Synthesis of project's main findings (WP7)

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European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses (TransSOL)

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European solidarity: an introduction to a multifaceted phenomenon

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Introduction

Solidarity has become a strongly debated issue within the European Union. Ongoing conflicts between member states about financial solidarity with weak states and fair burden-sharing with regard to the high numbers of refugees show the difficulties of living up to the standard of solidarity which the EU lists in its treaties as one of its guiding principles. At the same time, the debate unveils that solidarity is highly contested. The reservations of EU member states to share the burdens regarding the costs of the economic crisis and the migration inflow can be criticised as a lack of interstate solidarity and a prioritisation of national interests, but is not unrelated to fundamental conflicts about the adequate problem-solving strategies and policies. Moreover, governments are sensitive to nationalist and populist mobilisations and parties, whose electoral successes seem to limit the readiness of member states to engage beyond what might be conceived of as an instrumental and utilitarian solidarity of 'quid pro quo'. More than that, nationalist and populist parties contest the idea of European solidarity precisely in the name of national solidarity, and the need to defend national communities against outside interventions.

Hence, controversies about solidarity prevail within the public sphere. These debates, however, have paid more attention to interstate solidarity, thus marginalising another topic that is much less discussed and researched: European solidarity. In fact, even though we might expect that both dimensions are interrelated, it is necessary to differentiate between solidarity among states from solidarity between European citizens, between the 'intergovernmental' and 'transnational' dimensions of solidarity, and between the 'vertical' support of interstate solidarity by citizens and the 'horizontal' engagement of citizens in cross-border relations of support and help (Apostoli, 2012: 4). Very little is known about the amount of transnational solidarity and the effects of the current crises on it. On the one hand, we might expect that 60 years of European integration should have helped to promote the idea of European solidarity between citizens. The European integration process has gradually established feelings of belongingness to the European community, promoting shared identifications with Europe and the EU (Delanty and Rumford, 2005; Beck and Grande, 2007; Fligstein, 2008). Moreover, European integration has furthered cross-national experiences and contact among citizens, as well as transnational trust between European people (Delhey, 2007). Finally, public opinion polls show that in the midst of the European crisis, a slim majority of respondents still agree that it is desirable to give financial help to other countries in times of

crisis(56.5% in the EU 15 and 46.8% in the accession countries, 2011). Approval rates had increased from 2010 to 2011 by 3.5% for the enlargement countries, and shrunk by only 1.1% in the EU15. Fiscal solidarity is endorsed by the majority of respondents in many member states (Lengfeld et al., 2015; Gerhards, Lengfeld and Häuberer, 2016), thus showing that Europeans approve of the idea of solidarity and redistribution also within the EU (Börner, 2014).

On the other hand, we can expect that the intensity and the number of crises lived out within the EU have had an impact on rates of European solidarity, both between governments and citizens. Populist and Eurosceptic parties are mobilising a wider group of voters (Krouwel and Abts, 2007; Hutter and Grande, 2014; Kriesi and Pappas, 2015). Public opinion polls show that not all EU governments can be relied on to stand by the majority in favour of EU membership, The 'Brexit' vote in the British referendum of June 2016 shows how fragile these majorities can be. Since then, the choice of opting out is on the table and is being discussed in a number of other member states. Beyond the erosion of enthusiasm for the European cause, we also know from research that European solidarity is also patterned with cleavages along the North-South and West-East-divide, between the 'Europeans' and 'not-yet Europeans' (Eder, 2005), between countries with higher degrees of mutual trust (Northern and Western Europe) and the others (Delhey, 2007). Additionally, we need to take into consideration the fact that transnational solidarity between citizens might not be diffused evenly among the European people, but highly differentiated along socio-demographic traits, such as gender, ethnic background and social class (Kriesi et al., 2006). European solidarity might thus be limited to specific constituencies.

Overall, scholarly writing has generated little evidence on the scope and structure of citizens' solidarity within Europe. This report aims to fill in part of this gap by presenting findings from an EU-funded project that was devoted to the analysis of European solidarity. Its mission was to analyse the "European paths to transnational solidarity at times of crisis: Conditions, forms, role models and policy responses" (TransSOL). Research work was conducted between June 2015 and May 2018, with funding from the Horizon2020 research programme (Grant Agreement No. 649435). The project had comparative aims, given that it analysed the situation in eight countries (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK) and at the EU-level. Its main objectives were, among others, to assemble a systematic and cross-national database on solidarity in Europe at various levels of analysis (individual citizens, civil society, public policies and public discourses), to engage into an analysis of factors and forces promoting and inhibiting solidarity at these various levels, and to identify good practices and propose recommendations about remedial measures and policies. In all these aspects, we were geared to paint a nuanced and differentiated picture of European solidarity that does justice to its multifaceted and contentious nature. In fact, while it is important to map and measure the general readiness of Europeans to support others in need, we argue that it is also important to ask for the 'specific' readiness to help 'specific' groups of people, given that solidarity might be tied to various notions of conditional-

ity. For this purpose, our analyses were comparative in two respects: We were interested in measuring and analysing solidarity with regard to various target groups (people with disabilities, the unemployed, migrants or refugees) and territorial entities (people living in the own countries, within the EU or outside). Additionally, research was conducted in eight countries in parallel (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK) in order to give an authentic picture of the diversity of situations within Europe and the diversity of contexts impinging on (European) solidarity.

The overall research of TransSOL was devoted to a number of leading questions. How strong is solidarity among Europeans after almost 60 years of European integration? What do we know about beneficial and detrimental factors? And what should be done to safeguard or enhance European solidarity at the level of citizens, non-governmental organisations and policies? In order to answer these overarching questions, a number of research packages were identified and implemented, following a multidimensional approach. First, we were engaged in mapping and monitoring solidarity at the societal level. For this purpose, we analysed the role of solidarity within the legal framework and public policies of the eight countries and at EU-level (Work-package 1), and we engaged in an analysis of public discourses within the print and social media in order to better understand how idea and principle of (European) solidarity are constructed and eroded (Work-package 5). Second, we were interested in mapping and analysing organised forms of civic solidarity within and across member states, by focusing on civil society initiatives, non-governmental organisations and/or protest groups at the grass-roots level (Work-package 2 and 6) and at the national- and EU-levels (Work-package 4). Third, we were also interested in measuring and studying attitudes and activities of solidarity at the level of individual citizens by means of a representative survey (Work-package 3). Our aim was to gather systematic data to answer a set of specific research questions. To what extent are European citizens not only ready to help other Europeans, but also actively involved in individual and collective acts of solidarity? What can we say about the specific 'constituencies' of European solidarity in terms of socio-demographic traits and their spatial distribution across regions and countries? And how strongly do Eurosceptical citizens oppose European solidarity? How strongly developed is the field of civil society organisations and initiatives rallying for European solidarity, and how do they mobilise and organise civic engagement? Does European solidarity feature in the mass media, and which ideas, norms and claims are promoted in the various countries at times of crisis? Which picture emerges when focusing on European solidarity not in abstract terms, but in regard to vulnerable groups like the unemployed, migrants and refugees, and the disabled?

This report summarises the main findings of the TransSOL project, by providing insight into each of the listed work-packages and the related data we gathered and analysed. But before we move to the presentation of our empirical evidence, it is necessary to be introduced more systematically to the field of analysis, given that 'solidarity' is a widely used and multifaceted concept, and that the empirical phenomenon related to this concept is rather broad and diffuse. In fact, solidarity is a rather fragmented field of re-

search, possibly because it is unquestionably a topic that has received a great deal of attention in the long history of the social sciences (Bayertz, 1999; de Deken et al., 2006; Stjernø 2012; Smith and Sorrell, 2014). Various disciplines and research strands have devoted themselves to the analysis of solidarity, with very different research questions and aims in mind. Consequently, the study of solidarity is dominated by a diversity of disjointed inquiries. Moreover, we lack a discussion about whether existing knowledge about solidarity is a fruitful reference point for the analysis of solidarity within the EU. The attempt of TransSOL was to overcome this fragmented situation by developing a conceptually integrated, multidimensional research framework. Before moving into the main findings of the project, it is thus necessary to present this analytical framework in more detail. This introduction, thus far, has three overarching objectives. First, we wish to assemble available evidence and systematise empirical insight, in order to show how TransSOL aims to develop a more integrated framework of empirical data gathering and analysis. Second, the aim is to integrate the conceptual issues and the empirical evidence into a consistent framework of analysis that is well adapted to the study of European solidarity. The final aim is to provide insight into the empirical strategies adopted by TransSOL to describe and explain European solidarity effectively in its complexity and multidimensionality.

European solidarity as a research field: the state of the art

Solidarity is a topic that has always played an important role in the social sciences, because it has been identified as a core element for the constitution of social order and societal cohesion (Durkheim, 1997; Alexander, 1978). As a consequence, social theory and empirical research has tended to develop very different insights into the core dimensions, causes and consequences of solidarity (Bayertz, 1999; Maull, 2009). The field of research is marked by divergent concepts and understandings (Featherstone, 2012; Giugni and Passy, 2001). This brief overview already points to an interesting paradox of previous research: There is an overabundance of concepts and assumptions, but little reflection on the multidimensional and multifaceted nature of solidarity. At the same time, there is an overabundance of empirical evidence on various aspects, as will be shown, but little data on those aspects at the centre of our own analyses, namely transnational solidarity in the EU.

Before engaging in the development of a conceptual and theoretical framework of analysis, it thus seems necessary to map the immediately relevant fields of research. The latter can be grouped as follows: The study of European integration; the analysis of the public's support for re-distributional policies and institutions; studies on transnational (solidarity) movements and civil societies; and research about interpersonal or inter-organisational help between citizens. As we will explain later on, these areas conform to the three levels of aggregation of solidarity, the macro, meso and micro levels, to which TransSOL was devoted.

The first and largest strand of research focuses on societies, and thus on large-scale entities. One basic line of reasoning is devoted to a sociological analysis of modern societies, whose internal complexity leads to civic, voluntaristic and/or universalistic forms of solidarity (e.g., Durkheim, 1997; Parsons, 1951; Alexander, 1978). The construction of the European Communities fits into this argument, because European integration is perceived as a process that deepens the division of labour and the interconnectedness of peoples and corporate actors across borders (Münch, 2012). Increasing interdependencies and shared identities become an important precondition for a more stable European Union, growing solidarity between member states and citizens, and developing reciprocal obligations between them (Mau, 2006; Börner, 2013; Gerhards and Lengfeld, 2015). Recent debates tend to be more sceptical about the possibility of developing stable forms of transnational solidarity within the EU (e.g. Schäfer and Streeck, 2013), particularly because the economic and so-called refugee crises seem to undermine the societal and institutional foundations of European solidarity (e.g. Galpin, 2012; della Porta and Mattoni, 2014). However, the normative strand of this debate still insists on the need to cultivate transnational and/or postnational forms of solidarity that are able to absorb the disintegrative effects of globalisation and Europeanisation. Most often, they point to the political and constitutional preconditions for the development of a transnational or universalistic solidarity (Brunkhorst, 1997, 2005; Habermas, 2013). In this regard, a democratically grounded, and transnationally knit European citizenship is highlighted as an important building block for a solidarity that transcends both national divisions and discriminations (e.g., Balibar, 2004: 44; 2014: 162-163; Jacobs, 2007; Dobson, 2012; Guild et al., 2013; Isin and Saward, 2013).

Next to these theoretical debates, empirical research in the social sciences has been guided by the attempt to identify measurable indicators of solidarity. In this area, we can identify a second field of research that is made up of empirical studies that inquire into re-distributional preferences, most often with a focus on social policies. These studies are relevant for our purposes, because they argue that welfare states and social policies are institutionalised forms of wealth redistribution and collective solidarity (Svallfors, 1997; Fong, 2001; Amat and Wibbels, 2009; Alesina and Giuliano, 2011; Rehm et al., 2012). Studying public support of redistributive policies is thus taken as a measure of 'vertical solidarity', and thus for the readiness of people to support 'institutionalised solidarity', i.e., to finance and endorse public programmes aimed at sharing wealth with the needy. This empirical focus has the advantage of measuring solidarity at the individual level indirectly: It allows us to understand the redistributive preferences and attitudes of people, their cognitive correlates, and social-structural determinants. Many of these studies are comparative (e.g., Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Scheepers and Grotenhuis, 2005; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006; Brooks and Manza, 2007), and allow for an explanation of 'vertical solidarity' with reference to individual factors (micro) and country-level determinants (macro). In this sense, they provide an important source of inspiration to identify explanatory factors impinging on individual solidarity.

A third research strand is located at the meso-level of analysis, and deals with civil societies and social movements. The basic line of reasoning is that civil societies and social movements are organisational fields that mobilise, organise and stabilise solidarity within and across countries. Social movements and civic groups do not only rally for solidarity with specific target groups, but also require internal solidarity among their constituencies and members in order to arouse and sustain collective action. As we will see, these studies point to the importance of resources and collective identities (Hirsch, 1986; Hunt and Benford, 2004; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). This insight applies to the transnational level as well, because scholars have argued that the mobilisation of collective actions and social movements across borders depend on the ability to arouse identity and solidarity (e.g., Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997; Batliwala, 2002; Bandy and Smith, 2005; della Porta and Caiani, 2011; della Porta, 2018). Finally, studies in this field of research underscore solidarity as a contested field. Social movements that rally for solidarity with certain constituencies or target groups are often confronted with counter-mobilisations and/or competing issues and missions (e.g., Kriesi and Pappas, 2015; della Porta, 2018). As a result,'organised solidarity', out of necessity, builds on group identities that erect distinctions between 'us' and 'them', heightening antagonism between both. In-group solidarity might thus imply 'out-group' enmity.

Finally, the analysis of horizontal solidarity can also benefit from the extensive field of studies on social capital at the micro level. Many of these studies are interested in forms of interpersonal help and support; they highlight the importance of (interpersonal and institutional) trust; and they emphasise the importance of membership and active participation in voluntary groups and civic associations (Putnam et al., 2003; Bourdieu, 1986; Anheier and Salamon, 1999; Brown and Ferries, 2007; Bauer, Bredtmann and Schmidt, 2013; van Oorschot et al., 2006). Research tends to converge on the conviction that social capital is the necessary 'glue' of social cohesion (Chan and Chan, 2006; Jeannotte, 2000), and thus also essential for understanding the conditions, structures and dynamics of solidarity. In explanatory terms, scholars have tended to confirm the importance of socio-demographic determinants (e.g., social class, age, and gender), attitudes (post-materialist values and religious beliefs) and societal context factors (e.g., social cleavages, political conflicts, welfare state institutions) (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2005; van Oorschot and Arts, 2005; Gelissen et al., 2012). Also, in this field of analysis, scholars have insisted on the fact that solidarity might involve group closure, and thus a bifurcation of solidarity relations. The notion of 'bonding capital' was coined in particular to point to the fact that individuals do tend to limit their relations of trust, reciprocity and solidarity to a reduced number of strong ties and intimate relations, thus fencing themselves off from their wider social environment, civil networks of engagement and other constituencies and targets (Putnam, 2000; Patulny and Svensen, 2007). All in all, the study of solidarity has thus to consider the 'dark side' of social closure.

As we can see, empirical research has provided a variety of insights. However, available knowledge has still to struggle with considerable limitations. First, empirical research has a privileged the attitudinal dimension of solidarity, describing and explaining the

disposition to help. Less attention has been paid to the question of what kind of behaviour constitutes solidarity. Second, the analysis of solidarity is not clearly distinguished from other related phenomena, and sometimes the analysis considers altruism, care, philanthropy, empathy, help or support as potential synonyms. Hence, if solidarity is to be considered as a proper field of analysis, the specific traits of solidarity need to be highlighted. Third, much research has been undertaken with regard to public support of redistributive policies, but less knowledge is available on the level of interpersonal forms of solidarity. This is particularly true with respect to the international level, because there is almost no evidence about the European dimension of social solidarity. No doubt that there is abundant evidence with regard to the acceptance of the EU by its citizens, e.g., when referring to the debate about Euro-scepticism (Hooghe et al., 2007; Wessels, 2007; Lubbers and Scheepers, 2010; Boomgaarden et al., 2011). However, most research is unrelated to European solidarity in a stricter sense. Fourth, research lacks consideration of the various levels (micro, meso and macro) solidarity is structured and organised in modern societies. As we will argue in this paper, European solidarity can only be properly understood and analysed when considering this multilevel structure.

European solidarity: a conceptual and empirical approach

In the following, we wish to present the integrated framework of analysis on which the research within the TransSOL project was based. It aims at providing a consistent conceptual and theoretical 'roof' that is able to integrate the various research components of TransSOL's work-plan into a consistent frame of reference with a set of joint research concepts, questions and assumptions. Only such an integrated framework is able to guarantee that the analysis of solidarity at the micro, meso and macro levels is sufficiently interrelated in order to allow for additive and interrelated insight. Before we move to these reflections, however, we need to highlight the specific challenges a study of European solidarity has to overcome. First of all, our object of analysis – 'European' solidarity – refers to a spatial entity, to which solidarity is or might be attached. Our expectation is that solidarity is more palpable, once attributed to the European Union, and less clear when attributing it to the more diffuse notion of 'Europe', because the EU is an institutionalised spatial entity that demands some sort of solidarity among its members (countries and citizens). The Lisbon Treaty, for instance, stipulates that the EU "shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States" (TEU, Art. 3), a call that is restated in specific domains, such as asylum or security policies (TFEU, Art. 222). Even though these treaties primarily target the member states, they also provide a legal and institutional frame of reference for voicing and mobilising transnational solidarity below the state level. However, an exclusive reference to EU-solidarity will be short-sighted, particularly if we look at interpersonal, civic forms of solidarity within and across European countries. In fact, while interstate solidarity is strongly tied to and patterned by formal membership in the EU, this is not necessarily the case once dealing with citizens and civil society organisations. Civic solidarity across

borders might be smaller than the EU, when citizens and civil society organisations co-operate with other groups and support beneficiaries in neighbouring countries; but transnational solidarity might also go beyond EU-member states, when considering that some European countries are not formal members of the EU and/or people living outside Europe. The insertion of Switzerland into the TransSOL project shows this intention to combine an EU-related with a European-related analysis, in order to grasp the potential effect of EU membership on civil solidarity within and beyond national borders.

Second, our analytical framework has to do justice to the specificities of 'European' solidarity, given that we are speaking of transnational practices and attitudes within a rather large and extensive 'community'. This focus entails challenges, because we are addressing a topic or phenomenon that is more difficult to trace. In fact, we are interested in 'horizontal' relations of solidarity across borders, and this is not the same as studying the 'vertical' public support or acceptance of the EU, its institutions, discourses and policies. While our analyses were also interested in measuring and monitoring this 'vertical' support of 'institutionalised solidarity' at the member-state and EU level, our main aim was to deal with relations of solidarity between citizens across countries, hence, with the horizontal and/or transnational component of solidarity. In this regard, the analysis of European solidarity is particularly intriguing, because we might expect that this type of 'horizontal' solidarity has to overcome problems associated with the (factual and/or perceived) size of Europe and/or the EU. The possibility of rooting solidarity in individual, face-to-face relations of help and exchange is rather limited, but not excluded, given the growing importance of mobility with regard to education, work or leisure, which might help to create informal networks based on ethnic background, culture or common interest (Glick Schiller et al., 1995; Morokvasic, 1999; Recchi and Favell, 2009). However, beyond these transnational networks or groups, it is to be expected that intermediate, mediated and institutionalised forms of solidarity are required in order to mobilise, stabilise and sustain transnational forms of civic solidarity within Europe. In this sense, an analysis of civil society and social movements is required, because these organisational fields might be essential in fuelling and organising European solidarity. Finally, a study of European solidarity does not necessarily have to exclude other spatial horizons of analysis, given that solidarity might be empirically attached at various layers and levels. Some citizens, for instance, might proclaim the need for further solidarity within their own country, within the EU and at the global level at the same time, while other citizens might prioritise solidarity with one entity (e.g., the nation-state), possibly in antagonism with others (e.g., Europe or the world). This means that the study of European solidarity cannot be dissociated from the study of (complementary or antagonistic) claims for solidarity towards the regions, the nation-state, other member-states and/or the global level.

Conceptual matters: the multidimensionality of 'solidarity'

Our conceptual and theoretical framework required a definition of solidarity that is able to provide a conceptual and theoretical frame for the broader research objectives and work-packages of the TransSOL project, and to highlight the specificity of this concept, as compared to other notions like altruism, empathy, compassion, help or care. Following the conceptualisation of others (Bayertz, 1999; de Deken et al., 2006; Stjernø, 2012; Smith and Sorrell, 2014), we assume that solidarity has to do with these concepts, as Stjernø (2012: 88) proposed when defining solidarity as "the preparedness to share resources with others". However, we argue that this basic understanding is not enough, given that solidarity is not only a matter of philanthropic help towards others, of empathy or altruism. Solidarity is linked to reciprocal expectations and practices between people expressing sameness, togetherness and inclusiveness (Stjernø, 2012). Solidarity thus assumes the existence of (imagined) reference groups with some sort of 'membership', implying responsibilities for the others. Consequently, we propose the following definition: 'Solidarity' is understood here as dispositions and practices of mutual help or support, be that by personal contributions or by the active support of activities of others, tied to informal and/or institutionalised groups. Solidarity entails relations of care and help, of altruism and empathy, but it is more than these concepts propose, because solidarity is grounded in group-bound rights and obligation (Scholz, 2008). Solidarity is not only an individual phenomenon, but an interpersonal, collective one, because solidarity presupposes joint norms and expectations, social relations and practices. Solidarity recurs to acts and dispositions of help and care, but help and care are only acts of solidarity insofar as they are part of mutual relations of support. Solidarity builds implicitly on the notion of 'rights', because people can expect to be helped; and solidarity entails an implicit notion of 'obligations', because people are expected to help each other.

This definition requires several clarifications. First, our conceptualisation does not necessarily take sides in the theoretical and normative debate between communitarianism and universalism (Rasmussen, 1990; Zürn and de Wilde, 2016), because it departs from a more analytical understanding of 'groups', and thus allows for variation with regard to the kind of social entities, narratives and ideologies involved (Arendt, 1963 and 1972; Bayertz, 1999; Scholz, 2008). Citizens, civic initiatives and associations might cherish the idea of 'communitarian' solidarity, and thus they might believe that only members of established, 'natural' or local communities are enmeshed in reciprocal relations of help and support, and are thus entitled and constrained by mutual rights and obligations. But citizens, civic initiatives and associations might also promote the idea of 'universalistic' solidarity, and they might thus proclaim that anybody – in their quality as human being – can expect to receive help from others, and is at the same time also called to provide support to others, given universal concepts of mutual rights and obligations. Following this argument, we can thus define 'European' solidarity as an attitude and behaviour in support of other Europeans, regardless of their national origin. European solidarity might be motivated by a communitarian understanding of membership, cherishing common identities, cultural traits, historical legacies and missions, or by the more uni-

versalistic notion of European citizenship and the more open notion of (social, civic and political) rights and obligations of European citizens and/or residents.

Second, our own definition of solidarity stresses the need to consider attitudes and behaviours, particularly because solidarity entails notions of 'rights' and 'obligations'. So far, scholarly writing has tended to privilege attitudinal dispositions, in particular by focusing on the preparedness of citizens to share some of their resources with others (e.g., Stjernø, 2012: 2). Moreover, survey-based studies measure solidarity by the citizens' approval of re-distributional policies, and thus by the readiness to devote some of their contributions or taxes to the needy (Svallfors, 1997; Fong, 2001; Amat and Wibbels, 2009; Rehm et al., 2012). This option has been used to measure European solidarity, e.g., in terms of fiscal help, redistributional measures and burden-sharing (Lengfeld et al., 2012; Gerhards, Lengfeld and Häuberer, 2016). However, this focus on attitudes is not without problems. Taxes and contributions to social security programmes are compulsory and, hence, it is not completely clear what surveys measure when they ask respondents about their approval of redistributional policies – their general support of welfare states, or solidarity relations with specific groups of needy people. In other words: approval of social policies might not predetermine the readiness to commit individually in support of others. At the same time, social psychology has demonstrated that attitudes do not necessarily transform into action, particularly if complex value and belief systems, structural impediments or individual costs are involved (Blumer, 1955; Festinger, 1964; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005).

Third, standard measures of solidarity tend to privilege philanthropy or altruism (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993; Schroeder et al., 1995; van Oorschot, 2000). However, solidarity has also a political dimension. People demonstrate solidarity with others who struggle or are in need when participating in collective actions (e.g., public claims-making, political protests, communication campaigns) that strive to improve the situation of these groups by mobilising public support, committing stakeholders and/or changing public policies on their behalf (Balme and Chabanet, 2008; Baglioni and Giugni, 2014; Giugni and Grasso, 2015). In this sense, solidarity is a way of combating injustice and oppression suffered by specific groups or communities, on whose behalf individuals or organisation speak up (Scholz, 2008; Bayertz, 1999: 16). Solidarity is thus a means to enact (imagined) political communities with shared missions, ideas and beliefs. In these cases, 'European' solidarity is already present when people in some countries are aware about and support public claims by citizens of other European countries, their organisational representatives or government officials, and when they actively help them to promulgate their views and claims.

This sensitivity to the political dimension of solidarity helps to acknowledge the contentious aspects of solidarity, because claims of solidarity might entail exclusive identities and obligations, and they might challenge the status quo on behalf of specific groups against others (Arendt, 1963, 1972; Reshaur, 1992; Balibar, 2004). For a systematic analysis of European solidarity, this political dimension seems crucial. Populist groups and

parties speak out on behalf of exclusive, national communities, often claiming that solidarity with weak compatriots comes before solidarity with others, thus downplaying the legal, political or moral obligations nation-states have as members of the European Union; pro- or pan-European groups instead will speak out on behalf of social groups and member countries most affected by the crises, possibly as part of a struggle to improve the situation of weak compatriots, too. In these terms, particularistic and universalistic solidarity claims are in conflict with each other.

Fourth, the definition of solidarity has to be open due to the variety of manifestations. Two main issues need to be taken into consideration. On the one hand, solidarity can be motivated by very different norms, rules and expectations. Mau (2006) and Lengfeld et al. (2015), for instance, have highlighted different reasons and motivations for supporting European solidarity: For some, interstate support in times of crisis is a necessary correlate of common duties and moral obligations, for others just a consequence of reciprocal relations of mutual help, while still others define it as a rational (utilitarian) investment for the benefit of members states, donors included. In this sense, solidarity can be patterned along different levels of compassion and abnegation, reciprocity, cooperation and interdependency (Malamoud, 2015). On the other hand, we have to consider that solidarity is a relative phenomenon, i.e., conditional on the membership within specific communities and groups. Undoubtedly, solidarity can be a value tied to abstract groups or entities (i.e., humankind), and thus associated with a universalistic notion of generalised support (Brunkhorst, 1997; Balibar, 2004). In survey-based research, this solidarity is measured as a generalised, civic disposition of help not tied back to any particular group or conditionality (Amat and Wibbels, 2009; Fong, 2001; Rehm et al., 2012; Svallfors, 1997). However, empirically speaking, particularism is tightly associated with solidarity, too. As shown by empirical analyses, solidarity seems to be patterned by the assumed 'deservingness' of various social groups, thus favouring the elderly and disabled people in comparison with the unemployed, the poor, and immigrants (van Oorschot, 2006: 23). Conditionality is not necessarily restricted to social groups, but can apply to countries, as well, when considering the low rates of public German support for fiscal help to the Greek government,in comparison to that German support towards Ireland, Italy and Spain (Lengfeld et al., 2012).

Analytical and explanatory matters: multi-layered solidarity

The conceptual clarifications have helped us to identify the phenomenon under analysis. Solidarity is a normatively defined relation of mutual support linked to (informal/formalised, imagined/institutionalised, universal/particular) groups. This conceptual discussion requires further development, because solidarity might be 'organised' and 'institutionalised' at different levels of aggregation, particularly if we are speaking about complex social systems, such as 'national' societies, and even more so, Europe or the European Union. As we will show, it is advisable to distinguish three levels of aggregation and organisation: Solidarity can be organised at the interpersonal level (micro), at

the level of organisations and organisationalfields (meso), and at the level of political entities such as welfare states and public spheres (macro).

This differentiation of various levels of analysis is necessary to empirically map and describe solidarity in a more comprehensive manner. Additionally, however, we need to differentiate our analytic framework also with regard to the theoretical approaches used by previous studies in order to identify and explain types, processes and structures of solidarity (Doreian and Fararo, 1998). In fact, research by the TransSOL project was not only geared to describe levels and forms of solidarity within Europe, but also to decipher causes, correlates and consequences. Given the multidimensional approach of the project, we also required a multi-paradigmatic approach in analysing and explaining solidarity, because levels and forms of solidarity might be conditioned by different causes at the micro, meso and macro-level of analysis. Moreover, we need to grasp potential interrelations between the individual, organisational and societal spheres. For this reason, we propose an analytical framework that makes use of available theories and explanatory models for each of the three levels. This integrative approach calls for a distinction of two major explanatory strategies: On the other hand, the analysis of European solidarity has made use of theories either highlighting objective structures and mechanisms, or privileging ideational factors and communicative processes. We thus see the merit of considering the added-value of each of them, when dealing with solidarity at the micro, meso and macro levels. Table 1 summarises our analytical framework in rough terms, by listing the various levels of analysis and the theoretical approaches. On this basis, we can identify for each cell which explanatory factors should be taken into consideration. Overall, it provides us with a heuristic instrument to develop a multidimensional framework of analysis.

Table 1: Explanatory strategies in the study of (European) solidarity

	social-structural factors	cultural-ideational
micro-level: individual solidarity	socio-demographic determinants	preferences, identifications, values and ideas
meso-level: organised solidarity	organisational fields: resources, networks and cleavages	organisational spheres: frames, ideologies, and identities
macro-level: institutionalised solidarity	societal structures: legal and socio-economic contexts, welfare institutions and policies	cultural structures: belief systems, institutions, discourses



In the following, we wish to develop the theoretical arguments of this heuristic model by moving from the micro to the macro level, arguing for the necessity of the former levels of analysis to be embedded in the latter ones. Our theoretical journey will make use of previous research in order to highlight the specificities and potentials of each approach.

A first focus of explanatory strategies has been the micro-level of individual solidarity. Previous research has tended to privilege this level: Research has been interested in group-internal solidarity and the rules guiding internal exchange relations and group cohesion (Hechter, 1988; Markovsky and Lawler, 1994; Komter, 2005), in attitudes and practices of compassion, help and altruism (Schroeder et al., 1995; Skitka and Tetlock, 1993; Scheepers and Grotenhuis, 2005), and in understanding the citizens' support of the welfare states and their redistributive policies support (Blekesaune and Quadagno, 2003; Brooks and Manza, 2007). Regarding explanatory strategies, the analysis has tended to privilege two approaches. In the first instance, we can refer to authors who explain levels and forms of solidarity with reference to resources, objective interests and rational choices (Hechter, 1988). Solidarity is a choice reflecting the individual's socio-economic situation and the related cost-benefit calculations. We should thus expect that solidarity is more diffused among the most vulnerable and invulnerable social strata of the population (van Setten, Scheepers and Lubbers, 2017), as it implies more gains than losses for both sides: Recipients might suffer stigmatisation, once they disclose their neediness, but they gain financial help, while donors have to share their financial resources, but gain social recognition. But do these considerations apply to Europe? Solidarity within Europe might be more conditional and complex, and possibly also pre-structured by interlocking group memberships: Vulnerable social groups in affluent societies, for instance, might oppose the sharing of public funds with poorer countries, while privileged groups might expect less social recognition from inner-European redistribution of wealth.

These observations lead into the second strand of micro-level analyses, because they highlight that solidarity 'choices' will be most probably predetermined or mediated by subjective perceptions, emotions, values and belief-systems (Markovsky and Lawler, 1994; Komter, 2005). Research on solidarity has identified a number of these factors: Political allegiances (Skitka and Tetlock, 1993), religion (Abela, 2004; Stegmueller et al., 2012; Lichterman, 2015), post-materialism (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978), loyalties to ethnic groups (Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Luttmer, 2001), beliefs about the causes of income (Fong, 2001), or perceptions of deservingness (van Oorschot, 2006). These factors will most probably shape levels of individual solidarity at the local and national levels. However, this does not fully open the door to an understanding of the subjective and ideational determinants of European solidarity as such, given the fact that the EU is a much more multicultural entity than most member states are. Consequently, we must assume that individual solidarity within the EU is also shaped by the following two factors. On the one hand, we might expect that European solidarity is conditional on the development of identifications with the European Union, either as unique identifications and/or as elements of multiple (local, national, transnational) identities. On the other

hand, we might assume that solidarity within the EU is conditional on spatial and/or cultural distance, i.e., limiting individual solidarity between countries that are perceived to be (spatially, socially, culturally, historically) farther apart.

Overall, we argue that an research strategy centred on individuals might be an adequate way of operationalising solidarity empirically, but an incorrect way of explaining solidarity theoretically. In fact, findings about individual dispositions or acts of solidarity tend to argue that solidarity transcends the individual, namely by referring implicitly to group norms and beliefs, about joint expectations and responsibilities among group members. In this sense, solidarity is a collective phenomenon, before it becomes an individual one. This is the reason why the study of individual solidarity needs to be embedded in an inquiry of the meso and macro structures.

Accordingly, we propose to move to the meso-level, following the assumption that solidarity very often requires some sort of organisation. Undoubtedly, solidarity is also a matter of individual and spontaneous acts of help within face-to-face situations. However, as soon as we transcend this level of isolated activities, informal networks and interactions within every-day life, we move into what research about civil societies and social movements has identified as the determinants and properties of collective action (Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, 1997; Giugni and Passy, 2001). Solidarity demands, on the one hand, the pooling of resources, the coordination of individual activities, the provision of incentives and sanctions (Hirsch, 1986), while, on the other hand, building on the promotion of shared behavioural norms, ideas and identities is also a requirement (Minkoff, 1997; Hunt and Bendorf, 2004). Individual acts of solidarity will very often be motivated, directed and spurred on by the affiliation, membership or adherence to specific organisations and movements. The latter provide incentives to participate, role models for acting, and norms and identities to motivate and/or justify solidarity, e.g., when referring to membership fees and charitable donations, joint political protests, events of claims-making.

These observations are particularly relevant for European solidarity, given the fact that we are analysing rather complex and territorially-extended forms of collective actions (Smith, 2002; Batliwala, 2002). European solidarity will most probably be more dependent onorganisation as a process, and on organisations as entrepreneurial entities. In this regard, it seems indispensable to link the study of European solidarity to the analysis of transnational solidarity organisations and organisational fields (Bandy and Smith, 2005; Balme and Chabanet, 2008; della Porta and Caiani, 2011; Baglioni and Giugni, 2014). On the one hand, we hypothesise that European solidarity is clearly dependent on the development of transnational fields or networks of civil society and social movement organisations, which increase connectivity and diffusion processes, mobilise and organise constituencies, and define and circulate common discourses and identities. Consequently, we assume that European solidarity will be most probably structured differently in various issue fields and policy domains, mirroring the diverse organisational strength and mobilisation power of the various organisational fields. On the other hand, we have

to take into account that organisational fields are patterned along cleavages, conflicts and oppositions, too, which are of particular importance to better understand the contentiousness of European solidarity. In fact, in many issue fields and policy domains at national and EU level, we see the emergence of populist, nationalist and xenophobic groups, political parties and movements (Kriesi, 2012; Wodak et al., 2013; Gómez-Reino and Llamazares, 2013), which in many instances oppose attempts to mobilise and institutionalise measures of European solidarity. Here, we refer back to our argument that solidarity is highly political in the sense of implying (competing) notions of (imagined) groups or communities (e.g., regional, national, European) with opposing memberships, missions and ideas. In organisational terms, we hypothesise that the development of European solidarity at the individual and collective levels is therefore strongly dependent on organisational fields, their internal cleavages and contentions.

Third, the analysis of solidarity recurrently heads towards the macro-level, and here, social theories tend to privilege either structural, institutional and/or cultural dimensions. Here, the range of potential theoretical explanations is very wide, and thus we need to restrict ourselves to those most pertinent to the subsequent analysis. Of lesser importance are approaches committed to sociological modernisation theory, which stress the move towards 'organic' solidarities in functionally differentiated societies (Durkheim, 1997; Parsons, 1951), to more post-materialistic orientations within economically affluent societies (Inglehart and Rabier, 1978), and towards post-nationalistic and cosmopolitan orientations in times of reflexive modernity (Beck et al., 1994). All of them tend to stress unidirectional and linear developments, thus disregarding the contentiousness of European solidarity. Much more relevant are theories dealing with institutionalised forms of solidarity in terms of welfare states, public policies and constitutional rights.

