



EURYKA

Reinventing Democracy in Europe: Youth Doing Politics in Times of Increasing Inequalities

Integrated Report on Experimental Analysis

(Deliverable 5.2)

Workpackage 5: Dissemination and Exploitation

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Table of content

Elite discourses and youth political engagement	3
Protest, repression and solidarity across generations	14
The influence of police brutality on political participation of youth.....	25
How blaming attribution affects political participation.....	33
Effects of (mis)perceptions of inequality on youths' social trust and political engagement: the role of cultural orientation and social class.....	42
Peer pressure and political action.....	58
Conjoint experiment: 'Democratic freedoms for everyone?'	67

General Introduction

This deliverable reports preliminary findings of the survey experiments conducted in workpackage 5. The aim of this workpackage is to conduct a set of experiments with young people. In so doing, we seek to study the causal effect of different dimensions of the youth experience of inequalities and their support and potential for social and political change for strengthening democratic life in Europe that may include avenues for creatively reimagining democracy. While previous workpackages provide observational data for analyzing the connections between inequalities, on the one hand, and norms, values, attitudes, expectations, and behaviors of young people regarding democracy, power, politics, policy-making as well as social and political participation (online and offline) and the organization of economic, social and private life, on the other hand, providing evidence of covariance with strong external validity, these must be complemented with experimental evidence that provides internal validity to the causal claims made in other workpackages.

Overall, we conducted seven survey experiments: six vignette experiments and one conjoint experiment. We tested the effects of a number of treatments on young people's attitudes and behaviors relating to social and political engagement, including protest behavior. Some of the treatments refer to perception of the political and institutional context, such as discourses by political elites, state repression and police brutality, or blame attribution, while others deal with perceptions of the social environment, such as existing inequalities or pressures exerted by peers. Additionally, the conjoint experiment examines the extent to which young people are willing to restrict democratic freedoms for groups representing specific political opinions. We also consider the conditioning role of cognitive and emotional mediators. Manipulation checks are introduced to assess whether potential lack of significant causal effects is due to a real absence of effect or to an inability to properly manipulate the treatment.

All of the experiments focus on youth. However, some of them compare youth respondents to the population at large, depending on the research question. Moreover, some of the experiments follow a comparative design. This is useful to test for the effect of real-world pre-treatments, such as the actual information and feelings citizens have prior to the experiment, the institutional approaches towards youth, the frames used by political elites, and the characteristics of the political system.

Elite discourses and youth political engagement

Marco Giugni and Maria Grasso

Research question and brief explanation

This survey experiment tests the impact of the discourses of political elites on the political engagement of young people. We examine the effect of different kinds of elite discourses on the level of trust that young people have for various political actors and institutions, on their degree of internal and external political efficacy, and on their intention to engage in different forms of participation. Research on the impact of discursive opportunities on political attitudes and the participation of minority groups such as migrants and Muslims has shown that discourses that deny the rights and identities of these groups lead to lower levels of political interest, as well as to a lower likelihood that individuals belonging to these groups participate in politics. Here we follow this line of reasoning with a focus on discourses on youth more generally and the opportunities they provide to young people to become politically engaged.

The main research question is the following: to what extent is the political engagement of young people related to the content of the discourses of political elites? We focus more specifically on three aspects: political trust, political efficacy, and political participation more directly. This leads to three more specific questions:

1. To what extent is the political trust of young people related to the content of discourses of political elites?
2. To what extent is the political efficacy of young people related to the content of discourses of political elites?
3. To what extent is the political participation of young people related to the content of discourses of political elites?

Additionally, we examine the impact of certain attributes of the author of the discourse. More specifically, we are interested in determining whether the impact of pro-youth and anti-youth discourses depends on the ideology or political affiliation of those making them (whether they are leftist or rightist) as well as on their political role (whether they are in the government or in the opposition). This leads to the following further questions:

1. To what extent does the effect of elite discourses on the political trust, efficacy and participation of young people depend on the ideology or partisan affiliation of the author of the discourse?
2. To what extent does the effect of elite discourses on the political trust, efficacy and participation of young people depend on the political role of the author of the discourse?
3. To what extent does the effect of elite discourses on the political trust, efficacy and participation of young people depend on whether they are specifically mentioned in the discourse?

Hypotheses

H1. Political trust

H1.1. Discourses by political elites that depicts young people as alienated and uninterested in politics have a negative impact on their level of political trust.

H1.2. Discourses by political elites that depict young people as integrated and interested in politics have a positive impact on their level of political trust.

H1.3. The effect of elite discourses on the political trust of young people depends on the ideology or partisan affiliation of the author of the discourse.

H1.4. The effect of elite discourses on the political trust of young people depends on the political role of the author of the discourse.

H2. Political efficacy

H2.1. Discourses by political elites that depict young people as alienated and little interested in politics have a negative impact on their degree of internal and external political efficacy.

H2.2. Discourses by political elites that depict young people as integrated and interested in politics have a positive impact on their level of internal and external political efficacy.

H2.3. The effect of elite discourses on the internal and external political efficacy of young people depends on the ideology or partisan affiliation of the author of the discourse.

H2.4. The effect of elite discourses on the internal and external political efficacy of young people depends on the political role of the author of the discourse.

H3. Political participation

H3.1. Discourses by political elites that depict young people as alienated and little interested in politics have a negative impact on their political participation.

H3.2. Discourses by political elites that depict young people as integrated and interested in politics have a positive impact on their political participation.

H3.3. The effect of elite discourses on the political participation of young people depends on the ideology or partisan affiliation of the author of the discourse.

H3.4. The effect of elite discourses on the political participation of young people depends on the political role of the author of the discourse

Design

To test our hypotheses we use a 2 (discourse: pro-youth, anti-youth) x 2 (ideology: left, right) x 2 (role: government, opposition) between-subjects factorial design, which yields 8 experimental conditions as outlined below. In each condition, the subjects are confronted with a report of a statement by a politician. For instance, the pro-youth discourse condition depicts youths as alienated and uninterested in politics, while the anti-youth discourse condition depicts them as integrated and interested in politics. The survey is carried on a sample of young people (18- to 34-years-old) in the UK. Each experimental condition includes 800 respondents, for a total sample of 6,400 respondents.

Treatments

Discourse	Ideology	Political role	
		Government	Opposition
Pro-youth	Left	Pro-youth discourse by a leftist politician in government	Pro-youth discourse by a leftist politician in the opposition
	Right	Pro-youth discourse by a rightist politician in government	Pro-youth discourse by a rightist politician in the opposition
Anti-youth	Left	Anti-youth discourse by a leftist politician in government	Anti-youth discourse by a leftist politician in the opposition
	Right	Anti-youth discourse by a rightist politician in government	Anti-youth discourse by a rightist politician in the opposition

Dependent variables

Political trust
Internal political efficacy
External political efficacy
Political participation

Pre-treatment questionnaire

Attention to youth-related issues
Importance of youth-related issues
Political interest
Left-right values
Libertarian-authoritarian values

Post-treatment questionnaire

View about treatment
Emotions
Political trust
Internal political efficacy
External political efficacy
Political participation
Perception of discourse orientation: pro-youth/anti-youth (manipulation check)
Perception of ideology of author of discourse: left/right (manipulation check)
Perception of political role of author of discourse: government/opposition (manipulation check)
Age
Gender

Citizenship
Education
Working status
Occupation
Occupation of chief income earner
Income
Participation in petition

Results

Our analysis is quite simple and straightforward: we compare the scores (means) across the eight groups on our dependent variables. Before we test our hypotheses, however, we verify that randomization into the experimental conditions has worked properly. To do so, we compare the means of a number of variables across the eight treatments: degree of attention to youth-related issues, degree of importance of youth-related issues, political interest, left-right values, and libertarian-authoritarian values. Respondents are fairly homogeneous across groups on all counts. There are small differences, but not significant after an ANOVA, except for libertarian-authoritarian values (at the 10% level). Thus, overall, we have a similar composition across the eight groups.

Next, we take a look at results for questions that we had designed as factual manipulation checks coming after the measurement of all the dependent variables in turn after the treatment. To do this, we use the three variables mentioned earlier. The manipulation checks yielded some unexpected results. First, 32.5% of those who were exposed to a pro-youth statement said they thought it was negative about the potential of young people to be the driving force behind democratic renewal, while 49.6% of those who were exposed to an anti-youth statement said it was positive. Second, 39.4% of those who were exposed to a statement by a left-wing politician said the statement was made by a right-wing politician, while 49.5% of those who were exposed to a statement by a right-wing politician said it was made by a left-wing politician. Third, 42.4% of those who were exposed to a statement by a member of the government said it was made by a member of the opposition, while 53.8% of those who were exposed to a statement by a member of the opposition said it was made by a member of the government.

Given these distributions, one has three basic possible solutions: we can stick to the original treatments, therefore ignoring the answers to these questions; we can take the respondents' perceptions and recode positive/negative, left-wing/right-wing, government/opposition accordingly; or we can focus on those respondents who have given an answer in accordance with the treatments. Dropping observations or recoding them changes the randomization of subjects to the experimental conditions, as they no longer are assigned randomly to the eight groups. Given these shortcomings, here we opt for another solution: we stick to the original treatments, controlling for the three manipulation checks through regression models.

To test our hypotheses, we conduct two types of analyses: first, we provide a full comparison across all eight experimental conditions, then we focus on our main independent variable, confronting pro-youth and anti-youth discourses. Each step starts with a simple comparison of means, respectively a

two-way t-test for each dependent variable, then adds the controls in an ANOVA and a regression model (test of eight treatments), respectively a regression model (test of discourse treatment).

Table 1 shows the effects of the eight treatments on the five dependent variables. The first part of the table shows mean scores on each measure. The highest level of political trust is observed for the condition whereby a left-wing politician in the opposition makes a pro-youth discourse, while the lowest level relates to a pro-youth discourse by a right-leaning politician in opposition and to an anti-youth discourse by a right-wing politician in government. Thus, the two “most extreme” positions produce the biggest difference on this indicator of political attitudes, but at the same time a hostile discourse made by a rightist politician who holds government office equally leads to a lower level of political trust. The different position (holding government office or not) of a right-wing politician making an anti-youth discourse also determines a higher (when in the opposition) or lower (when in government) level of internal political efficacy. External political efficacy is highest, respectively lowest when moving from a left-wing to a right-wing politician making an anti-youth discourse.

Moving to political participation, we can see that the highest and lowest scores are determined by changing the role of a right-wing politician making an anti-youth discourse from opposition to government. Finally, the quasi-behavioral measure of participation (willingness to sign a petition) shows no relevant differences.

– Table 1 –

These differences are smaller than expected and there is little to ponder when we see that an ANOVA does not yield significant effects for the treatment variable. This might be due to a “blurring” effect. To reduce this problem, if not to solve it altogether, we included the three manipulation checks as controls in another ANOVA. Results show that the treatment variable is significant for the effect on political trust and on political participation. As a further check, we also ran an OLS regression for each dependent variable. Here the effect of the treatment variable (considered as metric in these models) is significant for three out of five dependent variables: political trust, political participation, and signing a petition.

Based on the regression models, we looked further at the pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions between all treatments. This means 28 comparisons for each dependent variable. Table 2 only shows the significant comparisons. The contrasts that appear to have more effects that between (i) an anti-youth discourse by a right-wing politician in the opposition and a pro-youth discourse by a left-wing politician in government, as well as (ii) the contrast between an anti-youth discourse and a pro-youth discourse by a right-wing politician in the opposition. Both contrasts are significant for political trust, political participation, and signing a petition. One other contrast is significant for two out of five dependent variables, while some are significant for only one dependent variable. All other contrasts are not significant.

– Table 2 –

Table 3 moves to the analysis of the aspects we are most interested in, namely the orientation of discourse (pro-youth or anti-youth). Since here we are dealing with only two groups, we ran a two-

sample t-test for each dependent variable. Here differences are not very large and are non-significant on all five counts. As with the eight treatments, we then ran OLS regressions. Coefficients and p values are also shown in the table. As we can see, when controlling for the perceptions respondents have of the treatment, the results yield some evidence for a causal effect of discourse. Specifically, the discourse treatment has a significant effect for political trust, political participation, and signing a petition. Only the two measures of political efficacy do not show any significant effect.

– Table 3 –

Conclusion

This paper has examined the effect of elite discourses on the political engagement of young people. More specifically, we have tested whether a politician's pro-youth or anti-youth statement impacts on the political trust, efficacy, and participation of young people, and whether such an effect also depends on the ideological position of the person making statement (left or right) and on the political role of that person (in the government or in the opposition). This was done through an experimental protocol including eight groups which were subject to different treatments.

In sum, in spite of a number of problems relating to a poor performance of the treatments, our analyses provide some evidence for a causal effect of elite discourses on youth political engagement. We found more specifically an effect on political trust as well as on intention of political participation and on a quasi-behavioral measure consisting in asking whether one would be ready to sign a petition urging the government to pay more attention to youth's needs when formulating new policies. The most important result in this regard is the impact of the orientation of discourse: anti-youth discourses tends to increase political trust of young people and also their propensity to say they intend to participate politically as well as the likelihood that they would sign the petition. With respect to the ideology or partisan affiliation of the politicians making the statement, as well as their role as members of the government or of the opposition: the effect of pro-youth or anti-youth discourses seems to depend on the characteristics of those who hold them.

Table 1. *Effects of eight treatments (means)*

	Political trust	Internal political efficacy	External political efficacy	Political participation	Signing petition
Pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in government	5.46	3.05	3.60	2.81	.79
Pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition	5.58	3.11	3.66	2.87	.78
Pro-youth discourse by rightist politician in government	5.53	3.11	3.62	2.86	.79
Pro-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition	5.38	3.05	3.62	2.85	.79
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in government	5.45	3.06	3.58	2.84	.78
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition	5.44	3.10	3.67	2.84	.80
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in government	5.38	3.00	3.67	2.78	.81
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition	5.50	3.12	3.69	2.88	.80
Prob>F for treatment from ANOVA	.37	.25	.19	.40	.92
Prob>F for treatment from ANOVA with controls	.10	.14	.33	.08	.29
P> t for treatment from OLS regression with controls	.05	.16	.59	.02	.01

Notes: Controls include perception of discourse orientation, perception of ideology of author of discourse, and perception of political role of author of discourse. Treatment is considered as metric in the regression models.

