

# What Do the Peacekeepers Do, Where and How? New Data on UN Peace-Building Activities during Election Times

**Abstract:** This article introduces a new dataset on peace-building activities during election times. It presents disaggregated data on the activities of 37 peacekeeping operations (PKOs) in 99 election periods in 27 conflict-affected countries from 1990 to 2012. These activities comprise the full range of policies implemented by multidimensional peacekeeping operations. The data provide new insights into which types of peace-building activities are carried out by UN PKOs during election times, to what degree PKOs engage in these activities and how activities and engagement vary over time and countries. I outline my coding methodology and case selection, examine descriptive statistics and compare my data to another dataset on PKOs' activities. I illustrate one potential use of the data by combining six different civilian activities into a composite index of PKOs' engagement in promoting peaceful and credible elections. In line with existing literature on peacekeeping deployment, I find that PKOs engage more extensively in these activities when threats to electoral security loom larger. This evidence supports the construct validity of the composite index and its activity components.

**Hannah Smidt**  
137 Oakley Square  
London, NW1 1PA

Tel: 07925 460578  
Email: hannah.smidt.13@ucl.ac.uk

# 1 Introduction

Beyond their traditional tasks of monitoring and military deterrence, UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs) become increasingly involved in transforming the administrative, social, political and economic structures of conflict-affected countries (Durch et al., 2003; Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013; Ruggeri et al., 2012). Multidimensional PKOs engage in a wide variety of peace-building activities. For example, they organize reconciliation events, assist electoral preparations, strengthen institutions, propose legislative reforms, transform security sector institutions, professionalize the media system, disarm and demobilize former combatants and facilitate their reintegration. This paper introduces a dataset on peace-building activities of 37 PKOs during 99 electoral periods in 27 conflict-affected countries from 1990 to 2012.<sup>1</sup> The dataset makes possible the analysis of peacekeeping effectiveness during election times, arguably a critical phase for peace-building after violent conflict (Reilly, 2008; Kumar, 1998; Brancati and Snyder, 2011, 2013). Data come from the reports of the UN Secretary-General on peacekeeping missions. Coding reports instead of mandates allows for measuring what PKOs do on ground and not only what they ought to do. The data collection is guided by the questions of why the UN invests more or less resources into peace-building activities across PKOs and how these peace-building activities affect electoral violence in post-conflict countries.

Research shows that the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions prolongs peace spells after civil war (Fortna, 2004a, 2008a; Gilligan and Sergenti, 2008; Doyle and Sambanis, 2006, 2000; Hegre et al., 2011), prevents civilian killings (Hultman et al., 2013) and massacres (Melander, 2009) and reduces the risk of conflict contagion (Beardsley, 2011). While research agrees that peacekeeping has an added value for maintaining order, the causal mechanisms underlying the relationship between peacekeeping and peace are often not directly tested. Data on PKOs' peace-building activities address this blind spot in the peacekeeping literature by examining how peacekeepers contribute to effective peace-building. Examining PKOs' activities during electoral periods may also shed light on the relationship between peacekeeping and democratization, thereby potentially reconciling divergent findings (Heldt 2011, for a positive effects; Fortna for insignificant effects; Metternich 2011 for violence-inducing effects of peacekeeping intervention with mandates for democratization). The data show that PKOs vary in their activity profiles when it comes to supporting elections and other elements of democracy. For example, UNTAC in Cambodia and UNMIT in East Timor organized elections whereas UNAVEM II in Angola only assumed monitoring functions. This variance may affect the occurrence and intensity of electoral violence and, thus, the success of long-term peace-building and democratization processes. Recent research has started to disaggregate peacekeeping in order to understand why peacekeeping works for peace-building and

---

<sup>1</sup>There are more peacekeeping missions than countries because the same country can have two different missions in different times, such as MONUC and MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo or UNPROFOR and UNCRO in Croatia.

why some PKOs work better than others. Scholars examine the effect of deployment timing (Costalli, 2014), personnel composition and strength (Hultman et al., 2013, 2014, 2015), mandates (Hultman, 2013; Benson and Kathman, 2014), and diversity of troop contributing countries (Bove and Ruggeri, Bove and Ruggeri). Beyond these mission attributes, this paper argues that what peacekeepers do everyday matters and provides direct measures of their activities during electoral periods (for a similar view see Howard, 2008; Autesserre, 2014; Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013). Figures 1 and 2 illustrate that there remains potentially significant variation in PKOs' activities when missions have similar troop numbers. Whereas the large-size mission UNMIS in Sudan and the medium-size mission UNTAES in Croatia implement many different activities, the large-size mission UNCRO in Croatia and the medium-size mission UNFIL in Lebanon either only assume monitoring functions or do not engage in the activities at all. Understanding this variation and its effects may yield policy-relevant insights. Finally, while we know that peacekeepers are deployed to the hard cases for peace-building (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2008a), data on peace-building activities allows us to examine where and when the UN invests resources for important peace-building activities upon peacekeepers' deployment. This question is not only substantively interesting but also important in order to correctly assess the effectiveness of PKOs' activities for various peace-building outcomes.

Figure 1: PKO activities for large troop size





Figure 2: PKO activities for medium troop size



The paper presents the day-to-day activities of PKOs in terms of 22 categories and captures the degree of engagement in each activity category from monitoring, to assisting, to sanctioning and implementing. We can use observations on these activity categories in order to classify PKOs in many ways. For example, we can assess how many policy fields are covered by PKOs, to what degree they assist the government or replace government function and how deeply PKOs intrude into classic government prerogatives. In this manuscript, I explore PKOs' activity profile regarding two critical pathways to holding peaceful and credible elections. Thus, PKOs are classified according to their degree of engagement for (1) upholding electoral fairness and (2) reducing anticipated losses for election losers. In line with existing research on peacekeepers' deployment, I argue and empirically show that PKOs more extensively engage in activities fulfilling these two functions in places and

times where the risk of electoral contention is higher. This finding suggests that we rather under-estimate than over-estimate PKOs' effectiveness for keeping electoral peace. Thus, this analysis sheds new light onto the insignificant effect of UN electoral assistance on containing conflict recurrence in existing research (Brancati and Snyder, 2013). The results of my analysis also support the construct validity of the index of PKOs' civilian engagement and its activity components.

