Table 8.3: Actor-by-Actor Clique Co-Membership Matrix

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0	1	2	2
		C	E	E	E	C	W	I	E	P	E	U	U	C	E	E	S	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1	CEU	5	2	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2	EC	2	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
3	ECJ	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
4	EP	4	2	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
5	CE	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
6	WTO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
7	ILO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
8	EESC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
9	PES	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
10	EUL	2	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11	UEN	2	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
12	UNICE	2	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	2	2	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
13	CEEP	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
14	ESBA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
15	ETUC	2	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
16	SP	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
17	EURES	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
18	ECAS	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	
19	EPC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
20	EAPN	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
21	ENU	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Table 8.4: HIERARCHICAL CLUSTERING OF EQUIVALENCE MATRIX

	E										U													
	W	I	E	S	S	E	E	U	E	E	C	U	E	E	E	E	C	C	B	U	A	P	P	N
	E	O	O	C	P	S	S	L	C	P	U	N	P	J	E	A	C	S	C	N	U			
						1	1						1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Level	5	6	7	8	6	7	9	0	2	4	1	1	3	3	2	4	5	8	9	0	1			
-----	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.000	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
2.000	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXX	.	.	XXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1.333	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXX	.	.	XXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
1.214	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	XXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
0.600	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXX	.	.	XXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
0.565	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	XXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
0.480	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	XXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
0.270	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
0.173	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.	.
0.000	XX																							

5.6 Issue-specific involvement

Within the wider field of unemployment policy, this project has focused on the specific issues of ‘job creation’ and ‘social benefits’. This section evaluates the engagement of various actors with the two issues, and specifically with the development of policy options about the same. The responses have been analysed in terms of different actor categories in order to understand which groups are involved in the issues and how effective they feel their involvement has been.

As table 9.1 indicates, over half the respondents interviewed claimed to have been involved a lot in the issue of job creation.

Table 9.1: Issue-specific involvement – job creation

Q: How involved has your organisation been in the issue of job creation over the last five years?

	Frequenc y	Percent
a lot	12	57.1
somewhat (enough)	1	4.8
somewhat (but not enough)	6	28.6
not at all	2	9.5
Total	21	100.0

**Table 9.2: Issue-specific involvement – job creation**

Orgtype	a lot	somewhat (enough)	somewhat (but not enough)	not at all	Total
<i>Policy</i>	6		2	1	9
<i>NGO</i>	1		4		5
<i>Interest group</i>	2	1		1	4
<i>Party</i>	3				3
<b>Total</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>21</b>

About 38 per cent of the actors said that their involvement was either inadequate or none at all. The level of involvement was clearly the highest for policy actors at 57 per cent and for political parties, which indicated a 100 per cent involvement in the issue of job creation. Among the policy actors not involved enough or at all in the issue, EURES said that it was not in the business of creating jobs, since it only made jobs available to people. The Council of Europe emphasised that the member states, the European Commission and the OECD play a more important role in this area.

Only 20 per cent of non-governmental organisations said that they were involved a lot. The other 80 per cent said that they were involved, but not enough. The reasons ascribed to this varied from lack of resources for organisations like the European Network of the Unemployed (ENU) and the European Citizen Action Service (ECAS), to inadequate expertise for organisations like Social Platform. As regards actors representing the interest of employers and employees respectively, UNICE said that their involvement has been "A lot because job creation is about entrepreneurship and that is our business", while ETUC claimed that trade unionists as a group do not participate directly in negotiations.

On the issue of social benefits, the overall involvement across all actor categories seemed to be marginally higher than for job creation.

**Table 10.1: Issue involvement – social benefits**

*Q: How involved has your organisation been in the issue of social benefits over the last five years?*

	Frequency	Percent
a lot	8	38.1
somewhat (enough)	5	23.8
somewhat (but not enough)	6	28.6
not at all	1	4.8
missing	1	4.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100.0</b>

**Table 10.2: Issue involvement – social benefits**

Orgtype	a lot	somewhat (enough)	somewhat (but not enough)	not at all	missing	
<i>Policy</i>	2	4	1	1	1	9
<i>NGO</i>	2		3			5
<i>Interest group</i>	2	1	1			4
<i>Party</i>	2		1			3
<b>Total</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>21</b>

Over 60 per cent of interviewees said that they were either involved a lot, or enough. These included EU institutions like the European Economic and Social Committee, European Council, European Court of Justice and European Parliament. Interestingly, the European Commission claimed that it was involved in the issue, but not enough; the reason given was that member states consider social benefits to be their own responsibility and thus the involvement of the Commission is limited to general orientation and does not cover specific details. EURES is the only organisations not involved at all. Its spokesperson stated that involvement is confined to making information about social benefits available to people.

As regards political parties, their involvement is not as high as in the case of job creation. While the European United Left (EUL) and the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) have indicated a high involvement, the Party of European Socialists (PES) said that their involvement is not enough as they lack the legal competencies to reform or change the welfare and benefits systems of member states. More than 50 per cent of non-governmental organisations said that they were not involved enough: the given reasons varied from lack of resources to lack of knowledge in the area. 50 per cent of interest groups said that they have been involved a lot, 25 percent felt they were involved enough, while 25 per cent of them admitted that their involvement was limited. In particular, the ETUC attributed this limited involvement to their primary role of fighting for workers' rights, which makes it difficult to negotiate with employers on issues like social benefits.

Broadly speaking, it can be said that about half of all actors interviewed said that they had been involved in the issues of job creation and social benefits, with the involvement in the latter being marginally higher. As expected, the involvement was the highest for policy actors - given their role in the policy domain - and for political parties - given their intermediary role between public and policy domains as well as the crucial position of the two issues in their agendas. The non-governmental organisations were the least involved - given their lack of resources - while interest groups were relatively more active.

Although only about 60 per cent of the actors indicated their active involvement in the issues, an examination of tables 11.1 and 11.2 in the following page reveals that when asked about participation in the development of policy options about job creation and social benefits, over 80 per cent of respondents gave a positive answer.

**Table 11.1: Involvement in development of policy**

*Q: Was your organisation involved in the development of the policy options about job creation and/or social benefits?*

	Frequency	Percent
yes	17	81.0
no	4	19.0
Total	21	100.0

Most of the policy actors indicated an involvement, with the exception of WTO and the European Council, which said that policy development was not their role. Surprisingly, most of the non-governmental organisations said that they had been involved in policy matters, despite the fact that a majority of them indicated low or no participation in the previous questions about general involvement.

**Table 11.2: Involvement in development of policy**

Orgtype	yes	no
<i>Policy</i>	7	2
<i>NGO</i>	4	1
<i>Interest group</i>	3	1
<i>Party</i>	3	
Total	17	4

There was more consistency in the case of interest groups and political parties, as 75 per cent of the interest groups and all the parties said that they were involved in the development of policy options, in line with their engagement with the two issues of job creation and social benefits. Most of the policy actors said that their involvement was in the way of advice, policy guidelines and recommendations. An exception was the European Court of Justice, which has contributed to the development of policy options by pushing the law forward. As regards non-governmental organisations, their involvement has been through giving suggestions, advices and expertise. The European Anti-Poverty Network said that it tries to influence policy options but it has been successful only in occasion of the revision of the European Employment Policy in 2002. Likewise, interest groups have made use of recommendations and advices for engaging within the policy arena.

To gain deeper insight, we took each issue separately and tried to determine whether actors use internal or external tactics to influence policy development. We therefore asked the respondents whether they have undertaken specific actions in the parliamentary and/or administrative arenas and/ or tried to mobilise the public in order to influence policy.

## **Job Creation**

**Table 12.1: Actions in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas**

*Q: Did your organisation undertake specific actions in the parliamentary or administrative arenas on the issue of job creation?*

	Frequency	Percent
yes	11	52.4
no	10	47.6
Total	21	100.0

**Table 12.2: Actions in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas**

Orgtype	Yes	No
<i>Policy</i>	4	5
<i>NGO</i>	2	3
<i>Interest group</i>	2	2
<i>Party</i>	3	
Total	11	10

On the issue of job creation just over half the respondents said that they have undertaken actions in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas to influence policy development. All the political parties gave an affirmative answer, in contrast with only ca. 50 per cent of the interviewees in each of the other categories. The key actions mentioned by the EU institutions included amendments of legislations, policy exchange and advice, as well as technical assistance. Non-governmental organisations and interest groups cited reports and proposals to Parliament and contributions to reviews and proposals for revisions of programmes and guidelines, while the political parties mainly referred to policy papers and reports. However, when asked to evaluate the effectiveness of their actions, only a few interviewees answered the question. While some did not want to comment, others said they were unable to assess the effectiveness of their actions.

**Table 13: Effectiveness of parliamentary and administrative actions on job creation**

*Q: How would you rate the effectiveness of your parliamentary and administrative actions on job creation?*

Orgtype	rather ineffective	rather effective	very effective
<i>Policy</i>		3	
<i>NGO</i>		1	1
<i>Interest group</i>	1		
<i>Party</i>		3	
Total	1	7	1

In the case of job creation, eight out of the nine interviewees who responded felt that their actions had been effective. These included the three political parties and three policy actors, namely, the European Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs of the European Parliament. The Commission felt that its reform of the European strategy adopted in 2003 has changed things a lot. Among the NGOs and interest groups there was the European Anti-Poverty Network and European Policy Centre. European Small Business Alliance claimed that it had been rather ineffective because “MEPs hear [small businesses], but do not listen.”

**Table 14.1: Mobilised/ informed the public on job creation**

*Q: Did your organisation undertake specific actions for informing or mobilizing the public on this issue?*

	Frequenc y	Percent
Yes	14	66.7
No	7	33.3
Total	21	100.0

**Table 14.2: Mobilised/ informed the public on job creation**

Orgtype	Yes	No
<i>Policy</i>	6	3
<i>NGO</i>	2	3
<i>Interest group</i>	3	1
<i>Party</i>	3	
Total	14	7

The respondents were also asked whether they had informed or mobilised the public on the issue of job creation. Table 14.2 in the previous page shows that ca. 66 per cent of respondents answered in the affirmative. This included all the political parties, 65 per cent of the policy actors, 75 per cent of the interest groups, but only 40 per cent of the NGOs. Actions in this field primarily consisted of media work including use of websites and distribution of promotional material like mailers and leaflets.

**Table 15: Effectiveness of informing and mobilizing the public on job creation**

*Q: How would you rate the effectiveness of your actions of informing and mobilizing the public on job creation?*

Orgtype	ineffectiv e	rather ineffectiv e	rather effective	very effective
<i>Policy</i>			4	1
<i>NGO</i>			2	
<i>Interest group</i>	1		1	
<i>Party</i>		1	1	
Total	1	1	8	1



On the effectiveness of their actions, table 15 shows that many respondents felt that they had been effective in achieving their objectives. The European Policy Centre for instance felt that its reports are valued and looked at and their effectiveness is evident from the massive turnout at their events in Brussels. The European Commission felt that its media work through press conferences, press releases and interviews to the media was effective because of both the coverage in newspapers and the popularity of the EURES website.

On the whole, 11 out of 14 respondents felt that their actions in trying to influence policy on job creation, whether through actions in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas or by mobilising the public had been effective in achieving their objective.

### Social Benefits

Tables 16.1 and 16.2 in the following page show that organizations' involvement in social benefits was greater than in job creation, especially for NGOs. As regards the question of actions in parliamentary or administrative arenas, 80 per cent of the NGOs said that they had tried to influence policy development through reports and lobbying in parliament. Only slightly over fifty per cent of the policy actors said that they had been involved with this issue in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas. The main actions included launching a process of coordination for guidelines on issues like work pay, active ageing and social protection, recommendations to Parliament and working with ministries and social partners on improving social welfare schemes. About 75 per cent of the interest groups said they had been active in the issue, mainly through lobbying and discussions with MEPs. In the case of political parties, the involvement was slightly lower than for job creation, with lobbying in Parliament and amendments to legislations as the main actions.

**Table 16.1: Actions in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas**

*Q: Did your organisation undertake specific actions in the parliamentary or administrative arenas on the issue of social benefits?*

	Frequency	Percent
yes	14	66.7
no	7	33.3
Total	21	100.0

**Table 16.2: Actions in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas**

Orgtype	Yes	No
<i>Policy</i>	5	4
<i>NGO</i>	4	1
<i>Interest group</i>	3	1
<i>Party</i>	2	1
Total	14	7

Table 17 on the following page shows that (as in the case of job creation) more than 50 per cent of the respondents did not choose to answer the question on the effectiveness of their

actions. Eight out of ten respondents said that they consider their actions in the parliamentary/administrative arenas to be rather effective. Most of the policy actors did not answer the question except for the European Economic and Social Committee and the Council of Europe, which said that its actions had been rather ineffective. The Commission felt that it was too early to comment. “On social protection the reason is that it’s not our own business. We have not followed it so closely.” Among the non-governmental actors, Social Platform said that its contribution to communication of the Commission on Making Work Pay by presenting a paper to MEPs had been quite effective. The European Policy Centre said that they have contributed to obtaining a better mutual understanding between players at the government level, and at the level of social partners and civil society.

**Table 17: Effectiveness of parliamentary and administrative actions on social benefits**

*Q: How would you rate the effectiveness of your parliamentary and administrative actions on social benefits?*

Orgtype	rather ineffective	rather effective
<i>Policy</i>	1	2
<i>NGO</i>		4
<i>Interest group</i>	1	
<i>Party</i>		2
Total	2	8

**Table 18.1: Informing/ mobilizing the public on social benefits**

*Q: Did your organisation undertake specific actions for informing or mobilizing the public on this issue?*

	Frequency	Percent
Yes	12	57.1
No	9	42.9
Total	21	100.0

**Table 18.2: Informing/ mobilizing the public on social benefits**

Orgtype	Yes	No
<i>Policy</i>	5	4
<i>NGO</i>	4	1
<i>Interest group</i>	1	3
<i>Party</i>	2	1
	12	9

On mobilising/ informing the public on the issue of social benefits, once again the involvement was high among the NGOs with 80 per cent of them indicating their involvement through the media (especially the internet), publishing reports and organising conferences.

Among the interest groups the participation was very low. UNICE, for example said that it directed its actions towards working with policy makers and the ETUC said that as a trade union its job was to protect the worker and it did not focus on areas like social benefits. The main forms of action consisted of press and media work, website and conferences. Among policy actors, just over half said that they tried to mobilise the public on the issue, mainly through the media. The political parties also used the same means.

**Table 19: Effectiveness of informing and mobilizing the public on social benefits**

*Q: How would you rate the effectiveness of your actions of informing and mobilizing the public on social benefits?*

Orgtype	rather ineffective	rather effective	very effective
<i>Policy</i>		1	2
<i>NGO</i>	1	3	
<i>Interest group</i>		1	
<i>Party</i>	1	1	
Total	2	6	2

On the effectiveness of their actions, eight out of ten respondents felt that they had been effective. Among the policy actors, EURES and the European Parliament felt that they had been very effective. For this question, most of the organisations chose not to comment with details.

In sum, of the 12 respondents who answered the question on effectiveness of their action on social benefits - whether in the parliamentary/ administrative arenas or by mobilising the public - eight felt that they had been effective and only four considered their actions to be rather ineffective. It is also clear that NGOs seem to be playing an important role in the issue of social benefit, especially when compared to the issue of job creation.