Table 2. *Pairwise comparisons of marginal linear predictions*

	Political trust		Internal political efficacy		External political efficacy		Political participation		Signing petition	
	Effect	P> t	Effect	P> t	Effect	P> t	Effect	P> t	Effect	P> t
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in government vs pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in government							.09	.05		
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition vs pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in government							.09	.05		
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition vs pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in government	.22	.02	.12	.02			.14	.00		
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in government vs pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition					-.11	.02				
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in government vs pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition									.04	.04
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in the opposition vs pro-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition									.04	.03
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition vs pro-youth discourse by rightist politician in government							.09	.05		
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition vs pro-youth discourse by rightist politician in the opposition	.20	.03								
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in the opposition vs pro-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition	.27	.00	.11	.03			.09	.04		
Anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in opposition vs anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in government					.09	.05				
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition vs anti-youth discourse by leftist politician in government					.11	.03				
Anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in opposition vs anti-youth discourse by rightist politician in government			.11	.02			.11	.01		

Table 3. *Effects of discourse treatment (means)*

	Political trust	Internal political efficacy	External political efficacy	Political participation	Signing petition
Pro-youth	5.49	3.08	3.63	2.85	.79
Anti-youth	5.44	3.07	3.65	2.84	.80
Difference	.05	.01	-.03	.01	-.01
Pr(T > t)	.32	.58	.26	.59	.44
Unstandardized coefficient for anti-youth discourse from OLS regression with controls	.10	.03	-.00	.04	.15
P> t from OLS regression with controls	.03	.20	.87	.05	.02

Notes: Two-sample t-test for differences in discourse treatment and OLS regressions. Controls include perception of discourse orientation, perception of ideology of author of discourse, and perception of political role of author of discourse.

Appendix: Wording of treatments

Discourse	Ideology	Political role	
		Government	Opposition
Pro-youth	Left	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p> <p>“Young people play a key role in British society today. They contribute in fundamental ways to British democracy. As a representative of a left-wing party in government, I truly believe our youth will be the driving force behind a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p> <p>“Young people play a key role in British society today. They contribute in fundamental ways to British democracy. As a representative of a left-wing party in the opposition, I truly believe our youth will be the driving force behind a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>
	Right	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p> <p>“Young people play a key role in British society today. They contribute in fundamental ways to British democracy. As a representative of a right-wing party in government, I truly believe our youth will be the driving force behind a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p> <p>“Young people play a key role in British society today. They contribute in fundamental ways to British democracy. As a representative of a right-wing party in the opposition, I truly believe our youth will be the driving force behind a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>
Anti-youth	Left	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p>	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p>

		<p>“Young people in the UK do not contribute to British society today. Youth are largely alienated from politics and have little to contribute to British democracy. As a representative of a left-wing party in government, I cannot see today how young people could be the driving force for a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>	<p>“Young people in the UK do not contribute to British society today. Youth are largely alienated from politics and have little to contribute to British democracy. As a representative of a left-wing party in the opposition, I must say that I cannot see today how young people could be the driving force for a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>
	Right	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p> <p>“Young people in the UK do not contribute to British society today. Youth are largely alienated from politics and have little to contribute to British democracy. As a representative of a right-wing party in government, I cannot see today how young people could be the driving force for a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>	<p>The role of youth in British politics and society has been the object of a number of political and public debates. Politicians have displayed different positions in this regard. Below we report a statement made by a prominent British politician during a party meeting on this topic. We would like to know your view about this statement.</p> <p>“Young people in the UK do not contribute to British society today. Youth are largely alienated from politics and have little to contribute to British democracy. As a representative of a right-wing party in the opposition, I cannot see today how young people could be the driving force for a democratic renewal in the UK.”</p>

Protest, repression and solidarity across generations

Lorenzo Bosi, Martín Portos and Katrin Uba

Research question and brief explanation

The overall aim of this survey experiment was to assess whether perceptions of repression in protest have a different impact on the attitudes and mobilization potential of the individual depending on the age cohort s/he belongs to. Specifically, it studies how the experience of repression influence individuals' attitudes towards protest mobilization and their propensity to participate in such events. It does so by bridging two broad aspects: repression and generational attributes.

“Although critics have long suggested that [... protest potential] represents an inadequate indicator of actual protest behaviour”, much extant empirical research on extra-conventional mobilization has been limited to examining its potentials— i.e. the “*would do*” instead of the “*have done*”. While we know that people will rarely engage in protest activities unless they are asked to do so, they will tend to resort to contentious behaviour provided they are motivated and feel it is a way to redress their grievances. That is the reason why protest potentials are of utmost importance for studies on the dynamics of mobilization.

Although the relationship between repression and mobilization is “at the core of any theory of rebellion”, at least in the context of established democracies, theoretical and empirical contributions are inconclusive. While the association between repression and mobilization is interactive and dynamic, we know little about the effects that (perceptions of) repression in a given protest event may have for subsequent protest potentials. This effect of repression in a protest event could affect mobilization prospects negatively or positively, or this association may be U-shaped.

We argue that the differences across generations influence perceptions of repression in a protest event and this also affects the mobilization potential of different age cohorts. The question remains an underexplored aspect in the literature and the nexus repression-mobilization has been rarely studied through experimental designs so far. Yet, it is a potentially relevant question that warrants further theoretical and empirical investigation. Specifically, after targeting and repressing different types of participants in a given protest performance, we expect the mobilization prospects for different groups to be uneven.

Hypotheses

While repression on protest events will have a negative impact on young people's mobilization potentials regardless the age of who is being repressed— *inter-generational solidarity*

hypothesis—, the non-young adults protest prospects will increase only when non-young adults are being repressed— (*exclusive*) *intra-generational solidarity hypothesis*—.

Design

The experiment is conducted in Italy, where the cultures of protest and repression have some peculiarities (linked e.g. with the authoritarian past). This country has recently experienced a deep economic recession, some degree of anti-austerity and youth-led protest (including e.g. the student Onda Anomala mobilisations in late 2008).

We first run a pre-treatment questionnaire in order to control for potentially confounding and moderating factors. In order to build the sample, the idea will be to target specifically two age groups: young (less than 35 years-old) and non-young (35 years-old or older) respondents. The treatments were administered within each age group as follows:

- 1) We showed one piece of text with information on a protest event where young protesters were repressed to a first treatment group (Treatment Group 1).
- 2) We showed one piece of text with information on a protest event where adult protesters were repressed to a second treatment group (Treatment Group 2).
- 3) We showed one piece of text with information on a protest event where young protesters were not repressed to a first control group— i.e. peaceful youth-led protests (Control Group 1).
- 4) We showed one piece of text with information on a protest event where adult protesters were not repressed to a second control group— i.e. peaceful non-youth-led protests (Control Group 2).

TEXT INFORMATION	Youth-led protest event	Non-youth-led protest event
Repression: yes	T.G.1	T.G.2
Repression: no	C.G.1	C.G.2

- 5) There was a final pure control group to whom we did not show any text clue at all (Control Group 3).

Pre-treatment questionnaire

Policy approval
Experienced repression
Left-right ideology
Issue salience
Democratic satisfaction
Political interest

Liberal-authoritarian values
Protest records
Socialisation with friends
Country of birth
Domicile
Education
Job status

Post-treatment questionnaire/ dependent variables

Trust Police
Emotions repression
Protest likelihood: collective
Protest likelihood: individual
Petition (quasi-behavioural test)
Repression deservingness (manipulation check)

Data

In order to make the sub-samples representative, Qualtrics applies (regional, sex, age) quotas. Overall, respondents come from two different age-targeted samples. Individuals were randomly allocated to each of the five groups (the two treatment groups, plus the three control groups). Table 1 shows the distribution of respondents by each sub-sample and the age dummy group. In total, we have got 1,720 (after dropping those who declared to be born before 1930). Each of the five groups consists of at least 15% of the total number of individuals in the experimental setup.

– Table 1 –

In this report, we use different questions in the post-treatment questionnaire as the dependent variable. Overall, we want to assess whether the age of the respondent (and the group treatment/control group) has an impact on further mobilisation prospects. With this purpose in mind, we consider two main explanatory variables.

First, we create a young people dummy variable (provided the respondent declares to be younger than 35 years-old=1; 0 when the individual is 35 years-old or older). While 51.8% of total people in the experiment sample is less than 35 years-old, 48.2% is 35 years-old or older.

Second, we create a 5-category subsample group variable, depending on which of the two treatment and the three control groups the individual belongs to. We take 5 as the baseline category (i.e. the reference is Control Group 3 to which no treatment/ no textual clue at all is shown). Value 1 refers to Treatment Group 1 (i.e., youth-led protests with repression), value 2 refers to Treatment Group 2 (non-youth-led protests with repression), value 3 refers to Control Group 1 (i.e., peaceful youth-led protests), and value 4 refers to Treatment Group 2 (i.e., peaceful

non-youth-led protests). We also include a number of control variables in our models to weight our arguments against alternative explanations. Specifically, we take into account the following:

- A 4-point decreasing scale of political interest, ranging from “very interested” to “not at all interested”.
- A 4-point decreasing scale measures how often the respondent has socially met with friends not living in the same household, ranging from “almost every day” to “less than once a month”.
- A 5-point scale best describing the area of the respondent’s domicile, ranging from “a big city” to “a farm or home in the countryside”.
- A 9 -point decreasing scale measures the highest level of education attained by the respondent, ranging from “primary education or less” to “PhD or equivalent”.

We consider the impact of the age dummy and treatment/control group on a number of variables, including:

- An 11-point scale of trust in the police, ranging from “no trust at all” to “complete trust”.
- A 1-4 ordinal scale of collective protest likelihood, which ranges from “not at all likely” to “very likely”. It is linked to the respondent’s category of a previous question on issue salience.
- A 1-4 ordinal scale of individual protest likelihood, which ranges from “not at all likely” to “very likely”. It is linked to the respondent’s category of a previous question on issue salience.
- A dummy variable measures whether the respondent is willing to sign a petition against police repression in peaceful protest performances.

Results

In Table 2 we summarize the descriptive statistics of the main variables reported throughout, demonstrating sufficient variation in the variables of interest. We next perform a series of regressions. Overall, note that the Adjusted R-squared statistics for all models are low, meaning a low fit of the regression predictions to data. Still, we report some of the preliminary findings throughout.

– Table 2 –

First, taking trust as the dependent variable, we observe there is a negative effect of the young respondent dummy variable on the level of trust in the police. In addition, relative to the pure treatment group (note the baseline category of the multinomial group variable is ‘5’), belonging to Treatment Group 2 (i.e., non-youth-led protests with repression) decreases trust in the police. However, there is not an interactive significant effect between the young respondent dummy and

the group the respondent is assigned to. In other words, young people are less trustful of the police, but this does not depend on our manipulations (i.e. whether there was repression or not, and whether the target group of the repression was young or old), see Figure 1. Also, political lack of interest is associated with lower trust in the police.

– Figure 1 –

When we take the likelihood of collective protest (on the issue most salient for the respondent) as the dependent variable, findings are similar to those for trust in the police. Relative to the pure treatment group to which no textual clue is shown, administering a piece of news with repression towards non-youth-led protesters increases the probabilities of predicting the likelihood of collective protest, but there is not an interactive significant effect between the young respondent dummy and the group the respondent is assigned to. Note here we cannot observe a direct negative effect of the young respondent dummy variable on the likelihood of collective protest. In other words, repressing old people leads to an increase in the likelihood of collective protest, but it does not depend on the age of the respondent. See Figure 2:

– Figure 2 –

The likelihood of individual protest is the explanandum in Figure 3. As with police, we find a strong effect of the young people dummy: young respondents are much more willing to engage in protest on an issue that is more salient to them. However, neither group effects nor interactive effects between group and the age dummy variables are reported. Still, when looking at the effects of these variables on the willingness for individual protest, one can notice relevant differences. Going beyond the positive effect for the youth dummy in the regression model, there is only an age gap for some treatment/control groups: while individual protest likelihood remains fairly constant across groups for young people, it changes among those who are 35 years-old or above. Particularly, there is a clear age gap among those who read a piece of news with young protesters being the target of repression. When young protesters are repressed, the likelihood of individual protest is higher among young respondents relative to non-young people. This age gap in individual protest likelihood also holds when there is a peaceful event led by non-young protesters, and for people who are not manipulated in the experimental setup.

– Figure 3 –

Finally, we report findings related to our quasi-behavioural test, see Figure 4. We ask the respondents whether they would be willing to sign a petition against police repression in peaceful protest performances on the issue that is most salient to them. Similar to individual protest likelihood, we find an age gap, but only in the case among those who read a piece of news with young protesters being the target of repression. In other words, young respondents are more willing to sign the petition than non-young people provided young actors are the target of repression in a protest event on a given issue.

– Figure 4 –

Conclusions

The overall aim of this experiment was to assess whether perceptions of repression in protest have a different impact on the attitudes and mobilization potential of the individual depending on the age cohort s/he belongs to. We expected that repression of protest events (evidence of this was presented via text) will have a negative impact on young people's mobilization potentials regardless the age of who is being repressed and adults protest prospects will increase only when adults are being repressed. In a nutshell, we cannot confirm our hypotheses either in terms of inter-generational solidarity of young respondents nor in terms of (exclusive) intra-generational solidarity among old people. Having said that, we observe some discontinuities in mobilization potentials of the mobilization agents depending on their age, but also depending on whether there was repression in the protest event and the eventual age of the target of such repression.

