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Voting for the Populist Radical Right in Switzerland

A Panel Data Analysis

Dan Orsholits

FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES DE LA SOCIÉTÉ
INSTITUT DE RECHERCHES SOCIOLOGIQUES

UNIVERSITÉ DE GENÈVE

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ACRONYMS

CVP: Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland/Christian Democratic Party

EGP: Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero

FDP: Free Democratic Party/Radical Democratic Party

OFS: Swiss Federal Statistics Office (*Office fédéral de la statistique*)

SHP: Swiss Household Panel

SP: Swiss Socialist Party/Social Democratic Party of Switzerland

SVP: Swiss People's Party

ABSTRACT

Working-class voters no longer systematically support left-wing political parties. This finding was initially viewed as signalling the end of class voting and the decline of the class cleavage's salience. Yet, in Western Europe, it would seem that the working class is turning to a new party family: the populist radical right. These parties which mobilize an anti-establishment and xenophobic, or "nativist", discourse seem to appeal more to the working-class than left-wing parties who in recent times have gained voters among sections of the middle class. This realignment is thought to be linked to globalization and the societal and economic changes that it brings.

Populist radical right parties are thought to channel the frustrations of working-class voters with culturally "open" or "liberal" views. The effects of economic changes are less clear and are more contingent on national context with some parties espousing protectionist economic measures while others have no clear economic stance or even adopt (neo)liberal positions.

The present work returns to the debate on the end of class voting and looks at methodological, empirical, and theoretical aspects before moving to the "new class" approaches which seek to link the decline of *traditional* class voting to a realignment of voters and parties. It then goes on to investigate how the populist radical right family is defined, and the characteristics of the parties that belong to it, with a focus on the case of Switzerland. Finally, using individual-level longitudinal data from the Swiss Household Panel, the work aims to assess the determinants of voting for the populist radical right in a more robust manner than previous studies employing only cross-sectional data. We find that there may be an

explanation beyond just class position in itself for the overrepresentation of the working class within populist radical right parties' electorate. However, there would seem to be a genuine class effect explaining why the culturally liberal segment of the middle class – socio-cultural (semi-)professionals – do not vote for such parties.

1. Introduction

In Western Europe populist radical right-wing parties have entered the political mainstream and this is especially the case in Switzerland with the rise of the Swiss People's Party. In the most recent elections it obtained nearly 30% of the seats in the National Council (Office fédéral de la statistique 2015). Explanations for the rise of the populist radical right in Western Europe put socio-cultural issues, principally related to immigration, at the centre and posit that political preferences are no longer primarily dictated by economic positions. Moreover, the profile of the populist radical right's electorate brings together two social classes who by classic accounts should be opposed to one-another politically: small business owners and blue-collar workers. The political realignment of the working class goes against traditional views of class voting which consider that the working class should vote for left-wing parties in accordance with their economic interests. This shift in voting behaviour, along with a growing part of the middle class voting for left-wing parties, was initially viewed as signalling the end of class voting. However, accounts of the radical right contend that class voting hasn't necessarily disappeared but has instead taken on a new form as "voting behavior continues to have a structural basis" (Bornschier 2010:4–5). Thus, class voting hasn't declined but has taken on a new shape with the working class supporting culturally "authoritarian" populist radical right parties with the electorate of the (new) left being increasingly composed of a new segment of the middle class: socio-cultural specialists (Kriesi 1998:170).

The present paper will first retrace the debate on the end of class voting by presenting empirical findings and explanations for the decline or persistence of class voting. Empirically, the debate

focuses on whether class no longer has *any* impact on voting or if it continues to play a role, albeit a reduced one, in determining voting outcomes. Another issue central to the debate is the operationalization of social class. Traditionally, studies on class voting used a simple dichotomous class variable distinguishing between manual and non-manual workers. However, critics argue that this is an oversimplification of reality and that more complex class schemas are necessary to fully measure class voting. Conceptually, there is also an argument over what constitutes class voting. In the narrow sense, class voting considers that classes vote principally according to their economic interests and as such the working class should vote for left-wing parties and the middle class for right-wing parties. In a less restrictive view, characterized by the "new class" approaches, class voting is simply the fact that certain social classes will systematically vote for a specific party. Such a view of class voting leaves room for the possibility of political realignment, and this realignment need not be limited to economic questions. These approaches argue that the economy is no longer the only structuring element of politics and political preferences, and that it is now complemented by a cultural dimension.

The second part will investigate radical right-wing populist parties. First, it will look at the difficulty in defining this party family. As we will see the main point of contention is whether radical right-wing populist parties ally (neo)liberal economic positions with authoritarian or anti-libertarian cultural positions or whether the party family's main feature is their culturally authoritarian and "nativist", or anti-immigrant, positions with economic agendas being of secondary or even no importance. Second, the empirical accounts for the rise and the success of these parties will be examined particularly in relation to the opposition between the economic and cultural positions of voters. The class basis of radical right populist parties' electorate is also explored as it of particular interest in testing if there has been a political realignment of the working class as they happen to be over-represented within the radical populist right's electorate. Finally, the particular case, and history, of the radical populist right in Switzerland will also looked

as it is especially important in determining which variables will be used in the panel data analysis.

Finally, this paper, by applying panel data methods to 11 waves of the Swiss Household Panel, will aim to determine what factors lead individuals to vote for the populist radical right – in this case the Swiss People's Party (SVP). The empirical work on the radical right is almost exclusively based on cross-sectional data, but the use of panel data methods can provide more robust results by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity as units, or individuals, are used as their own controls thus reducing potential biases linked to time-constant omitted variables.

2. Class Voting

The debate on whether class continues to structure voting preferences is empirical, methodological, and conceptual. Proponents of the decline or end of class voting point to the drop in support of left-wing parties by the working class. As we will see, the two main lines of criticism that address this view of class voting are related to methodological concerns, and the very concept of class voting. The methodological concerns criticize the simplistic operationalization of class – a dichotomy opposing manual workers to non-manual workers – and of voting outcomes – left and right. Conceptually, the proponents of the decline of class voting are also criticized for their reductionist view of class voting. They consider class voting as being more generally a systematic association between a certain voting outcome or political party, and a social class. The following section will first retrace the empirical evidence in favour and against the decline of class voting and the debate surrounding the apparent decline. The "new class" approaches which posit a political realignment of social classes will then be introduced.

2.1. Persistence, Decline, "Trendless Fluctuation"? A Summary of Empirical Findings

The debate on the decline of class voting starts from the assumption that individuals in non-manual occupations, as well as small business owners and farmers vote for economically right-wing political parties while individuals in manual (blue-collar) occupations vote for economically left-wing political parties (Achterberg and Houtman 2006:75). It is from this premise that claims that class

voting is in decline stem (Inglehart 1990, Clark and Lipset 1991). Using similar data sets, Inglehart, and Clark and Lipset both argue that social class no longer structures voting behaviour in western democracies. Clark and Lipset (1991:403) go one step further and even claim that it "has declined in every country for which data are available." The data on which they base themselves shows that the Alford Index of Class Voting (Alford 1962) – simply the difference in the proportion of manual and non-manual workers voting for a left-wing party – has almost constantly declined since the end of the 1960s in five countries: Sweden, Great Britain, the USA, France, and West Germany. For the authors, this suggests that class, more generally, is no longer an important social determinant especially when it comes to political choices. However, while Clark and Lipset do propose multiple explanations for this decline (see Section 2.1), they do not test to what extent class voting is related to other factors.

Kitschelt (1994:41–47) examines the extent to which the "naive" conception of class-voting – where the electoral success of left-wing parties is considered to be linked to the proportion of working-class voters – is applicable. He finds that even in countries where the number of blue-collar workers declined, support for left-wing parties hadn't, but in other countries where the proportion of blue-collar workers *did* decline, there was in fact no decline in the support for left-wing parties – notably in the case of Sweden, Italy, or Spain. The evidence would therefore seem to suggest that class-voting, in the classic sense, is declining, though Kitschelt would also argue that the "naive" conception was never necessarily true, as the SPD in West Germany should have been at its strongest in the '50s and '60s yet its electoral performance began to improve as the working class began to decline in size.

Kitschelt also tests the hypothesis that the decline in class voting is linked to a changing occupational structure (at least concerning left-wing party support). This explanation for the decline of class voting simply argues that as class structure changes and the manufacturing sector declines in importance, especially when

compared to the service sector, that it would be natural for support of left-wing parties to decline. However, this is far from being the case. In certain countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands), a decline in the number of working-class voters seems to have had no clear effect on the decline of the fortunes of left-wing parties.

Class characteristics increasingly explain less and less variance in left-wing party support even in countries where it traditionally explained a substantial proportion of left-wing party support such as Sweden, Britain, or Austria. Even in countries where the link between voting and social class was weaker, such as France, Germany, or Italy, there has been a decline even though other more traditional cleavages – such as religion – persist. In France, it appears that class conflict is increasingly being replaced by a more general opposition between public and private sector workers. More generally, left–right self-placement is an increasingly strong predictor for left-wing party support even in countries where class was a relatively weak predictor of voting choice.

In their article analyzing class voting in the United States, Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995) introduce a new measure of class voting. This measure – the *kappa* index (covered in more detail in Section 2.2.2) – is designed to provide an overall measure of class voting when using class schemas with more than two categories but also multiple voting outcomes. Quite simply, the *kappa* index is standard deviation of class differences across the different voting outcomes (813). Using a multinomial logistic regression, the authors look at both gross levels of class voting – i.e. where class is the only independent variable – and net levels of class voting with the inclusion of education, age, gender, and region as control variables (810). The gross *kappa* index suggests that class voting in the US remained relatively stable between 1948 and 1992 while the net index fluctuates much more. There is an initial decline following the mid-1960s with an increase in the 1980s which brings the net index back to levels similar to those of the 1960s. This leads the authors to question theories of political dealignment, however, the total class voting index doesn't show whether there

is a re-emergence of class cleavages or whether there has been a realignment (816–17).

Manza, Hout and Brooks then examine the logistic regression results which were used to generate the *kappa index*. They find that professionals, while very unlikely to vote for the Democratic party in 1948, became far more likely to vote for the Democrats starting in 1972 while just two elections prior (1964), they were more likely to support the Republicans than in any other election year. For Manza, Hout and Brooks , it would be "appropriate to view the change among professionals as two-step sudden realignment" (819). White-collar workers in non-managerial positions also moved from supporting the Republican party to supporting the Democrats. Managers remained Republican supporters while owners and proprietors became increasingly pro-Republican over time (819–21). When looking at skilled workers, there does seem to be a trend towards dealignment even if voting choice appears relatively volatile with high levels of support for the Republicans in certain election years and high levels of support for the Democrats in others. This is less the case for semi- and unskilled workers whose voting behaviour is closer to a situation of "trendless fluctuation" with a certain amount of volatility (821). Class voting can also be affected by voter turnout especially if there is a consistent association with abstentionism and a particular social class. Social class itself is an important determinant of voter turnout but so are other factors such as level of education. While the authors cannot find any evidence of a change in the association between voter turnout and class, there continues to be a persistent difference in the odds of voting versus not voting between professionals, and semi- and unskilled workers (824).

In a series of publications, Nieuwbeerta and his collaborators (Nieuwbeerta 1995, 1996, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee 1999, among others) show that class voting in 20 countries, using multiple measures rather than just the Alford Index, has declined in almost all of the considered cases. The Thomsen Index – simply the logarithm of "the odds for manual workers of voting left-wing rather than right-wing divided by the

odds for nonmanual workers of doing the same" (Nieuwbeerta 1995:39) – shows that there is a negative linear trend in class voting in 18 out of the 20 countries (with the exception of Portugal and Greece), but it is not significant in many cases in part due to the low numbers of observations for certain countries. There are nevertheless four countries (Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Canada) where the decline is not significant but for which there is enough data (Nieuwbeerta 1995:50–51, 1996:359, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999:32–34). However, the results obtained using the Alford Index, thought to overstate the decline of class voting, are largely similar with the two indices being highly correlated with each other (Nieuwbeerta 1995:54, 1996:360, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999:32–34). While these results are based on a dichotomous distinction between manual and non-manual workers, the results of analyses using the Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero (EGP) class schema provide similar results.

Using the *kappa* index, the linear time trends suggest a decline as well. Nevertheless, sufficient data is not available for many countries leading to a substantial amount of countries showing a negative, but not a statistically significant, trend when using the *kappa* index. The countries for which the linear change trend of class voting is negative and statistically significant are Britain, Germany, and Norway. Despite having sufficient data points, there seems to be no significant decline in class voting as measured by the *kappa* index in the US and the Netherlands (Nieuwbeerta 1995:108–09, 1996:364, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999:38). An additional measure of class voting employing the EGP schema is based on the uniform difference model where changes in class voting are summarized by the *delta* index which is a "multiplicative scalar that increases or decreases the absolute size of each interclass gap" (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1995:812) and thus shows "in which direction and to what extent class differences in voting behaviour uniformly […] vary across years […] and countries" (Nieuwbeerta 1995:110). The time trend of the country specific *delta* indices again indicates a tendency towards a decline in class voting except in Switzerland and the United States. The decline is

statistically significant in Australia, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden (Nieuwbeerta 1995:119, 1996:369, Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf 1999:41).

Van der Waal, Achterberg and Houtman (2007) take their starting point from Nieuwbeerta's data and seek to reproduce his results. The authors do nevertheless make a few improvements in their analysis notably going beyond a simple left–right dichotomy instead using "the average left-right self-placement of their constituencies so as to produce a continuous variable with scores indicating rightist voting" (412). They also note that Nieuwbeerta in his analyses did not consider new left parties as being left-wing which they argue leads to an underestimation of the decline of class voting. Using a multi-level regression analysis, members of the working class show lower levels of rightist voting than the reference group, higher professionals. However, interaction terms between class and year suggest that the level of rightist voting of skilled workers increases with time. Taking into account other variables such as years of education and income, the level of rightist voting increases with income and every additional year of education. However, the interaction term for education and year suggests that with time, more educated individuals' level of support for rightist parties decreases while the opposite is true for the relationship between income and time (414–16). Thus, for the authors this is evidence that "the decline of the relationship between EGP class and voting behavior has been caused by an increase in cultural voting—a decrease in the tendency of the well educated to vote for parties on the right and the poorly educated to vote for parties on the left" (416).

Oesch (2008a) provides a different approach to the analysis of class voting. First, rather than using established class schemas, such as the EGP or Wright schemas which "reflect employment stratification typical of high industrialism of the 1970s" (330), he uses one based not only on employment relations but also on work logic. This class schema is then used to analyze class voting in three countries – Britain, Germany, and Switzerland – along

two cleavages. The first is the "traditional" economic cleavage opposing "manual labour and holders of organizational power" (332) while the second is a cultural divide opposing libertarian and authoritarian individuals (333).

A bivariate analysis of the economic divide shows that, in Britain, service and production workers are significantly over-represented among the electorate for economically left-wing parties (the Labour Party) while in Germany it is production workers and clerks that are significantly over-represented among the electorate of the Social Democrats (SDP). In both countries, the traditional bourgeoisie and small business owners are significantly under-represented. This suggests that the traditional economic cleavage opposing low skilled wage-earners and those who own the means of production persists. In Switzerland, like Germany and the UK, the traditional bourgeoisie and small business owners are significantly under represented among the electorate of economically left-wing parties (the Social Democrats) but unlike the other two countries, clerks, service workers, and production workers are *not* over-represented. In fact, only socio-cultural specialists are significantly over-represented within the electorate of the Social Democrats in Switzerland (339–41).

The multivariate (where education, sex, age, and sector are included as control variables) binomial logistic regressions for the two cleavages provide some interesting results. The traditional economic divide is operationalized as the odds of voting for a centre-right party as opposed to left party. Compared to clerks – the reference social class – only socio-cultural specialists and production workers are significantly less likely to support the Conservatives in the UK. In the case of Germany, only the traditional bourgeoisie and small business owners differ from clerks in supporting centre-right parties. Finally, in Switzerland socio-cultural specialists are less likely to vote for centre-right parties than clerks while only managers are more likely to vote for the centre-right. Small business owners and the traditional bourgeoisie on the other hand are no more likely to support centre-right parties which is in stark contrast with Britain and Germany. Age does have an effect in

Britain and Germany with older individuals (51–65) being more likely to vote for centre-right parties than younger individuals (35–50) while in Britain very young individuals (20–35) are less likely to support such parties. In all three countries, individuals working in the public sector are significantly less likely to support centre-right parties than those working in the private sector (341–44).

Support for the libertarian left (the Liberal Democrats in the UK, the Green Party in Germany, and the Greens and Social Democrats in Switzerland) overwhelmingly comes from socio-cultural specialists even in the multivariate analysis with both older and younger individuals being less likely to support it in Switzerland while in Germany the oldest are less likely to support it. Individuals with tertiary education are more likely to support the libertarian left in all three countries while individuals working in the public sector are more likely to support the libertarian left than individuals working in the private sector only in Switzerland (344–45). More generally, the results of a multinomial regression show that, holding everything but class constant, in Germany and the UK, members of the working class (clerks, service workers, and production workers) continue to be the most likely to vote for traditional left-wing parties rather than the libertarian left. In addition, the working class in both countries is highly unlikely to support right-wing conservative parties. However, things are not so straight-forward in Switzerland as the working class less clearly supports left-wing parties with socio-cultural specialists being by far the most likely to support the left. This would suggest that while the economic cleavage remains salient in Britain and Germany, it is markedly less so in Switzerland (346–47).

A more recent study by Jansen, Evans and de Graaf (2013), employing a two-step analysis using data spanning from 1960 to 2005, also contends that class voting is in decline. The first step looks at the individual-level determinants of left-wing party support. Without controlling for individual characteristics such as age, gender, and education, it would appear that the manual working class is still more likely to vote for a left-wing party than any other class, but the differences between classes' propensity to vote for

left-wing parties declines over time. There are however differences between countries and class voting remains strongest in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and the UK while it is weakest in France, Italy, Switzerland, and the United States. Nevertheless, even in these countries, the differences in left-wing party support between the different social classes are in decline. The most apparent decline in class voting is visible when comparing the political behaviour of the working and the service classes, but even the self-employed are becoming less likely to support right-wing parties more often than the working class (383–85). With the controls, the difference in the propensity to vote for a left-wing party declines the most between the service class and the working class suggesting that some of the decline in class-voting is related to changes in other social characteristics. However, the effects of age and gender are often not significant which is not the case for education. The more years of education an individual has completed, the more likely they are to support a right-wing party – though this relationship seems to be declining over time (386–87).