The paper proceeds as follows: It first reviews existing data and findings on the characteristics of peacekeeping operation, and then describes the coding methodology and data and conducts a limited reliability check. Finally, the paper provides a brief application which examines factors influencing variation in peacekeepers' engagement for electoral security.

## 2 Literature review

Peacekeeping literature shows that UN peacekeeping works for maintaining peace and reducing violence (Fortna 2004, 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008). But there are contradictory findings regarding the effects of multidimensional peacekeeping (e.g. Paris, 2004) and the relationship between peacekeeping and democratization (e.g. Metternich, 2011). Recent research started to analyse PKOs' attributes to shed light onto causal pathways for why peacekeeping is (not) effective (e.g. Hultman et al., 2013; Hultman, 2010). But PKOs' peace-building activities have so far received little attention. The new dataset on PKOs' activities during election times may contribute to disaggregated peacekeeping research by shedding light onto different causal pathways, reconciling divergent findings and explaining variation in PKOs' activity profiles.

One established finding of cross-national research is that peacekeeping by and large works. The presence of PKOs decreases the risk of renewed warfare (Fortna 2004, 2008, Doyle and Sambanis 2000, 2006, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008, Werner and Yuen 2005). Peacekeeping can also prevent mass killings in ongoing civil war (Melander 2008) and conflict contagion (Beardsley, 2011). Research on peacekeeping theorizes many causal pathway that explain the positive effect of deploying peacekeepers, e.g. solving information and commitment problems (Fortna, 2004a), military deterrence (Werner and Yuen, 2005) or transforming conflict-inducing structures (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000).<sup>2</sup> But empirical testing often falls short of the sophisticated explanations,

<sup>2</sup>Fortna (2004) argues that peacekeepers solve information and commitment problems between belligerent who mutually benefit from a settlement. In contrast, Werner and Yuen (2005) theorize that peacekeeping works through military deterrence. Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) maintain that the degree to which peacekeepers are mandated to address the structural root causes of conflict is decisive for whether peacekeeping is effective. In line with their theoretical argument, they find that multidimensional peacekeeping operations with extensive civilian functions but not observer, traditional or enforcement mission contribute to long-lasting peace after civil war.

because statistical models only test the effect of the presence or absence of a (certain type of) PKO. Data on the activities of UN PKOs may allow us to directly examine causal mechanisms.

Directly examining causal pathways may also help us to reconcile divergent findings on the effects of multidimensional PKOs and the relationship between peacekeeping and democratization. Whereas some studies find that multidimensional PKOs contribute to the transformation of war-torn into peaceful societies (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006), others show that transformations assisted by peacekeepers create new conflicts: Multidimensional PKOs may create incentives to renege on a peaceful bargaining solutions by providing more rent-seeking opportunities to one side (Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013). Multidimensional PKOs are also more likely to pursue policies that contradict and even counteract local approaches in comparison with PKOs which do not aim at transforming the post-conflict society. Thus, multidimensional peacekeeping is more prone to sparking local resistance (Autesserre, 2014; Pouligny, 1999).<sup>3</sup> Furthermore, PKOs that promote democratization and elections may undermine the power position of smaller rebel groups (Metternich, 2011) and former powerful elites (Piccolino and Karlsrud, 2011; Paris, 2004), thereby triggering renewed fighting. This findings is also used by Fortna (2008b) to explain why peacekeeping has inconsistent effects on democracy. In contrast, other research suggests that multidimensional PKOs effectively enhance democracy (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000, 2006; Pickering and Peceny, 2006), especially if they have a mandate to do so (Heldt, 2011). In contrast, comparative case studies point out that external (peacekeeping) efforts to democratize are generally fraught by many dilemmas that may result in detrimental effects for democratization in the long run (Paris, 2004; Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Höglund and Fjelde, 2012). The divergent findings call for disaggregating multidimensional PKOs into activities. Then we may shed light onto which activities are indeed detrimental to peace-building and/or democracy and whether some combinations of activities can mitigate conflict-inducing effects of transformation processes.

Recent quantitative research has started to disaggregate the peacekeeping blackbox. Research shows that if UN peacekeeping missions deploy more troops, they reduce civilian victimization (Hultman et al., 2013), the risk of intra-state conflict recurrence (Hultman et al., 2015), and battle-field violence during active conflict (Hultman et al., 2014). Moreover, if PKOs are more diverse in terms of their national origins, they bring together more ideas and complementary skills and exert greater mutual controls to prevent misconduct. Therefore, more diverse missions are more effective in decreasing the number of battle-related and civilian casualties (Bove and Ruggeri, Bove and Ruggeri). The type of mandate also matters. While deploying any kind of peacekeeping mission may exacerbate violence against civilians done by rebels during intra-state conflict, missions with a

---

<sup>3</sup>When multidimensional PKOs create trusteeships as in Kosovo or Cambodia, they may empower non-democratic coalitions (Lake and Fariss, 2014) and create incentives for short-term cooperation that falter as soon as peacekeepers leave (Weinstein, 2005).

mandate for civilian protection can reduce this type of violence (Hultman, 2010). Overall, the new strand of disaggregated peacekeeping research suggests that mission attributes may explain differences in peacekeeping effectiveness. However, what peacekeepers do on the ground and how their activities influence peace-building outcomes remains under-researched.