Table 1. Crosstabulation of treatment and control groups by dummy of young people

Groups	Young	Adults	Total
1	173 (20.9%)	175 (19.6%)	348 (20.2%)
2	178 (21.5%)	195 (21.9%)	373 (21.7%)
3	113 (13.6%)	151 (16.9%)	264 (15.4%)
4	183 (22.0%)	190 (21.3%)	373 (21.7%)
5	182 (22.0%)	180 (20.2%)	362 (21.1%)
Total	829 (100%)	891 (100%)	1720 (100%)

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of main variables included in the statistical analyses

Variables	Obs.	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.
Trust police	1714	6.36	2.39	0	10
Collective protest likelihood	1716	2.24	.84	1	4
Individual protest likelihood	1715	2.25	.89	1	4
Petitioning	1711	.64	.48	0	1
Young dummy	1720	.52	.50	0	1
Group					
I_1	1720	.20	.40	0	1
I_2	1720	.22	.41	0	1
I_3	1720	.15	.36	0	1
I_4	1720	.22	.41	0	1
Political interest	1718	2.20	.88	1	4
Meeting friends	1715	2.22	.98	1	4
Domicile	1717	2.53	1.22	1	5
Education	1719	4.06	1.86	1	9

Figure 1. *Predicted values of trust in the police as a function of the young respondent's dummy and the treatment/control group. Controls: political interest, meeting friends, domicile, education.*




Figure 2. Predicted values of collective protest likelihood as a function of the young respondent's dummy and the treatment/control group. Controls: political interest, meeting friends, domicile, education.




Figure 3. Predicted values of individual protest likelihood as a function of the young respondent's dummy and the treatment/control group. Controls: political interest, meeting friends, domicile, education.





Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of petitioning as a function of the young respondent's dummy and the treatment/control group. Controls: political interest, meeting friends, domicile, education.



Appendix: Wording of treatments [mutually exclusive]

We show some text clues as isolated as possible from the context and other possible confounding factors (i.e. no visible claims, no minorities, no particular aesthetic style/definition, etc.). Importantly, the text will specify that the event was national. In order to make it as specific, relevant and touching for the respondent as possible, we specify it was related to the issue it chose as most salient in a prior question. We will frame it as coming from a real event and reliable source of information. The only distinctive word for the two age groups will be the age of the respondent. They read as follows:

T.G.1: “Now we will show you a piece of news that appeared on ansa.it on 21st January 2014,

This afternoon around 6pm there was a peaceful demonstration of people in their 20s on [Issuesalience response]. Protesters were met with fierce repression on the side of the police, with a number of challengers needing medical aid after being injured during the charges.”

T.G.2: “Now we will show you a piece of news that appeared on ansa.it on 21st January 2014,

This afternoon around 6pm there was a peaceful demonstration of people in their 60s on [Issuesalience response]. Protesters were met with fierce repression on the side of the police, with a number of challengers needing medical aid after being injured during the charges.”

C.G.1: “Now we will show you a piece of news that appeared on ansa.it on 21st January 2014,

This afternoon around 6pm there was a peaceful demonstration of people in their 20s on [Issuesalience response]. The protest run smoothly, without any encounters with the police.”

C.G.2: “Now we will show you a piece of news that appeared on ansa.it on 21st January 2014,

This afternoon around 6pm there was a peaceful demonstration of people in their 60s on [Issue saliience response]. The protest run smoothly, without any encounters with the police.”

Control Group 3: [no piece of news shown, proceed straight to post-treatment questionnaire]

The influence of police brutality on political participation of youth

Piotr Michalski and Marcin Sińczuch

Research question and brief explanation

The aim of the experiment is to determine whether and under what circumstances the perception of political authority as associated with brutality and use of direct force, has influence on political participation of youth. The fear of negative consequences for those who will oppose the mainstream, governing parties can be an important factor in political engagement of youth. The mentioned influence can have however different effect on people who support the governing party. Furthermore, we hypothesize that two fairly well recognized worldview variables (Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Social Dominance Orientation) will have an impact on the strength of willingness to participate in various forms of political engagement under different circumstances. RWA and SDO function in present theories as two sides of the same coin called authoritarian personality. RWA is connected with submissiveness to authorities and aggression directed towards those social groups who are pointed to by these authorities. We therefore expect that the influence perceived police brutality on political participation will be greater among people scoring higher on RWA and who identify themselves with the governing party. SDO on the other hand derives from a motivation to dominate others and perceiving the social world as strictly hierarchic in which groups which occupy lower positions of social ladder deserve despise and aggression. Therefore we expect the influence of manipulation on political participation to be lower above people who score high in the SDO scale. We hypothesize that this effect will be mediated by an opinion that the victims of police brutality probably caused the aggression of authorities by their inappropriate behavior. This phenomenon derives from the System Justification Theory which states that some individuals are more inclined to believe that the outcomes of people's actions are usually just and well-deserved.

The main research question of this experiment project is: Does the perceived police brutality stops young people from engaging in political activity?

Other research questions concern the circumstances under which the mentioned influence occur and are as follows:

1. Does the mentioned influence occur only among young people who are not supporting the government party?

2. What individual traits moderates the impact of perceived police brutality on political engagement of youth?

3. Is it enough to perceive the presence of police activity in public sphere to stop young people to engage in political activities or the actions of police have to be perceived as brutal?

Hypotheses

1. Political participation readiness will be similar among participants who have read neutral (fictitious story about a sailor) and “police presence” (history of the Polish Police Day) text.

2. Political participation readiness will be lower (compared to other two experimental groups) after exposing the experimental group to an article about police brutality.

2.1 This influence will be weaker among people who support the government

2.2 This influence will be weaker among people scoring higher in SDO scale

2.3 This influence will be weaker among people with higher social status

2.4. This influence will be weaker among people who perceive the Polish social and political system as just.

3. An interaction between RWA and support for the government will occur in explaining the differences in political participation of respondents:

3.1 People scoring high in RWA scale who do not support the government will be more likely to engage in political participation (in more radical forms)

3.2 People scoring high in RWA scale who support the government will be more likely to engage in political participation (in forms which express endorsement of the government)

3.3 Low levels of RWA has no moderating effect with support for the government in predicting political participation

Design

We will conduct a vignette experiment on a sample of 1000 adult young people (18-35) who at the beginning of the research will be randomly assigned to two experimental and one control groups.

Each experimental group will receive identical questionnaires except a short article and three questions testing whether the participants have read the given articles carefully:

1. First experimental group will read a fictional story about a man who have been beaten on a police station by policemen during his interrogation.
2. Second experimental group will read an article about the history of the Polish Police Day.
3. Control group will receive a short fragment of a “Heart of Darkness” by Joseph Conrad covering a story of a sailor.

Dependent variables

Different forms of political participation (including conventional and radical forms of participation)

Pre-treatment questionnaire

Sociodemographic questions
Social status
SDO scale
RWA scale
Support for the current government
System Justification

Post-treatment questionnaire

Different forms of political participation (including conventional and radical forms of participation)
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Results

To check whether the respondents read and understood the texts presented to them, on the following page of the questionnaire they were asked three questions. We decided to eliminate from further analyses persons who answered two or three of them incorrectly because of doubt about the influence of our experiment manipulation on them. As a result, the number of respondents in each group has decreased from the initial N=310 in the 'police brutality' condition to N=193, N=340 in the 'police celebration day' condition to N=225 and N=311 in the control group to N=204. The differences between the number of respondents in each condition were not statistically significant, which means that the manipulation texts were equally difficult to understand ($\chi^2(2, N = 622) = 2.958, p > 0.05$)¹.

¹ Additionally, we have compared the number of respondents in each pair of experiment conditions separately adjusting the results for multiple comparisons with Bonferroni correction – these analyses also did not show any significant differences.

Next, in order to verify Hypothesis 1 and 2, we conducted one-way ANOVA with an experimental condition as a factor and the sum of different forms of political engagement as the dependent variable. The analysis did not result in a significant difference between groups ($F(2,619) = 1.194$, $p > 0.05$) and therefore we have no basis for the conclusion that perceiving police brutality has an influence on the general level of the political engagement of the youth. We have, however, suspected that this method of calculating the dependent variable could be too general (because of a wide variety of forms of engagement) so we have decided to conduct separate analyses for each form of engagement.

First, we wanted to once again verify Hypothesis 1. Analyses with χ^2 test have shown no statistically significant differences between the control and 'police celebration day' conditions. On this basis, we decided to combine these two groups and compare the result with the 'police brutality' condition. The results of these analyses are shown in Table 1.

– Table 1 –

The results show the opposite direction of manipulation than expected. It turns out that young persons, after reading a text describing brutal police behavior, were more willing to sign a petition, to make internet statements regarding local and political issues and to take part in demonstrations that may result in destruction of property and fighting with the police. Therefore, young people are not easy to scare and do not retreat from political participation after realizing the risk of getting hurt by the police. It seems that they are more willing to take action when confronted with injustice from the government (by the hands of the police). On the other hand, respondents from this experimental condition have been less willing to financially support social actions which means that in participation they want to focus directly on political or system-related causes rather than on their outcomes.

The aim of the next analyses was to determine those factors responsible for the decrease in declared willingness for political participation (Hypotheses 2.1-2.4). Because the decrease was noted only in the case of financial support of social actions, we have decided to perform the analyses also for those of forms of participation where we observe increase in the declared involvement. Therefore, we have performed logistic regressions analyses with the mentioned forms of participation as dependent variables. As predictors we have included support for the government, social status, RWA, SDO, system justification and experimental condition (entered as a dichotomous variable: 1 – 'police brutality condition' and 0 – control + 'police celebration day'). In the second step of the regression analyses we have included interactions of experimental condition with variables from the first step. The results are shown in Table 2.

The results of the performed analyses confirm our assumption about qualitative differences between different forms of engagement. It turns out that social status is the only significant predictor of willingness to sign a petition: persons placing themselves at higher levels of social hierarchy are more eager to participate in that way. The factors that decrease the political engagement of the youth are RWA and system justification. Both of these variables negatively influence political participation readiness in forms of political activity via the internet, while system justification additionally weakens willingness to sign a petition. The most interesting results are, however, connected to interactions. The analyses show that only in the 'police brutality' condition does system justification negatively influence willingness to make internet statements regarding local issues. Second, only within the group of respondents' with lower social status we see increased willingness to take part in a demonstration, which may result in fighting the police.

Conclusion

The research reported here had two main goals. First, we wanted to determine whether showing the respondents a fictitious story about policemen being brutal and unpunished decreases their willingness to engage in political participation. Furthermore, we wanted to examine whether presenting the police as neutral will have the same impact on the youth. Secondly, the research questions concerned the circumstances in which the mentioned influence would be relatively stronger or weaker. In that respect, we have been interested in the worldviews and opinions of respondents.

The conducted analyses have shown that reading a story about the police celebration day did not have any impact on the engagement of youth in comparison with the control group. This means that the main factor influencing willingness for political participation is the brutality of the police and not police presence in the sociopolitical sphere. The direction of this relationship turned out to be opposite to the one we had assumed: young persons, instead of being frightened by the police and as a result staying away from political engagement, instead began to declare more willingness to participate, but only in specific forms of actions. These were signing a petition, making statements on the internet regarding local and political issues and participating in a demonstration that may result in destroying property and fighting the police. The opposite result of experimental manipulation (so in accord with our assumptions) appeared only in regard to donating money for social actions. It seems that young people engage in politics if they become aware of unjust treatment of the members of society by the authorities when there are no consequences from the government (as the policemen in the fictitious story are not punished for their brutality). This conclusion is in accord with the negative influence of system justification

on participation – if we believe that our society and government gives everyone what they deserve, then there is no need for change.

Another conclusion derived from the obtained results is that the initial reaction to unjust and brutal punishment delivered by the police are political participation forms that are safe and do not require too much effort – probably because they are the first step in trying to resolve this issue. We do not know what further youth engagement would look like if these forms of actions did not result in what was intended. We do know, however, that when confronted with unjust and brutal treatment from the police, young people will try to directly aim at the cause of their actions and not support people who have been hurt by the actions of the authorities. Furthermore, if young people at the same time perceive themselves to be at lower levels of the social hierarchy, they would be more willing to engage in protest actions that may end in violence against the police and the destruction of property. It seems that this is a way of delivering revenge to the authorities, whom are blamed for unjust positioning of the youth on the lower levels of the social hierarchy. We not observe similar relationships in the case of willingness to engage in violence against political opponents and therefore we can state that the anger of the youth is precisely aimed at the authorities rather than other social groups competing for a higher place in social hierarchy.

Table 1. *Number of respondents willing to participate in various forms of political engagement*

	Group (experimental condition)	
	Police brutality (N=193)	Control + Police Celebration Day (N=429)
To sign a petition	159(82.4%)*	306(71.3%)*
To donate money for political activities	15(7.8%)	34(7.9%)
To take part in a consumer strike	45(23.3%)	100(23.3%)
To make internet statements regarding local issues	104(53.9%)*	188(43.8%)*
To make internet statements regarding political issues	72(37.1%)*	123(28.7%)*
To make contact with a politician	30(15.5%)	58(13.5%)
To take part in a political meeting	68(35.2%)	122(28.4%)
To take part in a demonstration	87(45.1%)	172(40.1%)
To donate money for social actions	44(22.8%)*	133(31%)*

To take part in a strike	49(25.4%)	128(29.8%)
To take part in a peaceful counter-demonstration	57(29.5%)	119(27.7%)
To take part in a confrontational counter-demonstration	10(5.2%)	33(7.7%)
To take part in a counter-demonstration in order to frighten or hurt people with different views	6(3.1%)	13(3%)
To take part in an illegal demonstration	12(6.2%)	29(6.8%)
To take part in a demonstration which may result in destruction of property and fight with the police	12(6.2%)*	10(2.3%)*
*p < 0.05		

Table 2. Logistic regression analyses for five forms of political participation as dependent variables

	Dependent variables									
	To sign a petition (AOR)		To make internet statements regarding local issues (AOR)		To make internet statements regarding political issues (AOR)		To donate money for social actions (AOR)		To take part in a demonstration which may result in destruction of property and fight with the police (AOR)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Experimental condition	0.563*	0.552*	0.667*	0.652*	0.676*	0.664*	1.493*	1.512*	0.345*	0.328*
Government support	0.892	0.913	1.121	1.108	1.088	1.065	1.028	1.074	0.671*	0.646

SDO	0.937	0.928	0.974	0.891	0.938	0.918	0.81	0.829	0.96	1.042
Social status	1.182*	1.196*	1.052	1.091	1.116	1.117	1.037	0.989	0.956	0.897
System Justification	0.796	0.751*	0.818	0.726*	0.743*	0.73*	0.964	1.019	1.607	1.732
RWA	0.738	0.781	0.633*	0.644*	0.567*	0.61*	0.854	0.878	1.493	1.876
Group*Government support	-	1.143	-	1.012	-	0.97	-	1.133	-	1.253
Group*SDO	-	0.875	-	0.898	-	0.949	-	0.964	-	1.453
Group*Social status	-	1.008	-	1.040	-	0.958	-	0.895	-	0.594*
Group*System Justification	-	0.940	-	0.766*	-	0.946	-	1.151	-	1.001
RWA*Government support	-	1.092	-	1.097	-	1.121	-	0.988	-	1.284
R ² Nagelkerke	0.088	0.097	0.043	0.064	0.068	0.074	0.022	0.036	0.064	0.122
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test	22.741	14.170	15.418ns	9.677	4.85	11.854	8.894	6.875	5.851	4.423
	p = 0.004	ns		ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns	ns
*p < 0.05; ns – not significant										

How blaming attribution affects political participation

Valentina Holecz and Katherine Smith

Research question and brief explanation

This research focuses on how citizens, and especially young² citizens, have their attention drawn to a political issue with a specific target, and how they engage – or not – in different forms of political participation. Specifically, through an experimental survey, we analyse how blaming attribution has an effect on different forms of political participation, while controlling for generational effect. The aim of this study is thus to link the youth political participation literature to emerging political arenas where citizens engage alternatively and develop their political worldviews. Therefore, it is important to understand the role-played of the scope of the issue and how these affects different forms of political participation among citizens, both younger and older.