The second step of the analysis looks at the effects of the political system and the positions of political parties on class voting. Besides the polarization of the political system and the parties' actual positions in the political space, the propensity of non-manual and services classes to vote right-wing (compared to the manual working class) are negatively correlated with the year of survey suggesting that class voting is following a declining trend. Including party positions does not seem to lead to any major changes in the voting behaviour when compared to the working class, however the effect of party system polarization suggests that the more polarized a system the more likely other social classes are to support right-wing parties (387–90). This implies that class voting decreases as party system polarization decreases. This leads Jansen, Evans and de Graaf (2013) to conclude that while the "results are consistent with the erosion of class voting in modern democracies, they do not signal the end of class politics" (391).

The case of the traditional class cleavage – "considered as the opposition between the working class and the owners and employers" – in Switzerland is analyzed in detail by Rennwald (2014:553). Using Oesch's (2006a) class schema three periods are analyzed using a pooled multinomial logistic regression: the 1970s (data from the 1971 and 1975 elections were merged), 2007 and 2011. In the 1970s, small business owners and managers were more likely than production workers to support right-wing parties though the differences are less marked when considering the Christian Democratic Party. However, the Swiss People's Party mainly receives support from small business owners while the Radical-Liberal party is principally supported by large employers or the liberal professions, and managers. Moreover socio-cultural specialists and service workers are also more likely to support the Radical-Liberals thus indicating that there is also an opposition between routine non-manual employees and manual workers (Rennwald 2014:558–61).

The results for the 2000s suggest that the impact of social class on voting choices has changed. Production workers in 2007 and 2011 were almost just as likely as small business owners to support the Swiss People's Party as opposed to the Social Democratic Party. They however remain less likely to support the Radical-Liberal Party than the Social Democrats. In the 1970s, production workers were overwhelmingly the most likely to support the Social Democratic Party, but in 2011 this was no longer the case and instead socio-cultural specialists became the most likely to vote for the party (Rennwald 2014:562–65). While party alignments have changed, the differences between social classes concerning political participation persists, as socio-cultural specialists, and large employers and the liberal professions continue to be more likely to vote than service and production workers. However, while differences among men in the predicted probability of participation increased in the 2000s – despite a general decline in political participation – it is not necessarily the case for women nor for younger or older men (565–66). These results indicate that the (traditional) class cleavage in Switzerland is no longer as strong as it once was.

2.2. EXPLAINING THE DECLINE

Among the scholars that argue in favour of a decline in class voting, explanations for this decline are often framed in a larger perspective that posits that social class has become less relevant (or even irrelevant), and that this transformation is visible in the decline of class voting (Clark and Lipset 1991). However, authors considering that there is no clear indication of decline argue that such conclusions can stem from methodological issues related to the measures employed in conceptualizing class and voting. Proponents of the persistence of class voting single out the binary distinction – manual vs. non-manual – often employed as a measure of class as well as a binary view of voting choices (left or right).

2.2.1. THE RELEVANCE OF SOCIAL CLASS

The usefulness or even the validity of the notion of social class has been questioned. Indeed for Clark and Lipset "[…] class is an increasingly outmoded concept, although it is sometimes appropriate to earlier historical periods" (1991:397). They argue that class as an analytical framework is "increasingly inadequate […] as traditional hierarchies have declined and new social differences have emerged" (*ibid.*). Changes that have made social class less relevant for the two authors include an increasing differentiation of workers or labour notably *within* the working class which is increasingly segmented and based on different skill levels, but also with "the expansion of the 'middle class' of white-collar non-manual workers" (400). However, it is not only changes in the workplace or work relations which are considered to signal the decline of the relevance of social class, but also the reduction of clearly visible differences between social classes.

The mechanisms identified by Clark and Lipset that are considered to have reduced the pertinence of class analysis are related to the decline of traditional hierarchies, such as economic or family ones, which are considered to "determine much less than just a generation or two ago" (401). For the authors, the decline in the

relevance of social class is most evident in the decline of class voting. It is argued that the decline is due to the changing natures of the left–right political dimension. On the left of the political spectrum, it is considered that there is a split between the traditional left – which is supported by and represents blue-collar workers and focuses mainly on material class-related issues – and a second – or "new" – left "which increasingly stresses social issues rather than traditional class political issues" (403). They hypothesize that this political shift of the left from class issues to social issues is linked to affluence: "[…] as wealth increases, people take the basics for granted; they grow more concerned with life-style and amenities. Younger, more educated and more affluent persons in more affluent and less hierarchical societies should move furthest from traditional class politics" (*ibid.*).

A direct criticism of Clark and Lipset is provided by Hout, Brooks and Manza . One of the main points of contention is that class and hierarchy are used almost interchangeably by Clark and Lipset even though they don't refer to the same thing in reality. For Hout, Brooks and Manza, class "refers to a person's relationship to the means of production and/or labour markets" and while hierarchy can be viewed as leading to social stratification, the two are not equivalent (1993:261). The authors do not necessarily disagree that hierarchies are declining, they find it harder to believe that social classes are doing the same. They point out for instance persistent and increasing inequality in relation to fortunes which are still derived from the ownership of the means of production (262). In addition, were social classes really on the decline, it would be possible to see this through a decline in inter-class earning inequality (though *intra*-class earning inequalities may persist). Using the Wright and Erikson-Goldthorpe class schemas, they find, in the case of the US, that there remain earnings differences between all classes even when adjusting income to correct for factors like education, age, and hours worked. These earning inequalities persist despite the expansion of the middle class (263–64).

Economic Development and "Affluence"

Economic growth is considered to be one of the mechanisms that leads to more affluence. For Clark and Lipset (1991) affluence creates more income for individuals which then means that the poor become more independent of the rich, but also that "all can indulge progressively more elaborate and varied tastes" (405). In addition, the development of technology and the increasing importance of research and development for firms implies a "*decline in traditional authority, hierarchy and class relations*" (406; emphasis in original). The argument is that technological advancement reduces the need for unskilled workers performing routine tasks, but also for a large middle-management as routine tasks are increasingly automated. At the same time, the demand for autonomous decision-making on the part of employees increases. Thus, the advance of technology has led to an expansion of "white-collar, technical, professional and service-oriented" occupations which in turn modifies class structure which "increasingly resembles a diamond bulging at the middle rather than a pyramid" (*ibid.*). Such occupations require higher levels of education which has also led to an increase in the number of individuals pursuing further education. Other factors that the authors consider as leading to the decline of social stratification and social hierarchies include globalization and immigration, but also increasing social mobility. Concerning the latter, it is argued that higher levels of wealth as well as government support increase the amount of choices individuals have but also reduces the role of the family. Moreover, they argue that social mobility studies show that parents' levels of education and income no longer play a decisive role in determining occupations while an individual's level of education plays an increasingly important role (407).

Inglehart takes a similar position concerning the declining importance of social class. He argues that: "Economic factors tend to play a decisive role under conditions of economic scarcity; but as scarcity diminishes, other factors shape society to an increasing degree" (1990:248). The main argument, similar to Clark and Lip-

set 's notion of affluence, is that increasing economic development reduces the relevance of economic factors. Inglehart uses both macro-level and individual-level data to illustrate this claim. At the macro-level, he shows that life expectancy follows a logarithmic model meaning that the higher the level of economic development (measured as GNP per capita), the smaller the increase in life expectancy for the same increase in GNP per capita. Thus, "[e]conomic factors become less decisive, and life-style factors more so; […] longevity has more to do with life-style than with sheer income" (248–49).

A similar relationship can be observed between GNP per capita and inequality (measured by the share of total income of the top 10%) where again it is at low levels where a change in the level of GNP per capita makes a noticeable difference in decreasing inequality. Consequently, "political support for increased income equality reaches a point of diminishing returns at a level well short of perfect equality." Mechanisms that lead to this situation include capitalists consenting to "[…] democratic institutions through which workers could effectively press claims for material gains" and "[…] workers would consent to profits in the expectation that they will be invested productively, improving their future material gains" (251–52). In addition, in highly egalitarian societies, there is no longer a political base which would be receptive to arguments for the expansion of the welfare-state that rely on individuals' economic self-interest. Rather: "[…] further progress toward equality would come *not* from an emphasis on materialistic class conflict, but through an appeal to the public's sense of justice, social solidarity, and other nonmaterial motivations" (252).

Inglehart also assesses the impact of economic development on political preferences. Data from the Euro-Barometer surveys on opinions on economic policy (redistribution, government intervention, nationalization) seems to suggest that the more economically developed a country, the less support there is for "classic Left economic policies." Denmark, one of the richest countries with a highly developed welfare state, shows the *least* support for

reducing income inequality, government intervention, and nationalization (254–55). This would seem to indicate that: "The politics of advanced industrial societies no longer polarize primarily on the basis of working class versus middle class; and the old issues, centering on ownership of the means of production, no longer lie at the heart of political polarization" (257).

Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) test to what extent differences in class voting between and within countries (over time) can be attributed to economic explanations. Differences in the level of class voting between countries don't seem to be affected by the standard of living (measured by per capita GDP) nor by income inequality (measured as the income share of the top 20%) as the effect of these two variables is not significantly different from zero. However, the standard of living does have an effect on the level of class voting over time *within* countries and it has the expected effect i.e. an increase in the standard of living leads to a decrease in the level of class voting. In addition, there is a negative correlation between the trend parameters for class voting and the standard of living providing additional evidence in favour of a decline in the level of class voting in a country as its standard of living increases (143–46).

Social Mobility and Education

The declining relevance of social class is also thought to be related to higher levels of social mobility with more individuals joining the middle class than before. Improved access to education is also thought to be an important contributing factor to social mobility.

Kingston (2000) argues that social mobility is clearly on the rise. While there are scholars that are argue in favour of considering social mobility based on net effects – i.e. taking into account changes in occupational structure – he argues in favour of only considering *absolute* social mobility. He argues that "[w]hat matters is the outcome, not the cause of mobility. Socially mobile workers simply recognize that their own position differs from their origins

[…]" (63). Kingston shows that even for the upper non-manual classes, a large part of individuals belonging to the class came from manual or blue-collar, and farmer backgrounds. As for the class destinations of individual's children, occupational inheritance is most visible when comparing fathers and sons belonging to the upper non-manual classes. Nevertheless, the data also suggests that mobility for the manual classes remains as almost 31% of sons whose fathers had an upper manual occupation held an upper *non*-manual occupation. This evidence leads Kingston to claim that there is real class mobility as the children do not find themselves in a "'proletarianized' lower nonmanual job" (66–67).

He goes on to examine social mobility this time in relation to class – employing Wright's classification – rather than occupation. When looking at inflows, i.e. the father's class background/origin, the data shows that 45% of workers came from a working-class background, but that there is also a non-negligible proportion of workers that come from middle class backgrounds (31% of workers had fathers who were either managers or expert managers). In fact, very few members of the classes which possess the means of production come from such a background. Outflows tell a similar story with very few employers' sons becoming employers themselves (15%); in fact, there was a larger proportion of sons whose fathers were classified as experts that had gone on to become employers (21%) (70–71). In addition, women do not seem to be any less mobile than men with a large proportion of women from working class backgrounds occupying managerial positions, for instance. Women are nevertheless more likely to belong to the working class and less likely to hold a managerial position than men (75).

Kingston also investigates *intra*generational mobility as he considers that "individual work-life histories so directly speak to the claim that class is a persistent force" (76). Using data collected between 1969 and 1980 from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the author shows that just under 50% of individuals who in 1969 held an occupation as an "operator" i.e. workers changed occupations and in doing so also changed classes. However, "[…] the

upper stratum within the middle class and the upper stratum within the blue-collar working class provide relatively permanent occupational locations, though permanence is hardly guaranteed" (80–81). In fact, additional data provided by the study indicates that individuals changed occupational categories multiple times between 1969 and 1980 (50% had two occupational category changes, one-third had three) again suggesting that intragenerational mobility is rather common (82). Another argument that must be taken into account is that technological changes have occurred and consequently there was also a change in occupational structure which may make it seem as though one's social origins matter less in determining one's "destination" (63).

Regarding the effect of education on social mobility, rather than contending that it is becoming liberalized and less dependent on social origin, Hout, Brooks and Manza simply state that education has become less selective *in general* rather than selective based on an individual's social class. In addition, the authors also refute the argument that growing affluence led to a reduction in class-related barriers to education, rather it was a conscious policy choice to facilitate social mobility through education (Hout, Brooks and Manza 1993:269–70).

Yaish and Andersen (2012) go beyond simply using mobility matrixes and propose a multivariate analysis of social mobility using a multi-level model thus taking into account both mirco- and macro-level variables. When looking at individual-level variables, they find that the father's socio-economic status – operationalized as the father's current or last occupation (if retired for instance) – has a highly significant effect on an individual's occupation. However, an individual's level of education also has a highly significant effect on occupation and reduces the effect of the father's socio-economic status (though it does remain highly significant) (532–33). They also proceed to introduce contextual factors including measures of income inequality, migration, and GDP per capita. Despite the inclusion of contextual factors, the effect of the father's occupation continues to remain highly significant. In fact,

the net effects of the contextual factors are quite often not statistically significant with the exception of the net migration rate. This would thus suggest that migration favours social mobility. The effect of GDP per capita while not significant on its own is significant when interacting it with the father's socio-economic status suggesting that a more affluent society does favour more social mobility (535–37). Nevertheless, social origins do continue to influence social mobility and thus it would be difficult to affirm that social class has no bearing on social mobility even if its effect is lessened by educational attainment.

De Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath (1995) test to what extent social mobility affects class polarization and thus would be able to contribute to explaining variations in the level of class voting between countries – (West) Germany, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the United States – and over time. The authors test multiple hypotheses both at the micro and macro levels. At the micro level, they hypothesize that if an individual's voting behaviour is interest-based, they will be more likely to vote like the individuals in their class of destination rather than their class of origin. A first complementary hypothesis specifies an "acculturation" effect where as individuals grow older, their political preferences align more with their destination class than their origin. A second complementary hypothesis considers that individuals align their political preferences to whichever class is considered to be more prestigious – "status maximization" – and thus upwardly mobile individuals are more likely to adopt the political preferences of their destination class while downwardly mobile individuals tend to orient themselves towards the preferences of their class of origin (999–1000).

At the macro level, three hypotheses are made. The first is related to the composition of social classes. The political orientations of a social class can change based on inflow mobility, but this compositional effect also depends on the political preferences of mobile individuals. Two other contextual macro-level hypotheses are also made by de Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath. The first is that classes with relatively low levels of inflow will have more

influence on the political preferences of new members than classes with a high level of inflow. The second hypothesis specifies that, in the case of high levels of inflow, if the newcomers hold left-wing political preferences, the immobile members of the same class will have a tendency to adopt left-wing political preferences (1002–03).

When testing the micro-level hypotheses, model statistics shows that the acculturation model (without any country-specific parameters or weights) is to be preferred over the "status maximization" model thus implying a rejection of the second complementary hypothesis. To test the acculturation hypothesis, an interaction term between an individual's age, and origin and destination weights is included and is significant. This interaction is positive meaning that over time the weight of the class of origin relative to the weight of the destination class decreases (1014–16).

At the macro level, the compositional effect suggests that there has been a decline in the left-wing orientation of the working class and a slight increase in left-wing support among the service class despite the greater similarity in political preferences between mobile and stable individuals. However, the compositional effect is weaker in the US than in the three European countries as "class has a weaker effect on voting behavior in the United States, the compositional effects of social mobility, other things being equal, are likely to be smaller too" (1017). The first contextual macro-level hypothesis concerning the effect of the political preferences of the immobile on mobile individuals, is rejected. Models including class-specific weights did not provide a better fit suggesting that different classes do not have different effects on the political preferences of mobile individuals. The second contextual macro-level hypothesis about the effect of the mobile on the political preferences of the immobile is also rejected as the interaction term between inflow and the weight of the social class on political preferences is not significant (1018–20).

Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999) also test to what extent differences in class voting within and between countries can be attributed to social mobility. As their class division only distinguishes between manual and non-manual occupations, an individual (male) is categorized as mobile simply if their occupation differs from that of their father (151). Rather than finding that increased social mobility leads to a decline in class voting, they instead find that, at the country level, social mobility leads to an *increase* in the levels of class voting. This finding suggests that countries with higher levels of inter-generational mobility are likely to have higher levels of class voting (144). However, intergenerational social mobility *within* countries does not seem to have any effect on the level of class voting. Thus the results suggest that social mobility does not lead to a reduction in class voting as found by de Graaf, Nieuwbeerta and Heath (1995). Nevertheless, Nieuwbeerta and Ultee acknowledge that contextual factors are obscured by analyzing mobility as an absolute property (148–49).

2.2.2. MEASURING CLASS VOTING

One of the main points of criticism related to the decline of class voting is the use of the Alford Index (Alford 1962). The index – designed to measure "[t]he extent to which manual and nonmanual strata divide in their support for political parties" (421) – is simply the difference in the proportion of individuals in manual occupations who vote for a left-wing party (something that must be defined by the researcher) and the proportion of individuals in non-manual occupations voting for a left-wing party (422). While simple, the Alford Index is a relatively limited measurement of class voting as "[…] the measurement of the class–vote association is open to confounding by changes in the marginal distributions of the class-by-vote table deriving from changes in the class structure and in the general popularity of the parties" (Evans 1999:13). What this means is that a change in the size of the manual or non-manual classes or a drop in general popularity of a certain party would lead to a decline in the Alford Index. In addition

the dichotomous nature of the index means that the impact of abstention on class voting cannot be evaluated (Manza, Hout and Brooks 1995:152).