One reason for the lack of attention to PKOs' activities may be the lack of comprehensive and comparable data. Hultman (2010) collected information on whether peacekeepers engage in civilian protection activities and Heldt (2011) surveys PKOs' democracy-enhancing activities. Both studies only focus on one policy area and infer what PKOs do on the ground from mandates, e.g. from what they are requested and allowed to do. There exists only one other dataset with direct measures for a comprehensive set of activities of PKOs Based on UN reports, Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) collected event data on interactions between peacekeeping personnel and local actors (governments, rebels and local authorities), the type of peace-building activities and the depth of involvement of PKOs in these activities. Their dataset PKOLED covers activities during the full life-span of 19 PKOs in 13 African from 1989 to 2005. Using these data to analyse local reactions to UN peacekeeping, the authors find that governments and rebel groups are more cooperative when peace-building activities of PKOs offer more inclusive and extensive rent-seeking opportunities.<sup>4</sup> The dataset presented in this article builds upon PKOLED; expanding the range of categories to include, for instance, assistance to police reform, national reconciliation or civilian protection and covering a world-wide sample of electoral periods from 1990 to 2012.

Finally, while research shows that peacekeepers go to the most violence-prone place (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2008a) and deploy more personnel in more complex peace-building situation (Hultman et al., 2015), little is known about determinants of variation in PKOs' activity profiles. However, this question is important if we want to correctly assess the impact of UN PKOs' peace-building activities on various peace-building outcomes. The existing findings suggests that PKOs engage more extensively in a wider range of activities during election times when the risk of contention and, specifically, threats of electoral violence loom larger. This hypothesis may explain why some research did not find any effect of UN electoral assistance on the risk of renewed conflict after first post-conflict elections (Brancati and Snyder, 2013). Disaggregated data on where and when PKOs engage in which kind of activities and how extensively they do so may give us a new outlook on the benefits of PKOs' engagement in peace-building.

---

<sup>4</sup>Their empirical analysis shows that both actors are more likely to cooperate with peacekeepers' activities that strengthen the central state compared to humanitarian and refugee assistance. State-building assistance increase governments' power but also provide opportunities for rebel groups, such as jobs in the newly formed army. But when peacekeepers do not only regulate or assist but replace government functions and directly provide public goods, rebel groups are more likely to react with hostility since they are excluded from the rent-seeking opportunities. In contrast, actors are less cooperative with peacekeeping activities which challenge their power in the post-conflict society. Human rights monitoring and assistance constrain governments' strategies and are, therefore, met with more hostility from governments and more cooperation from rebels.

Overall, the data presented in this article makes an important contribution to existing research on the impact of peacekeepers' activities and degree of engagement on peace-building outcomes. It may be used to directly test causal mechanisms proposed by other studies, to reconcile divergent findings regarding multidimensional peacekeeping effectiveness and the relationship between peacekeeping and democracy, and shed light onto where, when and why the UN invests more or less into civilian peace-building activities.

### 3 Case selection, source data, coding and activity categories

The dataset describes activities of 37 UN peacekeeping missions in 99 electoral periods in 27 conflict-affected countries between 1990 and 2012. Ideally, an electoral period would start with voter registration and end by the swearing in of a new government. In my sample each electoral period spans six months, three months before and after election day. These temporal limits are frequently used and this period has been found to be most prone to electoral violence (Daxecker, 2012, 2014; Straus and Taylor, 2012). Electoral periods are arguably a critical phase in the peace-building process, as they bear the potential of either legitimizing peaceful forms of political contests or renewing violence (Reilly, 2008). I include all elections for a national-level legislative organ or head of state that occur within 20 years after the end of a minor or major intra-state conflict. The sample also includes elections in a year, in which minor or major conflict occurred. Excluding these elections would introduce bias by omitting the most violence-prone cases. Post-conflict elections are identified using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Themner, 2013; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themner and Wallensteen, 2013) and the list of elections from the National Elections Across Democracies dataset (Hyde and Marinov, 2012). Table 1 provides a list of countries, UN peacekeeping missions and election years in the sample.

Data on UN PKOs' activities come from reports of the UN Secretary General. These reports describe activities of the peacekeeping personnel as well as of other international organizations and states, the political and socio-economic context and the behaviour of local stakeholders. Not all reports but only those reports that cover the electoral period of three months before and after election day are used. I code reports instead of mandates. Relying on mandates alone would lead to a failure to capture the full range of peacekeeping activities, because implementation can diverge from tasks authorized by the mandate. For example, the 1992 post-election report on UNAVEM II in Angola states, "(i)t will be evident from the preceding section of the report that since the elections UNAVEM II has undertaken a number of tasks which extend beyond its original mandate (UNAVEM, 1992)."<sup>5</sup> Reports are divided into paragraphs. They vary in length between 9 to 141

<sup>5</sup>Reports also pick up important variation beyond mandates because they are regular and frequency. Usually, reports are issued three or four times a year, rarely weekly (UNPROFOR in 1992) and bi-annually (BINUB in Burundi in 2005).