Much literature shows that the political participation of young people tends to be in average lower than for the general population. However, the widespread idea that young people are less political can be shown to be false: other studies show that young people are attracted to and engage in non-traditional styles of participation. Younger citizens are as diverse as older citizens and have competing political interests. Hence, young people have different perceptions on how best to influence their political system, how to behave politically and how to consume and to pursue their political ideas. So, it may be that what is changing is reflections on the political landscape of where to deploy political actions. Hence, what is important is not an age gap among citizens but rather who people think is to blame. Scholars underline a declining trust in government; yet citizens require a form a trust in their forms of political participations in order to become involved. In fact, if the chosen style of political participation does not seem to impact on the public arena, citizens might select other forms to raise their voices, creating alternative arenas where citizens can express themselves. The feeling that government lacks responsibility and competence creates the possibility for citizens to find their own way to express themselves through alternative political practices.

Such arenas enable citizens: in their everyday political engagement, through their private and their public sphere, they can speak, re-think and engage in forms in which they believe. Therefore, we outline the following **research question**: how does blaming attribution shape political participation among citizens? Do young people engage differently on similar issues than older generations while controlling for the blaming effect?

² In this research, we define young people from the age of 18- to 34-years-old; 'older' citizens are individuals above the age of 35 years old.

Hypotheses

1. Giving people information on the extent of responsibility of an actor for an issue affects citizens' engagement:
 - i. When the actor is an institutional one, citizens will engage in an institutional form of engagement.
 - ii. When the actor is not an institutional one, citizens will engage by combining institutional forms and non-institutional form of engagement.

Design

The design of the experiment is a vignette one. We propose to conduct the survey experiments with respondents from Switzerland with a sample size of 1,200 people. The sample is divided as follows: 50% aged 18- to 34-years-old and the other 50% made up of people 35- to 65-years-old. The population segments should be split evenly across the six different conditions.

	Government	Civil Society	Control group
Pesticide	a	b	c
Water privatization	a	b	c

Respondents will choose among different issues: **water privatization and pesticide**. The choice made by each respondent will depend on their personal concern. In fact, we believe that citizens are much less likely to participate and get involved in politics when interests are diffuse. In addition, all issues are framed with a negative priming. We strongly believe that by inducing a negative priming, respondents will be more inclined to consider a preference to engage in such issues. Note that we are not interested in the correlation between issues and forms of participation. Rather, we are looking for a correlation between the preferred issues and, depending on the type of information that respondents have, the political participation preferences that participants are more likely to engage in.

The experiment will be constructed in two phases: first, participants will read an excerpt from a news article focusing on the chosen issue (water privatization or pesticide). Then, respondents will be asked what types of political participation in which they are more likely to engage. Second, participants will be asked to analyse the actor they consider as responsible.

We posit that when participants face an institutional actor such as parliament, and the risk is foreseeable, respondents will participate in a more institutional way. In fact, parliament is a key institution of representative democracy and can be held extrinsically accountable since citizens

can dismiss politicians when they disapprove of them. On the other hand, when participants face a civil society actor, they will foresee a different political arena.

	Institutional	Non-institutional
Individual		
Collective		

Issues: water privatization, pesticide.

a. Water privatization: Parliament

Since 2013, the city of Delémont is the first municipality to recognize water as a public good and intends to ensure that the management of this essential resource remains under its full responsibility. For the municipality, the privatization of the water sector in Switzerland would lead to a deterioration in the areas of environment and health. Sustainable community services in the field of water economy will be better preserved by the maintenance of the public law system, subject to democratic control.

Meanwhile, the Parliament is currently aiming to privatize water provision, even though the privatization of the water sector in Switzerland would lead to a deterioration in the areas of environment and health.

b. Water privatization: Civil society

Since 2013, the city of Delémont is the first municipality to recognize water as a public good and intends to ensure that the management of this essential resource remains under its full responsibility. For the municipality, the privatization of the water sector in Switzerland would lead to a deterioration in the areas of environment and health. Sustainable community services in the field of water economy will be better preserved by the maintenance of the public law system, subject to democratic control.

Meanwhile, a group of citizens is currently creating a collective with the aim to privatize water, even though the privatization of the water sector in Switzerland would lead to a deterioration in the areas of environment and health.

c. Water privatization: Control group

Since 2013, the city of Delémont is the first municipality to recognize water as a public good and intends to ensure that the management of this essential resource remains under its full responsibility. For the municipality, the privatization of the water sector in Switzerland would lead to a deterioration in the areas of environment and health.

Sustainable community services in the field of water economy will be better preserved by the maintenance of the public law system, subject to democratic control.

Meanwhile, expert just published a report where they firmly believe that water's privatisation is a suitable thing to do, even though the privatization of the water sector in Switzerland would lead to a deterioration in the areas of environment and health

a. Pesticide: Parliament

Since 2013, the city of Delémont is the first municipality to ban neocotinoids: pesticides that were used in agriculture for crops. These pesticides were contaminating the environment; they infected the food of bees and hence were the cause of the disappearance of bees. Bees and other pollinators are vital to three-quarters of the world's food crops. Their disappearance poses great risks in terms of the erosion of biodiversity.

Meanwhile, the Swiss Parliament is currently willing to intensify the use of neocotinoid, even though it will risk biodiversity and decreases in the bee population.

b. Pesticide: Civil society

Since 2013, the city of Delémont is the first municipality to ban neocotinoids: pesticides that used to be used in agriculture for crops. These pesticides contaminated the environment: they got into the food of bees and caused their disappearance. Bees and other pollinators are vital to three-quarters of the world's food crops. Their disappearance poses great risks in terms of the erosion of biodiversity.

Meanwhile, a group of citizens is currently creating a collective with the aim to intensify the use of neocotinoids, even though this will risk biodiversity and decreases in the bee population.

c. Pesticide: Control group

Since 2013, the city of Delémont is the first municipality to ban neocotinoids: pesticides that used to be used in agriculture for crops. These pesticides contaminated the environment: they got into the food of bees and caused their disappearance. Bees and other pollinators are vital to three-quarters of the world's food crops. Their disappearance poses great risks in terms of the erosion of biodiversity.

Meanwhile, expert just published a report where they firmly believe that the use of neocotinoids is a suitable thing to do, even though this will risk biodiversity and decreases in the bee population.

Pre-treatment questionnaire

Socio-demographics: age, gender, working status, precariousness
Sociotropy
Deservingness
Social trust
Life engagement
Use of social media
Political trust

Post-treatment questions

Political engagement intention
Different form of political participation – institutional – non institutional
Social trust
Blame attribution
Political trust
Internal political efficacy
External political efficacy
What the experiment was about

Results

We conducted the experiment in Switzerland, more specifically in the French-speaking region, obtaining a sample size of 1,225 people. We focus on this particular region since it would have been more difficult to take into account the other three national languages. The major descriptive data, summarized in Table 1, demonstrates that the respondents are relatively representative. In our sample we can observe that more than 80% have citizenship, which is an important element as we will further mention, since these respondents have a wider spectrum of choices in their political action, such as voting.

– Table 1 –

Considering the variable political interest, what should be underlined is that all respondents who either did not feel interested at all or were not interested in politics, had answer a follow up question to disentangle their feelings toward politics. Overall, 20.3% of respondents said that they do not feel competent, whereas only 8.8% say they think that their vote does not count – even though more than 16.5 % believe that their opinions do not matter to politicians. However, only 12.6% of respondents don't feel concern about politics.

Now, taking into consideration our experiment, as briefly explained earlier in the protocol, before giving treatment to our answerer, we gave respondents the possibility of choosing a thematic issue depending on an area of their personal concern. Therefore, the choice made by each respondent

depended on their particular interests. In fact, agreeing with the existing literature, we believe that citizens are more likely to participate and get involved in politics when they are interested and feel concern about something. Specifically, as it is shown in Table 2, 57.1% are more concerned about the issue of water privatization, whereas 42.8% are interested in the reintroduction of pesticide into the agriculture sector. We can see the different frequencies along the two issues as this was not a randomly assigned question.

– Table 2 –

In connection with the two different topics, it's necessary to explain how time-frame (from the conception of our protocol to the data collection) could affect our results. In fact, if in a first time we opted for an environmental topic for our treatments – water privatization and the reintroduction of pesticide into the agriculture sector – since these could be evaluated by our respondents as a 'non-salient issue', we now face a turning point. Since March 2019, Greta Thunberg and many young militants have been actively participating in #FridayForFuture creating a different debate with new actors around environmental issues. Therefore, as the data collection occurred during the summer time, we can no longer label as a 'non-salient issue' these two topics since we believe our sample was exposed to this new component.

Looking into our six different treatments - see Table 3 - even though we can affirm that treatments were randomly assigned, since we were able to control with their preference of issue, we can also observe the lack of frequencies. Indeed, for each of the six treatments, the maximum of percentage is 10.9%, which gives us little possibility to analyse our data. Thus, we realized there had been a mistake in the implementation of our experiment: even though respondents had the possibility of selecting from among two issues, only half of the sample, 624 respondents, were exposed to one of the six treatments. As a consequence, we face a subsample of 601 respondents which we will consider a control group, since they were not exposed to our treatments.

– Table 3 –

Dependent variable and treatments

For our preliminary findings, we consider a wide range of forms of political participation. In fact, following our hypothesis, we expected that when our treatment group had an institutionalised actor, Parliament, it was more likely that people would opt to choose among more institutional forms of action since i) the actor is clear and well defined, ii) the risk is foreseeable, so respondents – when considering whether to participate – would targeted the same arena, in this case an institutional one. In fact, parliament is a key institution of representative democracy and can be held extrinsically accountable since citizens can dismiss politicians when they disapprove of them. On the other hand, when participants had to face a civil society actor, they would foresee a different type of participation since i) the actor is less clear and it is not institutionalised, and ii) even though the risk is foreseeable, the blaming attribution is more diffuse, therefore the type of political participation would consider a non-institutional form of participation.

When considering all forms of participation as our dependent variable, unfortunately neither treatments has significant effect. However, when taking into account specific forms of engagement for our dependent variable, we can see a ray of hope – see Table 4. Changing habits for ecological reasons, participating in demonstration, and joining or starting a newsletter to inform citizens are valued as non-institutional practices. On the other hand, since voting and other more institutional forms were not significant, we considered contacting a politician as the dependent variable which would represent the institutional participation practices. If in one hand the ANOVA is significant as the p value, probably due to the few n in each treatment, the variance is close to 0. Further analysis should be done to investigate current results.

– Table 4 –

Conclusion

This preliminary research has examined the existing correlation between blame attribution and political participation forms in Switzerland, more specifically in the French-speaking part of the country. We have tested whether knowing and foreseeing an actor and their corresponding political arena, respondents would choose a type of political participation form. This was done through an experimental protocol including six groups that were subject to different treatments, on a sample of 1,225 respondents.

Our preliminary findings show how types of political practices are correlated depending on which actor respondents want to blame. We must, however, underline the presence of low frequencies in our treatments as only half of our sample was exposed to six of our treatments.

Table 1. *General Description Sample*

Variables	Values	Frequency	Percent
Age	18-24	155	12.7%
	25-34	275	22.5%
	35-50	450	36.7%
	50-65	344	28.1%
		1225	100%
Citizenship	Yes	985	80.4%
	No	238	19.4%
		1222	100%
Precariousness	Fairly possible	201	16.4%
	Possible	611	49.9%
	Very possible	231	18.8%
	Missing	182	14.8%
		1225	100%
Political interest	Not interested at all	157	12.8%
	Not interested A bit	197	16.1%
	interested	327	26.7%
	Interested	327	26.7%
	Very interested	141	11.5%
	Missing	9	0.7%
	Total	1225	100%

Table 2. *Treatments Preferences*

Variables	Values	Frequency	Percent
Issue Treatment	Water privatization	700	57.1%
	Reintroduction pesticide	524	42.8%
	Missing	1	0.1%
	Total	1225	100%

Table 3. *Descriptive Treatments*

Variables	Values	Frequency	Percent
<i>Treatment water</i>	Parliament	133	10.9%
	Civil society	120	9.8%
	Control	96	7.9%
	Missing* ³	*	*
	Total	1225	100%
<i>Treatment pesticide</i>	Parliament	76	6.2%
	Civil society	107	8.7%
	Control	92	7.5%
	Missing* ⁴	*	*
	Total	1225	100%

Table 4. *Regression, six treatments*

	Newsletters	Manifestation	Changing habits for ecological reasons	Contacting politicians
Water treatment, actor: Parliament	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
Water treatment, actor: Civil society				-0.004***
Water treatment, actor: Control	-0.006***	-0.007***	-0.006***	-0.005***
Pesticide treatment, actor: Parliament	0.005***	0.005***		0.006***
Pesticide treatment, actor: Civil society	0.009***	0.006***		0.007***
Pesticide treatment, actor: Control	0.007***		0.005***	0.005***
***p < 0,001				

³ The missing from the three treatment are the following one : 1092 for the Parliament, 1105 for the civil society, the control group 1129.