The data employed by Clark and Lipset (1991) to support their claims of a decline of class voting – and by extension the declining importance of social class – employs the Alford Index. The use of this index is one of the main criticisms Hout, Brooks and Manza (1993) make in response to Clark and Lipset's claims. They point to other studies employing more developed class schemas which instead of finding a generalized decline in the level of class voting, find that it has remained stable or even increased (265–66). Thus, the suitability of using a dichotomous class distinction based on contrasting manual and non-manual occupations is a point of contention in the debate on the persistence or the decline of class voting. In order to get around the constraints associated with the Alford Index, as well as linear regression models, analyses based on logistic regression or log-linear models are used. Indices of class voting derived from these models, which employ odds ratios, are insensitive to changes in the marginal distribution of voters.

The *kappa* index introduced by Hout, Brooks and Manza (1995:813) is one such index. It is defined "as the standard deviation of class differences in vote choice" and is designed to give the level of total class voting – i.e. across all social classes and all voting outcomes. In addition, the index can also be decomposed to give the level of class voting for a specific voting outcome. The *kappa* index has three main advantages: first as it uses log odds ratios, it is not sensitive to changes in the marginal distribution of voting. Second, it allows for polytomous voting and class outcomes contrary to the Alford Index's limitation to dichotomous divisions. Third, it can be used to establish the total level of class voting or traditional class voting (814). The *kappa* index is, however, simply designed to facilitate the interpretation of log-linear and logistic regression models and its benefits over linear models and the Alford Index are simply derived from those models.

Nieuwbeerta and Ultee (1999:132) argue however that using a more developed class schema, such as the Erikson–Goldthorpe schema, would not lead to different conclusions concerning the general decline of class voting. Nieuwbeerta and de Graaf (1999:34–35) explicitly test this claim by employing loglinear or logistic regression models where overall voting behaviour is measured using indices – the *kappa* and *delta* indices – based on the log odds ratios of the different classes. They employ the *kappa* index in conjunction with the Erikson–Goldthorpe-Portocarero (EGP) class schema (with unskilled manual workers being the reference social class) and a dichotomous voting outcome (left- or right-wing). When considering the linear time trend parameters, they find indications of a decline in class voting in all but one of the twenty countries considered (Austria). However, the parameters are significantly different from zero in only three cases (Germany, Norway, and Britain) in part due to the very low number of observations for approximately half the countries considered. The authors state that the only countries for which they can reasonably consider that there was no change in the class voting trend are the United States and the Netherlands suggesting that class voting in those two countries remained stable (38). However, despite employing a multi-category class specification, they do not fully take advantage of the possibility to specify a non-binary voting outcome despite the *kappa* index being designed for such a situation.

Evans (1999) also criticizes the use of dichotomous voting outcomes. It can be argued that using a simple left–right – or left as opposed to non-left – dichotomy to operationalize political preference facilitates comparison across systems and countries. However, such a division is selective and does not necessarily facilitate comparison. In addition, when looking at changes over time, just like with the Alford Index, a change in the size of a party's constituency, despite the relative support of a certain class for that party remaining the same, could "lead to spurious changes in the estimates of class voting" (12).

Moreover, such a dichotomy is also conceptually problematic. Class voting in a narrow sense considers that the (manual) working

class support economically left-wing parties while non-manual workers support economically right-wing parties (Achterberg and Houtman 2006:75). Class voting in a broader sense refers to the existence of a "pattern of association between class and vote" (Evans 1999:12). In other words, there is class voting when certain social classes are consistently associated with a certain political outcome. Adopting such a view of class voting not only permits dealignement but also *re*alignment i.e. the possibility that social classes change their party affinities. Evans thus argues that changes over time can be interpreted as dealignment, realignment or even increasing alignment depending on how both class and voting outcomes are operationalized.

2.3. The New Class Approach

Kitschelt (1994, 1997), Kriesi (1998), Kriesi et al. (2006, 2008), and Bornschier (2010) consider that social classes continue to form a basis of political divisions but the opposition is no longer only along economic lines. While these authors do agree with assessments indicating the decline of traditional class voting i.e. the fact that the working class votes for the left (Goldberg and Sciarini 2014:574–75), such a decline "does not necessarily signify the end of structuration by social divisions" (Kriesi 1998:181). Instead they argue that new cleavages have developed, that a "re-structuration and re-alignment" (Kriesi 2010:675) has taken place and that there has been a significant transformation of class structure notably *within* the growing middle class.

This approach adopts a broader view of what constitutes a social class and how it affects political preferences. Social class is not simply derived from property relations, but also arises from individuals' work experience. Individuals that occupy similar positions in relation to the means of production can still have completely different market experiences resulting from differences between the private and public sectors, or the exposure of an individual's job to competitive pressures. Thus, work experience is considered

to be a factor which can influence an individual's political preferences. Aspects of the work experience such as the level of autonomy, or whether individuals work primarily with objects rather than "cultural symbols that invoke the development of human individuality" (Kitschelt 1994:15–17) are viewed as playing a central role.

Furthermore (Kitschelt 2014) argues that using established class schemas, such as the Erikson–Goldthorpe–Portocarero schema, is in fact problematic as groups that are considered to be homogenous, such as the "salariat", in fact have completely different political preferences. However, the EGP class schema also makes a distinction between low-skilled service and production workers which would lead us to expect differing political preferences. In reality, the manual–non-manual distinction is not always empirically relevant when it comes to political preferences "as these groups do not experience analytically relevant differences in their occupational task structures" (230). As such, arguments that class no longer structures political preferences can be questioned especially if they utilized "objective class categories which no longer were adequate for the characterization of contemporary social structures" (Kriesi 2010:675).

Kriesi also argues for a division of the middle class along lines of different work experiences. Firstly, it is necessary to distinguish the "old" middle class – the petite bourgeoisie – from the "new" middle class or service class. The "new" middle class is characterized by the "exercise of delegated authority or control over organizational assets, on the one hand, and expertise, skills or credentials on the other hand" (168). This internal heterogeneity leads Kriesi to distinguish between managers – who exercise authority – and professionals on the grounds that they have different work experiences. Managers' work experience is defined as the "sharing of power within the command structure" which in turn should lead them to be more loyal to their organizations. Professionals on the other hand aim for high levels of autonomy and justify it by referring to their professional community. Within the group of professionals, social and cultural specialists are considered to be

the least likely to identify with an organization and the most likely to seek independence. Moreover, this group of individuals more than other professionals engage in "exchange with clients and the norms for care for them puts members of this group in a position in which they should be responsive to social rather than organizational concerns" (169).

Managers and socio-cultural specialists are hypothesized to have opposing values and political orientations with technical and administrative experts being somewhere in between. Socio-cultural specialists, because of their work experience, are considered to seek greater amounts of autonomy than managers and support egalitarian economic positions as a result of communicating and identifying with their clients. Thus, it is most likely that they would support left-wing parties but also new social movements. By contrast, managers are supposed to take broadly similar positions to the old middle class preferring market solutions but also subscribing to authoritarian conceptions of community. As these two groups have different political orientations, they are considered to be at the basis of a potential political cleavage.

Oesch (2006a) argues that adopting a vision of class based on work logics as done by Kitschelt and Kriesi not only permits one to view the middle class as more than a "monolithic bloc" (13) but also to distinguish between different sections of the working class. The use of work logics permits the distinction of positions that, while similar in terms of hierarchy, differ in terms of work logic. Routine workers may be at the bottom of the hierarchy, but a routine operative following a technical work logic can work in an environment with a strict division of labour. The same cannot be said for routine service workers who mainly rely on social skills and whose work experience is principally defined by face-to-face interaction.

Another central element is that divisions between social classes are structured by two dimensions rather than a single economic left–right divide. Rather than considering that the economic dimension has been eclipsed by a value cleavage as Inglehart (1990)

does, they instead argue that the two main existing cleavages, socio-economic and cultural, coexist and continue to structure the political space (Kriesi et al. 2008:12–13).

In Ketchelt's (1994:11) conception, the first dimension is an economic divide opposing socialist and capitalist conceptions of the economy and the second a libertarian–authoritarian cultural divide. The economic dimension opposes individuals in favour of market solutions for the allocation of resources to those who advocate allocation – redistribution – through political mechanisms (9). The second dimension opposes different visions of community. One pole is defined by a "libertarian" view where the "idea of community is associated with the voluntary and equal participation of all citizens in the community and the loose association of communitarian units in a federation." The other "authoritarian" pole is characterized by a conception of community advocating "compulsory membership in internally hierarchical units and a stratified ordering among communitarian units" (10).

Kriesi et al. (2008) take a similar approach but consider that the two dimensions are related to a single conflict opposing the "winners" and "losers" of globalization. Along the cultural dimension, the "winners" are expected to support "the opening up of the national boundaries and the process of international integration" while the "losers" should react to globalization by adopting protectionist measures and emphasizing national independence (9). Nevertheless, they do propose are more nuanced view of the economic divide in relation to globalization. The economic dimension continues to oppose pro-state and pro-market positions though these positions have evolved. Pro-state positions should be increasingly defensive and protectionist while pro-market ones should emphasize a country's ability to compete in international markets (13).

Many elements from the new class approach – especially political realignment, the use of developed class schemas, and a political space structured by an economic and a cultural dimension –

underpin the theoretical frameworks used to understand the emergence and success of populist radical right-wing parties.

To summarize, it would seem that class voting in the classic sense where is no longer as strong as it once was. The working class no longer predominantly votes for left-wing parties, while a growing contingent of the middle class is beginning to vote for the left. Nevertheless, such changes should not necessarily be interpreted as the "end" of class voting. Conceptually, class voting can be seen as referring simply to the existence of a systematic relationship between a class and a party. As such, class voting can take on a new form opposing classes along different divisions, not just economic ones, and classes can also realign. As we will see in the next section, explanations for the emergence and the rise of the radical right are underpinned by the hypothesis of a political realignment of the working class.

3. (Radical) Right-Wing Populist Parties

The previous section outlined the debate on whether there has been a decline in working-class support for left-wing parties. While for some this signalled the end of class as a determinant of voting, more generally it is thought to be part of a tendency towards a realignment of the working class' voting preferences. This realignment is most often viewed in relation to the two dimensional reconfiguration of the political space and the emergence of the cultural cleavage in addition to the existing economic cleavage. While Betz's (1994) and Kitschelt's (1997) (early) accounts of the radical right in Europe link positions along the two dimensions together, more recent accounts increasingly show that it is political alignments along the cultural or communitarian dimension that are at the basis of support for radical right-wing populist parties *despite* possible incompatibilities between party and voter positions on economic matters (Ivarsflaten 2005, Achterberg and Houtman 2006). In this section, first, definitions of what a right-wing populist party, and which parties belong this category, will be considered as there is as of yet no clear delineation that can be used to determine whether a party belongs to this party family. Second, explanations of the electoral success – or lack of success – will be explored. These explanations not only concern the micro-level or individual-level factors that lead to the success of such parties, but also the institutional and systemic characteristics of political systems. Marco-level factors are considered to be especially relevant in explaining cross-national differences in the success of radical right-wing populist parties despite the presences of favourable micro-level conditions for party support. After this more general overview, the case of Switzerland itself will be analyzed in more detail. The evolution and emergence of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) as the country's leading radical right-wing populist party,

displacing previously established members of the party family in the process, will be retraced. The characteristics of the SVP's electorate will also be examined in more detail.

3.1. Defining Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties

The radical right-wing populist family denotes a set of parties – such as the Front National, or the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) – that while diverse, and emerging from different historical contexts, seemingly have many similarities (Mudde 2007:11, Bornschier 2010:33). The lack of a common definition for such a party family is visible in the plethora of different terms employed by studies analyzing this group of parties (Mudde 2007). Moreover, while there seems to be a lack of consensus on defining the radical right, most definitions agree on which parties belong to the new party family (Rydgren 2007:242). With the wide array of party family names proposed by different authors, in what follows, they will all be treated as synonyms as in most cases they refer to similar concepts and are relatively close.

An early view offered by Ignazi (1992) labels radical right parties "extreme right" parties and while "new" extreme right parties are considered as being distinct from (neo-)fascist parties, they are nevertheless grouped together. Ignazi proposes three criteria which can be used to distinguish extreme right parties from other right-wing parties: their position on the political spectrum, the party's ideology (and whether it references fascism), and attitudes towards the political system. The spatial indicator in itself it not sufficient to establish whether or not a party belongs to the extreme right. Moreover, party positions vary from system to system and positions are not necessarily absolute, but relative. Thus, the spatial criteria is almost a "preliminary screening" that defines which parties should be retained for further analysis (Ignazi 2006:31). The ideological criterion is also not straightforward. The extreme right is not necessarily fascist – in fact many extreme right

parties deny having any ties to fascism – but they share many commonalities in their ideologies (32). In Ignazi's earlier work, the distinction between "new" and "old" extreme right parties hinged on whether or not a party had a fascist legacy (1992:12). The third criteria, having an anti-statist position, permits the inclusion of newer extreme right parties removed from the fascist legacy. Fascism itself is fundamentally incompatible with democracy. Anti-system parties do not reject democracy but rather liberal democracy and institutional features such as "the parliamentary system, […], excessive freedom, the weakness of the state, the disruption of the traditional natural communities, and "unnatural" egalitarianism" (*ibid.*). In his later work, the second and third criteria are merged into a single ideological criterion and extreme right parties are instead defined as holding values and attitudes that are radically opposed to their particular political systems (Ignazi 2006:32).

The definition of radical right-wing populism offered by Betz (1994:3) builds on each component which composes the party family's name. In his view *radical* denotes:

> [The] rejection of the established socio-cultural and socio-political system and their advocacy of individual achievement, a free market, and a drastic reduction of the role of the state without, however, openly questioning the legitimacy of democracy in general.

The right-wing aspect refers to three elements. First, these parties oppose equality and efforts to reduce inequality. Second, they refuse to support the integration of marginalized groups. Finally, they make xenophobic (and possibly racist and anti-Semitic) appeals. The populist element derives from the parties' practice of exploiting a general sense of disenchantment through appeals to common sense and the "common man." Based on this definition, radical right-wing populist refers to an alliance of pro-capitalist economic positions with xenophobic and anti-universalistic tendencies that channel individuals' dissatisfaction.

Another early proposal for the definition of the "new radical right" party family is that of Kitschelt (1997). He retains two main

criteria for inclusion. The first is that other competing parties must "perceive it [the party] to be 'located on the right' and not a viable coalition partner." More precisely, a party is considered to belong to the new radical right when moderate right parties consider it to be too extreme to be included in a government coalition. The second criterion, when the party appeared on the political scene, is related to the view that new radical right parties are fundamentally opposed to the new or libertarian left and thus should have appeared "in the same general time period as their antagonists." As such, Kitschelt considers right-wing parties founded in the latter half of the 1960s to be candidates for inclusion in the new radical right party family (49).

Based on these criteria, three possible party positions – within Kitschelt's two-dimensional space – are identified within the new radical right party family. First, there is the "master case" which refers to parties that adopt authoritarian cultural positions (i.e. position themselves against multiculturalism, gender equality, etc.) and capitalist (neoliberal) economic positions (the dismantling of the welfare state above all). In terms of their position in the two dimensional political space, such parties would be located in the bottom-right quadrant which is to say towards the capitalist pole on the economic dimension and the authoritarian pole of the libertarian–authoritarian axis. This model of a new radical right party is considered to be the most likely to achieve electoral success (19). However this model has been criticized and is viewed as being "time limited" in that while it is was applicable in the 1990s, radical right parties have since distanced themselves from (neo)liberal economic positions (McGann and Kitschelt 2005:149).

The two other possible positions, which are considered to be less likely to lead to electoral success, are a populist anti-statist position and racist authoritarian or "welfare chauvinist" appeal. Populist anti-statist parties direct their appeals "against "big government" and the "political class" […] but to a much lesser extent against […] libertarian themes" (Kitschelt 1997:21). Such a party's position in the political space is not necessarily clearly defined. While it is clear that it should find itself towards the capitalist pole

of the socialist–capitalist axis, its position along the libertarian–authoritarian axis is less so. Such parties, are not necessarily authoritarian and in fact, on many issues (multiculturalism, gender equality, environmentalism for instance) may even take libertarian positions. This leads Kitschelt to consider populist parties as borderline cases when they are successful (41) but more generally concedes that populist or anti-statist parties do not necessarily belong to the new radical right party family (21). Thus Kitschelt's definition of the radical right, contrary to later definitions, does not include populism – anti-establishment discourses and sentiments – as a defining feature of the party family. In fact, it is considered to be one possible orientation in situations where there is a "clientalist" political economy (22).

Welfare chauvinist or racist authoritarian parties on the other hand stay "studiously stay away from an admiration of market-liberal capitalism." Instead, their main focus "is the mobilization of resentment on the authoritarian/libertarian axis" (*ibid.*). Such parties may even explicitly defend the welfare state but only for a certain subset of individuals who belong to a specific ethnic group and who have contributed to the system *de facto* excluding immigrants who are viewed as "free-loaders." The main reason Kitschelt is skeptical about the possibility of electoral success for such parties is that:

> […] short of a major economic catastrophe, it appears unlikely that the gradual structural transformation of Western economies will ever threaten or actually cut free a sufficiently large proportion of the workforce into unemployment to provoke the rise of significant authoritarian welfare-chauvinist parties. (Kitschelt 1997:23)

However, in light of the current economic situation following the 2008 financial crisis, this may no longer be the case.

More recent definitions of the radical right-wing populist party family often do not refer to parties' economic positions. In fact, newer definitions often explicitly state that these parties mobilize voters almost exclusively along a cultural line of conflict.

Bornschier (2010:35) proposes such a definition and establishes three criteria for the inclusion of political parties in the "extreme-right-wing populist party family." The first is that such parties should be located at the extreme right on the cultural dimension. Bornschier's cultural dimension – which opposes libertarian-universalistic positions and traditionalist-communitarian positions – is similar to Kitschelt's. Communitarians would be more likely to defend cultural homogeneity and view immigration as a threat unlike individuals holding universalistic and libertarian values (23).