Finally, it is crucial to analyse questions asking the respondents to comment on their general perception of the two issues, and in particular, whether they think that the general public finds the issues of job creation and social benefits important or unimportant. As tables 20.1 and 20.2 in the following page demonstrate, nearly all the respondents felt that the general public finds the issue of job creation important. In the case of social benefits (tables 21.1 and 21.2), the ‘verdict’ on the importance of this issue was unanimous.

**Table 20.1: Issue of job creation**

*Q: Do you think the public finds the issue of job creation very important, rather important, rather unimportant, very unimportant?*

	Frequency	Percent
very important	14	73.7
rather important	4	21.1
rather unimportant	1	5.3
Total	19	100.0

**Table 20.2: Issue of Job Creation**

Orgtype	very important	rather important	rather unimportant	
<i>Policy</i>	8		1	9
<i>NGO</i>	3	2		5
<i>Interest group</i>	2	2		4
<i>Party</i>	3			3

**Table 21.1: Issue of Social Benefits**

*Q: Do you think the public finds the issue of social benefits creation very important, rather important, rather unimportant, very unimportant?*

	Frequency	Percent
very important	13	68.4
rather important	6	31.6
Total	19	100.0

**Table 21.2: Issue of Social Benefits**

Orgtype	very important	rather important	
<i>Policy</i>	6	3	9
<i>NGO</i>	4	1	5
<i>Interest group</i>	3	1	4
<i>Party</i>	1	2	3

## 5.7 *The Role of the European Union*

### **Impact of the EU on unemployment policy**

In this section we examine the respondents' comments on the role and impact of the European Union on unemployment policy in general, and on the issues of job creation and social benefits in particular. More than half the respondents felt that the EU has had a positive impact on unemployment policy in member states. Among the other half only a couple of organisations criticised the EU, while many actors gave a neutral assessment of the EU's role. The European Employment Strategy, the Lisbon Strategy, the European Social Fund and the Open Method of Coordination were the most frequently mentioned aspects of the EU's impact.

As expected, the EU institutions considered the overall impact of the EU to be positive, although there were differences of opinion on the specific issues of job creation and social benefits. For example, the European Court of Justice considered the overall impact of the EU to be positive, but it expressed its concern about job creation schemes claiming that these schemes push trained and experienced people away. The European Commission was of the view that while the impact of EU job creation policies has been positive, it has also been uneven, with some member states benefiting more than others. While applauding the EU for an overall positive impact through the Open Method of Coordination, the European Council added that in the specific areas of job creation and social benefits, the EU institutions need to have more direct means of implementation at their disposal in order to be more successful.

Among the NGOs and interest groups, the opinions were mostly neutral, lined with positive appreciation in some cases. Organisations which felt that the impact of the EU has been positive pointed out achievements like increased growth that has created employment, the role of structural, regional and social funds, and the Common Agricultural Programme in job creation, especially in disadvantaged and troubled regions, as well as laying down minimum standards which encourage all member states to enhance welfare intervention. Yet, there were sceptics like the ETUC and ESBA which felt that while the EU had adopted various policies in this area, it is difficult to assess their achievements. Social Platform was of the view that the EU has not been particularly influential with regard to unemployment policy. "The Lisbon objective really tries to have an effect on job creation because they want the EU to become the most advanced region in research, innovative products etc but they don't have the means for that. So they want to but they haven't had an impact."

The political parties were fairly critical of the EU's role in this area. One group felt that economic and fiscal policies are still considered to be a matter of the member states and interference by Brussels is not welcomed, especially by national conservative governments. Another spokesperson pointed out that the positive impact on employment was a result of the EU's economic policies, not its employment guidelines and that there is a need for specific policies to deal with unemployment.

On the whole, however, the feeling towards the role of the EU with regard to a European unemployment policy has been positive and it appears that even the sceptics feel that the EU can play a positive and important role in Europe.

### **EU employment policy vs. national employment policy**

In addition to seeking views on the overall impact of the EU, we also asked respondents to compare unemployment policy at the EU level with the national level. In this section we examine whether actors in the EU consider policy at the EU level more or less important than the national level and understand how they perceive the relationship between the two. The data to discuss are shown in tables 22.1 and 22.2.

**Table 22.1: EU vs. national employment policy**

*Q: Thinking about the role of the strategies for dealing with unemployment in Europe for your organisation relative to unemployment policy at the national level: is its role becoming increasingly important compared to the national level, less important compared to the national level, or does it not change at all?*

	Frequency	Percent
increasingly important	15	71.4
unchanging	4	19.0
less important	1	4.8
missing	1	4.8
Total	21	100.0

**Table 22.2: EU vs. national employment policy**

Orgtype	increasingly important	unchanging	less important	missing	
<i>Policy</i>	7	1		1	9
<i>NGO</i>	3	1	1		5
<i>Interest group</i>	2	2			4
<i>Party</i>	3				3

It is noticeable that over 70 per cent of respondents felt that the role of unemployment policy at the EU level was increasingly important compared to policies at the national level. This view was clearly the strongest amongst policy actors and political parties. According to the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), competence is still with the national governments, but convergence is coming about through coordination of policies and implementation of same social and market rules. EURES echoes this view stating that the EU has a central role in governing the way in which employment policies are delivered in member states. According to EUL, increasing importance of the EU is a result of economic integration. PES feels that states are particularly dependent on each other.

Opinions were more varied among non-governmental organisations and interest groups, since 60 per cent of NGOs and 50 per cent of interest groups said that the role of the EU is becoming increasingly important. The European Network of the Unemployed (ENU), for

instance, was of the view that in the long run the European Employment Strategy, along with the Open Method of Coordination and the Commission recommendations, will play an important role in making nations bring about change for the better. By contrast, the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN) felt that the role of the EU is less important than the national level as national governments only agree on a common EU policy on matters that have already been agreed upon at the national level. Similarly, ETUC and ESBA were fairly sceptical about the importance of the EU. In particular, ETUC felt that the European strategy is important for better research, technology and education, while it is difficult to gauge the relative importance of the EU as national policies are so different across Europe.

However, as it has already been emphasised, a large majority of respondents feel that the EU is playing an increasingly important role in unemployment policy. This reiterates the results of the previous section on the positive view on the role of the EU.

### **The future**

Looking ahead at the future, we asked interviewees to comment on the role of the EU in unemployment policy in the years to come. Most of the respondents felt that the EU will have an increasing impact on unemployment policy in the future. While only a few actors provided details comments on the two specific issues of job creation and social benefits, the general view was that the EU will become more important and that there will be increasing cooperation between member states. As a spokesperson from the European Council put it: “I can’t see us even going back to a situation with no European employment policy. Problems may change but there will always be a coordinated approach.” In the words of the EAPN representative: “There is no specific EU policy on job creation. On general unemployment policy, the European employment policy will speed up the liberal structural reforms that have been chosen anyway by the national governments and perhaps will spread knowledge and increase lifelong learning.” The Lisbon agenda was specifically discussed by some of the respondents. In particular, UNICE and the Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN) stated that the objectives of the Lisbon agenda will be increasingly important in the future.

Relevant data are contained in tables 23.1 and 23.2. Table 23.1 shows that over 75 per cent of responds were actually in favour of an increase in European influence in unemployment policy in Europe. This datum included most of the NGOs, about 60 per cent of the policy actors and 75 per cent of the interest groups (table 23.2). As regards political parties, they all were in favour of an increase in European influence.

#### **Table 23.1: Increase in European Influence**

*Q: Is your organisation generally in favour of an increase in European influence in strategies for dealing with unemployment in Europe or is it against it?*

	Frequency	Percent
Strongly in favor	9	42.9
Rather in favor	7	33.3
Rather against	1	4.8
Don't have a	3	14.3

position		
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**Table 23.2: Increase in European Influence, by actor type**

Orgtype	Strongly in favor	Rather in favor	Rather against	Don't have a position	
<i>Policy</i>	3	3		2	8
<i>NGO</i>	3	1		1	5
<i>Interest group</i>	1	2	1		4
<i>Party</i>	2	1			3

It is also crucial to emphasise that this was one of the few questions that caused evident hesitation amongst respondents. Indeed, three policy actors (namely, the European Commission, European Parliament, and WTO) and a non-governmental organisation (namely, Social Platform) did not want to take a position at all. For example, the Commission said that the purpose of its intervention was limited to introduce policies for job creation, increase in productivity and social cohesion. “If this means more influence, I don’t know.” Among the supporters of a stronger European influence, UNICE felt that the EU level can help to improve the employment situation by facilitating an informed debate, as well as exchange of experiences on solutions found in different member states. The European Council was in favour of the present approach and coordination, but did not foresee member states allowing a common employment policy backed by hard law. ESBA was the only actor explicitly against an increase in EU influence. This organisation emphasised that the EU is plagued by too much bureaucracy and needs further deregulation.

In the main, however, the role of the EU emerges in a positive light. A majority of actors within both the public and policy domains are in favour of an increase in the influence of the European Union on unemployment policy. They also believe that the EU will continue to make contributions to job creation and social benefits.



**6. Appendix - list of organisations interviewed and abbreviations**

1	Council of the European Union (CEU)
2	European commission: DG for Employment and Social Affairs (EC)
3	European Court of Justice (ECJ)
4	European Parliament – Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EP)
5	Council of Europe (CE)
6	World Trade Organisation (WTO)
7	International Labour Organization (ILO)
8	European Economic and Social Committee (EESC)
9	The European Job Mobility Portal (EURES)
10	Party of European Socialists (PES)
11	European United Left/Nordic Green Left (EUL)
12	Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN)
13	Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE)
14	European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP)
15	European Small Business Alliance (ESBA)
16	European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
17	Social Platform – Platform of European Social NGOs (SP)
18	European Citizen Action Service (ECAS)
19	European Policy Centre (EPC)
20	European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN)
21	European Network of the Unemployed (ENU)

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**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Codebook**

**Workpackage 1: Political claim-making in the public domain**

**Marco Giugni**

Note: This codebook is in part inspired by two other codebooks, both authored by Ruud Koopmans (Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung). The first one (MERCİ codebook) has been used in the research “Mobilization on Ethnic Relations, Citizenship and Immigration.” The second one (EUROPUB codebook) has been used in the research “The Transformation of Political Mobilization and Communication in European Public Spheres.” Crucial input was provided by the members of the UNEMPOL research team.

## PART I: CODING INSTRUCTIONS

### Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis is the single political claim, broadly defined as follows. A political claim is a strategic intervention, either verbal or non-verbal, in the public space made by a given actor on behalf of a group or collectivity and which bears on the interests or rights of other groups or collectivities. In other words, a claim is the expression of a political opinion by verbal or physical action in the public space. If it is verbal, a claim usually consists of a statement, an opinion, a demand, a criticism, a policy suggestion, etc. addressed to the public in general or to a specific actor. Thus, claim are not equivalent to political demands, but include other kinds of intervention in the public space.

Claims can take three main forms:

- Political decisions (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure, etc.)
- Verbal statements (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention, etc.)
- Protest actions (demonstration, occupation, violent action, etc.)

All claims taking one of these forms are coded, provided that they fall in the field of unemployment and employment policy (see below). In addition, claims are by definition politically and strategically oriented, i.e. they relate to collective social problems and imply a policy evaluation. This means that purely factual information is excluded. Similarly, editorial commentaries and simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the media or by other actors are also excluded. Guest commentaries can be coded optionally, but the specific code in the variable FORM must be used.

The definition of the claim, rather than the article or the single statement, as the unit of analysis has two implications. First, an article can report several claims. The whole article must therefore be read so as to code all the claims reported. Second, a claim can be made of several statements or actions. Statements or actions by different actors are considered to be part of a single claim if they take place at the same time (the same day) and the same place (the same locality) and if the actors can be assumed to act “in concert” (i.e. they can be considered as strategic allies). Example: two substantively identical statements by the same actor on two different days, or on one day in two different localities are two separate claims. Similarly, statements by different speakers during a parliamentary debate or a conference are considered part of the same claim as long as they are substantively and strategically compatible. This implies that different actors will be coded together under the same claim if they all express a similar point of view. However, if the actors take positions that are substantially different enough to reject the assumption that they are acting in concert, the statements are coded as separate claims. Examples: if an identifiable part of a peaceful demonstration breaks away from a march and turns violent, the assumption of acting in concert is no longer warranted and a separate claim is coded; if two negotiation partners present a compromise package at a press conference, the two’s statements are coded as one instance of claims-making, even if the two may emphasize different elements of the compromise. Events that take place simultaneously in several locations are coded as a single claim if no further information than a list of locations and as separate claims if further information is given on specific locations.

In sum, claims must have a temporal, spatial, and strategic unity (i.e. unity of time, place, and aim). Statements by different actors but occurring at the same time, in the same place, with

similar aims (i.e. expressing a similar point of view) are considered as part of a single claim, unless the assumption of the strategic unity can be rejected. Exceptions to this rule are cases where there is temporal or spatial continuity between actions.

### **Thematic field**

All claims are coded which belong thematically to the issue field of unemployment, narrowly defined as follows. All political decisions, verbal statements, and protest actions are coded which deal with the following themes: unemployment, under-employment, joblessness, exclusion from the labor market, measures and provisions for unemployed people (including training courses, financing of unemployment insurance, and workfare). Claims referring to related fields are coded only if they explicitly refer to the issue field of unemployment. Thus, employment policy, economic development policy, and other (general or specific) issues/problems concerning the situation of the labor market or the creation of jobs are included only if the claim makes an explicit reference to unemployment, under-employment, or joblessness. This includes both these keywords and their synonymous. In addition, claims are coded also if unemployment is not the primary focus.

Claims dealing with precarious employment belong to the thematic field and are then coded. In addition, all claims by organized groups of unemployed are also coded, regardless of their thematic focus. However, claims by individual unemployed are excluded. Other claims concerning employment policy and the labor market are also excluded. Examples: wage conditions; discrimination on the labor market; pension schemes; integration of foreigners into the job market. Of course, if these issues are addressed in relation to unemployment, under-employment, or joblessness, then they are coded. Also excluded are claims dealing with the issue of working poor, because they are outside the thematic field.

### **Sample**

All claims are coded which are reported in the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the selected national newspaper (Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday for the case of France). The coding covers the period from 1 January 1990 to 31 December 2001. The international, national, and economic sections of the newspaper are consulted. Local pages can be coded optionally, but the specific code in the variable SECTION must be used. The other sections and possible special sections are ignored (except for the front page of the newspaper).

If an issue did not appear, the next available issue must be taken. If the latter is already part of the sample, the next issue not part of the sample must be taken. Claims reported in the issue consulted and which took place up to two week before or which will take place up to two weeks after the date of appearance of that issue are also coded (but only if they have not already been coded).

In principle, only claims are coded which take place in the country of study. However, also coded are claims made in other EU countries or Switzerland, except when they are contained within one country. In other words, we exclude claims by national or subnational actors made in another country but without any reference to European issues or to other EU countries.