⁴ The missing from the three treatment are the following one : 1149 for the Parliament, 1118 for the civil society, the control group 1133.

Effects of (mis)perceptions of inequality on youths' social trust and political engagement: the role of cultural orientation and social class

Konstantinos Kafetsios

Research question and brief explanation

(Mis)perceptions of inequality vary significantly and this variation can have important effects on attitudes and intentions. The perception and attributions to such inequalities can interact with several social and psychological factors that can further influence political attitudes and political participation. The present experiment tested this hypothesis in youth and compared to ways of thinking of older adults.

Differences in the perception of inequality and its causes critically depend on cultural orientations and related interpretative patterns. It is known that persons from more collectivistic societies and from lower social class adopt and are more influenced by contextual than dispositional explanations. Moreover, in high power distance/collectivistic cultures and persons of lower SES put more emphasis on social status.

Recent research has also pointed out the importance of examining the impact that increasing inequality, poverty, precarity and grievances have on protest and social movement mobilization, especially since the global economic crisis of 2007.

The question posed in this research is, therefore: "how do (mis)perceptions of inequality as a function of the status of the source and contextual explanations, influence attitudes and intentions toward civic participation and political engagement of the youth?"

This survey experiment manipulated two main variables: Level of inequality perception (High, low) followed by contextual and dispositional explanations of inequality free to vary as a function of priming inequality. Individual SES, cultural orientation and insecure identity were also measured.

We formed the following research questions:

1. To what extent are youths' perceptions of inequality (low, high) related to intentions and attitudes towards political engagement and social trust?
2. To what degree do explanations/attributions of inequality (contextual, referring to the collective, individual-regarding a particular individual) influence the perception of inequality and hence social trust and political engagement?
3. To what extent do perceptions of inequality influence participation in soft protest action (e.g. signing a petition)?

Key moderating factors: Participants' social class/SES, cultural orientation, power distance orientation, and insecure attachment orientation. We aimed to test those questions in youth and compare those mind-sets with older participants in Greece, a collectivistic country.

Hypotheses

Based on previous research conducted in the US we formed the following hypotheses:

H1. Higher levels of inequality presented will result in lower social cohesion perception and lower social trust and intention for political participation.

H2. Cultural orientation and SES will moderate the above association as a function of contextual/individual explanation of inequality.

H2a. Within each culture, lower SES youth will make more contextual attributions in inequality and in response to the inequality priming in particular.

H3. Higher contextual attributions of inequality (in the high inequality condition) will lead to lower social trust and political participation intentions.

H3b. Higher contextual attributions of inequality (in the high inequality condition) will lead to lower social trust and political participation intentions especially for the higher collectivism/power distance youth.

H3c. Higher contextual attributions of inequality (in the high inequality condition) will lead to lower social trust and political participation intentions especially for the lower SES youth.

H4. Higher perception of inequality will lead to higher probability of participation in a soft protest action, especially among youth.

The experiment was pre-registered on 10.05.2019 at osf.org: <https://osf.io/xq54t/>

Method

Sample. The sample comprised 1003 participants (493 men $Age = 39.75$, $SD = 12.55$) whose responses were collected via an online survey (Qualtrics). After screening for responses to the attention question ('I do not speak Greek', the final sample was reduced to 846 participants (408 men, 3 gender missing, $Age = 40.49$, $SD = 12.57$). There was an almost equal number of men and women participating, and age ranged from 18 to 65 randomly allocated in one of the two experimental conditions/manipulations (See Phase B).

Procedure. The survey experiment comprised three phases: Phase A – pre-priming, Phase B – inequality priming, Phase C – post-priming. The three phases are briefly depicted below.

Design

Phase A- Pre-treatment questionnaire

Subjective social status
Knowledge about inequality
Political self-efficacy
Life satisfaction & happiness
Cultural Self-Constual
Secure and insecure attachment
Holistic-Analytic Orientation

Phase B- Manipulations /Treatments

Perception of equality/inequality in Greece
Conditions (See Appendix 1)
1 = (Low inequality)
2 = (High inequality). There was be a random assignment between conditions 1 and 2
Contextual attributions of inequality: inheritance, political influence, economic structure of society, personal background, educational opportunity, wages, and prejudice and discrimination
Individual attributions of inequality ambition, ability and talent, hard work, effort, and money management skills

Phase C Post-Treatment (Dependent variables)

Intention to participate in political action (signing a petition)
Social and political trust perceptions
Political engagement intentions
Standard demographics (at the end of Survey)

End of survey message: Thank you very much for having taken the time to respond to our survey. At this stage we would like to inform you about the aim of this research, which was to study the effect the perception of inequality (high-low) in youth has on political participation and political attitudes. Please note that the graph you have seen, although containing real data about economic inequality in Greece, was attributed to a hypothetical and not a real person.

Research Design

Experimental manipulation. Participants were given a questionnaire assessing perceptions of the causes of economic inequality. Reproduced on every page of this questionnaire was a graph/table displaying economic trends in society. The graph/table was manipulated to depict increasing or decreasing inequality between the richest and the poorest. The graph/table *is adapted from real data* to depict increasing or decreasing inequality between the richest and the poorest in different years. The two conditions were randomly presented (high, low inequality priming).

Explanations of economic inequality. After viewing the graph, participants were asked to indicate how important they think the contribution of each of the following factors is to growing (decreasing) economic disparity:

Contextual explanations: inheritance, political influence, economic structure of society, personal background, educational opportunity, wages, and prejudice and discrimination.

Dispositional items: ambition, ability and talent, hard work, effort, and money management skills.

Factor analysis of Dispositional and Contextual attributions of inequality

In order to distinguish the two attribution factors (Contextual/ allocentric, Dispositional/

idiocentric) we conducted a principal components analysis, varimax, for two underlying factors. The factors analysis explained cumulatively 42% of the variance with the first factor composing of questions (9, 10, 5, 8, 4) and the second factor questions (3, 2, 6,7). Question 1 (Inheritance) did not load heavily on any of the two factors. The former factor concerned dispositional (hard work, personal capability/talent, personal ambition) and family related questions (family help, educational opportunities), whereas the latter, Contextual/allocentric factor involved items (political influence, financial structure of the society, discrimination, salary). Please note question 7 (salaries) in Greece is construed as contextual given the notion is associated with working in the public sector. Also, inclusion of family with dispositional attributions reflects Greece's cultural make-up/mandate. For the rest of the analyses, we follow this structure.

Design: 2 (high, low inequality). Contextual or dispositional attributions were continuous moderators. Mixed model analyses were utilized.

Individual Moderators

We were interested to investigate a number of individual difference factors that may moderate the above hypothesized relationships:

Subjective Social Status (SSS): Social class has been repeatedly shown to influence perceptions of inequality and political participation in specific ways, through for example the sense of personal control. Subjective social status was measured with the use of the MacArthur scale of Subjective Social Status. This is a scale that depicts a ladder consisting of 10 different ranks with each rank representing people with different levels of education, income, and occupation status. Participants are instructed to select the level that represents their standing relatively to the people in their social milieu.

Secure and insecure attachment is a more personal dimension indicator in how one treats/perceives personal threat.

Cultural orientation (independent - interdependent), These two individual difference factors pertain to chronic tendencies to perceive the social world as structured around the 'self' or structured around the (in)group. This tendency has stark effects in how one approaches leadership and messages that come from persons of higher status. Self-Construal Scale is a measure of trait or chronic self-construal. We used the revised version of the SCS that consists of two orthogonal dimensions that measure the strength of independent and interdependent self-construal. Each subscale contained 15 items and responses were made on a seven point Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). The independent self-construal subscale contains items that assess uniqueness in social behavior and related cognitions and emotions (e.g., "I do my own thing, regardless of what others think"); the interdependent self construal subscale includes items that assess connectedness in social behavior especially emotions, cognitions, and behavior with regards to in-groups (e.g., "It is important to me to respect decisions made by the group"). Several studies have shown the SCS distinguishes between independent and interdependent self-construal at the individual level.

Holism scale. The causality part of the analytic-holistic orientation scale

Outcome variables:

Political engagement intention. One question asked participants to indicate how likely they are to participate in signing a petition for the introduction of policies that reduce inequality

Political self-efficacy scale/attitudes: How likely it is to participate in political engagement (9 statements)

Perceptions of social trust: Trust in legal system, Trust in educational system, Trust in police
Trust in politicians

Interest in Politics: How much are you interested I political issues?

Politics complicated: Politics are far too complicated for one to understand

Results

Analyses were weighted for national representativeness of participant responses. Table 1 presents basic psychometric properties of the scales utilized before and after priming. Table 2 presents results from zero-order correlations of all study main variables.

- Table 1 –

- Table 2 -

Effects of inequality priming

Before going into examining the effects of priming inequality on the political engagement intention variables, we ascertained the randomness of ascribing to each condition. Results from one-way ANOVAs with priming condition as the predictor variable found a significant difference in interdependence levels. Participants in the equality priming condition were significantly higher on interdependence pre-priming ($F[1,824] = 25.87, p < .01$ $M_{inequal} = 3.51, SD = .55, M_{equal} = 3.70, SD = .52$). Therefore, all subsequent analyses examining priming effects, controlled for levels of interdependence. There was no other significant relationship between priming and any of the other pre-priming variables.

Inequality Priming (IP) and dispositional or contextual attributions of inequality

In order to test differences of priming condition on consequent dispositional and contextual attributions for each of the two priming conditions, each of the two attributions were regressed on inequality priming (see Table 3). IP was positively associated with dispositional attributions of inequality ($\beta = .19, t = 5.49, p < .001$) and negatively associated with contextual attributions of inequality ($\beta = -.24, t = -7.38, p < .001$ [interdependence, $\beta = .23, t = 6.39, p < .001$]). That is, compared to inequality priming, equality priming raised dispositional attributions and reduced contextual attributions.

- Table 3 -

Inequality priming, attributions of inequality priming and political intentions

Multiple regression analyses were conducted where political engagement intentions and attitudes,

trust, and life satisfaction and happiness were regressed on inequality priming, interaction of priming by attributions controlling for age, gender, and perceived social status.

- Table 4 -

Political engagement intention

Main results are presented in Table 4. Priming was unrelated to political engagement intention. Of the two inequality attributions (Dispositional, Contextual) Contextual orientation ($\beta = .204$, $t = 5.76$, $p < .001$) was positively related to political engagement intention. An interaction of priming (-1 = inequality, 1 = equality) with contextual orientations was negatively associated with political engagement intentions ($\beta = -.164$, $t = -4.895$, $p < .001$). A simple slopes analyses is required to be conducted to ascertain the effect, indicatively equality perceptions and other orientations may result in lower political engagement intentions. This effect was not explained by either holistic orientation, self-construal, or their interactions with priming.

<35: Results were exactly the same for the younger part of the sample as above

Political self-efficacy engagement attitudes

Priming was unrelated to political engagement attitudes. **The same effects as per above were observed for all described variables only the effects were milder and marginally significant** (see Table 4). Specifically, contextual attributions were associated with higher political self-efficacy attitudes ($\beta = .123$, $t = 3.40$, $p < .01$) and there was a positive relationship with an interaction of priming and dispositional attributions ($\beta = .091$, $t = 2.67$, $p < .01$). In addition, age and perceived social status were positively associated with political engagement attitudes ($\beta = .11$, $t = 3.28$, $p < .001$, $\beta = .12$, $t = 3.42$, $p < .001$ respectively). Higher age and SSS partly explained attributions positive relationships with political engagement attitudes. These relationships were not explained by holistic orientation, but the dispositional relationship with political engagement attitudes was mediated by independent self-construal.

< 35: In the younger part of the sample there were no effects whatsoever. Only higher interdependence was associated with higher political self-efficacy.

Interest in politics

Interest in politics was negatively related with equality priming ($\beta = -.104$, $t = -2.96$, $p < .01$) suggesting that participants expressed higher interest in politics in the inequality priming condition (see Table 4). Dispositional attributions were negatively associated with interest in politics ($\beta = -.090$, $t = -2.68$, $p < .01$), and contextual attributions were positively associated with interest in politics ($\beta = .172$, $t = 4.84$, $p < .001$).

Interdependent self-construal was positively related with interest in politics ($\beta = .096$, $t = 2.72$, $p < .001$). Females were less interested in politics overall ($\beta = -.16$, $t = -4.74$, $p < .001$) and older people were more interested in politics ($\beta = .11$, $t = 3.14$, $p < .01$).

< 35: Younger persons seemed unmoved by inequality priming. The only significant variable is interdependent self-construal.

Politics complicated

Neither inequality priming or its interaction with dispositional attributions of inequality were associated with perceiving politics as complicated (Table 4). However, higher contextual attributions overall and higher interdependence were associated with perceiving politics as complicated ($\beta = .102, t = 2.89, p < .01$; $\beta = .24, t = 6.91, p < .001$). The interaction of inequality priming with contextual attributions of inequality was negatively associated with politics being complicated ($\beta = -.063, t = -1.87, p = .06$).

< 35: The above results hold for younger participants.

Trust

Trust was negatively related with equality priming ($\beta = -.134, t = -3.81, p < .001$) suggesting that participants expressed higher interest in politics in the inequality priming condition (see Table 4). The dispositional attribution was strongly positively related to trust ($\beta = .235, t = 6.98, p < .001$). Females reported lower trust and higher SSS was associated with higher trust. When holistic thinking is controlled, higher other attributions are also associated with higher trust.

< 35: The above results hold for younger participants.

Life satisfaction

Inequality priming was negatively associated with life satisfaction (see Table 4, $\beta = -.169, t = -4.84, p < .001$). Higher dispositional and contextual attributions were positively related to life satisfaction and happiness ($\beta = .097, t = 2.90, p < .01$; $\beta = .106, t = 3.01, p < .01$ respectively) and an interaction between inequality priming and contextual attributions was also positively related to life satisfaction ($\beta = .106, t = 3.17, p < .01$). The association was not mediated by either holistic orientation or self-construal.