In fact, solidarity is a political idea and a legal norm institutionalised by the emerging welfare states in order to regulate the social rights and obligations of their citizens. The principle of solidarity is thus woven into constitutions (Brunkhorst, 2005; Ross and Borgmann-Prebil, 2010; Bellamy et al., 2006; Dalessio, 2013), but also in policy fields and specific policy measures, as research on welfare regimes and social policies argues (Esping-Anderson, 2002; de Bùrca, 2005; Morel et al., 2012). The extent to which citizens can count on the solidarity of the state and citizenry thus depends on the range and kind of social rights and entitlements guaranteed by public policies, on the way social policies are funded and administered, and on the way citizens claim their rights in case of dissent. An analysis of legal frameworks and institutional settings is not only important to understand the levels and forms of 'institutionalised solidarity', though. It also seems pertinent with regard to the analysis of civic solidarity at the level of individual citizens and civil societies. Research has shown that the different welfare regimes provide different opportunities and constraints for non-profit associations, 'private' welfare provision, or volunteering (Evers, 1995; Anheier and Salamon, 1999; Bauer, Bredtmann and Schmidt, 2013). Before this backdrop, we might hypothesise that the uneven institutionalisation of solidarity within the legal framework and public policies at the national and

EU level might have implications for the uneven development of solidarity at the level of citizens and civil societies within Europe. Research has given examples of how a benevolent welfare state with strong policies of redistribution might spur on crowding out effects on private philanthropy (Abrams and Schitz, 1978; Frey, 1998; Nikolova, 2014). In this vein, we can assume that the weak institutionalisation of solidarity at the EU level might condition crowding in effects on civic solidarity, particularly in times of accelerating crisis and urgent need for remedial actions.

References to the legal and institutional framework are incomplete, however, if we do not take into consideration the constitutive role of the public sphere as an arena of contestation and deliberation. Law and public policies mirror, to a certain extent ideas, beliefs and values cherished within the public sphere (Habermas, 1996: 76; 2013), which means that also 'institutionalised solidarity' is constantly constructed and reproduced through public narratives, ideologies and discourses (Brown and Gilman, 1960; Calhoun, 2002; Pensky, 2008). Our references to the macro-level would thus remain incomplete if we ignored the decisive role of the mass media as an arena for the formation of collective opinions and ideas about legitimate solidarity (Mylonas, 2012; Papathanassopoulos, 2015). This role has been evidenced in previous episodes of the European integration process (e.g., Statham and Trenz, 2013), but is particularly important when considering the impact of the European crisis on public debates at the European and national levels. Studies have dealt with the Great Recession since 2008 and have shown that the crisis increased the intensity of conflicts between different governments about the necessary measures to combat the (budgetary, economic, and social) consequences of the crisis (Wilde, Michailidou and Trenz, 2013). Given the fact that the mass media are still strongly attached to different language areas, political systems and specific national audiences (Boomgaarden et al., 2013), it is very probable that the propagated notions of European solidarity will structurally mirror the antagonistic positions of member states within the European crisis.

Overall, we thus propose a conceptual and theoretical framework that includes various analytical dimensions and explanatory factors. Beyond a purely additive rationale, this framework insists on the need to analyse the embeddedness of individual and organised forms of solidarity within the meso- and macro-level of collective constraints and opportunities, cultural meanings and discourses. In fact, we assume that the degree and the forms of European solidarity among citizens will be shaped by their socio-demographic traits and immediate social environment (e.g., gender, social class, political, religious allegiances, etc.), but also by the availability of organisations (e.g., self-help groups, welfare associations, social movement organisations), and the transnational structures of organisational fields. Finally, individual solidarity will also be influenced by constitutional and institutional opportunities and constraints on social solidarity, and it will most probably be impacted by public discourses on legitimate and accepted forms of (European) solidarity (Lindenberg, 1998). In fact, individual citizens might withdraw from solidarity in reaction to proliferating public mistrust against the addressees of help; they also might be less inclined due to flourishing reservations against civic organisations or public

authorities channelling (financial) contributions, or they might abstain because of a mushrooming scepticism about the value of helping others in times of crisis. Charitable or political organisations might find it harder to mobilise individual, corporate or state support for their work in times of shrinking institutional and/or interpersonal trust and eroding public commitment to (transnational) solidarity.

Figure 1: European solidarity as a multidimensional phenomenon



Structure of the report

The review of scholarly writing in the area of European solidarity can be synthesised in a concise manner: While the study of solidarity is as old as the social sciences, we have a very limited picture of European solidarity, particularly because we cannot apply standard wisdom about solidarity to the European level, given the complexity of the European Union. The TransSOL project aimed at closing part of this knowledge gap, by providing systematic data on the levels and forms of solidarity within Europe, and by engaging in in-depth analysis of the factors promoting and inhibiting civic solidarity. Based on the conceptual, analytical and explanatory framework of analysis presented in the previous pages, TransSOL was devoted to this task, by implementing a work-plan that consisted of various work-packages. Each of these elements was devoted to the analysis of one of the components of the analytical framework: The first and fifth work-packages focused on the legal framework and public policies of our eight countries and the EU, and analysed public debates within the print and social media; the second and fourth work-packages dealt with the organisational field of civil society at the grass-roots and the national/European level; and the third work-package centred on individual citizens.

In the following, we will present the main findings of these five research-based work-packages. The second chapter will present the evidence gathered through the analysis of

constitutions, public policies and court rulings. It will show that the principle of solidarity is unevenly institutionalised within the eight countries and at the EU, and that there are regressive moments due to the various crises affecting Europe since 2008. The third and fourth chapter unveil our empirical findings about the organisational field of transnational solidarity, both at the grassroots and the national/European level. It will identify a remarkably wide range of initiatives, and show that the organisational field is not strongly transnationalised in terms of cross-national activities, but rather decentralised in its main structure. The fifth chapter is devoted to presenting findings from the survey among individual citizens. Its results highlight that a considerable share of the population in our eight countries is committed to solidarity practices and approves of redistribution; however, European solidarity is the weakest element in the array of target groups. The sixth chapter moves back to the macro-level, as it is interested in portraying public discourses on the refugee crisis between mid-2015 and early 2016. It identifies a strong moment of solidarity during the summer of 2015, but provides evidence for moments of regression since then. Finally, the report ends with a short concluding chapter, where the main findings across the various chapters and work-packages are discussed.

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Solidarity in Europe – European solidarity: a comparative account of citizens' attitudes and practices

Maria Grasso and Christian Lahusen

Introduction

Solidarity has received heightened attention in recent times due to the various crises that have affected the European Union since 2008. Critical voices have repeatedly raised their concern that solidarity is severely at risk within the EU because of the inability of the European institutions and member states to agree on mechanisms of burden-sharing. This is true in regard to the economic and financial crisis that has affected several European countries. Even though the European Union has developed a number of policy measures (e.g., the 'European Financial Stability Facility', the 'European Stability Mechanism', and the 'Stability and Growth Pact') which have opened the door to financial assistance, the EU remained committed to a bail-out policy package that delegated financial liabilities and risks to nation-states threatened by bankruptcy. As a reaction, most commentators converged upon the conviction that international solidarity was dead (see Habermas 2017, Balibar 2010). A similar conclusion was drawn in regard to the issues emerging in reaction to the increased inflow of refugees from Syria and other regions affected by wars, and the inability of the EU institutions and its member states to agree on a coordinated asylum policy and mechanisms of admission and integration. Consensus could only be reached in regard to the external dimension (e.g., frontier controls, fight against human trafficking), leaving the issue of internal coordination unsolved.

The success of populist parties, the Brexit vote, and the mobilization of Eurosceptic and xenophobic protests across Europe has raised further concerns that European solidarity might be at risk in a more fundamental and all-encompassing manner. In times of crisis, we might not only be witnessing the erosion of cooperation and solidarity between member state governments, but also the corrosion of solidarity at the level of the European citizenry, thus threatening the social foundations of solidarity on which EU institutions and policies are built. Do these observations and concerns mirror the current situation throughout the European Union? Is European solidarity really on the retreat within the European citizenry? How strongly is solidarity rooted at the individual level, both in terms of attitudes and practices? And which factors seem to contribute to the reproduction and/or corrosion of solidarity in times of crisis?

We are urgently in need of sound empirical evidence in order to answer these questions. Public debates and contentions continue to return to this issue but we have had very

little empirical evidence on which to draw to inform this debate to date. To date, diverging facts and observations have been taken into consideration. On the one hand, it seems true that the various crises affecting the EU are putting European solidarity under strain. Possibly, it is easier to profess cooperation and help in times of economic growth and optimistic economic outlook, while solidarity might turn out to be much more difficult to sustain in times of recession and scarcity. This is particularly true given that populist and xenophobic political entrepreneurs can draw on the exacerbation of citizens' fear and grievances and that the crisis overlaps with a long history of ineffective policies in key domains, such as poverty and unemployment, immigration and asylum. Consequently, political debates are marked increasingly by antagonism, conflict and mistrust between governments and citizens. On the other hand, it remains to say that 60 years of European integration has gradually established feelings of belongingness to the European community, enabled shared identification with European institutions, as well as European and cosmopolitan identities (Delanty and Rumford 2005; Beck and Grande 2007). Moreover, European integration has furthered cross-national experiences and contacts amongst citizens, as well as transnational trust between European peoples (Delhey 2007). Finally, public opinion polls show that, in the midst of the European crisis, a majority of respondents still agree that it is desirable to give financial help to other countries in the name of European solidarity between member states, according to Eurobarometer data (2011, 76.1) and survey data by exploratory studies (Lengfeld et al. 2012).

This chapter tries to shed more light into this debate by presenting core descriptive findings of a representative survey among citizens of eight European countries. The survey was conducted in the context of the TransSOL project (details provided in the next paragraph). A specialised polling company (INFO) was sub-contracted and the same questionnaire was administered in the relevant languages to approximately 2,000 respondents in each of the countries of the project (Total N 16,000). Respondent samples were matched to national statistics with quotas for education, age, gender and region and population weights are applied in the anal yzes presented in this report. The questionnaire aimed to address the major dimensions of solidarity both attitudinal and behavioural as well as the relevant independent variables. More information about the survey and the country specific findings is available through the project's website (see reports on the website: http://transsol.eu/).

Contributing knowledge to an established field of research: concepts and objectives

Solidarity is one of the key phenomena studied in the social sciences. For many decades, scholars from sociology, economics, political sciences and psychology, amongst others, have inquired into the forms and conditions of solidarity, even though our knowledge is quite limited in regard to the transnational dimension, i.e., European solidarity. This lacuna is even more serious once we move to the individual level and ask for the atti-

tudes and practices of the European citizenry with reference to European solidarity. How strongly is the idea of solidarity shared by citizens throughout Europe, and how much are they engaged in solidarity-related activities? Is solidarity limited to specific communities or target groups, or do we detect also a universalist or cosmopolitan philanthropy dimension? What can we say about the social traits, beliefs and convictions of people engaged in solidarity activities? And which are the factors inhibiting solidarity dispositions and practices?

Previous research has not addressed these questions in any systematic manner, but a review of available studies is important to lay the groundwork for contextualising the data analyzes presented in this report. Existing evidence helps to grasp the phenomenon under study by identifying relevant dimensions and aspects, and by highlighting explanatory factors that might affect also European solidarity. First of all, previous research is important in conceptual terms, given that we need to agree what the notion of 'solidarity' is all about. In this regard, we converge with a strong strand of research that defines solidarity as the preparedness to share one's own resources with others and/or support state redistributive policies (e.g., Stjerno 2012: 2). This proposal stresses one element that has received much attention in the social sciences: namely, attitudes and dispositions. In fact, most surveys are primarily interested in measuring the readiness of citizens to share some of their resources with others, and here, a recurrent topic was the support of redistributional (social) policies and the willingness of respondents to devote their taxes to these means (Svallfors 1997; Fong 2001; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Rehm 2009; Rehm et al. 2012). This aspect is crucial for European societies, given the prominence of welfare institutions and social policies as institutionalized forms of solidarity.

Research about redistributive preferences among citizens is an important contribution to understanding the extent to which the welfare state is rooted in society. However, our own research needed to enlarge the focus in three directions to grasp the role and place of European solidarity. First, attitudes and dispositions do not determine actual practices. This means that our own survey aimed more explicitly to measure reported activities in order to get a more reliable picture about the extent to which European citizens are committed to supporting others within and beyond their countries and communities. Second, scholarly writing has tended to focus on the (financial) help to the needy, thus privileging the charitable dimension of solidarity. While this aspect is important, it downplays the political dimension of solidarity. In fact, people demonstrate solidarity with other persons in struggle or in need when participating in collective actions (e.g., public claims-making, political protests, communication campaigns) that strive to improve the situation of these groups by mobilizing public support, committing stakeholders and/or changing public policies on their behalf (Giugni and Passy 2001).

Particularly in the context of the EU, it is important to include this dimension of solidarity (Balme and Chabanet 2008; Lahusen 2013; Baglioni and Giugni 2014; Giugni and Grasso forthcoming). European solidarity is already present when people help other European citizens to raise their voice and make it heard, particularly if we are speaking

of social groups at the fringes of society that are not only exposed to social exclusion, but also to political marginalization and invisibility in terms of news-coverage and interest representation. Finally, our project confirms previous research that solidarity is of little analytic and practical use when conceived of as a generalized disposition or practice. Studies recurrently highlight that solidarity is conditional and thus tied to specific issues and target groups (Komter 2005). Solidarity is related to ideas about the neediness, deservingness or social proximity of targeted groups. These targets can be vulnerable groups within society, such as the elderly, the unemployed or the disabled (van Oorschot 2006), but also entire countries, such as the European Member States affected by the economic crisis (Lengfeld et al. 2012).

The research design of our survey reflected these conceptual clarifications. First, our questionnaire included questions addressing attitudes and dispositions related to solidarity, but also asked respondents to list reported activities. In asking questions about which types of solidarity-related activities individuals performed, we tried to be more demanding than previous studies by assembling information about various activities, ranging from boycotting products to active participation in voluntary associations. Second, the survey was conceived to measure not only the charitable dimension of solidarity, but also the political aspects indicated above. For this purpose, questions were based on a rights-based concept of solidarity by asking respondents whether they actively support the rights of various groups. Additionally, we assembled information on political activities and orientations related to solidarity, ranging from protest participation to policy related issues (e.g., European solidarity measures). Third, the survey aimed at gathering data on the 'vertical' and 'horizontal' dimension of solidarity. To this end, on the one hand, it included questions measuring the support of respondents for redistributive policies within their country and at the EU level. On the other hand, it asked respondents to indicate their involvement in interpersonal forms of help and support. Finally, the interview guidelines were devoted to assessing whether solidarity dispositions and practices were generalized and/or bound to certain target groups. For this purpose, we differentiated between a spatial dimension (i.e., solidarity with people within the respondents' countries, within the EU, and beyond the EU) and an issue-related dimension by addressing three different target groups (i.e., the refugees/asylum seekers, the unemployed, and the disabled).

These nuances allowed us to gather a data set that measures solidarity within the EU in a systematic and comprehensive manner and on different levels and dimensions. On these grounds, we are able to describe levels of solidarity dispositions and activities within the eight countries under study, and give a nuanced and differentiated picture of various forms of (target-specific) solidarity. Among other things, we are able to contextualize European solidarity and compare it with other (group-bound) forms of solidarity. This descriptive aim, however, was not the only objective of this survey. More than that, TransSOL was geared to shed light on those factors that are beneficial or detrimental for solidarity at large, and European solidarity in particular. Also in this regard, the survey followed knowledge previously accumulated in scholarship on the subject. Since many

studies converge in the observation that civic or social solidarity among citizens is highly patterned by a battery of factors, namely socio-demographic traits, social class, political allegiances, social capital, religious beliefs and values among others, we included these variables in our study. Scholarly writing in various areas of research identify these factors. In this regard, three strands of inquiry are of particular relevance for the discussion at hand.

A first source of inspiration comes from empirical research about redistributive preferences. These studies are interested in identifying those factors that guarantee the support of citizens for the welfare state at large, and various social policies in particular, and thus spur the backing of institutionalized forms of wealth redistribution and help (Alesina and Giuliano 2011; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Fong 2001; Rehm 2009; Rehm et al. 2012; Svallfors 1997). Studies have addressed a variety of social policy fields, among them pensions (Jaime-Castillo 2013), poverty (Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Scheepers and Grotenhuis 2005) and immigration (Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Mau and Burkhardt 2009). Evidence suggests that the support for redistributive preferences is influenced by the respondents' position in society, e.g., the 'rational calculations' tied to their state of vulnerability (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm 2009) but cognitive and ideational factor also play a role. Research has pointed to the role of religion and religiosity (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015), but also general beliefs about the causes of income inequality (Fong 2001) and perceptions of deservingness (van Oorschot 2006) seem to play a role. In regard to the latter, research has identified several criteria that influence the judgment of deservingness: (1) the level of perceived responsibility and neediness, (2) social and spatial proximity and identity, including loyalties to ethnic groups, (3) the recipients' attitudes and the degree of reciprocation (receiving and giving) (Oorshot 2000 and 2006; Alesina and Glaeser 2004; Luttmer 2001).

Second, the extensive field of studies on social capital and social cohesion is relevant for our discussion here since it focuses on topics that are closely interrelated to (transnational) solidarity. In this field, we find studies that are interested in forms of interpersonal help and support, which highlight the importance of (interpersonal and institutional) trust, and which emphasize the importance of memberships and active participation in civic associations and groups (Putnam et al. 2003; van Oorschot et al. 2006) for the development of reciprocal trust and the bedrock of well-functioning democratic societies. In all these areas, the assumption is that social capital is the necessary 'glue' for social cohesion (Chan et al. 2006; Jeannotte 2000; Delhey 2007), and thus also essential for understanding the conditions, structures and dynamics underpinning solidarity. Similar conclusions to the above stated research have been made in regard to the conditioning factors: social class, age, and gender play a role, as well as post-materialist values and religious beliefs; societies with social cleavages and political conflicts, as well as more residual welfare state institutions provide a less conducive environment (Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; van Oorschot and Arts 2005; Gesthuizen et al. 2008; Gelissen et al. 2012).

Finally, there are also lessons to be drawn from research on political behaviour in general, and social movement and protest participation more specifically. These strands of research focus on the political dimensions of solidarity, and thus help to answer the question of whether political solidarity is determined by similar factors as the ones discussed above. Scholarly writing seems to support some of the research assumptions presented before, by showing how political behaviour is patterned by social inequalities and forms of social exclusion (Brady, Verba and Schlozman 1995; Kronauer 1998). Moreover, studies agree on the fact that solidarity is also highly patterned by political preferences and orientation, e.g., along the left-right scale (Likki and Staerklé 2014). Social movement analysis adds relevant knowledge by pointing to the importance of mobilization processes lead by existing organizations and groups, with the latter considered as collective means of mobilizing, organizing and perpetuating (transnational) solidarity in terms of binding norms, commitments and behaviours (Smith 1997; Balme and Chabanet 2008; della Porta and Caiani 2011; Baglioni and Giugni 2014). That is, being a member or follower of a certain initiative, association, organization or movement implies a commitment not only to specific norms of solidarity, but also to palpable acts as well (e.g., membership fees and charitable donations, joint political protests, events of claims-making).

Based on these insights, the survey included a series of questions that geared to gather data on all these explanatory factors. This information should allow us to identify those variables that tend to boost or inhibit solidarity dispositions and practices along the various dimensions identified before. First, we are interested to see whether solidarity is patterned along cross-national differences. Moreover, gender, age, and other types of socio-demographic characteristics could also be studied. The study of civil societies, for instance, has shown that voluntary engagement tends to replicate the public/private divide by centring more strictly on male-dominated and 'public' activities, to the detriment of female networks of care and help (Neill and Gidengil 2006; Valentova 2016). It has been shown that younger and older citizens are more active in social movements, following different grades of 'biographical availability' in the life course (Beyerlein and Bergstrand 2013). And we know that migrants are often involved in cross-national networks of support and help (Glick Schiller et al. 1995; Morokvasic 1999; Recchi and Favell 2009). Second, we wish to test whether solidarity is patterned by the differential access of citizens to valued resources and skills, such as income and education, by the respondents' social status and affiliation to social class (Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Cainzos and Voces 2010), and by different levels of social exclusion and deprivation (Kronauer 1998). Third, we wish to analyze to what extent solidarity is conditioned by social capital, following the propositions of research devoted to civil society and social movements (Putnam et al. 2003; van Oorschot et al. 2006; Jenkins 1983). In particular, we wish to highlight the role of institutional and interpersonal trust, of informal networks and social relations, and of associational involvement in a wide range of social, cultural and political organizations and groups. Fourth, we aim to identify the interrelation between political orientations and behaviours on the one side, and solidarity dispositions and practices on the other. In particular, we try to assess whether relevant factors investigate at

the national level – e.g., levels of political participation, political preferences and ideological orientations (e.g. Blekesaune and Quadagno 2003; Amat and Wibbels 2009; Likki and Staerklé 2014), also differentiate citizens with regards to European solidarity. Finally, we wanted to identify the role of ideational and cognitive factors, too, assuming that the collective identities and the attachment to groups and communities might condition levels of (European) solidarity (Luttmer 2001; Komter 2005;) as much as religion and religiosity (Stegmueller et al. 2012; Lichterman 2015), moral norms and visions of a desirable social order (Stets and McCaffree 2014).

European solidarity: a descriptive account of eight European countries

The results from our online survey in eight member states, conducted by the TransSOL-project in November and December 2016, show that European citizens testify a readiness to engage for solidarity. A strong majority of respondents supports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development, with 62% supporting and only 14% opposing these measures (see Table 1). Moreover, a majority of respondents reports having engaged in solidarity activities for people in their country (51%), including donating money or time, protesting and engaging in voluntary associations (see Table 2). Finally, we see that European citizens strongly support solidarity-based (redistributive) public policies (see Table 3), with 68% considering the reduction of big income inequalities as an important goal. In other words, the traditional European social model is not questioned by our interviewees.

Table 1: Development aid

"The European Union provides development aid to assist certain countries outside the EU in their fight against poverty and in their development. How important do you think it is to help people in developing countries?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Not at all (%)	Not very (%)	Neither (%)	Fairly important (%)	Very important (%)	Total N
Denmark	4	8	26	43	19	2183
France	5	9	32	38	16	2098
Germany	3	6	18	46	28	2064
Greece	6	7	21	44	22	2061
Italy	4	7	18	46	26	2087
Poland	5	16	35	35	8	2119
United Kingdom	6	9	27	37	21	2083
Switzerland	3	8	20	44	25	2221
Total	5	9	25	42	20	16916

Table 2: Support of other people

"Have you ever done one of the following in order to support the rights of people/groups?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	People in your own country (%)	People in other countries within the EU (%)	People in countries outside the EU (%)	Disability rights (%)	The unemployed (%)	Refugees/ asylum seekers (%)	Total N
Denmark	47	23	35	44	27	30	2183
France	47	25	30	50	24	20	2098
Germany	51	31	40	52	27	34	2064
Greece	62	35	36	62	58	36	2061
Italy	47	32	33	49	36	28	2087
Poland	59	35	37	65	40	27	2119
UK	38	19	25	35	19	22	2221
Switzerland	59	34	45	67	33	33	2083
Total	51	29	35	53	33	29	16916

Note: at least one of the following was named: protest, donate money or time, bought or boycotted goods, passive or active membership

Table 3: Eliminating inequalities

Eliminating big inequalities in income between citizens (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Not at all important (%)	Not very important (%)	Neither (%)	Fairly important (%)	Very important (%)	Total N
Denmark	5.4	12.7	33.1	32.8	16	2,183
France	2.4	5.8	20.3	37.5	34	2,098
Germany	2	6.2	22.8	39.3	29.7	2,064
Greece	1.8	3.5	16.7	35.1	42.9	2,061
Italy	1.4	3	14.9	40	40.7	2,087
Poland	2.6	5.4	21.7	36.5	33.8	2,119
UK	3.6	6.7	28.5	35.8	25.4	2,083
Switzerland	3.2	7.9	22.3	38.9	27.7	2,221
Total	2.8	6.5	22.6	37.00	31.1	16,916

At the same time, however, citizens are less inclined to support European solidarity. Only 29% of the respondents have engaged in activities in support of the rights of people in other EU countries (see Table 2). Moreover, the general public is divided when it comes to the question whether governments and the EU should engage in solidarity measures within the EU. In the case of fiscal solidarity measures in support of countries with public debts the supporters outweigh the opponents only slightly (41% vs. 30%), with 29% undecided respondents (see Table 4). In regard to refugees, the group opposing more funds for EU measures slightly outweighs the supporters (39% vs. 35%), again

with a considerable share of undecided (see Table 5). The support is somewhat stronger in countries requiring help in the risis: i.e., the support is stronger in Greece and Italy with regard to public debts, and higher in Germany, Greece and Denmark with regard to refugees.

Table 4: Fiscal solidarity: pay public debts

"The EU is currently pooling funds to help EU countries having difficulties in paying their debts. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this measure?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Strongly disagree (%)	Disagree (%)	Neither (%)	Agree (%)	Strongly agree (%)	Total N
Denmark	14	24	34	23	5	1939
France	15	19	30	28	8	1903
Germany	15	26	25	27	6	1914
Greece	7	4	24	38	26	1975
Italy	5	11	18	47	19	1928
Poland	8	12	42	33	6	1938
United Kingdom	18	23	25	27	7	1861
Switzerland	14	22	31	28	5	1992
Total	12	18	29	31	10	15455

Table 5: Fiscal solidarity: help refugees

"Would you support or oppose your country's government offering financial support to the European Union in order to help refugees?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Strongly oppose (%)	Somewhat oppose (%)	Neither (%)	Somewhat support (%)	Strongly support (%)	Total N
Denmark	16	17	25	27	14	2183
France	26	19	29	21	5	2098
Germany	12	17	24	35	12	2064
Greece	24	15	23	31	8	2061
Italy	21	25	28	23	4	2087
Poland	18	19	33	24	5	2119
United Kingdom	20	18	27	26	10	2221
Switzerland	21	25	20	28	6	2083
Total	20	19	26	27	8	16916

As such, our results show that European citizens are ready to help, but our findings suggest that most citizens are skeptical towards a universalistic and humanitarian conception of solidarity (i.e. solidarity towards human beings as such) that entails unconditional

solidarity. On the contrary, the motives of people to support fiscal solidarity within the EU (see Table 6) show that the largest group subscribes to the idea of reciprocity and deservingness. According to these views, solidarity in the EU is an exchange relation of giving and receiving help. Moreover, groups receiving help need to show that they are worthy of being helped. European solidarity suffers immediately, when citizens have the feeling that support measures are one-sided and potentially misused. This conditionality is confirmed in regard to migrants.

Table 6: Fiscal solidarity: reasons

"There are many reasons to state for or against financial help for EU countries in trouble. Which one of the following best reflects how you feel?" Multiple answers possible (in %) (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Poland	UK	CH	Total
Financial help has also beneficial effects for the own country	20	13	15	19	16	24	15	13	17
It is our moral duty to help other member states that are in need	18	16	21	27	20	20	17	15	19
member states should help each other, as some-where along the way every country may require help	33	37	45	59	52	49	31	42	44
Financial help should not be given to countries that have proven to handle money badly	40	37	40	22	26	38	42	38	35
Don't know	19	17	9	8	13	11	16	12	13
Total N	2183	2098	2064	2061	2087	2119	2083	2221	16916

Table 7 shows that only a minority of 12% is against granting migrants access to social benefits and services. However, access is conditional on two things: they should have worked and payed taxes (42%), and they should become citizens of the country (30%). A minority of respondents (16%) is more generous, granting migrants access more easily.

Table 7: Migrants and social rights

When should migrants obtain rights to social benefits and services as citizens do? (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Immediately on arrival (%)	After living 1Y (worked or not) (%)	After worked & paid taxes 1Y (%)	After citizenship (%)	Never (%)	Total N
Denmark	7	9	37	36	11	2,183
France	5	9	41	26	18	2,098
Germany	9	13	46	24	7	2,064
Greece	8	8	34	35	15	2,061
Italy	8	7	38	36	12	2,087
Poland	7	8	43	32	10	2,119
UK	6	8	46	27	14	2,083
Switzerland	6	9	52	23	10	2,221
Total	7	9	42	30	12	16,916

Overall, we see that for most citizens, solidarity is rights-based and thus tied to some notion of citizenship, i.e., delimited by legal entitlements and mutual obligations (e.g., such as receiving social benefit and paying taxes or contributions). This might explain why respondents privilege rights-based solidarity within "traditional" national communities, whereas relations of solidarity are weaker across national borders. However, this does not necessarily exclude European solidarity. European citizens seem to insist that people or countries receiving help should be part of a rights-based system of entitlements and obligations because solidarity is a reciprocal relation of giving and receiving. Apparently, Europeans do not see yet the EU as an "accomplished" political community establishing and guaranteeing common rights and mutual obligations. This seems to reflect a general feeling that there is not yet a fair system of rules in place that balance the mutual rights and obligations of the European peoples within the EU. In other words, the promotion of European solidarity requires a conception of social citizenship that is firmly anchored in a political and social union.

European Union membership and attachment

The issue of European solidarity cannot be discussed without reference to the feelings of satisfaction and belongingness with regards to the EU. The results presented in Table 8 show opinions on jobs and employment if the country were outside the EU (in Switzerland we asked if they country were *in* the EU). In all countries, except for Switzerland and Greece, the idea of being outside the EU is seen as detrimental for jobs and employment. In Switzerland, about 50% think that being inside the EU would be bad for jobs (with only 11% thinking that it would be good); in Greece 38% per cent think it would be good to be outside the EU (against 31% thinking it would be bad).

Moreover, the gap between those thinking being outside the EU would be bad for jobs and employment is smaller in the other Southern European countries- Italy and France and the UK. On the other hand, it is quite large, signaling greater positive feelings about EU membership in Denmark, Germany and Poland. Across the countries, a sizeable proportion ranging from about 17 percent in Greece and almost 30 percent in France think it would make no difference and between 14 and 24 percent of respondents are not sure.

Table 8: Effect on jobs and employment if country was *outside* the EU (in %)

(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Would be good	Would be bad	Would make no difference	Don't know	Total
Denmark	16.2	37.8	21.7	24.3	100
France	23.8	27.6	27.8	20.8	100
Germany	14.4	43.7	26.5	15.4	100
Greece	38.4	31.2	16.5	14.0	100
Italy	25.9	35.4	21.9	16.8	100
Poland	10.6	52.1	18.1	19.2	100
Switzerland*	11.3*	49.6*	25.0*	14.1*	100
UK	26.5	33.0	24.3	16.1	100
Total	20.8	38.9	22.7	17.6	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked if the country was *in* the EU*

Table 9 asks respondents how they would vote if there was a referendum on their country's membership of the EU (in Switzerland we asked about joining). Results show once more that across countries, Switzerland prefers to stay outside and Greece would prefer to leave; there is a very slight preference for leaving in the UK as well. Once more gaps are smaller in Italy and France than in Denmark, Germany and Switzerland.

Table 9: Referendum on EU-membership (in %)

"If there was a referendum on your country's membership of the EU how would you vote?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Remain (*Become a member)	Leave (*Stay outside)	Would not vote	Don't know	Total
Denmark	47.6	32.1	4.2	16.1	100
France	42.7	30.3	7.6	19.4	100
Germany	61.3	23.5	6.0	9.3	100
Greece	37.7	46.3	7.9	8.1	100
Italy	43.1	36.1	6.4	14.5	100
Poland	64.0	14.8	7.8	13.4	100
Switzerland*	10.5*	74.3*	5.7*	9.5*	100
UK	44.3	45.2	3.7	6.8	100
Total	48.7	32.6	6.2	12.6	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked about joining the EU*

Table 10 asks respondents if they believe that the UK should remain or leave the EU. A slightly higher proportion of UK respondents felt the UK should leave than those saying it should remain. Reflecting patterns found previously, the Swiss, Greeks, French and Italians all think that the UK should leave whereas the Danes, Germans and Polish think it should stay.

Table 10: Should the UK remain a member or leave the EU? (in %)

(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Remain	Leave	Don't know	Total
Denmark	45.1	34.5	20.4	100
France	30.3	46.6	23.1	100
Germany	51.7	35.7	12.6	100
Greece	32.2	51.7	16.1	100
Italy	39.8	43.2	17.0	100
Poland	59.0	19.5	21.5	100
Switzerland	26.3	55.1	18.7	100
United Kingdom	45.3	47.1	7.6	100
Total	41.1	41.7	17.2	100

Table 11 presents results from asking respondents whether they feel that on balance their country's membership of the EU was good, bad or neither a good nor a bad thing. In Switzerland, we asked about potentially joining the EU. Reflecting once more the patterns found previously, the Swiss think joining the EU would be bad, and the Greeks think that being members of the EU is a bad thing. On the other hand, all the others think it's on balance a good thing but the gap is smaller in the UK, Italy and France than in Denmark, and particularly Germany and Poland.

Table 11: EU-membership good/bad (in %)

"Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European Union is ...?"
(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	A good thing	A bad thing	Neither good nor bad	Don't know	Total
Denmark	38.9	25.3	26.3	9.6	100
France	34.4	26.5	29.8	9.3	100
Germany	53.3	15.6	26.6	4.5	100
Greece	30.7	34.0	31.1	4.2	100
Italy	35.8	30.6	26.4	7.2	100
Poland	62.7	9.2	20.9	7.2	100
Switzerland*	8.0*	67.6*	18.1*	6.3*	100
UK	40.3	35.4	18.0	6.4	100
Total	37.8	30.8	24.6	6.9	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked about joining the EU (joining the EU would be…)*

Table 12 presents results asking respondents if they think their country has more directly benefited from being a member of the EU (in Switzerland we asked if they benefited from NOT being members). In Switzerland, over 70% think the country has benefited from NOT being part of the EU. In Greece, Italy and – by a tiny margin – in France, higher proportions think the country has not benefited from membership. Even in the UK a higher % felt they benefited from membership. In Denmark, Germany and Poland again attitudes are very positive in terms of feeling that the countries benefited from being part of the EU.

Table 12: Benefited from EU.-membership (in %)

"Taking everything into account, would you say that your country has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Benefited	Not benefited	Don't know	Total
Denmark	48.6	29.8	21.7	100
France	36.2	37.6	26.2	100
Germany	58.5	27.4	14.2	100
Greece	37.2	53.1	9.6	100
Italy	28.2	52.7	19.1	100
Poland	70.9	14.3	14.8	100
Switzerland*	70.3*	13.4*	16.3*	100
UK	43.7	37.0	19.3	100
Total	49.4	32.9	17.7	100

*Notes: *in Switzerland we asked if the country benefited or not from NOT being a member of the European Union*

Table 13 compares attachment to the European Union to other entities including the world/humanity, one's country, region and one's city. It is very clear that the EU scores the lowest levels of attachment compared to the other spatial entities. The strongest attachment to the EU is clearly in Poland, followed by Germany, Italy and France, then the UK, Denmark, Greece and Switzerland. By and large an interesting pattern is that despite quite high levels of dissatisfaction with EU membership Italy and France still show very high levels of attachment to the EU whereas, despite high satisfaction Danish attachment is lower than one would expect it to be.

Table 13: Attachments (% fairly and very attached)

"Please tell me how attached you feel to …?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	European Union	The world/humanity	Country	Region	City
Denmark	33.4	64.1	90.8	62.2	80.3
France	47.1	72.7	88.6	80.5	79.0
Germany	53.3	69.0	83.7	79.1	82.1
Greece	32.3	73.8	90.5	85.0	85.0
Italy	49.1	73.4	78.1	80.2	82.3
Poland	65.8	79.9	89.8	87.8	87.6
Switzerland	28.1	74.6	89.1	84.0	81.1
United Kingdom	40.1	67.7	82.5	75.8	79.7
Total	43.5	71.9	86.7	79.3	82.1

Table 14 shows the relationship between feelings of solidarity and attachment to the European Union. This allows us to have a look at to what extent feelings of solidarity coincide with feelings of attachment to the EU. It is clear from the results that those who feel the strongest feelings of attachment to the European Union are also those that are most likely to support the pooling of funding to help countries in debt.

Table 14: Solidarity and attachment to the EU (% fairly and very attached)

(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

Agreement with pooling funds to help countries in debt *(see Table 4)*	Attached to the EU
Strongly disagree	18.2
Disagree	31.2
Neither	43.5
Agree	59.0
Strongly agree	58.7
Don't know	30.6
Total	43.5

Attitudes towards migration and the inclusion of migrants

Currently, the discussion about European solidarity also covers the issue of migration. Citizens' attitudes towards immigration are an important indicator of the society's openness towards non-nationals and thus also for the inclusivity of solidarity. In this regard, our survey adopted a series of questions that were geared to measure public attitudes towards groups migrating into one's country from the EU and beyond it. A particular focus was put at Syrian refugees from the most recent crisis affecting these individuals fleeing their war-torn countries.

Table 15 looks first at respondent opinions in terms of the types of measures they think their government should pursue in terms of economic migrants from within the European Union. As we can see, across countries most people tend to accept economic migration in so far as "there are jobs they can do". Lower proportions are more liberal agreeing to "allow all those who want to come". In particular, Greeks and Poles tend to be most welcoming followed by Italians and Germans and Danes, then the French with the Brits and the Swiss being the least welcoming with only 10% selecting this option. Indeed, the Brits and Swiss display the highest proportions of respondents agreeing that there should be "strict limits on the number allowed to come". Up to 8 % of individuals in the UK would completely prohibit economic migration from the EU (8.1% also in France).