### Summary of general coding rules

- Only political claims are coded. Purely factual information (i.e. which does not imply policy evaluation) and statements that refer to individual strategies (i.e. which do not relate to collective social problems) are excluded (but must be photocopied).
- Claims are coded only to the extent that they deal with unemployment, under-employment, and joblessness. Other claims are coded only to the extent that an explicit reference is made to these issues.
- Claims are coded which take place in the country of study. In addition, also coded are claims made in other EU countries or Switzerland, except when they are contained within one country.
- In case of repeated statements or announcements, each one is coded as a separate claim. Example: an actor announces several times that it will hold a meeting on unemployment.
- Information found in another article or newspaper issue on a given claim that has been coded previously should be corrected. Thus, claims that were coded but are found in a further issue of the newspaper not to have occurred must be withdrawn from the sample. Similarly, additional information found in another article (even on a different issue of the newspaper) regarding a claim previously coded is used to complete the coding of that claim.

## PART II: VARIABLES

For each claim retrieved, a number of variables are coded which can be divided in ten groups. The core variables correspond to the basic elements of a claim (actors, forms, addressees, issues, objects, frames). The last group of variables provide additional information on protest actions. For each group, one or more variables are coded. Some of these variables are summaries of more detailed variables and therefore have an “s” as the first letter in their name. In addition, sometimes there are three variables for the same kind of information. In these cases, the first variable has to be used to code the main information. Example: variables ACTOR1-3 are meant to allow for the coding of more than one actor. It is not a way of coding in three different ways a single actor. The main actor is coded in ACTOR1, the other actors are coded in ACTOR2 and ACTOR3.

The ten groups of variables are the following:

Description of the claim

*Variable: TITLE*

Location of the claim in time and space

*Variables: SECTION, IDART, IDCLAIM, YEAR, MONTH, DAY, REGION, PLACE*

Actor making the claim

*Variables: ACTOR1-3, SACTOR1-3, PARTY1-3, ACTTYPE1-3, ACTNAME1-3, ACTSCOPI-3, ACTEUI-3*

Form of the claim

*Variable: FORM*

Addressee of the claim

*Variables: ADRI-3, SADRI-3, ADRSCOPI-3, ADREUI-3, CRACTI-3, SCRACTI-3, CRSCOPI-3, CRACTEUI-3*

Aim of the claim

*Variables: AIMI-3*

Issue of the claim

*Variables: ISSUE1-3, ISSCOPI-3, ISSCOPB1-3, ISSEUI-3, ISSPOSI-3*

Object of the claim

*Variables: OBJI-3, OBJSECTI-3, OBJSCOPI-3, OBJEUI-3, CONPOSI-3*

Framing of the claim

*Variable: DIAG1-3, PROG1-3*

Additional information for protest actions

*Variables: PART, POLPRES, ARREST*

**DESCRIPTION**

This variable is used to give a brief description of the claim. It should contain at least the main actor, form, addressee (if any), object, and aim of the claim.

Variable name	<b>TITLE</b>
Variable label	'description of claim'
Values	string variable



## IDENTIFICATION AND LOCATION OF CLAIMS

These variables are used to identify the claims and locate them in time and space. Variables YEAR, MONTH, and DAY refer to the actual date of occurrence of the claim. If only a vague identification of date is reported, such as “last week” or “a few days ago”, the claim is coded as if it occurred 7 days earlier. If no indication of date is reported, the date of appearance of the newspaper is coded.

Variable name	<b>SECTION</b>	
Variable label	‘newspaper section’	
Value labels	1	‘front page’
	2	‘international’
	3	‘national’
	4	‘regional’
	5	‘local’
	6	‘economic pages’
	7	‘parliament’

Note: Use code 5 (‘local’) as a default if the regional and local sections are merged in the newspaper.

Variable name	<b>IDART</b>
Variable label	‘identification number of article’
Values	3-digit code (1-999)

Note: Starts from 1 at the beginning of each year.

Variable name	<b>IDCLAIM</b>
Variable label	‘identification number of claim’
Values	3-digit code (1-999)

Note: Starts from 1 at the beginning of each year.

Variable name        **YEAR**  
 Variable label      ‘year of occurrence of claim’  
 Values                4-digit code (1995-2002)

Variable name        **MONTH**  
 Variable label      ‘month of occurrence of claim’  
 Values                2-digit code (1-12)

Variable name        **DAY**  
 Variable label      ‘day of occurrence of claim’  
 Values                2-digit code (1-31)

Variable name        **REGION**  
 Variable label      ‘region in which the claim was made’

Value labels         0        ‘Europe’  
                           99        ‘unknown/unspecified’  
                           other codes: see country-specific codelist (regions)

Note: The region has to be defined at the country-level according to the meaningful administrative units. Example: cantons in Switzerland, *Régions* in France, *Länder* in Germany. Use code 0 for claims occurring in other countries.

Variable name        **PLACE**  
 Variable label      ‘place in which the claim was made’  
 Values                string variable

## ACTORS

These variables are used to code the actors of claims. They should be as inclusive as possible, i.e. they should include formal organizations and institutions, unorganized collectivities and groups, and single individuals. If several identifications are reported for a single actor, the following rules apply: (1) code the institutional affiliation of the actor in variables ACTOR1-3; (2) code the party affiliation of the actor in variables PARTY1-3; (3) code the personal name of the actor (single individual) in variables ACTNAME1-3. Variables ACTOR1-3, PARTY1-3, and ACTNAME1-3 are coded on the basis of open lists in which a new code is created for each new actor retrieved.

Variable name        **ACTOR1**  
 Variable label      ‘first actor’  
 Value labels        string variable

Variable name        **ACTOR2**  
 Variable label      ‘second actor’  
 Value labels        string variable

Variable name        **ACTOR3**  
 Variable label      ‘third actor’  
 Value labels        string variable

Variable name        **SACTOR1**  
 Variable label      ‘summary first actor’  
 Value labels

- 10    *‘state actors’*
- 110    ‘government/executive’
  - 120    ‘parliament/legislative’
  - 130    ‘courts/judiciary’
  - 140    ‘welfare/social security agencies’
  - 151    ‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with employment issues’
  - 152    ‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with economic issues’
  - 153    ‘other state agencies’ (incl. advisory agencies)
  - 160    ‘state-controlled regulatory bodies’
  - 170    ‘independent regulatory bodies’
  - 180    ‘public service/company/utility’
  - 190    ‘other state actors’
- 20    *‘political parties’*
- 210    ‘political parties’ (incl. party sub-organizations and individual politicians)

- 30 *'labor organization and groups'*  
 310 'working poor'  
 320 'precarious workers/employees'  
 330 'workers/employees of the same company'  
 340 'other/unspecified workers/employees'  
 350 'workers advisory councils'  
 360 'peak unions'  
 370 'branch-specific unions'  
 380 'other/unspecified unions'
- 40 *'employers organizations and groups'*  
 410 'individual employers, private companies'  
 420 'peak employers organizations'  
 430 'branch-specific employers organizations'  
 440 'other/unspecified employers organizations and groups'
- 50 *'unemployed organizations and groups'*  
 510 'young unemployed'  
 520 'old-age unemployed'  
 530 'women unemployed'  
 540 'migrant unemployed'  
 550 'disabled unemployed'  
 560 'long-term unemployed'  
 570 'unemployed recently made redundant'  
 580 'other/unspecified unemployed organizations and groups'
- 60 *'non-state welfare organizations and groups'*  
 610 'organizations specifically dealing with young unemployed'  
 620 'organizations specifically dealing with old-age unemployed'  
 630 'organizations specifically dealing with women unemployed'  
 640 'organizations specifically dealing with migrant unemployed'  
 650 'organizations specifically dealing with disabled unemployed'  
 660 'organizations specifically dealing with long-term unemployed'  
 670 'organizations specifically dealing with unemployed recently made redundant'  
 680 'other/unspecified organizations dealing with unemployment issues'  
 690 'other/unspecified non-state welfare organizations and groups'
- 70 *'other civil society organizations and groups'*  
 710 'schools, research institutes, think tanks' (incl. individual experts)  
 720 'churches and religious organizations'  
 730 'media and journalists'  
 740 'other/unspecified professional organizations and groups'  
 750 'other/unspecified civil society organizations and groups'
- 80 *'social partners'*  
 810 'social partners'
- 90 *'other actors'*  
 910 'other actors'

99     *'unknown/unspecified'*  
 999    *'unknown/unspecified'*

Variable name     **SACTOR2**  
 Variable label    *'summary second actor'*  
 Value labels      see SACTOR1

Variable name     **SACTOR3**  
 Variable label    *'summary third actor'*  
 Value labels      see SACTOR1

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Codes referring to organizations or institutions include their representatives. Codes referring to state actors include all administrative levels. If an organization or group identification falls into several categories at the same time, the following priority rules apply: (1) state identifications have priority over party identifications; (2) identifications as unemployed have priority over other identifications. Concerning unemployed organizations and groups as well as non-state welfare organizations and groups, the following priority order applies: (1) young unemployed, (2) old-age unemployed, (3) women unemployed, (4) migrant unemployed, (5) disabled unemployed, (6) long-term unemployed, (7) unemployed recently made redundant, (8) other organizations and groups. If these rules do not allow a decision, use the order in which the actors are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article. Local communities are coded as “government/executive” if there is explicit information allowing to do so. Only actors with decisional/regulatory/advisory power belong to the category of state actors. Members of commissions with such power also belong to state actors. Party members are coded as “political parties” (not as state actors) when they act as such. Use code 0 for ‘no second actor’ in variable SACTOR2 and for ‘no third actor’ in variable SACTOR3.

Variable name     **PARTY1**  
 Variable label    *'party affiliation of first actor'*  
 Value labels      see country-specific codelist (parties)

Variable name     **PARTY2**  
 Variable label    *'party affiliation of second actor'*  
 Value labels      see country-specific codelist (parties)

Variable name     **PARTY3**  
 Variable label    *'party affiliation of third actor'*  
 Value labels      see country-specific codelist (parties)

Note: Use code 0 for ‘no second actor’ in variable PARTY2 and for ‘no third actor’ in variable PARTY3.

Variable name        **ACTNAME1**  
 Variable name        ‘full name of spokesperson for first actor’  
 Value labels         string variable

Variable name        **ACTNAME2**  
 Variable name        ‘full name of spokesperson for second actor’  
 Value labels         string variable

Variable name        **ACTNAME3**  
 Variable name        ‘full name of spokesperson for third actor’  
 Value labels         string variable

Variable name        **ACTTYPE1**  
 Variable label        ‘type of first actor’

Value labels         1        ‘state institution or agency’ (incl. representatives)  
                           2        ‘non-state organization’ (incl. representatives)  
                           3        ‘unorganised collectivity or group’  
                           9        ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name        **ACTTYPE2**  
 Variable label        ‘type of second actor’  
 Value labels         see ACTTYPE1

Variable name        **ACTTYPE3**  
 Variable label        ‘type of third actor’  
 Value labels         see ACTTYPE1

Note: The category ‘state institution or agency’ refers to administrative levels. Actors are coded as ‘unorganized collectivity or group’ if there is no mention of formal organization. Individuals are coded as ‘unknown/unspecified’ if there is no mention of organizational affiliation. Political parties are coded as ‘non-state institution’. Use code 0 for ‘no second actor’ in variable ACTTYPE2 and for ‘no third actor’ in variable ACTTYPE3.

Variable name        **ACTSCOPI**  
 Variable label        ‘scope of first actor’  
 Value labels         1        ‘supranational/transnational’ (except European Union)  
                           2        ‘European’

3	'multilateral'
4	'bilateral'
5	'national'
6	'regional'
7	'local'
9	'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name        **ACTSCOP2**  
 Variable label      'scope of second actor'  
 Value labels        see ACTSCOP1

Variable name        **ACTSCOP3**  
 Variable label      'scope of third actor'  
 Value labels        see ACTSCOP1

Note: The scope of actors refers to the organizational extension of the organization or institution. For unorganized collectivities and groups, it refers to the scope of mobilization. Use code 0 for 'no second actor' in variable ACTSCOP2 and for 'no third actor' in variable ACTSCOP3.

Variable name        **ACTEU1**  
 Variable label      'relation of first actor to EU'  
 Value labels        1        'contained in the EU'  
                           2        'not contained in the EU'  
                           9        'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name        **ACTEU2**  
 Variable label      'relation of second actor to EU'  
 Value labels        see ACTEU1

Variable name        **ACTEU3**  
 Variable label      'relation of third actor to EU'  
 Value labels        see ACTEU1

Note: Variables ACTEU1-3 apply only to codes 3 to 7 in variables ACTSCOP1-3. Use code 1 ('contained in the EU') only for actors that are completely contained in the EU, otherwise use code 2 ('not contained in the EU'). Use code 0 for 'no second actor' in variable ACTEU2 and for 'no third actor' in variable ACTEU3.

## FORMS

This variable is used to code the form of claims. If there are more than one form, the following priority rules apply: (1) political decisions have priority over the other forms; (2) protest actions have priority over verbal statements; (3) among protest actions, the more radical ones have priority over moderate ones. If these rules do not allow a decision, use the order in which the forms are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article.

Variable name	<b>FORM</b>
Variable label	'form of action'
Value labels	
20	<i>'political decisions'</i>
21	'proposal of new legislation'
22	'adoption of new legislation'
23	'implementation of new legislation'
24	'administrative decision'
25	'decision by administrative or constitutional court'
26	'decision by state committee'
27	'repressive measures'
29	'other/unspecified political decisions'
30	<i>'verbal statements'</i>
31	'decision by non-state institution' (party, union, private company, etc.)
32	'parliamentary debate/intervention' (incl. in committees)
33	'direct information to the public' (conference, congress, etc.)
34	'declaration in the media/interview/press conference'
35	'written statement/resolution/publication'
36	'advertisement campaign'
37	'guest commentary'
39	'other/unspecified verbal statements'
40	<i>'conventional protest actions'</i>
41	'judicial action'
42	'lobbying/political pressure'
43	'launching of initiative/referendum'
44	'participation to committees/consultations/negotiations'
45	'creation of new organization'
46	'closed-doors meeting' (not public)
49	'other/unspecified conventional actions'
50	<i>'demonstrative protest actions'</i>
51	'collection of signatures for initiative/referendum'



- 52 'presentation of signatures for initiative/referendum'
- 53 'petition/collection of signatures/letter campaign'
- 54 'public rally/assembly' (incl. distribution of leaflets)
- 55 'demonstration/protest march' (legal and non-violent)
  
- 59 'other/unspecified demonstrative actions'
  
- 60 '*confrontational protest actions*'
  - 61 'illegal demonstration' (non-violent)
  - 62 'boycott'
  - 63 'strike'
  - 64 'self-imposed constraints' (hunger strike, suicide)
  - 65 'blockade'
  - 66 'occupation'
  - 67 'perturbation of actions by others'
  
  - 69 'other/unspecified confrontational actions'
  
- 70 '*violent protest actions*'
  - 71 'violent demonstration'
  - 72 'threats/call to use violence'
  - 73 'limited destruction of property'
  - 74 'large destruction of property' (incl. arson, bomb attack)
  - 75 'sabotage'
  - 76 'light physical violence against people'
  - 77 'severe physical violence against people'
  
  - 79 'other/unspecified violent actions'

Note: Only 2-digit codes are used for primary coding. Political decisions (codes 21-29) refer only to state actors and actions. Decisions by other organizations are not political decisions (use code 31). Examples: a decision by a political party is not a political decision; a proposal for new legislation delivered at a party convention or during a parliamentary debate is not a political decision.