Moreover, contrary to Kitschelt, Bornschier argues that extreme-right-wing populist parties are not necessarily located on the extreme right of the economic axis as party positions on (re)distributive matters is influenced by the characteristics of its constituency. It is also necessary to specify along which axes the party is "extreme" as using a single left–right division confounds positions along both the cultural and economic axes. Second, these parties must also mobilize an anti-establishment discourse that pits them against established political parties. Such a discourse can also serve to bind together members of a heterogeneous electorate who do not necessarily share the same values and to forge a new identity. However, there can be a certain level of incompatibility between a party's anti-establishment discourse and participation in the government. The case of the SVP suggests that it is possible to maintain such a discourse *and* participate in government with no clear detrimental effects on support (36). Finally, extreme-right-wing populist parties have another fundamental characteristic which is that they are hierarchically organized permitting them to be extremely flexible and responsive. This allows them to capitalize on new issues as they emerge (34).

Mudde (2007) proposes his own definition of radical right-wing populist parties by starting from a minimal definition based on what he identifies as the core concept behind the ideologies of these parties: the nation. Nevertheless, defining nationalism is not an easy task as it can refer to many different concepts. Mudde retains two main dimensions of nationalism: an *ethnic* and a *civic* dimension. In this sense, nationalism refers to a political doctrine

that "strives for the congruence of the cultural and the political unit, i.e. the national and the state, respectively" (16). This definition in itself is not sufficient to permit the classification of radical right parties as it does not distinguish between more moderate and more radical positions (17).

Instead, Mudde chooses to employ the concept of nativism defined as: "*an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ("the nation") and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state*" (19; emphasis in original). Nativism as a concept is also more useful for identifying radical right parties as it excludes liberal forms of nationalism, but is also not necessarily racist. Exclusion and inclusion can be defined along cultural or religious lines rather than by "race."

While nativism is an important core dimension of radical right-wing parties, for Mudde it is one of three dimensions which characterize the ideology of the radical right. The concept of nativism combines nationalism and xenophobia which are key elements of radical right-wing parties' ideology (22). The second dimension is authoritarianism. In this case it does not refer to a tendency to support nondemocratic forms of government – though this is not precluded – but rather to "the belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely" (23). The final aspect is populism which Mudde considers to be an ideology rather than just a style of politics. These parties believe that society is divided into two opposing groups – "the pure people" and the "corrupt elite" – and that politics should be the expression of the "general will of the people" (*ibid.*).

From these three main ideological elements, Mudde argues that parties which show evidence of adhering to these elements indeed belong to the radical right. First, the term "radical" is deemed more appropriate than "extreme" as the parties which are being defined are more often opposed "to some key features of liberal democracy, most notably political pluralism", but this term must be considered in conjunction with party positions in the political

space (25). The qualifier "right" when applied to political parties most often refers to their position on the economic axis. In the case of radical right parties, treating the term in such a manner isn't necessarily correct as economic questions are not central to party ideology. Moreover, radical right parties occupy differing positions along the economic dimension (considered to oppose partisans of market solutions to those in favour of state intervention).

Mudde instead argues that left and right should be defined by a party's stance on inequality. A left-wing party would consider inequality to be artificial and seek to correct it while a right-wing party would consider it to be natural. The inclusion of populism makes the definition of radical right parties more restrictive as it prevents the inclusion of parties that hold elitist conceptions of nativism (24). Parties that match this definition belong to the "populist radical right" party family. This name is chosen over "radical right populist" as the former puts the emphasis on the fact that this party family "refers to a populist form of the radical right" while the latter would seem to emphasize a radical right form of populism (26).

To illustrate his definition of populist radical right parties, Mudde shows which parties do *not* have a nativist ideological core, a right-wing position, and a populist, anti-elite, ideology. Conservative parties – which are considered to be authoritarian, traditional, religious, and nationalist – are close but differ when it comes to nationalism which is closer to patriotism, or loyalty to the nation. Neoconservative parties differ from populist radical right parties in that nativism is not central to their ideology. Moreover, despite views such as Kitschelt's (1997) where neoliberal positions are associated with populist radical right parties, their support for free markets further distances them from populist radical right parties as for the latter, economic concerns are of a secondary nature (Mudde 2007:27–28).

Another distinction that is important to make is between regionalist and nationalist parties on the one hand, and populist radical right parties on the other. Regionalist parties do not belong to the populist radical right party family as they seek more autonomy but do not necessarily oppose themselves to a multinational state nor are their appeals for autonomy culturally motivated. A nationalist party, insofar as its ideology includes populism and authoritarianism, can be included in the party family. However, this is not always the case and thus "while all populist radical right parties are nationalist, only subsets of the nationalist parties are populist radical right" (Mudde 2007:29). This distinction is especially important when considering whether or not the Lega dei Ticinesi should be considered a radical right-wing populist party.

Finally, populism itself can be used in different contexts. Populist parties are simply those that take an anti-establishment position and thus not all populist parties belong to the radical right. It is entirely possible to have a social populist party that while being anti-elitist also takes an egalitarian of even left-wing stance when it comes to questions of redistribution. Parties can also be populist but hold neoliberal economic positions. However, Mudde argues that neoliberal populist parties are *not* populist radical right parties as they do not necessarily adhere to nativist or nationalist ideologies (30).

Radical right-wing populist parties have also been characterized as not being a party family, but simply single-issue or neo-fascist parties. Kitschelt (1997) argues that while radical right-wing parties may share some similarities with neo-fascist parties and movements, they should not be grouped together. Fascist movements – which should be considered separately from fascist regimes – can be defined as being:

> […] opposed to the dominance of markets and bureaucracy and instead advocated an authoritarian, hierarchical, and communitarian order under the leadership of charismatic individuals. (Kitschelt 1997:29)

This definition of fascism does bear a strong resemblance to definitions of the radical right, but for Kitschelt there are three main differences between the two (though it must be noted that these differences are between fascism and Kitschelt's definition of the radical right). First, they differ in their relation to capitalism. The new radical right embraces free market capitalism while fascism mobilizes an anti-capitalist discourse. Second, they differ in their conception of authoritarianism. Again, the radical right's authoritarianism stems from its defence of the capitalist system and its paternalist, family-based method of accumulation. Finally, fascist movements were not necessarily racist or xenophobic, with militarism and nationalism taking their place in certain cases. This is however not the case with the radical right as xenophobia, or nativism if we follow Mudde (2007), are central to party ideology (Kitschelt 1997:30–31). Like Kitschelt, Mudde also argues that the radical right differs from extreme right movements, such as neo-fascism or neo-Nazism. The crux of the argument is that the radical right, in principle, is not anti-democratic unlike the extreme right (Kitschelt 1997:43, Mudde 2007:49). Rather, it is opposed to a certain *type* of democracy: liberal democracy (Mudde 2007:311).

Another view is that radical right parties are simply single-issue parties that have no discernable features; that is: an electorate without any particular social structure, support for the party stems from a single issue, and the absence of an ideological programme other than opposing immigration (Mudde 1999:183–84). In such a situation, radical right voters, when compared to others, should have a high level of support for restricting migration while on other matters, they shouldn't differ significantly from the mean (Kitschelt 1997:26). This however is not the case as the electorate of radical right parties is specific and has a particular social structure. It is primarily composed of younger, predominantly male voters, working in the private sector (Mudde 1999:185). Second, while in many cases the radical right's ideology is quite simply viewed as being the opposite of that of the left, as Mudde's later definition shows, they have a specific ideology based around a nativist core (which in earlier works is still referred to nationalism). Nevertheless, while the issue of immigration is central to radical

right parties, security, law and order, and even the criticism of other exiting political parties and the political system are issues that can eclipse immigration (188–91).

In summary, the different definitions of the extreme or radical right agree that such parties hold conservative and anti-liberal views of society. They support (culturally) exclusionist and nativist positions opposing themselves to anti-authoritarian politics and culturally open societies. In addition, radical right parties are not considered to be simply an expression of anti-immigration sentiments or an extension or refashioning of fascist ideals. Where the different definitions diverge is on the importance of taking into account a party's economic agenda. While Betz and Kitschelt contend that the radical right holds pro-capitalist and neoliberal economic beliefs, later definitions such as those offered by Mudde or Bornschier contend that the economy doesn't necessarily contribute to the appeal of the radical right.

3.2. Explaining Support for Radical Right-Wing Populist Parties

Explanations for the emergence of the radical right are quite often multi-level. Individual-level, or demand-side, consider that individuals negatively affected by modernization and globalization tend to vote for parties that position themselves against such developments. At the party level, or the supply-side, explanations focus on the relative positions of the different parties in the political system but also on more general systemic attributes such as the electoral model (proportional or majoritarian), or the system of government (federalism vs. republican models).

3.2.1. Demand-Side Explanations

There are two main demand-side explanations that emerge from the literature on the radical right. The first, posits that economic grievances arising from an increasingly globalized economy leads

those most vulnerable, namely the working class and the "old" middle class, to vote for parties that position themselves against such developments. However, economic explanations for the support of radical right-wing populist parties have evolved and changed with the economic programmes of those parties. Radical right parties dropped their neoliberal economic platforms and instead moved towards the centre on economic matters no longer positioning themselves explicitly against the welfare state. This change is considered to be linked to the growing blue-collar constituency of radical right parties in the 1990s which led radical right parties to shift along the economic dimension towards Kitschelt's "welfare chauvinist" position.

The second explanation focuses on an opposition dominated by cultural positions. Here "culture" is treated broadly as a division between individuals supporting multiculturalism, and open non-authoritarian societies to those who defend paternalistic, nativist, and traditionalist views (Betz and Johnson 2004:316). Rather than consider immigration to be a separate from the cultural dimension – and thus a separate "explanation" for radical right populist party support – it will be considered here as a central element of the "cultural divide" following Bornschier (2010:21).

Economic Explanations

Initially, radical right parties focused on neoliberal economic appeals but later embraced more protectionist and anti-globalization stances (Betz 1994:109). Nevertheless, Kitschelt (1997:6–9) argues that supporters of radical right parties do indeed have right-wing economic preferences. International competition is viewed as being a catalyst for *supporting* welfare retrenchment. Individuals who work in sectors exposed to international competition – most notably financial services and the manufacturing sector – are more likely to oppose redistribution as it would drain resources that would be available for investment and consumption. On the other hand, individuals employed in sheltered domestic sectors (be it in the public or the private sector) would continue to be favourable

to protectionist and redistributive economic policies. Neoliberal appeals are not necessarily attractive to all potential radical right-wing populist voters. The "old" middle class or petite bourgeoisie is expected to be responsive to such positions, but this is not necessarily the case for blue-collar workers.

Kitschelt nevertheless amends his view concerning the economic basis of support for the radical right and the "winning formula." Shifts in class structure have changed which voters can be responsive to radical right appeals. The petite bourgeoisie or the "old" middle class has since been replaced by new highly educated self-employed individuals who are culturally incompatible with radical right parties. Moreover, the decline of blue-collar working class and white-collar clerical occupations has led to an increase in the share of the labour force that finds itself in precarious working conditions or unemployment. Younger workers in such occupations are especially likely to be supportive of the radical right as they have not been socialized through unions like older workers have Kitschelt (2014:242–43). Trade union membership can attenuate xenophobic tendencies brought about by perceived economic threats by building on tendencies to exhibit solidarity with fellow workers (Betz 1994:97).

More recent explanations that give an economic basis for radical right-wing populist support point to the role of economic grievances in relation to individuals' positions as either "losers" or "winners" of economic modernization (Bornschier and Kriesi 2014:13). The "losers" find themselves in precarious economic situations – or at least fear ending up in such a situation – and thus vote for parties that position themselves against those who they think would stand to benefit: immigrants (Betz 1994:85). Economic "losers" also express opposition to the European Union (and EU integration) through radical right parties. Moreover, these individuals are not in favour of dismantling of the welfare state, rather they vote *against* the left because they no longer feel that the (welfare) state – which is traditionally defended by the left – offers them protection (Ivarsflaten 2005:469).

Ivarsflaten (2005) shows that the economic preferences of blue-collar workers in France and Denmark diverge from those of small business owners. However, when looking at only individuals who voted for a radical right party, in Denmark there is no longer any real difference in economic preferences between blue-collar workers and small business owners who both take a relatively centrist position on economic matters. This would therefore suggest that the radical right does not mobilize along economic lines (484–85). In France on the other hand, blue-collar workers and small business owners voting for the FN continue to have diverging economic preferences. This again suggests that it is preferences on issues that cross-cut the economic divide, such as Euro-scepticism or exclusionist attitudes, that lead individuals to vote for the FN rather than economic concerns (486–89).

In a later larger cross-national study using data from the European Social Survey, Ivarsflaten (2008) revisits economic explanations for supporting radical right-wing parties in countries or regions where they have been successful (Austria, Denmark, Flanders, France, the Netherlands, Norway, and Switzerland). In all seven considered cases, individuals with right-wing economic preferences are less likely to vote for the mainstream left than they are for a populist radical right party. However, economic preferences do not account for why individuals vote for the radical right rather than the mainstream right. On the other hand, individuals that are dissatisfied with the economy are no more likely to vote for the radical than they are to vote for the mainstream left or the mainstream right. This would therefore suggest that, contrary to Kitschelt's (1997) "winning formula", populist radical right parties' success is not dependant on mobilizing voters with right-wing economic preferences or who are dissatisfied with the economy (Ivarsflaten 2008:11–12).

Oesch (2008b), also using European Social Survey Data, tests economic explanations for five countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. In Austria, Belgium, and France, the fear of wages being brought down through immigration is a highly significant predictor of voting right-wing populist,

but not for Norway, or Switzerland. Another economic hypothesis, the belief that immigrants "take advantage of" the welfare state, also increases the chances of individuals voting for right-wing populist parties in Austria (but the effect is not as highly significant as concerns about wages), Norway, and Switzerland. However, when introducing other independent variables pertaining to cultural explanations for right-wing populist support, positons on economic issues are no longer significant in Belgium, France, Norway, or Switzerland. Only in Austria do economic concerns related to a downward pressure on wages due to immigration remain a significant predictor of individuals voting for right-wing populists. In addition, interaction terms between being a member of the working class and economic concerns are not significant. However, they are positive suggesting that working-class voters are more sensitive to economic issues than other right-wing populist voters.

Rydgren's (2008) analysis shows that when taking into account cultural frames of reference and sociodemographic characteristics, "welfare chauvinist" frames that present immigration as an economic threat generally do not incite individuals to support the radical right. Nevertheless, in France, and Denmark, individuals that believe that immigrants are taking jobs are more likely to support the radical right. Individuals in Austria and the Netherlands that consider that immigrants live on welfare are also more likely to vote for the radical right though the effect of such attitudes disappears when controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and attitudes related to the effect of immigration on culture.

Bornschier and Kriesi (2014) also test to what degree economic explanations account for individuals supporting radical right populist parties. Using European Social Survey data for fourteen Western European countries, they find that in general, individuals with market-liberal, i.e. right-wing economic preferences, are slightly more likely to support the radical right (21). However, when looking at only the manual working class, economic explanations seem to have no bearing whatsoever on their propensity

to vote for radical right populist parties. In fact, job insecurity rather than leading individuals to vote for the radical right, instead increases the propensity for abstention. Trade exposure, which for Kitschelt (1997) should lead manual workers to support radical right parties, also has no effect. Thus, it would seem that, unlike the general population, working-class support for the radical right *cannot* be explained by economic factors or dispositions (Bornschier and Kriesi 2014:22–23).

Similar results are found by van der Brug et al. (2014) using data from the European Election Studies. Unlike Bornschier and Kriesi, they do not aggregate economic and cultural issues into two factors. They find that among the four included economic issues – state ownership, support for private enterprises, government intervention, and wealth redistribution – only positions on wealth redistribution have a significant effect on the propensity for individuals to support the radical right (64–65). Moreover, it is individuals that support *more* wealth redistribution that are more likely to support the radical right again providing evidence against Kitschelt's initial formulation of the "winning formula" (71).

It would seem that economic explanations for why voters, especially working-class voters, would support radical right-wing populist parties do not necessarily hold up to empirical evidence. Generally, individuals with market-liberal economic preferences are more likely to support the radical right, but the case of working-class voters is more ambiguous. They continue to support redistribution, albeit in an exclusionist manner, *despite* supporting radical right populist parties. Nevertheless, radical right populist parties have shifted their economic policies away from neoliberalism to a more centrist position. Essentially, they do not oppose capitalism but they are in favour of state intervention in order to "moderate its inherent detrimental social effects" (Mudde 2007:124).

Consequently, the "winning formula" may no longer be associating neoliberal economic positions to authoritarian cultural positions as advocated by early accounts of the radical right (Betz

1994, Kitschelt 1997). However, the new "winning formula" isn't necessarily a combination of authoritarian cultural appeals and centrist or even left-wing economic appeals as suggested by van der Brug et al. (2014). Rather, following Mudde (2007:136), it could be that the economy is a secondary issue, and that it is the authoritarian and nativist appeals that are central in explaining support for radical right populist parties.

"Cultural" Explanations

Cultural explanations for why individuals vote for radical right populist parties often find their basis in a certain conception of the emergence of the radical right. In this view, the radical right is considered to be a reactionary movement opposing the tenets of the "new" left and new social movements of the mid to late 1960s. Immigration, unlike in the economic view, is opposed not because of concerns related to wages or welfare but because "certain groups cannot be integrated into society and therefore represent a fundamental threat to the values, way of life and cultural integrity of the "indigenous" people" (Betz and Johnson 2004:318). Non-"indigenous" groups are viewed as being unwilling to "integrate" and insist on preserving their own cultures putting the existing national culture at risk. Thus, radical right populist parties see it as their task to prevent the extending of "unjustified privileges to minorities at the expense of everybody else" that is a consequence of recognizing cultural diversity (320). In fact, "ethno-pluralist" views consider that it is impossible for different cultures to coexist and that a peaceful society is necessarily one with an "ethnically homogenous population" (Rydgren 2008:746).

The cultural aspect can also refer to not just integrating different cultural visions and practices but also to exclusionist views of citizenship. Kitschelt's (1994, 1997) libertarian–authoritarian axis incorporates differing conceptions of citizenship. In the case of the radical right, the opposition stems from different views on citizenship with a "cosmopolitan" and inclusive view going up against a narrow exclusive form of citizenship that at the extreme

excludes women, immigrants, and certain ethno-cultural groups (Kitschelt 1997:4). In other words, culturally the new radical right "stands for an exclusionary particularist definition of citizenship rights confined to a culturally homogenous group of residents" (19–20).