Table 15: Immigration policies for EU-citizens (in %)

"For each of the following groups, what measures do you think the government should pursue? People from European Union coming to ***COUNTRY*** to work?" (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Allow in all those who want to come	Allow people to come as long as there are jobs they can do	Put strict limits on the number allowed to come	Prohibit people from these countries coming here	Don't know	Total
Denmark	14.6	52.1	18.9	3.8	10.7	100
France	13.0	42.2	25.1	8.1	11.6	100
Germany	16.3	46.2	26.1	4.8	6.7	100
Greece	22.0	44.7	23.0	4.2	6.1	100
Italy	16.7	48.5	20.7	5.7	8.3	100
Poland	20.0	44.2	19.1	5.3	11.5	100
Switzerland	7.2	46.4	36.8	4.2	5.4	100
United Kingdom	9.7	41.2	31.8	8.0	9.4	100
Total	14.9	45.7	25.2	5.5	8.7	100

Table 16 presents results from the same question but asking specifically about economic migrants from non-EU countries. Here we see that people are considerably less welcoming across countries compared to the results for EU migrants presented in Table 14 and discussed above. The most welcoming are Italians with about 8% suggesting all the people who want to come should come, followed by 7.8% of Greeks, 7% of Germans, 6.2% in France and Poland, 5.6% in Denmark, 5.3% in the UK and only 4.5% in Switzerland. In Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Poland respondents are more likely to support economic migration provided there are jobs; whereas, in France, Germany, Switzerland and the UK respondents are more likely to prefer putting "strict limits on the number allowed to come" from non-EU countries. Up to 14.5% of people in France want to completely prohibit non-EU people from coming to their country, followed by 12.3% of Germans and about 9-10% in the other nations adopting this very unforgiving position on migration.

Table 16: Immigration policies for non-EU-citizens (in %)

”For each of the following groups, what measures do you think the government should pursue? People from non-EU countries coming to ***COUNTRY*** to work?” (Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

	Allow in all those who want to come	Allow people to come as long as there are jobs they can do	Put strict limits on the number allowed to come	Prohibit people from these countries coming here	Don’t know	Total
Denmark	5.6	40.3	31.8	10.7	11.6	100
France	6.2	32.8	34.3	14.5	12.2	100
Germany	7.0	32.1	40.3	12.3	8.3	100
Greece	7.8	38.0	37.2	11.1	5.9	100
Italy	8.0	46.6	27.4	9.3	8.8	100
Poland	6.2	34.8	33.7	11.9	13.4	100
Switzerland	4.5	35.3	45.1	9.2	5.8	100
UK	5.3	37.0	37.2	10.5	10.0	100
Total	6.3	37.1	35.9	11.2	9.5	100

Table 17 specifically presents opinions on admitting Syrian refugees fleeing the war relative to the numbers being accepted at the time of survey. Here the UK, Denmark and Switzerland stand out as the countries more likely to say higher numbers should be admitted. In most countries however, the largest proportions of citizens prefer either keeping the current numbers or admitting even lower numbers (the latter is particularly true in Greece and Italy). In Poland 36.3% argued that none should be allowed to come at all, followed by France with 25% taking this harsh position, 22% in Italy, 20% in the UK and around 17% in Denmark and Greece and 12-13 in Germany and Switzerland.

Finally, Table 18 shows the relationship between EU solidarity and attitudes to migration and more specifically Syrian refugees. The results clearly show that individuals who feel attached to the EU are also more generous with regards to refugees, wanting them to be accepted in greater numbers.

Table 17: Immigration policies for refugees (in %)

"How do you think your country should handle refugees fleeing the war in Syria? " Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435)

	Admit higher numbers	Keep numbers coming about the same	Admit lower numbers	Should not let any come in	Don't know
Denmark	17.1	29.0	27.0	16.8	10.1
France	10.0	21.1	29.8	25.0	14.1
Germany	9.3	35.8	37.0	12.7	5.3
Greece	8.6	18.9	49.5	16.9	6.1
Italy	8.7	23.4	34.8	22.0	11.1
Poland	9.2	24.5	15.8	36.3	14.2
Switzerland	15.6	38.0	27.3	12.2	7.0
UK	18.1	24.9	24.8	20.0	12.3
Total	12.1	27.0	30.6	20.2	10.0

Table 18: Solidarity with Syrian Refugees and attachment to the EU (% fairly and very attached)

(Source: TransSOL (Horizon2020, GA, no 649435))

What should be done regarding refugees fleeing war in Syria (see Table 17)	Attached to EU
Admit higher numbers	61.0
Keep numbers coming about the same	53.6
Admit lower numbers	38.9
Should not let any come in	29.1
Don't know	38.6
Total	43.5

Conclusion

Solidarity is a pressing issue of our times. The various crises affecting the European Union since 2008 show there is a general need for solidarity between the European people, especially when dealing with the consequences of the Great Recession and/or the welcoming of the refugees fleeing from war, prosecution and poverty. But how strong is solidarity within the European citizenry? And how generalized is the readiness of Europeans to help others in need? This introduction has provided first findings by comparing the levels of solidarity in terms of reported practices and attitudes in the counties under analysis.

The key conclusions of our cross-national assessment of solidarity on several dimensions including attitudes to the European Union and migration. We found that a strong major-

ity of respondents supports the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development; a majority of respondents reports having engaged in solidarity activities for people in their country, including donating money or time, protesting and engaging in voluntary associations; European citizens strongly support solidarity-based (redistributive) public policies with almost three-quarters considering the reduction of big income inequalities as an important goal. In other words, the traditional European social model is not questioned by our interviewees. Anal yzes of the motives of people to support fiscal solidarity within the EU show that the largest group subscribes to the idea of reciprocity and deservingness. Apparently, Europeans do not see yet the EU as an "accomplished" political community establishing and guaranteeing common rights and mutual obligations. This seems to reflect a general feeling that there is not yet a fair system of rules in place that balance the mutual rights and obligations of the European peoples within the EU. In other words, the promotion of European solidarity requires a conception of social citizenship that is firmly anchored in a political and social union.

Moreover, with respect to attitudes to the EU and migration we found that in all countries, except for Switzerland and Greece, the idea of being outside the EU is seen as detrimental for jobs and employment. In the other countries, the gap between those thinking being outside the EU would be bad for jobs and employment is smaller in the other Southern European countries- Italy and France and the UK whereas it is quite large, signaling greater positive feelings about EU membership in Denmark, Germany and Poland. Asking whether they feel that on balance their country's membership of the EU was good, bad or neither a good nor a bad thing reflects the patterns found previously, the Swiss (in Switzerland we asked about potentially joining the EU) think joining the EU would be bad, and the Greeks think that being members of the EU is a bad thing. On the other hand, all the others think it's on balance a good thing but the gap is smaller in the UK, Italy and France than in Denmark, and particularly Germany and Poland. Results also showed that those who feel the strongest feelings of attachment to the European Union are also those that are most likely to support the pooling of funding to help countries in debt. Moreover, across countries most people tend to accept economic migration in so far as "there are jobs they can do". Moreover, with respect to specifically Syrian refugees, the results clearly show that individuals who feel attached to the EU are also more generous, wanting them to be accepted in greater numbers.

This introductory chapter has shown that solidarity is a complex and multidimensional concept that has different meanings and understandings as well as different relationships to adjacent attitudes and concepts. We have also shown that there are important cross-national differences as well as that solidarity, attachment to the European Union and attitudes in favour of migration are interlinked. In what follows, the national-focused chapters will further aid to shed light on who is most committed to overt solidarity and who is more strongly opposed as well as show mechanisms underlying solidarity in contemporary Europe.

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Innovative practices of transnational solidarity: the grassroots level and beyond[1]

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Introduction

Transnational solidarity is a highly dynamic field responding to ongoing societal challenges. Although transnational solidarity organisations have a long history and cover a wide repertoire of activities (Davies 2016), there is a lack of up-to-date empirical, systematic and cross-national studies within Europe. This is particularly true when examining specific fields of innovative and recent transnational solidarity, such as migration, disability and unemployment since the global financial crisis of 2007.

Innovative transnational solidarity practices emerge as Solidarity Action Organisations, i.e. formal or informal organisations, including social movement groups/organisations, citizen initiatives, producer-consumer networks, time banks, cooperatives, unions, NGOs and volunteer organisations which have been active since the 2007 global financial crisis. Such organisations often surface in response to hard economic times (Moulaert and Ailenei 2005, Kousis and Paschou 2017, Kousis, Kalogeraki and Cristancho 2018), but many tend to sustain their activities for groups in need.

The recent refugee crisis of 2015 has accentuated the importance and growth of transnational solidarity organisations. Contentious, as well as solidarity movements across the globe, which address refugee and migrant needs, are an important and growing form of social movement, in need of scholarly attention (Atac et al., 2016). Older movements, such as the disability movement or the unemployment/labour movements, also illustrate the importance of transnational solidarity and the impact of the crisis. Yet, disability activism studies usually focus on the national level (Hande et al. 2016, Soldatic and Grech 2016). In contrast, recent work on transnational unemployment/labour solidarity addresses its global dimension outside of the European context (Scipes 2016, McCallum 2013), as well as within Europe (Baglioni and Giugni 2014, Lahusen 2013). Nevertheless, there is a dearth of systematic empirical, cross-national studies on transnational solidarity organisations in these three fields, during the recent crises, with recent forthcoming empirical works in process (Lahusen, Kousis and Zschache forthcoming, Kanellopoulos et al 2018, Zschache, Theiss and Paschou 2018, Loukakis and Maggini 2018) .

[1] This chapter uses selected parts of the WP2 Integrated report to offer an encompassing view of new findings on main features of transnational solidarity organizations and the challenges they face.

This chapter provides an overview of data collected and analysed for work package 2 on innovative practices of transnational solidarity in the areas of migration, disability and unemployment, in response to the economic crisis, such as citizens' initiatives and networks of cooperation among civil society actors in three thematic areas, namely: disability, unemployment and immigration. Such initiatives appear to have become especially visible in the past few years owing to the strong impact of the economic crisis following the drastic cuts in terms of social services and heavy losses in income and jobs (Kousis, Paschou and Loukakis 2017).

The chapter uses fresh data deriving from website-based analysis of 2,408 Transnational Solidarity Organisations (TSOs), an online-based survey sent to 1,108 TSO representatives, and qualitative interviews with 247 TSO representatives. These innovative forms and practices are expected to appear during the recent global economic crisis period (2007- 2016) and to use digital technology (e.g. a website or an online platform). They may also have innovative forms of organizing or new activities, aims and routes proposed to reach their objectives.

The sections to follow present an aggregate comprehensive overview of, a) the methodological approach applied to produce three different datasets, b) a systematic brief portrait of TSOs based on the coding of organizational websites, by field, c) a summary of the findings of the online survey with representatives of high visibility TSOs, d) selected main findings from the qualitative interviews

The methodological approach

Following the main objectives, a mixed methods approach was applied, involving action organization analysis (Kousis, Giugni and Lahusen, 2018), an online survey and qualitative interviews.

Action Organization Analysis

The unit of analysis is the innovative transnational solidarity initiative/organization (TSO), a specific formal or informal group of initiators/organizers who act in the public sphere through solidarity events with visible beneficiaries and claims on their economic and social wellbeing – including basic needs, health, and work - as depicted through the TSO website/online sources (TransSOL WP2 Codebook, 2016). According to our criteria of selection, organizations are "transnational" in terms of at least one of the following categories: a) organizers with at least one organizer from another country, or supranational agency, b) actions synchronized or coordinated in at least one other country, c) beneficiaries with at least one beneficiary group from another country, d) participants/supporters with at least one participating or supporting group from another country, e) partners/collaborating groups with at least one from another country, f) sponsors, with at least one from another country or a supranational agency (e.g. ERDF, ESF), g)

frames with cross-national reference/s, h) volunteers with at least one volunteer group from another country and i) spatial, at least across two countries (at the local, regional or national level).

Solidarity Organizations were excluded if they were: 1) irrelevant to our three fields and devoted to other areas of work (e.g. elderly care, child care), 2) exclusively organized (or led) by the state, or the EU or private corporations, 3) non-solidarity oriented, and 4) with a non-transnational, purely local/national orientation, i.e. without any of the 9 transnational features mentioned above (TransSOL WP2 Integrated Report, 2016).

Like in the LIVEWHAT project[2], the TSO related hubs were identified at the national level on the basis of systematic google searches and the related literature, based on common criteria and keywords. Compared to other options, the hubs/subhubs which were selected by the teams of each country provide large numbers of links on TSOs and the best possible coverage of the main categories of alternative action types related to urgent needs, economy, energy and environment, civic media and communications, alternative consumption/lifestyles, self-organized spaces, as well as art and culture (TransSOL WP2 Codebook, 2016).

Following communication between each national team, the ICS engineers and the UoC coordinating team, hubs selection was finalized, ensuring maximal coverage for each of the three fields (Marketakis et al. 2016). The produced hub/nodal-websites encompass the 'universe' of about 30,000 SOs from which a random sample of TSOs was drawn for coding purposes. Thus, nodal-websites are used as sources, similarly to the way in which newspapers are treated in protest event or political claims analysis (TransSOL WP2 report, 2016).

The selected TSOs are solidarity-oriented in terms of at least one of the following categories: a) mutual-help, mobilizing or collaborating for common interests (bottom-up, solidarity exchange within group), b) support or assistance between groups, c) help or offer of support to others and d) distribution of goods and services to others (top-down, solidarity from above). Second, we were interested in 'innovative' groups insofar as their solidarity work was responding to actual social challenges, and they were engaged in communication via the internet. Third, our aims was to map the field of solidarity work with these target groups in its transnational dimension. For this purpose, we opted for an inclusive sampling strategy that is not only interested in civic groups directly engaged in 'transnational solidarity', but also open to all organizations indirectly tied into the field via their partners, supporters or beneficiaries. This sample allows identifying those factors that distinguish the degree of involvement into transnationally solidarity work. Our sampling process yielded about 2,408 cases (300 in each country, 100 for each field). These cases then entered the next stage of the research process, namely the coding process.

[2] EU FP7 Living with hard times: citizens' resilience in times of crises, http://www.unige.ch/livewhat/

Online survey

Aiming to shed more light on TSOs, based on the views of their representatives, a targeted sample of 1,108 high visibility TSO was constructed based on google searches. The online survey was conducted on May and July 2016, and involved Organisations, Groups and Networks organizing transnational solidarity actions mostly related to the three fields, but also to similar ones (TransSOL WP2 report, 2016). Following repeated reminders, 144 TSOs participated in the survey, leading to a response rate of 13%, by the end of July 2015, when the survey closed.

The questionnaire offers detailed information on the mechanisms, activities, and links of the involved collective actors, the ways in which they address transnational solidarity with citizens confronted with hardships, and the different types of required resources. It also offers detailed information concerning the mechanisms, tactics, and links of the involved TSOs, the ways in which they address transnational solidarity and the different types of required resources.

Qualitative interviews

Aiming to complement the two methods above, 30 qualitative interviews were also carried out in each country with Transnational, Innovative, Informal Solidarity Organizations, to offer more illustrative and in-depth insight into the citizens' transnational solidarity work. The same guidelines were followed by the national teams, which define the key interviewees, the number of interviews for each alternative structure, and the content of the interviews. This kind of qualitative investigation provides profound awareness on how TSOs operate, and their dynamics and helped us contextualise the data obtained from the previous stages of this WP, i.e. the coded websites (phase 1) and the standardised online survey (phase 2).

The purposive sample consists of representatives and participants from selected community settings, 10 from each of the target groups (disabled, unemployed, and migrants): 5 from Charity/ practical help/ service TSOs and 5 from protest/ social movement/ policy-oriented TSOs. The analysis of the interviews highlights transnational solidarity and the effects of crises on the unemployed, immigrants and asylum-seekers, as well as people with disability, paying attention to gender, mobility and age issues. We centred our joint efforts on adequately summarizing the findings of phase 3 (interviews) and spot 'in vivo' statements that provide an authentic insight into the field based on TSO experiences.

Transnational solidarity organizations in Europe: unemployment, disability, migration

The three sub-sections that follow offer new findings that derive from the mixed methods approach which was applied, i.e. first, action organization analysis, secondly, the online survey and thirdly, qualitative interviews.

Action Organization Analysis of TSOs

The new methodological approach which retrieves, randomizes and codes organizational TSO websites based on AOA (Kousis, Giugni and Lahusen 2018), offers fresh descriptive findings. Reflecting major characteristics, a selection of these, is presented below across the three fields under study, on the types of TSOs, their aims as well as the routes they use to achieve them and their transnational partners. Furthermore, using AOA data, explanatory analysis aims to offer preliminary findings on explaining European Solidarity.

Types of organizations and activities

The examination of 2,408 TSOs across the different types of organisations in our total sample, as seen in Figure 1.1 shows that NGOs are the most frequent actor, as almost half (46.3%) of all TSOs are NGOs, followed by charities and churches, as well as social economy enterprises and unions (18.4% and 17.0% respectively).

This picture changes when examining the types of organisations across the three fields. Even though NGOs maintain the leading position in disability and migration TSOs, they are second in frequency among unemployment TSOs. There, the prominent type is that of social economy enterprises and unions (43.7%), albeit with a limited presence in the other two fields. Informal citizens and protest groups are very important solidarity providers in the migration field as they comprise almost one third of the migration TSOs. Charities and churches are very active in the fields of migration and disability (more than 20% of the TSOs per field) but much less visible in the unemployment field (less than 10%).

Figure 1.1: TSO Type per field



The following figure illustrates the types of solidarity that the TSOs offer to their members and participants. Looking across the three fields (Figure 1.2) the main finding is that the majority of migration and disability TSOs offer solidarity in an altruistic/philanthropic manner – i.e. more than 80% offer support to others. Furthermore, half of the TSOs in these fields choose the top down approach of distributing good and services to their beneficiaries. By contrast, almost half of the unemployment TSOs offer a more collective form of solidarity by organizing and maintaining networks of mutual help and support between people and groups. This way of co-opting collectively to address hardship tends to be strongly connected with social movement organisations.

Figure 1.2: Solidarity type of TSOs per Field



Figure 1.3 provides data across the three fields, on the different activities that are organised by TSOs. In general, the most prominent category of activities is that of 'urgent needs' followed by 'dissemination' and 'economy'. More specifically, 'urgent needs' actions are those provisions that meet essential daily needs such as food, shelter, clothes provision, medical services, etc. These are the top frequency activities among the migration and disability fields, with the highest frequency showing in disability organisations (94.1%). The next prominent activity category is that of dissemination which

includes drafting reports, people's media, raising awareness actions and educational activities for the public. It is also considerably used by TSO in all three fields. The third most frequent activity is 'economy related ones', such as job training programs, financial support, products and service provision on low prices, fundraising activities, second-hand shops and bazaars. As would be expected, this category is the top actions' category among unemployment organisations (87.5%). The following two most common action categories are that of 'culture' (including art, sports and social hangout actions) and 'lobbying'. Both categories are common among TSOs in all three fields, but they are used more by disability TSOs (48.4% and 42%, respectively).

Figure 1.3: TSO actions per field



TSO aims and routes to achieve them

Figure 1.4 depicts the aims and goals of TSOs in the three different fields. In general, most TSOs aim towards: promoting health, education and welfare; helping others; combating discrimination; and promoting equal participation in the society. We noticed that the aims are strongly related with the field of TSOs, with the primary goal of disability TSOs being to promote health (87.3%), of unemployment TSOs to improve working conditions and the return to the job market (71%) and of migration TSOs to combat discrimination and promote equal participation in society (68.8%). In general, we observed more similarities between the Migration and Disability fields with respect to the importance of particular aims, such as to combat discrimination, to help others and to promote integration into the society. The goal of reducing the negative effects of crisis is much more frequently met in the unemployment TSOs compared to those of the other fields. Furthermore, unemployment TSOs are closer to social movements given their

significantly more frequent mention (compared to the other TSOs) of the aims to promote democratic practices/ equal participation, promote collective identities and community empowerment, promote collective action and/or social movement identities and promote and achieve political change.

Figure 1.4: TSO Aims per Field



Figure 1.5 illustrates the findings on the route that TSOs choose in order to achieve their goals. The majority of TSOs (approximately 80% in each field) consider direct, non-protest solidarity activities as the most effective way of accomplishing their goals. The

next most prominent route is that of raising awareness in all field but more visibly in Disability TSOs (83.9%). In general, policy reform as a strategy to achieve their goals is less popular among TSOs, with the exception of unemployment ones (40%). Following a tradition of the labour movement, approximately 12% of the organisations in the same field see that the best way to fulfil their expectation is by changing the government or the establishment.

Figure 1.5: Route to achieve their Aims



Transnational partners

Looking at the transnational partners of the TSOs, figure 1.6 demonstrates their absence for almost one third of all TSOs. However, most TSOs (63%) have from 1 to 10 transnational partners, while only about one tenth (8.0%) have more than 11 transnational partners. Focusing on differences across the three fields, migration TSOs are less networked, with almost half of them not mentioning any partners, while disability organisations are much more networked with transnational partners compared to the TSOs in migration and unemployment.

Figure 1.6: Number of Transnational partners per field



Explaining European solidarity activism

The aim of our analyses is to understand better why certain TSOs are engaged in furthering European solidarity, while others are not. In other words, we wish to explain the extent of European solidarity as our dependent variable, by calculating the effect of further variables that might increase or decrease the probability of TSOs being active at the European level (see Table 1). For the following analyses, we will centre exclusively on the European level, thus disregarding the other dimensions of 'transnational solidarity', here in particular the non-European and global scopes of activities and beneficiary groups. This focus is due to the objective of our analysis, namely to better understand European solidarity. Moreover, a closer look at the data reveals that activities on the various levels are interconnected only in a rather weak way.

Table 1: Scope of activities and beneficiaries

Activities Scope		%
	local	70,3
	regional	47,9
	national	41,0
	European	12,9
	non-European	8,0
	global	9,4
Beneficiary/Participant Scope		
	local	68,6
	regional	49,0
	national	42,4
	European	9,1
	Non-European	10,5
	Global	13,0
Value frame		
	Transnational/global	58,7

In order to identify our explanatory factors, we made use of further items of our data set which assembled information on the TSOs, their organisational form, their aims, routes of action, the partners, allegiances and geographical locations. Our assumption was that these factors might be interrelated with the propensity of TSOs to be engaged in European solidarity. Four groups of factors were identified, following four basic assumptions.

First, we wanted to check whether the ability to engage in the field of European solidarity depends on related organisational capabilities. Here, we list a number of potential conditions that might be relevant:

- to organise European solidarity requires time, that is older TSOs are more likely to have developed greater commitment in this field than younger ones. For this purpose, we use two items of our codebook that ascertain when the TSO started its work, and when the Main Online Media Outlet was made publicly available.
- European engagement is more diffused among TSOs that are more formally organised and thus more settled. The codebook listed a number of organisational features that are relevant to this respect; i.e., it checked whether the TSO had: a board, a president or leader, a secretary/administrative assistant, a treasurer or someone responsible for finance, trustees, paid staff, a written constitution, spokesperson/media-PR, a general assembly, or committees for specific issues. We ran a factor analysis in order to identify the main dimensions, and detected just one stastically significant dimension. Factor loadings were particularly high for a number of items (president, secretary, treasurer, written constitution, general assembly, and committees) that are tightly related to formalisation. The scale reliability was satisfactorily high (alpha test 0.7932).
- TSOs are more likely to engage in European solidarity if they cooperate more closely with (international) partners. Our data included a variable that specified this number in various categories, ranging from ‘none’ to ‘more than 50’.
- European solidarity is more probable among TSOs who count on proper organisational structures at the EU level. Following our codebook, we included variables that specified whether the TSOs’ organisational structures run ‘primarily across national borders’, and whether they are members of European umbrella and/or European networks. Finally, we might expect that transnational solidarity is more probable once TSOs have partners in other countries to facilitate cooperation and joint activities.

Second, our aim was to ascertain whether the commitment to European solidarity is conditioned by strategic choices and objectives. It could well be the case that TSOs opt against, or for a European scope of activity, depending on which routes of action they prefer, and which kind of roles they assign to the people these civic initiatives try to recruit and mobilise. Accordingly, we looked more closely into the following items:

- Solidarity at the European level requires certain choices in regard to the ‘proposed route to achieve the TSOs’ aims’. On the basis of the codebook’s list of fourteen

different routes, we conducted a factor analysis in order to identify overarching groups of action routes. These analyses ascertained three main routes, namely 'lobbying' (just one item loading), confrontative change action (consisting of 'collective protest action', 'change government', and 'change system/establishment', alpha 0.6025), and a reform-oriented agenda (but only consisting of items directed at the disability-health field, alpha .6791). Confrontative routes might be less interrelated with European solidarity than conventional and reformist strategies.

- TSOs that focus more on the recruitment of personnel and donors might be more engaged in European solidarity than those looking for volunteers and members, as the latter implies a more local scope of activities. For this purpose, we used one variable from the codebook that assembled information on the 'type of Invitee/s'.

Third, we were interested in knowing whether European solidarity is motivated by the missions and aims of the TSOs. Probably, there are a number of aims and goals with regard to solidarity that motivates activists and organisations more strongly to engage themselves at the European level. European solidarity could be motivated by two different reasons:

- European solidarities' category is tied to organisational aims. Our codebook specified eighteen different aims. Hence, we decided to run factor analysis in this case, in order to reduce the list of items to a number of overarching dimensions. On the basis of these findings, we extracted three groups of aims: one directed at furthering empowerment and participation (including the promotion of social change, political change, democratic practices/participation, community responsitlity/empowerment, collective action/movement identities, alpha 0.6059), the second promoting understanding and tolerance (consisting of aims to combat discrimination, increase tolerance and mutual understanding, and promote social exchange and direct contact, alpha: 0.6217), and the final one striving for social cohesion in times of crisis (combining aims to reduce the negative impact of the economic crisis/austerity with the objective to improve the pay and working conditions, alpha: 0.5617). The empirical analysis was conducted to show if these aims play a role at all, and if yes, which objectives are more tightly interwoven with European solidarity.
- European solidarity might also be motivated by different types of solidarity norms and conceptions. In our codebook, we distinguished between four 'types of solidarity orientations or approaches': solidarity as (a) mobilizing or collaborating for common interests, as (b) support or assistance between groups, as (c) altruistic help or support to others, or as (d) altruistic or philanthropic distribution of goods and services to others. In this case, we wanted to see inductively whether European solidarity is interrelated with these different norms and concepts, and if yes, to which one.

Finally, our analysis strove to ascertain whether European solidarity is distributed evenly across the three issues' fields under analysis in this work-package. For this purpose, we

also included variables in our analysis specifying in which issue area (migration, disability, and unemployment) the TSOs are mainly involved in.

We excluded two groups of factors that visibly interact with European solidarity: the countries of origin, and the languages of the main online outlet. As evidenced in the previous sections, the country of origin is an important factor to take into consideration, and the same applies to the languages used to communicate their aims and missions. However, these variables were excluded because the low number of cases produces serious problems to a probabilistic statistical analysis. This is particularly true for some countries, for example, where only some TSOs reported activities at the European level (France 7, Switzerland 9, United Kingdom 8).

Our statistical analyses used logistic regression in order to predict probabilities, i.e., to ascertain to which extent the three dimensions of European solidarity (activities, beneficiaries, and value frame) are interrelated with the four groups of factors introduced before. Logistic regression analyses allow us to extrapolate specific findings, for instance, the extent to which reported activities of European solidarity are more probable, once we move from less formalised TSOs to more formalised ones, from younger to older TSOs, and so forth. Given the fact that our dependent variables are binary (i.e., either the European solidarity dimension was named or not), we opted for probit regression analysis, also because this procedure generates more conservative measures. Finally, we decided to run a stepwise regression that uses a backward-selection procedure. This is due to the explorative and inductive objectives of our analyses. Indeed, academic research knows little about the factors impinging on European solidarity, and the TransSOL-project initiated its field-work with the explicit aim to provide a first systematic data set. Backward-selection is a preferred strategy of analysis, because in this case all potential variables are included in the analysis, and only those variables that 'survive' the various calculations contribute to a significant degree to the explanatory power of the overall model. The final table is thus quite straightforward, because it includes only the 'surviving' items.

The regression analyses generate findings that paint an interesting, yet mixed picture (see Table 2). Overall, the explanatory power of the model is rather modest, in particular for beneficiaries. This has to do, in part, with the low numbers of TSOs indicating European activities and beneficiaries. Moreover, we see that only a number of items is significantly interrelated with European solidarity across the three dimensions (activities, beneficiaries, value frames). In fact, European solidarity is more diffused among TSOs with a higher proportion of transnational partners, and among TSOs whose organisational structures run across member states. This suggests that there are two answers to the problem of organizing European solidarity: either through collaboration with partners, or through the setting up of proper organisational structures of operation. Additionally, the motivation to promote empowerment and participation interacts positively with European solidarity across all dimensions.

Table 2: European solidarity and its covariates (probit regression)

variables		(1) activities	(2) beneficiaries	(3) value frames
Organisational Traits				
starting date: TSO				0.0947
starting date: media outlet				
formalisation		0.521**		0.568**
no. of partners		0.214**	0.147**	0.186**
Europ. level of organisation		0.151**	0.155**	0.529**
members in Europ. umbrella		0.234**	0.0881	
Strategic Orientation				
route:	lobby	-0.162*		
	Confrontative change	-0.183*		
	reform agenda	0.123*		
invitees:	volunteers			
	members			
	donors	-0.135*		
	personnel			
Motivation and Orientation				
aims:	empowerment	0.194**	0.172**	0.165**
	understanding			0.169**
	social cohesion			0.227**
solidarity:	common interests			-0.164**
	between groups	0.152*		
	help to others			
	goods and services		0.139*	-0.128*
Main Issue Field				
migration				0.604**
disability				-0.224**
unemployment				
Constant		-1.384**	-1.380**	0.263*
Observations		1,434	1,434	1,376
pseudo r^2		.1772	.0713	.2689

Significance levels: ** p<0.001, * p<0.01, no asterisk p<0.05

If we look at activities and value frame separately, we see that further variables have a considerable explanatory power. In regard to activities, we see that organisational matters are decisive. The stronger the degree of formalisation, the higher the probability that TSOs will engage in European solidarity, with a probability of about 50%. Being a member of a European umbrella organisation or networks greatly helps, too. Additionally, TSOs with a European commitment tend to be less oriented towards lobbying and a confrontative change agenda, while the role of a more reformist change agenda is more important. Overall, this shows that TSOs involved in European solidarity are more established and institutionalised within the policy domain.

In regard to value frames, we see that organisational traits matter as well. However, aims and issues are much more important to understand why TSOs frame their solidarity

work in a transnational and European rhetoric. All three aims (empowerment, understanding, and social cohesion in times of crisis) are important motivations to engage in European solidarity, even though the struggle against the detrimental effects of the crises is the most relevant one.

Finally, it is interesting to note that a number of items tend to be irrelevant. In particular, it is revealing that the issue fields affect how TSOs communicate, because initiatives in the field of migration are more outspokenly transnational, when compared to those active in the field of disabilities. This is not a surprising finding. More interesting is the fact that issue fields do not matter when looking at activities and beneficiaries. TSOs in the area of disability are not significantly less active on a European dimension, when compared to initiatives in the area of disability, and similar observations are true in the field of unemployment.

Equally revealing is the fact that TSOs with a European commitment are not tied to a specific group of constituents. European solidarity is not restricted to TSOs relying on specific types of invitees, nor do they exclude any of them. The only exception true for European activities, is the lower propensity to rely on donors. A similar observation is true for solidarity norms and values. TSOs engaged in the area of European solidarity do not make reference to specific ideas, even though weak tendencies are visible, but tend to run across all of them indiscriminately. Both observations are encouraging, because they show that European solidarity can be linked to the broader discourse, constituency and engagement forms typical for civil society, and thus even across various issue fields.

The online survey

The 144 TSOs responding to the online survey reflect a good geographical global spread, not only covering a number of EU and European countries other than the eight countries of the project, but also involving other world regions, such as Africa, Asia, North America and Oceania – see Figure 2.1. Almost one third of the answers come from organisations which are based in EU countries other than the eight involved in the project. This may reflect the higher concentration of Brussels-based TSOs which are active at the European level. The next most prominent country of the TSOs' origin is Germany (22.2%), probably due to the larger population of NGOs it hosts. Interestingly, there is almost an equal distribution of responses among TransSOL project countries (approximately 5% per country). This mirrors the similar numbers of TSOs that were identified through the keyword search for the online survey sample, by each of the eight teams, for each country. This geographic spread, which also includes about 6% of TSOs based outside of Europe, reveals a more European transnational solidarity activity, influenced to an extent by the sample itself.

Figure 2.1: Country or Region



Our data reveal that across our fields, NGOs or other formal volunteer associations are the most frequent type of TSOs (59.9%). They are even more prominent, however, in the fields of migration and disabilities (67.2% and 58.7% respectively). Information platforms are the second more frequent TSO type (12.4%), especially among migration-related organisations (14.1%). One out of ten TSOs is a charity in every field, while unions are important only in the unemployment field (11.1%).

Figure 2.2: TSO Type



Figures 2.3, 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 provide data about the solidarity activities of the TSOs in four different levels. More specifically, Figure 2.3 points out the basic activities that the TSOs carry in the country where they are based and for native groups. The most prominent activity in every field is that of networking with other organisations (approximately 20% in each field), followed by raising awareness/political education activities, which are organised by TSOs in all topics except migration, where TSOs are more engaged in these (18.4%). Cultural and protest activities are organised more by migrant TSOs, lobbying and fund-raising by disabilities TSOs, and report writing and distribution of goods and services by unemployment TSOs.

Figure 2.3: Most important types of actions - in country for Natives



Looking at the same kind of activities as for native groups, but organised outside the country where the organisation is based (Figure 2.4), we can see similarities and differences. Again networking (20%), political education activities (15%) and interest representation/lobbying are the most important action types. Unemployment related organisations are more active in networking, cultural, drafting reports and protest activities. Disabilities TSOs organise more lobbying and fundraising actions (17.8% in both categories) and migrant organisations are more active in raising awareness (19.5%) and providing services (10.2%).

Figure 2.4: Most important types of actions - in other Countries for Natives



Figure 2.5 provides information about solidarity actions which are organised in the country where they are based but for migrant groups. The main patterns remain the same and the most prominent types of action are networking and political education/raising awareness (approximately 20% and 15%, respectively). TSOs with activities for migrant groups carry out more cultural and protest activities. Disabilities organisations are more active in lobbying (14.8%) and in providing services (15.6%). Finally, unemployment related TSOs organise more networking (20.7%), raising awareness (15.7%), and drafting reports activities (13.4%).

Figure 2.5: Most important types of actions - in country for Migrants



Regarding the solidarity activities that TSOs conduct for migrant groups outside of the country where they are based (Figure 2. 6), networking is still the most common one, followed by political education and lobbying. Unemployment organisations are more active in networking (21.7%), drafting analyses and reports (17.4%) and cultural actions (15.2%). Disabilities organisations carry out lobbying (18.7%) and raising awareness activities (17.3%) more often than unemployment and migration TSOs. Migration TSOs organise more providing services (11.4%) and protest actions (4.4%).

Figure 2.6: Most important types of actions - in other countries for Migrants



The following three sets of figures describe the major changes that the TSOs have experienced during the last years. The first set has to do with the changes on funding, the second set is about TSO-organised changes in actions and the participants and beneficiaries of those actions. The third set is about collaborations in order to influence domestic and international policies.

The first set depicts the changes in funding either from state agencies, from non-state actors or from international agencies. Figure 2. 7 provides details about changes in state funding. A considerable portion of the responding TSOs (43%) stated that the question was not applicable, while only 5% responded 'don't know'. From those who stated that funding changes did occur, about 25% faced a decrease in state funding. Only in the migration field is the situation almost balanced as the TSOs stating that funding decreased are almost equal in numbers with those responding that state funding increased during the last years.

Looking at the funding from international or EU agencies (Figure 2. 8), most organisations (40%, on average) mentioned that they do not receive any funding from abroad. Impressively, most of the organisations which are active in the migration field answered that international funding has increased over the last years. On the other hand, most of the disability TSOs (25%) mentioned that EU funding had decreased and unemployment

organisations' responses were equally distributed among increased and decreased (both 17.4%).

Regarding non-state funding, as Figure 2. 9 shows, the vast majority of the organisations who are active in migration and in disabilities fields have experienced an increase (38.1% and 40.9%, respectively). More than 22% of the TSOs in all fields do not receive any non-state funding. Unemployment organisations answers do not show any tendency towards increasing or decreasing funding.

Figure 2.7: State funding



Figure 2.8: EU funding, or funding from other countries



Figure 2.9: Non-state funding



The next set of figures deals with changes regarding the number of actions taken, the volunteers who participate and the number of people who benefit from these actions. In general, all figures show that in all fields there is an increase in the above mentioned aspects. More specifically, TSOs mentioned that they have increased the frequency of conducting actions (Figure 2.10) by more than 50% in every field. Only a 15% of organi-

sations in the Disability and Unemployment fields answered that they have decreased the frequency of conducted actions.

Figure 2.11 provides information about the members or the volunteers of TSOs where the general tendency shows that they have increased. The biggest increase rate is given by unemployment TSOs (47.8%). Important as well is the number of the organisations mentioning that their members have been decreasing. This group is about 21.5% - 26% of the TSOs.

As for the number of beneficiaries or participants of the TSOs' activities (Figure 2.12), the survey data show that they have been increasing impressively. In more detail, the beneficiaries on unemployment field increased in 52% of the TSOs. The migration and disability organisations' increased number of beneficiaries was mentioned by 67.7% and 61.4% of the TSOs, respectively.