## ADDRESSEES

These variables are used to code the addressees of claims, i.e. the actors to which the actors refer in their claims. There are two types of addressees:

- The addressee narrowly defined (ADR1-3, SADR1-3, ADRSCOP1-3, ADREU1-3), i.e. the actor who is held responsible for acting with regard to the claim or at whom the claim is directly addressed as a call to act. In other words, this is the actor at whom a demand is explicitly addressed (usually, a state actor).
- The criticized actors (CRACT1-3, SCRACT1-3, CRSCOP1-3, CRACTEU1-3), i.e. the actor who is overtly criticized or mentioned in a negative way in the claim.

If there are more than one addressee or criticized actor, the following priority rules apply: (1) organizations or institutions (or their representatives) have priority over unorganized collectivities or groups; (2) state actors have priority over non-state actors. If these rules do not allow a decision, use the order in which the addressee or criticized actor are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article.

Variable name	<b>ADR1</b>
Variable label	‘first addressee’
Value labels	string variable

Variable name	<b>ADR2</b>
Variable label	‘second addressee’
Value labels	string variable

Variable name	<b>ADR3</b>
Variable label	‘third addressee’
Value labels	string variable

Variable name	<b>SADR1</b>
Variable label	‘first summary addressee’
Value labels	

<i>10</i>	<i>‘state actors’</i>
110	‘government/executive’
120	‘parliament/legislative’
130	‘courts/judiciary’
140	‘welfare/social security agencies’
151	‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with employment issues’
152	‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with economic issues’
153	‘other state agencies’ (incl. advisory agencies)
160	‘state-controlled regulatory bodies’
170	‘independent regulatory bodies’

- 180 'public service/company/utility'
- 190 'other state actors'
  
- 20 *'political parties'*
  - 210 'political parties' (incl. party sub-organizations and individual politicians)
  
- 30 *'labor organization and groups'*
  - 310 'working poor'
  - 320 'precarious workers/employees'
  - 330 'workers/employees of the same company'
  - 340 'other/unspecified workers/employees'
  - 350 'workers advisory councils'
  - 360 'peak unions'
  - 370 'branch-specific unions'
  - 380 'other/unspecified unions'
  
- 40 *'employers organizations and groups'*
  - 410 'individual employers, private companies'
  - 420 'peak employers organizations'
  - 430 'branch-specific employers organizations'
  - 440 'other/unspecified employers organizations and groups'
  
- 50 *'unemployed organizations and groups'*
  - 510 'young unemployed'
  - 520 'old-age unemployed'
  - 530 'women unemployed'
  - 540 'migrant unemployed'
  - 550 'disabled unemployed'
  - 560 'long-term unemployed'
  - 570 'unemployed recently made redundant'
  - 580 'other/unspecified unemployed organizations and groups'
  
- 60 *'non-state welfare organizations and groups'*
  - 610 'organizations specifically dealing with young unemployed'
  - 620 'organizations specifically dealing with old-age unemployed'
  - 630 'organizations specifically dealing with women unemployed'
  - 640 'organizations specifically dealing with migrant unemployed'
  - 650 'organizations specifically dealing with disabled unemployed'
  - 660 'organizations specifically dealing with long-term unemployed'
  - 670 'organizations specifically dealing with unemployed recently made redundant'
  - 680 'other/unspecified organizations dealing with unemployment issues'
  - 690 'other/unspecified non-state welfare organizations and groups'
  
- 70 *'other civil society organizations and groups'*
  - 710 'schools, research institutes, think tanks' (incl. individual experts)
  - 720 'churches and religious organizations'
  - 730 'media and journalists'
  - 740 'other/unspecified professional organizations and groups'
  - 750 'other/unspecified civil society organizations and groups'

80	<i>'social partners'</i>
810	'social partners'
90	<i>'other actors'</i>
910	'other actors'
99	<i>'unknown/unspecified'</i>
999	'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name           **SADR2**  
 Variable label        'summary second addressee'  
 Value labels           see SADR1

Variable name           **SADR3**  
 Variable label        'summary third addressee'  
 Value labels           see SADR1

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Codes referring to organizations or institutions include their representatives. Codes referring to state actors include all administrative levels. If an organization or group identification falls into several categories at the same time, the following priority rules apply: (1) state identifications have priority over party identifications; (2) identifications as unemployed have priority over other identifications. Concerning unemployed organizations and groups as well as non-state welfare organizations and groups, the following priority order applies: (1) young unemployed, (2) old-age unemployed, (3) women unemployed, (4) migrant unemployed, (5) disabled unemployed, (6) long-term unemployed, (7) unemployed recently made redundant, (8) other organizations and groups. If these rules do not allow a decision, use the order in which the addressees are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article. Local communities are coded as "government/executive" if there is explicit information allowing to do so. Only actors with decisional/regulatory/advisory power belong to the category of state actors. Members of commissions with such power also belong to state actors. Party members are coded as "political parties" (not as state actors) when they act as such. Use code 0 for 'no second addressee' in variable SADR2 and for 'no third addressee' in variable SADR3.

Variable name           **ADRSCOPI**  
 Variable label        'scope of first addressee'  
 Value labels           1       'supranational/transnational' (except European Union)  
                           2       'European'  
                           3       'multilateral'  
                           4       'bilateral'  
                           5       'national'  
                           6       'regional'  
                           7       'local'  
                           9       'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name       **ADRSCOP2**  
 Variable label       ‘scope of second addressee’  
 Value labels         see SADRSCOP1

Variable name       **ADRSCOP3**  
 Variable label       ‘scope of third addressee’  
 Value labels         see SADRSCOP1

Note: Use code 0 for ‘no second addressee’ in variable ADRSCOP2 and for ‘no third addressee’ in variable ADRSCOP3.

Variable name       **ADREU1**  
 Variable label       ‘relation of first addressee to EU’  
 Value labels         1       ‘contained in the EU’  
                           2       ‘not contained in the EU’  
                           9       ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name       **ADREU2**  
 Variable label       ‘relation of second addressee to EU’

Variable name       **ADREU3**  
 Variable label       ‘relation of third addressee to EU’

Note: Variables ADREU1-3 apply only to codes 3 to 7 in variables ADRSCOP1-3. Use code 1 (‘contained in the EU’) for addresses that are completely contained in the EU, otherwise use code 2 (‘not contained in the EU’). Use code 0 for ‘no second addressee’ in variable ADREU2 and for ‘no third addressee’ in variable ADREU3.

Variable name       **CRACT1**  
 Variable label       ‘first criticized actor’  
 Value labels         string variable

Variable name       **CRACT2**  
 Variable label       ‘second criticized actor’  
 Value labels         string variable

Variable name       **CRACT3**  
 Variable label       ‘third criticized actor’  
 Value labels         string variable

Variable name       **SCRACT1**  
 Variable label       ‘summary first criticized actor’  
 Value labels

- 10     ‘state actors’
- 110    ‘government/executive’
  - 120    ‘parliament/legislative’
  - 130    ‘courts/judiciary’
  - 140    ‘welfare/social security agencies’
  - 151    ‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with employment issues’
  - 152    ‘state executive agencies specifically dealing with economic issues’
  - 153    ‘other state agencies’ (incl. advisory agencies)
  - 160    ‘state-controlled regulatory bodies’
  - 170    ‘independent regulatory bodies’
  - 180    ‘public service/company/utility’
  - 190    ‘other state actors’
- 20     ‘political parties’
- 210    ‘political parties’ (incl. party sub-organizations and individual politicians)
- 30     ‘labor organization and groups’
- 310    ‘working poor’
  - 320    ‘precarious workers/employees’
  - 330    ‘workers/employees of the same company’
  - 340    ‘other/unspecified workers/employees’
  - 350    ‘workers advisory councils’
  - 360    ‘peak unions’
  - 370    ‘branch-specific unions’
  - 380    ‘other/unspecified unions’
- 40     ‘employers organizations and groups’
- 410    ‘individual employers, private companies’
  - 420    ‘peak employers organizations’
  - 430    ‘branch-specific employers organizations’
  - 440    ‘other/unspecified employers organizations and groups’
- 50     ‘unemployed organizations and groups’
- 510    ‘young unemployed’
  - 520    ‘old-age unemployed’
  - 530    ‘women unemployed’
  - 540    ‘migrant unemployed’
  - 550    ‘disabled unemployed’
  - 560    ‘long-term unemployed’
  - 570    ‘unemployed recently made redundant’

- 580 'other/unspecified unemployed organizations and groups'
- 60 *'non-state welfare organizations and groups'*
- 610 'organizations specifically dealing with young unemployed'
- 620 'organizations specifically dealing with old-age unemployed'
- 630 'organizations specifically dealing with women unemployed'
- 640 'organizations specifically dealing with migrant unemployed'
- 650 'organizations specifically dealing with disabled unemployed'
- 660 'organizations specifically dealing with long-term unemployed'
- 670 'organizations specifically dealing with unemployed recently made redundant'
- 680 'other/unspecified organizations dealing with unemployment issues'
- 690 'other/unspecified non-state welfare organizations and groups'
- 70 *'other civil society organizations and groups'*
- 710 'schools, research institutes, think tanks' (incl. individual experts)
- 720 'churches and religious organizations'
- 730 'media and journalists'
- 740 'other/unspecified professional organizations and groups'
- 750 'other/unspecified civil society organizations and groups'
- 80 *'social partners'*
- 810 'social partners'
- 90 *'other actors'*
- 910 'other actors'
- 99 *'unknown/unspecified'*
- 999 'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name           **SCRACT2**  
 Variable label        'summary second criticized actor'  
 Value labels           see SCRACT1

Variable name           **SCRACT3**  
 Variable label        'summary third criticized actor'  
 Value labels           see SCRACT1

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Codes referring to organizations or institutions include their representatives. Codes referring to state actors include all administrative levels. If an organization or group identification falls into several categories at the same time, the following priority rules apply: (1) state identifications have priority over party identifications; (2) identifications as unemployed have priority over other identifications. Concerning unemployed organizations and groups as well as non-state welfare organizations and groups, the following priority order applies: (1) young unemployed, (2) old-age unemployed, (3) women unemployed, (4) migrant unemployed, (5) disabled unemployed, (6) long-term unemployed, (7) unemployed recently made redundant, (8) other organizations and groups. If these rules do not

allow a decision, use the order in which the criticized actors are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article. Local communities are coded as “government/executive” if there is explicit information allowing to do so. Only actors with decisional/regulatory/advisory power belong to the category of state actors. Members of commissions with such power also belong to state actors. Party members are coded as “political parties” (not as state actors) when they act as such. Use code 0 for ‘no second criticized actor’ in variable SCRACT2 and for ‘no third criticized actor’ in variable SCRACT3.

Variable name	<b>CRSCOP1</b>
Variable label	‘scope of first criticized actor’
Value labels	1 ‘supranational/transnational’ (except European Union)
	2 ‘European’
	3 ‘multilateral’
	4 ‘bilateral’
	5 ‘national’
	6 ‘regional’
	7 ‘local’
	9 ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name	<b>CRSCOP2</b>
Variable label	‘scope of second criticized actor’
Value labels	see CRSCOP1

Variable name	<b>CRSCOP3</b>
Variable label	‘scope of third criticized actor’
Value labels	see CRSCOP1

Note: Use code 0 for ‘no second criticized actor’ in variable CRSCOP2 and for ‘no third criticized actor’ in variable CRSCOP3.

Variable name	<b>CRITEU1</b>
Variable label	‘relation of first criticized actor to EU’
Value labels	1 ‘contained in the EU’
	2 ‘not contained in the EU’
	9 ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name	<b>CRITEU2</b>
Variable label	‘relation of second criticized actor to EU’



Value labels	see CRITEU1
Variable name	<b>CRITEU3</b>
Variable label	'relation of third criticized actor to EU'
Value labels	see CRITEU1

Note: Variables CRITEU1-3 apply only to codes 3 to 7 in variables CRSCOP1-3. Use code 1 ('contained in the EU') for addresses that are completely contained in the EU, otherwise use code 2 ('not contained in the EU'). Use code 0 for 'no second criticized actor' in variable CRITEU2 and for 'no third criticized actor' in variable CRITEU3.

## AIMS

These variables are used to code the aims of claims, i.e. their substantive content. The information is coded in string variables which report a detailed description of the substantive content of the claim, including direct and reported speech where possible. These variables are used to retrieve information on the issues, objects, and framing of claims. Together, objects, issues, and frames define the substantive content of the claim. The detailed information on the substantive content is coded in the aim variables, the summary information is coded in separate variables for issues, objects, and frames (see below).

Variable name	<b>AIM1</b>
Variable label	'first aim of claim'
Values	string variable'

Variable name	<b>AIM2</b>
Variable label	'second aim of claim'
Values	string variable'

Variable name	<b>AIM3</b>
Variable label	'third aim of claim'
Values	string variable'

Note: Variables AIM1-3 are coded as string variables which report a detailed description of the claim, including direct and reported speech where possible. Use variable AIM1 for the main aim.

## ISSUES

These variables are used to code the issues of claims, i.e. their thematic focus. A distinction is made between the thematic focus of the claim strictly defined (variables ISSUE1-3), on the one hand, and the position of claims towards the issues (variables ISSPOS1-3) and towards the constituency (CONPOS1-3), on the other. Variables ISSUE1-3 should be coded as “policy-neutral”, i.e. with no reference to the direction or evaluation of the claim. The latter will be coded in the variables ISSPOS1-3 and CONPOS1-3.