< 35: Only interdependent self-construal was significant.

In sum, inequality priming influenced subsequent attributions of inequality. It was these attributions however, that related to political engagement intentions, attitudes, trust and well-being.

Age effects

In order to examine possible age differences in the measured variables and in political participation intention we divided the sample in two (17-34-years-old, 35-65-years-old), based on a visual observation of the sample age distribution. We conducted ANOVA on the response variables, and in the case when the response variables were post-primed, we controlled for the priming condition through an ANCOVA.

Age and pre-priming variables

Among the pre-priming (individual differences) variables there were no significant age differences – with the exception of perceived social status where younger participants reported lower levels. Younger persons reported significantly lower levels of happiness than older persons ($F(1,816) = 24.42, p < .001$). There were no significant age differences in the level of social

inequality knowledge or any of the other initial political intent control questions.

Age and attributions of inequality

There was no significant age or an age by priming interaction on attributions of inequality.

Age and post-priming political intention

Among the post-priming, political participation an intention variables, older participants reported higher political intent ($F(1,816)= 4.49, p < .05, MargLage= 4.24, SE=.08, MargHage= 4.50, SE = .09$) marginally higher trust ($F(1,816)=3.22, p = .07, MargLage = 1.98, SE =.03, MargHage=2.06, SE = .04$, no significant difference in behavioral intention to political participation (in a demonstration to reduce inequality).

Holism

Given a significant association between holism and attributions of inequality, we examined the effects of holism, holistic orientations interactions with priming and with the two attribution orientations.

Multiple regression analyses were conducted controlling for age, gender, and perceived social status, inequality priming, interaction of priming by attributions and interactions holistic orientation with attribution (see Table 5). Holistic tendencies (or their interaction thereof) were not associated with life satisfaction, but were associated with happiness ($\beta = .073, t = 2.24, p < .05$), behavioral intention to political participation ($\beta = .25, t = 7.05, p < .001$), political intent ($\beta = .069, t = 1.95, p = .052$). However, there were no interactions with Priming or attributions to priming thereof.

- Table 5 -

Attachment orientations

The same models were performed for anxious and avoidant attachment (included in the same model see table 5).

Political participation intentions

Avoidance was associated with lower intent in political engagement. Moreover, there was an interesting interaction with inequality attributions. Higher anxiety and both types of inequality attributions (but mostly dispositional) were associated with LOWER political participation intentions (see Table 5). Conversely, avoidant attachment and higher dispositional inequality attributions were associated with HIGHER political participation intentions.

Life satisfaction and happiness

Both insecure attachment orientations were associated with lower life satisfaction and happiness. Among all the interactions with priming and attributions to inequality priming, a combination of higher anxiety and individual/family attributions were associated with lower life satisfaction and lower happiness.

The interactions of anxiety by inequality attributions were fully explained by **holistic orientations**, but not the avoidance by inequality attributions which remained significant (see Table 5).

Finally, we examined relationships between the two attachment orientations and holistic thinking and interdependent and independent self-construal (see Table 6). Higher avoidance was associated with lower holism and interdependent self-construal. Anxious attachment was not associated with holism but was positively associated with interdependence and independence (see Table 6).

Self-construal

Higher interdependence was associated with higher political intention participation in both indicators. There was no interaction with priming or inequality attributions.

Higher interdependence was associated with higher trust. An interaction was observed such that a combination of higher interdependence and individual attributions were associated with LOWER trust, whereas a combination of higher independence and independent attributions to inequality was associated with higher trust post-prime.

Conclusion

This online experiment aimed to test: a) the extent to which perceptions of inequality (low, high) are related to attitudes and intentions for political engagement and social trust; b) the degree to which contextual or dispositional explanations/attributions of inequality in youth influence political engagement attitudes and intentions, as well as social trust; c) the moderating effect on the above of key factors to do with: social class/SES, cultural orientation, power distance orientation, and insecure attachment orientation.

The main hypothesis (H1) predicted that inequality priming will result in lower social cohesion perception and lower social trust and intention for political participation. Results refuted this hypothesis, since inequality priming resulted in higher political engagement (but not higher political engagement attitudes) compared to equality priming and higher interest in politics. Higher inequality priming was associated with lower happiness as one may expect, which provides further credence to the priming effect. This finding has implications for understanding motivational priming in youth and in a country like Greece.

The second hypothesis (H2) expected that cultural orientation and SES will moderate the above association as a function of contextual/individual explanation of inequality. This was actually observed, yet, in a fashion that was contrary to H2a that expected that lower SES youth will make more contextual attributions in inequality and in response to the inequality priming in particular. Interestingly, however, lower SES youth was associated with lower contextual attributions.

The third hypothesis (H3) expected that higher contextual attributions of inequality (in the high inequality condition) will lead to lower social trust and political participation intentions. This hypothesis was partly supported since higher contextual attributions in the inequality condition was, indeed, associated, with lower political engagement intentions.

Importantly, the results did not seem to differ meaningfully between the youth and the older

groups. It seems that the cultural mandate of the country may influence younger and older persons equally in the way they attribute causes of inequality, and how these may impact political engagement intentions and attitudes. Results seem to partly diverge to findings from other cultures and this is an interesting finding by itself.

Individual differences moderators: attachment orientations and holistic thinking

Anxious attachment was associated with higher contextual inequality attributions. Avoidant orientation was associated with lower contextual and higher dispositional attributions to inequality and lower tendency to think holistically. Holistic thinking mediated the negative relationship between avoidance and contextual attributions. Importantly, avoidance was negatively associated with political participation intentions and attitudes and a higher avoidance-dispositional attributions interaction was positively associated with political participation intention. Holistic thinking partially mediated the former and fully mediated the latter effect. These results highlight contextual socio-cognitive processes in the link of insecure attachment, avoidance in particular, and political orientation.

Table 1. *Study variables' basic psychometric properties*

	Mean SD	A
Phase A (pre-priming)		
Average SES	5.20 (1.88)	
Attachment avoidance	2.45 (.71)	.69
Attachment anxiety	2.73 (.73)	.74
Independent	3.52 (.64)	.60
Interdependent	3.60 (.55)	.70
Holism	3.87 (.58)	.75
Phase B (post-priming)		
Political engagement intention (one item)	8.12 (3.11)	
Political engagement attitudes	4.37 (1.79)	.85
Trust	2.07 (.66)	.74
Life Satisfaction (single item)	3.19 (1.03)	
Happiness (single item)	3.37 (1.01)	

	Age	Gender	PRM	Avoid	Anxiet	Ind	Intr	Holism	Political attitudes	Trust	Lfstisf	Happy	Polit Intent	Attr. Disposit	Attr. Context
Age	1	-.077*	.016	-.035	-.034	-.023	.037	.099**	.119**	.069*	-.056	-.073*	.044	.022	.006
Gender		1	.030	-.059	.046	.081*	.018	.153**	.033	-.089*	-.041	-.044	.008	.102**	.003
PRM			1	-.026	.011	-.015	.109**	-.021	.002	-.003	-.031	-.046	.010	.192**	-.260**
Avoid				1	.418**	.060	-.108**	-.166**	-.048	-.074*	-.299**	-.329**	-.114**	.019	.032
Anxiet					1	.027	.060	.001	.070*	-.021	-.291**	-.318**	-.026	.114**	.027
Indep.						1	.298**	.199**	.038	.057	.055	.106**	.075*	.101**	.128**
Intrdep							1	.308**	.120**	.164**	.169**	.188**	.110**	.053	.147**
Holism								1	.085*	-.057	.037	.062	.247**	.075*	.183**
Political attitudes									1	.204**	.109**	.068*	.188**	.044	.045
Total trust										1	.320**	.279**	-.034	.201**	-.056
Life satisfaction											1	.778**	.001	.063	.041
Happy												1	-.011	.057	.024
Political intent													1	.018	.129**
Attr. Dispositional														1	-.488**
Attr. Contextual															1

Table 2. *Zero-order correlations between study variables*

Note: Avoid: avoidant attachment, Anxiet: Anxious attachment, PRM: Priming (-1 = inequality, 2 = equality), Indep: Independent self-construal, Intr: Interdependent self-construal, Holism: Causality holism, Political intent: Political engagement intention, Political attitudes: Political engagement attitudes. Attribute Dispositiona: Dispositional attributions to inequality, Attr. Contextual: Contextual attributions to inequality. * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 3. *Predicting contextual and dispositional attributions from PRM, attachment orientations and PRM x attachment orientations interactions*

	Attr-Contextual			Attr-Dispositional		
PRM	-.22***	-.21***	-.21**	.13***	.12***	.13***
Avoidance	-.11**	-.11**	-.05	.07 [^]	.06 [^]	.08*
Anxiety	.11**	.10**	.09	-.02	-.01	-.01
PRM_avoidance		.08*	.07 [^]		-.09*	-.10**
PRM_anxiety		-.02	-.03		.07 [^]	.06 [^]
Holism			.20***			.08*
F(6,839)	16.35***	10.74***	15.18***	5.49**	4.66**	4.81**
R ²	.06	.06	.10	.02	.03	.03

Note: PRM: Priming (-1 = inequality, 2 = equality) * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Table 4. *Regressing political intent and attitudes, trust happiness and life satisfaction on IP and dispositional vs contextual attributions*

	Political engagement intention	Political Self-efficacy engagement	Interest in politics	Politics complicated	Trust	Happy	Life Satisfaction
Step 1							
PRM	.038	-.021	-.104**	.020	-.134***	-.223***	-.169*
Attr_dispositional	-.023	-.038	-.090**	-.008	.235***	.115**	.097***
Attr_contextual	.204***	.123***	.172***	.102**	.016	.039***	.106***
Step 2							
PRM	.041	-.025	-.105**	.021*	-.136***	-.225***	-.172**
Atr_dispositional	-.009	-.026	-.093**	.008	.230***	.114**	.091**
Atr_contextual	.235***	.119**	.177***	.114***	.005	.025***	.085***
PRM_Dispos	.032	.091**	-.035	-.016	-.014	.016*	-.009
PRM_Context	-.164***	.018	-.030	-.063^	.054	.07	.106***

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 5. *Regressing post-priming political intent and political engagement attitudes on PRM, priming attributions, attachment orientations and holism*

	Political engagement		Political engagement	
	Intent		Attitudes	
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 1	Step 2
PRM	.047	.041	.035	.035
Attr_dispositional	.003	-.020	-.014	-.009
Attr_contextual	.187***	.135***	.104**	.114**
PRM_Dispos	.011	-.001	.055^	.057^
PRM_Context	-.132***	-.099**	.02	.013
Avoid	-.221***	-.163***	-.06^	-.071^
Anxiet	.043	.04	.081*	.08*
PRM_avoid	.027	.027	.029	.030
PRM_anx	.048	.030	-.098**	-.096**
Anx_Disposit	-.06^	-.034	-.018	-.023
Avoid_Disposit	.105**	.088**	-.032	-.029
Holism		.21***		-.036



Note: PRM: Priming (-1 = inequality, 2 = equality). * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 6. *Regressing holistic thinking and self-construal on avoidant and anxious attachment orientations*

	Holism	Interdependence	Independence
Avoidance	-.25***	-.29***	-.071^
Anxiety	.04	.15***	.17***
R2	.06	.07	.02
F(2,843)	25.19***	31.02***	10.42***

Controlling also for Avoidance*Anxiety interaction. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Appendix: Wording of treatments [mutually exclusive]

Condition 1	Condition 2																												
<p>Part of this research measures your views on the structure of economic inequality in Greece. Here you see data from a published study by Professor Dr. Andreas Papadopoulos, documenting the reduction of economic inequality in Greece between 2004 and 2009.</p>	<p>Part of this research measures your views on the structure of economic inequality in Greece. Then you see data from a published study by Professor Dr. Andreas Papadopoulos, documenting the increase in economic inequality in Greece between 2008 and 2015.</p>																												
 <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Condition 1 Graph</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Index</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2004</td><td>33.9</td></tr> <tr><td>2005</td><td>34.5</td></tr> <tr><td>2006</td><td>35.1</td></tr> <tr><td>2007</td><td>34.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2008</td><td>33.6</td></tr> <tr><td>2009</td><td>33.6</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Index	2004	33.9	2005	34.5	2006	35.1	2007	34.0	2008	33.6	2009	33.6	 <table border="1"> <caption>Data for Condition 2 Graph</caption> <thead> <tr> <th>Year</th> <th>Index</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr><td>2009</td><td>33.6</td></tr> <tr><td>2010</td><td>34.1</td></tr> <tr><td>2011</td><td>34.8</td></tr> <tr><td>2012</td><td>36.3</td></tr> <tr><td>2013</td><td>36.0</td></tr> <tr><td>2014</td><td>35.7</td></tr> </tbody> </table>	Year	Index	2009	33.6	2010	34.1	2011	34.8	2012	36.3	2013	36.0	2014	35.7
Year	Index																												
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Peer pressure and political action

Lia Duran Mogollon, Johannes Kiess & Christian Lahusen

Research question and brief explanation

Does group pressure alter the willingness of young people to join political action?

Aside from classic experimental research on conformity and group pressure, we can refer to previous work on political action: recently, studies have focused on the impact of social media on people's voting behaviour and protest, explaining differences and showing that, regardless of the content of messages, strong ties are more influential than weak ties. The extensive acknowledgment of the relevance of framing processes in social movements studies includes the insight that (perceived) social desirability matters for mobilization, and personal cost may deter from joining. Social desirability in experimental and survey research, especially in social psychology, is mainly studied as a challenge for research, not as a factor of mobilization. Due to the existing work, we need to carefully establish our research question and treatment in order to add to our knowledge and provide additional insights. It appears that the topic of conformity and group pressure, especially among young people, still offers much to explore.

This experiment, however, must confront several challenges. First, we need to distinguish the effect of social desirability from the respondents' own disposition to attend a specific protest event for a specific issue. Second, we need to disentangle the potential effect of peer influence on attendance. If we assume that peers influence (negatively or positively) the predisposition to attend a protest action, we might need to consider that this influence has at least two levels of 'causation': on the one hand, the mere information provided by peers (and the information that they will attend themselves) might alter the 'individual calculation' of respondents to join; on the other hand, this information might be coupled to (emotional, moral) expectation to join. Third, we need to define what we mean by peers. In this experiment, we focus on friends, and given that respondents might have different conceptions of what friends are, we see the need to provide respondents with our understanding of 'friends' in the post-treatment questions in order to guarantee a common reference point.