Figure 2.10: Frequency of conducting main types of action



Figure 2.11: Number of members or volunteers



Figure 2.12: Number of beneficiaries or participants



The following set of figures describes the collaborations and involvement in domestic and international policy of the TSOs. Regarding the collaboration with other organisations Figure 2.13 shows that the vast majority (more than 60%) of the TSOs active in all fields have increased their collaborations with other organisations during the last years. Only 13% of organisations in the unemployment field mentioned that they collaborate less and less.

As for the involvement in domestic policy making (Figure 2.14), again the general tendency is that most organisations have increased their involvement. In more detail, 44.3% of the migration organisations, 38.6% of disabilities and around 28% of unemployment organisations mentioned that they have increased their involvement in domestic policy decisions. On the other hand, 13.6% of disabilities and unemployment organisations answered that their involvement has decreased.

Figure 2.15 provides information about the involvement on international policy making procedures. The majority (36.7 - 31.8% depending on the TSOs' field) of the TSOs which participated on the survey answered that they have increased their involvement in the international policy arena. It is worth mentioning that almost one out of four TSOs in each field does not participate in international decision-making procedures.

Figure 2.13: Collaborations with other organisations



Figure 2.14: Involvement in policy and decision-making procedures



Figure 2.15: Involvement in international policy and decision-making procedures



Our online survey included also a section on the constraints that TSOs faced during the last 12 months in three broad topics: lack of material resources, lack of human resources and lastly, lack of collaboration with other organisations and agencies.

Disability-related organisations suffer slightly less than the TSOs from the other two fields when it comes to financial or material resources. More specifically (Figure 2.16), 34% of the organisations in the disabilities' field answered that the lack of funding or donations is an extremely pressing constraint regarding their operation. In comparison, the impact was higher for organisations working on unemployment and migration. In fact, for 37.5% of TSOs in the unemployment field and 40% of TSOs in the migration field, the lack of funding or donations was experienced as a highly-pressing issue. When it comes to the lack of material resources as a constraint (Figure 2.17), we find a similar pattern. Approximately one third of the unemployment TSOs feel that the lack of material resources is an extremely pressing situation; a similar response was given by migration TSOs (20%).

Figure 2.16: Lack of funding or donations



Figure 2.17: Lack of material resources



The next set of constraints is about lack of human resources, which does not appear to be so pressing for the operation of the TSOs regardless of the field in which they are active. In more detail, lack of skilled or expert personnel (Figure 2.18) is considered as an extremely pressing constraint by one out of four migration TSOs and one out of five disability TSOs (25.7% and 19.1%, respectively). Lack of volunteers (Figure 2.19) is high or extremely pressing for almost 15% of the migration and disabilities organisations. Finally, the lack of leaders (Figure 2.20) seems to be a fairly pressing constraint faced mostly by the disabilities TSOs (13%).

Figure 2.18: Lack of personnel with skills or expert knowledge



Figure 2.19: Lack of volunteers and/or active members



Figure 2.20: Lack of organisational leaders



The last set of constraints which is presented in Figures 2.21 to 2.24 focuses on the lack of cooperation with other organisations and agencies at the national or transnational levels. More specifically, lack of cooperation with state agencies (Figure 2.21) has been described as a high or extremely pressing constraint by approximately one fourth of migration and disabilities organisations and almost 15% of the unemployment TSOs. Lack of cooperation with other, non-state, organisations (Figure 2.22) is either not applied in TSOs such as disabilities TSOs (12.8%) or is slightly, or not, pressing. One out of five migration TSOs described the lack of cooperation with EU agencies (Figure 2.23) as a highly pressing constraint, but this situation does not fit in with the other TSOs' responses (more than 20% of Disabilities and Unemployment TSOs answered little or no pressing). Figure 2.24 is about lack of cooperation with international organisations, which for most of the TSOs is not a constraint, or is not a high constraint, except for almost 19% of the migration organisations.

Figure 2.21: Lack of support or cooperation from state agencies



Figure 2.22: Lack of support or cooperation from non-state organisations



Figure 2.23: Lack of support or cooperation from EU agencies



Figure 2.24: Lack of support or cooperation from international organisations



The qualitative interviews

A common integrated methodological approach for the identification of TSOs, the sampling strategy and the recruitment of interviewees has been applied in all participating countries. Each national teams was responsible for the final selection of the interviewed TSOs. A main criterion in this selection was to assure variance and balance between the

service and political advocacy orientation in the TSOs selected. Particular attention has been paid to locality and innovativeness criteria as long as our approach was bottom-up, addressing mainly the local-regional levels and the national to transnational levels only as regards informal, grassroots organisations or social movement groups. With respect to innovativeness, although TSOs did not have to be fully innovative, they were asked about their innovative practices in reference to one or several of the following aspects: a) processes; b) content; c) communication; d) Capacities; and e) the kind of help offered. The analysis of the qualitative interviews which were carried out in each country highlighted the effects of the crises on the target groups of the unemployed, immigrants and asylum-seekers, and people with disabilities, and examined the various actions of solidarity expression by TSOs within this context.

Overall, a gender balance exists across national samples (47% men-53% women). Women are overrepresented in the migration field, which is mostly due to the Swiss, the Danish and the Italian samples. Men are overrepresented in the unemployment field in all country-samples except the Danish sample. Regarding the age variation in our sample the vast majority of the interviewees are middle-aged. Comparing activism across fields, our findings suggest that elderly people are more likely to be active in disability TSOs, while young people (below the age of 30) are usually more active in the migration field.

Based on our data, the choice of the field for the activists who participate in organized solidarity action appears to be experience driven. This is especially visible in the disabilities TSOs where interviewees may be disabled themselves or have a family member who is disabled. Similarly activists/representatives in unemployment TSOs have experiences as either precarious workers or unemployed at some period in their lives.

Transnational solidarity action can take place at home or abroad. In the first case, it involves actions of support directed towards migrants, refugees and asylum seekers as well as collective acts of voicing out with the beneficiaries abroad. In the second case, it addresses people in need in other countries and may include transnational linkages between organisations, such as joint projects, funding relationships and networks of multicultural knowledge exchange.

Transnational solidarity relations are targeted by all organisations across all fields, but are more central in the activity of migration-related organisations. Despite the fact that transnational solidarity partnerships are regarded to be very important, obstacles such as the imbalance between the size of organisations and their workload, their reliance on volunteer work and limited funding prevent them from establishing stable cross-national networks and cooperation. Hence, it is revealed by our qualitative interviews in all countries that transnational solidarity is harder to achieve. Drawing on the Italian and Polish findings for example, it is revealed that the size of an organization determines how likely it is to engage in transnational practices and to have supranational connections, with the smaller organisations being less likely to develop beyond the broader activity.

With respect to the degree of TSOs politicisation, migration is highlighted as the most politicised field in all countries, with most activities being embedded within a political mission or representing a political statement. By contrast, disability organisations tend to be highly help- and service-oriented, with a pragmatic, non-politicised agenda. Unemployment organisations lie somewhere in the middle, with some of them being engaged in political action and protest together with the provision of social advice and others focusing solely on the empowerment of their beneficiaries, thus largely abstaining from political action, as noticed by our German team. In Italy, a left-wing orientation emerges when it comes to the ideological standpoint of the politicised organisations, those which are active in the unemployment and migration fields. In Denmark, a country with high levels of trust in political institutions, it is noticed that the smaller, grassroots organisations focus on practical help and their action does not tend to be politicised, because they rely on the trusted structures of the welfare state and the larger umbrella organisations.

Inclusion and empowerment seem to be the triggers of innovativeness, according to the findings of the German interviews. In the migration field, inclusion and empowerment materialize through the promotion of actions that encourage self-reliance and self-representation and abolish the distinction between the providers and receivers of solidarity action. In the field of disabilities, innovative action focuses on the creation of conditions that enable the beneficiaries to participate in a social life and live independently. As for unemployment, innovativeness is expressed through the emergent social movement of cross-sectoral solidarity, through initiatives of capacity building and via actions which aim to reconstruct the representation of unemployed individuals as active agents. Innovativeness is also prompted by the flexibility necessary for meeting specific needs during times of scarce resources, and the ability of organisations to adapt to social pressure.

TSOs representatives mentioned innovative elements when they referred to the development of new funding schemes and strategies, to networking activity and the ability to adapt their action plan to the human resources available, especially in harsh times when they have to largely rely on unpaid and voluntary work. Our Swiss team identified two poles of innovation: innovation reflected in the practices adopted by TSOs (partnership, horizontal collaboration, inclusiveness and environmental reactivity), and innovation reflected in their value system (embracing autonomy, voicing inequality, reciprocity and integration).

In addition, our study highlights the imprint of the economic crisis as underlined by those who have been working in healing those who suffered at most. Based on the French interviews, the populations most affected by the crisis were children and young single mothers. Regarding the migrants/ refugees group, mostly women, then men aged 45 + suffered with respect to limited job opportunities and unemployment, while the elderly were the worst hit group regarding the disabled. The increased vulnerability of the elderly due to the crisis is also stressed by disability organisations in Poland, while

vulnerability of young people is underlined with respect to unemployment. Even though Poland does not own to being much affected by the economic crisis, its interviewees noticed that Western Europe's economic problems have a negative influence on mobility, migrant workers and young migrants.

Representatives of Italian, French, British and Greek organisations underlined the negative impact of the economic crisis on their operation, which is mainly attributed to decreasing public funds together with the rise of vulnerability. This effect is much less intense in organisations which are active in big cities, where the existence of stronger networks and higher rates of volunteerism make the survival of transnational organisations easier, as underlined by our French team. According to the findings of French interviews, the pressure due to the increased number of beneficiaries led TSOs to adopt strategies oriented more towards the provision of services than their political goals.

While the economic crisis increased competition over scarce resources and put some limits to TSOs' capacity for action, it led at the same time to the adoption of innovative solutions to deal with increased demand for transnational solidarity. An example is the "pact" between Italian and Greek social movements, which is reported by representatives of Italian organisations.

Organisations located in countries which are less influenced, or not affected by the financial crisis like Denmark, Switzerland, Germany and Poland, report minor or no direct effect of the European economic crisis on their activity.

A positive impact of the refugee crisis, found in the German interviews, was the intensification of refugee solidarity action, both in terms of civic engagement and the undertaking of new initiatives. The refugee crisis in 2015-16 attracted much public interest which led to an increase in volunteerism and funding opportunities for the organisations active in this field. On the contrary, a decrease in public attention and resources for other target groups, including unemployed and disabled people, posed problems for TSOs which are active in these respective fields, with the smallest groups being most seriously affected.

Finally, our interviewees recommended law improvements and policies to reduce bureaucracy. Solidarity organisations need to receive greater state and European support, both to enhance their reach and to boost volunteerism. In addition, they proposed cooperation of welfare state and local authorities with civil society in order to meet the increasing social needs more adequately.

Discussion

TSOs in the three fields have roots as far back as the early 1900s, with noticeably increasing waves immediately after WWII, the 1950s and 1960s. The growth of the sector was somewhat different in the three fields: disability organisations increased in numbers

particularly from the early 1980s to the early 2000s, unemployment organisations from the late 1970s to the early 2010s, and migration TSOs escalated in the most recent period, from the 1990s to the present, with a significant peak in the past three years. The growth of the fields is even more in countries like Denmark and the UK, in contrast to Germany and Greece with the highest peaks since 2010.

With regard to solidarity orientations, we see that the majority of migration and disability TSOs offer solidarity in an altruistic manner, and utilise a top-down approach to offering support to others. By contrast, the biggest share of unemployment TSOs follows a more collective form of solidarity by organizing and maintaining networks of mutual help and support between people and groups.

TSOs are engaged in a variety of activities. Among them, meeting 'urgent needs' is the most important type, particularly in the migration and disability fields. Dissemination (including reports, mass media, awareness raising, education activities) ranks second, and economy-related activities (such as job training programs, financial support, products and service provision) rank third at the aggregate level, but come first in the unemployment field. Direct, non-protest solidarity activities are the most effective ways of TSOs to accomplish their goals, with raising awareness following in all field but more visibly in disability TSOs.

Findings show that most TSOs are well integrated into international networks of cooperation, with 63% of all TSOs having one to ten transnational partners. However, we need to highlight that 28% of all TSOs do not liaise with other organisations at the international level. Disability organisations are better networked at the transnational level, when compared to the TSOs in migration and unemployment.

Solidarity actions by civil society organisations tend to constitute a local phenomenon, when considering activities and beneficiaries. Solidarity at the supra- and transnational level is a priority only for a minority of TSOs. The exploratory analysis shows that TSOs across fields share similar organisational and motivational traits. A truly European scope of activities is more diffused among TSOs with a higher proportion of transnational partners, and among TSOs with more Europeanised organisational structures. This indicates two routes of organizing European solidarity: either through collaboration with partners, or through the setting up of proper organisational structures of operation. Two further factors are relevant. On the one side, the motivation to promote empowerment and participation interacts positively with European solidarity activities, and the same applies to a higher degree of organisational formalisation. All three aims of TSOs which are examined -empowerment, understanding, and social cohesion in times of crisis- are important motivations to engage in European solidarity, even though the struggle against the detrimental effects of the crises is the most relevant one.

Findings from the online survey show that the field of TSOs has a clear European and global coverage. Their main activities primarily comprise networking, awareness raising and interest representation. TSOs report about several constraints to their activism.

Most activists describe the lack of funding/donations and of material resources as a pressing constraint, particularly among migration and unemployment TSOs. In regard to persons, respondents see a need for volunteers/active members, experts and leaders, but this constraint is described as less pressing. The same applies to the cooperation with state and non-state actors within and across countries.

The explanatory analysis of this data reveals that TSOs are faced with various changes and challenges within their environment, but that they are able to manage them with varying degrees of success. Activists report that the number of activities has increased substantially since 2010, particularly in the area of migration, and among TSOs focused on the provision of services. Activists report about shrinking funding opportunities in times of growing numbers of activities, even though groups working on migration issues are less affected by these funding cuts. This bifurcating trend is only compensated by increasing numbers of volunteers and members. Recruitment works better among TSOs targeting migrants in the TSOs' home country and/or engaging in protest activities across countries. The number of beneficiaries and participants is also on the rise, particularly among TSOs with many national and international partners. Finally, the involvement of TSOs in consultations and meetings at the local, national and European levels has been improving since 2010. TSOs benefit mostly from these developments if they are well represented in these policy domains (e.g., participation in meetings and committees, drafting of reports, interest representation), and maintain good working relations within a series of other organisations.

Based on the findings from the 247 qualitative interviews, the organisations which are active in the field of migration are more prone to transnational solidarity and more politicised than the organisations in the other two fields. On the contrary, organisations in the field of disabilities have a pragmatic and non-politicised agendas, while organisations in the field of unemployment present a mixed picture with respect to politicisation.

Despite the fact that transnational collaboration is highly valued by TSO representatives, cross-national networks and cooperation remain marginal, mainly for the smaller organisations. The imbalance between the size of organisations and their workload, their reliance on volunteer work and limited funding prevent TSOs from establishing stable cross-national partnerships.

Innovativeness in TSO activity is expressed through their discourse, values and the principles guiding their operation as well as through the practices adopted. Innovative action is undertaken in order to develop initiatives aimed at achieving the goals of social inclusion and civic empowerment. TSOs illustrate a collective resilience that allows them to survive and respond to the needs of their beneficiaries/participants in times of crises, and this resilience and flexibility further motivates and enhances their novel initiatives and practices. Innovation is also observed with respect to funding schemes, action development with limited resources and the strategies adopted for the optimal utilisation of voluntary work.

Our study explores to what extent vulnerable groups, such as women, children, single-parent families and the elderly are mainly affected by the economic crisis, in various degrees across the three fields of unemployment, disability and migration. The economic crisis appears to also generate new solidarity initiatives. Even though the crisis has affected TSOs by reducing their resources at a time of increased demand, at the same time, it has also triggered transnational cooperation and innovativeness. Similarly, the refugee crisis in 2015-16 led to an increase in civic engagement and the disposition to undertake new initiatives tailored to the needs observed in specific localities and populations.

Drawing on their experience, our interviewees who represent 247 TSOs, made several policy recommendations relevant to their field of expertise, which concern both the content and the enforcement of law in their national context (see related policy brief, D7.3). Our qualitative data reveal the need for increased state/EU support towards TSOs and an increased communication and collaboration between welfare state and local administration services with TSOs.

These findings have allowed us to paint an overall picture of innovative transnational solidarity. Our analyses show that civic organizations portray novel transnational features and are strongly and firmly committed to solving problems and hardships directly linked to the various crises affecting Europe. The number of innovative initiatives, groups and organisations is on the rise, and this applies also to the number of their activities and collaborations. The main focus of innovative, transnational civic solidarity is a local one, and transnational solidarity requires additional organisational commitments. Moreover, these organizations are able to mobilise considerable support through members, volunteers and participants; and they are able to raise their voice within the institutionalized policy domain. However, their work is constrained by various factors, in particular funding, resources, and skills.

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Mind the gap: the scarcity of transnationalism in organising solidarity in Europe at the national and European level

Simone Baglioni and Tom Montgomery

Introduction

If solidarity is to be considered the element holding society together, the value committing people to mutual support, even in the absence of legal obligations and communitarian links (Supiot 2015, Musso 2015), civil society as associational life is a critical component of it. Actually, the voluntaristic nature of associational membership is considered by some as the quintessential form of solidarity where people engage not under the obligation of an authority nor following utilitarian calculations, but do so in accordance with the social spirit which is an intimate component of human beings (Rodotà, 2014:44).

In other words, civil society provides solidarity with the organisational infrastructure it needs to be transferred from the spiritual to the 'real' world, as its deployment enables people to act collectively to achieve a given social or community benefit.

Civil society organisations facilitate such pro-solidarity action through two functions: work at the political level such as advocacy and contribution to policy-making, and service delivery on a range of policy domains primarily related with the welfare state (Baglioni and Giugni 2014). Work at the political level focuses upon the enforcement of rights and policy innovation that helps public bodies to meet social needs, while service delivery is a consequence of the way public services are designed and delivered in contemporary societies. Two different interpretations of such changes have been proposed: a neo-liberal view considers the actions of CSOs as a consequence of the externalization of the welfare state (Paugam 2015), while another perspective considers the contribution CSOs provide to be an avenue of renovation for the welfare state (Barthélemy 2000).

Moreover, through both policy and service-oriented activities, civil society organisations enter the public space and therefore become proper political actors of solidarity (Paugam 2015).

Although the political and service-provision capacity of civil society at national and subnational levels is considered to be an '*acquis*' in social science thinking, what proves more difficult to assert is their intervention as transnational or, in the approach of the TransSOL project, as cross-European actors. The existence of a civil society operating across borders remains contested in academia. In particular, several scholars have contributed towards providing critical perspectives about the existence and functioning of a

cross-European civil society sphere: most of this criticism has focused on the relationship between the institutions of the European Union and civil society organisations and the capacity CSOs have had in shaping EU policies and discourse rather than them being shaped by the EU.

EU institutions have been criticized for an opportunistic use of civil society, that is, by confining CSOs to an ancillary role of policy implementation rather than policy inspiration and design. The existence of a genuine European civil society has been questioned from those perceiving EU funding mechanisms to have become a trap which contributes towards silencing the voice of CSOs and one where only 'tame' organisations are allowed to operate (Warleigh 2001). Others have pointed to a European civil society being de facto reduced to a Brussels'-based elite of professionals primarily devoted to lobbying (Greenwood 2007). Similarly, scholars have also criticized the selection bias operated through the modus operandi of European institutions according to which only the most resourceful and financially-hungry organisations succeed (Baglioni 2015). And finally, there are also scholars who consider the question regarding the existence of a European civil society as a non-question given that civil society organisations are country or nation bound rather than EU bound (van Deth 2008). Following such critical voices one would need to conclude that official policy rhetoric about the existence of a transnational or European-wide civil society qualifies as a participatory myth (Smismans 2006 as in van Deth 2008).

However, the economic and financial crisis that has affected Europe since the 2008 onwards, and the massive influx in 2015-16 of would be refugees and migrants that have reached European shores as a consequence of the war in Syria and political destabilizations in the Middle East have brought to the attention of European public opinion and citizens the existence of a vast, cross-European mobilisation of organized actions to support people in need or to make claims for different socio-economic policies. Such collective action can be considered as evidence of what has been portrayed as transnational civil society (Florini 2000, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002).

In between such diverse understandings, the TransSOL project has investigated civil society action occurring at the edges between national and cross-national boundaries to ascertain the degree of civil society involvement at supranational level as well as the different shades such involvement might have. We have conceptualised transnational civil society as a spatial dimension resulting from three sets of intertwined factors related to civil society organisations: a) Organisational formal structures, that is, those functional dimensions of CSOs that allow them to operate in policy advocacy and service delivery, such as human resources, funding, decision making mechanisms, etc.; b) Organisational activities, including the range of actions CSOs are involved in, with a particular focus on specific campaigns and events connected to the three fields of disability, unemployment and migration/asylum (as specified later in this introduction, in our methodology section); and c) Relational dimensions, that are CSOs social and political connections and networks (Figure 1 summarises our research framework).

In the next section we present our research strategy in greater detail, and after that we discuss some initial comparative results and related hypotheses about the existence of a transnational civil society sphere in Europe.

Figure 1: TransSOL research design framework to study Transnational CSOs



Methodological approach

The prism through which we undertook an analysis of collective forms of solidarity in WP4 was that of civil society organisations engaging in practices of solidarity in each of our fields of vulnerability: migration/asylum, disability and unemployment. Building upon the extensive experience of the teams in conducting research into civil society organisations, a survey design process was initiated during which teams were consulted for their expertise in the field and to draw upon their methodological skills and pre-tests took place to ascertain the effectiveness of the survey design and identify any issues prior to its deployment across all participating countries. Clear lines of communication were established between the WP4 leadership and the participating teams in order to ensure the rigorous methodological approach we adopted was deployed consistently across all countries and fields. The organisational surveys which emerged from this collaborative process reflect our objective to capture different dimensions of how collective solidarity is enacted both within and across fields and what dynamics enable and constrain collective solidarity at times of crisis. Moreover, our survey design process involved recognising that a slightly differentiated approach would be required for the

analysis we were undertaking at the transnational level (focusing upon campaigns and events) and the national level (focusing upon umbrella organisations and networks).

The 245 interviews we conducted with civil society organisations can best be described in three parts. In the first part of our interviews at the national level we adopted an open ended question format to capture information from interviewees on the participation of their organisations in joint events and campaigns. The purpose of these questions was to elicit the key issues surrounding the organisation of collective solidarity including the motivations for the organisation to participate, the challenges that the encountered, their experiences, if any, of transnational collaboration as well as whether or not they understood their experiences of national and transnational levels of collective action and cooperation as forms of solidarity. The same open ended format was also deployed in the transnational level interviews we conducted but this time adjusting for the sharper focus on organisations that had participated in specific transnational campaigns or events (discussed further in our sampling section below). In the first part of these transnational interviews our questions sought to elicit the views of interviewees on various aspects of the transnational campaign or event in which their organisation had participated including the decision making processes, the challenges that emerged regarding common strategies or shared resources, whether or not they perceived these modes of collective action as forms of solidarity as well as their expectations on what would be the eventual outcomes of the campaign or event.

The second part of our interviews adopted the same approach at both the national and transnational levels and focused upon the composition of organisations and their operational scope. In the course of our interviews we sought to uncover the shape of the membership of organisations, how members were recruited, the main activities of organisations at the national and transnational levels, and whether or not such activities were also directed towards groups outside their main beneficiaries as well as examining the services provided by the organisations. Moreover, in this part of our interviews we also focused upon the resources available to organisations including their operating budgets and their main sources of funding whilst gauging the extent to which the organisations have experienced an impact on their finances in times of crisis. One further dimension of this part of the interview process was to ascertain the degree to which organisations were embedded in policymaking processes and doing so involved eliciting from interviewees the interactions of their organisations with institutions and policymaking procedures at the transnational, national and sub-national levels.

The third part of our interview process involved working with interviewees to identify the relationships their organisation had with other civil society organisations and institutions. The data collected at this stage of the interview would later form the basis of the social network analyses found in each of the national level reports. At this stage of the process each interviewee was presented with a list of organisations drawn from the relevant umbrella organisations or networks in their specific field (migration/asylum, disability and unemployment, for more details see our sampling section below) and from

this list they were asked to identify those organisations with whom they had shared information, collaborated in projects or events, had any personal contacts and finally whether or not they had any disagreements with any of the organisations listed. The interviewees were also asked to identify any organisations with whom they had interactions both within their own field and outside of it but were not to be found in the lists we had presented. Finally, interviewees were asked to name those public authorities with whom they had interacted and to identify those which they viewed as being the most relevant in their field.

The interviewee process at the transnational level concerning campaigns and events was also complemented by non-participant observation across our three fields. One cross-thematic (employment/migration) event we attended was the meeting of the Transnational Social Strike which took place in February 2017 in London and involved a range of activists from various organisations, some of whom would also later be interviewed. In addition we attended the European Day of Persons with Disabilities in November 2016 which took place in Brussels and brought together a range of actors, many of whom were themselves disabled, engaged in offering solidarity to disabled people. Our attendance at both of these events provided us with an opportunity for triangulation and offered a much needed first hand insight into how collective solidarity was differently organised not only in terms of across fields but also across different approaches, one being grassroots (the Transnational Social Strike) and one adopting a more official format (the European Day of Persons with Disabilities). This approach combined with our rigorous interview process enabled us to collect rich data for our analysis. Each of our approaches offered unique insights into how solidarity is organised in Europe following the global financial crisis, the austerity measures which followed and following the so called refugee crisis that began in 2015. The focus of this chapter shall be the second part of our interview process outlined earlier, namely the composition of civil society organisations across the eight countries and their operational scope.

Sampling

The objective of our sampling process in WP4 was twofold: on the one hand to meet the required number of interviews (30 CSOs per country/10 per field for the national level interviews and 10 per campaign/event at the transnational level) and on the other hand to ensure the most relevant and cutting edge examples of transnational collective action in Europe at times of crisis (see figure 2 and table 1 for an overview).

Figure 2: Sampling



Our sampling approach sought to uncover the most relevant examples of how solidarity is operationalised through civil society organisations across two specific dimensions:

i) Umbrella organisations and networks

Building upon our previous research in the project combined with web searches, we mapped the most salient umbrella organisations and networks operating in each field at the transnational level and interviewed key informants. When the relevant umbrella organisation and networks were identified in each field each participating team was provided with a list of these umbrellas and networks and asked to extract from these those organisations which were members in their own countries. The teams were then asked to collate the extracted organisations into lists for each field (which would also provide us with the list presented to interviewees in each country as part of the network analysis part of our interview) and begin contacting these organisations for interview. It should be added that memberships of the transnational umbrellas or networks do not reflect a homogenous approach to transnational activity in these platforms. In other words there are some organisations who will engage more frequently and more substantively in these umbrellas and networks than others. We also adopted the snowballing technique to allow teams to expand the number of interviews until we reach the required amount at both transnational and national levels.

ii) Campaign and events

We selected three campaigns and events that were either monothematic and thus focused upon one of the three issue fields (e.g. decriminalising solidarity on migration/asylum; European day of persons with disabilities) or those which were cross-thematic (e.g. the Transnational Social Strike operates across employment and migration). Moreover, our sampling encompassed both formal and informal (or less well-established) transnational networks/organisations which thus offered us an insight into

the potentially variegated dynamics of transnational collective solidarity when it is performed from the grassroots or through more formal structures. Those organisations participating (e.g. national member organisations, transnational platforms) in the campaign or event were then mapped as they appeared on the event information available online and through the snowballing technique via telephone interviews (or email) with the purpose of gathering the contacts necessary to enlarge our map after the first round of interviews (through the deployment of an ad-hoc question in the questionnaire). The campaigns and events were led in each field by one project team: USIEGEN for Decriminalising Solidarity; GCU for the European Day for Persons with Disabilities; and UNIGE for the Transnational Social Strike.

Table 1: Sampling selection:

Dimension	Umbrella organisations or networks	Campaigns and events
EU Level	Umbrella organisations or networks	Participating organisations
National Level	National branches or affiliates of umbrellas plus connected organisations identified via snowballing	Participating national organisations involved in the campaigns plus connected organisations identified via snowballing

Discussion of findings

In the following section we discuss some preliminary findings of our survey of CSOs by making use of two hypotheses. The first hypothesis builds from theories that conceive of solidarity as a political arena (Musso 2015): civil society organisations enter the 'solidarity arena' as the public space in which they intervene either as advocacy actors or as service providers to become de facto political actors. This idea, combined with a neo-institutionalist approach to civil society (Skocpol, Ganz and Munson 2000, Kriesi and Baglioni 2003) implies that civil society organisations will likely act at those spatial-political levels where they understand key-political actors to be located: therefore if a CSO decides that for a specific issue or mission goal, the key actors are located at the European level, they will likely engage at the transnational level, while if, due to their specific field of action, they consider it to be more effective or strategic to address authorities at a different (e.g. national or subnational) level, their action will primarily develop across these levels.

TransSOL focuses on topics that are intimately related with the welfare state such as disability and unemployment, or with issues related to justice and home affairs such as migration and asylum, these are all themes over which nation states have maintained

policy authority and are reluctant to devolve it to supranational actors such as the EU. Therefore we expect CSOs active on these topics to develop their actions more at the national level than at the transnational one. Nevertheless, our sampling strategy to target transnational organisations could possibly lead to different results.

Our analysis of the transnational involvement of CSOs for solidarity purposes begins by considering their geographical scope of action. Table 2 provides an overview of the different geographical levels at which civil society organisations can deploy their activities, ranging from the local, to the regional, national, and finally European and transnational (representing those activities occurring inside and outside the EU) levels. For the purposes of this report, we consider as activities occurring at the transnational level those which occur both at the European (across Europe) and at the transnational (in and outside the EU) levels. As Table 2 shows, if we read the 'Total' row, one in every two civil society organisations are active at the transnational level (53.9% at EU, and 48.6% at 'transnational' level). Given that our sample focused on those organisations active in transnational campaigns or which were part of supranational umbrella organisations, we would have expected to find a higher share of CSOs to be active beyond their own national borders. Therefore, the first lesson we learn from Table 2 is that for civil society organisations, including those that are part of transnational networks and campaigns, the national level remains the most salient geo-political spatial dimension at which to act (the 'national level' of action is by far the most popular choice of our CSOs, with close to 80% of them affirming that they operate at that level). Further reinforcing the importance of the 'country' level of action, Table 2 also shows that slightly more than one in every two organisations are active also at sub-state levels (both local and regional) and that these scales of activity are at least as, if not slightly more, important than the EU level for the CSOs in our study, a finding made all the more significant when considering that the CSOs we interviewed across the eight European countries were sampled based on their membership of transnational umbrellas and networks

Moreover, Table 2 reveals that the situation is more nuanced if we consider cross-country differences: Danish and Polish CSOs lead the group on European and transnational level activities, while Greek, German, British and Swiss organisations appear to be less inclined to engage across their country borders, while French and Italian CSOs occupy an intermediary position. A deeper analysis of the transnational activism of Danish CSOs is, in part at least, explained by the connection and activation of these CSOs through Scandinavian networks rather than through EU based ones. When a similar scrutiny is placed upon the Polish case, the high degree of Polish transnational (particularly EU level) activism may reflect the country's engagement with the EU in terms of access to regional development-related funding but it may also reveal the difficulties that Polish civil society organisations are facing at home in their relationships with a government which approaches migration, asylum, disability and unemployment, our CSOs fields of action, with a conservative policy frame (see infra the Danish and Polish country reports included in this integrated report).

Table 2: In which of these geographical areas is your organization/group active?

	Local (%)	Regional (%)	National (%)	EU (%)	Transnational* (%)
Denmark	63.3	66.7	96.7	86.7	63.3
France	69.7	75.8	81.8	57.6	57.6
Germany	23.3	33.3	90	40	43.3
Greece	36.7	46.7	73.3	36.7	30
Italy	76.7	66.7	76.7	50	56.7
Poland	56.7	53.3	86.7	76.7	66.7
Switzerland	50	63.3	66.7	43.3	33.3
UK	81.3	56.3	62.5	40.6	37.5
Total	**57.6**	**58**	**79.2**	**53.9**	**48.6**

*Transnational here refers to activism inside and outside the European Union (N=245)

The prominence of the national level also emerges when considering the spatial distribution of CSOs activities. Table 3 shows that no matter which specific activity an organisation deploys (it can be a political-related one such as 'political education of citizens' or a service delivery-focused one, such as 'offering counselling services or material support') in each case the national level largely overshadows the transnational one. Although in the case of service delivery and material support it is understandable that CSOs with scarce resources do not aim to deliver such services on a cross-border scale but in terms of awareness raising, although resources will of course play a role here, it is still perhaps not the full story given that in an digitally interconnected age the transnational level is very much a secondary priority to the national level. Somewhat unsurprisingly, activities that imply an active mobilization of membership (in Table 3 these are 'Mobilizing members through direct actions' and 'Mobilizing members through protest/demonstrations') essentially occur at the national level: in contrast with literature having advocated for the existence of a European public sphere for political mobilization, it seems that our CSOs are still much more focused on mobilising members at the national level rather than at the transnational one.

Another intriguing finding of Table 3 is the poor number of organisations that look to the transnational and European levels of action for fundraising: only one in every five organisations declare that they undertake fundraising activities at the transnational level while two thirds carry out fundraising at the national level. Given the importance of securing finance to the sustainability of CSOs we might conclude that the strong focus on the national level will not disappear if we add in the analysis other organisational dimensions. In fact, organisations in constant need of funding will likely focus their capacity and resources for action at the spatial level where they can expect such funding to have the greatest impact and where future funding streams are most readily available. In sum, we might predict that our CSOs act at the national level more than at transnational one because their audience is, in many senses (funding-wise, policy-wise, and beneficiaries-wise) national more than transnational.

Table 3: Action types by geo-political level

	National (%)	Transnational* (%)
Political education of citizens / raising awareness	89	28
Services to members (counselling; material support; etc..)	81	14
Interest representation / Lobbying institutions	79	36
Participation in legal consultations/policy making	79	31
Mobilizing members through direct actions	69	20
Fundraising	64	20
Services to others (e.g. clients)	61	17
Mobilizing members through protest/demonstrations	51	20

*Transnational here refers to activism inside and outside the European Union (N=245)

Consistent with our earlier findings, if we consider the sources of funding for CSOs (Table 4), we see that national level donors (in this case, 'Grants from national governments') are more than twice as important as European grants. Again, there are differences among countries: French and Polish CSOs show a higher interest in pursuing, or a greater reliance upon, transnational (European) grants than CSOs in the other countries as they have more than a third of their civil society organisations for whom European grants are very important for everyday action. Actually for Polish organisations European funding is as relevant as national government funding: as the Polish country report illustrates (see infra Polish WP4 national report), in fact, due to the strong political polarization promoted by the centre-right government, many CSOs that oppose government policies need recourse to EU funding in order to survive, given that government funds are precluded to them. In Greece, funding emanating from the EU largely supersedes funds from national government, perhaps as a consequence of the reduced capacity of the Greek state to subsidise civil society due to the critical situation of its public budget. While for the remaining countries, national governments still provide a quite relevant source of economic resources not comparable with the transnational one (in Denmark 80% of organisations access national grants while only 13% consider EU grants as very important, similarly in Germany one in every two organisations rely upon national grants, while only less than one in ten consider as very relevant funding from the EU level). Aside from Greece, one other country where national government grants were less relevant was in the UK where our national level analysis revealed a fragmented landscape of funding with numerous organisations relying upon a portfolio of funding sources including charitable trusts to sustain themselves. This is in a context where funding for local authorities has been at the forefront of austerity measures implemented since 2010.

Table 4: Share (%) of CSOs for whom national and EU level grants are very relevant for survival

	National Governments Grants (%)	EU Grants (%)
Denmark	80	13
France	45	36
Germany	50	7
Greece	7	20
Italy	27	10
Poland	37	33
Switzerland	37	3
UK	13	9
Total	**37**	**17**

(N=245)

Another indicator we examine to assess the capacity of CSOs to operate transnationally is whether or not they are part of consultative policy-making processes at various spatial levels. Table 5 provides an overview of this indicator: overall, once again the national level is more relevant than the European one as an arena for policy engagement, and also the subnational one is overall a political-spatial level where CSOs are engaged in policy advisory functions. However, if we consider the situation among countries, again, there are interesting differences to be noted. Firstly, consistent with our earlier results pointing to the importance that the EU represents for the fundraising activities of Polish CSOs, Table 5 reveals that Polish CSOs are highly engaged at the EU policy consultative level (63% of those we have interviewed in Poland say that they are consulted systematically on policy issues by EU bodies). Secondly, there are some differences between the results in Table 5 and earlier tables: while in earlier tables, for example in Table 2, Danish CSOs appeared to be more engaged at the transnational level than German CSOs, in Table 5 we see that one in every two German organisations is consulted by an EU body during ad hoc policy making procedures, and the same occurs with Italian CSOs, while less than one fifth of Danish organisations are consulted in EU policy-making processes, despite Table 2 having shown that 87% of Danish CSOs were active at the EU level.