Variable name        **ISSUE1**  
 Variable label        ‘first issue of claim’  
 Value labels

### 1 ‘SOCIO-ECONOMIC ISSUES RELATING TO THE SITUATION OF THE LABOR MARKET’

- 10                    *‘macro-economic issues’*
- 100 ‘macro-economic issues in general’
  - 101 ‘strength/weakness of national economy’ (e.g. national competitiveness)
  - 102 ‘effects of currency fluctuation/exchange rate on national economy’
  - 103 ‘economic change/competitiveness of a specific sector of the economy’
  - 104 ‘economic change/competitiveness of a specific sub-national region’
  - 105 ‘social dialogue’
  - 106 ‘social responsibility of private companies’
  - 107 ‘dismissals’ (other than state action against them)
  - 108 ‘partial unemployment’
  - 109 ‘other specific macro-economic issues’
- 11                    *‘economic development/promotion policy’*
- 110 ‘economic development/promotion policy: general evaluation and policy orientation’
  - 111 ‘liberalization, flexibility’
  - 112 ‘economic effects of monetary policies on national economy’
  - 113 ‘taxation, social expenses’
  - 114 ‘state subsidies to companies’
  - 115 ‘state subsidies to economic sectors’
  - 116 ‘state subsidies to regions’
  - 117 ‘help to small/medium companies’
  - 119 ‘other specific issues relating to economic development/promotion policy’
- 12                    *‘state policy relating to the labor market’*
- 120 ‘state policy relating to the labor market: general evaluation and policy orientation’
  - 121 ‘creation of more spending power’
  - 122 ‘creation of jobs by the state’

- 123 'part-time employment'
  - 124 'job-sharing, reduction of collective labor time'
  - 125 'moonlighting'
  - 126 'lowering of the employment costs' (e.g. cheap labor)
  - 127 'state action against dismissals'
  - 129 'other specific issues relating to the state policy concerning the labor market'
- 13 *'state policy relating to the labor forces'*
- 130 'state policy relating to the labor forces: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 131 'impact of immigration on labor forces'
  - 132 'seasonal work's impact on labor forces'
  - 133 'impact of cross border commuters on labor forces'
  - 134 'changes in the impact of retirement age on labor forces'
  - 135 'socio-demographic changes'
  - 139 'other specific issues relating to the labor forces'
- 14 *'work conditions'*
- 140 'work conditions: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 141 'wages'
  - 142 'precarious work'
  - 143 'working hours'
  - 149 'other specific issues relating to work conditions'
- 15 *'targeted/group-specific employment measures'*
- 150 'targeted/group-specific employment measures' (e.g. policies against discrimination, for equal opportunities in the labor market)
- 2 'WELFARE SYSTEMS AND SOCIAL BENEFITS'**
- 20 *'unemployment-insurance system'*
- 200 'unemployment insurance system: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 201 'social security system: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 202 'access to unemployment benefits'
  - 203 'unemployment insurance benefits: duration, amount'
  - 204 'financing of the unemployment insurance' (e.g. paid contribution, part of the State)
  - 205 'regional, local system of unemployment insurance'
  - 206 'administration of the unemployment insurance'
  - 209 'other specific issues relating to the unemployment-insurance system'
- 21 *'social aid/assistance'*
- 210 'social aid/assistance: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 211 'access to social assistance'
  - 212 'financing of the social assistance'
  - 213 'social assistance benefits: duration, amount'
  - 214 'minimum wage/ basic income'
  - 215 'social assistance in connection to the unemployment insurance, of the whole social security system'
  - 216 'administration of the social assistance, structures'

- 219 'other specific issues relating to the social aid/assistance'
  
- 22 '*non-state welfare systems*'
  - 220 'non-state welfare systems: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 221 'semi-private welfare systems' (private institutions receiving state subsidies)
  - 222 'private welfare systems' (charity systems)
  - 223 'other specific issues relating to non-state welfare systems'
  
- 23 '*targeted group-specific reactive measures*'
  - 230 'targeted/group-specific reactive measures'
  
- 3 'INDIVIDUAL (RE)INSERTION INTO THE LABOR MARKET'**
  
- 30 '*active measures, (re)insertion measures for the unemployed*'
  - 300 'active/reinsertion measures for the unemployed: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 301 'workfare, compulsory work'
  - 302 'administrative help, placing procedures'
  - 303 'help to the unemployed to start a private company'
  - 304 'targeted/group-specific (re)insertion measures'
  - 309 'other specific (re)insertion measures'
  
- 31 '*training and formation for the unemployed*'
  - 310 'training and formation for the unemployed: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 311 'courses, education for the unemployed' (e.g. language, computing courses)
  - 312 'training courses for unemployed' (e.g. vocational training)
  - 313 'in-service training, temporary jobs for the unemployed'
  
- 32 '*educational issues*'
  - 320 'education: general evaluation and policy orientation'
  - 321 'transition from school into the labor market'
  - 322 'apprenticeship issues'
  - 323 'college and universities issues'
  - 324 'technical schools'
  - 325 'adult education' (e.g. continuing formation)
  - 326 'distribution of state resources and priorities relating to education'
  - 329 'other specific issues concerning education'
  
- 4 'ISSUES RELATING TO THE CONSTITUENCY OF THE UNEMPLOYED'**
  
- 40 '*associational life*'
  - 400 'associational life in general'
  - 401 'political mobilization'
  - 402 'self-help'
  - 409 'other specific issues relating to associational life'
  
- 41 '*attitudes/psychological disposition of unemployed*'
  - 410 'attitudes/psychological disposition of unemployed'

- 42     *'other issues relating to the constituency of the unemployed'*  
       420    *'other issues relating to the constituency of the unemployed'*  
       421    *'social problems'*
- 5        **'ACTOR-CLAIMS UNEMPLOYED'**  
       50     *'actor-claims unemployed'*  
       500    *'actor-claims unemployed'*
- 6        **'OTHER ISSUES'**  
       60     *'other issues'*  
       600    *'other issues'*  
       601    *'illegal work'*  
       602    *'crime and unemployment'*

Variable name        **ISSUE2**  
 Variable label        *'second issue of claim'*  
 Value labels         see ISSUE1

Variable name        **ISSUE3**  
 Variable label        *'third issue of claim'*  
 Value labels         see ISSUE3

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Category 1 ('socio-economic issues relating to the situation of the labor market') refers to claims concerning the situation of and changes in the labor market (e.g. expansion of the labor market, macro-economic solutions to unemployment, liberalization, flexibility, economic competitiveness). General and abstract references to unemployment receive code 100. Category 2 ('welfare systems and social benefits') refers to claims relating to the welfare state, but only insofar as financial matters are concerned (except for code 221, which may include issues other than financial matters). Category 3 ('individual (re)insertion into the labor market') deals with insertion and reinsertion measures at the individual level. These should be distinguished from the issues in category 1, which imply an intervention on the labor market itself. Therefore, code 150 is used for targeted/group-specific measures at the labor market level, while code 304 is used for targeted/group-specific measures at the individual level. Claims under code 3 should deal only with issues relating to state action. Insertion measures by private or semi-private institutions receive code 220 or 221. Categories 31 and 32 must be distinguished: category 31 deals with reinsertion measures for the unemployed (i.e. as a way to improve their possibilities to find a job); category 32 refers to education in general. Category 4 ('issues relating to the constituency of the unemployed') refers to issues relating to the unemployed themselves, the way they live and act. It does not deal with any kind of measure connected to them, but only with their own actions. Category 5 ('actor-claims unemployed') is reserved to claims made by the unemployed themselves which are outside the issue field of unemployment. Category 6 ('other issues') is for issues that cannot be classified in one of the other categories.

Variable name	<b>ISSCOP1</b>
Variable label	‘scope of first issue’
Value labels	1 ‘supranational/transnational’ (except European Union) 2 ‘European’ 3 ‘multilateral’ 4 ‘bilateral’ 5 ‘national’ 6 ‘regional’ 7 ‘local’  9 ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name	<b>ISSCOP2</b>
Variable label	‘scope of second issue’
Value labels	see ISSCOP1

Variable name	<b>ISSCOP3</b>
Variable label	‘scope of third issue’
Value labels	see ISSCOP3

Note: The scope of issues refers to the geographical and/or political scope of the issue. This is not necessarily the same as the scope of the actor (variables ACTSCOP1-3). Use code 0 for ‘no second issue’ in variable ISSCOP2 and for ‘no third issue’ in variable ISSCOP3.

Variable name	<b>ISSCOPB1</b>
Variable label	‘scope of first issue: broad definition’
Value labels	1 ‘supranational/transnational’ (except European Union) 2 ‘European’ 3 ‘multilateral’ 4 ‘bilateral’ 5 ‘national’ 6 ‘regional’ 7 ‘local’  9 ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name	<b>ISSCOPB2</b>
Variable label	‘scope of second issue: broad definition’
Value labels	see ISSCOPB1

Variable name           **ISSCOPB3**  
 Variable label        ‘scope of second issue: broad definition’  
 Value labels           see ISSCOPB1

Note: The broad definition of scope of issues refers to largest scope of the issue, taking into account both the scope of the issue and the scope of the actor. Example: if a local government criticizes the national government for interfering in its implementation of a EU regional policy relating to unemployment, the issue scope here is coded as ‘European’ and not as ‘local’ or ‘national’.

Variable name           **ISSEU1**  
 Variable label        ‘relation of first issue to EU’  
 Value labels           1       ‘contained in the EU’  
                           2       ‘not contained in the EU’  
                           9       ‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name           **ISSEU2**  
 Variable label        ‘relation of second issue to EU’  
 Value labels           see ISSEU1

Variable name           **ISSEU3**  
 Variable label        ‘relation of third issue to EU’  
 Value labels           see ISSEU1

Note: Variables ISSEU1-3 apply only to codes 3 to 7 in variables ISSCOP1-3. Use code 1 (‘contained in the EU’) only for issues that are completely contained in the EU, otherwise use code 2 (‘not contained in the EU’). Use code 0 for ‘no second issue’ in variable ISSEU2 and for ‘no third issue’ in variable ISSEU3.

Variable name           **ISSPOS1**  
 Variable label        ‘first position of claim towards issue’  
 Value labels           -1     ‘negative’  
                           0     ‘neutral/ambivalent/technocratic’  
                           1     ‘positive’

Variable name           **ISSPOS2**  
 Variable label        ‘second position of claim towards issue’



Value labels            see ISSPOS1

Variable name            **ISSPOS3**

Variable label            'third position of claim towards issue'

Value labels            see ISSPOS1

Note: Variables ISSPOS1-3 are used to code information on the position of claims towards the issues. They are meant to provide a general indicator of the (policy) direction of the issue. All claims that are in favor of the issue receive code 1. All claims that are against the issue receive code -1. All neutral, ambivalent, or technocratic claims receive code 0. Claims that cannot be classified according to this aspect receive code 9. Use code 8 for 'no second issue' in variable ISSPOS2 and for 'no third issue' in variable ISSPOS3.

## OBJECTS

These variables are used to code the objects of claims, i.e. the actors whose interests are affected by the claims. The object refers to the constituency to which the claim is addressed. This might be identical with the actor, identical with the addressee, or different from both. If there are several objects, the ultimate object should be coded as first object. If this rule does not allow a decision, use the order in which the objects are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article.

Variable name           **OBJ1**  
 Variable label           ‘first object of claim’  
 Value labels

- 10     *‘labor organization and groups*  
       110   ‘working poor’  
       120   ‘precarious workers/employees’  
       130   ‘workers/employees of the same company’  
       140   ‘illegal workers’  
       150   ‘other/unspecified workers/employees’  
       160   ‘workers advisory councils’  
       170   ‘peak unions’  
       180   ‘branch-specific unions’  
       190   ‘other/unspecified unions’
- 20     *‘unemployed organizations and groups’*  
       210   ‘young unemployed’  
       220   ‘old-age unemployed’  
       230   ‘women unemployed’  
       240   ‘migrant unemployed’  
       250   ‘disabled unemployed’  
       260   ‘long-term unemployed’  
       270   ‘unemployed recently made redundant’  
       280   ‘social welfare recipients’  
       290   ‘other/unspecified unemployed organizations and groups’

Variable name           **OBJ2**  
 Variable label           ‘second object of claim’  
 Value labels            see OBJ1

Variable name           **OBJ3**  
 Variable label           ‘third object of claim’  
 Value labels            see OBJ1

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Codes referring to organizations include their representatives. If an organization or group identification falls into

several categories at the same time, the following priority rule applies: identifications as unemployed have priority over other identifications. Concerning unemployed organizations and groups, the following priority order applies: (1) young unemployed, (2) old-age unemployed, (3) women unemployed, (4) migrant unemployed, (5) disabled unemployed, (6) long-term unemployed, (7) unemployed recently made redundant, (8) other organizations and groups. If these rules do not allow a decision, use the order in which the objects are mentioned, unless it is possible to find a priority rule according to other information in the article. Use code 0 for ‘no second object’ in variable OBJ2 and for ‘no third object’ in variable OBJ3.

Variable name	<b>OBJSECT1</b>
Variable label	‘economic sector of first object’
Value labels	
10	<i>‘primary sector (agriculture/extraction)’</i>
110	‘agriculture, fisheries, forestry’
120	‘mining, oil, natural gas’
190	‘other/unspecified primary sector’
20	<i>‘secondary sector (industry/manufacturing)’</i>
210	‘manufacturing’
220	‘electricity, gas, water’
230	‘construction’
290	‘other/unspecified secondary sector’
30	<i>‘tertiary sector (services/commerce)’</i>
310	‘wholesale and retail trade’
320	‘hotels and restaurants’
331	‘transport, storage’
332	‘communication’
340	‘financial services’
351	‘business services’
352	‘real estate’
360	‘public administration’
370	‘education’
381	‘health’
382	‘social work’
390	‘other/unspecified tertiary sector’
99	<i>‘unknown/unspecified’</i>
999	‘unknown/unspecified’

Variable name	<b>OBJSECT2</b>
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Variable label 'economic sector of second object'  
Value labels see OBJSECT1

Variable name **OBJSECT3**  
Variable label 'economic sector of third object'  
Value labels see OBJSECT1

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Use code 0 for 'no second object' in variable OBJSECT2 and for 'no third object' in variable OBJSECT3.

Variable name **OBJSCOP1**  
**Variable label** 'scope of first object of claim'  
Value labels

1	'supranational/transnational' (except European Union)
2	'European'
3	'multilateral'
4	'bilateral'
5	'national'
6	'regional'
7	'local'
9	'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name **OBJSCOP2**  
Variable label 'scope of first object of claim'  
Value labels see OBJSCOP1

Variable name **OBJSCOP3**  
Variable label 'scope of first object of claim'  
Value labels see OBJSCOP1

Note: Use code 0 for 'no second object' in variable OBJSCOP2 and for 'no third object' in variable OBJSCOP3.

Variable name **OBJEU1**  
Variable label 'relation of first object to EU'  
Value labels

1	'contained in the EU'
2	'not contained in the EU'
9	'unknown/unspecified'

Variable name       **OBJEU2**  
 Variable label       ‘relation of second object to EU’  
 Value labels         see OBJEU1

Variable name       **OBJEU3**  
 Variable label       ‘relation of third object to EU’  
 Value labels         see OBJEU1

Note: Variables OBJEU1-3 apply only to codes 3 to 7 in variables OBJCOP1-3. Use code 1 (‘contained in the EU’) only for issues that are completely contained in the EU, otherwise use code 2 (‘not contained in the EU’). Use code 0 for ‘no second object’ in variable OBJEU2 and for ‘no third object’ in variable OBJEU3.

Variable name       **CONPOS1**  
 Variable label       ‘first position of claim towards constituency’  
 Value labels         -1     ‘negative’  
                           0     ‘neutral/ambivalent/technocratic’  
                           1     ‘positive’  
                           9     ‘unclassifiable’

Variable name       **CONPOS2**  
 Variable label       ‘second position of claim towards constituency’  
 Value labels         see CONPOS1

Variable name       **CONPOS3**  
 Variable label       ‘third position of claim towards constituency’  
 Value labels         see CONPOS1

Note: Variables CONPOS1-3 are used to code information on the position of claims towards the constituency (i.e. the unemployed and workers/employees). They are meant to provide a general indicator of the rights and position of the constituency, of its benefits and opportunities, and of its duties. All claims that imply an improvement of the rights and position of the constituency group or an enlargement of its benefits and opportunities receive code 1. Claims that imply a decrease of the duties of the constituency also receive code 1. All claims that imply a deterioration of the rights and position of the constituency group or a restriction of their benefits and opportunities receive code -1. Claims that imply an increase of the duties of the constituency also receive code -1. All neutral, ambivalent, or technocratic claims receive code 0. Claims that cannot be classified according to this aspect receive code 9. Use code 8 for ‘no second issue’ in variable CONPOS2 and for ‘no third issue’ in variable CONPOS3.