Table 1: List of cases

Country	UN mission	Election Years
Afghanistan	UNAMA	2004, 2005, 2009, 2010
Angola	UNAVEM II	1992
Bosnia-Herzegovina	UNMIBH	1996, 1998, 2000, 2002
Burundi	ONUB, BINUB	2005, 2010 (2)
Cambodia	UNTAC	1993
Croatia	UNCRO, UNTAES, UNPROFOR	1992, 1993 (2), 1995 (2), 1997 (2)
DR Congo	MONUC	2006 (2), 2011
East Timor	UNTAET, UNMIT	2001, 2002, 2007 (3), 2012 (3)
El Salvador	ONUCA, ONUSAL	1991, 1994 (2)
Ethiopia	UNMEE	2005
Georgia	UNOMIG	1995, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2004 (2), 2008 (2)
Guatemala	ONUCA, MINUGUA	1990, 1991, 1999 (2), 2003 (2)
Haiti	UNMIH, UNSMIH, MIPONUH, MICAHA, MINUSTAH	1995 (3), 1997, 2000, 2006 (2), 2010, 2011
Iraq	UNAMI	2010
Ivory Coast	UNOCI	2010 (2), 2011
Kosovo	UNMIK	2001, 2004, 2007, 2010
Lebanon	UNFIL	1992, 1996, 2000, 2005, 2009
Liberia	UNOMIL, UNMIL	1997, 2005 (2), 2011 (2)
Morocco	MINURSO	1993, 1997, 2002, 2007
Mozambique	ONUMOZ	1994
Nepal	UNMIN	2008
Nicaragua	ONUCA, ONUVEN	1990
Serbia (Yugoslavia)	UNMOP,	1996, 2000, 2002 (3),
Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL UNIOSIL	2002, 2007 (2)
Sudan	UNMIS	2010
Syria	UNSMIS	2012
Tajikistan	UNMOT	1995 (2), 1999, 2000 (2)

paragraphs. In order to avoid missing important activities, I code every paragraph in the reports separately and then aggregate the observations per electoral period. There is a high degree of similarity in the kind of peace-building activities carried out by UN PKOs as well as in the language (UN diplomatic lingua) used to describe them (Howard, 2008). This similarity is exploited to inductively find a categorization scheme that fits across 37 missions.

### 3.1 Activity categories and degree of engagement

The ordinal and longitudinal dataset includes information for 22 discrete peace-building activity categories as well as the degree of engagement of peacekeepers in each activity category. A peace-building activity is goal-oriented behaviour that falls under a discrete policy domain of the state (e.g. police sector reform, institution-building) and directly or indirectly aims at preventing violent political contests.

Policy-oriented case studies of UN peacekeeping missions and activities inform the identification of 22 categories from vast amount of information available in UN Secretary General reports. For the purpose of description, I group them into security-related tasks, political reform-related tasks, social cohesion-related tasks and state-building tasks.



There are seven security-related activities: *Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR)* refers to collecting weapons, reducing the number of combat ready persons and (re-)introducing former combatants into civilian life or military and police units (Schulhofer-Wohl and Sambanis, 2010; Carbonnier, 1998; Ball and Van de Goor, 2006; Colletta et al., 1996; Spear, 2006). *Controlling arms* refers to reducing and controlling the number and circulation of arms outside DDR programmes. It also includes monitoring and enforcing an arms embargo. *Police reform, military reform and justice sector reform* deal with the core agencies and agents in the state-owned security sector. Since the late 1990s peacekeeping operations increasingly engage in security sector reform, that is "the reform of the elements of the public sector charged with the provision of external and internal security (...) and is essentially aimed at the efficient and effective provision of state and human security within a framework of democratic governance" (Hänggi, 2005, 1). Police reform and military reform entail activities for augmenting the capacity of these forces, integrating former rival groups into these sectors, strengthening civilian oversight and promoting professional norms of conduct (Call and Barnett, 1999, for police reform). Activities in the justice sector reform process aim at increasing the capacity of the state to prosecute and punish violations of domestic and international laws. *Electoral security* refers to peacekeepers' engagement in creating a violence-free electoral environment and to protect election workers, candidates and voters (Höglund and Jarstad, 2011; Kumar, 1998). *Civilian protection* means that PKOs follow patrolling procedures and conduct other activities that are designed to protect civilians from atrocities (Hultman et al., 2013). Finally, *monitoring security* is essentially a residual category that picks up on whether PKOs monitor the general security environment, e.g. acts and threats of political and criminal violence.

The data provide information on three political reform-related activities: *Electoral assistance* refers to "a the set of economic, technical, and political programs (...) for governmental institutions, political parties, civil organizations, and other organizations involved in the planning and conducting of elections. Election monitoring is part of electoral assistance" (Kumar, 1998, 6). *Institution-building* refers to strengthening checks and balances as well as the inclusiveness of the decision-making process in state institutions, especially the parliament and parliamentary organs (Krasner, 2004; Caplan, 2004). Finally, *power-sharing and concessions* refers to activities of peacekeepers in order to support 'pacts' that share or divide power among rivals along its political, territorial, military, or economic dimension (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). This may include technical assistance to forming a government of national unity or establishing quotas for public offices.

Furthermore, the data contain information on peacekeeping operations' activities to build peace-conducive social environments: *Media assistance and public information* refers to "journalism training, direct support

to news organisations, efforts to aid media law reform, support for professional journalism and broadcast associations, support for developing financial sustainability of media outlets, and initiatives designed to transcend national, religious or ethnic barriers in the media" (Price et al., 2002, 2). It also includes direct broadcasting and public information activities conducted by UN peacekeeping missions (Betz and Papper, 2015; Lehrmann, 1999). *Elite-level conflict mediation* refers to peacekeeping missions' provision of good office and other mechanisms to create improve communication and create trust between former belligerents (Fortna, 2008a, 77-78). **National reconciliation** includes activities aimed at facilitating exchange between rival communities and assisting compensation and justice mechanisms (e.g. Lederach, 1997; Menkhaus, 1996). The *human rights (including gender equality)* category refers to monitoring human rights violations perpetrated by political elites and supporters, armed groups and regular security sector agents, investigating these violations and assisting their prevention.

Finally, the data provide information on peacekeepers' engagement in seven state-building tasks, which is defined as "strengthening or constructing effective and legitimate governmental institutions" (Sisk, 2008, 14). These state-building activities include extending state authority by supporting or establishing the state administration (*State-building I*), assisting economic development and humanitarian relief efforts (*State-building II*), providing assistance to refugees and internally displaced people (*State-building III*), providing de-mining assistance (*State-building IV*), implementing Quick Impact Programmes including small income projects (*State-building V*) facilitating foreign relations and regional integration (*State-building VI*) and assisting border security and customs (*State-building VII*). Table 2 gives an overview of how many PKOs engage in each of these activities across the 99 electoral periods in my sample.