In sum, there is no direct correspondence between those CSOs that undertake action at the transnational level and those that, although focusing on nationally-bounded activities, are still considered valuable interlocutors in policy processes in Brussels and are therefore invited to provide advice during a policy-making procedure. This is an outcome we should consider in greater depth as it may have implications for how we interpret transnational activism, drawing our attention to the existence of difference shades of transnational activism, and different types of organisations engaged at the transnational level: some more openly focused on supranational policy issues and arenas, others more concerned with their own country's situation but still open to engage, if invited and on an ad hoc basis, also at transnational level.

In fact, when we discussed with CSOs their experience of working at the transnational level, most of them did appreciate acting across-state boundaries as an opportunity of mutual learning, and also as a viable way to strengthen their voice vis-à-vis policy makers and stakeholders. Moreover, activities done at transnational level seem somehow less exposed to infra-CSOs competition, and as such are appreciated for their fostering cooperation and reciprocal support. At the same time, the diversity of circumstances among European countries in the three policy fields covered by TransSol, the fact that the working across state boundaries requires substantial human and economic resources, and even language barriers, have all been pointed as factors obstructing further engagement at transnational level.

Table 5: CSOs participation with a consultative status in policy-making procedures at different spatial levels

	EU consultative (%)	National consultative (%)	Subnational consultative (%)
Denmark	17	80	40
France	39	61	51
Germany	53	53	30
Greece	33	53	60
Italy	47	70	80
Poland	63	77	60
Switzerland	20	57	50
UK	34	69	63
Total	**38**	**65**	**54**

(N=245)

A pre-condition of our initial hypothesis was that solidarity is a genuinely political arena, which may explain why CSOs act primarily at those levels in which they consider political actors to be more prominent and also more easily approachable, that is, the national level. We consider now more specifically the level of 'political' connotation our CSOs have.

Evidence about the political connotation of civil-society led solidarity was already provided by Table 3 earlier which showed the range of activities deployed by CSOs, among which political actions, such as 'Political education of citizens, raising awareness' or 'Interest representation, lobbying' were revealed to be very prominent. Table 6 provides additional evidence about the political nature of our CSOs' engagement: it shows answers to the question, 'why do people join your organisation'? Although the most important reason across the countries is an altruistic willingness to help others (63% of interviewed CSOs selected that response), the second most relevant reason to join the organisation is for sharing political ideas and values (55% of CSOs), and more than one third of the sample (36%) also chose another very political reason that is 'For political

support'. The political connoted answer items are popular across all countries apart from Greece, where less than one third selected those options: once again, Greek CSOs stand apart as being primarily concerned with providing the help and support required by both an impoverished population suffering from the national public deficit and economic crisis, and masses of refugees fleeing Syria (see infra the Greek WP4 national report).

Table 6: According to your experience, why do people join the organization?

	for political support (%)	for financial support (%)	for legal/judiciary support (%)	for social contacts (%)	for helping, assisting people (%)	for sharing political ideas values (%)	Other (%)
Denmark	50	13	30	63	80	63	60
France	58	27	33	73	67	64	49
Germany	40	13	27	37	63	57	33
Greece	30	17	20	30	77	27	27
Italy	17	0	23	47	70	73	37
Poland	10	17	37	47	63	40	30
Switz.	57	37	13	20	40	53	27
UK	22	9	22	44	47	62	38
Total	**36**	**17**	**26**	**45**	**63**	**55**	**38**

(N=245)

We turn now to the activation of CSOs on welfare-state issues as a factor that contributes towards explaining the interest of CSOs in the national level. We consider the type of service provided by CSOs, their frequency and the number of beneficiaries of those services. Table 7 shows that almost two thirds of CSOs provide assistance with accessing the welfare state on a regular basis and another 10% does so from time to time. This high frequency of interaction with the welfare system may speak to the sometimes complex, bureaucratic and conditional welfare regimes that claimants must navigate when accessing support to meet their basic needs. Interesting to note in Table 7 is that the complementary welfare state action of CSOs is not only relevant in countries with less generous welfare regimes such as Italy and Greece (where respectively 90% and 67% of CSOs interviewed provide assistance with accessing the welfare state system) but also in countries with generous welfare provisions, such as Denmark (73% of CSOs provide support with accessing welfare services).

Table 7: Providing assistance in access to the welfare system

	Often (%)	Seldom (%)	Never (%)
Denmark	73	3	0
France	61	15	9
Germany	33	17	0
Greece	67	10	0
Italy	90	7	0
Poland	50	7	0
Switzerland	33	13	7
UK	56	6	0
Total	**58**	**10**	**2**

(N=245)

Table 8 complements our understanding of the welfare-state related contribution that CSOs provide, by revealing how civil society organisations provide in-kind forms of support such as meals, clothes, and accommodation which would usually be provided by public anti-poverty programmes. Table 8 shows that one in every four organisations provide such in-kind services on a regular basis, and that more than one in every ten does it occasionally. The provision of in-kind services is more salient in countries such as Greece that are experiencing difficult circumstances, but is still not negligible in welfare generous and affluent countries such as Denmark, France and Italy, where a third of CSOs provide these services regularly or occasionally. These findings highlight the complementary role that CSOs play in supporting individuals in crisis across the eight European countries of our study and raises questions about the capacities of such organisations to sustain their operations should there be (in some cases further) cuts to public budgets which help to keep their organisations open to meet the needs of vulnerable groups, particularly given such cuts would serve only to increase the numbers of vulnerable people requiring assistance from these same CSOs.

Table 8: Providing assistance in-kind support (e.g. meals, accommodation, clothes, etc.)

	Often (%)	Seldom (%)	Never (%)
Denmark	27	10	63
France	30	15	39
Germany	10	13	73
Greece	43	27	30
Italy	30	10	60
Poland	37	10	53
Switzerland	13	20	60
UK	13	22	66
Total	**25**	**16**	**56**

(N=245)

Table 9 provides an estimation of the number of beneficiaries that our CSOs reach with their welfare-state related services: 40% of our sample offer services on a yearly basis to a large number of beneficiaries (more than 1000), with some of these reaching even a much larger share of the population in need. There is evidence therefore in Table 9 of an active solidarity that reaches out to people through the various forms we have discussed earlier: more political forms, such as advocacy and policy-awareness but also more service-oriented forms such as support in accessing the welfare state and in-kind services.

Table 9: How many persons (beneficiaries) overall obtained services in the last year?

	None (%)	Less than 100 (%)	Less than 500 (%)	Less than 1000 (%)	More than 1000 (%)	Don't Know (%)
Denmark	7	7	20	10	50	7
France	0	18	15	9	55	3
Germany	0	17	10	20	27	27
Greece	0	17	33	10	30	10
Italy	0	7	23	13	53	3
Poland	0	17	17	17	30	20
Switzerland	0	17	20	3	37	23
UK	0	6	25	9	41	19
Total	**1**	**13**	**20**	**11**	**40**	**14**

(N=245)

Tables 7, 8 and 9 confirm the contribution that CSOs are making in keeping welfare state services running, and they provide vivid evidence of the welfare-mix (Evers 1995) which has been described to as reflective of contemporary European welfare systems, where a mix of public and private actors provide a range of services, in a diversified legal pattern.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen that despite our efforts to target organisations that are active across countries through being part of a specific transnational umbrella organisation or network, we have found limited evidence of transnational dimensions of solidarity. In some of our countries, namely Denmark and Poland, there is evidence of a degree of engagement by CSOs which operate across spatial-political levels, including the transnational or European levels. While in most of the other countries although cross-border activities are not rare (roughly one in every two organisations do operate transnationally on a cross-country average) their scope of action remains heavily centred on the national (and eventually sub-national) level.

Our understanding of these findings are based on a neo-institutionalist approach to civil society which considers civil society and public authorities to be intertwined and there-

fore an approach in which civil society action will likely occur at the same political-spatial level in which the actor bearing political authority of an issue operates. Given that our CSOs operate in very specific fields (disability, unemployment, migration/asylum) that are under the political remit of national government (and eventually subnational ones, in particular concerning the implementation of services for disabled people, but also for the unemployed as well as migrants and refugees), it is at that level that their action develops.

However, this chapter has provided evidence also of the existence of a range of activities that CSOs engage in—some in connection to a weakened degree of public intervention in welfare state issues—that speak about solidarity as both an act of support in meeting people's needs and an act of political expression.

Furthermore what our findings indicate is a paradox between the issues confronting the vulnerable groups of our study and the gap in transnational solidarity among the CSOs we interviewed. On the one hand the economic crisis, the Eurozone crisis and the austerity measures which followed are in themselves essentially transnational issues that involve transnational actors. Moreover the so called refugee crisis (although perhaps better understood as a tragedy for the refugees and perceived as a border crisis in Europe) is at its core a transnational issue that can only be properly addressed through multilateral action. Nevertheless, it is clear from our interviews across eight European countries during this period that civil society organisations, which form the building blocks of associational life and are a formal expression of solidarity, remain bounded to their national contexts. This finding is also best understood by revisiting our sample of organisations that were principally drawn from transnational umbrellas and networks. This gap in transnational solidarity comes at a time when reactionary parties and xenophobic movements are on the rise in Europe and beyond and therefore our findings act as a signal that efforts to construct a truly transnational civil society may be more necessary than they have been in some time but its realisation seems some distance away on the horizon.

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Talking about solidarity…it sounds like a whisper: solidarity in law and public policies[3]

Veronica Federico

Introduction

Solidarity, from whatever perspective analysed, is a fundamental social fact, which characterises societies as it defines the interdependence among the different elements of the social fabric. Solidarity is an evocative, romantic, simple, but evanescent concept. Everyone has a basic understanding of what the concept means, but unequivocal, satisfactory definitions are difficult to find. For a long time social sciences have engaged refined research to explore its intimate meaning and its heuristic capacity in social, political, economic, cultural and legal domains, as discussed in the introduction. The scope of the chapter is not to add supplementary definitions, neither it is to provide an overview of the extensive academic literature on the topic. Rather, we intend to discuss the political and legal context of social and civic solidarity (for what does this means in the different contexts, in the eight countries examined in the TransSOL research - Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland, and the UK, and at the EU level) at the time of the crisis. This information has been retrieved via a combination of the desk research of various sources (e.g. legal and policy documents, national and EU case law, scientific literature), information requests to relevant institutions and semi-structured interviews with legal and policy experts and academics, which were conducted in July and October 2015. Additionally, we gathered further insights to complement the analysis of the role of the law, not just as it exists in legal text and in cases but rather as it is actually applied in society, through a series of qualitative interviews with representatives of grassroots/informal solidarity organisations, associations and movements active in the three fields of analysis (unemployment, disability and immigration and asylum).[4]

The crisis has evidently increased the need for solidarity, putting European societies under pressure, but at markedly different paces from country to country; the crisis has increased inequality among and within the countries; it has brought poverty back on the political agenda and on the spotlight of the media debate; it has generated an escalation in xenophobia and the tightening of immigration laws; it has polarized the political debate. Crisis-driven reforms (welfare system, labour market, immigration and asylum laws to quote the more relevant for our analysis) have marked all countries, even though to a very different extent in TransSOL three policy-domains: disability, unemployment and

[3] Freely inspired by the lyrics of "*Talking about A Revolution*" song by Tracy Chapman.
[4] Based on the TransSol research project's tasks, 30 in-depth interviews were conducted in each country from August to October 2016.

immigration/asylum. For what it concerns unemployment, it led to the adoption of anti-crisis packages and shocks absorbers measures; a further liberalization of the labour market; a redefinition of the role of the unions; reforms of retirement age and the adoption of youth targeted measures. In the field of immigration and asylum, laws have been generally amended, adopting more restrictive measures. Concerning disability, the crisis led to a reduction of grants and allowances and to the introduction of the system of means-test for services and benefits. Moreover, the reforms of the welfare system generally meant an increase in the vulnerability of the people with disability. Quite interestingly, however, the coincidence between the early stages of the crisis and the entering into force of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities caused the fact that precisely between 2007 and 2014 there has been the extension of anti-discrimination measures in several countries and also a shift from a medical definition of disability to a social oriented one. Against this backdrop, the purpose of the chapter is to explore whether solidarity as source of social ties and as fundamental principle in policy and law-making, as well as in judicial review and constitutional litigation, ha fully exerted its potential potency.

The failure to meet European citizens' expectations in terms of both capacity to provide adequate responses to basic needs, and to craft new, alternative visions of future European societies is evident. And yet, the ongoing political, social, and academic debates of the past decade have revealed the latent potency of existing legal, institutional, social principles and mechanisms that could prove useful when re-thinking and re-conceptualising social, political and legal institutions at national and supranational level. New actors have emerged over the years (movements, groups, parties, etc.), and others (such as courts, for example) have sometimes emerged more valiant than expected. Therefore, the discussion unveils specific traits of policy and legal systems and their social responses that are crucial for reflecting on whether - following Habermas' call (2013)- the path towards a more pervasive European (i.e. transnational) solidarity to politically overcome the crisis is viable.

In this chapter, we will first illustrate the socio-economic context of Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK during the crisis; secondly we will reflect on the significance and the "function" of solidarity in TransSOL countries' legal systems, highlighting: whether the formal inclusion of solidarity in the constitutional texts and in the EU treaties makes a difference, the most important implications of solidarity as a source of legislation and policies at both national and EU level; thirdly we will discuss the most relevant dimensions of solidarity in the different jurisdictions. Finally, through the comparative scrutiny of legal and policy regulation of the three TransSOL research domains (unemployment, disability and immigration/asylum) and of the impact of the crisis, we will examine whether solidarity proved to be a real source of legislation and policy making.

Talking about solidarity… the numbers

The data we have assembled from various compendia and statistical databases (see WP1-Dataset: http://transsol.eu/outputs/data/) largely assert two main findings: European countries diverge considerably with regard to societal cleavages and redistributive policies; at the same time, the various crises affecting the EU since 2008 have increased the differences and inequalities among the countries Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK present very diverse socio-economic backgrounds, with Greece representing the most deprived landscape and Switzerland holding the most privileged position (see gross domestic product [GDP] per capita). The economic crisis has evidently exerted a strong impact on the socio-economic structures of the studied countries. Looking at growth in GDP between 2010 and 2013, we can say that the crisis has not notably affected economic growth in Poland and Switzerland, and it has had a temporary impact on the economy in countries such as Germany, France, Denmark and the UK (Figure 1). The crisis has led to a considerable recession mainly in Italy and, above all, in Greece. In addition, in Italy and Greece, the economic crisis was accompanied by a debt crisis, which pushed governments to undertake severe retrenchment policies and austerity measures.

Figure 1



Figure 2



Source: OECD and Eurostat statistics

The financial and economic crisis has also hit hard on the social structures of EU countries, bringing economic grievances and poverty back onto the political agenda. These developments have also affected the welfare state, which has had problems with addressing the population's various needs due to increasing the numbers of beneficiaries and limited public funding. Figure 3 provides empirical indications for this development.

It indicates that the proportion of people in the population who live under economic strain (i.e. the percentage of households acknowledging that making ends meet is difficult) is particularly prominent in Greece, followed by Italy and Poland. In Germany, Denmark and France, economic strain remains low, even though all three countries experienced minimal increases in the number of households making ends meet with difficulty during the crisis, with this number decreasing in recent years. The same trend applies in the UK, where variations were stark. In 2010, only 3.9% of Swiss households were experiencing economic strain, and this percentage diminished during the crisis (although not linearly), reaching its lowest rate (2.8%) in 2016. The Polish case is particularly interesting: While presenting the third-highest rate of economic strain in 2010 (14.1%), it experienced a marked decrease and attained an 8.4% rate in 2016.

Figure 3



Figure 4



Source: OECD and Eurostat statistics

A similar picture is drawn when we consider the rates of risk of poverty, which correspond to the percentage of people with incomes below a threshold of 60% of the national median equivalised disposable income, including social transfers (Figure 4). This percentage is high in all of our countries, with the most alarming percentage being in Greece, where up to 36% of the population was at risk of poverty in 2014.

If we focus more closely on the three target groups in which our study is mainly interested (the unemployed, people with disabilities and refugees and migrants), official statistics demonstrate that the number of people affected by vulnerability in these areas is considerable in all countries, and it has tended to increase since 2008. Figures 5 and 6 disclose these developments for the number of jobless people and people with disabilities suffering severe material deprivation. In all countries, unemployment among the

general population has been on the rise, even though the effect was rather short term in Germany and Switzerland.

Financial hardships have not only impacted the jobless population but also people with disabilities, even though the experiences within the eight countries are quite different. The percentage of people with disabilities who indicated being exposed to severe material deprivation is highest in Greece, Poland and Italy, and it is lowest in Switzerland and Denmark. The economic and financial crisis has affected the disabled population particularly in Greece, Italy and the UK, as the proportion of those suffering deprivation has increased dramatically; in Denmark a regression can be reported for the years after 2012. In contrast to these countries, the situation has improved in Poland, France and Switzerland given that the number of people acknowledging living in precarious conditions has decreased significantly.

Figure 5



Figure 6



Source: Eurostat statistics

In the field of migration and asylum, the statistical data reveal considerable changes over time, particularly towards the end of our period of analysis. In fact, 3.8 million people immigrated to one of the EU's 28 member states in 2014.[5] Inflows of the foreign population continued to increase in 2015 but not everywhere or to the same extent across European countries. However, we need to contextualize these figures by relating them to the sizes of the countries' populations. As Figure 8 reveals, we see that the number of overall asylum applications per 100 inhabitants increased not only in Germany but also in Switzerland, Denmark, Italy and Greece in 2015. Overall, we thus see that

[5] See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics.

the deteriorating situations in the bordering regions of Europe stemming from war, persecution and poverty have had strong repercussions for many European countries, thus challenging the little-developed ability of the EU and its member states to find common policy solutions.

Figure 7



Figure 8



Source: OECD Database on International Migration; Eurostat Database on asylum and general population (own calculations)

In addition, all of these developments have had repercussions for the welfare state because the financial and economic crisis has dampened the state's ability to respond to the growing social problems, particularly among the most-deprived population groups. To provide a concise picture of these repercussions is not an easy task given the variety of welfare regimes and programmes in Europe. In general lines, studies have talked about a gradual retrenchment of the welfare state since the 1990s (Bonoli et al. 2000; Ebbinghaus 2015). This does not mean that redistributive policies are generally on the retreat. On the contrary, social expenditure has been increasing in most countries, either following and reflecting economic growth in terms of GDP rates, and/or as a reaction to economic downturns and the subsequent rise of social benefits to compensate for market inequalities, but we have seen welfare state reforms governed primarily by efficiency and austerity concerns (Kersbergen et al. 2014; Hermann 2014).

The statistics corroborate this uneven development across European nations. As revealed in Figures 9 and 10, we see that social expenditures diverge considerably. When considering expenditure per capita, it is Denmark, Switzerland, Germany and France that present the highest amounts of public funds devoted to social protection. Poland and Greece are at the other end of the group, with the lowest per capita rates of our eight countries. In all countries, the public funds invested in social policies increased

between 2008 and 2010 as a reaction to the crisis and the growing need for assistance for the rising rate of unemployed and poor people. Since then, social expenditures have increased in most countries in absolute terms, but they have developed in parallel to the growth of the economy, thus maintaining a stable share of the GDP across time. Only Greece has experienced a notable welfare retrenchment since 2012.

Figure 9



Figure 10



Source: Eurostat statistics

Talking about solidarity… in the constitutions

Solidarity as a legal concept has a long history, dating back to Roman times. Along the centuries, from the Roman law of contracts, it moved to the constitutional realm, underpinning the principle of collective responsibility and "allowing to think individuals on a collective dimension" (Supiot, 2015:7, and in the same direction, Rodotà, 2014; Blais, 2007).

By recognising the revolutionary principle of solidarity (named *fraternité* in that context*)* as the socio-legal marker of the nation states' membership, the newly created national communities of the 18th and 19th centuries transformed solidarity into a binding legal standard. Since then, solidarity has become a general principle of law, first at national level, and then, through the action of the European Court of Justice and the principles endorsed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, at the European level. In fact, at the end of the Second World War, solidarity was fully entrenched in constitutional texts in Europe (De Búrca and Weiler 2011; Tuori, 2015). This was when a new model of constitutions grounded in the value of the person, human dignity and fundamental rights, bloomed. In these constitutions, rights and liberties are conceived in a "solidary"

frame, therefore the respect for and guarantee of those rights and liberties has to be intrinsically combined with the meta-principle of social solidarity (Cippitani, 2010: 34-37). From the TransSol research perspective, this is a highly relevant legal innovation. The interweaving of rights and solidarity becomes clear, for example, in Art. 25(4) of the Greek constitution ("The State has the right to claim off all citizens to fulfil the duty of social and national solidarity") and in Art. 2 of the 1948 Italian Constitution ("The Republic recognises and guarantees the inviolable human rights, be it as an individual or in social groups expressing their personality, and it ensures the performance of the unalterable duty to political, economic, and social solidarity"). Inviolable human rights are therefore intertwined with the "unalterable duty to […] social solidarity."

At the EU level, on 9 May 1950, the French Minister Robert Schuman, proposing the creation of a European Coal and Steel Community, declared that "Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity." Solidarity features in the EU landscape since the very beginning, despite a number of ambiguities and "the Lisbon treaty conforms [its] centrality in the EU's future constitutional arrangements" (Ross, 2010:45).

From the comparative analysis of Danish, France, Germany, Greece, Italian, Polish, Swiss and British solidarity clearly emerges as a founding principle for all TransSOL countries' legal systems, even though it is not necessarily listed in specific constitutional provisions. In fact, it is explicitly named in the constitutional texts in four cases (France, Greece, Italy and Poland), in three (France, Poland and Switzerland) solidarity is also evoked (or only) in the preamble to the constitution, and in the remaining three cases (Denmark, Germany and the UK) it has to be inferred by a systematic interpretation of contiguous legal principles, such as equality, human dignity, etc. In the EU treaties, a number of articles explicitly refer to solidarity: from Art. 3 of the TEU, enunciating the objectives of the Union (the Union "shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States") to Art. 80 of the TFEU, ("The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter [V, devoted to EU policies on border checks, asylum and immigration] and their implementation shall be governed by the *principle of solidarity* and *fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications*, between the Member States"- emphasis added), and Articles 122 and 194 of the TFEU which establish a principle of solidarity in the field of economic policy, and, in particular, with reference to energy policy: "Without prejudice to any other procedures provided for in the Treaties, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may decide, in a spirit of solidarity between Member States, upon the measures appropriate to the economic situation, in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy".

Solidarity is part of the constitutional DNA of all our countries. But does its strong entrenchment in constitutional documents make an explicit difference? This entails, first, that the constitutional value attributed to solidarity allows legislators and policy-makers to refer to it as a legitimate source of legislation and policies that go far beyond the more "typical" application of the principle of solidarity that is the welfare system span-

ning from housing policies to family law, from fiscal measures and tax law to labour law; from international cooperation to energy legislation; from the promotion of volunteering and civil society to freedom of association. And, secondly, the presence of solidarity among the fundamental principles of the constitutions should policy-makers to enact solidarity legislation and policies, activating a sort of "virtuous circle" of solidarity that starts from the constitution, is put into effect in legislation and policies, through legislation and policies it supports and strengthens solidarity at societal level, and the social value of solidarity reinforces and "gives meaning" to the constitutional principle.

Moreover, should this virtuous circle be breached, as it has happened during the crisis, the constitutional entrenchment of solidarity makes it easier for judges, especially constitutional judges, to refer to it as an insurmountable constitutional paradigm. Indeed, both the Italian Constitutional Court and the French Constitutional Council have been prone to refer to solidarity as a tool to mitigate measures that might have a negative impact on vulnerable people's dignity. The Constitutional Council has referred many times to the notion of solidarity. In its jurisprudence, the term solidarity has a plurality of meanings. The Constitutional Council uses the terms "*mécanisme*" (mechanism) of solidarity, "*principe de solidarité*" (principle of solidarity), "*exigence de solidarité*" (solidarity requirement), "*objectif de solidarité*" (solidarity objective), sometimes relying on several of them in the same decision. It is therefore not a monovalent concept. The privileged applications of these notions obviously lie in the domain of social systems, spanning the routes that individuals make across their lives, for example in and out of the labour market. Similarly, the Italian Constitutional Court often uses solidarity in very diverse fields. Recently, in a case concerning the right to education of pupils with disability (CC decision n.257 of 16 December 2016), the Court went much further than mitigating austerity measures. It argued that when a core of absolute, unswerving guarantees for vulnerable people is at stake, the very balancing of interests (which is the essence of constitutional courts usual reasoning) becomes pointless. The duty of social solidarity simply prevails. What emerges is a very powerful interpretative innovation.

Noticeably, in Greece the constitutional case-law is more ambivalent than in other TransSol countries and it brings to the forefront a second, very important entailment of the principle of solidarity: sacrificing the interests of determined categories in the name of the survival of the whole nation. During the crisis, Greek judiciary has interpreted solidarity as a constitutional paradigm both to mitigate some crisis-driven reforms (in this case solidarity assumes the function of a shield, protecting people's fundamental rights and accessibility to a decent living), and to enforce other austerity laws (in this case solidarity assumes the value of the community's higher common interest). In fact, on the one hand the Council of State (case 668/2012) maintained that the reductions in public wages, pensions and other benefits were justified by a stronger public interest (improving the state's economy and financial situation) – and moreover the measures guaranteed the common interest of the Member state of the Eurozone (a "reinforced" public interest). On the other hand, the Court of Auditors (Proceedings of the 2nd special session of the plenary, 27 February 2013) ascertained that the discretion of legisla-

tors to adopt restrictive measures to decrease public spending should not jeopardise adequate living conditions (recognised by Articles 2 and 4(5) of the Constitution), and should ensure a fair distribution of the crisis-burden on citizens in the name of the principle of proportionality (Art. 25(1)) and of the state's right to require social and national solidarity a duty of all citizens.

This is particularly interesting from our perspective: the apparent ambiguity of Greek courts reveals a crucial element of the notion of solidarity that we mentioned in abstract terms in the introduction of the present volume If solidarity is to be considered as a status of intersubjectivity, in which people are bound together, whether by a shared identity or by the facts of their actual interest, into mutual relationships of interdependence and reciprocal aid, the two dimensions of solidarity that emerge in Greek case-law are both crucial: fundamental rights that grant human dignity on the one hand, and the very existence of the community, which may require the sacrifice of individual interests and benefits, on the other. Of course, this reasoning is not meant to legitimise the harsh austerity measures imposed on Greece to prevent the financial collapse due to the debt crisis and the conditions for the bailout. Beyond the political and social evaluation of the Greek austerity measures, what is relevant here is that this extremely critical situation revealed the notion of solidarity as interconnection between rights and duties. And it is this interconnectivity that integrates the individual into a community of citizens (Apostoli, 2012:10-11).

At the EU level, the Court of Justice contributed to consolidate a restrictive trend in interpreting solidarity based measures, "casting an increasingly tolerant eye upon national measures restricting the access to social benefits by mobile EU citizens and, by these means, seeking to reassure Member States concerned about social tourism. By so doing, it sacrificed the expansive logic of Union citizenship as a fundamental status of European citizens" (Giubboni, Costamagna, 2017).

Talking about solidarity… its dimensions

In legal systems based on solidarity, i.e. where solidarity "defines a *perimeter of mutual assistance* which includes some people and excludes others" (Supiot, 2015: 15), citizenship -which is the maker of this perimeter, means that the legal bond between the individual and the State creates a relationship of mutual responsibility that does not simply concern a bi-directional vertical dimension between the State and its citizens, but also a bi-directional horizontal dimension, i.e. between fellow-citizens. Every citizen is responsible for the promotion and guarantee of fellow citizens' rights and needs (Apostoli, 2012: 143). Moreover, in decentralised States solidarity acquires a third, crucial aspect: the territorial dimension, i.e. the principle of federal solidarity. "The general idea is that governments forming a federation do not merely calculate their actions to be to their own benefit. By forming a federation, partners intend to work collectively for the common good of a shared citizenry. Each government – be it federal, provincial or territorial

– owes special duties to the other common members of the federation that they do not necessarily owe to foreign states (or that are not owed with the same degree of intensity) precisely because they belong to a common body politic" (Cyr, 2014: 31). These three dimensions are all interconnected, and they assume a slightly different connotation at the EU level[6].

The most relevant element of solidarity's vertical dimension in every country is the welfare system (Ferrera 2005). From the Danish social democratic Nordic welfare model (Esping-Andersen 1990), where there is a strong state that builds on the principles of universalism by providing tax-financed benefits and services, to the Italian "residual welfare state" in the broader category of the conservative-corporatist model (or Ferrera's Southern group model (1996)), where social services are provided to people who are unable to help themselves; from the Swiss liberal welfare with a moderate decommodification but with a high generosity index, close to the one in Sweden (Scruggs, Allan 2006: 67) to the Greek pre-crisis corporatist model based on moderation and the elimination of the most dramatic inequalities through redistribution policies; from the Polish social model which blends elements of liberalism on a conservative and corporate tradition inherited from the period between the wars (Esping-Andresen,1999) to the French corporatist regime reflecting, for most part, the Birmarkian tradition of earning-related benefits (Serre and Palier 2004); from the British universalism based on the Beveridge model (Taylor-Gooby, 2013) to the typical conservative welfare regime in Germany (Esping-Andersen 1990); whatever type of welfare regime presumes an unequal distribution of resources and wealth, and the specific function of solidarity is to bridge these inequalities through redistribution policies. Solidarity that is embodied in welfare systems on the one hand promotes human dignity through the enforcement of fundamental rights, and, in this sense, the welfare state represents the institutional form of social solidarity generated in constitutional principles and specified in codified entitlements to social policies. On the other hand, solidarity promotes social cohesion through the binding force of the interconnectivity between rights and duties. Indeed, the welfare state as a set of redistributive policies has been a key tool in the promotion of national identity, and therefore as a way to create solidarity among citizens, "bounding for bonding" (Ferrera, 2005:44). In fact, citizens allow a redistribution of their resources to happen as long as they perceive each other as members of the same group or nation. As we will highlight later on, the crucial issue, then, becomes the boundaries of welfare, i.e. where to draw the perimeter of solidarity.

6 Due to the supranational nature of the EU legal system, at this level solidarity is embedded in two dimensions: the relationship between Member states (horizontal dimension) that is evoked in a number of articles of the treaties - for example, Article 3 of the TEU, enunciating the objectives of the Union, declares that the Union "shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States"- and the relationship between the States and their subjects, i.e. the individuals (vertical dimension), which appear in the Preamble of the TEU stating that the Union aims are to "deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and their traditions".

"The concrete enforcement of solidarity in its vertical dimension (from the State and the institutions towards individuals) is tightly connected to the functioning of the guiding principle of subsidiarity […] as subsidiarity presupposes the *subsidium*, which is the duty of participation and support «top down» by virtue of social cohesion" (Apostoli, 2012:61). Subsidiarity opens the public sphere to citizens' participation and free engagement in the fulfilment of fundamental rights and in service delivery, connecting the vertical and horizontal dimensions. Civil society participates in realising the rights and may even go further by directing its energy towards expanding and enriching the quality and quantity of those rights (Onida, 2003: 116). In other words, if rights cannot be fully and directly enforced by the State, either because of economic restrictions (as may be the case during a crisis) or because of political opportunity reasons, the State may "activate" the citizens' duty of solidarity through legislation promoting private intervention.

The horizontal dimension of solidarity finds its most evident and most widespread expression in volunteerism, may be favoured by specific legislation and measures promoting the third sector (as has been the case of the Italian law n. 266 of 1991), and it has provided valuable solidarity responses during the crisis, as the Greek case clearly describes. But the opening to this horizontal dimension may also acquire more ambiguous political aspects, as was the case of the UK's The Big Society policy.

Indeed, in all TransSOL countries the social value of solidarity is tightly intertwined with volunteering. Being engaged in civil society activities, donating time, competencies and money, is a shared value and a widespread practice, but it assumes different connotations, which may reverberate on the general understanding of solidarity.

Table 1 – Proportion of people involved in solidarity activities in the past 5 years (2012-2016)

	Helping a stranger (%)	Donating money (%)	Donating time (%)
Denmark	57	54	21
France	39	30	31
Germany	58	55	22
Greece	50	10	11
Italy	44	30	15
Poland	37	27	13
Switzerland	39	51	33
The UK	58	64	28

Note: In the World Giving Survey, respondents were asked whether they have helped a stranger or someone they did not know; have donated money to charities; and have volunteered time in a voluntary or charitable organisations. The estimates derived here correspond to the proportion of respondents who answered positively.

Sources: World Giving Index 2017

As we can see from Table 1, in all countries almost half of the population is engaged in solidarity activities connected with volunteering, with the exception of Poland and, to a different extent, Greece. Thus, if we assume volunteerism as an indicator of social solidarity at the interpersonal level (Hustinx and Lammertyn 2000; Valastro 2012; Zambeta 2014), we can assert that at least in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Switzerland and the UK, a number of forms of solidarity are based on social activism and volunteerism. Interestingly, however, each country has its own way to solidarity through volunteering, and in each country, solidarity is characterised by specific connotations.

In all TransSol countries, to a lower degree in Poland, the socio-cultural significance of solidarity evokes altruism and volunteering. However, it assumes different flavours in the various countries: a more accentuated political taste in some countries, and a more moral one in others; tones that are closer to charity in some contexts, and tones evoking social protest in others; a tighter connection with the kin dimension is some societies, and a tighter connection with the institutional dimension in others. This paints a rather variegated "European horizontal way" towards solidarity.

Finally, in decentralised states, subsidiarity allows for interconnectivity between the different tiers of government, making the significance of solidarity relations among all territorial entities emerge. The importance of territorial solidarity is taken into consideration in the cases of Germany, Italy, the UK and Switzerland. In all these jurisdictions, the very structure of the decentralised (federal, regional or cantonal) state relies on the mechanism of power sharing (which assumes different political and legal forms, structures and mechanisms in the different countries) that enables mediation between sub-national and national interests, needs, resources and competences. However, in none of these countries is the equilibrium between diversity, autonomy and solidarity a simple one, and the crisis has exacerbated several elements of this difficult equilibrium. The British and the Italian cases represent the two most critical aspects of territorial solidarity: the very respect of the *pactum unionis* among sub-national entities and the exacerbation of difference to the detriment of equality in rights enforcement which questions the solidaritstic dimension of decentralisation.

In the UK, the solidarity-creation mechanisms between sub-national entities (Scotland, Wales, England, and Northern Ireland) have been seriously challenged in the past few years by political and political-economic issues. These challenges seem to be a catalyst for the robust revival of sub-national solidarities against the British one. The devolution of power occurring from the end of the 1990s has come under intense scrutiny in recent years in terms of its capacity to allow sub-national communities to have their voice and interests represented by British decision making. As a consequence, in Scotland in 2014, a referendum took place for one of the "constituting nations" of the UK to become independent from the UK. Although the vote upheld the will of Scottish people to remain British, this was a very strong attempt to reshape the boundaries, and even the content, of territorial solidarity. Even though not directly connected with the Scottish national question, the British people put another form of supranational solidarity under pressure

as a legitimate system of redistributing resources across the continent: solidarity based on the European Union. In June 2016 they voted to leave the European Union: A dramatic outcome.

In Italy since the 1990s, there has been a significant devolution of functions to regions in the field of welfare, which has radically changed the relationship between the central government, the regional governments, and local governments according to the principle of subsidiarity. The economic crisis had the effect of modifying and reinforcing the role of regional governments in new strategic policy-making and service delivery to temper both the direct effect of the crisis and the impact of national retrenchment measures. Regional responsibilities in the field of social policies has become so important that scholars argue that Italy has moved from a 'welfare state' to 'welfare regions' (Ferrera, 2008). This process has exacerbated existing differences, especially between Northern and Southern regions, that remain more strongly marked by high rates of poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, and whose regional governments have proved to be less pro-active in counter-balancing the worst effects of the crisis, especially in the field of unemployment. The gap is not only measurable in terms of per capita income, but also in terms of well-being and opportunity gaps (Cersosimo, Nisticò, 2013). The paradox is that regions most severely hit by the crisis were the most vulnerable ones, and the most severely hit populations were the most marginalised. Another dramatic failure of territorial solidarity.

Talking about solidarity… Immigration and asylum, unemployment and disability

Principles and rules deriving from the European Union legislation and policies should provide a common normative framework in the fields of unemployment, disability and immigration/asylum in EU Member states. Nonetheless, the comparative analysis of the seven EU member states and of Switzerland[7] shows that national principles, legislation and policies remain highly country-specific. Moreover, even at the national level there is a lack of consistency. Disability legislation and policies, for example, are generally characterised by internal fragmentation and in decentralised states, they are influenced by the regional or federal organisation of the competences.

In many European countries the economic, as well as "refugees" crises of the past years had a considerable impact on the legal entrenchment of the solidarity principle and its implementation in administrative practice. Across Europe, this impact has been very differential, depending on each country's specific crisis experience. The transposition of the constitutional solidarity principle into specific legislation and policies is not simple,

7 The research on the EU impact over Swiss law and policy is wide. Suffice to mention, there are various way of influence: from the so-called autonomous adaptation, to multilateral agreements, passing through international treaties and the comparative law method. For insights: Epinay, 2009; Jenni, 2014.

and in several cases there are evident discrepancies between a solidaristic approach embodied in the constitution and specific laws, regulations and policies violating it. As already highlighted, Courts may intervene and quite often they do so, reaffirming the overarching constitutional value of solidarity, but this has not prevented dramatic welfare retrenchment measures and a generalised tightening of migration laws.