The position of claim towards constituency (variables CONPOS1-3) is not necessarily the same as the position of claim towards issue (variables ISSPOS1-3). The latter

should be restricted only to claims referring to policy fields and policy measures. In other words, variables ISSPOS1-3 refer to means, whereas variables CONPOS1-3 refer to ends. Examples: if an actor is in favor of cutting benefits to the unemployed (AIM), the issue is “unemployment insurance and benefits”, the position towards issue is -1 (i.e. the actors wants benefits to be cut), and the position towards constituency is also -1 (i.e. the claim implies a deterioration of the rights and position of the constituency group); if an actor is in favor of liberalizing the labor market to reduce unemployment (AIM), the issue is “macro-economic framework”, the position towards issue is 1 (i.e. the actor wants the labor market to be liberalized), and the position towards constituency is either 0 or 1 (depending on the context of the article); if an actor simply states that unemployment is bad (AIM), there is no position towards issue (code 9) as it is a general verbal statement and does not refer to the policy field, and the position towards constituency is 1 (i.e. the claim implies an improvement of the rights and position of the constituency group).

## FRAMES

These variables are used to code the framing of claims, i.e. the ways in which the issue of unemployment is evaluated by the actors. We distinguish between two types of frames:

- Diagnostic frames: they refer to the causes of unemployment as formulated by the actor of the claim. In other words, they are the attribution of blame or responsibility for the problem or situation.
- Prognostic frames: they refer to the solutions to the problem of unemployment as formulated by the actor of the claim. In other words, they represent what the actor think it should be done to solve the problem of unemployment.

Variable name	<b>DIAG1</b>
Variable label	‘first diagnostic frame of claim’
Value labels	
10	‘economic/technological causes’
110	‘economic causes’ (e.g. costs, market, firms)
120	‘technological causes’ (e.g. innovations, mechanization)
190	‘other economic/technological causes’
20	<i>‘political/institutional causes’</i>
210	‘political causes’ (e.g. power struggle, interest mediation)
220	‘legal/administrative/regulatory causes’ (e.g. state, policy)
290	‘other political/institutional causes’
30	<i>‘social/demographic causes’</i>
310	‘social causes’ (e.g. distribution of resources, segregation)
320	‘educational causes’ (e.g. training, skills)
330	‘demographic causes’ (e.g. overpopulation, immigration)
390	‘other social/demographic causes’
40	<i>‘cultural/psychological causes’</i>
410	‘cultural causes’ (e.g. values, social norms)
420	‘individual/psychological causes’ (e.g. motivations, laziness)
490	‘other cultural/psychological causes’
50	<i>‘external causes’</i>
510	‘international causes’ (e.g. state relations, globalization)
520	‘climatic/seasonal causes’ (e.g. bad weather, dryness)
590	‘other external causes’

90 *'other diagnostic frames'*  
 910 'other diagnostic frames'

99 *'unclassifiable'*  
 999 'unclassifiable'

Variable name **DIAG2**  
 Variable label 'second diagnostic frame of claim'  
 Value labels see DIAG1

Variable name **DIAG3**  
 Variable label 'third diagnostic frame of claim'  
 Value labels see DIAG1

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Variables DIAG1-3 refer to the evaluation of the causes of unemployment. Example: "The government should introduce training courses for unemployed people (issue) because unemployment stems from a lack of working skills (diagnostic frame). Use code 0 for 'no second diagnostic frame' in variable DIAG2 and for 'no third diagnostic frame' in variable DIAG3.

Variable name **PROG1**  
 Variable label 'first prognostic frame of claim'  
 Value labels

1 'POLICY-DRIVEN SOLUTIONS' (FOCUS ON STATE INTERVENTION)

10 *'economic/technological policy solutions'*

100 'economic policy solutions' (e.g. market incentives, tax policy)

101 'technological policy solutions' (e.g. incentives for more innovation, better laws to encourage patents or research)

109 'other economic/technological policy solutions'

11 *'political/institutional/legal solutions'*

110 'political solutions' (e.g. change in political leadership)

111 'administrative/institutional solutions' (e.g. service reorganization, institution building, centralization/decentralization, programs for the unemployed)

112 'regulatory/legal/judiciary solutions' (e.g., laws specifying legal rights and duties of workers, employers (labor market or active measures), and the unemployed (insurance systems, or passive measures).

119 'other political/institutional/legal solutions'



- 12 *'other policy solutions'*  
 120 'social dialogue, partnerships'  
 121 'educational policy solutions' (e.g., state needs to reorganize schools or universities, better funding of education).  
 129 'other policy solutions'
- 2 'SOLUTIONS THAT ARE NOT POLICY-DRIVEN' (DO NOT REQUIRE STATE INTERVENTION)
- 20 *'cultural/individual solutions'*  
 200 'cultural solutions' (e.g. values, norms)  
 201 'individual/psychological solutions' (e.g. motivation)  
 202 'migration solutions' (e.g. move to where the jobs are)  
 209 'other cultural/individual solutions'
- 21 *'societal solutions'*  
 210 'market solutions' (e.g. the employers/the market will solve the problems)  
 211 'educational solutions' (e.g., universities, schools, and/or employers are called to provide better training and work experiences)  
 212 'science and technology solutions' (e.g., better science, new products, advancements of production forms)  
 213 'demographic solutions' (e.g., we need more children, less/more immigrant workers, less/more female workers)  
 219 'other societal solutions'
- 22 'external solutions'  
 220 'international solutions' (e.g. EU-policies, international treaties, ILO, GATT, WTO, globalization)  
 221 'climatic/seasonal solutions'  
 229 'other external solutions'
- 3 'OTHER SOLUTIONS'
- 30 *'other solutions'*  
 300 'other solutions'
- 9 *'Unclassifiable'*  
 99 *'unclassifiable'*  
 999 'unclassifiable'

Variable name      **PROG2**  
 Variable label      'second prognostic frame of claim'  
 Value labels        see PROG2

Variable name	<b>PROG3</b>
Variable label	'third prognostic frame of claim'
Value labels	see PROG3

Note: Only 3-digit codes are used for primary coding. Variables PROG1-3 refer to the ways in which actors envision and formulate solutions to the unemployment problem, including both macro (unemployment rate) and micro (individual unemployed) conceptions of the problem. They include both the rationales for policy-driven solutions (which interventions/programs do actors propose as solutions and on what basis) and the extent to which proposed solutions are not policy driven, i.e. do not require state interventions (e.g. the market, the weather, individual motivations). If actors propose the elimination or curtailment of existing programs as solutions, these are coded as policy-driven solutions here. However, specific 'policies' are coded in the ISSUE variables, while the PROG variables refer to social rationales or rationalities of action. Use code 0 for 'no second prognostic frame' in variable PROG2 and for 'no third prognostic frame' in variable PROG3.

**ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR PROTEST ACTIONS  
(TO BE CODED ONLY IF FORM > 40)**

These variables are coded only for protest actions, i.e. if FORM > 40. They are meant to provide information on the number of participants, the presence of the police to these actions, and the number of people arrested (if any).

Variable name	<b>PART</b>
Variable label	'number of participants'
Values	6-digit code (1-999998)
Missing value	999999

Note: For figures higher than 999998, use 999998. If several figures are is reported, use the highest.

Variable name	<b>POLPRES</b>
Variable label	'presence of police'
Value labels	0 no 1 yes, facilitating action 2 yes, neutral/ambivalent action 3 yes, repressive action

Variable name	<b>ARREST</b>
Variable label	'number of people arrested'
Values	3-digit code (1-998)
Missing value	999

Note: For figures higher than 998, use 998. If several figures are reported, use the highest.



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Basic Interview Schedule**

**Workpackage 2: Policy deliberation in the national policy domain**

**Paul Statham**

Note: This Basic schedule draws on the structure and experience of a schedule developed in a workpackage in another EU F5 project Europub.com, in which members of our team were involved in developing and testing, but which was principally authored by Hanspeter Kriesi.

## I. Action forms: General action repertoire

- 1 We would like to start this interview with a few questions about the **action repertoire** of your organization. Organizations such as yours use many different techniques to try to influence public policy **in (Country name)**. We have sent you *a list containing different techniques* which are used by such organizations. Please, tell me *which techniques* on this list *you use*, and whether you use it *regularly or occasionally*. (Just use the numbers of the different techniques for answering)

<i>Action form (State actors)</i>		<i>Nat. Q1</i>		<i>EU Q2</i>	
		<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>
<i>A. Media-related</i>					
1	giving interviews to the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	writing newspaper articles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	distribution of press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	holding press conferences to announce policy positions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	presenting yourself on the Web	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>B. Informing the public/getting informed about the public</i>					
6	making public speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	hiring a public relations firm to assist in your political activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	running advertisements in the media about your positions on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	polling the general public on policy issues of concern to you	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>C. Negotiating with or informing policy-makers</i>					
10	negotiating with or informing branches of government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	negotiating with or informing members of Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	negotiating with or informing interest groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>D. Consultation</i>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	participating in governmental consultation procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	serving on governmental advisory commissions or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	testifying in parliamentary committees or intervening in Parl.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>E. court-action</i>					
16	filing suit or engaging in some sort of litigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<i>Action form (Non-state actors)</i>		<i>Nat. Q1</i>		<i>EU Q2</i>	
		<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>
<i>A. Contributing to political campaigns</i>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	making financial contributions to electoral campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	making public endorsements of candidates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	contributing to other political campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>B. Media-related</i>					
4	giving interviews to the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	writing newspaper articles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	distribution of press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	holding press conferences to announce policy positions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	presenting yourself on the Web	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>C. Informing the public/getting informed about the public</i>					
9	making public speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	hiring a public relations firm to assist in your political activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	running advertisements in the media about your positions on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	polling the general public on policy issues of concern to you	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	polling your members on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>D. Mobilizing the public</i>					
14	engaging in direct mail fund-raising for your organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	organizing letter campaigns in newspapers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	organizing petitions/signature collections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	launching/supporting referendum campaigns <sup>51</sup>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	holding public assemblies and meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	protesting or demonstrating	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	organizing boycotts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	Striking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>E. contacting/lobbying</i>					
22	direct personal contact with members of Parl. or their staffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	direct personal contact with members of govt or their staffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	direct personal contact with public officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>F. consultation and cooperation</i>					
25	participating in governmental consultation procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26	serving on governmental advisory commissions or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27	testifying in parliamentary committees or intervening in Parl.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	supplying information to policymakers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>G. court-action</i>					
29	filing suit or engaging in some sort of litigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<sup>51</sup> Probably only to be used for CH and I.

2. Do you use any of these techniques **at the European level**?

- yes: please go through the list once again
- no

3. How important are **media-related strategies** (A IN THE LIST OF ACTION FORMS) for (ORNAME) compared to working with policy-makers (E/F IN THE LIST)?

- much more important
- more important
- less important
- much less important

Please, elaborate:

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

4. How important are **strategies directly informing (FOR NON-STATE ACTORS: and mobilizing) the public** (C/D IN THE LIST OF ACTION FORMS) for (ORNAME) compared to working with policy-makers?

- much more important
- more important
- less important
- much less important

Please, elaborate: .....

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**II. Issue-specific influence**

We have tried to establish a **list of the organizations** which play a role in policies relating to unemployment. You have also received a copy of this list.

5. Could you first name **all organizations** on this list, which, from your point of view, have been **particularly influential in policies relating to unemployment** over the past few years? You may also mention your own organization.

1		<input type="checkbox"/>	21		<input type="checkbox"/>
2		<input type="checkbox"/>	22		<input type="checkbox"/>
3		<input type="checkbox"/>	23		<input type="checkbox"/>
4		<input type="checkbox"/>	24		<input type="checkbox"/>
5		<input type="checkbox"/>	25		<input type="checkbox"/>
6		<input type="checkbox"/>	26		<input type="checkbox"/>
7		<input type="checkbox"/>	27		<input type="checkbox"/>
8		<input type="checkbox"/>	28		<input type="checkbox"/>
9		<input type="checkbox"/>	29		<input type="checkbox"/>
10		<input type="checkbox"/>	30		<input type="checkbox"/>
11		<input type="checkbox"/>	31		<input type="checkbox"/>
12		<input type="checkbox"/>	32		<input type="checkbox"/>
13		<input type="checkbox"/>	33		<input type="checkbox"/>
14		<input type="checkbox"/>	34		<input type="checkbox"/>
15		<input type="checkbox"/>	35		<input type="checkbox"/>
16		<input type="checkbox"/>	36		<input type="checkbox"/>
17		<input type="checkbox"/>	37		<input type="checkbox"/>
18		<input type="checkbox"/>	38		<input type="checkbox"/>
19		<input type="checkbox"/>	39		<input type="checkbox"/>
20		<input type="checkbox"/>	40		<input type="checkbox"/>

6. Are there **other influential organizations** in unemployment policy which you do not find on this list?

- no
- yes: which are they? .....
- .....
- .....
- .....

7. Among the organizations you have mentioned now, which are **the three most influential organizations** relating to unemployment?

- 1. ....
- 2. ....
- 3. ....

8. And which one among these three would you put in **first place**?  
.....



**III. Relations with other Collective Actors**

9. Which organizations on this list has (ORGNAME) **tried to influence** over the last five years? Please use the numbers on the list for your answers.

10. Are there any **other targets** (not on the list) which you tried to influence in recent years?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....
- 5.....
- 6.....

11. To which **three government agencies, committees, or officials** do you devote most of your resources in influencing policies on unemployment?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

12. Now look at the list once again. With which organizations on the list has (ORGNAME) **closely collaborated** over the last five years?

13. Are there any **other organizations** with whom you have **closely collaborated** in recent years?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....
- 5.....
- 6.....

14. Please, look at the list one more time: with which of these organizations did you have **some major disagreements** over the last five years?

*List of organizations*

		tried to influence Q17	Closely col- laborated Q20	Disagree -ments Q22
1		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
29		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
36		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

15. Are there any **other organizations** with whom you have had **major disagreements** in recent years?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....

16. (ONLY FOR NON-STATE ACTORS) Does (ORGNOME) belong to one or more **international organization or association**?

- no
- yes: please give the name of each organization

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

Please elaborate.....

17. (ONLY FOR NON-STATE ACTORS) Does (ORGNOME) maintain regular contact with **similar organizations in other countries**?

- no
- yes: please give the name of the most important ones

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

Please elaborate.....

**IV. Issue-Specific Interest: Job Creation/Social Benefits**

18a. Now we would like to ask you some questions about **job creation** and **social benefits**, two unemployment issues of particular interest to us. Could you please describe the **general position** of (ORGNOME) on **job creation** in a few words?

.....  
 .....

18b. Could you please describe the **general position** of (ORGNOME) on **social benefits** in a few words?

.....  
 .....

19a. Was (ORGNOME) **actively involved** in the issue of job creation over the last five years?

- yes
- no

19b. Was (ORGNOME) **actively involved** in the issue of social benefits over the last five years?

- yes
- no (IF NO ALSO IN Q19 GO TO Q28)

20. (IF YES in Q19/19b): Was (ORGNAME) **involved in the development of the policy options** about job creation and/or social benefits?  
 yes  
 no (GO TO Q22)

if yes, please, elaborate: .....  
 .....  
 .....