The dataset also codes the degree of engagement of PKOs in each activity category, which may range from monitoring, over technically assisting and materially assisting, to sanctioning behaviour and partially implementing or fully implementing an activity. The underlying rationale of this ordinal scale of engagement is to measure how much control PKOs have over the outcome of engagement in a policy area. I prefer to measure engagement in each activity category on an ordinal scale instead of using a count of tasks pertaining to an activity category, because tasks are usually not equally intrusive. My engagement categories map into the scale developed by Ratner (1996) and its elaboration by Dorussen and Gizelis (2013). The lowest degree of engagement is 'monitoring' defined as "observation of a situation to confirm that certain behaviour conforms to that previously accepted by the parties, but without the mandate to influence directly the actors involved". I include Ratner's category 'supervision' in the category 'monitoring' since there is much empirical overlap. 'Supervision' means that PKOs "have oversight over situations with a mandate to request changes in the behaviour of actors,

Table 2: Description of activities of UN peacekeeping missions

Activity category	Highest Engagement	N
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	Implement	36 (36.5%)
Controlling arms	Implement	36 (36.5%)
Electoral security	Implement	60 (60.6%)
Police reform	Sanction+Implement	66 (66.6%)
Military reform	Sanction+Implement	50 (50.5%)
Justice sector reform	Sanction+Implement	57 (57.6%)
Civilian protection	Implement	14 (14.1%)
Monitoring security	Monitor	75 (75.8%)
Electoral assistance	Implement	62 (62.6%)
Institution-building and reform	Sanction+Implement	36 (63.6%)
Power-sharing and concessions	Implement	8 (18.2%)
Media assistance and public information	Implement	47 (47.5%)
Elite-level conflict mediation	Assist	94 (94.9%)
National reconciliation	Implement	45 (45.5 %)
Human rights (including gender equality)	Assist	75 (75.8%)
State-building I: Extension of state authority / administration	Implement	64 (65.5%)
State-building I: Humanitarian relief and economic development	Implement	75 (75.8%)
State-building III: Refugees and IDPs	Implement	53 (53.5%)
State-building IV: De-mining	Implement	22 (22.22%)
State-building V: Quick impact programs	Implement	17 (17.2%)
State-building VI: Economic and political regional integration	Implement	35 (35.35%)
State-building VII: Regional stability and border control	Implement	48 (48.5%)

but not to order those actors directly to correct their behaviour.” Following the elaboration of Ratner’s scale by Dorussen and Gizelis (2013, 9), I also add the category ‘education’. I relabel this category ‘assistance’ since the term assistance better fits the language used in the UN Secretary General reports. Furthermore, I distinguish between technical and material assistance. I assume that material assistance gives peacekeeping missions more control over the outcome of their engagement than technical assistance. The category ‘sanctioning’, that is ”having a direct line of authority over local actors”, is adapted without modification. ‘Conduct’ is the highest degree of engagement, which means ”to perform certain tasks directly, with or without assistance of local authorities and notwithstanding their views on those matters”. Instead of using the term ‘conduct’, I prefer ‘implement’ to clarify that peacekeepers directly implement policies that are classic government prerogatives (for the definition of engagement categories see Dorussen and Gizelis, 2013, 9). In the case of ‘electoral assistance’ I distinguish between ‘partially implementing’ and ‘fully implementing’ to pick up on the distinction between PKOs assuming transitional authority and PKOs that are in a joint electoral commission with the government. ‘Elite-level conflict mediation’ and ‘human rights monitoring and assistance’ are by definition restricted to monitoring and technical assistance, since they primarily target local (elite) actors’ behaviour and cannot be implemented without the consent of at least some local (elite) actors. The second column in Table 2 shows the highest degree of engagement coded for each activity category.

For example, engagement of peacekeeping operations in 'media assistance and public information' is recorded on a five-point scale. 52.53 % of the sampled electoral periods see no engagement. In 9.1% (9) peacekeeping operations only monitor the media environment. For example, the report of UNMIBH in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2000 only states that "(t)he recent general elections held in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated yet again how nationalist parties are willing to incite inter-ethnic fear and suspicion in order to preserve their power and privileges" (UNMIBH, 2000). In about 4% (4) of the electoral periods in the sample, peacekeepers also technically assist freedom of expression and access to unbiased information. The 2009 report on peacekeeping in Burundi, for instance, states that "different organizations of journalists and media professionals established, with the support of BINUB, the Union of Burundian Journalists, which aims at protecting and promoting press freedom, including through the monitoring of violations of the rights of journalists" (BINUB, 2009). In none of the electoral periods, material assistance to media development and public information is coded as the highest engagement category. When peacekeeping missions materially assist in this category, they also always directly broadcast into the host society. Indeed, in 34.3% (34) of the sample peacekeeping operations implement their own media and public information programs. For instance the report on UNIOSIL in Sierra Leone in 2010 states that "UNIOSIL has continued to promote a culture of peace, dialogue and participation on national issues, in particular through United Nations Radio" (UNIOSIL, 2010).

### 3.2 Relationship to other data on PKOs' activities

Dorussen and Gizelis (2013) collected data on peacekeeping activities in Africa from 1989 to 2005 in the form of daily events for the full life span of a peacekeeping mission (PKOLED). PKOLED and my data overlap for Angola 1992, Burundi 2005, Liberia 1997 and 2005, Mozambique 1994 and Sierra Leone 2002. This overlap allows for a limited reliability check. I compare whether the PKOLED activities coded from the same reports match up with the activities recorded in my dataset. Out of the 22 categories, fourteen are also covered by PKOLED (see table 6 in appendix) . Comparing my data and PKOLED, the agreement rate is fairly high at 79.2%. I checked the source data of the non-matching cases, concluding that differences are due to differences in coding rules (see appendix A). I also plan to conduct a reliability check using data gathered by (Howard, 2008, 347ff.).