Very seldom, solidarity is expressly named as the leading principle in any of the framework legislation in the policy domains of disability, unemployment/asylum and migration. Very interestingly, from being a fundamental value at the constitutional level, solidarity seems to have become a recessive one at the level of legislation.

Nonetheless, solidarity is of relevance for rights and entitlements in disability, migration/asylum and unemployment law to the extent that it can be derived from other basic constitutional rights and principles, such as equality and anti-discrimination, with few exceptions such as “solidarity contracts” in Italy and Switzerland, for example. For instance, in Germany it can derived from the constitutional vision of humanity, the fundamental rights, the welfare state principle, equal treatment, equal participation, and equal opportunities. The right to live a life in human dignity stands above all, and all other rights are subordinate to it. This also means that rights have to be interpreted in the light of the overriding right to a dignified life. Thus, irrespective of the missing explicit reference to solidarity, German law still foresees a broad range of instruments and mechanisms to support the unemployed, asylum seekers and disabled people. And yet, some degree of vagueness in determining the exact significance and legal impact of these principles opens the door for policy making to downplay the role of solidarity and to increase the conditionality of solidarity within vulnerable groups. This has happened particularly in the asylum and unemployment fields in the past few years. Moreover, laws and their administrative implementation are not always perceived by civil society as sufficient to meet solidarity expectations. Indeed, recent policy reforms have shown that solidarity remains highly contested and subject to political struggles between different interest groups in society, even in a country with good economic performances and low unemployment like Germany.

In other countries, such as Greece, although solidarity and the social welfare state are clearly defined in the Constitution as a duty of the Greek state towards its citizens, there is mounting evidence that the recent policy options are progressively eroding their normative foundation and practical exercise. After several years of recession, Greece has adopted painful policy choices with regards to wage and pension cuts, labour relations, layoffs and social policies. Failure to protect the weaker, vulnerable population groups most severely hit by the country's multiple crises suggests that Greek political elites and policy-makers have neglected solidarity. The weakening of solidarity policies for the social protection of people with disabilities, the unemployed, the migrants, the newly-arrived refugees and asylum seekers has gone hand in hand with increased retrenchment, severity of sanctions and welfare conditionality.

The constitutional entrenchment of solidarity should find a direct application in the legislation. As pointed out by the Italian Constitutional Court, "social solidarity is a general guideline," not merely an abstract, moral and ethical value. It has to be considered "binding for the legislators" (C.C. decision n. 3 of 1975), which means that solidarity should permeate in a very concrete way the whole legal system, or should provide a relevant interpreting paradigm. And yet, the process of translating a constitutional principle (either directly or indirectly enforced) into specific legislation and policies may present major difficulties, as the analysis of TransSol's three policy domains illustrates.

Solidarity in disability legislation and policies

In the frame of the EU approach mainly based on non-discrimination measures, TransSol countries' disability laws pursue social integration and equality combining typical anti-discrimination measures, proactive integration tools (social inclusion at school and in the labour market, for example) with social assistance.

Except in Germany, people with disabilities have suffered from significant reductions of disability grants and allowances due to the crisis in all countries. The introduction of the system of means-testing for services and benefits in several countries and the reforms of the welfare system generally have meant a further increase in the vulnerability of people with disability. This occurred especially during the first years of the crisis, even in countries not strongly economically affected such as Denmark, Switzerland and Poland. Disability is one of the typical fields where the notions of intersectionality and multiple discrimination have become very relevant (Soder, 2009; Lawson, 2016), which means that disadvantages in the intersection between disability and, for example, unemployment, gender, race, class, etc. are likely to become more severe, and this is why austerity measures tend to have a stronger impact on people with disabilities.

In a first group of countries (Germany, France, Italy, Denmark and Greece) there have not been significant reforms, whereas in the UK, Switzerland, and Poland a number of reforms have been upheld, not touching the principles, but reviewing the mechanisms for accessing benefits. In Poland, indeed, there has been a relevant legal activism in order to align with the European standards, which has meant an enhancement of rights' guarantees for Polish people with disabilities. Moreover, the concomitant adoption of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 2006 has entailed innovative approaches to disability, which means that in the time-frame of the crisis, in terms of legal principles and values, law reforms tended to enhance the level of rights and guarantees.

Nonetheless, the crisis has exacerbated the process of socio-spatial production of legal peripheries (Febbrajo, Harste, 2013) in the field of disability, where contemporary discourse of inclusion and tolerance of diversity is at odds with the real guarantee of fundamental rights, regarding the relationship with the democratic institutions and public administration services. While formally entrenched in legal documents, basic human

rights are systematically denied by the lack of resources, and those same rights then become the terrain where exclusion is *de facto* widespread and strong.

Interestingly, in most countries, the main concerns regarding the disability field do not lie in the lack of legislation, but in their implementation, as highlighted by the analysis of the interviews carried out with grassroots and civil societies' associations and movements in all countries. In Italy, for instance, the legal framework is deemed appropriate, in line with the most progressive European countries. In some fields, Italy has been (and sometimes still is) ground-breaking, as with the example of disabled pupils' integration in schools. What remains highly problematic is the actual implementation of existing legislation. But this is true even for a country like Germany, where the effective enforcement of guarantees and the rights of disabled persons is often a question of the quality of administrative practice at the levels of national state, the single federal states, local authorities and benefit providers, and the assertiveness of individual claimants (Kuhn-Zuber 2015; Welti 2010: 27).

Solidarity in unemployment laws and policies

The crisis impact on the quantitative and qualitative levels of employment has put heavy responsibility on European institutions' capacity given that Article 145 TFEU, states that "the Union shall contribute to a high level of employment by encouraging cooperation between Member States and by supporting and, if necessary, complementing their action". Despite the fact that EU competence in this field relies primarily on coordination of national policies and legislation, EU legislation and policy have developed along two salient issues: social protection of workers and social rights. Human rights play a key role within the EU coordination of national employment policies in times of crisis: all actions of EU Institutions and member states shall comply with them, as well as with the European Social Charter of the Council of Europe. However, the potential role of European Institutions is still undeveloped, given the fact that the importance of the European Social Charter within EU social policies is proved by its special mention in Article 151 of the TFEU. Nonetheless, the implementation of these principles have fallen short of people's expectations.

At the member state level, the 2008 global economic crisis had very different effects in terms of unemployment: some countries were severely hit by the economic and financial crisis, especially Southern countries, but conversely, in Germany, Switzerland, and, partially, in Poland, the crisis had a more modest impact. The picture of policy and legislative responses in the field of unemployment shows also differentiated patterns which, nonetheless, do not necessarily adhere to the crisis effect. The crisis has been seen as an opportunity to address historical weaknesses in the labour market, whereas in other countries it was just an "excuse" to pursue a very politically-oriented agenda. In all countries, however, we detected a general tendency towards policy changes emphasising flexibilisation of labour relations, conditionality for welfare and unemployment benefits and 'activation' elements, in accordance with the broader supply-focused trend

characterising European unemployment policies throughout the 1990s and 2000s. And against this trend, all our TransSol respondents from grassroots and civil society organisations active in the field of unemployment agree that a solidarity approach in labour market and welfare benefit reforms is sorely lacking. Employment and unemployment remain highly contested terrains, especially in the countries where the most radical reforms have been upheld. Solidarity is a recessive value in current unemployment/labour legislation, even though in this domain it is overtly named, for example, in "solidarity contracts", in Italy and in Switzerland, and in "solidarity gradual pre-retirement contracts" in France.

Solidarity in the field of migration legislation and policies

The economic crisis was followed by a "refugee" crisis that especially affected Mediterranean countries like Italy and Greece. The EU legal framework in this field is pivotal: the principle of solidarity has a special role in the common policies of asylum and immigration, set forth respectively in Articles 78 and 79 of the TFEU. This is due to Article 80 TFEU which meaningfully provides that these policies and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States. However, the principle of solidarity in immigration and asylum policies also includes the relationship between the EU and its member states, on the one side, and individuals, especially those escaping persecution and war and looking for asylum in Europe. Indeed, this is the sole interpretation, which is in harmony with the values enshrined by Articles 2 and 3, para. 5 of the TEU, according to which, "In its relations with the wider world...it shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter". According to this interpretation, solidarity should apply both to the relationship among member states and to the relations among peoples inside and outside the European territory. It expresses a model of society that should fight against discrimination, violence and unfairness towards disadvantaged people and should actively promote minimum standards of dignity for all human beings.

Nonetheless, moving from theory to practice, the effectiveness of such fundamental provisions is problematic.

Immigration and asylum laws were generally amended in all TransSol countries, adopting more restrictive measures, except in Poland and Greece. This occurred regardless of the country's actual involvement in the migratory crisis, signalling a politicisation of this issue and the increasing importance of populist claims in this regard (Boswell, Geddes, and Scholten, 2011; Van der Brug, et al., 2015). This has been confirmed by the firm Polish refusal to welcome refugees and asylum seekers according to the burden-sharing approach of the European Union, refusal that has been sanctioned by the European

Commission launching infringement procedures against Poland (and Hungary and Czech Republic) in June 2017 for not having fulfilled their obligation to host relocated migrants from Italy and Greece.

The importance of the migration waves has been claimed as political justification for restrictive legislation and policies in Germany and in Italy, but the Greek case demonstrates that, even under very critical conditions, the legal response may assume different tones. Furthermore, the cases of Denmark, Switzerland, the UK and France confirm that the political debate easily overlooks the real numbers of either the "refugee crisis" or the economic one, as a number of research papers and studies maintain (Geddes and Scholten, 2016; Van der Brug, et al., 2015). Moreover, this is further confirmed by the interviews carried out with civil society and grassroots movements and organisations in the field of migration: the exacerbation of the tones of the political debate on the refugee crisis have blurred the real aspects of the phenomenon. And the securisation trend of the legislative and policy reforms has been intensified by the lack of material resources and slow policy implementation, especially in the countries most severely involved with intense refugee and migrant incoming fluxes.

Finally, little reference, if any at all, is made to solidarity. There are other keywords often mentioned, such as fundamental rights, human dignity, social integration, but solidarity, with its distinctive significance, is absent from the legal discourse, and curiously, it appears in media and popular language to identify a crime in France.

Solidarity… it does sound like a whisper

Solidarity can be portrayed as an hourglass: its broad and solid entrenchment at both constitutional and EU treaties level on top, an equally important spectrum of solidarity practices at the level of civil society at the bottom, the two connected through the bottleneck of legislation and policies.

All TransSol countries, in fact, are characterised by complex webs of solidarities, and the same applies to the legal and policy framework at the European Union level. Solidarity is the EU's intimate component: it is indicated as a key-value in its founding treaties both as a general principle and as a norm guiding mutual support among member states and peoples during specific circumstances such as natural or man-made calamities. These multiple solidarities are sometimes imposed by the legal frameworks, while at other times the legal frameworks accommodate and recognise existing solidarity ties and practices, and on other occasions, laws and policies result in counter-solidarity measures.

The Courts have played a significant role, admittedly with a certain degree of ambiguity in some jurisdictions (at the level of the EU, the judgements rendered by CJEU in the cases *Brey* and *Dano* show how EU case law fluctuates between two "visions" of solidarity: the conception in *Brey* is based on territorial presence, while the one in *Dano* (and

Alimanovic) promotes social cohesion (Thym, 2015)), in mitigating the most severe austerity measures, using solidarity as a valiant constitutional paradigm.

Has solidarity resisted the crisis crush test?

In our analysis, we have tried to free solidarity from the rhetoric often associated with the idea, and to understand the effective potency of the notion. Thus, we should be careful not to paint solidarity as the panacea to the global economic crisis while paying homage to its unique and transformative role in mitigating the ill effects of the crises economically, socially, politically and legally at national and European levels. In all the three policy domains, solidarity has been a recessive value against the imperative of the market (in the field of unemployment), of the securisation discourse (in the field of migration) and of welfare retrenchment (in the field of disability). And even in the field of disability, where all our country analyses have highlighted a strong entrenchment of solidarity in the legal framework, the implementation of the laws remains highly problematic, and this seriously jeopardises people's rights and dignity and undermines solidarity. Moreover, the large majority of interviewed grassroots and civil society organisations across the eight countries struggle to acknowledge the value of a solidarity legal framework. Seldom do they resort to courts to seek the sound respect of the constitutionally entrenched principle of solidarity, so that the judiciary remains an underestimated tool for the entrenchment of solidarity.

There is no single lesson to be learned here. There is no single recipe. There is no single roadmap to the full disclosure of the still latent potency of solidarity. As we have demonstrated, *per se* the presence of solidarity in the constitutions or in the EU treaties does not guarantee the solidaristic quality of national and European laws and policies. But constitutions and Treaties are documents deemed to persist in time, and solidarity is not solely the virtue of hard times.

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Solidarity contestation in the public domain during the 'Refugee Crisis'

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Introduction

In this chapter we carry out a systematic analysis of media content so as to assess the extent to which the so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015-16 has opened up deep fault lines across Europe, for example about the way that this crisis has been framed in the voice of main actors accessing the media, or how the crisis should be handled. The selection of our countries is large enough to include very different positions with regard to the question of transnational solidarity and whether hospitality should be granted to the incoming refugees. Greece, which, together with Italy, was the first entry point to the European Union for most refugees, insisted on fair burden sharing with the rest of Europe. After a series of dramatic events at Europe's external borders and on the transit routes through the Balkans, Germany decided to suspend the Dublin Regulation at the end of August 2015 so as to accept asylum applications from refugees travelling from Greece. In turn, this open-door policy was heavily criticised by Denmark and Poland, but supported by France, which was, however, less affected by the inflow of refugees. Great Britain took almost an outlier position, but had an issue with France over the responsibility of refugees camping in Calais with the hope of crossing the Channel. Finally, Switzerland, as a non-EU country, but nonetheless a part of Schengen, also received increasing numbers of refugees from Syria, mainly entering through its southern borders with Italy.

In the light of these differences in terms of attitudes of hospitality and policies of control, security and solidarity, this chapter has a few main objectives. We identify the extent to which acts of solidarity towards refugees were granted public awareness and what claims on behalf of or against hospitality towards refugees were made, and by whom. We also examine the discursive construction of European solidarity in terms of its underlying positions and justifications that drive public debate, and how such differences are used in contestations between various allegiances (e.g., proponents and opponents of humanitarian solidarity, or of national exclusive solidarity). These main objectives intersect with a number of research questions that are at the core of this chapter. Accordingly, we look more specifically into the true fault line that opened up across Europe by assessing the extent to which processes of cross-national convergence were subjacent to the development of the 'crisis' itself. At the same time, we assess the extent to which national debates followed similar dividing lines of governments, political parties and civil society actors, in terms of both the positioning vis-à-vis refugees, and the way that these same actors justified (or not) solidarity with refugees.

Overall, our approach in this chapter allows for reconstructing solidarity contestation in the media. Propositions of, and opposition to different solidarity projects are taken as 'claims' that compete for salience in the public domain as represented by the media. As actors of these 'claims', claimants intervene within national public spheres; but their solidarity contestations are carried out across Europe since the decision of one country to open its borders towards refugees potentially affect all the others. What is at stake is the fact that solidarity relationships are not containable within one single country, but need to be re-negotiated between all Europeans. Accordingly, we recollect the general patterns and dynamics of 'claims' in the public sphere during the most intense crisis period between August 2015 and April 2016. Through our quantitative analysis of 'claims', we can thus analyse the main protagonists and targets in the public domain, the main concerns expressed, the degree of transnationalisation of debates, the various forms which claims took, the favourable or unfavourable positions that claimants had towards refugees, as well as the justifications given for either granting or rejecting solidarity.

The method of 'claims-making'

Our 'claim-making' approach allows for the study of interventions by organised publics in the public domain (Bassoli & Cinalli, 2016; Cinalli, 2004 and 2006; Cinalli & Giugni, 201; Koopmans and Statham 1999; Koopmans et al. 2005) providing a detailed cross-national overview of solidarity in Europe. Within the public domain, solidarity contestation was carried out by a large plurality of actors, whose claims were made selectively salient in the media: state actors and governments, political parties and powerful elites, as well as corporate actors, pressure groups, civil society organisations and movements. These different actors competed for attention in the media as a common arena for making public their positions, mutual conflicts, shared agreements, and so forth. While previous research on solidarity in Europe has dealt with the direct interactions between state and civil society actors on the one hand, and the objects of solidarity on the other (cf. the other chapters in this volume), our focus is on mediated relationships and mediated conflicts as they develop in the public domain, including different types of "publics" that are at the same time the subject and the object of policy making.

In any large polity —whether about it is a specific city, a larger region, a national state, or the whole European community— it is impossible for all actors to interact face-to-face with each other. Consequently, they must rely to a considerable extent on the media to access the public domain, and be able to contribute to debates by expressing their own opinion, pondering on the pros and cons of different policy choices, or calling for action. This key role of the print media as a forum for public debate and opinion formation in confirmed by the literature on comparative media systems and journalism (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Pfetsch et al., 2008), which is why we have selected print media as our primary source of analysis. Our argument is that a more complete research design dealing with the public domain must allow for examination of the crucial discursive dy-

namics by which the plurality of claimants intersect with each other. We thus follow the example of a key body of literature that deals with the crucial relationship between different types of actors, their interventions, and the public domain that is available through the various types of media acknowledging the plurality of modes of intervention that may be used (Sanders, 1997; Young, 2000). More specifically, we rely on the method of claims analysis so as to capture the main trends of 'claims-making' within the public domain. 'Claims-making' was born in scholarly field of contentious politics (Koopmans & Statham, 1999; Cinalli & Giugni, 2013 and 2016; Koopmans et al., 2005), and it consists of retrieving interventions in the public domain on a given issue (or range of issues), drawing from media sources, and most often —also here—newspapers. Hence, claims-making is valuable to study the roles and positions in the public domain of all actors that formulated claims relating to the refugee crisis.

Our unit of analysis is the single claim, which is as an intervention, verbal or nonverbal, made in the public domain by any actor in the media (including individuals), which bears relation to the interests, needs or rights of refugees. In the quality of objects of the claims, these include refugees as individuals or as a collective group. Each claim by any actor is characterised by a typical structure, which can be broken down into a number of elements enquiring into the main characteristics of a claim. In particular, our cross-national analysis of print media here deals with six main comparative variables of all claims, including the 'actor' (who makes the claim), the 'addressee' (who is held responsible for the claim) the 'issue' (what the main concern is about), the 'form' (the action through which the claim is inserted in the public domain), the 'position' (whether the claim is unfavourable or favourable to refugees), and the 'value' (how claimants justify their interventions). The analysis draws on the same comparative dataset, stemming from a systematic content analysis of newspapers in each of the countries under study. A complex procedure has been followed to gather the relevant content-analytic data, combining the advantages of automated search and selection of online media sources with the qualitative detail allowed by human coding.

In the first step, a representative number of national newspapers have been selected (available online through sources such as Lexis-nexis and Factiva). The choice of these newspapers has followed on from the need to ensure, as far as possible, a representative and unbiased sample. Thus we have included both quality newspapers and more tabloid-oriented newspapers, while at the same time considering newspapers from different political orientations as well as more "neutral" ones.[8] All articles containing any of

[8] In particular, Le Monde, Le Figaro, and Le Parisien were selected for France; Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Bild were selected for Germany; Proto Thema, Ta Nea, and Kathimerini were selected for Greece; La Repubblica, Corriere della Sera, and Libero were selected for Italy; Gazeta Wyborcza, Rzeczpospolita, and Fakt were selected for Poland; Politiken, Jyllandsposten, and BT were selected for Denmark. The Guardian, The Telegraph, and The Express were selected for Great Britain; lastly, due to its regional specificities, the Swiss case relied on the examination of five newspapers (Le Matin, Le Temps, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Tages Anzeiger, La Regione Ticino), two of which are written in German, two in French, and one in Italian.

the two words “refugee” (and its derivatives) and “asylum” have been selected and coded, to the extent that they referred to the current ‘refugee crisis’. We have created a comparative dataset by random sampling about 700 claims per country (for a total sample of 5,948 claims) pertaining to transnational solidarity over the ‘refugee crisis’ between 1st August 2015 and 30th April 2016. We have coded all articles which report political decisions, verbal statements, direct solidarity action or protest actions on a number of themes that refer explicitly or obviously to the ‘refugee crisis’. Claims concerning the activities of actors who claimed to be victims of the ‘refugee crisis’ have also been coded. We have coded all claims taking place in one of the analysed countries, or addressing actors from these countries. Claims have also been studied if they were made by or addressed at a supranational actor of which one of our countries of coding is a member (e.g., the UN, the EU, the UNHCR), on the condition that the claim was substantively relevant for any of our country.

The definition of the claim, rather than the article or the single statement as the unit of analysis, has two implications. First, an article can report several claims. Second, a claim can be made up of several statements or actions. Statements or actions by different actors have been considered to be part of a single claim if they took place at the same time (on the same day), place (in the same locality), and if the actors could be assumed to act “in concert” (i.e. they are considered as strategic allies); simply put, in our coding, claims have a unity of time and place. At the same time, only news articles have been coded, meaning that other genres, such as sport sections, editorials, or letters, have been excluded. In so doing, we have excluded simple attributions of attitudes or opinions to actors by the print media since our main focus is in fact on the claims of the actors themselves.

Europeanisation/polarisation of solidarity contestation in the public domain

By engaging in a cross-national overview of claims in the print media, we take the ‘refugee crisis’ as a field of public contestation that can tell us more about where Europe stands in terms of its union and divisions. We start by considering the diachronic development of claims-making in order to assess the extent to which claims follow (or do not) a similar cross-national pattern over time. Hence, we appraise whether potential matching across countries can be related to variations of ‘grievance-based’ factors such as the number of asylum applicants. Given some crucial cross-national similarities in terms of asylum-seeking (O'Neill & Harcup, 2009, Harcup & O'Neill, 2016), it is unlikely to find strong cross-national variations in terms of whole volumes of claims-making. We also consider the potential impact of other domestic-based factors given that any disruption of societal routines opens up political space for many actors who are willing to redefine issues, policy reforms, and gain advantage on opponents (Boin et al., 2009: 82). In so doing, we engage with a long-standing tradition of scholarly debate that opposes ‘grievance’ and ‘opportunity’ theories in the field of contentious politics. If on the one hand

we wonder whether grievance-based potential for conflict has a positive impact on claims, we are only too aware that other scholars have, contrastingly, argued that grievances do not necessarily lead to claims-making (Kriesi, 2004; Meyer, 2004). Under this viewpoint, given the nature of the 'refugee crisis' and its transnational implications, the main ambition is to enquire into the relationship between Europeanisation and 're-nationalisation' of solidarity contestations beyond an initial appraisal of similarities of debates across countries in terms of attention cycles.

Our engagement with Europeanisation vs. polarisation continues by appraising three main variables of claims which our codebook has scored directly in terms of their variations across the national/trans-national scope, namely, the actor, the addressee, and the issue. The variable 'actor' is especially useful for assessing the visibility of different claimants in the public domain, paying particular attention to the presence of national and supranational actors, respectively. The crucial role of the 'refugee crisis' for imposing some primary definers of debate against the others is evident when distinguishing between national and transnational actors, respectively. Obviously, the securitising and 'nationalisation' twists suggest the likely hegemony of national actors among the primary definers in the public domain; by contrast, a more supranational view of a European people that discuss matters of common interest predicts some very high cross-national visibility of supranational actors in the public domain. We are also interested in appraising whether political actors in particular are still maintaining their inherent news value allowing for their more extensive coverage (Koopmans & Statham, 2010; Tresch, 2009), or if the 'refugee crisis' is instead opening more space for the intervention of other actors, such as, for example advocacy groups challenging established policies or other potential claimants of change (Boin et al., 2009: 82). In addition, the specific salience of claims by civil society actors gives a more refined understanding of how much centrality the state is still holding in the refugee field through different types of actors.

Afterwards, the same analysis can be repeated for the variable 'addressee', the main actor who is held explicitly responsible for acting with regard to the claim, or at whom the claim is explicitly addressed as a call to act. In particular, the two variables, actor and addressee, can be intersected in the discussion so as to have a more detailed view of cross-national variations of the public domain between the two polar configurations of 'nationalisation', whereby the field is dominated by national actors addressing other national actors, and 'supranationalism', whereby the field is dominated by supranational actors addressing supranational addressees (Balme & Chabanet, 2008; Della Porta et al., 2013). The 'issue' is the last variable which our codebook scores in terms of national/supranational variation. In this case, we can rely on some specific issues such as refugees' quota and borders' control that would indicate the importance of European policy-making through the strengthening of a national focus on European topics (Brüggemann & Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2009; Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Kleinen-von Königslöw, 2012).

Finally, we focus on three main variables, namely 'form', 'posit' and 'frame'. The variable 'form' refers to the type of action that claimants use to enter the public domain, distinguishing between repressive measures (policing, courts' ruling, etc.), political decisions (law, governmental guideline, implementation measure, etc.), verbal statements (public speech, press conference, parliamentary intervention, etc.), protest actions (demonstration, occupation, violent action, etc.), humanitarian aid, and solidarity action (the latter as a direct act of providing help/assistance to others in need of support). In this case, it seems highly relevant to understand whether the 'refugee crisis' has transformed into a typical contentious field of European politics, or rather stands out as a more heterogeneous field where protests do not cross-nationally take over a larger variety of repertoires that cut across the standard distinction between 'outsiders' and 'insiders'(Tarrow 1994; Tilly, 1978). The variable 'posit' is useful for checking for cross-national longitudinal increases of favourable and unfavourable positions vis-à-vis refugees. In addition, this variable is valuable to appraise whether anti-refugee claims-making is driven by salient divides about solidarity towards refugees, or instead whether media debates do converge on issues and positions about solidarity. In this case, we expect national debates to follow similar dividing lines of governments, political parties and civil society actors, especially when considering the favourable or unfavourable position of their claims vis-à-vis refugees. An assessment of polarising trends between favourable and unfavourable claims within the overall debate, also adds further understanding about the degree of contentiousness in the field, for example, allowing us to discuss the 'backlash thesis' and the relationship between conflict and coverage (Boin et al., 2005; Heath, 2010; Boomgaarden et al., 2013; Van der Pas & Vliegenthart, 2016). Our last variable 'value' considers how different actors justify their opposing views on questions regarding solidarity with refugees. By connecting the positionality of claimants toward refugees with their justifications, i.e. criss-crossing 'value' with 'posit', our analysis aims to understand how, and to what extent, the humanitarian aspects of the 'refugee crisis' become visible. Most crucially, however, the analysis of the variable 'value' allows for a closer look at the core idea of whether solidarity contestations may be driven by a new divide replacing traditional ideological cleavages, and that juxtaposes the so-called communitarians with cosmopolitans in unmistakable terms.

Europeanisation and diachronic dynamics

Starting with our research question on Europeanisation, an analysis of longitudinal dynamics is crucial to evaluate whether solidarity debates are nationally confined — leading us to expect a low degree of overlaps between attention cycles across countries— or whether attention cycles do peak cross-nationally at the same time. By tracing dynamics of solidarity contestation over time, we can thus detect a Europeanised public debate with similar attention cycles across countries, or alternatively, a re-nationalisation in how Europe discusses the 'refugee crisis' in each country distinctly. Figure 1 shows that Europe's claims-making landscape stands out for a quite regular

distribution over time of the total number of articles retrieved cross-nationally (see Figure 1). In particular, the months of September and January mark frequency peaks in covering the 'refugee crisis' across Europe, thereby matching the main calendar of important events in the field. The 'refugee crisis' was particularly salient in September 2015 given that the EU ministers voted on the EU Commission's plan to redistribute 160,000 refugees across the EU member states. Salience has a second cross-national peak in the following December-January, though in this case, salience seems to follow more specific national dynamics, for example owing to the traumatic experience of terrorism in France, or the contentious 'jewellery law' in Denmark.

Greece is the only national case that departs from this ubiquitous trend, given that the increase of claims in January continues in the following months by contrast with the decreasing trend in all other countries, reaching a peak in March which is unparalleled throughout the whole period and across all countries. In fact, the first three months of 2016 were extremely important in Greece because there was a series of events, political decisions and debates which strengthened the 'refugee crisis' in the public discourse much more than in any other country. Suffice it to mention that there was the debate about the expulsion of Greece from the Schengen Agreement, the closing of the Balkan route, and especially the EU-Turkey agreement. Once again then, this finding underlines the potential re-appropriation of the transnational 'refugee crisis' that each national state performed from the end of autumn 2015 onward, in a way to fit the domestic dynamics of its own national politics. Simply put, our main argument is that the two peaks of September 2015 and January 2016 are profoundly different: the 'refugee crisis' had a common 'supranational *momentum*' in September 2015, which was lost in the 're-nationalisation' of the public domain in the following months, thereby triggering national claims-making on follow-up events or political decisions by national governments.

Figure 1: Total number of articles over sample time period



The frequency distribution of the sampled claims in Figure 2 confirms the existence of the supranational *momentum* of September 2015. Having peaked in September 2015, the European claims-making decreased in the following months, but then increased again in a new (minor) peak at the beginning of 2016. Once again we find that, by contrasting this with trends in other countries, claims in Greece continues to increase throughout the first trimester of 2016, reaching the highest peak only in March (though this peak in terms of claims-making is lower than the peak for articles in figure 1).

Figure 2: Total number of claims over sample time period



As said, a crucial analysis consists of matching this consistent diachronic trend across both articles and claims with the variation of a main 'grievance-based' factor, such as the number of asylum applicants. The idea is that higher numbers of asylum seekers stand for stronger feelings over refugees, thereby potentially leading to more claims and media coverage in general; by contrast, lower numbers of asylum seekers translate into low level of claims and media coverage, in general. Figure 3 shows numbers of 'first time asylum applicants'. It confirms the existence of very similar patterns of asylum-seeking across the eight countries, which in turn fit the expectation that a similar diachronic pattern should be found across them in terms of both articles and claims. Yet, while we have already noticed the existence of a similar diachronic pattern in terms of articles and claims, this hardly follows the same chronology of asylum requests in Figure 3. In particular, we can detect two peaks, but these peaks have a gentler slope than in Figures 1 and 2, following, rather than anticipating, the two peaks that were found in the public domain analysis.

Figure 3: Number of 'first time asylum applicants' during the 'refugee crisis'



Source: Eurostat 2016

Primary definers, targets and concern of claims

A detailed enquiry into Europeanisation can be furthered by the analysis of claims-makers as the primary definers of the 'refugee crisis' in the public domain. Accordingly, Table 1 shows the cross-national distribution of claims when looking at the main claimants, answering the simple question "Who makes the claim?" Findings are provided so as to distinguish the main actors of decision-making, such as the state and political parties, civil society groups and organisations of different kind,[9] individual citizens, and, lastly, supranational actors in their role of major stakeholders in the public debate over the 'refugee crisis'.

[9] Under this category we have included a wide range of civil society actors, including welfare movements, charity networks, cooperatives, human rights organisations, citizens' initiatives, and different types of advocacy and policy-oriented groups.

Table 1: Actors of claims by country (percentages)

	State actors and political parties	Civil society groups/collectives	Individual citizens/activists	Supranational actors	Unknown	Total
France	64% (489)	23.2% (177)	6.4% (49)	6.4% (49)	0% (0)	100% (764)
Germany	63.5% (470)	15.8% (117)	13.5% (100)	7.2% (53)	0% (0)	100% (740)
Greece	63.1% (475)	20.6% (155)	5.6% (42)	10.5% (79)	0.2% (2)	100% (753)
Italy	64.5% (452)	21.4% (150)	6% (42)	8% (56)	0.1% (1)	100% (701)
Poland	58.8% (411)	26.9% (188)	7.9% (55)	6% (42)	0.4% (3)	100% (699)
Denmark	57.7% (408)	22.9% (162)	9.8% (69)	9.6% (68)	0% (0)	100% (707)
Switzerland	62.7% (499)	20.4% (162)	5.4% (43)	10.8% (86)	0.7% (6)	100% (796)
Great Britain	62.3% (491)	20.9% (165)	5.1% (40)	11.7% (92)	0% (0)	100% (788)

The cross-national comparison of figures (see Table 1) shows that state actors and political parties had the lion's share in all countries, with very little variation existing between countries with the highest (Italy) and the lowest (Denmark) percentages, respectively. The low cross-national variation is confirmed when dealing with civil society groups. With the exception of Germany, which stands out for a very low score of 15.8%, all other percentages varied between 20.4% for Switzerland and 26.9% for Poland. This relatively high salience of civil society further shows that the domestic debate was not state and government driven, but that many other groups, such as trade unions, advocacy groups and human rights organisations took part in the debate. Some larger cross-national variations can be noticed when dealing with individual citizens and activists since we can detect at least two poles of low presence (Great Britain, Switzerland and Greece) and high presence (Germany), respectively. However, most crucially for our argument, cross-national variation is evident when focusing on supranational actors. In this case, percentages doubled when moving from the lowest presence of supranational actors in Poland (6%) to the highest presence of supranational actors in Great Britain (almost 12%).

Hence, overall results seem to suggest that there is a wide distribution of voices across different categories of actors (even though voices are distributed unequally over differ-

ent actor categories), which shows that refugee solidarity debate was quite plural and weakly polarised with no monopole of single actors. Even if visibility of political parties varied across countries, the share of state actors and parties was similar across countries. The same can be said about civil society in general, that is to say, regardless of specific distinctions made within this category. The proportions between state actors and parties on the one hand, and, on the other, civil society, are also useful when focusing on national specificities; thus, the true force behind the more generous stand that Germany took vis-à-vis the other European countries seems to originate particularly in the direct relationship between policy actors and individual citizens, with only a minor role left for 'client politics' (Freeman, 1995, 1998). However, overall comparative findings are sufficient to indicate that supranationalism followed a different trend across countries, which is consistent with the idea that the European *momentum* of the first peak in Figures 1 and 2 was lost in the following months, while the second peak in the same Figures may have been to do with the process of re-nationalisation of narratives within the public domain of various countries.

Moving on to the analysis of the addressee, Table 2 shows the cross-national distribution of claims when answering the question "Who is held responsible with regard to the claim?" Once again, findings are provided so as to distinguish the main actors/decision-makers, such as parties and the state, civil society groups and organisations of different kinds, individual citizens, and, lastly, supranational actors in their role as major stakeholders, hence a very likely target to be addressed by other actors.

Table 2: Addressees of claims about the refugee crisis by country (percentages)

	State and political party	Civil society groups/collectives	Individual citizens/activists	Supranational actors (EU and UN)	No actor or unknown	Total
France	9.3%	1.8%	1.2%	3.7%	84.0%	100.0%
Germany	9.2%	0.9%	0.7%	1.9%	87.3%	100.0%
Greece	19.1%	10.4%	2.0%	6.1%	62.4%	100.0%
Italy	12.7%	5.8%	1.9%	3.9%	75.7%	100.0%
Poland	20.2%	5.2%	4.6%	2.3%	67.8%	100.0%
Denmark	15.7%	2.7%	1.1%	4.4%	76.1%	100.0%
Switzerland	17.5%	1.1%	3.5%	4.3%	73.6%	100.0%
Great Britain	14.8%	1.8%	0.8%	3.2%	79.4%	100.0%
Total	14.8%	3.7%	2.0%	3.7%	75.9%	100.0%

The first overall finding is that only a minor percentage of claimants explicitly addressed another actor when intervening in the public domain. However, when focusing on the analysis of valid cases (almost a quarter of the whole sample) we find that state actors and political parties had, once again, the lion's share across all countries. In this case,

some higher variation distinguished countries with the lowest addressing of state and parties on the one hand (France and Germany), and on the other, countries with the most extensive addressing of state and parties on the other (Poland and Greece). While it is numerically grounded in the highest proportion of addressed actors in some countries but not in others, this difference between the two poles of the most- and the least-addressed respectively is somewhat confirmed when dealing with civil society groups (scarcely addressed in Germany, but extensively addressed in Greece).

Most crucially for our argument, cross-national variation is once again evident when focusing on supranational actors. In this case, percentages more than tripled when moving from the lowest presence of supranational actors as an addressee in Germany (under 2%) to the highest presence of supranational actors in Greece (over 6%), while scoring differently in each other country along the *continuum* between one pole and the other. Emphasis should be put on the fact that countries which played a minor role in the 'refugee crisis' were not necessarily indifferent to discussing and detecting responsibilities at the supranational level, while countries with a major role were not necessarily interested in detecting responsibilities at the supranational level (cf. the low percentage of Germany when compared to France, controlling for a similar number of valid cases). So overall, data fit the idea that national specificities may have prevailed in the long run, having lost the driving potential of the supranational *momentum* of September 2015.

As regards the analysis of the issue, Table 3 shows the cross-national distribution of claims when answering the question "What is the main concern about?" Findings are provided to help distinguish among a number of major issues that were in the public domain cross-nationally, namely, migration management, integration, the background of refugees, consequences of the 'refugee crisis', and public/civic initiatives. Overall, data show that the debate in Europe over the 'refugee crisis' focused in particular on migration management. This is consistent with both a national and overall supranational fit, given the ubiquitous contestation over borders in almost all countries, as well as for the direct engagement of the EU in the formulation of the 'refugee quota scheme'. Yet, national specificities are once again present when focusing on other dominant issues after migration management. The concern about integration was especially prevalent in Denmark; the concern about the background of refugees was especially prevalent in Great Britain; the concern about the consequences of the 'refugee crisis' was especially prevalent in Germany; the concern about public/civic initiatives was especially prevalent in Switzerland. Simply put, overall findings once again fit the idea of a specific re-appropriation of the 'refugee crisis' in each country, in spite of a strong overall supranational framework.