Finally, these experiments propose to control for country effects in order to check whether peer pressures can claim a culturally invariant validity. For this purpose, we propose to include two countries that come from different cultural traditions and have different forms of peer socialization: Germany and Spain.

Hypotheses

Peer pressure:

(1) Peers have an influence on the decision of respondents to join political protest action.

(1a) Receiving information from peers about a protest can influence someone's predisposition to participate.

(1b) Expected approval/disapproval by peer groups matters in the decision of respondents to participate in a protest event:

(1b_a) voiced approval by peer groups increases the readiness to join political action.

(1b_b) voiced disapproval by peer groups decreases the readiness to join political action.

Variation of peer pressure according to intervening factors:

(2a) We expect the effect of peer pressure to be higher among the participants below 34-years-old, when compared with those beyond 34 (diverging importance of friends in the life course).

(2b) Having larger networks of friends makes young people less likely to cave to peer pressure.

(2c) We expect to find fewer effects of peer pressure on readiness to participate among Spanish than German respondents, due to the assumed bigger friendship circles in Spain.

Design

To test our hypotheses, we developed a survey experiment with two subsamples specifying two equally large age groups and testing for a total of four conditions. The subsamples included respondents from Germany (1,220 completed surveys) and Spain (1,197 completed surveys). From the polling institute we required the sample to be split not only between the two countries, but also according to age groups (50% below and 50% over 35) and between the four conditions (control group, persuasive, pressure, neutral information, dissuasive pressure). The actual distributions are presented in Table 1.

Table 1: sample specifications

Country	Positive pressure (C1)	Informing	Negative pressure	Control (no treatment)
Germany N = 1,220	283 (147 18-34, 136 35-64)	277 (142 18-34, 135 35-64)	304 (152 18-34, 152 35-64)	356 (166 18-34, 190 35-64)
Spain N = 1,197	313 (170 18-34, 143 35-64)	293 (151 18-34, 142 35-64)	281 (131 18-34, 150 35-64)	310 (146 18-34, 164 35-64)

All participants were asked to answer a few questions (sociodemographic, political views, and demonstration engagement and political priorities). In addition, participants were randomly allocated to one of the treatment groups (positive, negative, informative and control). Those in the control group received no treatment and hence went directly from the pre-treatment to the post treatment questions.

Treatments

Three treatments were developed, one for each of the hypotheses introduced before (i.e., 1b, 1b_a and 1b_b). Additionally, we included one questionnaire type for a control group (no treatment). In regard to the political issue at stake, we opted for a fictive demonstration organized by Greenpeace targeting climate policies. The treatments included (see Appendix for English translations of the full treatment shown to the respondents):

- a. One message simply sharing information about an upcoming demonstration. There is no manifest judgement of the event. (neutral information)
- b. Positive pressure to attend a demonstration: peers expressing their support for the cause and their commitment to attend via a fictive WhatsApp chat. (persuasive information)
- c. Negative pressure attempting to dissuade the participant from demonstrating: peers expressing rejection and distrust towards a cause and its supporters in a fictive WhatsApp chat (dissuasive information).
- d. Additionally, a control group was not subject to any manipulation, as customary in experimental design.

Pre-treatment questions

age, gender, region of residence, parents' migrant background, birthplace, occupation, educational attainment, relevance of political demands, social media use

Post treatment questions

Willingness to participate after reading the except
Number of friends
Frequency of meeting friends
Interest in politics
Discussing politics with friends, family, etc.
Voting
Affiliation to political/ citizen associations
Reason for this survey

Results

In order to test our hypotheses, we first calculate means for different subsamples and, in a second step, conduct a regression analysis. By comparing treatment groups, we seek to investigate causal effects of different treatments; by comparing different sub-samples we seek to investigate possible contextual effects. The multivariate regression analyses help us to verify that it is indeed those variables we point towards that have an impact on political action.

In Tables 2 and 3 we report the mean approval rate on different forms of political action for each treatment, and the Spanish and German samples respectively. First of all, we observe that, as may be expected, respondents are less likely to take part in a demonstration and to participate in a sit-in or blockade, compared to signing petitions or engaging in boycotts/buycotts. Since the latter require less effort and, arguably, are less controversial while being less visible to people around the active person, this is not surprising. Our first set of hypotheses assumed that different treatments impact respondents' readiness to take political action. ANOVAs conducted for all four dependent variables (demonstrating, petitioning, boycotting, blockading) reveals that this is indeed the case. However, to trace the significant differences between groups, and more importantly between treated groups and the control group, we conducted t-tests between the control group and the different treatment groups.

Mean comparisons and t-tests reveal the following for the German sample (see Table 2): neutral information on a political topic actually decreases readiness to take action, with the effect of such information being significant for taking part in demonstrations (low level of significance) and joining sit-ins/blockades. The other two activities are not affected significantly by neutral information. We can corroborate hypothesis 1a only to some degree and with an interesting direction of the effect. Information about activities concerning the climate crisis resulted in demobilization compared to the non-informed group that was only asked whether they would participate in any kind of political action without being given the information about the climate-related demonstration. However, the treatment going beyond simple information and including persuasive pressure significantly increased the readiness to take part in demonstrations, signing petitions, and sit-ins (no significant effect for political consumerism). This corroborates our hypothesis 1b_a stating that voiced approval by peer groups increases readiness to join political action, specifically such action that can be considered more demanding. Interestingly, dissuasive pressure by peers does not have the demobilizing effect we expected. Rather, we observe a higher rate of readiness to participate, the differences to the control group being significant for taking part in demonstrations and for signing petitions. All in all, these results are partly contradictory and to some extent we must assume that respondents were reacting defensively against the information on the climate related demonstration.

– Table 2 –

Table 3 shows the same means comparisons and t-test results for the Spanish sample. This allows us to verify our results from the German sample but also to account for possible contextual, namely cultural effects (Hypothesis 2c, see below). First of all, we observe much higher rates of participation among Spanish respondents across activities and across treatment groups. However, we cannot confirm our findings from the German sample: in the Spanish sample, the treatments do not have the expected effects, except dissuasive pressure, which works as a demobilizing factor. On the contrary, all treatments significantly reduce

boycotting/buycotting and readiness to participate in sit-ins/blockades. To some extent, this may be caused by the higher levels of participation: respondents in Spain are already more mobilized and may therefore be affected differently by the treatments employed here.

Moreover, taken together with the already contradictory results from the German sub-sample, we can summarize two findings. First, dissuasive pressure actually works as expected as a negative incentive to politically participate, but we can only partially confirm an increasing effect for persuasive pressure. Second, respondents seem to react very cautiously to the treatments, which is especially underlined by the negative effect of the purely informational treatment. Respondents seem to be very sensible towards manipulation on this topic.

– Table 3 –

In Table 4 we show the distribution between age groups. As can be expected in light of the literature on youth participation, the young are more likely to participate in unconventional and especially confrontational political activities. However, while the differences between the younger group (18-34) and the older group (35-65) is significant across all forms of political action in Germany, in Spain we find a significant difference only for the most confrontational activity, i.e. sit-ins/blockades. Again, this may be due to the overall higher rate of protest participation in Spain. Context therefore matters, as does age.

– Table 4 –

Table 5 summarizes the results for four regression models calculated for the four dependent variables and accounting for country effects, the treatments used in the experiment (control as base), education, age, gender, migrant background, social media activity, number of friends, and frequency of meeting with friends. In addition, institutional social capital was measured by membership in different organizations; we also include in the models a variable measuring political interest, one accounting for the frequency political topics are discussed among friends and family, and two variables on political positions (on environmental and on migration policy).

First of all, the treatments remain to have the reported impact on political action. Persuasive pressure increases participation in demonstrations and petitioning (an effect due to the German sub-sample, see above), neutral information decreases participation probably because respondents see through the trigger or because some are demobilized by the climate issue, dissuasive pressure results in mixed reactions. The regression reveals a positive effect on demonstrating and petitioning, no significant effect on political consumerism, and a negative effect on the more confrontational blockading/sit-in activities.

As already indicated, national context matters. Spanish respondents are more likely to participate, but for boycotting we find the reverse effect. As Table 4 above indicates, young Germans especially engage more often in political consumerism. Moreover, friends matter when it comes to taking political action. More specifically, having more friends increases readiness to join political action; meeting more regularly with friends decreases petitioning and increases confrontational activity. Frequenting social media matters for taking part in demonstrations but has no significant effect on taking on other actions. Migrant background has a positive effect on blockading, and education has only a small positive effect on political consumerism. While accounting for all these effects, the treatments still have significant effects in the regression models.

The addition of variables accounting for political interest, frequency of political discussion among peers, and political-ideological positions, allows for further differentiation. While the first two variables help us control for how far respondents may already be aware of the political topics transported with our treatments (and politics more generally), the latter provides us with a topical ideological assessment. Indeed, political interest and a higher frequency of discussing politics with friends increase the likelihood of engaging in the different forms of political participation. More interestingly, agreeing that environmental and climate-related policies should be given priority (asked before the treatments containing information about climate-related issues) increases the likelihood for political participation significantly. On the contrary, agreeing to a tougher stance on immigration and refugee policies (again asked before the treatments containing information about climate-related issues) decreases the likelihood of political activity. This implies an ideological left-right divide on political participation and engagement, but also raises the question in how far such political positions impact on the openness to being influenced by our treatments.

– Table 5 –

Conclusion

Apparently, country-specific dispositions and attitudinal dispositions are more important than peer pressure. This also means that respondents tend to react to peer pressure indirectly, that is, mediated by their personal convictions. Respondents are prone to participate if they consider environmental issues important. Attempts of peers to influence respondents' personal decisions seem to be received critically. In regard to demonstrative protests, dissuasive pressure from peers rather leads respondents to insist on their personal readiness to participate, while persuasive do reinforce these dispositions. In this sense, respondents tend to subscribe to the idea that protest participation is an act of individual freedom that, hence, must ultimately resist peer pressure.

Table 2. *Effects of three treatments vs. control group for German sample (means)*

	Taking part in a demonstration	Signing petition	Boycott/boycott	Sit-in/blockade
Control group	4.08	6.13	6.21	3.96
Persuasive pressure	5.25***	6.99***	6.40	4.41#
Neutral information	3.64#	5.93	5.72*	3.63
Dissuasive pressure	4.69**	6.77**	6.47	4.18

t-test between control group and different treatments respectively, *** $p < 0.001$ ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$ # $p < 0.1$

Table 3. *Effects of three treatments vs. control group for Spanish sample (means)*

	Taking part in a demonstration	Signing petition	Boycott/boycott	Sit-in/blockade
Control group	6.29	7.47	6.43	6.12
Persuasive pressure	6.22	7.26	5.57***	5.05***
Neutral information	6.04	7.37	5.71**	4.91***
Dissuasive pressure	5.87#	7.09#	5.59***	4.61***

t-test between control group and different treatments respectively, *** $p < 0.001$ ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$ # $p < 0.1$

Table 4. *Effects of three treatments vs. control group for Spanish sample (means)*

		Taking part in a demonstration	Signing petition	Boycott/boycott	Sit-in/blockade
Germany	18-34	4.61	6.79	6.45	4.52
	35-65	4.20#	6.10***	5.96**	3.57***
Spain	18-34	6.23	7.40	5.90	5.45
	35-65	6.00	7.20	5.77	4.92**

t-test between age group per activity and subsample, *** $p < 0.001$ ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.05$ # $p < 0.1$

Table 5. *Regression Analysis*

	demonstrate	petition	boycott	blockade
persuasive	0.886**	0.614**	-0.017	-0.102
info	-0.583**	-0.118	-0.326*	-0.885**
dissuasive	0.461**	0.559**	-0.042	-0.474**
country	1.672**	0.743**	-0.597**	1.159**
below35	0.303*	0.437**	0.278*	0.423**
male	-0.061	-0.304**	-0.356**	0.142
migrant	-0.185	-0.103	-0.088	0.431**
education	0.028	-0.040	0.062*	-0.013
frequentSM	0.621**	0.083	0.158	0.188
member	0.580**	0.478**	0.344**	0.659**
manyfriends	0.202**	0.142*	0.326**	0.452**
meetfriends	0.094	-0.176*	-0.076	0.183*
z2polinterest	0.525**	0.448**	0.420**	0.043
z2poldiscuss	0.460**	0.177*	0.334**	0.618**
z2fosterclimat	0.668**	0.988**	0.782**	0.301**
z2controlmigra	-0.331**	-0.248**	-0.186**	-0.206
_cons	3.125**	6.182**	5.701**	3.018**
R^2	0.31	0.22	0.17	0.18
N	2,176	2,176	2,176	2,176

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$

Appendix: Wording of treatments[mutually exclusive]

Appendix A: Treatments used in the experiment

	Wording of treatments (in the Spanish version we used different names and places)
Persuasive pressure	<p>Imagine that a demonstration is planned in your city that demands stricter environmental laws. Please read the conversation below as if you were "Alex" and as if this were a WhatsApp chat group you have with your friends:</p> <p>Anna: Hey! Have you heard about the Greenpeace demo? I am here with Max.... Is anyone else coming?</p> <p>Marius: I'll be there in five minutes.... I am with my roommates.... Daniel, what about you?</p> <p>Daniel: I am also on the way. Martina? Should I bring anything else?</p> <p>Martina: I am already here :) It's great that everyone is coming! What about you, Alex?</p> <p>Marius: I'm sure she'll come, too. It's a good thing. Right, Alex? :)</p>
Neutral information	<p>Imagine you have received this message from a friend who informs you about a demonstration.</p> <p>Hello everyone!</p> <p>In case someone is interested:</p> <p>Greenpeace Cologne</p> <p>Demonstration to comply with 2019 carbon budget</p> <p>Tuesday 3 July, Cologne Domplatz</p>
Dissuasive pressure	<p>Imagine that a demonstration is planned in your city that calls for stricter environmental laws. Please read the conversation below as if you were "Alex" and as if this were a WhatsApp chat group you have with your friends.</p> <p>Philip: Did you also get Paula's call to participate in the Greenpeace demo? Anyway, I'm not going....</p> <p>Zayra: Nah, she's annoying with her pushy nature. Wants to save the world and thinks she's better.</p> <p>Daniel: I have other plans already. Remember, there's a party tonight at Katty's. And it would be good if we preparty at my place.</p> <p>Anna: Cool, I will definitely come to your place. Nah, I find demos scary, you just walk around, yell brainless sayings and get gaped at stupidly.</p> <p>Philip: Great, then I'll see you at Daniel's. What about you, Alex?</p>

Conjoint experiment: 'Democratic freedoms for everyone?'