## 4 Application of the data

Since the end of the Cold War, the international community promotes democratization as a means of transforming war-warped into peaceful societies. UN peacekeeping missions are engaged in this complex endeavour, among other things, by building an environment for holding peaceful and credible elections. Because there are only limited resources (money, political will, etc.) but high demand for peace-building assistance, the international community and the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations, in particular, has to carefully decide where to invest them. Existing research finds that the international community is more likely to deploy a peacekeeping missions (Gilligan and Stedman, 2003; Fortna, 2008a) and to staff it with greater numbers of personnel (Hultman et al., 2015), when the peace-building situation is more complex and there is a greater risk of (renewed) violence. Is the selection process of peace-building activities fulfilled by UN PKOs driven by the same parameters? This section addresses the question of where and when UN peacekeeping missions engage in civilian activities to promote peaceful and credible elections and why some peacekeeping missions engage in these activities to a higher degree than others. I first construct a composite index of civilian activities performed by UN peacekeeping missions that may contribute to an environment for peaceful and credible elections because they a) uphold electoral fairness and b) reduce losses for election losers. I then argue that greater engagement in these activities is expected when the risk of electoral contention is higher. The analysis yields evidence in line with this argument, which I interpret as support for the construct validity of my composite index and its activity components.

### 4.1 Activities for peaceful and credible elections

PKOs can engage in two functions to mitigate the risk of violent electoral contention. Table 3 gives an overview of these functions, civilian activities and mechanisms contributing to electoral security, which will be explained in more detail in this section.

#### *Preventing certainty of defeat in elections*

In order to accept elections as a means of distributing political power, stakeholders need to perceive a fair chance of winning (e.g. Anderson and Mendes, 2005). If former war-time rivals are certain to lose elections, they are likely to spoil the democratization and peace-building process by using violence in order to prevent their own marginalization (Metternich, 2011). While many actor-specific attributes influence whether actors anticipate losing elections, election rules and conduct are also decisive for whether actors anticipate a fair chance of winning elections and are, therefore, more willing to refrain from violent means to gain or maintain power (Reilly, 2006).

Table 3: Classifying peacekeeping activities by their function for promoting peaceful and credible elections

<b>Function</b>	<b>Activities</b>	<b>Mechanisms</b>
<b>Preventing certainty of defeat</b> Can I win elections?	Electoral assistance	Naming and shaming election fraud and reducing opportunities for fraudulent behaviour
	Media development and assistance	Creating a fair campaign environment
<b>Mitigating losses</b> What do I lose upon defeat?	Elite-level mediation	Increasing trust
	National reconciliation	Reducing incompatibilities among ordinary citizens
	Assistance to power-sharing	Facilitating power guarantees for minorities
	Institution-building	Closing opportunities mistreat to opposition groups after elections

First, electoral assistance activities of UN PKOs may increase electoral actors' perception of having a fair chance of winning elections by preventing fraud and professionalizing the conduct of elections. Electoral assistance activities in peacekeeping missions may include monitoring election preparations and polling and certifying the election outcome. Monitoring and certifying can deter election fraud through 'naming and shaming' its perpetrators and threats of withdrawing international legitimacy and support. Electoral assistance of UN PKOs can also include technical and material assistance to the election organizations, thereby closing opportunities for election fraud. Finally, some peacekeeping missions organize elections in cooperation with the national electoral commission and government (e.g. UNAMA in Afghanistan) or without the involvement of national stakeholders (e.g. UNTAC in Cambodia). When taking over the election organizations, peacekeeping missions may reassure actors against technical flaws, political interference and fraud. I measure the degree of engagement of UN PKOs in electoral assistance on an ordinal scale, where monitoring is 1, certifying is 2, technical and material assistance is 3, conducting elections in cooperation with national actors is 4 and taking over the election organization is 5. For this and the following activity categories I collapse technical and material assistance, since they often occur together.

Second, media development and assistance can create a fairer campaign environment and increase non-state actors' perception of having a fair chance of winning elections. Peacekeeping missions may monitor the media environment, report bias and recommend changes. Thereby, peacekeepers put pressure on government to allow

opposition groups to broadcast their campaigns in state-owned radio and televisions. They may also deter governments from misusing the media for propaganda and intimidation of opposition voters. Technical or material assistance provided by peacekeeping operations to media agencies and agents supports fact-oriented reporting and pluralism, which guarantees that all parties can reach out to voters. Peacekeeping missions sometimes also provide alternative sources of information directly. They establish their own radio stations or broadcast TV spots which promote minority views and non-violent political alternatives. The degree of engagement of peacekeeping missions in media development and assistance is measured on an ordinal scale, where monitoring is 1, technical or material assistance is 2, and directly providing alternative information sources is 3.

#### *Mitigating losses upon electoral defeat*

Beyond the question of whether all actors have a fair chance to win elections, electoral conflict is also driven by how much actors anticipate to lose upon electoral defeat. If electoral stakeholders fear ruin, they become less likely to peacefully accept elections and more likely to violently contest the process or its result (e.g. Przeworski, 1991; Höglund, 2009). In contrast, when elections only marginally influence the domestic distribution of power, economic wealth and status and electoral stakeholders believe that these changes are temporary (until the next elections), peaceful electoral participation is more attractive and violent electoral conflict is less likely.

Four peacekeeping activities may mitigate election losers' perceived losses upon losing elections. First, UN PKOs engage in elite-level conflict mediation activities that may facilitate dialogue between candidates and representatives of political parties. Thereby, elite-level conflict mediation may increase trust between electoral stakeholders and decrease fears of exploitation when losing to a political adversary. Peacekeepers' degree of engagement in this activity category include monitoring behaviour of political elites and requesting cooperation, which is coded 1. Engagement extends to providing technical assistance, for example, by assuming a mediator function and material assistance, for example, by providing secure meeting space. Both forms of assistance are coded 2.