As for why individuals would be likely to support such exclusionist cultural positions, the mechanisms often revolve around education and to what degree an individual is able to adapt to a changing and shifting society. In Betz's (1994) view, migration provides tangible evidence of the "modernization" of societies. Individuals that feel threatened by such changes would also be more likely to oppose themselves to the cultural and social changes that arise from migration. Younger individuals, as well as those with higher levels of education, are expected to also be less likely to be hostile to immigration (97). Kitschelt (1997:7) also posits a relationship between education and cultural liberalism. Individuals with greater cognitive skills, in other words individuals with higher levels of education, are considered to be more likely to "develop a sense of mastery of their social environment that leads them to raise claims to political participation, equality, and self-governance in all social institutions" and consequently take more libertarian political positions. Individuals with lower levels of education are considered to be have more schematic views of social reality thus predisposing them to adopt authoritarian positions.

In addition, Kitschelt (1997:6–10) hypothesizes that work experiences also influence an individual's receptiveness to the cultural appeals made by the radical right. Individuals occupying positions where their everyday activities involve "symbol- and client-processing" – that is to say where social relations are central to their work – are more likely to adopt libertarian and egalitarian views of democratic politics. However, individuals that process objects and work in more instrumental environments are deemed to more responsive to authoritarian visions. As such, blue-collar workers and small independent business owners are more likely to respond to authoritarian and anti-universalistic appeals. Thus, the

cultural appeals of the radical right would seem to mobilize voters along the “new” class division opposing the (manual) working class and socio-cultural specialists (Bornschier and Kriesi 2014:14).

Bornschier and Kriesi (2014:20–24,29) find that positions along the cultural divide do indeed have a significant impact on individuals’ propensity to vote for the radical right (versus voting for another party) with individuals holding universalistic values being less likely to support such parties. High levels of education have a significantly negative effect on the likelihood of supporting radical right-wing parties, however, individuals with low levels of education are no more likely to support the radical right than those with medium levels of education. Class differences continue to persist, even with the inclusion of both the economic and cultural dimensions, with socio-cultural workers being less likely to vote for radical right parties while routine operatives and skilled production workers remain more likely to support the radical right. Within the working class itself, skilled workers are no more likely to support the radical right than are routine operatives. Union membership, and education play no role in explaining radical right-wing party support while positions along the cultural dimension remain highly significant. When looking at the specific case of what makes working-class individuals more likely to vote for the radical right rather than voting for the mainstream left, union membership does have a negative effect but only for skilled workers.

Oesch (2008b:359–65) disaggregates the cultural dimension into two main elements: whether individuals feel a country’s culture is being undermined by immigrants and whether immigrants should be given the same rights. In Austria, individuals with the opinion that the country’s culture is being undermined by immigrants are significantly more likely to vote for a radical right-wing populist party (in this case the FPÖ [Austrian Freedom Party]), however attitudes related to giving equal rights to immigrants do not have a significant effect. In the case of Belgium, individuals

that feel their country's culture is being undermined by immigration are also more likely to support radical right populist parties, while attitudes related equal rights for immigrants are not significant. In the case of France, when taking into account economic attitudes and satisfaction with democracy, attitudes related to giving immigrants equal rights are more significant indicator that an individual would vote for the radical right than attitudes relating to immigrants undermining of a country's culture. The case of Norway is more or less the same as Austria while in Switzerland individuals that perceive immigration as a threat to their country's culture as well as those that believe that immigrants should not have the same rights are significantly more likely to support a radical right populist party. Trade union membership, thought to attenuate the support for radical right parties, is only significant in the case of Norway where trade union members are indeed less likely to support the radical right. In France, trade union membership has no significant effect (the coefficient is even *positive*) on whether an individual would vote for the radical right in general, however unionized *workers* are significantly less likely to support the Front National.

Rydgren's (2008) broad cross-national analysis (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Netherlands, and Norway) goes even further and tests a large array of anti-immigrant attitudes in relation to their effect on the likelihood of voting for the radical right. Among these anti-immigrant attitudes, he seeks to distinguish between the effects of immigration-sceptic, xenophobic, and racist attitudes on the propensity for individuals to vote for the radical right. He finds that only immigrant-sceptic attitudes – operationalized as whether individuals want to allow no or few immigrants into the country – significantly impact the odds of voting for the radical right. Having xenophobic attitudes – in this case the degree to which an individual is opposed to having an immigrant as their boss or their wife – does not systematically make an individual more likely to vote for the radical right (740–45). Rydgren also investigates to what extent the anti-immigrant frames offered by radical parties actually lead to electoral support. Ethno-pluralist, or nativist, frames that present immigrants as increasing tension

within society have the potential to encourage individuals to vote for the radical right in all the considered countries except the Netherlands (when controlling for socio-demographic factors and other frames). The depiction of immigrants as undermining the nation's culture and causing crime finds resonance with voters as individuals expressing such attitudes are significantly more likely to vote for the radical right. This is not however the case in France as individuals that believe that immigration is undermining the country's culture are not more likely to support the radical right (747–54).

Ivarsflaten (2008:15–17) also shows that the more an individual is in favour of restrictive immigration policies, the more likely they are to vote for right-wing populist parties rather than the mainstream left or the mainstream right. Among the seven countries and regions considered, the effect of favouring restrictive asylum and immigration policy seems to be the weakest in Austria. Moreover, anti-immigration attitudes seem to have a greater bearing on why individuals vote for right-wing populist parties versus the mainstream left than why individuals choose to vote for the radical populist right over the mainstream right. The predicted probabilities for voting radical right in relation to preferences for restrictive immigration policy show that an increase in the preference for restrictive immigration policies leads to a large increase in the predicted probability of voting for a radical right party.

3.2.2. Supply-Side Explanations

While the focus of the subsequent empirical section of this paper will be dedicated to analyzing demand-side explanations for why individuals vote for radical right-wing populist parties, it is nevertheless necessary to mention supply-side factors that influence the success of such parties. Kitschelt (1997:14–18) for instance, argues that social-democratic parties' movement towards libertarian cultural orientations leaves a potential opening for the radical right to make gains among economically left-wing, but culturally authori-

tarian, voters. More generally, if the distance between the mainstream left and the mainstream right is reduced, for instance by the mainstream left moving closer to the median voter, it is likely to disenfranchise authoritarian voters that support the mainstream or "moderate" right especially in the case where the moderate right participates in government. In the case of the mainstream left, moving to the centre, or taking a more libertarian stance, leads to the alienation of their traditional working-class and lower-level white-collar workers who are susceptible to authoritarian appeals.

Rydgren (2005:418–22) argues that the success of extreme right-wing populist parties depends on their ability to find niches within the political space. Voters' positions often change more quickly than those of parties and the case of a major change, such as the emergence of a new cleavage or new issue which existing parties have not dealt with, provides an opportunity for new parties to position themselves in a niche. Nevertheless, the extent to which a new cleavage or issue provides an opportunity for realignment also depends on the existing cleavage structure. In countries where there are multiple cleavages that cross-cut the economic dimension, the potential for realignment along new dimensions is higher than in countries where the dominance of the economic dimension resulted in stronger alignments between parties and voters.

In addition to party alignments, institutional factors such as the electoral system, or the type of political system are also thought to play a role in the success of the radical right. Countries with proportional electoral systems are considered to be more open and thus favour the emergence of the radical right. Nevertheless, empirical studies on the effect of the electoral system on the success of radical right parties present conflicting evidence on whether proportionality actually favours the radical right (Mudde 2007:233–34). Van der Brug et al. (2014:560–61) find that proportional representation has a negative effect on the electoral success of the radical right but that it is not significant. However, Arzheimer and Carter (2006:432–33) using pooled national survey data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and

Norway, do find a statistically significant positive relationship between "disproportionality" and the propensity to vote for the extreme right. In other words, the *less* the electoral system is proportional, the more likely individuals are to support the extreme right. Using a multi-level model, Arzheimer (2009:268–69) continues to find a positive relationship between disproportionality and the likelihood of voting for the extreme right though it is not statistically significant.

Another aspect is a country's political system. Federalist systems are in some views seen as unfavourable to the success of the radical right at the national level yet federalist countries such as Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland have very successful radical right parties. It can also be argued that countries with consensual or corporatist political systems may favour the emergence of the radical right, but this could just as well fuel support for anti-establishment parties in general (Mudde 2007:236). Arzheimer and Carter (2006) and Arzheimer (2009) find that the extent to which the political system is decentralized does not contribute significantly to the odds of supporting the extreme right though the former find a negative effect of decentralization while the latter finds a positive effect. As for the effect of consensual politics, Arzheimer and Carter 's results show that the presence of a grand coalition doubles the odds of supporting an extreme right-wing party. Thus, generally "[p]olitical and electoral systems do not so much determine whether political parties have electoral success; they provide them with electoral and political opportunities" (Mudde 2007:237).

3.3. The Case of Switzerland

Following this broad and general presentation of radical right populist parties, it is now time to turn to the specific case of Switzerland. This subsection will have three main parts. First, the historical context of the radical right will be retraced. Switzerland is different from many other Western European cases. Radical right parties, or at least very close precursors, emerged in the 1960s as

a reaction to a perceived "overforeignization" of Switzerland. However, today's dominant radical right-wing populist party, the Swiss People's Party (SVP), was initially a conservative agrarian party and it was following an internal transformation of the party that it took on the form it has today. The second part will deal with the SVP's political realignment more in depth and also its position on issues. Finally, the profile of the SVP's electorate will be explored.

3.3.1. A Brief History of the Radical Right

Skenderovic (2009) identifies 3 main historical periods in the evolution of the radical right in Switzerland. The first phase began in the 1960s and ended in the 1980s and was characterized by the emergence of radical right parties from the larger more general "Movement against Overforeignization." This movement opposing immigration was one of the first of its kind in Western Europe and led to the founding of four parties: National Action, Vigilance in the canton of Geneva, the Swiss Republican Movement, and the Swiss Democratic Union. Initially, they were just fringe parties but the election of James Schwarzenbach, the head of National Action, to the National Council and the public debate that surrounded the so-called "Schwarzenbach Initiative" which aimed to curb immigration (with a turnout of just under 75%, it was rejected by 54% of voters) served to establish the party "as a serious political force on the Swiss political scene" (Skenderovic 2009:58). Internal power struggles led Schwarzenbach to found his own party the Swiss Republican Movement which received 4% of the national vote in the 1971 elections. In 1975, Vigilance managed to gain a seat in the National Council and formed an alliance with Schwarzenbach's Swiss Republican Movement.

The beginning of the second phase saw the collapse of the Swiss Republican Movement after Schwarzenbach's departure in 1978. National Action on the other hand experienced a resurgence in popularity once the party switched its focus from curbing immigration to asylum policy. The party later changed its name to

the Swiss Democrats and expanded its political agenda to include broader issues related to foreign policy such as an opposition to Switzerland joining supra-national institutions (the EU and the UN), but also the defence of national identity. The party never really achieved electoral success and by 1999 had become almost completely irrelevant (77–80).

Also in the 1980s, a new strand a radical right parties unrelated to Movement against Overforeignization appeared, most notably the Automobile Party, later renamed the Freedom Party, and the Lega dei Ticinesi. Initially, the Freedom Party was a neoliberal reaction to the development of ecologist movements and green parties, but it later incorporated exclusionist ideas. It openly criticized the state and administration, as well as the party system in general, in addition to advocating spending cuts and reduced state intervention in the market. Only later did it begin to adopt xenophobic positions but the party depicted immigration and asylum as mainly being a financial burden rather than a cultural threat (Betz 1994:121). While both Betz (1994) and Kitschelt (1997) consider that the Automobile Party belongs to the radical right party family, (Mudde 2007:47–48) disagrees as the party's core ideology is neoliberalism and, as also noted by Betz, "their xenophobic rhetoric is primarily informed by their liberalism." The party was relatively successful winning two seats in the National Council in the first elections it participated in. It won eight seats in 1991, and seven in 1995. However, in the 1999 elections, it lost all its seats to the SVP as well as a large part of its personnel (Skenderovic 2009:113–14).

The Lega dei Ticinesi was created in 1991 as an anti-establishment protest movement that "opposed the consensual politics and agreements of the cantonal political elite" (Skenderovic 2009:114). In the same year it took part in the elections and received 23.5% of the votes for the National Council within the canton. Election surveys suggest that Lega voters' attitudes, except for confidence in political institutions, differed very little from voters supporting the Christian Democrats or the Liberals (117). This would instead suggest that the Lega is more of a populist

party rather than one of the radical right. While the Lega also adopted an anti-immigrant and anti-asylum rhetoric reminiscent of the radical right, on issues such as homosexuality, or women's rights, the Lega in fact does not take a position similar to radical right parties (Albertazzi 2006:137). Moreover, the Lega dei Ticinesi being a regionalist party – and not advocating separation from the rest of Switzerland – also leads Mudde (2007:56–57) to exclude the Lega from the radical right party family.

3.3.2. The Transformation of the Swiss People's Party

For Skenderovic , the third phase of the development of the radical right in Switzerland is the transformation and reorientation of the Swiss People's Party. The precursor of the Swiss People's Party was the Farmers, Artisans, and Citizens Party (*Bauern-, Gewerbe- und Bürgerpartei*; BGB). It traditionally allied itself with the Liberal Democrats and became a junior coalition partner with the introduction of the "magic formula" in 1959. In 1970 the BGB, like all other mainstream political parties in Switzerland, opposed the "Schwarzenbach Initiative" and the "Movement against Overforeignization" (Skenderovic 2009:127). The SVP as a party was established in 1971 following the merger of the BGB with the Democratic Parties of Glarus and Graubünden "partly in a bid to attract other social groups [...] as their core constituency – farmers and rural inhabitants – were losing ground" (128). The party subsequently moved towards the political centre in a bid to gain more votes, but it did not succeed. The 1980s saw internal tensions between the cantonal sections of Bern and Zurich rise and culminate in the 1990s. The Zurich section began politicizing asylum and European integration issues which led to harsh criticism on the part of the cantonal sections of Bern, Graubünden, Vaud, and Jura who "insisted that the SVP should commit to moderate right-wing politics and show responsibility as a governmental party" (129).

Christoph Blocher's wing became more dominant as the Zurich SVP, and other affiliated sections, began to improve their electoral performance and this was further reinforced following the referendum on joining the European Economic Area (McGann and Kitschelt 2005:153). While the Blocherite wing opposed EEA membership, the majority of the SVP leadership continued to back the government's plan to join until just before the referendum when the rest of the party, except the Bern and Vaud sections, endorsed the rejection of the referendum (Skenderovic 2009:136). The "new" SVP, compared to the "old" SVP, adopted a strategy of criticizing the government and established parties in order to create a climate of discontent and alienation. It also changed its position on immigration moving from issues of job competition and migration rates to concerns over integration and multiculturalism. Non-European immigrants were especially singled out for their "cultural distance" from the Swiss and were portrayed as being unable and unwilling to integrate into Swiss society (161–65).

The transformation of the SVP is visible through its changing position within the political space. Bornschier (2010:141–43) finds that the SVP did indeed significantly change its position over time. In the 1970s, the SVP was located close to the Liberals and thus occupied a centrist political position. However, this began to change in the 1990s with the SVP moving further to the right along the cultural divide. By 1991, the SVP was the most authoritarian of the mainstream political parties and by 1995, it was closer to the traditionalist-communitarian pole of the cultural dimension than even the extreme right parties, a position that was cemented in the 1999 elections. The SVP's position along the economic divide on the other hand is relatively constant over time. In the 1970s, it was the most right-wing of all parties in the country, but in the early 1990s it moved to a position left of the Liberals before moving back to the right in 1999 (150).

The accounts of the transformation of the SVP would suggest that the party, under Blocher's impetus, transitioned from being a

centrist agrarian party to a radical right-wing populist party. However, Mudde (2007:58) views the SVP as being a borderline case especially due to the decentralized nature of the national party and competition between different factions. Nevertheless, he does acknowledge that the ability of the more moderate factions of the SVP to challenge the populist tendencies of the Blocherite wing has declined. Moreover, in 2007 and 2008 the moderate faction of the SVP split leading the founding of the Bourgeois Democratic Party (*Bürgerlich-Demokratische Partei*) in the cantons of Bern, Graubünden, and Glarus further cementing the dominance of the SVP's more radical faction (Skenderovic 2009:130).

3.3.3. The Swiss People's Party Electorate

Based on the proposed profile of the radical right we should expect that the "new" SVP's class base is represented by blue-collar and small independent business owners while socio-cultural specialists should be underrepresented within the party's electorate. McGann and Kitschelt (2005:155) using data from 1999 do indeed find an overrepresentation of both blue-collar workers and small business owners (including farmers) within the SVP's electorate, but also of retirees. However, the SVP's electoral profile was rather different in 1991 with small business owners and farmers being overrepresented, along with homemakers. Selb and Lachat's (2004:19) data paints a slightly different picture. The predicted probabilities of farmers voting for the SVP, compared to technical specialists, are significantly higher in 1995, 1999, and 2003. While the predicted probabilities of skilled workers voting for the SVP are not significantly different from those of technical specialists, they rose consistently between 1995 (19.9%) and 2003 (48.5%) indicating that the appeal of the SVP for this group of individuals rose over time. Unskilled workers are more variable as in 1999 they were significantly less likely to vote for the SVP than were technical specialists while in 1995 and 2003 there was no significant difference. Socio-cultural specialists are the only group who are consistently and significantly less likely to vote for the SVP.

Bornschier (2010:158) however finds that, compared to managers, only farmers are significantly more likely to support the SVP (in 1975, 1995, and 1999) while socio-cultural specialists are significantly less likely to vote for the party in 1995, and 1999 (but not in 1975). In all three periods, skilled and unskilled workers' propensity to vote for the SVP was not significantly different from that of managers.