Katrin Uba and Pär Zetterberg

Research question and brief explanation

The main research question of this experiment is whether young people facing inequalities are more eager to restrict democratic freedoms for groups representing specific political opinions than well-off members of their cohort or older people in general.

The question of when citizens are ready to restrict the freedoms of expression of some specific groups have been studied in the literature of political tolerance, but often the survey settings suffer due to the social desirability bias. One recent study suggests that citizens' beliefs about the rights of peaceful demonstration are mainly associated with country's experiences of nonviolent and violent protests rather than individual-level factors because even "bystanders" are affected by protest events. However, this study used data from 2008 and mainly focused on young democracies, where the norms of democracy are likely to be much weaker than in older democracies in Western or Northern Europe. For instance, it is known that "the adolescents who seemed to have a more explicit picture of political democracy often preferred a strict focus on majority rule, neglecting minority interests" in Netherlands. Thus, we know little about individuals' beliefs or norms regarding the restricted freedom of expression. Which groups, if any, should not enjoy the right to mobilize a peaceful demonstration? Which age (young or old) and social groups (low-high socio-economic status) are more eager to prohibit some demonstrations?

Hypotheses

The degree to which individuals support the idea that some demonstrations could be prohibited relates to the extent to which it is believed that such a reaction is necessary (justified) for preventing violence and guaranteeing the stability in the society. It is often related to the perceived "threat" the event proposes for the individual and the extent of compliance with law of freedom of expression the individual values. Such perceptions are likely to vary across age groups, as well as individuals' socio-economic background. There is a certain trade-off between security and justice, and in the U.S., it has been shown that "the greater people's sense of threat, the lower their support for civil liberties". Thus, it is likely that due to the personal experience of protest actions, presentation of contentious actions in the media or the general political memory (protest culture) some political groups are more likely to be perceived as "threatening" to social order. Researchers show that if a protest group is known to use violence, human rights abuses towards this group are accepted among public due to the public security concerns (in India and Israel, but not in Argentina). This might also be the case in Europe, although we lack (experimental) empirical evidence for that and the proposed experiment could provide it.

Considering the recent discussions in the media and the experience of various European countries, the analysis will focus on the rights to peaceful demonstration of several political groups: radical right, skinheads, anti-abortion activists [all more right-related], radical left,

anarchists, radical feminists [all more left related]. Depending on the country of analysis, we expect to see varying differences across age groups due to the inter-generational value change, as well as the countries' experience of democratization.

The experiment will test the following hypotheses:

H1: Individuals are more eager to prohibit a (peaceful) demonstration mobilized by *radical right* than the one mobilized by *radical left*

H2: Individuals are more eager to prohibit a (peaceful) demonstration mobilized by *skinheads* than the one mobilized by *anarchists*

H3: Individuals are more eager to prohibit a (peaceful) demonstration mobilized by *anti-abortion activists* than the one mobilized by *radical feminists*

H4: The opponents of a specific political ideology are more eager to prohibit that group

H5: Young people in general are not as ready to prohibit the a (peaceful) demonstrations mobilized by “radical” groups as older people are

H6: Young people facing inequalities (low SES) are more eager to prohibit the a (peaceful) demonstrations mobilized by “radical” groups than young well-off people or older people in general

H7: Women are not as ready to prohibit the demonstrations mobilized by “radical” groups as men are

H8: In the countries with the recent experience of radical right (left) violence individuals are more eager to prohibit the demonstrations mobilized by this group

Design

To test our hypotheses, we run a conjoint experiment with 1000 respondents in Germany, Spain, and Sweden. Respondents are faced with two different profiles of peaceful demonstrations that have a set of variables with randomly assigned attributes and are asked to choose the demonstration they would rather prohibit. Each respondent is asked to repeat the same task **six** times. This procedure allows us to assess the relative influence of each attribute on the prohibition of demonstration and determine what combination of variables increases the willingness to prohibit a demonstration. The survey together with treatment will not be longer than 10 minutes (tests show that it takes max 8 minutes).

In order to test the hypotheses, we will include independent variables with different attributes: mobilizing group, level of violence, location and day of event. Eventually, we are only interested in the two first independent variables and assume that the remaining two have no impact on dependent variable.

This procedure allows us to assess the relative influence of each attribute on the decision to allow the demonstration and determine what combination of variables increases the willingness to allow a demonstration to take place. The response could be discussed from the perspective of legitimacy – which groups could be seen as having legitimacy to demonstrate on the streets, as well as the issue of political tolerance towards specific political groups.

are no non-logical combinations for “Mobilizing group” and “Violence”, though in the real life there might be some more likely distributions of such combinations in our examined countries. In general, however, there are examples of demonstrations which have turned violent and had been mobilized by any of the listed groups. In total it is possible to have 48 different combinations of given attributes.

Our design has several advantages over prior approaches to study the legitimacy or attitude towards different protest events or (political) tolerance towards specific groups. First, there have not been similar experimental designs which allow to minimize the effect of social desirability bias as well as to estimate the causal effect of specific attributes. In our case, the attribute values are randomized and this design allows us to identify the effect of each demonstration attribute on the probability of being preferred for taking place. We can disentangle the effects of violence from the effects of mobilizing group. Second, we can examine possible interactions in the effect of the demonstration attributes: does violence matter more for radical right than for feminists? Third, the interaction between respondent characteristics, e.g., being in particularly young or facing financial difficulties might correlate with the effect of some specific demonstration attribute (e.g., violence).

Table 2. Possible pares of demonstrations

Pair 1	Demonstration A	Demonstration B
Mobilizing group	Radical right	Anarchists
Violence	Violent	Peaceful
Location	Public park	Town square
Day of event	Saturday	Saturday
Pair 2	Demonstration A	Demonstration B
Mobilizing group	Radical left	Anarchists
Violence	Peaceful	Violent
Location	Public park	Town square
Day of event	Saturday	Sunday
Pair 3	Demonstration A	Demonstration B
Mobilizing group	Radical feminists	Anti-abortion group
Violence	Violent	Peaceful
Location	Public park	Town square
Day of event	Sunday	Saturday

Pre-treatment questionnaire

Gender
Education
Age
Ethnic background
Gal-Tan-scale attitudes
Support for democracy
Voting experience
Protest participation
News consumption
Organization membership

Post-treatment questionnaire

Housing situation
Number of books at home
Location - living in an urban or rural area
Financial situation – difficulties
Knowledge about legality of demonstrations

Results

We have conducted three experiments: one in each of the countries of Germany, Spain, and Sweden. The major descriptive data, summarized in Table 3, demonstrates that the respondents are relatively representative, though probably a bit more political than the general population across the three countries.

– Table 3 –

It is noteworthy that the 60% of the respondents in Sweden answered that all groups are allowed to demonstrate according to the law (the list of groups was the same as used in describing the demonstrations above). The proportion is almost half as large in Germany and Spain, although the constitutional right to assembly and demonstration is rather similar in the countries. The differences are mainly related to the system of prior notification, the location of demonstrations and covering the face.⁶

Here, we focus on major results, leaving the specific details of the analysis and detailed discussion for future publications. Our main interest is in whether the level of violence (peaceful or violent) and/or type of mobilizing organization (radical left, radical right, anarchists, Nazis, radical feminist or pro-life movements) behind the demonstration influences the probability that the demonstration is allowed to take place (dichotomous choice). Hence, for estimating the overall effect of a specific attribute (violence) across the other attributes of the demonstration (organization, location, timing) is estimated as an average marginal component effect (AMCE). For example, the AMCE of violence represents the average effect of violence on the probability that the demonstration will be allowed to take place, and the average here is defined over the distribution of the demonstration attributes other than the level of violence across the repeated samples. The analysis accounts that N respondents had six pairs of demonstrations to evaluate, and therefore we can talk about Nx6 choices made in each country, that is 12,468 choices in Germany, 12,504 in Spain, and 12,000 in Sweden.

The estimates of the effects of the randomly assigned demonstration attribute values on the probability of being allowed to take place in Germany are presented in Figure 1 (respectively for Sweden in Figure 2, and for Spain in Figure 3). These estimates are based on the OLS model with clustered standard errors (indicating the respondent), point-bars refer to 95% confidence interval and the points without bars on the line are baseline variables. The effects would be

⁶ See further details in http://www.unige.ch/livewhat/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LIVEWHAT_D2.3.pdf

similar if we focus on the ratings of the demonstrations. In addition, the 'control' variables of the day and location of the demonstration have no effect on the probability of allowing demonstration in any of the examined countries.

In Germany, a violent demonstration as opposed to a peaceful one reduces the probability that the demonstration is allowed to take place by 0.32 (SE=0.01). Differences between organizations are smaller; however, being mobilized by radical right as opposed to radical left reduces the probability of being allowed by 0.11 (SE=0.02). In Spain, the results are rather similar with respect to the violence of the demonstration, but being mobilized by Nazis as opposed to radical left reduces the probability of being allowed by 0.22 (SE=0.02). That is a clearly larger effect than in Germany. In comparison to the radical left, a demonstration mobilized by radical feminists has an increased probability of being allowed by 0.04 (SE=0.01) and this effect is smaller in Germany. In Sweden (see Figure 3), the effect of violence, Nazis, and anarchists is rather similar to other countries. There is, however, an interesting effect: being mobilized by radical feminists (which in Swedish context actually referred to the group mobilizing for the right of abortion) as opposed to radical left increases the probability of being allowed by 0.14 (SE=0.02). Pro-life groups, which increased the probability of being allowed in Germany and Spain, have no such effect in Sweden that is also known for its gender equality policies.

- Figure 1 –
- Figure 2 –
- Figure 3 –

In this report, we only test Hypothesis 5, which expected that young people in general are more likely to allow (peaceful) demonstrations mobilized by 'radical' groups compared to older people. For these purposes, the youth was defined as respondents below 30 years of age and the results are presented separately for each country. In the case of Germany (see Figure 4), the results do not indicate significant patterns among young and older people. Still, among the respondents under 30, being mobilized by radical right as opposed to radical left reduces the probability of a demonstration being allowed by 0.18 (SE=0.04), while the respective number for those over 30 is 0.09 (SE=0.02). This rather suggests that young people see demonstrations by radical right as opposed to radical left as less legitimate. Further analysis will show if this effect remains after control for the ideological background of the respondents, as young people often tend to be more left-wing than the ones over 30-years-old.

- Figure 4 –

In the case of Spain (see Figure 5), the results do not indicate any significant differences among younger and older people. Only being mobilized by pro-life group as opposed to radical left slightly increases the probability of a demonstration being allowed among those above 30, while this is not a case at all for those under 30. In Sweden, there is a similar pattern of no significant differences across the age groups (Figure 6).

However, if we examine the differences in probabilities of allowing demonstrations across voting background – in the Swedish case – between those voting for the radical right party Sweden Democrats (SD, 22% of the respondents) and those not doing so, then there emerge clear differences as shown in Figure 7. The effect of being mobilized by Nazis as opposed to radical left is no longer there for those voting for the SD. And for them the mobilization of a radical right group is (expectedly) more acceptable as opposed to the radical left group. The effect of the violence appears to remain.

- Figure 5 –
- Figure 6 –
- Figure 7 –

Conclusion

This report has described our conjoint experiment for studying individuals' likelihood to allow specific kinds of demonstrations – depending on their level of violence and mobilizing groups, and especially the difference between the young and older respondents in this respect. We have shown that in our three examined countries – Germany, Spain and Sweden – the expected violence of a demonstration is something which is strongly related to the probability of allowing such demonstration to take place. The perceived illegitimacy of violent protests is certainly not new, but we have also shown that there are no significant differences among young and older people in this respect. However, the first analysis also show that younger and older people have rather similar way of reacting to the groups organizing the protests – the demonstrations mobilized by extreme groups such as Nazis as opposed to left-radicals are strongly disliked among younger and older respondents in all countries. However, the ideological leaning of the activists probably plays a role, as those voting for a radical right party (in Sweden) did not demonstrate disapproval towards demonstrations organized by Nazis as opposed to the ones by radical left.

In sum, despite presenting only a tiny part of the analysis here, we can conclude that the experiment as such has worked well – the randomization of the demonstration profiles as well as the attribute levels functioned, and the control variables in terms of timing and location of the demonstration had no effects on the probability of allowing the demonstration. While prior studies have focused on the attitudes towards protest action, the conjoint experimental data presented in this report allows us to show clearly the causal effects of mobilizing groups on the perceived legitimacy of demonstrations as well as analyze the political tolerance towards specific political groups. As one potential limitation in the context of contemporary events, especially the youth related environmental protests, it had been empirically interesting to include also environmental groups into the analysis.

Table 3. Summary descriptive data of the experiment

	Sweden	Germany	Spain
Number of finished survey answers (N)	1000	1039	1042
Proportion of those under 30 (young)	19 %	19 %	20%
Born in the country	86 %	95 %	89 %
Voted in last elections	89 %	84 %	82 %
Participated in demonstration during last 12 months	21 %	20 %	34 %
Civil society membership	26 %	27 %	28 %
Answering that all groups are allowed to demonstrate (according to the law)	60 %	35 %	36 %

Figure 1. Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration in Germany




Figure 2. Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration in Spain




Figure 3. *Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration in Sweden*




Figure 4. *Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration by people under and over 30 in Germany*




Figure 5. *Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration by people under and over 30 in Spain*




Figure 6. *Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration by people under and over 30 in Sweden*




Figure 7. *Estimated effects on probability of allowing demonstration by people voting and not voting for the Swedish Democrats in Sweden*