21. (IF NOT YET CLEAR) Which **level of political decision making** did (ORGNAME) try to influence? (SEVERAL CHOICES POSSIBLE)  
 European  
 other countries  
 national, own country  
 regional  
 local

- 22a. Did (ORGNAME) undertake specific **actions in the parliamentary or administrative arenas** on the issue of **job creation**?  
 yes  
 no (GO TO Q24)

if yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones**?

1. ....  
 .....  
 2. ....  
 .....  
 3. ....  
 .....

- 23a. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....  
 .....  
 .....

- 24a. Did (ORGNAME)
- (NON-STATE ACTORS) undertake specific **actions for informing or mobilizing the public** on the issue of **job creation**?
  - (STATE ACTORS) make attempts to communicate with **the public** on this issue?
    - yes
    - no (GO TO Q26)

If yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones**?

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....

- 25a. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

- 22b. Did (ORGNAME) undertake specific **actions in the parliamentary or administrative arenas** on the issue of **social benefits**?
- yes
  - no (GO TO Q24)

if yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones**?

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....

23b. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

- 24b. Did (ORGNAME)
- (NON-STATE ACTORS) undertake specific **actions for informing or mobilizing the public** on the issue of **social benefits**?
  - (STATE ACTORS) make attempts to communicate with **the public** on this issue?
- yes
- no (GO TO Q26)

If yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones**?

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....

25. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

26a. Two final questions about **job creation**: Do you think the public finds this issue:

- very important
- rather important
- rather unimportant
- very unimportant

27a. Do you think (ORGNAME) takes a position on job creation that **the majority of the public** agrees with, or do you think a majority of the public disagrees with your position on this issue?

- a majority agrees
- the public is evenly divided on this policy
- a majority disagrees
- don't know
- public doesn't know our position

If so desired, please elaborate: .....  
.....  
.....

26b. Two final questions about **social benefits**: Do you think the public finds this issue:

- very important
- rather important
- rather unimportant
- very unimportant

27b. Do you think (ORGNAME) takes a position on social benefits that **the majority of the public** agrees with, or do you think a majority of the public disagrees with your position on this issue?

- a majority agrees
- the public is evenly divided on this policy
- a majority disagrees
- don't know
- public doesn't know our position

If so desired, please elaborate: .....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**V. Role of EU**

To conclude our interview, we would like to ask you a few questions concerning **European integration**.

28. To what extent has the role of the EU been discussed in (ORG Name)?

- 1. Lots of discussion
- 2. Some discussion
- 3. No discussion

Please elaborate: .....  
.....  
.....

29. What *impact* did the EU have on **unemployment policy** in general?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

30a. And on **job creation** in particular?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

30b. And on **social benefits** in particular?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

31. And what has been the *impact* of the EU **on the situation of** (ORGNAME)?

.....  
.....



32. Are you aware of European strategies on unemployment?

- Yes
- No

Please elaborate (also on effectiveness of strategies).....

33. And *how involved* has (ORGNAME) been in **European policies relating to unemployment**?

- a lot
- somewhat (enough)
- somewhat (but not enough)
- not at all

If somewhat, but not enough or not at all: what were the reasons for this lack of involvement?

.....  
.....  
.....

34. And thinking about the **role of the European policies for unemployment** for (ORGNAME) **relative to** policies at the **national level**: are their role becoming increasingly important compared to the national level, less important compared to the national level, or does it not change at all?

- increasingly important
- unchanging
- less important

Please, elaborate: .....  
.....  
.....  
.....

35a. *Thinking about the future now*: what **impact** do you **expect European policies on unemployment in general**, and more specifically **European policies on job creation**, to have over the years to come?

.....  
.....

35b. And what about the impact of **European policies on social benefits** over the years to come?

.....  
.....

36. Is (ORGNOME) generally **in favour of an increase in European influence** in unemployment politics or is it against it? (IF NOT CLEAR: PROMPT: rather or strongly (in favor/against))

- strongly in favor
- rather in favor
- rather against
- strongly against

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

37. We are now at the end of our interview. Is there **anything you would like to add** to what we have discussed?

.....

.....

.....

.....

38. Do you want to get a **summary of the results** of this project?

- no
- yes: where should we send them to?

.....

.....

**On behalf of the whole project team, I would like to thank you very much for your cooperation!**

**(Obviously if teams are conducting extra questions Q.39 will come after those)**

**“UNEMPOL” additional questions for unemployed organizations**

(to be asked prior to basic schedule for unemployed organisations only)

i) Could you tell us briefly how your organization was founded, when, by whom, and why (brief history of the organization)?

.....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

ii) (FOR LOCAL ORG) Is your association/group active (respondent can choose MORE than ONE answer)?

- in a part of (City Name) → which part:.....
- in (City Name) in general
- in (City Name) and in (Region Name)
- in (City Name), in (Region Name) and in other parts of (country)
- outside UK (non-EU)
- in Europe

iii) Structure of Membership (give absolute numbers)

a. How many members does your organization have? (N)

.....

b. How many paid people work for your organization? (N)

.....

c. How many work on a voluntary basis? (N)

.....

iv) Of your members, are any made up of the following categories, and if so, what proportion (categories not mutually exclusive)?

	None	%
Unemployed	<input type="radio"/>	
Youths (up to 18 years)	<input type="radio"/>	
Young people between 18 and 25	<input type="radio"/>	
Women	<input type="radio"/>	
Ethnic minorities	<input type="radio"/>	
Long term Unemployed	<input type="radio"/>	
Disabled	<input type="radio"/>	
People over 50 years	<input type="radio"/>	
Trade Union Members	<input type="radio"/>	

v) Please describe the activities and main concerns of your organization:

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

vi) How are decisions taken and tasks shared within your organization?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

vii) Thinking of your main activities, which individuals or groups, apart from the unemployed, does your organization attempt to reach or help?

- None

- Some: Please specify all of these in order of their importance.

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....
4. .... etc...

viii) And among the unemployed which specific types of individuals or groups (e.g. long term unemployed, minorities, disabled etc.), does your organization attempt to reach or help?

- Organization does not differentiate among unemployed

- Yes - Please specify all of these in order of their importance.

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....
4. .... etc...

**Move onto to basic schedule – interviewer to explain that basic section is for international comparative project.**

### **Additional open ‘paths’:**

#### **Professionalism of the organisations of the unemployed:**

- Which is the professional background of the paid people working for your organisation?
- How is work distributed between paid people and volunteers?
- Which kind of importance do the paid people for (ORGNAME) have?

#### **Strategies mobilising the unemployed:**

- Which opportunities do especially unemployed people have to work within your organisation?
- Which groups of unemployed do engage politically?
- How does your organisation attract unemployed people to volunteer?
- How did the possibilities to mobilise unemployed people develop over the last years?

#### **Strategies of cooperation with other organisations:**

- How is cooperation organised? Are there coordinators or umbrella organisations? How is information exchanged? Are there newspapers of the organisations, coordination by internet? Which kind of joint actions are there?
- Contents of cooperation: On which topics do you easily agree with the other organisations? Which are the concrete problems of cooperation? How do you agree on priorities of your joint actions? Who takes the main decisions?

#### **Communication Strategies:**

- How is unemployment framed a) within the organisation? b) in cooperation with other organisations? by the organisation in the public?
- How are certain topics pictured in order to attract the public?



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Schedule for Unemployed Organizations**

**Workpackage 4: Organization and Activities of Unemployed**

**Simone Baglioni, Didier Chabanet, Christian Lahusen and Paul Statham**

Note: This Basic schedule draws on the structure and experience of a schedule developed in a workpackage in another EU F5 project Europub.com, in which members of our team were involved in developing and testing, but which was principally authored by Hanspeter Kriesi.

1) Could you tell us briefly how your organization was founded, by whom, when, why (brief history of the organization) ? **(TO INTERVIEWER: please, note that this is a crucial question allowing to get answers referring also to many other questions, so do not be afraid to spend time on it !)**

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

2) Does your organization have a formal membership? How many persons belong to the organization?

.....

2a) and how many persons take part in its activities ?

.....  
.....

3) Does your organization have paid staff ? If yes, which are their tasks?

.....  
.....

4) How many persons work on a voluntary basis?

.....

5) How does your organization attract unemployed people to participate?

.....  
.....

5a) Why an unemployed should join your association/group?

.....  
.....

5b)How do you recruit members or supporters?

.....  
.....

5c) Has membership increased or decreased over the last past years?

.....

6) How did the possibilities to mobilize unemployed people develop over the last years?

.....  
.....

7) Is your association/group active only in (NAME of the city) or is it active also on a regional, national, supranational (EU) or transnational level ?

.....  
.....  
.....

**7a) If the association/group is active also beyond the local level, what are the reasons that pushed the association/group to engage on the "other" levels ? (TO INTERVIEWER If ORG is active on a EU level, USE this question to understand why they refer to EU, how important the EU can be for their demands etc..).**

.....  
.....  
.....

8) Is your association/group part of an umbrella (national or supranational) organization?

.....

8a) If your association/group is part of a (formal or informal) network of organizations is this network focused on unemployment or does it concern also other issues?

.....  
.....

8b) If your association/group is part of a (formal or informal) network of organizations, how is cooperation organized? How is information exchanged?

.....

8c) Did your organization participate to the European social marches against unemployment and social exclusion or to the anti-globalization meetings? If yes, why did you decide to participate and how did you organize it? If no, why not?

.....  
.....

8d) If your organization participate to such events, does this provoke important effects on your organization? Please, elaborate:

.....

8e) What do you think of the action of the European Trade Union Confederation?, Please, elaborate:

.....



8f) Which kind of joint actions do you organize, within your umbrella or network organizations, during the last years? :

.....

8g) How much does it count the coordination via the internet?

.....

9) Which is your main area (issue) of work? Please, elaborate:

.....

.....

TO INTERVIEWER: the interviewed should answer to questions 10 to 15 bearing in mind a particular issue.

10) Thinking of your main activities, which individuals or groups, apart from the unemployed, does your organization attempt to reach or help? Why? PLEASE, TRY TO ANSWER THINKING TO A PARTICULAR ISSUE.

.....

.....

11) And among the unemployed which specific types of individuals or groups (e.g. long term unemployed, minorities, disabled etc..), does your organization attempt to reach or help? (issue specific, as above)

.....

.....

12) Organizations such as yours use many different techniques to try to influence public policies related to the employment situation both at national and at EU level. We have sent you *a list containing different techniques* which are used by such organizations. Please, tell me *which techniques* on this list *you use*, and whether you use it *regularly or occasionally*. (Just use the numbers of the different techniques for answering)

<i>Action form (Non-state actors)</i>		<i>Nat. Q1</i>		<i>EU Q2</i>	
		<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>
<i>A. Contributing to political campaigns</i>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	making financial contributions to electoral campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	making public endorsements of candidates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	contributing to other political campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>B. Media-related</i>					
4	giving interviews to the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	writing newspaper articles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	distribution of press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	holding press conferences to announce policy positions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	presenting yourself on the Web	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>C. Informing the public/getting informed about the public</i>					
9	making public speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	hiring a public relations firm to assist in your political activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	running advertisements in the media about your positions on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	polling the general public on policy issues of concern to you	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	polling your members on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>D. Mobilizing the public</i>					
14	engaging in direct mail fund-raising for your organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	organizing letter campaigns in newspapers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	organizing petitions/signature collections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	launching/supporting referendum campaigns <sup>52</sup>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	holding public assemblies and meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	protesting or demonstrating	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	organizing boycotts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	Striking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>E. contacting/lobbying</i>					
22	direct personal contact with members of Parl. or their staffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	direct personal contact with members of govt or their staffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	direct personal contact with public officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>F. consultation and cooperation</i>					
25	participating in governmental consultation procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26	serving on governmental advisory commissions or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27	testifying in parliamentary committees or intervening in Parl.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	supplying information to policymakers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>G. court-action</i>					
29	filing suit or engaging in some sort of litigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<sup>52</sup> Probably only to be used for CH and I.

13) Why do you choose these strategies ? On what basis do you select strategies ? (issue specific, as above)

.....  
.....

14) How important are media-related strategies compared to other actions? (issue specific, as above)

.....  
.....

15) And how important are strategies directly informing and mobilizing the public? (issue specific, 15as above)

.....  
.....

16) What are, currently, the main constraints/obstacles to the mobilization of the Unemployed, at the local, national and European level (including transnational level)?

.....  
.....

17) We have tried to establish a **list of the organizations** which play a role in policies relating to unemployment. You have also received a copy of this list.

Could you first name **all organizations** on this list, which, from your point of view, have been **particularly influential in policies relating to unemployment** over the past few years? You may also mention your own organization.

THEN:

Which organizations on this list has (ORGNAME) **tried to influence** over the last five years?

With which organizations on the list has (ORGNAME) **closely collaborated** over the last five years?

With which of these organizations did you have **some major disagreements** over the last five years?

(TABLE IS AN EXAMPLE FROM UK)

1	European Economic and Social Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	21	Local branches of Liberal Democrats	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	European Committee of the Regions	<input type="checkbox"/>	22	Church of England	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	European Council	<input type="checkbox"/>	23	Catholic Church	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	European Parliament (MEPs)	<input type="checkbox"/>	24	National Association of Citizens Advice Bureaux	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	European Commission	<input type="checkbox"/>	25	The Institute for Public Policy Research	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	HM Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	26	The Improvement and Development Agency	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	Department of Work and Pensions	<input type="checkbox"/>	27	The Joseph Rowntree Foundation	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	Jobcentre Plus	<input type="checkbox"/>	28	The Fabian Society	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	Department of Trade and Industry	<input type="checkbox"/>	29	The Work Foundation	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	Local Jobcentre Plus Offices	<input type="checkbox"/>	30	The Institute for Employment Studies	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	Trades Union Congress	<input type="checkbox"/>	31	Tomorrow's People	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Local branches of Trade Union Congress	<input type="checkbox"/>	32	Institute of Economic Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Confederation of British Industry	<input type="checkbox"/>	33	The Adam Smith Institute	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	Local branches of CBI	<input type="checkbox"/>	34	PAULO (NTO for community-based development)	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	Federation of Small Businesses (FSB)	<input type="checkbox"/>	35	The Black Training and Enterprise Group (BTEG)	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	Labour Party.	<input type="checkbox"/>	36	Centre for Economic and Social Inclusion	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	Local branches of Labour Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	37	National Council for One Parent Families	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	Conservative Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	38	Local/Regional branch Trade Union organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	Local branches of Conservative Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	39	Unemployed organisations and campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	Liberal Democrats	<input type="checkbox"/>	40	Local Authorities	<input type="checkbox"/>

17a). Are there **other influential organizations, other organizations you tried to influence, other organizations with whom you closely collaborate and other organizations with whom you have had major disagreements** in unemployment policy, which you do not find on this list?

no

yes: please, elaborate .....

.....  
 .....

.....  
.....

18) Is your association/group generally in favor of an increase of European influence in unemployment politics or is it against it? Why ?

.....  
.....

19) Compared to the national arena, is the EU more an opportunity than a boundary for the promotion and the defense of the Unemployed interests? Please, elaborate:

.....  
.....

20) Did you try to obtain direct funds or resources from the EU ? (TO INTERVIEWER: the AIM is to understand the organization's knowledge of EU circuits, especially the financial ones, so, in both cases of positive or negative answer, ask why they get the money or why not).