As for the level of education, the effect on an individual's chances of voting for the SVP doesn't seem to be particularly clear. Bornschier's analysis shows that only individuals with a high level of education were significantly less likely to support the SVP than those with a medium level in 1995. Selb and Lachat (2004:19–20) find that individuals with high levels of education are significantly less likely to support the SVP in 1999 and 2003 than individuals with a medium level of education. Data for the 2007 and 2011 elections (Lutz 2008:13–14, 2012:14–18) shows that the SVP doesn't particularly appeal to individuals with a high level of education, especially when compared to the Social Democrats, while the proportion of individuals with low and medium levels of education voting for the SVP has grown over time.

The ideological preferences of the SVP's electorate seem to broadly be in line with Kitschelt's "winning formula." In 1999, individuals who voted for the SVP, on average, were more supportive of a free market economy than even individuals who voted for the liberal Free Democratic Party. They were also the most authoritarian, the most opposed to EU membership (in fact, out of the electorates of the four main parties they were the *only* voters opposed to joining the EU), and were the most in favour of privileging Swiss over foreigners. However, the results of a multinomial logistic regression with these four attitudinal indicators show that being opposed to the EU and having conservative socio-cultural attitudes increases the chances of individual voting for the SVP over the FDP, while a dislike of immigration and supporting free market economic positions does not (McGann and Kitschelt 2005:157–58, 60–61). Bornschier (2010:154–55) finds that, in 1995 and 1999, individuals opposed to EU membership were

twice as likely to vote for the SVP, and those with communitarian-traditionalist attitudes were also more likely to support the SVP. In addition, individuals with pro-market economic attitudes are also more likely to support the SVP, though such individuals still remain more likely to support a liberal party.

Similarly, Selb and Lachat's (2004:27) results for 2003 show that individuals who voted for the SVP were more likely to oppose joining the EU; in fact they were more likely to oppose joining the EU than in previous elections. However, their data on SVP voters' preferences concerning the taxation of high incomes suggests a centrist economic position as they were no more likely to support raising or lowering taxes for high incomes than doing nothing at all. Also in 2003, individuals supporting nuclear power were more likely to vote for the SVP while this was not the case in previous years. Nevertheless, it would seem that the SVP principally mobilizes voters around the issue of immigration as in 2007 and 2011 approximately 40% of individuals who voted for the SVP stated that immigration was their most important concern with European integration being a very minor concern (2% of SVP voters 2007 and 7% in 2011 stated it was their most important concern) (Lutz 2008:29, 2012:29).

In summary, the socio-demographic profile of the SVP's electorate corresponds to the hypothesized profile of the radical right's electorate i.e. the SVP receives an over-proportional level of support from members of the (skilled) working class and from small business owners. Moreover, socio-cultural specialists are significantly less likely to support the SVP. The educational profile of the electorate is also in line with expectations with highly educated individuals being less likely to vote for the party than individuals with low or medium levels of educational attainment.

Individuals opposed to immigration (and for whom immigration is a major political concern), EU integration, and who hold more authoritarian cultural positions are more likely to vote for the SVP which corresponds to the expected profile of the radical right electorate. While the SVP is considered to be one of the few

successful radical right parties, it continues to support a liberal economic agenda and is thus located on the right of the state–market divide. However, voters with free market preferences are not necessarily more likely to vote for the SVP over existing mainstream right-wing parties. Holding pro-market economic preferences is generally associated with a higher propensity to vote for the populist radical right, but it does not explain why working-class voters are more likely to vote for such a party and we can expect a similar situation in the case of the SVP.

To conclude this section – before moving on to the panel data analysis – analyses of the radical right agree that a nationalist or "nativist" ideological core is a common characteristic of parties belonging to the party family. However, there is still division on whether radical right parties are characterized by neoliberal economic positions. Studies on the electorate of the radical right suggest that working-class and self-employed voters are overrepresented. Individuals holding culturally conservative attitudes are more likely to support the radical right while the impact of economic attitudes is less clear. Compared to this more general view of the radical right, the Swiss People's Party differs somewhat. Generally, the profile of the party's electorate corresponds to that of the radical right. Nevertheless, voters with pro-market preferences were also more likely to support the SVP than almost any other party which demarcates the SVP from the radical right in other countries.

4. A Panel Analysis of Populist Radical Right-Wing Party Support in Switzerland

Theories explaining the rise of the populist radical right posit a dynamic process where changing voting preferences lead to a political realignment. This is especially the case for working-class voters who over time are considered to have become more likely to support the populist radical right rather than the mainstream left. However, studies investigating the success of the radical right rely on cross-sectional data making it impossible to ascertain the effect of a change at the individual level on the likelihood of voting for a populist radical right party. Panel data on the other hand does permit such analyses (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:4). Another advantage of panel data is that is can also control for unobserved characteristics (Halaby 2004:508, Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:6). This section will apply panel models in order to understand what factors would make individuals more likely to support the radical right – in this case the SVP – in Switzerland by using 11 waves of the Swiss Household Panel survey conducted between 1999/2000 and 2009/2010. While the following analysis doesn't fully exploit the possibilities offered by longitudinal data to establish dynamic relationships, it does allow for more robust analyses and results – particularly when using fixed effects models – as relationships are established using change over time *within* individuals thus controlling for any individual heterogeneity. In other words, panel data regression techniques let us control for unobserved individual characteristics (if they don't vary over time) which are not explicitly included in the regression.

4.1. Hypotheses

A consistent pattern seems to emerge from the empirical accounts and theoretical frameworks of the rise and success of the radical right. Radical right parties seem to predominantly mobilize individuals not along economic divisions, but along a cultural dimension characterized by an opposition between individuals with more libertarian and universalistic attitudes, and those with communitarian and authoritarian views. This cultural dimension is characterized by issues related to immigration and asylum, gender equality, law and order, and environmental protection among others. Individuals that take authoritarian positions on these issues should be more likely to support radical right parties. We can thus make a series of simple hypotheses:

H1. Individuals opposed to immigration and asylum are more likely to support the radical right.

H2. Individuals in favour of gender equality are less likely to support the radical right.

H3. Individuals for whom environmental concerns are important should be less likely to support the radical right.

H4. Voters for whom law and order is an important concern are more likely to support the radical right.

However, we can also consider that attitudes related to issues on the cultural dimensions are mediator variables. The accounts of the electoral profile of the radical right show that highly educated individuals are underrepresented among their electorate. It is also considered that higher levels of education foster more libertarian views and consequently highly educated individuals are less likely to support culturally authoritarian populist right parties. We can now specify an additional hypothesis:

H5. Individuals with higher levels of education are less likely to vote for the radical right.

More recent views on the electoral success of the radical right suggest that economic preferences do not play a substantial role in explaining why individuals vote for the radical right. However, the case of Switzerland is slightly more delicate as the Swiss People's Party continues to be one of the most pro-market radical right parties and it continues to oppose state intervention in the economy and redistribution (Mudde 2007:123).

H6. Voters with pro-market attitudes are more likely to support the SVP than are individuals in favour of redistribution and state intervention.

Another aspect of radical right parties is their "populist" and anti-system appeals. We would therefore expect that individuals who are dissatisfied with the state of politics, or who feel that they have on influence on political matters, would also be more likely to support a party that presents itself as an alternative to the established parties. This leads to another hypothesis:

H7. Individuals who are dissatisfied with politics and the political system are more likely to vote for a populist radical right party.

The final element that needs to be tackled is social class. The electorate of radical right parties is disproportionately composed of blue-collar workers who according to classic class voting perspectives should not support the radical right but social democratic parties. However, as we have seen with the new class approach, social class encompasses more than just economic preferences. Members of the working class and the "old" middle class (principally small business owners) are considered to have more authoritarian cultural preferences. They are derived, in part, from their work experience which is characterized by hierarchical relations and work in instrumental environments with relatively limited autonomy. In contrast, socio-cultural specialists, through their interaction with individuals and higher levels of autonomy, are predisposed to adopt more libertarian cultural attitudes, and therefore they would be highly unlikely to support the radical right.

Rather than considering that social class only has a direct influence on the likelihood of an individual to vote for the radical right, it can also have an *indirect* effect by influencing political attitudes which in turn influence the propensity for individuals to vote for the radical right. In addition, education itself can be viewed as mediating the link between class and the likelihood of voting for the radical right. Thus, the following hypothesis can be made:

H8. Members of the working class and small business owners are more likely to support the radical right than socio-cultural specialists.

4.2. Operationalization

4.2.1. The Data Set

The analysis uses data collected by the Swiss Household Panel survey between 1999–2000 and 2009–2010 from eleven panel waves. The panel started with 5,704 households but by the eleventh wave only 2,930 households responded to the survey. At the individual level, 7,779 individuals responded the survey in the first wave with 4,494 individuals responding to the eleventh wave. However, the number of individuals by the eleventh wave who had responded to *all* previous waves was significantly lower at 1,952. In 2004–2005 a second sample of households (2,704) was recruited with 2,538 completing the household interview and 3,654 individuals completing the personal interview. By 2009–2010, only 1,289 individuals from the second wave of households had responded to all waves of the survey (Swiss Household Panel 2014).

These eleven panel waves are analyzed chiefly because of changes related to the collection of the variables related to political attitudes. Prior to the twelfth wave of the survey, political attitudes

were part of the questionnaire every year[1]. However, a lack of variability led to political attitudes becoming a rotating module with questions being asked every three years. In addition, following the 2009–2010 wave, individuals were no longer asked to report whether they belonged to a trade union or an association of employees reinforcing the decision to limit the analysis to these eleven panel waves. The individuals that will be considered here are at least 18, however as the question on which the dependent variable is based is hypothetical, individuals who don't necessarily have the right to vote will still be included.

4.2.2. DEPENDENT VARIABLE

The dependent variable is the response to the question: "If there was an election for that National Council tomorrow, for which party would you vote?" (Swiss Household Panel 2013a:374). This question is asked not only to individuals who can vote but also to those who don't actually have the right to vote. Aside from choosing a party, respondents could also answer that they would support a candidate but not a party, would refuse to vote for any single party (empty ballot), or would simply not vote at all. As our main interest is what would make individuals more likely to vote for the SVP as compared to any other alternative, the dependent variable becomes a binary one with the base outcome being not voting for the SVP.

There are however some issues related to the representativity of the sample population of the SHP. When comparing actual electoral results to the voting intentions of the SHP sample in election years, there seems to be a systematic under-representation of voters for the five main parties except for the Social Democrats.

[1] With the exception of attitudes related to gender equality – added in the second wave – and the army – absent from the eleventh wave.

Table 1: Proportion of Votes for Main Parties

	FDP & Liberals	CVP	SP	SVP	Greens
1999 — SHP	13.93%	7.51%	21.65%	11.83%	2.97%
1999 — OFS	22.18%	15.85%	22.47%	22.54%	4.97%
	-8.25%	-8.34%	-0.82%	-10.71%	-2.00%
2003 — SHP	11.68%	6.87%	24.18%	11.55%	5.71%
2003 — OFS	19.53%	14.36%	23.33%	26.65%	7.43%
	-7.85%	-7.49%	0.85%	-15.10%	-1.72%
2007 — SHP	11.80%	10.47%	19.51%	16.46%	10.83%
2007 — OFS	17.61%	14.48%	19.55%	28.90%	9.69%
	-5.81%	-4.01%	-0.04%	-12.44%	1.14%

Proportion of individuals who would vote for main parties in the case of an election tomorrow (SHP) and the proportion of actual votes following elections (OFS). Sources: Office fédéral de la statistique (2014) & Swiss Household Panel (SHP)

Another possible issue with the dependent variable, especially in the case of longitudinal analyses, is the relative stability of individuals' choices especially those who wouldn't vote for the SVP. When looking at our binary dependent variable and the associated transition probabilities, very few people who stated that they wouldn't vote for the SVP change their voting preference year on year.

Table 2: Empirical Transition Probabilities

Year	Voting Choice	Transition Probability	
		Wouldn't Vote for SVP	Would Vote for SVP
1999	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.75	3.25
	Would Vote for SVP	41.71	58.29
2000	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.09	3.91
	Would Vote for SVP	28.71	71.29
2001	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.45	3.55
	Would Vote for SVP	31.36	68.64
2002	Wouldn't vote for SVP	94.36	5.64
	Would Vote for SVP	28.73	71.27
2003	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.66	3.34
	Would Vote for SVP	32.19	67.81
2004	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.52	3.48
	Would Vote for SVP	30.48	69.52
2005	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.22	3.78
	Would Vote for SVP	21.71	78.29
2006	Wouldn't vote for SVP	94.31	5.69
	Would Vote for SVP	20.04	79.96
2007	Wouldn't vote for SVP	97.72	2.28
	Would Vote for SVP	34.62	65.38
2008	Wouldn't vote for SVP	96.63	3.37
	Would Vote for SVP	24.30	75.70

Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP)

The transition probability corresponds to the probability of an individual being in a certain category in the next year – in this case voting or not voting for the Swiss People's Party – given the category they were in the current year (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:69). For example, individuals who wouldn't have voted for the SVP in 1999 had a probability of 96.75% of indicating that they wouldn't vote for the SVP in 2000 while individuals who would have voted for the SVP in 1999 had a probability of 41.71% of indicating that they wouldn't vote for the SVP in the following year. Nevertheless, there seem to be two patterns that emerge. Individuals who wouldn't have voted for the SVP in a previous year have a higher chance of transitioning to indicating that they *would*

vote for the SVP when the following year is an election year. However, following an election year, the probability of an individual who indicated that they would vote for the SVP indicating that they wouldn't vote for the SVP the following year increases. This suggests that responses to the question "If there was an election for that National Council tomorrow, for which party would you vote?" are sensitive to whether the current year was an election year or not.

Table 3: Frequencies of the Dependent Variable by Year

Year	Wouldn't Vote for SVP	Would Vote for SVP
1999	88.04%	11.96%
2000	90.46%	9.54%
2001	90.45%	9.55%
2002	90.28%	9.72%
2003	88.64%	11.36%
2004	87.82%	12.18%
2005	89.02%	10.98%
2006	88.22%	11.78%
2007	84.03%	15.97%
2008	87.88%	12.12%
2009	87.18%	12.82%

Source: Swiss Household Panel (SHP)

A similar pattern is evident from a simple tabulation of the proportion of individuals in each category of the dependent variable in each year. However, the pattern is less clear for 2003. This stability does have some methodological implications. Fixed effects panel regression models, as we will see later, only use individuals or units where the dependent variable's value has changed over time thus reducing the sample size and making results less robust due to larger standard errors.

4.2.3. Independent Variables

Based on the hypotheses made, many independent variables need to be included. Social class is the most delicate of the independent variables to operationalize in this case. Kitschelt's framework for

explaining the rise and the success of the radical right, but also "new class" approaches, have a different conception of social class that is based not only the position in the production hierarchy but also on work experiences. The SHP offers multiple class schemas to choose from – the EGP class schema, Wright's class schema, and the Swiss socio-professional categorisation among others – but the class schema proposed by (Oesch 2006a, b) is built around differentiation by work experiences.[2]

Three different work logics are considered for employees: a technical work logic, an organizational work logic, and an interpersonal work logic. The technical work logic is characterized by the "deployment of technical expertise and craft", the organizational work logic by "the administration of organizational power," and the interpersonal work logic by the "face-to-face attendance of people's personal demands" (Oesch 2006b:267). These work logics also differ when it comes to relations of authority. Individuals working in an interpersonal logic are the most likely to work outside lines of command. By contrast, individuals in an organizational work logic work in a "bureaucratic command structure". The technical work logic is less clear-cut. High grade technical professional work outside the lines of command while lower grade technical workers are part a command structure. The self-employed belong to a fourth work logic: the independent work logic. Within each work logic there is an additional skill-based element leading to a distinction between high- and low-skilled workers. This results in a class schema that includes 17 classes but it can be collapsed into a more parsimonious eight-class version and it is this one that will be used (Oesch 2006b:268–69). The 8-class version distinguishes between:

1. Self-employed professionals and large employers
2. Small business owners

[2] While Oesch's class schema is not included in the SHP data set, syntaxes are available at http://people.unil.ch/danieloesch/scripts that construct the class schema from the ISCO classification included in the data set.

3. (Associate) Managers and administrators
4. Office clerks
5. Technical professionals and technicians
6. Production workers
7. Socio-cultural (semi-)professionals
8. Service workers

Political attitudes are derived from a battery of questions covering many domains (Swiss Household Panel 2013b:368, 2013a:360–63, 70–77). As we have seen, the radical right's populist element is related to anti-establishment discourses that appeal to individuals who are disenchanted with politics. Three 11-point scale questions (ranging from 0 to 10) are used to assess an individual's satisfaction with politics. The first asks to what extent respondents are satisfied with democracy, the second to what extent they think they have an influence on politics, and finally how much they trust the Federal Government. Positions along the economic dimension are determined by two variables with three options: an increase, a decrease, or no change. The first concerns whether individuals want to see higher levels of social expenditure, lower levels of social expenditure, or neither of the two options ("Are you in favour of a diminution or in favour of an increase of the Confederation social spendings [sic.]?"). The second concerns taxation of high incomes ("Are you in favour of an increase or in favour of a decrease of the tax on high incomes?") with the options being an increase, a decrease, or neither of the two options.

Attitudes related to the cultural dimension are questions of the same sort (with the exception of questions related to gender equality) with the same set of options: in favour, neither, against. The questions that are retained are the following:

- "Are you in favour of Switzerland joining the European Union or are you in favour of Switzerland staying outside of the European Union?"

- “Are you in favour of Switzerland offering foreigners the same opportunities as those offered to Swiss citizens, or in favour of Switzerland offering Swiss citizens better opportunities?”

- “Are you in favour of Switzerland being more concerned with protection of the environment than with economic growth, or in favour of Switzerland being more concerned with economic growth than with protection of the environment?”

- “Are you in favour of Switzerland having nuclear energy, or are you in favour of Switzerland not having nuclear energy?”

- “Are you in favour of Switzerland having a strong army or for Switzerland not having an army?”

Questions relating to gender equality are scored on a scale of 0 to 10. The questions retained are the following:

- “Do you have the feeling that in Switzerland women are penalized compared with men in certain areas, if 0 means “not at all penalized” and 10 “strongly penalized”?”

- “Are you in favour of Switzerland taking more steps to ensure the promotion of women, if 0 means “not at all in favour” and 10 “totally in favour”?”

Also included in this group of variables relating to the “cultural” dimension is trade union membership as it can potentially lead to less culturally authoritarian working-class individuals.