Table 3: Issues of claims about the 'refugee crisis' by country (percentages)

	Migration management	Integration	Background of refugees	Consequences of refugee crisis	Public/civic initiatives	Total
France	64.9%	5.2%	10.9%	11.9%	7.1%	100.0%
Germany	49.9%	8%	12.3%	16.2%	13.6%	100.0%
Greece	66.1%	2.9%	11.6%	11%	8.4%	100.0%
Italy	65.5%	2.6%	15.4%	7.1%	9.4%	100.0%
Poland	62.4%	4%	10.6%	9.9%	13.1%	100.0%
Denmark	66.5%	8.9%	7.6%	7.8%	9.2%	100.0%
Switzerland	66.1%	4.2%	8.4%	6%	15.3%	100.0%
Great Britain	68.1%	3.2%	15.9%	8.6%	4.2%	100.0%
Total	63.7%	4.9%	11.6%	9.8%	10%	100.0%

Solidarity divides across countries: form, positionality and justification of claims

A key aspect to consider when focusing on solidarity contestations in the public domain refers to the analysis of forms of political intervention, in line with seminal literature debate within the scholarship field of contentious politics (Tilly, 1978). Accordingly, Table 4 provides data on the *repertoire* of mobilisation by answering the question "By which action is the claim inserted in the public domain?". In this case, our systematic analysis refers to all potential forms of action over the 'refugee crisis', such as purely verbal statements (including public statements, press releases, publications, and interviews), protest actions (including forms such as demonstrations and political violence), humanitarian aid (including solidarity mobilisations), direct solidarity (including the provision of help and assistance to others in need of support) as well as other forms of intervention that were the prerogative of state and policy actors such as political decisions and repression. The hegemony of verbal statements is just one expected finding given the intense debate over the 'refugee crisis' spreading throughout Europe. Yet, beyond this homogeneous result, we find evidence for emphasising national specificities.

In particular, an elites-based and state-centric approach in France, Denmark, Switzerland translated into an extensive presence of political decisions. Political decisions were less extensive in more crisis-laden countries such as Germany, Greece and Italy; these latter countries, by contrast, stood out as the ones with the highest percentages of protest action. While we find no relevant cross-national differences in terms of humanitarian aid, we do find some substantial variation across countries when dealing with another form of pro-refugee support, namely, direct solidarity; in particular, countries covered variable positions across the two poles of high solidarity in Germany on the one hand, and low solidarity in Great Britain on the other. Overall then, findings suggest that the

'refugee crisis' did not become a typical contentious field of European politics, or rather, only few countries have witnessed this. By contrast, we observe cross-nationally a more heterogeneous field, where protest did not dominate a larger variety of national-specific *repertoires*.

Table 4: Forms of claims about the refugee crisis by country (percentages)

	Political decisions	Direct solidarity	Humanitarian aid	Protest actions	Repressive actions	Verbal statements	Unknown	Total
FR	20.5%	7.5%	2.0%	8.9%	0.9%	59.9%	0.3%	100.0%
DE	10.7%	9.2%	1.8%	10.4%	0.5%	67.4%	0.0%	100.0%
GR	12.7%	6.2%	2.9%	13.9%	2.3%	61.9%	0.0%	100.0%
IT	15.3%	3.7%	1.9%	12.7%	5.0%	61.5%	0.0%	100.0%
PL	11.2%	3.7%	2.4%	9.8%	0.6%	72.2%	0.0%	100.0%
DK	18.0%	3.8%	3.3%	8.1%	2.3%	64.6%	0.0%	100.0%
CH	21.6%	6.3%	2.0%	9.7%	2.8%	57.7%	0.0%	100.0%
UK	15.5%	1.8%	1.6%	9.4%	1.3%	70.4%	0.0%	100.0%
Total	15.8%	5.3%	2.2%	10.4%	1.9%	64.4%	0.0%	100.0%

Another key aspect to consider when focusing on solidarity contestations in the public domain regards the question: How do different actors position themselves towards the question of refugee solidarity? Regarding the overall position towards refugees as our object of solidarity, findings in Table 5 suggest that all countries were strongly divided about the question of refugee solidarity. Public claims-makers were generally disposed to granting solidarity to refugees with a slight majority of positive (39.7%) over negative voices (35.7%) (See Table 7). 24.6% of the claims were neutral or ambivalent. This rather even distribution between pro- and anti-solidarity claims in the media indicates a rather balanced coverage of different political opinions in all countries, but also underlines the lack of agreement among claimants regarding the question of how Europe should treat its refugees. It also suggests a relatively high degree of contestation given that positive and negative claims were more dominant, i.e. opinionated claims made up 75.4% of the claims (as opposed to 24.6% of neutral or ambivalent claims).

Table 5: Positions across Countries

	Negative	Neutral/ ambivalent	Positive	Total
France	31.8%	29.6%	38.6%	100.0%
Germany	29.6%	31.8%	38.6%	100.0%
Greece	42.1%	14.9%	43.0%	100.0%
Italy	30.2%	29.4%	40.4%	100.0%
Poland	34.3%	30.2%	35.5%	100.0%
Denmark	40.0%	19.9%	40.0%	100.0%
Switzerland	33.2%	19.3%	47.5%	100.0%
UK	43.7%	22.8%	33.5%	100.0%
Total	35.7%	24.6%	39.7%	100.0%

When zooming in more closely to observe the different countries of Table 6, we find the lowest level of neutral claims, and thus the highest level of solidarity contestation, in Greece, arguably the one country in the sample which was affected most impacted by huge numbers of refugees landing on its coasts. Also Denmark shows a high degree of – balanced – contestation with only 20% of claims being neutral or ambivalent. Similarly for Switzerland, claims were mostly evaluative though quite clearly leaned towards the positive. The opposite is true for Great Britain where contestation was comparably high as well, but negative claims outweighed the positive ones. Positions seem rather evenly distributed in Polish, French, German and Italian claims, but more positive overall for the latter three mentioned. Overall, then, positions seem to be covered rather evenly in the media, often (slightly) more positive, with the exception of Great Britain, where claims in the three largest newspapers were more often anti-solidarity claims. Nevertheless, findings in Table 5 suggest that differences were not that big: average positionality ranges were between ca. 0.15 and -0.10.

Table 6: Average positionality towards refugees per country



As discussed already, state and political actors were the most dominant claimants. This is, in itself, not a surprising finding since political actors tend to be the most dominant in the public space in general (e.g., Tresch, 2009). However, when dealing with positionality, findings in Table 7 show that state and political actors were particularly visible with negative claims where 26.2% of the negative stances towards refugees were expressed by them– as opposed to 4.6% by civil society groups and collective actors. State and political actors also led the field in positive (19%) and neutral claims (16.9%), yet, negative claims were more prominent. Overall, our claims analysis neatly pictures the political contestation over how to treat refugees – not only between political actors and the more positive claimants from civil society, but also among the different categories of state and political party actors.

Table 7: Positionality across claimant types

Positionality	Percentages	Frequencies
Negative	35,7%	2122
State and political party actors	26.2%	1560
Civil society groups/collectives	4.6%	276
Individual citizens/activists	2.9%	173
Supranational actors	1.8%	107
No actor or unknown	0.1%	6
Neutral/ambivalent	24.6%	1465
State and political party actors	16.9%	1007
Civil society groups/collectives	3.6%	215
Individual citizens/activists	0.6%	35
Supranational actors	3.5%	206
No actor or unknown	0.0%	2
Positive	39.7%	2361
State and political party actors	19.0%	1128
Civil society groups/collectives	13.2%	785
Individual citizens/activists	3.9%	232
Supranational actors	3.6%	212
No actor or unknown	0.1%	4
Grand Total	100.0%	5948

In terms of the Europeanisation of solidarity contestation during the refugee crisis, one way to understand it is to look at the visibility of actors with different scopes and nationalities. Here, when pooled across countries, Figure 4 shows quite clearly that actors were on average the most negative when they had a national scope, whereas claimants with a scope beyond the national context were the most positive most of the time.

Figure 4: Average position of actors by scope across all countries over time



The average positionality of claims seems to follow similar trends across different scopes, though. This suggests that events like the Paris attacks in November 2015 and the sexual assaults that took place in Cologne over New Year, 2016 influenced the discourse about solidarity with refugees towards the negative. In addition, claimants with a greater-than-national scope were overwhelmingly positive regarding solidarity with refugees, in contrast to national scope claimants. This seems to mirror the divide between national governments and EU actors where EU actors, favouring a European solution based on universal human rights, found themselves in opposition to national governments refusing to comply with EU resettlement schemes, for example.

Looking into the average positionality of actors of different scopes by country reveals some remarkable differences. Figure 5 shows that Germany and Greece, for example, were the two countries in the sample where actors of national scope had, on average, made more positive claims about refugees, whereas in all other countries, national scope equalled negative tonality. Greece sticks out again when looking into the positionality of actors with a larger than national scope. Here, it seems to be the only country in the sample where newspapers published more negative claims put forward by trans-, supra- or international actors. Overall, solidarity claims in Greece seem to follow an opposite dynamic in terms of positionality and scope when compared to most of the other countries in our sample.

Figure 5: Average positionality of claimants by country/scope



The overwhelming majority of claims were made by actors with a national scope. However, this does not shed light on potential divides between different nationalities. Zooming in on the national category of actor scopes, again, reveals interesting differences between countries. First of all, in around 15% of our cases, nationalities could not be identified for the main claimant. Going back to our example of Greece, Figure 6 shows that Greek actors were responsible for the overall positive positionality of claims, while actors with other nationalities were negative on average. The same was true for all countries except Great Britain and Denmark, where all types of national-scope claimants were negative on average. Claimants with a national scope and nationalities from other European countries made more negative claims in all countries. Regarding non-EU nationalities, Poland was the only country in which such actors seem to have made more positive claims.

Figure 6: Average positionality of claimants with national scope by nationality



Moving on to consider the justification of claims, we should emphasise that the debate over the 'refugee crisis' was mainly about values and the morally defensible limits of humanitarian assistance (Bauböck,2017: 141). With regard to our analysis here, the question then is whether and how claimants justified their respective stances on the question of solidarity with refugees. A first finding in Table 8 is that the largest volume of claims (41.9%) were not provided with a justification. This share is followed by 34.9% of claims that were justified by using an 'interest-based' value to give more rational or pragmatic reasons. A 'rights-based' value was used in 16.7% of cases whereas an 'identity-based' value was the least employed in justifying positive, neutral/ambivalent or negative positions.

Table 8: Percentages of justifications by position and claimant

	Interest-based	Rights-based	Identity-based	No justification	Grand Total
Political actors					
Negative	13.8%	1.7%	1.8%	10.8%	28.0%
Neutral/ambivalent	9.4%	1.4%	0.7%	9.0%	20.4%
Positive	6.4%	6.0%	1.0%	9.1%	22.5%
Civil society actors					
Negative	2.2%	0.4%	1.5%	3.4%	7.5%
Neutral/ambivalent	1.3%	0.3%	0.3%	2.4%	4.2%
Positive	2.0%	6.8%	1.2%	7.1%	17.1%
Unknown/unspecified					
Negative	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
Neutral/ambivalent	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
Positive	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%	0.1%
Grand Total	34.9%	16.7%	6.5%	41.9%	100.0%

The interest-based justification seems to be reserved for political actors and their negative positions, rather than the other claimant groups which are, as already stated, more positive overall and use rights-based arguments to justify their opinions. It seems that non-political actors served as balancers of sorts for rather negative and (national) interest-oriented political actors.

Zooming in more closely on the different countries, Figure 7 shows that rights-based values seem close to always employed when claiming solidarity with refugees. Findings also show that the opposite was true for interest- and identity-based justifications, although the tendency towards the negative was not as spelled out. In Switzerland, Denmark, and France, identity was, on average, more related to positive stances which seems to suggest a more inclusive approach to solidarity in this country, whereas claims in Great Britain and Greece more often conveyed a perception of an exclusive national identity in opposition to the identity of refugees. Interest-based positions were almost balanced in Greece, Germany, and France.

Figure 7: Frames and average positions in claims by country



Conclusions

This chapter has suggested a number of main points that are at the core of any systematic reflection over the 'refugee crisis' in Europe. First, we have showed that public debate and contestation over the 'refugee crisis' emerged as an extremely dynamic process. This dynamic process started with a genuine European *momentum*, but then transformed quickly through the re-appropriation of the 'refugee crisis' by national actors. These latter were often driven by concerns and positions of national politics. Simply put, we have showed that solidarity contestation depends on particular moments, and certainly a moment for European solidarity was triggered by the dramatic events that unfolded throughout the summer of 2015. Yet supranationalism declined over time, leav-

ing the space for national specificities to re-emerge and re-nationalisation to take place over the following months. At the same time, our findings have suggested that the 'refugee crisis' has not become a typical contentious field of European politics; in fact, we have observed a quite heterogeneous field in terms of forms of action, whereby protest does not dominate the larger variety of national-specific *repertoires*.

Looking into the average positionality of actors, we have showed that the public domain was not simply a main arena that can be held solely responsible for promoting anti-solidarity and anti-refugee attitudes, justifications, and positions. The overall position of claims was often favourable, rather than unfavourable, vis-à-vis refugees, while some strong emphasis was regularly put on humanitarian issues and not just on security concerns. In addition, civil society was particularly active, and most often with a positive position. We have showed only some limited cross-national differences when looking at average positionality. By contrast we have found that variation is stronger when looking at intra-national differences between different actors: in particular, state and political actors stand out for their stronger involvement in negative claims whereas civil society groups and collective actors engages more extensively in pro-refugees claims.

Claimants with a greater-than-national scope were overwhelmingly positive regarding solidarity with refugees, in contrast to national scope claimants. This seems to fit the idea of a deeper line opposing a more cosmopolitan supranational project vis-à-vis the renationalising function of national states. Furthermore, we have identified some relevant patterns in terms of values which claimants appeal to when justifying their claims. In particular, rights-based values are often used when claiming solidarity with refugees, while the opposite is especially true for interest- and identity-based justifications. This finding corroborates the opposition between supranationalism and renationalisation processes: thus, national governments often refused to comply with EU resettlement schemes so as to defend their interests and identities at the same time when EU actors favoured a solution based on universal human rights.

Ultimately, our findings have showed that there was more solidarity outside the strict borders of the national public domain, but this was especially linked to the 'supranational *momentum*' of September 2015, after which solidarity simultaneously declined and re-nationalised. The European integration has always been advanced as an expansive solidarity project, for example including the European social model, the EU as a humanitarian power, free flows of labour, capital and people or inclusive notions of citizenship (Trenz, 2016). Yet European solidarity, perceived as something expansive, is increasingly looking as something exclusive and protective. In this new constellation, the anti-solidarity contestation is often combined with an anti-European mobilisation and a re-nationalising project. This has lead us to explore more precisely the idea that solidarity contestations are driven by a new ideational divide that replaces traditional ideological cleavages and that juxtaposes so-called communitarians with cosmopolitans (Zürn and De Wilde, 2016; Kriesi et al., 2012). By looking at media contestation over the refugee crisis, this chapter has uncovered the wider connotation of the term 'refugee crisis'.

While one may disagree with the idea that the 'refugee crisis' was Europe's September 11 (Krastev 2017), it is nonetheless clear that the 'refugee crisis' has not only been about refugees, but has also been, and still is, about the Europeans themselves.

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‘Taking voice’ and ‘taking sides’: The role of social media commenting in solidarity contestation

Hans-Jörg Trenz, Verena K. Brändle, Manlio Cinalli and Olga Eisele

Introduction

Bottom-up mobilisation of solidarity is commonly analysed in terms of initiatives by civil society activists, affected citizens, communities and grassroots movements to provide support to vulnerable groups of the population (see Kousis et al in this volume). Solidarity relies here on the organisational capacities of ‘civil society’ or the ‘third sector’ as providers and as innovators of aid that supplements and/or substitutes the existing arrangements of state-provided welfare. Solidarity is however not only ‘action’ in the form of aid but also ‘voice’ that is filtered by the media. Bottom-up mobilisation of solidarity is translated into political speech, for instance in the form of campaigns in support of particular groups whose needs are brought to the attention of broader publics and of political representatives. Solidarity consists, on the one hand, in ‘giving voice’ to those who are usually not heard and, on the other hand, in amplifying the ‘voice’ of the supporters of such groups in the form of calls for action and ascriptions of responsibility. We are interested here in this latter aspect of ‘bottom-up voice’ in the form of calls for solidarity with vulnerable groups that are raised by selected citizens in a context of mediated debates. We are further interested in the ways such calls for solidarity are contested in a media context and how the deservingness of particular groups as recipients of solidarity is discussed controversially. Bottom-up voice of citizens raised in the media does in this sense comprise both calls for and rejections of solidarity.

Our focus in this chapter on social media dynamics in the mobilisation of support or opposition towards refugees serves as a perfect complement to the claims-making analysis of mainstream media coverage (see Cinalli et al. in this volume). While the study of claims-making allowed us to map the voice of organised publics and powerful ‘clients’ that were capable of leading politics (Freeman, 1995 and 1998), online commenting well suited our aim to collect data on the more hidden side of the public sphere, where people may seize the chance to express emotions and translate them into political action. This is particularly interesting because the case of solidarity with refugees has divided public opinion all over Europe with advocates of human rights and open borders opposing supporters of exclusive, nationalist welfare (della Porta 2018). We expect that bottom-up contestation of refugee solidarity is triggered by particular events and their interpretation in the media, such as the humanitarian disasters at Europe’s external borders that unfolded during the months of September 2015 (Triandafyllidou, 2017). The dramatic events which were brought into focus by the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ of Sep-

tember 2015 are particularly interesting because they were staged in many countries as direct confrontation between citizens and refugees.

In particular, we conducted a comparative analysis of online commenting on Facebook news sites in order to assess the political expressions of selected citizen-users who decide to position themselves in debates about refugees. Social media offer an interesting opportunity for citizens to 'take voice' or 'take sides', which is the precondition for any form of political mobilisation. At the reception site, we can measure opinions in the form of general attitudes expressed towards refugees as shaped by media discourse. We can also measure responsiveness, either in the form of consenting or opposing claims raised in the media. And finally, we can measure voices in the form of political statements made by these citizen-users who intervened in the debate as 'secondary definers' of the events.

An important element of the media story of a humanitarian crisis consists of the expression of emotions such as sympathy or antipathy towards refugees (Chouliaraki 2013). One (and possibly the most frequent) case for the use of emotions in media discourse on migration was the evocation of fear (Wodak 2015). Refugees are, for instance, regularly portrayed in the media as threats and media coverage built on fear-appealing metaphors such as 'flood', 'swarms' or marauders, or on suffixes such as 'unwanted', 'irregular' or 'illegal'. Another (and possibly more exceptional) case for the use of emotions in media discourse on the humanitarian crisis is what Boltanski (1999) calls a 'politics of pity'. 'Pity', which is to be defined as an emotional reaction to the witnessing of human suffering, can be considered as an important element in the mobilisation of solidarity in the way it allows for rapid changes of opinion from indifference or even 'antipathy' towards the object of solidarity to attention and personal emotional engagement (to be followed by possible forms of individual or collective support action). In the case of the 'refugee crisis', for instance, one example for the solidarity effects of such a 'politics of pity' would be the so-called 'welcoming culture' that triggered spontaneous reactions of assistance either in the form of direct aid or of financial assistance. Hospitality and empathy towards refugees was motivated here by mediated images of human suffering (such as the image of the drowned boy, Aylan Kurdi, on the Turkish beach), which contributed to rapid shifts in opinion in reception countries (Mortensen and Trenz 2016).

However, our survey of online commenting is not meant as a systematic investigation of the role of emotions in political mobilisation.[10] We are more interested in the way bottom-up solidarity seeks political expression. The emphasis is put on the translation of emotions such as 'fear' or 'pity' into a public statement of solidarity that 'takes sides'. Consequently, we are focusing on debates that present themselves as a moral spectacle in which citizens became engaged in debating whether solidarity should be granted or not (see Mortensen & Trenz, 2016). Through our combination of claims-making and reader commenting analysis, we argue that fear or pity as expressed in strong emotions in media discourse was turned into public speech, i.e. used as an element of claims-

[10] These aspects are covered by (della Porta 2018).

making through which responsibility was ascribed and politicians were called on to act. The question thus is how a 'politics of pity' interferes with a 'politics of fear' in media discourse, what contributes to the salience of 'pity' or 'fear' at any particular moment of the debate, and who defines and interprets 'pity' and 'fear' and translates them into calls for or rejections of solidarity.

It is therefore all the more interesting to zoom in on solidarity contestation unfolding on Facebook at the peak of a heated debate, when media claims-making was most intensive. User comments on Facebook news sites constitute a response (indirect or direct) of selected citizens to the top-down contestation by political actors. How did citizens selectively pick up issues that were of concern to them? How did they support or oppose different categories of actors: Representative actors, such as governments and political parties, civil society actors or affected actors from the 'crisis', such as refugees? How did citizens voice their own concerns with regard to the 'refugee crisis'? And did they selectively amplify a 'politics of fear' or a 'politics of pity'?

Civic and uncivic elements of online solidarity contestation

In confronting the evidence of the 'refugee crisis', social media users enter into some sort of collective, interpretative work. They produce text in the form of comments that not only interpret the evidence but also ascribe political responsibility or reflect on political consequences. It is, of course, an exaggeration to say that these interpretations unfold in a completely autonomous way. Structures of meaning remain embedded and are influenced by the frames of interpretation used by political actors in the mainstream media, but, in addition to journalists, intellectuals and political actors as claimants, the users now contribute in significant ways to the generation of public discourse. To do this interpretative work, social media users need to relate to each other and engage in an exchange of arguments. They need to come up with their own justifications as to why solidarity towards refugees is accepted or rejected. The manners in which such an exchange of arguments is organised varies however in important ways. In the following we underlie two alternative scenarios of an online civic sphere and an online uncivic sphere of solidarity contestation.

According to the first scenario, news readers' commenting practices on social media are interpreted as part of an online civic culture that enriches the traditional top-down ways of political communication by facilitating horizontal exchanges among the citizens, making the media voice more plural and participatory, and thus facilitating a more inclusive sphere for the formation of public opinion (Dahlgren 2013). To approach this scenario of an online civic culture, online commenting practices would need to meet the following three criteria: First, we would expect online users to be responsive to news contents and to claims raised in the news media. Secondly, we would expect them to relate directly to refugees as objects of solidarity and to critically judge whether or not solidarity should be granted to them. And thirdly, we would expect online news readers to consider the

possibility of 'taking action', or at least the possibility of discussing possible forms of action. Taking voice' through social media commenting can be paired with demands for collective action: 'we shall', 'let's do'. Users can motivate and encourage each other to swing to commitment and to group each other around a cause. As such, they would become secondary definers of the 'refugee crisis', not simply accepting or rejecting claims raised in the media, but also giving witness testimony, engaging in their own collective practice of interpretation of the situation and taking sides on the question of refugee solidarity.

At the same time, online participatory news formats and, in particular the evolving forms of user commenting on social media and online news sites have become the object of a harsh normative critique. According to our second scenario, online publics would be non-responsive and marginal and overall suffer from deficits of publicity: The online media would engage selected citizens, but these debates would remain detached from formal, decision-making contexts and would have minimal impact on political outcomes or public opinion in general (Givskov & Trenz, 2014). These formal aspects regarding the status of online publics in the democratic process, would further affect online users' capacities to express informed opinions or to defend values of social justice and solidarity. Online user communities would be fragmented and single users would position themselves in increasingly polarized ways. This would be dominantly expressed in nationalist, xenophobic and racist statements. There would be, in other words, a general tendency of online users to adopt what, in line with Benjamin Moffitt (2016), can be called a populist style in challenging the performance of democratic (representative) politics and to display and amplify primarily positions taken by populist parties in the electoral contest. The online 'uncivic sphere' would in this sense unfold through a populist style of user debates, which is characterised by the distortion of facts, the showing of disrespect to other users' opinions, the anti-elitist stances and the overall focus on the de-legitimation of political representatives. In terms of solidarity contestation, we would expect online publics to voice their discontent with established representative politics, to express preference for nationally exclusive over transnational and European solidarity and to perceive refugees not as 'objects of solidarity' but as potential enemies or as undeserving of solidarity.

Methods: a qualitative in-depth analysis on online solidarity contestation

This study of solidarity contestation of Facebook was conducted during the most intense time of the 'refugee crisis', with the highest number of refugees arriving (September 2015). We selected the five most commented Facebook posts with news content on the refugee crisis from three newspapers per country.[11] For each post, 20 comments were

[11] The country cases and online newspapers selected are identical with the newspapers selected for our claims-making (see Cinalli et al. in this volume) except for the following cases where online editions were not available: Il Giornale exchanged for Libero Quotidiano, La Regione for Blick, and Bild for Spiegel.

coded (with an absolute number of 300 comments per country divided per three newspapers). These 20 comments had to be the 20 most-liked top comments on Facebook in the form of primary statements of users and not replies to other user comments. In addition to the comments, the main posts (usually newspaper articles) were sampled and coded following the method of claims-making analysis described in the previous chapter (Cinalli et al. in this volume). In that way, we were able to systematically link top-down solidarity contestations by claimants in the media with patterns of bottom-up mobilisation of user comments.

Through inductive qualitative content analysis, an integrated tool for user commenting analysis was set up based on thick description and analysis of public contestations about European solidarity. This tool was made applicable for team coding and imported into SPSS. The unit of analysis was the single user comment. These comments were thematically related to the topic of European solidarity through the main news article – either in response to information given in the main article, as opinions expressed by political actors/journalists, or as an independent statement/opinion/expression of sentiments in the general context of these debates. Responses to statements or opinions expressed by other user/commenters were excluded, as well as all comments that were not thematically related to the topic of the 'refugee crisis' in its broad sense.

The degree to which user-commenters discussed our specific target groups as objects of solidarity varied and was open to investigation. Usually (but not necessarily) comments had at least an identifiable issue and expressed an opinion towards our object of solidarity (refugees). In user comments, such opinions were, however, often expressed in abbreviated forms and not given in the form of a full claim. For instance, the comment 'poor child' was considered as an opinion towards our object of solidarity (here a refugee child). We did not code any comments that were unrelated to political opinion formation or contestation, such as comments which were part of a general conversation between users without a political focus, or comments that asked for clarification ('can you explain this?'), for information or requests ('send me the link') as well as comments that simply tag other Facebook users.

In the following we will present the main findings of our comparative analysis and discuss their implications in terms of a) the type of solidarity (national-transnational-European) made salient in online discussions, and b) the type of public sphere this speaks for (civic and uncivic elements of solidarity contestation, as well as the possible effects of segmentation and polarisation).

Online contestation in the context of the 'refugee crisis': main findings

During the month of September 2015, media claims-making peaked in all countries under investigation in this survey. This allowed for focused attention on European solidarity contestations on Facebook news sites about the destiny of refugees in Europe, which

was clearly visible in the practice of user commenting. Commenters on online platforms can be characterised as more active users who consider themselves to be relevant contestants regarding certain political issues (Brändle, 2017: 53). In this way, Facebook news sites offer platforms for these people to engage in the bigger debates and to respond to the claims in the posts curated by the newspapers.

We will approach the dynamics of bottom-up solidarity contestations from a comparative view in two steps. First, we will discuss the general patterns of the debates on the Facebook news sites during the given period. This will provide us with information on online contestation in the general context of the debate on the 'refugee crisis', especially with regard to the question regarding the concerns raised by citizen-users and how they relate to the content of political news. Secondly, we will focus on solidarity contestation, i.e. take a closer look at those cases where citizen-users 'took sides' on the question of solidarity towards refugees. This will provide us with insights into the question of whether a notion of extended European solidarity is supported in social media commentary and how such positions are justified.

Opinion exchange or opinion bubbles?

As regards our first scenario of an online civic culture, we will investigate whether online news readers engage in an exchange of opinion about political news, act as secondary definers of the debate, relating to original content and interpretation and entering into a more direct relationship with the objects of solidarity. The alternative scenario is that social media commenting practices lead to segmentation of refugee solidarity debates. As an indicator for segmentation, we can analyse how users connect their comments to mainstream media content. We speak of segmentation of solidarity contestation when user debates unfold independently of the news content provided by professional journalists and are unrelated to claims raised by political actors.

Considering the general relationship between news content and commenting on Facebook, we do not find confirmation for the thesis of a segmented online public sphere in the form of a 'bubble', a closed community, where users mainly exchange opinions among the like-minded (Rasmussen, 2014; Sunstein, 2009). Instead, commenting is generally motivated as a form of engagement. We distinguish three forms of motivation: 1) to make a general contribution to the debate raised by the article, 2) to respond to a claim, and, 3) to make an independent contribution to the debate outside the thematic context of the article. The second form is obviously the most interdiscursive, but also the first and the third from a deliberative point of view can be considered as valid contributions to a political debate. We disregard non-discursive forms such as hate speech, as they are considered as breaches of netiquette and, as such, are rarely found in our sample of most popular comments. This consequent absence of hate speech can be explained as a result of debate moderation by the site owners (the newspapers) and of Facebook's popularity ranking (the most popular user comments are unlikely to contain elements of 'hate speech'). We have, of course, no information about the percentage of

comments which breach netiquette or that are filtered out by the group moderators, but we would assume from existing studies that this number is low (the Guardian, in an internal survey, speaks of 2% of comments that breach netiquette in the commenting sections on their own news site[12]).

The responsiveness of commenters on Facebook and thus the degree they enter into an exchange of opinion is in this sense found to be high (see Figure 1): 74.4% of all commenters responded to news content on the refugee crisis and only 25.6% of the users posted unrelated independent statements (most of them, however, still within the thematic context of the refugee crisis). Among those comments, which related directly to news content, the majority (39.2%) responded to the general issue raised in the main article, but every third comment (35.2%) also responded to a claim raised by a claimant in the main article.

Figure 1: Comment type: in % and frequency in brackets



Instead of an online bubble, there was a vivid exchange of content and information between news articles and user comments. This suggests that commenters form a group of engaged citizens who wish to express their voice on highly contentious issues. In other words, these findings show that a majority of the commenters 'talked back' to content and claimants in the media. The power of media claimants as primary definers of the debate is, in this sense, not challenged but rather confirmed by online commenting. The content and the claims raised in the news article set the context for user debates and their interpretations and expressions of opinions.

[12] See (https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/apr/12/the-dark-side-of-guardian-comments).

Given the 'reactive' nature of the comment sections (Reagle, 2015: 2), their responsiveness can be assessed further by analyzing how commenters 'talk back' to claims, i.e. what issues they raise and to what extent they 'took sides' in the solidarity question. Although the limited sample size does not allow for more general observations, the online claims seem to a great extent to follow the broader patterns of print claims regarding main claimant and issue putting state actors as claimants and issues of migration management centre stage (see Cinalli et al. in this volume). By further analysing the positionality of online commenters towards issues or claims raised in the main article, we find that indeed the great majority of commenters (80.1%) took sides (see Table 1). Among those, 47% of responsive comments were in opposition to the general issues or claims in the main article, and only 33.1% expressed support. User commenting was, in this sense, found to be critical and not affirmative.

Table 1: The type of comment by position of commenter towards the issue/claim in the posted article (frequencies in brackets)[13]

	Negative/ opposing	Neutral/ ambivalent	Affirmative/ supportive	Total
Response to general issue in main article	29.6% (463)	10.1% (158)	14.3% (224)	54.0% (845)
Response to claim raised in main article	17.4% (272)	9.8% (154)	18.8% (294)	46.0% (720)
Total	47.0% (960)	19.9% (428)	33.1% (626)	100% (1565)

What issues or concerns were raised by online commenters, and did citizens-users raise a different agenda of issues as political claimants? Our analysis reveals that the issue agenda of news and the agenda of topics raised for debate in online commenting largely overlapped, yet with a slightly different emphasis put by online commenters that reflects a more bottom-up dynamic of mobilisation (see Figure 2). 37.7% of commenters raised issues regarding migration management, which was also the most salient issue in media claims-making. Citizen-users put, however, comparatively less emphasis on control policies and raised a more diverse mix of issues. Bottom-up mobilisation did not, in this sense, simply mirror the political agenda of news but added to the plurality of the debate and a more profound understanding of issues relating to refugee solidarity by highlighting, for instance, civic initiatives (21.2%) as well as the potential consequences of the influx (17.3%) and personal backgrounds of refugees and asylum seekers (17.9%) (see Table 2). This suggests a focus on more personal aspects regarding the 'refugee

[13] Independent statements are subtracted from the total number of comments.

crisis' in which commenters shared their own experiences and views. In this sense, the comment sections also gave expression to bottom-up views on the 'refugee crisis'; and more precisely, offered a look into the concerns and demands of those more active citizen-users.

Despite the overall congruence of issues of concern in the refugee debate from a top-down and bottom-up perspective, we find important nuances in user commenting that speak for the expression of a plurality of issues and concerns in social media, and not a narrowing down of the news agenda. The power of claims-makers as primary definers of the debate is, at least to some degree, challenged by commenters, who as secondary definers of the debate, partly replicated the issue agenda of the news media but partly also shifted its emphasis.

Figure 2: Main issues in claims and comments (%)



For our understanding of solidarity contestation across countries, it is of further interest to investigate whether commenters across countries focused on the same issues or whether attention was distributed unequally with different issues brought into focus by commenters in different countries. Table 2 shows no clear pattern in the cross-country distribution of issue attention, apart from an overall congruence of the agenda, which makes us conclude that from a bottom-up perspective, the 'refugee crisis' raised similar issues of concerns in all countries under investigation. Commenters in all countries focused on the 'refugee crisis' as a management problem that required the state to regain control and adopt adequate policies. There was, further, a concern regarding the general consequences of crisis and the problems created by refugees. Non-state civic activi-

ties also figured prominently, especially in Denmark and Switzerland. The background situation and the fate of refugees were also discussed to some degree, especially around the case of the drowned Syrian boy, Aylan Kurdi.

Table 2: Cross-country distribution of issues in comments

	Migration management	Integration	Background/ situation of refugees	Consequences of refugee influx/crisis	Issues regarding public/civic initiatives	Unknown	Total
France	49.3%	3.0%	7.3%	21%	17.7%	1.7%	100%
Germany	16.3%	0.3%	17.3%	40.7%	22%	3.3%	100%
Greece	54%	0%	18%	10.3%	17.7%	0%	100%
Italy	33.3%	1%	21.3%	5%	21.3%	18%	100%
Poland	25.3%	9%	15%	30.7%	18%	2%	100%
Denmark	44.3%	0.3%	13.7%	7.7%	31%	3%	100%
Switzerland	29.3%	4.3%	20%	14.3%	31%	1%	100%
UK	49.3%	0.7%	30.7%	8.7%	10.7%	0%	100%
Total	37.7%	2.3%	17.9%	17.3%	21.2%	3.6%	100%

By comparing issue scope between claims-making and online commenting and across countries, we can investigate variations between top-down and bottom-up contestation, and whether commenting on social media in some countries is more europeanised than in others. Do commenters focus more on national and subnational issues?

Table 3: Issue scope of claims and comments across countries

		Trans-/ supra-/inter-national	National	Subnational	Unknown/ unclassifiable	Total
France	Claims	32.6%	41.7%	25.1%	0.6%	100%
	Comments	28.3%	54.0%	0.7%	17.0%	100%
Germany	Claims	20.2%	69.3%	9.7%	0.8%	100%
	Comments	67.3%	28.3%	1.0%	3.4%	100%
Greece	Claims	39.0%	53.7%	7.3%	0%	100%
	Comments	9.3%	63.0%	27.7%	0%	100%
Italy	Claims	26.5%	29.5%	44.0%	0%	100%
	Comments	17.0%	40.7%	23.3%	19.0%	100%
Poland	Claims	24.0%	58.2%	16.6%	1.2%	100%
	Comments	27.7%	67.3%	0%	5.0%	100%
Denmark	Claims	41.0%	43.4%	15.6%	0%	100%
	Comments	13.3%	73.4%	12.0%	1.3%	100%
Switzerland	Claims	26.9%	43.8%	25.0%	4.3%	100%
	Comments	41.7%	56.7%	0%	1.6%	100%
United Kingdom	Claims	42.5%	45.5%	10.8%	1.2%	100%
	Comments	30.7%	60.7%	7.6%	1.0%	100%
Claims across countries		31.0%	46.6%	21.3%	1.1%	100%
Comments across countries		29.4%	55.5%	9.0%	6.1%	100%

On average, claims more often referred to all three scopes, while comments focused strongly (55.5%) on national issues (see table 3). One reason for this could be that the national level is easier for citizens to grasp, yet the main reason is that claimants are also non-domestic actors and represent other scopes as well.

Finally, we were able to differentiate between comments which directly or indirectly related to refugees as an object of solidarity, and comments which did not engage in this kind of solidarity contestation (see Table 4). The analysis shows that, across countries, the majority of commenters did indeed show engagement in solidarity contestation. Thus, commenters on the Facebook news sites on average strongly tended towards leaving comments directly related to refugees. They took sides on the question regarding solidarity for refugees. These dynamics of 'taking side' on refugee solidarity will be analysed in further detail in the next section.