.....  
.....

21) What has been the impact of the EU on the situation of your association/group?

.....  
.....



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
 Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Questionnaire for Interviews with European Actors**

**Workpackage 3: Policy deliberation at the EU Level**

**Paul Statham**

Note: This EU level schedule has been adapted from the Basic UNEMPOL schedule which draws on the structure and experience of a schedule developed in a workpackage in another EU F5 project Europub.com, in which members of our team were involved in developing and testing, but which was principally authored by Hanspeter Kriesi.

Name of interviewer:	
Date of interview:	
Interviewee:	
Organisation:	

## I. Action forms: General action repertoire

- 1 We would like to start this interview with a few questions about the **action repertoire** of your organization. Organizations such as yours use many different techniques to try to influence public policy **in the European Union**. We have sent you *a list containing different techniques* which are used by such organizations. Please, tell me *which techniques* on this list *you use*, and whether you use it *regularly or occasionally*. (Just use the numbers of the different techniques for answering)

<i>Action form (State actors)</i>		<i>EU Q1</i>		<i>Member State Q2</i>	
		<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>
<i>A. Media-related</i>					
1	giving interviews to the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	writing newspaper articles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	distribution of press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	holding press conferences to announce policy positions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	presenting yourself on the Web	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>B. Informing the public/getting informed about the public</i>					
6	making public speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	hiring a public relations firm to assist in your political activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	running advertisements in the media about your positions on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	polling the general public on policy issues of concern to you	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>C. Negotiating with or informing policy-makers</i>					
10	negotiating with or informing branches of government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	negotiating with or informing members of Parliament	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	negotiating with or informing interest groups	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>D. Consultation</i>					
13	participating in governmental consultation procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	serving on governmental advisory commissions or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	testifying in parliamentary committees or intervening in Parl.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>E. court-action</i>					
16	filing suit or engaging in some sort of litigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

<i>Action form (Non-state actors)</i>		<i>EU Q1</i>		<i>Member State Q2</i>	
		<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>	<i>Reg</i>	<i>Occ</i>
<i>A. Contributing to political campaigns</i>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
1	making financial contributions to electoral campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	making public endorsements of candidates	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	contributing to other political campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>B. Media-related</i>					
4	giving interviews to the media	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	writing newspaper articles	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	distribution of press releases	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	holding press conferences to announce policy positions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	presenting yourself on the Web	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>C. Informing the public/getting informed about the public</i>					
9	making public speeches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	hiring a public relations firm to assist in your political activities	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	running advertisements in the media about your positions on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	polling the general public on policy issues of concern to you	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	polling your members on policy issues	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>D. Mobilizing the public</i>					
14	engaging in direct mail fund-raising for your organization	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	organizing letter campaigns in newspapers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	organizing petitions/signature collections	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	launching/supporting referendum campaigns	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	holding public assemblies and meetings	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	protesting or demonstrating	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	organizing boycotts	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	Striking	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>E. contacting/lobbying</i>					
22	direct personal contact with members of Parl. or their staffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	direct personal contact with members of govt or their staffs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	direct personal contact with public officials	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>F. consultation and cooperation</i>					
25	participating in governmental consultation procedures	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26	serving on governmental advisory commissions or boards	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27	testifying in parliamentary committees or intervening in Parl.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	supplying information to policymakers	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
<i>G. court-action</i>					
29	filing suit or engaging in some sort of litigation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>



2. Do you use any of these techniques **at the national level (member and candidate member states)**?

- yes: please go through the list once again
- no

3. How important are **media-related strategies (B IN THE LIST OF ACTION FORMS)** for (ORGNOME) compared to working with policy-makers (E/F IN THE LIST)?

- much more important
- more important
- less important
- much less important
- equally important

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

4. How important are **strategies directly informing (FOR NON-STATE ACTORS: and mobilizing) the public (C/D IN THE LIST OF ACTION FORMS)** for (ORGNOME) compared to working with policy-makers?

- much more important
- more important
- less important
- much less important
- equally important

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

## II. Issue-specific influence

We have tried to establish a **list of the organizations** which play a role in European unemployment policy. You have also received a copy of this list.

5. Could you first name **all organizations** on this list, which, from your point of view, have been **particularly influential in European unemployment policy** over the past few years. You may also mention your own organization.

<input type="checkbox"/> 1 Council of the European Union	<input type="checkbox"/> 21 Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE)
<input type="checkbox"/> 2 European commission: DG for Employment and Social Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/> 22 European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP)
<input type="checkbox"/> 3 ECJ (European Court of Justice)	<input type="checkbox"/> 23 National employers associations
<input type="checkbox"/> 4 Committee of the Regions	<input type="checkbox"/> 24 Private commercial enterprises
<input type="checkbox"/> 5 European Parliament – Committee on Employment and Social Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/> 25 European Small Business Alliance
<input type="checkbox"/> 6 Council of Europe	<input type="checkbox"/> 26 European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)
<input type="checkbox"/> 7 World Trade Organisation (WTO)	<input type="checkbox"/> 27 National Trade Unions (from Germany France or Britain)
<input type="checkbox"/> 8 ILO (International Labour Organization)	<input type="checkbox"/> 28 National Trade unions (from other EU member states than D, F, UK)
<input type="checkbox"/> 9 German Government	<input type="checkbox"/> 29 Social Platform – Platform of European Social NGOs
<input type="checkbox"/> 10 French Government	<input type="checkbox"/> 30 European Unemployment Lawyers Group
<input type="checkbox"/> 11 British Government	<input type="checkbox"/> 31 International Council on Social Welfare
<input type="checkbox"/> 12 Govts of other EU Member States	<input type="checkbox"/> 32 EURES – The European Job Mobility Portal
<input type="checkbox"/> 13 Regional governments from EU Member States	<input type="checkbox"/> 33 European Citizen Action Service
<input type="checkbox"/> 14 European Economic and Social Committee	<input type="checkbox"/> 34 International Council on Social Welfare
<input type="checkbox"/> 15 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	<input type="checkbox"/> 35 Churches
<input type="checkbox"/> 16 European Peoples' Party (Christian Democratic/ Conservative)	<input type="checkbox"/> 36 European Policy Centre
<input type="checkbox"/> 17 European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party	<input type="checkbox"/> 37 European Anti-Poverty Network
<input type="checkbox"/> 18 (PES) Party of European Socialists	<input type="checkbox"/> 38 European Network of the Unemployed
<input type="checkbox"/> 19 GUE/NGL (European United Left/Nordic Green Left)	<input type="checkbox"/> 39 national welfare and charity organisations
<input type="checkbox"/> 20 UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations)	<input type="checkbox"/> 40 national organisations of the unemployed from EU member states

6. Are there **other influential organizations** in European unemployment policy which you do not find on this list?
- no
- yes: which are they? .....
- .....
- .....

7. Among the organizations you have mentioned now, which are **the three most influential organizations** in European unemployment policy?
1. ....
2. ....
3. ....

8. And which one among these three would you put in **first place**?
- .....

### III. Relations with other actors

9. Which organizations on this list has (ORGNAME) **tried to influence** over the last five years? Please use the numbers on the list for your answers.

10. Are there any **other targets** (not on the list) which you tried to influence in recent years?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....
- 5.....
- 6.....

11. To which **three government agencies, committees, or officials** do you devote most of your resources in influencing European unemployment policy?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

12. Now look at the list once again. With which organizations on the list has (ORGNAME) **closely collaborated** over the last five years?

13. Are there any **other organizations** with whom you have **closely collaborated** in recent years?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....

- 4.....  
 5.....  
 6.....

14. Please, look at the list one more time: with which of these organizations did you have **some major disagreements** over the last five years?

	<b>LIST OF ORGANISATIONS</b>	tried to influence Q17	Closely col-laborated Q20	Disagree-ments Q22
1	Council of the European Union	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2	European commission: DG for Employment and Social Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3	ECJ (European Court of Justice)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4	Committee of the Regions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
5	European Parliament – Committee on Employment and Social Affairs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
6	Council of Europe	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
7	World Trade Organisation (WTO)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
8	ILO (International Labour Organization)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
9	German Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
10	French Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
11	British Government	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
12	Govs of other EU Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
13	Regional governments from EU Member States	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
14	European Economic and Social Committee	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
15	European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
16	European Peoples' Party (Christian Democratic/Conservative)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
17	European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
18	(PES) Party of European Socialists	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
19	GUE/NGL (European United Left/Nordic Green Left)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
20	UEN (Union for Europe of the Nations)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
21	Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
22	European Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic Interest (CEEP)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
23	National employers associations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
24	Private commercial enterprises	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
25	European Small Business Alliance	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
26	European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
27	National Trade Unions (from Germany France or Britain)	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
28	National Trade unions (from other EU member	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

	states not 27)			
29	Social Platform – Platform of European Social NGOs	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
30	European Unemployment Lawyers Group	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
31	International Council on Social Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
32	EURES – The European Job Mobility Portal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
33	European Citizen Action Service	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
34	International Council on Social Welfare	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
35	Churches	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
36	European Policy Centre	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
37	European Anti-Poverty Network	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
38	European Network of the Unemployed	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
39	national welfare and charity organisations	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
40	national organisations of the unemployed from EU member states	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

15. Are there any **other organizations** with whom you have had **major disagreements** in recent years?

- 1.....
- 2.....
- 3.....
- 4.....
- 5.....
- 6.....

**IV. Issue-specific interest: Job Creation/Social Benefits**

18a. Now we would like to ask you some questions about job creation and social benefits, issues within European unemployment policy of particular interest to us. Could you please describe the **general position** of (ORGNAME) on job creation policy in a few words?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

18b. Could you please describe the **general position** of (ORGNAME) on social benefits policy in a few words?

.....

.....

.....

.....

.....

- 19a. **How involved** has (ORGNAME) been in the issue of job creation over the last five years?
- a lot
  - somewhat (enough)
  - somewhat (but not enough)
  - not at all

*If somewhat, but not enough or not at all: what were the reasons for this lack of involvement?*

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

- 19b. **How involved** has (ORGNAME) been in the issue of social benefits over the last five years?
- a lot
  - somewhat (enough)
  - somewhat (but not enough)
  - not at all

*If somewhat, but not enough or not at all: what were the reasons for this lack of involvement?*

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

20. (IF YES in Q17a/b): Was (ORGNAME) **involved in the development of the policy options** about job creation and/or social benefits?
- yes
  - no (GO TO Q20)

if yes, please, elaborate: .....

.....  
.....  
.....

21. (IF NOT YET CLEAR) Which **level of political decision making** did (ORGNAME) try to influence? (SEVERAL CHOICES POSSIBLE)
- European
  - other countries
  - national, own country
  - regional
  - local

- 22a. Did (ORGNOME) undertake specific **actions in the parliamentary or administrative arenas** on the issue of job creation?  
 yes  
 no (GO TO Q22a)

If yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones?**

1. ....  
 .....  
 2. ....  
 .....  
 3. ....  
 .....

- 23a. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....  
 .....  
 .....  
 .....

- 24a. Did (ORGNOME)
- (NON-STATE ACTORS) undertake specific **actions for informing or mobilizing the public** on this issue?
  - (STATE ACTORS) make attempts to communicate with **the public** on this issue?
- yes  
 no (GO TO Q24a)

If yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones?**

1. ....  
 .....  
 2. ....  
 .....  
 3. ....  
 .....

25a. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

22b. Did (ORNAME) undertake specific **actions in the parliamentary or administrative arenas** on the issue of social benefits?

- yes
- no (GO TO Q22b)

If yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones**?

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....

23b. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....



- 24b. Did (ORGNAME)
- (NON-STATE ACTORS) undertake specific **actions for informing or mobilizing the public** on this issue?
  - (STATE ACTORS) make attempts to communicate with **the public** on this issue?
- yes  
 no (GO TO Q24b)

If yes: Could you please mention **the three most important ones**?

1. ....
2. ....
3. ....

- 25b. (FOR EACH ACTION MENTIONED): How would you rate **the effectiveness** of this action?

	Action 1	Action 2	Action 3
very effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather effective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
rather ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
very ineffective	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

.....

- 26a. Two final questions about job creation: Do you think the public finds this issue:

- very important
- rather important
- rather unimportant
- very unimportant

- 27a. Do you think (ORGNAME) takes a position on job creation that **the majority of the public** agrees with, or do you think a majority of the public disagrees with your position on this issue?

- a majority agrees
- the public is evenly divided on this policy
- a majority disagrees
- don't know
- public doesn't know our position

If so desired, please elaborate: .....  
.....  
.....

26b. Two final questions about social benefits: Do you think the public finds this issue:

- very important
- rather important
- rather unimportant
- very unimportant

27b. Do you think (ORGNAME) takes a position on job creation that **the majority of the public** agrees with, or do you think a majority of the public disagrees with your position on this issue?

- a majority agrees
- the public is evenly divided on this policy
- a majority disagrees
- don't know
- public doesn't know our position

If so desired, please elaborate: .....  
.....  
.....

**V. Role of EU**

To conclude our interview, we would like to ask you a few questions concerning **European integration**.

29. What **impact** did the EU have on **unemployment policy** in general?

.....  
.....  
.....

30a. And on **job creation** in particular?

.....  
.....  
.....

30b. And on **social benefits** in particular?

.....  
.....  
.....

34a (ONLY FOR NON-STATE ACTORS) **How *important*** would you say is the **European unemployment policy** for (ORGNOME) **compared** to unemployment policy at the **national level today?**

- much more important
- somewhat more important
- somewhat less important
- much less important

34. And thinking about the **role of the European unemployment policy** for (ORGNOME) **relative to** unemployment policy at the **national level**: is its role becoming increasingly important compared to the national level, less important compared to the national level, or does it not change at all?

- increasingly important
- unchanging
- less important

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....

35a. *Thinking about the future now*: what **impact** do you **expect European unemployment policy *in general***, and more specifically **European job creation and social benefits policy**, to have over the years to come?

.....

.....

.....

.....

36. Is (ORGNOME) generally **in favour of an increase in European influence** in unemployment policy or is it against it? (IF NOT CLEAR: PROMPT: rather or strongly (in favour/ against))

- strongly in favour
- rather in favour
- rather against
- strongly against
- Don't have a position

Please, elaborate: .....

.....

.....

.....



.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

39. Are there **any persons** you would suggest for us to meet for additional interviews on this subject matter?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

40. Do you want to get a **summary of the results** of this project?

- no
- yes: where should we send them to?

.....  
.....  
.....  
.....

**On behalf of the whole project team, I would like to thank you very much for your cooperation!**



**The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe**  
Political Claim-making, Policy Deliberation and Exclusion from the Labor Market

**Readings on Unemployment: Social and Political Aspects**

## Readings on Unemployment: Social and Political Aspects

This is a selective list of readings on unemployment. Apart from a few exceptions, it focuses on those works that stress the social and political aspects of unemployment. It includes both general and/or comparative studies (including those dealing with the European level) and works focused on one or more of the six countries of the unempol research project (France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). Priority was given to English written texts, but certain works in one of the national languages of these six countries are also reported. Unpublished material (e.g. conference papers) is excluded. The items are listed according to language (English, French, German, Italian, Swedish).

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