A series of control variables are also included. Education is operationalized as a three category variable distinguishing between individuals whose highest level of education corresponds to a less than upper secondary level, an upper secondary level, and a tertiary (university) level. Age, gender, and linguistic region are also included. Another control variable that is included is how interested a person is in politics (on a scale of 0 to 10). The descriptive statistics for the independent variables can be found in the Appendix.

4.3. METHODS

Panel data cannot be analyzed using conventional methods of regression analysis used for cross-sectional data for one main reason: the observations are not independent and in fact correlate with each other over time. Standard regression techniques assume that the observations of the dependent variable – party choice in the case of an election – are in fact independent from each other and thus estimated standard errors could be too low (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:69–70). In the present case, we have a categorical dependent variable for which we would normally use a logistic or probit regression. The general form of a longitudinal logistic regression function is the following (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:227):

$$\Pr(y_{it} = q) = G(\beta_0(t) + \beta_1 x_{1it} + \cdots + \beta_k x_{kit} + \gamma_1 z_{1i} + \cdots + \gamma_j z_{ji} + u_i)$$

where the dependent variable is the probability of observing a certain outcome for a specific unit i at time t, G is a transformation function, for instance logit or probit, that provides values between 0 and 1, $\beta_k x_{kit}$ denotes a time-varying independent variable, $\gamma_j z_{ji}$ denotes a time-constant independent variable and u_i a unit-, or in this case, person-specific error term. In the case where the logit transformation is used the regression equation takes the following form:

$$\mathrm{PR}(y_{it} = 1) = \frac{\exp(\beta_0(t) + \beta \mathbf{x}_{it} + \gamma \mathbf{z}_i + u_i)}{1 + \exp(\beta_0(t) + \beta \mathbf{x}_{it} + \gamma \mathbf{z}_i + u_i)}$$

where $\mathbf{x}_{it}$ is a vector of time-varying variables and $\mathbf{z}_i$ is a vector of time-constant variables.

Another consideration that must be taken into account with longitudinal regression methods is how the individual error term u_i – which is a measure of time-constant unobserved unit heterogeneity or "a sort of random disturbance at the individual level" – is treated. If it is assumed that this error term is independent from the other explanatory variables, then a random effects model is

estimated and the error term is treated as being a random variable with a given distribution. In the case where this unit-specific is *not* independent from the other explanatory variables, it is instead considered to be a fixed parameter specific to each unit and in this case a fixed effects model is estimated (Allison 2009:28, Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:229). Moreover, each model is estimated using different methods. The fixed effects model can be estimated using conditional maximum likelihood. This estimation method only takes into account the individuals for whom the outcome has changed over time. Estimation by conditional maximum likelihood also eliminates the individual error term u_i which in essence means that unobserved heterogeneity is controlled for in this approach, but without having to actually estimate it. However, any other time-constant variables are also eliminated meaning that observed heterogeneity is also controlled for but its effect is not estimated (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:232–34).

Estimating random effects models is done using maximum likelihood estimation. In this case the full likelihood is the product of the all the unit-specific likelihoods of observing a specific outcome. Each unit-specific likelihood also contains a unit-specific error term which is weighted by the probability of observing a certain value of this error term. However, as this error term is unknown, it must also be estimated. The error term is assumed to be a "continuous random variable […] that ranges from minus to plus infinity" that is normally distributed, that is with a mean of 0 and a variance of σ^2. The probability of observing this error term is defined by a normal density function but it must be integrated. Therefore, estimating a random effects logit model is actually more difficult than estimating a fixed effects model. It does however have the benefit of allowing the estimation of time-constant variables, something that cannot be done with a fixed effects logistic regression (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:238–40).

A random effects model would seem to be more desirable to use as it can estimate time-invariant variables. Also, as it isn't restricted to units where the dependent variable changes over time,

standard errors are lower and the estimations are more precise because more units can be included leading to a larger sample size. However, it can produce biased estimates in the case where the assumption that the individual error term, or unobserved heterogeneity, and the explanatory variables are independent does not hold. The Hausman test is used to test the hypothesis that the explanatory variables and the unit-specific error or random effect are uncorrelated by comparing the estimators of a random effects model to the same estimators obtained with a fixed effects model. If there is no significant difference between the two models' estimators, then the random effects model is preferred over the fixed effects model (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:243–44).

Another possible approach, termed a "hybrid" model, attempts to correct the bias of the random effects model. This is done by decomposing each time-varying variable into two components: a within-person component and a between-person component where the between-person component is each unit's or individual's mean value for a specific variable while the within-person component is the deviation from this unit-specific mean. This hybrid model can be expressed in the following manner (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:245):

$$\Pr(y_{it} = 1) = \frac{\exp(a)}{1 + \exp(a)}$$

where a is:

$$\beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot (x_{1it} - \overline{x}_{1i.}) + \varphi\overline{x}_{1i.} + \cdots + \beta_k \cdot (x_{kit} - \overline{x}_{ki.}) + \varphi\overline{x}_{ki.} + \gamma_1 z_{1i} + \cdots + \gamma_j z_{ji} + u_i$$

and where $\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_k$ are the coefficients measuring the within-unit effect of time-varying variables, $\varphi_1, \ldots, \varphi_k$ are the coefficients measuring the between-unit effect of time-varying variables, and $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_j$ are the coefficients for time-constant variables. The coefficients for the within-person component of a variable correspond more or less to the fixed effects estimates but not exactly due to the non-linearity of models employed with binary or categorical dependent variables (Allison 2009:245, Andreß, Golsch

and Schmidt 2013:41). (However, in the case of linear models with a continuous dependent variable, the within-person component matches the fixed effects estimates.)

4.4. Results

Multiple fixed and random effects models were fitted. All the fixed effects models use the same sample of individuals and observations. The same is true for the random effects models, but the sample is not the same as that used in the fixed effects models as individuals for whom the dependent variable didn't change over time are not dropped. The base model contains only one explanatory variable: social class. The second model introduces the various control variables. The third model incorporates measures of political satisfaction. The fourth model adds economic attitudes and the fifth cultural attitudes. Both random effects and fixed effects estimation methods were used. The random effects model provides us with a ρ term which is the proportion of "total error variance that is due to unobserved heterogeneity" but can also be interpreted as a measure of serial correlation in the dependent variable once the independent variables are taken into account (Andreß, Golsch and Schmidt 2013:241). If this term is significantly different from 0, then panel models must be used. However, in the case that it isn't, a simple pooled regression can be used as the observations of the dependent variable are not serially correlated. The models were estimated using Stata's (2015) `xtlogit` command.

Table 4: Fixed effects regression models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Class					
(ref: Office clerks)					
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.238 (0.205)	-0.190 (0.209)	-0.189 (0.209)	-0.178 (0.210)	-0.184 (0.211)
Small business owners	-0.377 (0.201)	-0.286 (0.206)	-0.286 (0.206)	-0.276 (0.206)	-0.285 (0.207)
(Associate) managers and administrators	-0.201 (0.215)	-0.230 (0.219)	-0.231 (0.220)	-0.215 (0.220)	-0.217 (0.222)
Technical professionals and technicians	-0.359 (0.291)	-0.379 (0.297)	-0.380 (0.297)	-0.352 (0.298)	-0.385 (0.300)
Production workers	0.0766 (0.219)	0.0625 (0.223)	0.0676 (0.223)	0.0797 (0.224)	0.106 (0.225)
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	-0.793* (0.326)	-0.824* (0.332)	-0.838* (0.332)	-0.817* (0.334)	-0.804* (0.337)
Service workers	-0.236 (0.232)	-0.239 (0.237)	-0.245 (0.237)	-0.221 (0.237)	-0.201 (0.239)
Age		0.102*** (0.0128)	0.101*** (0.0129)	0.0948*** (0.0131)	0.0808*** (0.0135)
Education (ref: Upper secondary)					
Less than upper secondary		-0.152 (0.305)	-0.153 (0.305)	-0.135 (0.305)	-0.126 (0.306)
Tertiary		-0.125 (0.283)	-0.131 (0.283)	-0.144 (0.283)	-0.175 (0.288)
Linguistic region (ref: German-speaking)					
French-speaking		-1.162 (1.309)	-1.118 (1.308)	-1.200 (1.315)	-1.221 (1.329)
Italian-speaking		0.537 (1.115)	0.615 (1.117)	0.593 (1.121)	0.617 (1.119)
Interest in politics		0.118*** (0.0226)	0.114*** (0.0228)	0.115*** (0.0229)	0.113*** (0.0230)
Satisfaction with democracy			0.0238 (0.0236)	0.0260 (0.0237)	0.0246 (0.0239)
Feeling of political influence			0.0254 (0.0165)	0.0225 (0.0166)	0.0189 (0.0167)
Trust in the federal government			-0.0183 (0.0225)	-0.0157 (0.0226)	-0.0130 (0.0228)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Social spending (ref: No change)					
Decrease				0.160 (0.0862)	0.154 (0.0872)
Increase				-0.188* (0.0935)	-0.205* (0.0946)
Taxation of high incomes (ref: No change)					
Increase				-0.0355 (0.0974)	-0.0446 (0.0984)
Decrease				0.131 (0.136)	0.113 (0.138)
Opinion on army (ref: Neither)					
Strong Army					0.227** (0.0874)
No army					0.101 (0.131)
Opinion on joining the EU (ref: Neither)					
In favour					0.0358 (0.184)
Against					0.457** (0.169)
Equality of chances (ref: Neither)					
Equal opportunities for Swiss and non-Swiss					0.0644 (0.119)
Better opportunities for Swiss					0.350** (0.123)
Protection of the environment or economic growth (ref: Neither)					
Protection of the environment					-0.0494 (0.0839)
Economic growth					-0.0118 (0.0962)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nuclear Power (ref: Neither)					
In favour					0.0694
					(0.135)
Against					-0.0635
					(0.136)
Feeling that women are penalized compared to men					-0.0122
					(0.0163)
In favour of gender equality measures					0.00131
					(0.0147)
Trade union member					0.00809
					(0.127)
N	5,921	5,921	5,921	5,921	5,921
df	7	13	16	20	33
Log lik.	-2215.9	-2165.3	-2163.4	-2156.3	-2135.6
AIC	4445.7	4356.6	4358.8	4325.6	4337.2
BIC	4492.5	4443.5	4465.8	4486.4	4555.8
Individuals	1227	1227	1227	1227	1227
χ^2	13.61	114.8	118.6	132.7	174.2

** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$*

Standard errors in parentheses; sex is excluded as it is time-invariant

Source: SHP waves 1 to 11

Table 5: Random effects regression models

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Class (ref: Office clerks)					
Self-employed professionals and large employers	-0.158 (0.153)	-0.274 (0.159)	-0.275 (0.159)	-0.285 (0.158)	-0.200 (0.156)
Small business owners	0.231 (0.146)	0.108 (0.150)	0.112 (0.150)	0.131 (0.149)	0.136 (0.145)
(Associate) managers and administrators	-0.203 (0.146)	-0.209 (0.152)	-0.198 (0.151)	-0.222 (0.151)	-0.209 (0.147)
Technical professionals and technicians	-0.397* (0.184)	-0.418* (0.194)	-0.404* (0.193)	-0.358 (0.192)	-0.304 (0.188)
Production workers	0.846*** (0.146)	0.652*** (0.152)	0.646*** (0.151)	0.653*** (0.150)	0.538*** (0.145)
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	-1.990*** (0.208)	-1.866*** (0.205)	-1.836*** (0.202)	-1.707*** (0.200)	-1.163*** (0.187)
Service workers	0.165 (0.157)	0.164 (0.160)	0.159 (0.159)	0.188 (0.158)	0.150 (0.153)
Age		0.00507 (0.00307)	0.00471 (0.00306)	0.00308 (0.00301)	-0.00444 (0.00285)
Sex (ref: Male)		-0.769*** (0.112)	-0.770*** (0.111)	-0.674*** (0.109)	-0.442*** (0.105)
Education (ref: Upper secondary)					
Less than upper secondary		0.548*** (0.132)	0.548*** (0.131)	0.517*** (0.129)	0.307* (0.121)
Tertiary		-0.909*** (0.121)	-0.899*** (0.119)	-0.939*** (0.119)	-0.665*** (0.113)
Linguistic region (ref: German-speaking)					
French-speaking		-1.980*** (0.144)	-2.036*** (0.142)	-1.861*** (0.140)	-1.142*** (0.129)
Italian-speaking		-1.995*** (0.330)	-2.019*** (0.325)	-1.891*** (0.318)	-1.494*** (0.291)
Interest in politics		0.0970*** (0.0165)	0.107*** (0.0167)	0.109*** (0.0166)	0.116*** (0.0162)
Satisfaction with democracy			-0.0559** (0.0208)	-0.0557** (0.0207)	-0.0586** (0.0204)
Feeling of political influence			0.0478*** (0.0140)	0.0412** (0.0139)	0.0421** (0.0138)
Trust in the federal government			-0.131*** (0.0189)	-0.122*** (0.0188)	-0.0946*** (0.0186)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Social spending (ref: No change)					
Decrease				0.816***	0.683***
				(0.0765)	(0.0756)
Increase				-0.582***	-0.383***
				(0.0797)	(0.0803)
Taxation of high incomes (ref: No change)					
Increase				-0.128	-0.0349
				(0.0824)	(0.0820)
Decrease				0.323**	0.280*
				(0.119)	(0.118)
Opinion on army (ref: Neither)					
Strong Army					0.639***
					(0.0732)
No army					-0.501***
					(0.101)
Opinion on joining the EU (ref: Neither)					
In favour					-0.540***
					(0.158)
Against					1.305***
					(0.148)
Equality of chances (ref: Neither)					
Equal opportunities for Swiss and non-Swiss					-0.333**
					(0.106)
Better opportunities for Swiss					0.717***
					(0.109)
Protection of the environment or economic growth (ref: Neither)					
Protection of the environment					-0.119
					(0.0719)
Economic growth					0.185*
					(0.0826)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Nuclear Power (ref: Neither)					
In favour					0.254*
					(0.118)
Against					-0.216
					(0.118)
Feeling that women are penalized compared to men					-0.0339**
					(0.0137)
In favour of gender equality measures					-0.0370**
					(0.0121)
Trade union member					-0.312**
					(0.0984)
Constant	-5.058***	-4.570***	-3.698***	-3.470***	-3.582***
	(0.121)	(0.225)	(0.251)	(0.264)	(0.319)
σ_u	4.171***	3.927***	3.859***	3.593***	2.897***
	(0.0741)	(0.0774)	(0.0759)	(0.0758)	(0.0733)
ρ	0.841***	0.824***	0.819***	0.797***	0.718***
	(0.00475)	(0.00571)	(0.00583)	(0.00683)	(0.01025)
N	39,059	39,059	39,059	39,059	39,059
df	7	14	17	21	34
Log lik.	-9622.8	-9439.6	-9399.0	-9264.9	-8692.2
AIC	19263.6	18911.1	18836.1	18575.7	17456.4
BIC	19340.8	19048.3	18999.0	18772.9	17765.0
Individuals	10678	10678	10678	10678	10678
χ^2	224.3	519.3	609.2	876.0	1729.3

** $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$*
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: SHP waves 1 to 11

Before proceeding to the analysis of the regression results, a few preliminary comments can be made regarding the models. First, the AIC and BIC indicate that out of the five random effects models, the fifth should be retained as the AIC and BIC for this model are smaller than for all the other models. However, this is not the case with the fixed effects model. While the AIC is the smallest for the fourth model, the BIC – which more heavily penalizes additional variables – on the other hand suggests that it is the second model that should be used. Second, the ρ parameter in the random effects models is significantly different from zero in all cases meaning that it would not be possible to use a pooled logistic regression as the observations of the dependent variable are serially correlated. Finally, the Hasuman test indicates that when comparing the fifth random effects model to the fifth fixed effects model, that the fixed effects model should be preferred (χ^2: 1038.19, *df*: 34, *p*-value: < 0.0001). Nevertheless, as many observations were dropped in the fixed effects models because the outcome didn't vary – 31,705 – it is not worth discounting the random effects models entirely. Consequently, the results of both the random effects and the fixed effects models will be discussed.

The fixed effects models seem to suggest that, compared to office clerks, no social class is more inclined to vote for the SVP with only socio-cultural (semi-)professionals being significantly less likely to vote for the SVP – about two-and-a-half times less likely – which is in line with expectations. In the random effects models on the other hand, technical professionals and technicians are less likely to vote for the SVP in all but the final model, and production workers are significantly more likely to vote for the SVP. When comparing the standard errors of the coefficients for production workers in the fixed effects models to those of the random effects models, there is a slight increase due to the lower amount of observations in the fixed effects model. However, as the coefficients themselves are smaller, this would suggest that there is in fact some time-invariant variable not included in the random effects model that would explain why production workers are more likely to support the SVP. This is not necessarily the case

however for technical professionals and technicians as the coefficients in both models are rather close but the standard errors are much larger. Small business owners who are considered to be more likely to support populist radical right parties, and who are often over-represented among populist radical right parties' electorate, are no more likely than office clerks to support the SVP. Based on this evidence, hypothesis 8 cannot be completely confirmed in the case of the fixed effects models. Nevertheless, it would appear that socio-cultural specialists do have a propensity to not vote for the SVP while the fact that production workers are more likely to support the SVP, if we consider the fixed effects models, could possibly explained by a time-constant variable omitted from the random effects model and thus being a production worker in itself does not make an individual more likely to support the SVP.

The addition of the control variables doesn't lead to substantially different estimates on the effect of being a socio-cultural (semi-)professional on the likelihood of an individual's intent to vote for the SVP. We do however find that age has a significant positive effect in the fixed effects models meaning that older individuals are more likely to intend to vote for the SVP. This is however not the case in the random effect models. Education, and linguistic region are not significant in the fixed effects models. In the case of linguistic region, the extremely large standard errors suggest that this variable does not vary substantially over time. The differences between the random and fixed effects models when it comes to education are more difficult to understand. Tertiary education, compared to individuals having completed an upper secondary level of education, in both models is associated with a lower likelihood of intending to vote for the SVP, however it is not significant in the fixed effects models. In the random effects model individuals with less than upper secondary levels of education are more likely to have the intention of voting for the SVP, while in the fixed effects models they are *less* likely even if the effect is not significant. In the case of the random effects model, hypothesis 5 is corroborated however, the same cannot be said in the case of the fixed effects model. Interestingly, both the fixed

and random effects models suggest that the more an individual claim they are interested in politics, the more likely they are to indicate they would vote for the SVP.