Second, national reconciliation activities may decrease incompatibilities between ordinary citizens belonging to rival and exclusively defined (ethnic) groups. PKOs may monitor governments' efforts to reconcile different people in the conflict-affected society, for example, the setting-up of the national reconciliation and truth commission or a compensation scheme. PKOs may also technically or materially assist these efforts. Some missions directly implement national reconciliation activities by convening social cohesion events for local communities or establishing transportation routes to facilitate inter-community exchange. Putting pressure on or assisting governments to promote national reconciliation and implementing national reconciliation activities

may reduce incompatibilities between different groups in the war-affected society and create a sense of national unity. Thereby, national reconciliation activities reduce perceived losses when the candidate of a former rival group wins elections. PKOs' degree of engagement in national reconciliation is coded on a scale from 1 for monitoring, 2 for technical or material assistance and 3 for direct implementation.

Third, UN PKOs may engage in institution-building in order to establish a set of institution, laws, rules as well as administrative procedures which enable the opposition to constrain the government's exercise of power. If opposition groups can maintain and exercise political influence, electoral defeat is associated with fewer losses, which in turn decreases incentives to hold onto power by using electoral violence. PKOs monitor institutional processes and political elites' behaviour, thereby deterring political actors from misusing institutional power. PKOs may technically or materially assist the development of checks- and-balances institutions, such as parliamentary committees or constitutional courts. When PKOs assume transitional or partial government authority, they may implement institutional devices to allow opposition groups and civil society actors to control the government. In these cases, PKOs can also sanction political misbehaviour, such as corruption and favouritism. Institution-building is coded on an ordinal scale from 1 for monitoring, 2 for assistance, 3 for sanctioning political misbehaviour and 4 for sanctioning political misbehaviour and implementing more inclusive institutional designs.

Finally, peacekeeping missions may monitor, assist or implement power-sharing between former belligerents as well as power guarantees and concessions. Power-sharing allows parties a say in the political decision-making process that may not be proportional to their share of votes in the elections. Power guarantees, such as amnesty provisions, mitigate potential losses from defeat against a rival party. PKOs may monitor power-sharing and power guarantees in order to deter breaches of earlier agreements. They also assist the design of such arrangements. In some cases, PKOs enforce power-sharing in local institutions, for example by establishing quotas for the recruitment of public officials. Peacekeeping operations' engagement score for power-sharing ranges from 1 for monitoring, 2 for assistance to 3 for implementing.

## 4.2 A composite index of civilian activities for peaceful and credible elections

Having identified the six activities that fulfil two crucial functions for promoting an environment for peaceful and credible elections, I now construct composite index for the degree of engagement. I find that the engagement scores in the six activity categories for enhancing electoral security more often than not occur together and are highly correlated, as show in Figure 3 and Table 6, respectively. This suggests both interdependency and the influence of common mission- or country-level factors that affect the adoption of these activities into PKOs.



These are ideal conditions for creating a composite index. I sum the engagement scores for each of the six activity categories in each electoral period and divide that score by 20, the highest overall engagement score possible.<sup>6</sup>

Figure 3: Number of activities for electoral security per electoral period




Figure 4: Engagement score for electoral security




Table 4: Correlation between peacekeeping activities to enhance electoral security

	Electoral assistance	Media development	Conflict mediation	Reconciliation	Institution-building	Power-sharing
Electoral assistance	1					
Media	0.5574*					
Conflict mediation	0.0045	0.1340	1			
Reconciliation	0.3058*	0.3013*	0.1140	1		
Institution-building	0.5080*	0.4949*	-0.0323	0.4602*	1	
Power-sharing	0.3253*	0.1746*	-0.0810	0.2598*	0.3899*	1

\* p < 0.05

Empirically, the composite index for PKOs' engagement in activities promoting peaceful and credible elections ranges from 0.05 % for UNSMIH 1997 in Haiti and ONUCA 1990 and 1991 in Guatemala to 100 % for UNMIK 2001 in Kosovo. The histogram in Figure 4 shows there is substantial variance in the distribution of the composite index. The final subsection seeks to shed light onto this variance and the question of why peacekeeping operations engage more or less extensively in civilian activities for promoting peaceful and credible elections?

### 4.3 Examining factors influencing PKOs' civilian engagement

Previous research finds that the UN is more likely to deploy peacekeeping missions in the most difficult cases (Fortna, 2008a; Gilligan and Stedman, 2003). Hultman et al. (2015) argue that "(t)he number of troops deployed to these conflicts also reflects the complexity of the situation." In line with these arguments, this section shows

<sup>6</sup>5 for electoral assistance, 3 for media development and public information, 2 for elite-level mediation, 3 for national reconciliation, 4 for institution-building, 3 for power-sharing. The sum of the highest engagement in all categories is 20.

that UN peacekeeping missions engage more extensively in six civilian activities conducive to an environment for credible and peaceful elections in places and times where peace-building is more difficult and threats to electoral security loom larger.

### *Research design*

Variation of PKOs' engagement in civilian activities for promoting peaceful and credible elections is examined in the full sample of 99 electoral periods from 1990 to 2012 using a Generalized Linear Regression Model (GLM) with a cloglog link function. This model fits my dependent variable - the composite index for PKOs' civilian engagement - in that its predictions range between 0 and 1 and its functional form approximates the underlying data generation process of the observed values (see comparison with OLS and logit GLM in Table 8 in Appendix B). I estimate on regression model for the composite index of six activities (model 1) and another model for the composite index with five activities without elite-level conflict mediation because conflict mediation is not correlated with the other civilian activities (see Table 4). In order to shed light onto the relationship between peacekeepers' engagement in civilian activities and threats to electoral security, I use predictor variables that Brancati and Snyder (2013) find to significantly influence the risk of conflict recurrence after post-civil war elections. I seek to show that peacekeepers' engagement score is higher when the risk of violence associated with elections is greater.