Table 4: Comments relating to refugees / not relating to refugees as object

	Refugees not the object of comment	Refugees discussed as objects of solidarity	Total
France	8.7%	91.3%	100%
Germany	33.0%	67.0%	100%
Greece	8.0%	92.0%	100%
Italy	20.3%	79.7%	100%
Poland	20.3%	79.7%	100%
Denmark	22.7%	77.3%	100%
Switzerland	2.3%	97.7%	100%
UK	13.3%	86.7%	100%
Total	16.1%	83.9%	100%

Taking sides: Bottom-up solidarity contestation on social media

Online Mobilisation: Calls for action

With regards to our two alternative hypotheses of an online 'civic' and 'uncivic' sphere of social media solidarity contestation, we can test in this section whether online commenting a) activates users beyond talk and is more participatory; b) facilitates users to enter a more direct relationship with the objects of solidarity and, c) positions them in solidarity contestations to 'take sides' and critically justify their positions.

The idea of a switch from talk to action that would indicate more open forms of user engagement and participation cannot be clearly confirmed by the data. Especially the question of whether Facebook activity fosters offline participation as well, needs to be considered with caution as Facebook users cannot be regarded as representative of the whole population, but do show a political interest, are probably younger and better educated and, as such, may be more likely to be politically active offline (e.g., Mellon & Prosser, 2017; Vissers & Stolle, 2014). We can ask however whether commenters in this particular debate constituted a politicised group of citizens that stand up to contest refugee solidarity – either by showing activism in terms of readiness for political mobilisation or extremism in terms of more radical opinion (as compared to the claims-makers in the media).

Contrary to our assumption of bottom-up mobilisation in support of a 'politics of fear' or a 'politics of pity' our analysis does not reveal high levels of political activism in online commenting. Among the comments, with refugees as objects, only a minority of comments called for action (27.4%), while in 72.6% of them, no calls for action could be identified. Overall, we find that refugee debates in all countries were mainly fought verbally, and only occasionally linked to calls for protest or solidarity action. In addition,

these calls for action mainly addressed the government as a legislator and did not try to mobilise fellow citizens. This is in line with our claims-making analysis, which revealed a rather low salience of direct solidarity action as an element of news coverage. As shown in Figure 3, direct action, such as protest and calls for solidarity, was even less visible in user comments than in the political news.

Figure 3: Form of / call for action in printed claims and comments (%)



Even in countries like Germany, proud of its welcoming culture, the acts of welcoming were not made visible in the media. The commenting section on Facebook is not, in this sense, the place where political protest is mobilised, nor is it the place where solidarity action in the form of charity or humanitarian assistance is given support. On the contrary, the responsibility to take action is delegated and the government/state is called upon to 'do something about it'. Facebook commenters are, in this regard, primarily passive and critical observers, not activists.

Tonality of debate

By looking at commenters' tonality regarding refugees, we can measure degrees of polarisation of the solidarity debates. We speak of a polarisation of solidarity contestation when user comments mainly clashed with political actors who spoke in the media and expressed diametrically opposed opinions or when their opinions were, on average, more extremist on the scale of positionality.

Generally, across all countries, we can see that even though the majority (47.7%) rejects solidarity with refugees, there was a substantial minority of supportive users (31.1%), while 21.3% remained neutral or ambivalent (see Table 5).

Table 5: Tonality of claims and comments across countries

	Claims in newspapers			Comments		
	Anti	Neutral	Pro	Anti	Neutral	Pro
France	28.5%	24.5%	47%	53.3%	26.3%	20.4%
Germany	22.6%	28.2%	49.2%	55.2%	21.4%	23.4%
Greece	41.5%	17%	41.5%	24.6%	42%	33.3%
Italy	31.9%	22.3%	45.8%	27.6%	23%	49.4%
Poland	27.2%	29%	43.8%	75.3%	15.9%	8.8%
Denmark	39.3%	14.5	46.2%	47.4%	12.9%	39.7%
Switzerland	24%	14.4%	61.6%	48.8%	16.4%	34.8%
UK	40.7%	24.6%	34.7%	52.3%	10%	37.7%
Total	30.7%	22.3%	47%	47.7%	21.3%	31.1%

Given that the comment sections are not politically mobilised as such, what encourages commenters to respond to the posted articles (and relate to their content to such a high degree)? As shown in Figure 4, the online claims in the most popular Facebook articles during September were, on average, more positive towards refugees. This was in stark contrast to all comment sections, except for the cases in Greece and Italy (see Figure 5).

Figure 4: Average tonality in online claims



This is interesting from the viewpoint of understanding commenters in terms of 'taking sides' on the question of solidarity with refugees. Except for Greece and Italy, where online claims and commenters were positive, we found that commenters tended to be more negative towards refugees than claimants in the online news articles (see Figure 5). By looking more closely at the country differences, we find that commenters in countries with external borders that were crossed by refugees, Italy and Greece, were on average more positive toward refugees, while commenters in Germany, whose government 'welcomed' high numbers of refugees in September 2015, tended to reject refugee solidarity. Poland, with the lowest number of asylum applications (9,490) in our sampling period from August 2015 to April 2016 (Eurostat, 2018), was the most negative country.

Figure 5: Tonality of commenters across countries



It is further noteworthy that negative and supportive commenters raised different issue agendas. In line with a 'politics of fear', the most salient issue of migration management was more strongly referred to by negative commenters (42.0%, see Table 6),[14] followed by issues relating to the consequences of increased migration influx to their countries (29.5%). Positive commenters, instead, in line with a 'politics of pity' highlighted refugees' personal backgrounds and situations (38.0%, compared to 11.6% in negative comments, see Table 7), followed by a focus on civic initiatives (30.2%). Hence, whenever the background situation or fate of the refugees was referred to ('politics of pity'), this increased the likelihood of a positive positioning towards refugees. If instead an emphasis was put on crisis ('politics of fear'), this was mostly done in the context of a negative statement towards the refugees. If governance and state policies were mentioned, this was mainly combined with negative attitudes towards refugees, while civic activities were related to positive statements.

[14] Similar for neutral or ambivalent commenters.

Table 6: Issues among commenters with negative stance towards refugees[15]

	Migration Management	Integration	Background/ situation: refugees	Consequences of refugee influx/ crisis	Issues regarding public/ civic initiatives	Total
France	61.6%	1.4%	2.7%	22.6%	11.6%	100%
Germany	20.7%	0.0%	4.5%	64.9%	9.9%	100%
Greece	57.4%	0.0%	4.4%	25.0%	13.2%	100%
Italy	43.9%	1.5%	9.1%	13.6%	21.2%	100%
Poland	19.4%	11.7%	16.7%	43.3%	7.8%	100%
Denmark	42.7%	0.9%	25.5%	17.3%	13.6%	100%
Switzerland	35.7%	5.6%	12.6%	22.4%	23.8%	100%
UK	65.4%	0.7%	12.5%	16.9%	4.4%	100%
Total	42.0%	3.5%	11.6%	29.5%	12.5%	100%

Table 7: Issues among commenters with positive stance towards refugees[16]

	Migration Management	Integration	Background/ situation: refugees	Consequences of refugee influx/ crisis	Issues regarding public/ civic initiatives	Total
France	41.1%	3.6%	8.9%	19.6%	26.8%	100%
Germany	6.4%	2.1%	53.2%	8.5%	29.8%	100%
Greece	16.3%	0.0%	52.2%	5.4%	26.1%	100%
Italy	17.8%	0.8%	47.5%	4.2%	29.7%	100%
Poland	23.8%	4.8%	23.8%	9.5%	38.1%	100%
Denmark	37.0%	0.0%	12.0%	1.1%	48.9%	100%
Switzerland	26.5%	2.0%	27.5%	6.9%	35.3%	100%
UK	25.5%	1.0%	61.2%	0.0%	12.2%	100%
Total	24.4%	1.3%	38.0%	5.6%	30.2%	100%

[15] Displayed without category 'unknown', which amounts to 0.9% in total; Italy 10.6% and Poland, 1.1%.

[16] Displayed without category 'unknown', which amounts to 0.5% in total; Switzerland: 2% and Denmark 1.1%

Consequently, we find different issue patterns between negative and positive commenters. The generally more personal focus on the comments in comparison to claims (see section 1) might derive from the more positive commenters. This group of citizen-users might therefore relate to refugees more directly (and personally) by highlighting their backgrounds and pathways to Europe. They also referred to (often local) initiatives beyond political governance. In this way, and possibly to a higher degree than claimants in the news media, positive commenters did not 'dehumanise' refugees. On the contrary, they focused on humanitarian issues in the 'refugee crisis'.

Summing up this section, we can conclude that Facebook commenting on mainstream newspaper sites was not the place for a radicalisation of political opinion through the expression of xenophobia or hatred. At least below the most popular posts and the respective most popular comments that were ranked highest on Facebook and likely moderated by the newspapers' web administrators, refugee solidarity was debated in a rather balanced way, with a majority rejecting refugee solidarity, however, this anti-solidarity voice did not dominate the debate and did also not systematically turn disrespectful towards the opinions of others, or towards our objects of solidarity.

Justifications

Online commenting forums are not structured in a way to facilitate an exchange of arguments among users. Commenters rarely enter a dialogue with each other. Providing justifications by expressing one's opinions is therefore in no way self-evident, as opinions are often expressed in an abbreviated way by making use of more emotional language instead of rational argumentation.[17] Our initial assumption has been, however, that a 'politics of pity' and a politics of fear' require citizens-users as witnesses of human suffering to translate their first emotional reactions into public speech. In line with this assumption, we found that a slight majority of commenters (57.3%) justified their stances regarding solidarity toward refugees, pointing thus to discursive contestation and engagement instead of plain opinion-stating. By making such a solidarity statement, the user-commenters thus *took side* and *decided* about the deservingness of the refugees as an object of solidarity.

By looking at the justifications of solidarity statements more specifically, we find that commenters relied on a wide spectrum of arguments. As country differences in the use of justifications were neither significant nor did they show the expected correlations (e.g. the emphasis on religion in Poland), we will in the following compare the argumentative patterns of pro- with anti-refugee commenters.

What comes to our attention first is that anti-solidarity commenters engaged to a higher degree in justificatory practices than pro-solidarity commenters (see Figure 6). We explain the lower engagement of pro-solidarity commenters in justificatory practices with

[17] See Chouliaraiki & Stolic (2017) and Triandafyllidou (2017) for an 'interpretative approach towards the refugee crisis as an event that triggered particular emotions.

the unconditionality of pro-solidarity arguments. If solidarity is granted unconditionally (as in the case of human rights protection), it cannot further be contested and qualified.

Figure 6: Justification versus no justification in comments with tonality toward refugees (%)



Our findings secondly pointed to important differences between these two groups of commenters regarding the justifications they used to underline their pro- or anti-solidarity stances (see Figure 7). In the anti-solidarity comments with a justification against solidarity with refugees, the most frequent argument used was that national citizens should be regarded first (welfare chauvinism, 16.1%). This was followed by references to the inappropriateness of migrants' behaviour (11.9%). Religious reasons ranked third on average at 9.7%. Comments with a positive stance towards refugees were less frequently justified (no justification found in 50.3% compared to 30.7% in the negative comments). In particular, Greece and Italy stood out as cases in which commenters posted frequently without justifications (Greece 77.2% and Italy 56.9%). These were also the two countries in which commenters were, on average, more positive towards refugees. Pro-solidarity justifications most frequently referred to human rights and broader humanitarian aspects (25.2% of positive comments as compared to only 1.6% in the negative comments).

Figure 7: Justifications of solidarity of negative and positive comments compared



To sum up, these findings further back the first scenario of an online civic sphere of solidarity contestation, especially with regard to the assumption of the building of critical capacities of online commenters. Following the pattern of social desirability, solidarity towards people in need of assistance is a mandatory response. The choice to reject solidarity towards those people in need, therefore, requires the proponent of a claim to engage in an explicit justification (Chouliaraki, 2013). The quite substantial presence of commenters with positive views on refugees and their attitude to what negative commenters often termed 'do-gooders', further challenges the negative majority to engage in the formulation of arguments for their anti-solidary choices. In other words, commenters feel urged to back their anti-solidarity opinions with arguments, i.e. explain why they are against refugees. Pro-solidarity contestants instead speak in name of a higher morality and of absolute values.

Conclusion: an integrated sphere of online solidarity contestation

The Facebook comment sections of mainstream newspaper sites offered an opportunity for focused debates about the 'refugee crisis'. Our comparative view on bottom-up solidarity contestation at the height of the so called 'refugee crisis' shows how citizen-users on Facebook all over Europe took the opportunity to take voice on an issue of shared concern. This voice was raised in the commenting sections of mainstream newspapers' public Facebook sites, and was informed and motivated by the witnessing of a humanitarian disaster and human suffering but also, and more dominantly, by diffuse feelings of fear in light of a seemingly uncontrolled influx of refugees. We found elements of a 'politics of fear' and a 'politics of pity', which translated emotions into public speech in the form of political statements that 'took sides' and positioned themselves on the question of whether solidarity with refugees should be granted or not.

These dynamics of bottom-up solidarity contestation are first of all found to be closely related to the dominant public and political discourse in a particular national country context. Social media commenting sites are not, as is often assumed, per se the debate place of a fragmented and polarised user community (the online bubble). Looking at public Facebook sites of mainstream newspapers, instead of segmentation, we found a strong linkage between online news and online commenting. This points to an integrated public sphere of solidarity contestation, where primary definers in the news media set the agenda and the main frames for secondary definers of the debate in terms of-social media users' responses. In this debate, a plurality of issues is raised dominantly relating to security concerns, but highlighting also a plethora of other issues, such as the welfare state and civil society aspects, or the destiny of refugees, their living conditions and personal stories of flight. Bottom-up solidarity contestation is most often verbally fought, and social media are not used for targeted political mobilisation in the sense of direct calls for protests or acts of solidarity.

Looking more closely at the dynamics of 'taking sides', on the question of refugee solidarity, we find that opinions expressed by commenters were overall more negative than the opinions expressed by claims-makers in the news media, which were still balanced in most countries, except Poland, by a substantial minority, backing solidarity with refugees. In two countries (Italy and Greece), a positive view even prevailed over hostility. The comment sections of news sites on Facebook were however not used for the expression of political extremism, of xenophobia or of 'hate' towards foreigners. Nor do we find the online voice to be particularly polarised. Again, it is likely that news sites moderate their Facebook pages as well as take preventive measures by selecting less controversial news content to be posted on Facebook.

Online users in all countries systematically related to the positions of claims-makers in the media and tended to be critical towards them, not affirmative. They did not, however, take fundamentally opposed views to the ones expressed by political representatives. In equal terms, their views expressed towards the refugees as our object of solidarity were balanced and they did not seek polarisation or direct confrontation. Three deviating countries, Italy, Greece and Denmark, are interesting, as the citizen voice here was, on average, more positive towards refugees than the voice of claims raised in the print news media. This is a significant finding, which makes us aware how solidarity contestation towards refugees and the domestic contestation of the national political actors are interrelated. A negative view on national government can motivate a positive expression of solidarity towards refugees. In Germany and France, instead, where the governmental position towards refugee solidarity was positive during the month of September, the larger share of negative positioning of citizen-users towards refugee solidarity might also be explained as an implicit or explicit critique of national government.

The analysis of justifications used to back or reject refugee solidarity reveals an interesting dynamic of how solidarity was made conditional in public debates. 'Taking sides' on the question of refugee solidarity generates a requirement to enter a practice of justifi-

cation of one's position. These requirements for justification are however spelled out differently depending on the pro- or anti-solidarity position one wishes to defend. While pro-solidarity commenters often relied on an unconditional form of justification such as the higher morality of human rights and absolute values, the anti-solidarity commenters most commonly defended a notion of conditional solidarity. This required them to spell out the conditions under which solidarity should apply or be withdrawn. The anti-solidarity voice in all countries generated, therefore, a higher amount of justifications than those comments that called for solidarity with refugees.

Coming back to the specific situation of 'humanitarian emergency' in September and the controversial decisions by the German government to open its borders to refugees, we might ask whether our purposive sample of the most popular comments on news sites is a good indicator for public opinion during that time. This question should be further investigated in future research. The so called 'welcoming culture' was more reflected in news claims making, where in every country's positivity peaked in the early months of our entire sampling period. User comments, especially in Germany, remained more distanced and critical of the decision to open the borders to refugees. Such an attitude of critical scepticism was, however, paired with many spontaneous expressions of solidarity.

Our findings point in this sense to a much more complex picture of solidarity contestation than expected. Instead of a clear-cut divide between cosmopolitans in support of humanitarian solidarity towards refugees, and communitarians in support of nationally exclusive notions of solidarity, we find shifting agendas and discourses. We also do not find an alliance between anti-refugee positions and anti-European position, on the contrary, anti-solidarity claims were often raised in the name of Europe, and Europe is also seen by citizens in its role as a guarantor of security and exclusive solidarity. As there was a general responsiveness towards both issues and general claims raised in the news, the online user debate was mainly a general replication of the patterns of political debates found in the claims-making analysis, and not a segmented debate that followed its own logic, detached from the political mainstream.

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Conclusion: the entangled paths toward European solidarity

Christian Lahusen

Introduction

Solidarity is a lived experience in Europe, if we consider attitudes and practices of European citizens (e.g., donations, volunteering or protest participation), civil society initiatives and campaigns (e.g. cooperatives, self-help groups, social enterprises or time banks), and social rights and public policies of redistribution by the modern welfare state. 'European' solidarity, however, is a much more contested and fragile phenomenon. It is weakly institutionalised within European treaties and public policies, and exposed to contestation and counter-mobilisation within the public sphere. Civil society organisations are committed to sustaining solidarity within their immediate environment, but are limited in their ability to establish cross-national platforms and patterns of work. And public opinion polls show that European citizens engaged in solidarity practices towards fellow citizens also support the rights of other Europeans; but even these citizens tend to prioritize other targets, and thus are less engaged in supporting the cause of other Europeans.

In these broad terms we can summarise some of the main findings from the TransSOL-project, which was committed to a systematic analysis of transnational solidarity in times of crises. Its mission was to take a careful look at the state of (European) solidarity, and thus to look beyond potential appearances. In fact, most people will most probably subscribe to the idea of solidarity in its broader sense. Hence, it is necessary to dig into issue- and target-specific forms of solidarity in order to get a more nuanced and authentic picture. Our assumption was that citizens, organisations and policy-makers would prioritise specific groups or issues; they might even have clear ideas of who does and does not deserve support. Before this backdrop, the TransSOL eight-country project centred its analysis on various target groups, both in terms of vulnerable groups (people with disabilities, the unemployed, and immigrants and asylum seekers) and spatial entities (the own country, Europe and the non-European world). Additionally, it aimed at painting a comprehensive picture of practiced solidarity by arguing that solidarity is constructed and organised at various levels of aggregation, namely the levels of citizens, civil societies and nation-states. Consequently, TransSOL was committed to mapping and analysing (European) solidarity dispositions and practices at each of these levels: With regard to practices of interpersonal support within and beyond borders; with a focus on organised forms of solidarity in terms of citizens' groups, initiatives and associations, and their webs of transnational solidarity work within and beyond borders; and finally, with regard to institutionalised forms of solidarity in terms of social rights and entitlements, and public discourses about solidarity within and beyond borders. The

European coverage of TransSOL (Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and the UK) allowed us to map solidarity in all these dimensions, and in very diverse national contexts. The multinational composition of TransSOL enabled us to engage in a comparative analysis of factors and forces promoting or inhibiting solidarity within Europe.

The TransSOL project grounded its research on a number of guiding assumptions. First, it was argued that individual solidarity would most probably be patterned along socio-demographic traits and constituencies. In particular, we assumed that the propensity to support others (including, in particular, other Europeans) would be more diffused among people with a higher social class status, stronger shares in bridging social capital, post-materialist values, and political orientation towards the left. Second, TransSOL built on the proposition that civil society organisations provide arenas and opportunities for the mobilisation and reproduction of solidarity, and that European solidarity is thus dependent on an organisational field with a related 'supply chain'. On this analytical level, we assumed that European solidarity would most probably be limited by the uneven development of civil societies across the eight countries under analysis, and by the more local and national outlook of established organisational fields. Third, research work followed the assumption that solidarity is not only dependent on an 'organisational supply', but also on the institutional and legal frameworks established by the nation-states and the European Union. In this regard, we argued that the institutionalisation of solidarity is marked by an unbalanced situation, according to which solidarity is weakly established at the EU-level, while being much more forcefully institutionalised at the national level. This situation most probably discourages transnational forms of solidarity at the level of citizens and civil societies, because the latter is contained and constrained by a national frame of reference. However, it was expected that the specific timeframe would yield new challenges and opportunities for civic solidarity. In times of accelerating crises and emergency situations, the fact that citizens and civil society organisations become more active could not be excluded, particularly in countries with growing grievances and accelerating needs.

The fragile and contested nature of (European) solidarity

Examining the findings presented in the previous chapters, we get a nuanced picture of the state of solidarity within Europe. Some of our assumptions had to be refuted or reformulated. Overall, the contested and fragile nature of solidarity is confirmed at each level of analysis: The micro, meso and macro.

In regard to the individual level, we had conducted an online-based survey among a representative sample of residents. Although our own findings confirmed the general picture painted by previous research, we can highlight some interesting deviations. In the first instance, we noted that Europeans largely approve of redistributive policies geared at reducing income inequality (Burgoon, 2014). In our own survey, almost three-

quarters considered the reduction of big income inequality as an important public policy goal. Additionally, a strong majority endorsed the attempts of the EU to help countries outside Europe in fighting poverty and promoting development. Interestingly enough, the share of people engaged in personal acts of solidarity was higher than some previous studies have shown. While comparative analyses showed that only every fifth European citizen had donated time or money to non-profit organisations (Bauer et al., 2013), and every third had joined an unconventional protest such as signing petitions or boycotting products (Hafner-Fink, 2012), our own survey showed that almost every second respondent reported having engaged in solidarity activities for people in their country, including donating money or time and/or protesting and engaging in voluntary associations. This seems to be a consequence of the crisis, given that levels of support for fellow citizens were highest in Greece, while support for refugees and asylum seekers was strongest in Greece and Germany. Greece had been severely affected by the Great Recession and/or the so-called refugee crisis, Germany in regard to the latter.

It became evident that Europeans support solidarity as a private and public virtue. As our findings show, however, this picture had to be disaggregated, because people tend to prioritise between groups when solidarity is at stake. Our respondents were most engaged in the support of people in their own country, and least supportive of fellow Europeans; in addition, they reported more practices of solidarity towards the disabled, and the least with refugees. For many, solidarity is restricted to specific groups or entities (Hunt and Bendford, 2004; Stets and McCaffree, 2014), which they consider more deserving (van Oorschot, 2000 and 2006). Moreover, solidarity seems to be closely tied to the notion of citizenship (Miller, 2000; Keating, 2009). In fact, our respondents prefer to grant access to social benefits only to fellow citizens, and to migrants only under the condition that they work and pay taxes, and thus contribute to the country's well-being. In both cases, solidarity is highly conditional, and tied to norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness (see also Lengfeld et al., 2015; Thielemann, 2003; also Wheeless, 1978).

The identification of 'constituencies' delivered interesting findings, partially disproving our initial assumptions. Further analyses recently published in an open access book (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018) show that solidarity practices are rather evenly distributed within the population. In fact, socio-demographic traits and social structural resources do not really help to dissociate the active from the inactive constituencies across countries, thus disproving the general role of gender (Neill and Gidengil, 2006), age (Beyerlein and Bergstrand, 2013; Grasso, 2013), education (Bauer et al., 2013; Grasso, 2013) or occupational and class status (Wilson, 2000). While these factors do play a role in individual countries, solidarity seems to belong to the activities conducted by very different groups of people. More important are attitudinal dispositions like interpersonal trust and religiosity. Political motivations play a role, but there is no consistent pattern, thus highlighting that solidarity is, for many, a more social than political act. Finally, a notable difference was found between the active and the inactive citizens: Respondents engaged in support of one target were most probably committed to furthering the cause of other groups as well, while inactive people tended towards consistent inactivi-

ty. These findings highlight that European solidarity is not necessarily in competition with solidarity towards fellow citizens, but rather compatible with the latter. Still, citizens tended to prioritise national solidarity, to the detriment of European solidarity. We might interpret this peculiarity as a consequence of the predominance of national conceptions of solidarity and an implicit notion of subsidiarity: Other European citizens might be needy, but respondents felt less responsible for them, as they assumed that other nation-states and citizens would provide for them.

The organisational analyses reflected this finding. The two chapters on the organisational fields at the grassroots- and the national/European levels showed that most citizens' groups, associations and networks are active at the local and national levels. Among the sample of grassroots groups, only every tenth organization reported being active within Europe – both at the supranational level of the EU and/or in other countries. Among national organisations, the share of groups being active at the EU level was higher – i.e., almost every second indicated this. But once we asked for activity types, funding and membership in consultative bodies, the numbers dropped considerably. Hence, also in this regard, the main ambit of operation was the country of birth and/or the most immediate surroundings. In this regard, our initial research assumption was corroborated. Civil societies are still strongly contained by the nation-state (Anheier and Salamon, 1999; Baglioni and Giugni, 2014), given the prevalence of nationally-defined public policies, funding schemes and established consultation procedures, and probably also the urgency of country-specific problems and needs to be addressed. Additionally, there were also marked differences between countries in the degree of European activities: Countries with more established civil societies seemed to provide a more beneficial background for the development of European solidarity activities than countries with a less developed sector – as the comparative analysis of TransSOL-data revealed (Lahusen, Kousis, Zschache and Loukakis, 2018).

Findings of our organisational analysis, however, did not suggest that European solidarity activism is altogether absent. Indeed, we have noted that civil society organisations from a number of very different countries are active at the EU level for very specific aims (e.g., funding, consultation, mobilisation). More importantly, however, we had to redirect our view away from the arena of EU-governance and take it back to the grassroots' level. A closer look at the data suggests that European solidarity is a matter of a specific organisational pattern: The activism is decentralised and localised, and it follows soft forms of transnationalism via cooperation and diffusion. This finding complements results from previous studies on the Europeanisation of civil societies and social movements. On the one hand, scholarly writing has been interested in the different 'scales' of activities – from the local to the European. Studies testified the emergence of a European field of civil society (Smismans, 2006; Kutay, 2014; Kröger, 2008; Kohler-Koch and Quittkat, 2013), because the EU attracts local and national civil society organisations by providing funding, access to legislative processes and consultations and thus an arena of influence-taking (Kousis, 1999; Císař and Vráblíková, 2013; Sanchez Salgado, 2017). However, it is well known that these 'European' associations and networks have had

problems mobilising their members' support at the local level (Petrova and Tarrow, 2007; Tarrow, 2011, 191–193; Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005). This 'resistance' is also to do with the fact that the EU-governance system exerts accommodative pressures on civil society actors, many of which are not ready to adopt, given a more contentious action repertoire and a stronger orientation towards the grass-roots' level (Rucht, 2001; Balme and Chabanet, 2008). Hence, civil society organisations interested in furthering solidarity might thus willingly opt against a 'vertical' Europeanisation, and thus against a scale shift towards the EU (Tarrow and McAdam, 2005). In these cases, activists might opt for a 'horizontal' Europeanising: Local and national organisations expand their area of activities into other European countries mainly by means of cooperation civic groups and organisations from other European nation-states (Lahusen, Kousis, Zschache and Loukakis, 2018).

We can thus assume that the organisational field of European solidarity is marked more strongly by a 'horizontal' and transnational orientation. Additionally, this orientation goes along with a decentralised structure of organisation and activism. Both aspects are well-known in social movement analysis (Imig and Tarrow, 1999; Della Porta and Caiani, 2009) that is interested in describing and explaining mobilisation waves across space and time. The study of transnational protest waves has placed particular emphasis on the processes of diffusion of protest activities at the grassroots level. The strength of social movements resides more often than not in their ability to promote the diffusion of ideas and practices from one country into another (Della Porta and Tarrow, 2005; Tarrow, 2005). Findings show that global and/or EU-level associations and networks play an important role in the diffusion and coordination of transnational protest activities (Smith, Pagnucco and Romeril, 1994; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Smith, 2002; Ruzza and Bozzini, 2008). Following a conceptual distinction by Tarrow (2012), who distinguished between thick and thin diffusion, we thus propose speaking about soft and strong forms of transnational solidarity activities. The least important one places more weight on an organisation and formalisation of solidarity campaigns and activities in terms of formalised European platforms, networks and/or campaigns; the other more prominent type rests more strongly on a decentral web of loosely coupled (local, national) initiatives and organisations, engaged in information exchange, cooperation and ad-hoc campaigning (Tarrow, 2012; Mattoni and della Porta, 2014).

The strength of civic solidarity in Europe did not reside, before this backdrop, it its ability to set-up formal organisations with professionalised staff, hierarchical decision-making procedures and mass constituencies. On the contrary, citizens and activists seem to privilege forms of 'soft' transnational solidarity with a clearly decentralised structure, rooted in specific localities and tied to specific constituencies. The former model might be more visible from the outside, as it resides in big, formal and professional working groups. But the latter might be more effective in its ability to mobilise support and further solutions in an extended range of localities. Its strength and weaknesses reside thus in its ability to mobilise local support and maintain cross-national networks of exchange and cooperation throughout Europe.

This observation leads us to the final level of our analysis: TransSOL has also been committed to analysing the role of solidarity as a legal principle and as a component of public policies in each of our eight countries, and within the legal framework of the EU. Moreover, we were interested in public debates about solidarity within the mass media, in order to grasp quite how far the notion of solidarity has been constructed and/or eroded within the public sphere. It is here that policymakers and stakeholders deliberate about the political consequences of social problems and upcoming crises, and it is here that they form the 'publicised' public opinion that might influence the choices of its citizens. In fact, this macro-level is important to better understand the political context within which civil society organisations and citizens operate.

The relevance of this legal, institutional and political context is corroborated by the findings presented in our previous chapters in two respects. In the first instance, our analyses have shown that the principle of solidarity is very unevenly institutionalised within the constitutional frameworks and public policies, when comparing both national and European levels. TransSOL'sfindings, published in an open access volume (Federico and Lahusen, 2018) have highlighted that solidarity is part of the nation-state's legal framework in all eight countries, when looking at constitutional text, court rulings and public policies in the three policy fields under analysis (disabilities, unemployment, migration, and asylum). While the levels, forms and rationales of welfare provision and social security are very different between countries (Esping-Andersen, 1990 and 1996; Castels, 2004), the analyses has shown that solidarity is a common constitutional principle everywhere (also Ross, 2010). The situation is quite different, however, once we move to the European level, because the principle of solidarity is much less prominent there. EU treaties refer to this value in general terms (Art. 3 of the TEU), and as a goal in the area of asylum and immigration (Art. 80) and economic and energy policy (Articles 122 and 194 of the TFEU), but it is lacking in other areas. Moreover, member states and EU institutions have had problems in meeting the expectations of this principle. Even though they are called on to respect the principle of solidarity, their incapacity to agree on shared responsibilities for the growing number of refuges immigrating to Europe since 2015 has demonstrated that solidarity is a marginal factor in EU policy-making.

This imbalance in the institutionalisation of solidarity seems to impact on the uneven organisation of solidarity within civil societies. As we have seen above, citizen groups, non-profit-organisations and welfare associations operate mainly within the nation-state, while being Europeanised only to a lesser degree. This reflects institutional and legal parameters: The EU might be engaged in attracting civil society organisations to the European level by means of funding schemes and consultation procedures, but the social competencies of the EU are too weak to restructure nationally segmented civil societies into pan-European platforms and activities. Additionally, we have seen that citizens are primarily engaged in acts of solidarity within their own country, both in terms of personal practices of support, and as members of civil society organisations. This national outlook makes sense, given that solidarity is strongly institutionalised within the nation-state. Nation-states establish social rights and entitlements, they adminis-

ter funds for service delivery and they provide fora of political contestation and legal litigation. Hence, citizens' groups will most probably direct their appeals to their local, regional or national governments and public authorities. At the same time, citizens seem to be less encouraged to get active on a personal level in support of other Europeans, possibly because the national model of solidarity is deeply enshrined in individual citizens: Citizens seem to expect that everybody is taken care of by their own government.

These observations, however, are not fully correct, because TransSOL's findings show that citizens are active in support of other Europeans, both in individual terms and as part of civic groups and organisations. In structural terms, we might expect that the predominance of national solidarity discourages citizens and civil society organisations from engaging in transnational, European solidarity. However, in times of crises, this imbalance seems to generate contrary effects: The solidarity gap within the constitutional framework of the EU, its public policies and interstate bargains seems to call citizens and civil society organisations into action, when severe social grievances across national borders emerge. Citizens and civil society organisations tend to compensate for the deficiencies of public policies, both at the national and European level. This observation is not restricted to current times, because citizens and civil society groups have long been committed to combatting social problems and grievances, in part aggravated by ongoing processes of welfare retrenchment and policies of austerity (Pierson, 1994 and 1996; Bonoli et al., 2000; della Porta, 2015). But this observation seems to apply in particular to our own times. In fact, our findings show that citizens and civil society organisations have been active since the start of the Great Recession which began in 2008, as well as during the so-called refugee crisis (2015) – another event which spawned a definitive reaction to the inability of member states to find solutions within their own territory, and the shared incapacity of national governments to agree on joint European solutions.

In this sense, the European citizenry has been Europe's fire brigade in times when governments have had trouble coming to terms with rampant area fires. We find empirical evidence for this emergency relief in the mushrooming numbers of newly-founded citizen groups in the area of unemployment during the periods of mass unemployment during the 1990s, and the subsequent Great Recession since 2008, but also in the strong increase in civil society initiatives responding to the strong influx of refugees since 2015.

Moreover, the momentum of civic solidarity was palpable in public debates devoted to the refugee crisis in 2015, as our analysis of mass mediated news coverage shows strong initial support for the German 'welcoming culture'. In the beginning, claims and activities of civil society had a lot of influence on public debates within the media. Claims frequently addressed the causes of forced migration and commented on citizens' activities and volunteering. These voices were overwhelmingly positive, stressing the importance of solidarity. This moment of solidarity and unity within the public arena, however was not long lived: In reaction to violent incidents (e.g., the terror attacks in Paris, the sexual assaults on New Year's Eve in Cologne) political contestation against migration started to conquer the public arena, thus discontinuing this important momentum. Debates were

spearheaded by political actors and centred on issues of migration management (e.g., border management, registration of asylum seekers, relocation of refugees or the cooperation with non-EU countries such as Turkey over keeping refugees in their country) and the problems of long-term integration of refugees, with a more negative tone with regard to refugees and solidarity towards them.

An uncertain future?

The future of European solidarity seems thus to be uncertain. Findings of the TransSOL project show that solidarity is deeply enshrined in the legal frameworks of Europe, in the values cherished by its citizens, and it the activities of civil society organisations. 'Europe' does not seem to be the primary target and reference point of this solidarity, but this is not necessarily our focal point of concern. In fact, solidarity might rank less highly in the prioritisation of European citizens, but our results indicate that there is not necessarily any antagonism between national, European and global solidarities, but rather a complementarity. Citizens' initiatives and civil society organisations might be committed mainly to local constituencies and tasks, but our findings suggest that the organisational field adapts quite quickly to upcoming crises and grievances and spurs considerable transnational activity through horizontal forms of diffusion and cooperation at the grassroots level.

What is rather an issue of concern is the regressive tendencies in the social, political and legal environment of civic solidarity. Citizens and civil society organisations have been responding to the dramatic emergency situations after the Great Recession since 2008 and the so-called refugee crisis of 2015. But the momentum of public solidarity lacked longevity in both cases, because European solidarity cannot reside in the voluntary and spontaneous engagement of European citizens. It requires institutional responses and public policies. In this regard, however, regressive moments prevail, not only in general terms, but also in view of the three issue fields under analysis. Schemes of unemployment and disability protection have been weakened with reference to fiscal and market imperatives, and solidarity with migrants and refugees has been limited due to security concerns – even in cases where solidarity is strongly entrenched in law. The crises might have aroused considerable solidarity from its citizens in terms of short-term relief, but they have reduced the strength of solidarity as a legal and political principle in the long-term.

Given these contextual developments, it is very probable that European solidarity will remain highly contentious, dynamic and fragile. This is regrettable. Citizens do not seem to be against European solidarity per se. On the contrary, they tend to cherish the idea of 'solidarity', and this support does not exclude – in most cases, it actively includes – a 'European' element. Disagreement emerges in the way of organising and institutionalising solidarity in terms of rights, entitlements and benefits within Europe. Political institutions thus have to do their homework. A similar indication is applicable to the level of

civic solidarity. As we have seen, there is a considerable number of Europeans who are ready to commit personally to solidarity with the needy, both within their country and beyond. But disengagement is very probable when political institutions are unable to find solutions, and counter-mobilisations seize the moment within the public sphere. Fragility also prevails at the organisational level of civil society. Groups and organisations are committed to furthering their specific goals in their circumscribed environment, but European networks and circuits of mutual support are more difficult to sustain in times of welfare retrenchment and national antagonism. Organisations committed to furthering European solidarity require moral, political and legal support. If European solidarity is such a highly-valued force, it is imperative that more care be given to nurturing it.

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