The third model adds different measures of an individual's trust in, or satisfaction with, the political system. None of the variables exert a significant effect on an individual's propensity to vote for the SVP in the fixed effects models. However, in the random effects models, all three of the variables are significant. The fixed effects models would seem to indicate that voting for the SVP is not necessarily done as a sign of protest or dissatisfaction with the political system as a whole. The random effects model suggests that the more satisfied individuals are with the government and with democracy the less likely they are to vote for the SVP. The feeling of political influence on the other hand shows that the more an individual thinks they can influence politics and government policy the more likely they are to vote for the SVP. This could indicate that the SVP is viewed as a vector for change by voters.

Economic attitudes also play a role. In both the fixed and random effects models, individuals who are in favour of increasing social expenditure are less likely to vote for the SVP than are individuals who would rather see no change. In the fixed effects models, being in favour of decreasing social spending does not always significantly increase the chances of intending to vote for the SVP while this is the case for the random effects model. Moreover, individuals in favour of *decreasing* the taxation of high incomes are more likely to vote for the SVP in the random effects model, but again this is not significant in the fixed effects model.

As for issues on the cultural divide, individuals in favour of a strong army, against EU integration, and in favour of prioritizing chances for the Swiss are all more likely to support the SVP in both the random and fixed effects models. However, questions of gender equality, environmental concerns, and trade union membership in the fixed effects model do not seem to have any effect

on an individual's chances of voting for the SVP. The random effects models suggest that individuals that do not favour environmental protection are more likely to vote for the SVP, but also that individuals in favour of gender equality or who feel that women are penalized are less likely to vote for the SVP. Members of a trade union or an employees' association are less likely to support the SVP, as hypothesized, unlike in the fixed effects model.

Returning to the effect of class on an individual's likelihood of supporting the SVP, despite controlling for cultural, economic, and political attitudes (in addition to socio-demographic characteristics), social class continues to have an effect. In the random effects model, socio-cultural (semi-)professionals continue to be significantly less likely to vote for the SVP while production workers continue to be significantly more likely. However, with the introduction of the additional variables, the effects are not as strong suggesting that attitudes serve to mediate the effect of class on the chances of voting for the SVP. In the fixed effects model, the introduction of the additional variables seems to have no real discernable effect on the negative relationship between the chances of voting for the SVP and being a socio-cultural (semi-)professional.

Based on these results the final fixed effects models corroborate hypotheses 1, and 4 as individuals that support prioritizing Swiss over others and who favour a strong army are indeed more likely to vote for the SVP. Moreover, individuals with anti-statist economic attitudes are also more likely to support the SVP which is in line with the sixth hypothesis. However, the fixed effects model also invalidates are host of hypotheses. Individuals in favour of gender equality or the protection of the environment are not less likely to support the SVP (hypotheses 2 and 3) while higher levels of education do not contribute significantly to reducing the likelihood of voting for the SVP either (hypothesis 5). Hypothesis 6 is also not confirmed as it is not individuals with pro-market attitudes that are more likely to support the Swiss People's Party, but rather it is that individuals with pro-state attitudes are less likely to vote for the SVP.

Hypothesis 7 is also rejected as none of the various measures of political satisfaction have any significant effect on the chances of an individual intending to vote for the SVP. Hypothesis 8 is partially rejected as production workers and small business owners are not significantly more likely to vote for the SVP. However, socio-cultural specialists are less likely to indicate that they would vote for the SVP as hypothesized. Based on these results, the overrepresentation of small business owners and production workers within the electorate of the populist radical right could potentially be explained by external factors while the under-representation of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals cannot.

5. Conclusion

The results of the panel data analysis suggest that the being a member of the working class (a production worker) in and of itself does not explain why such individuals are over-represented in the electorate of the populist radical right compare to other classes. Nevertheless, the same data also shows that socio-cultural (semi-) professionals intrinsically are less inclined to vote for the Swiss People's Party even when controlling for economic and cultural attitudes. It would therefore seem that, in the case of Switzerland, the SVP's socio-structural base can be more defined in terms of who *wouldn't* vote for the party rather than by those who would. As for attitudes, the data also suggests that the SVP mobilizes voters both along the cultural and economic divide. Individuals with more left-wing economic attitudes are less likely to vote for the SVP while individuals holding more authoritarian positions related to immigration, the army, and a resistance to EU membership are more likely to vote for the party.

Nevertheless, these conclusions are not exempt from criticism. First and foremost, the data only covers the demand-side of the question even though party positions and the polarization of the political system also play a role in determining how individuals vote. Moreover, there is ample evidence that social-democratic parties have transformed and repositioned themselves especially along the cultural axis becoming more culturally libertarian over time and thus alienating the working class (Kitschelt 1994, 1997, Kriesi 1998, Kriesi et al. 2008). In relation to the modernization "losers" and "winners" views, the data also does not take into account factors at the national or even supra-national level that could also affect individuals' propensity to vote for the radical

right notably the evolution of the level of immigration and economic processes tied to globalization.

There are also problems related to the data available in the Swiss Household Panel. The perceived threat of immigration is only measured through a relatively vague question asking individuals whether Swiss and non-Swiss should have the same opportunities. Questions of identity, which are viewed as central in explaining the rise of, and support for the populist radical right, are never directly addressed by the SHP meaning that they are also not present in the analysis. (However, the latest wave does include questions related to identity.)

Another possible criticism is related to the sample and the dependent variable itself. The possibility of generalizing the results even to the case of Switzerland alone is rather limited especially if we consider how different voting intentions of the sample population and the actual electoral results are. In addition, the operationalization of the dependent variable poses some problems as the reference category of individuals who wouldn't vote for the Swiss People's Party is particularly heterogeneous combining individuals who would vote for other parties with those who wouldn't vote or who would vote for a specific candidate.

Nevertheless, the results are consistent with findings that indicating that the overrepresentation of the working class within the populist radical right's electorate can be explained by external factors. There would thus seem to be no particular predisposition for this class to support this party over any other voting outcome unlike the socio-cultural (semi-)professionals where there seems to be a clear class effect. However, the analysis has not permitted the identification of these factors. Notwithstanding the problems outlined above, the finding that socio-cultural (semi-)professionals remain less likely to vote for the SVP even when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity using fixed effects models is significant in its own right. What remains to be investigated is whether there are other omitted time-varying variables which can explain this, or whether there is something inherent in being a socio-cultural

(semi-)professional which makes them unlikely to vote for the Swiss People's Party. Investigating the effect of socio-cultural (semi-)professionals' work experiences on their political preferences in more detail may bring to light why this is the case.

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APPENDIX

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

NUMERIC INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Age					
1999	9,635	44.06	15.92	18	95
2000	8,721	44.58	16.06	18	96
2001	8,327	44.90	16.18	18	97
2002	7,129	45.61	16.30	18	97
2003	6,346	45.93	16.37	18	98
2004	10,764	46.05	16.66	18	95
2005	8,560	46.62	16.78	18	95
2006	8,383	47.05	16.95	18	95
2007	8,577	48.01	17.03	18	95
2008	8,566	48.17	17.21	18	96
2009	8,864	48.80	17.36	18	95
All years	93,827	46.34	16.70	18	98
Interest in politics					
1999	7,303	5.14	2.93	0	10
2000	6,609	5.44	2.78	0	10
2001	6,152	5.59	2.75	0	10
2002	5,331	5.65	2.73	0	10
2003	4,861	5.69	2.75	0	10
2004	7,842	5.72	2.81	0	10
2005	6,058	5.87	2.71	0	10
2006	6,208	5.76	2.69	0	10
2007	6,454	5.75	2.71	0	10
2008	6,382	5.88	2.68	0	10
2009	6,589	5.84	2.65	0	10
All years	69,456	5.66	2.76	0	10

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Satisfaction with democracy					
1999	7,093	5.70	2.00	0	10
2000	6,403	6.08	1.92	0	10
2001	5,993	6.03	1.93	0	10
2002	5,222	6.04	1.94	0	10
2003	4,763	5.88	1.98	0	10
2004	7,312	5.88	2.00	0	10
2005	5,972	6.04	1.95	0	10
2006	6,090	6.13	1.86	0	10
2007	6,358	6.09	1.91	0	10
2008	6,262	6.16	1.90	0	10
2009	6,466	6.10	1.90	0	10
All years	67,934	6.01	1.95	0	10
Feeling of political influence					
1999	7,098	3.14	2.66	0	10
2000	6,444	3.48	2.65	0	10
2001	6,033	3.55	2.58	0	10
2002	5,528	3.66	2.64	0	10
2003	4,795	3.62	2.61	0	10
2004	7,339	3.70	2.65	0	10
2005	5,981	3.74	2.64	0	10
2006	6,111	3.84	2.59	0	10
2007	6,362	3.90	2.60	0	10
2008	6,258	3.94	2.57	0	10
2009	6,527	3.90	2.55	0	10
All years	68,223	3.68	2.62	0	10

	Observations	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Trust in the federal government					
1999	7,063	5.74	2.27	0	10
2000	6,426	5.93	2.15	0	10
2001	6,016	5.92	2.16	0	10
2002	5,224	5.62	2.15	0	10
2003	4,782	5.44	2.18	0	10
2004	7,314	5.28	2.16	0	10
2005	5,959	5.39	2.15	0	10
2006	6,099	5.50	2.09	0	10
2007	6,351	5.51	2.10	0	10
2008	6,284	5.67	2.15	0	10
2009	6,484	5.39	2.14	0	10
All years	68,002	5.58	2.17	0	10
Women penalized					
2000	6,529	5.45	2.71	0	10
2001	6,081	5.31	2.69	0	10
2002	5,282	5.28	2.75	0	10
2003	4,807	5.17	2.70	0	10
2004	7,367	5.43	2.71	0	10
2005	6,033	5.40	2.57	0	10
2006	6,154	5.44	2.46	0	10
2007	6,386	5.33	2.51	0	10
2008	6,312	5.16	2.50	0	10
2009	6,518	5.16	2.48	0	10
All years	61,469	5.32	2.61	0	10
Gender equality measures					
2000	6,469	5.70	3.23	0	10
2001	6,038	5.60	3.32	0	10
2002	5,249	5.59	3.20	0	10
2003	4,764	5.57	3.17	0	10
2004	7,315	5.88	3.25	0	10
2005	5,972	5.82	3.19	0	10
2006	6,118	5.94	3.06	0	10
2007	6,358	5.89	3.00	0	10
2008	6,280	5.73	3.06	0	10
2009	6,485	5.54	3.05	0	10
All years	61,057	5.72	3.16	0	10

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All years
Class												
Self-employed professionals and large employers	3.76%	6.34%	6.72%	7.75%	6.60%	13.49%	12.88%	10.74%	5.86%	5.81%	5.40%	7.84%
Small business owners	9.08%	12.53%	13.85%	10.25%	9.09%	11.32%	12.60%	10.07%	8.41%	8.90%	8.84%	10.47%
(Associate) Managers	18.02%	16.25%	15.72%	16.38%	17.22%	14.59%	14.88%	15.74%	17.84%	17.90%	17.85%	16.27%
Office clerks	14.38%	13.19%	12.79%	13.46%	13.82%	11.86%	11.67%	11.73%	12.42%	12.05%	12.14%	12.64%
Technical professionals	7.98%	7.68%	7.33%	7.54%	8.13%	6.28%	6.22%	7.05%	8.25%	8.32%	8.48%	7.55%
Production workers	17.28%	16.11%	16.44%	16.65%	16.03%	14.70%	13.73%	15.97%	17.00%	16.74%	17.09%	16.14%
Socio-cultural (semi-) professionals	14.65%	14.00%	13.94%	14.56%	15.49%	14.90%	15.56%	15.37%	16.25%	16.04%	15.80%	15.15%
Service Workers	14.85%	13.90%	13.21%	13.39%	13.63%	12.86%	12.46%	13.33%	13.96%	14.23%	14.39%	13.66%

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All years
Education												
Less than upper secondary	34.44%	33.91%	34.08%	33.26%	32.36%	31.53%	31.25%	31.70%	31.43%	31.23%	30.90%	32.36%
Upper secondary	47.47%	46.90%	46.29%	45.98%	45.80%	45.83%	44.62%	43.78%	43.39%	43.31%	43.39%	45.18%
Tertiary	18.09%	19.19%	19.63%	20.77%	21.84%	22.64%	24.13%	24.52%	25.17%	25.47%	25.72%	22.46%
Sex												
Male	48.54%	48.30%	48.14%	48.06%	48.30%	48.14%	48.07%	47.85%	47.85%	47.51%	47.47%	48.02%
Female	51.46%	51.70%	51.86%	51.94%	51.70%	51.86%	51.93%	52.15%	52.15%	52.49%	52.53%	51.98%
Trade union membership												
Member	16.38%	17.35%	16.87%	16.94%	16.70%	16.48%	16.97%	16.63%	16.36%	16.21%	17.05%	16.71%
Non-member	83.62%	82.65%	83.13%	83.06%	83.30%	83.52%	83.03%	83.37%	83.64%	83.79%	82.95%	83.29%

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All years
Linguistic region												
German-speaking	67.64%	67.68%	66.45%	67.74%	67.65%	69.42%	70.16%	70.40%	70.55%	71.05%	70.36%	69.06%
French-speaking	27.87%	27.81%	28.83%	27.44%	27.48%	26.39%	26.50%	25.85%	25.59%	25.26%	26.12%	26.76%
Italian-speaking	4.49%	4.52%	4.72%	4.83%	4.87%	4.19%	3.79%	3.75%	3.86%	3.69%	3.52%	4.18%
Social spending												
Decrease	18.50%	14.17%	12.88%	15.00%	17.04%	22.47%	24.21%	21.78%	23.78%	21.66%	22.57%	19.58%
No change	38.03%	38.59%	40.15%	37.66%	38.44%	37.38%	35.73%	34.38%	34.54%	34.40%	38.66%	37.08%
Increase	43.47%	47.24%	46.97%	47.35%	44.52%	40.16%	40.06%	43.84%	41.68%	43.94%	38.77%	43.35%

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All years
Taxation of high incomes												
Increase	69.55%	71.49%	71.73%	70.36%	70.42%	71.25%	73.26%	73.71%	71.02%	73.73%	71.36%	71.62%
No change	19.91%	19.84%	20.42%	22.30%	22.57%	19.23%	17.43%	17.17%	18.72%	17.10%	19.57%	19.38%
Decrease	10.53%	8.67%	7.85%	7.35%	7.01%	9.52%	9.31%	9.13%	10.25%	9.17%	9.07%	8.99%
Army												
Strong army	39.40%	36.09%	39.12%	35.36%	33.41%	32.62%	31.92%	35.28%	34.66%	38.80%	—	35.73%
Neither	30.29%	35.56%	34.50%	34.86%	35.22%	32.56%	31.39%	27.52%	26.34%	23.83%	—	31.07%
No army	30.31%	28.35%	26.38%	29.79%	31.37%	34.82%	36.60%	37.20%	39.00%	37.36%	—	33.20%

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All years
Joining the EU												
In favour	59.52%	54.77%	52.21%	52.02%	48.23%	51.22%	47.38%	43.75%	38.92%	37.72%	37.83%	47.71%
Neither	7.22%	7.37%	6.03%	6.88%	6.59%	4.31%	5.34%	4.42%	4.30%	4.03%	3.68%	5.43%
Against	33.26%	37.86%	41.76%	41.10%	45.18%	44.47%	47.28%	51.83%	56.77%	58.25%	58.49%	46.86%
Equal opportunities												
For Swiss an non-Swiss	56.23%	63.75%	64.04%	60.69%	63.52%	62.78%	65.09%	65.84%	66.27%	66.98%	64.91%	63.59%
Neither	9.90%	9.77%	8.71%	11.01%	7.87%	8.23%	6.84%	6.41%	6.23%	5.99%	5.25%	7.82%
Better opportunities for Swiss	33.87%	26.48%	27.25%	28.30%	28.61%	29.00%	28.07%	27.75%	27.49%	27.02%	29.84%	28.59%

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	All years
Environment vs. economic growth												
Environmental protection	45.94%	48.74%	46.62%	46.62%	44.62%	42.86%	45.55%	50.01%	53.14%	49.93%	48.38%	47.49%
Neither	36.13%	39.35%	41.01%	40.14%	39.92%	38.75%	36.05%	34.43%	31.63%	33.30%	33.70%	36.67%
Economic growth	17.92%	11.91%	12.37%	13.24%	15.46%	18.39%	18.40%	15.56%	15.23%	16.78%	17.91%	15.84%
Nuclear energy												
In favour	26.81%	27.22%	27.76%	27.19%	35.09%	32.24%	34.64%	34.87%	36.40%	37.95%	35.00%	32.22%
Neither	8.33%	9.66%	9.59%	7.78%	7.56%	5.33%	5.46%	4.55%	5.28%	4.85%	3.60%	6.54%
Against	64.86%	63.12%	62.66%	65.03%	57.35%	62.23%	59.90%	60.58%	58.33%	57.21%	61.31%	61.24%

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Working-class voters no longer systematically support left-wing political parties. This finding was initially viewed as signalling the end of class voting and the decline of the class cleavage's salience. Yet, in Western Europe, it would seem to be turning to a new party family: the populist radical right. This realignment is thought to be linked to globalization and the societal and economic changes that it brings.

Populist radical right parties are thought to channel the frustrations of working-class voters with culturally "open" or "liberal" views of society while the effects of economic changes are less clear and more contingent on national context.

The present work links the debate on the decline of class voting and the rise of the populist radical right parties. Using individual-level longitudinal data from Swiss Household Panel, it aims to more robustly assess the determinants of voting for the populist radical right.

Dan Orsholits is currently a PhD student within the Swiss National Centre of Competence in Research LIVES. His main area of research is the modelling of vulnerability.

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