Brancati and Snyder (2013, 839) show that the timing of elections after the end of violent conflict is the most important predictor for whether civil war recurs after first post-conflict elections. Since my sample does not only include first post-conflict elections but also later ones, I include two different election timing variables for whether the elections takes place immediately after the end of a major conflict or at a later stage and whether the elections takes place in minor or major conflict or afterwards (Themner, 2013; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themner and Wallenstein, 2013, constructed from UCDP intra-state conflict data). I also use several other variables which Brancati and Snyder (2013, 839) find to be significant predictors of conflict recurrence after first post-conflict elections. I include whether the conflict ended in military victory or differently, e.g. in negotiated settlement or with lower levels of conflict. Military victory is associated with fewer bargaining problems during election times and less violence. Data for this variable come from Kreutz (2010). Three political variable - whether a proportional or first-past-to-post system is used, whether the political system is parliamentary, semi-presidential or presidential system, and whether there are autonomous regions - enter the model. Data for these variables come from Beck et al. (2001). Proportional electoral rules, parliamentary systems and a higher degree of decentralization increase the inclusiveness of the political system and potentially reduce election losers' violence-inducing grievances against political exclusion. I further include measures for the severity of the past

conflict, e.g. the duration of the past conflict (Themner, 2013; Gleditsch et al., 2002; Themner and Wallensteen, 2013, constructed from UCDP intra-state conflict data) and the number of battle-related death within the past ten years (Pettersson, 2014, for data). Electoral defeat to a war-time rival after more severe conflicts may be associated with larger losses due to hardened identities and, consequently, more election-related contention. I do not include GDP per capita, because data for Kosovo and East Timor are missing. As the sample is restricted to the post-Cold War period and countries where peacekeepers are deployed, I neither include an index for the Cold War period nor an index of UN intervention. Interestingly, while Brancati and Snyder (2013) show that peacekeeping deployment reduces the risk of conflict recurrence, UN electoral assistance has no effect. My argument suggests that this lack of association could be due to selection bias in favour of the most violence-prone elections. Finally, I add the number of peacekeeping troops, police personnel and military observers. Size of the PKO may arguably influence electoral contention through security provision and deterrence (Kathman, 2013). I hypothesize that personnel strength is positively related to peacekeepers' civilian engagement, since more personnel is expected in more complex peace-building situations (Hultman et al., 2015) and, by extensions, more dangerous elections.

### *Results*

The results provide evidence in line with the argument that PKOs engage to a greater degree in the six civilian activities for credible and peaceful elections in places and times where the risk of electoral contention is higher. Models 1 and 2 in Table 5 show that several predictors of conflict recurrence after first post-conflict elections are also associated with higher scores of PKOs' civilian engagement. While the indicator for one-sided victory shows the expected effect signs, it fails to reach statistical significance. The indicators for proportional representation, presidential systems and elections in years in major conflict show an unexpected sign but are statistically insignificant. Only the negative effect of the number of PKO troops on PKOs' civilian engagement contradicts the argument, which is plausibly explained by the fact that PKOs with high civilian engagement often rely on other foreign troops instead of PKO troops. The results are consistent across both models, e.g. for engagement scores combining six or five activities.

To substantively interpret the results, I predict the average engagement scores from model 1 when significant predictor variables vary from their minimum to their maximum while all other variables are held at the most prevalent or average values.<sup>7</sup> When elections are held for the first time after violent conflict, then PKOs' engagement for promoting peaceful and credible elections is greater. The predicted civilian engagement of PKOs

<sup>7</sup>First post-conflict election is set to 1; Elections in conflict is set to 0; the number of battle-related death and conflict duration are set to their means; military victory is set to 0, the electoral system is set to proportional, the political system is set to parliamentary, the variable for regional autonomy is set to no regional autonomy (all 0); the size of peacekeeping troops, police personnel and military observers are set to their means; population size (logged) is also set to its average.

Table 5: GLM with cloglog link function PKOs' engagement in civilian activities

	Model 1	Model 2
	Six Activity Index	Five Activity Index
First post-conflict elections	0.424*** (0.152)	0.585** (0.257)
In conflict	-0.190 (0.166)	-0.292 (0.228)
Battle deaths	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
Conflict Duration	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Military Victory	-0.347 (0.238)	-0.527 (0.635)
Plurality	-0.065 (0.167)	-0.036 (0.252)
Presidential	-0.162 (0.201)	-0.212 (0.309)
Autonomous regions	-0.610*** (0.205)	-0.859* (0.440)
PKO troops	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
PKO police	0.000*** (0.000)	0.000*** (0.000)
PKO observers	0.001* (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)
Population (ln)	-0.294** (0.124)	-0.410** (0.171)
Constant	3.427* (1.910)	4.834* (2.559)
Observations	99	99

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

increases from 21.60 % to 35.88 %, as shown on the left side in figure 5. Furthermore, PKOs are more extensively engaged in building environments conducive to holding peaceful and credible elections if the previous conflict was more severe. Figure 6 shows that the positive relationship between the predicted engagement score and battle-related deaths in the past ten years. Conflict duration, however, does not influence engagement for credible and peaceful elections. While electoral rules and the political system type do not influence peacekeepers' civilian engagement for peaceful and credible elections, the results show that having autonomous regions decreases the predicted engagement score from 14.42 % to 8.14 %. This effect is illustrated on the right side in figure 5. Since autonomy or a high degree of decentralization can mitigate electoral conflict, this is evidence that peacekeepers chose the most difficult cases for assisting or implementing civilian activities. Finally, police and military observer personnel is positively associated with greater engagement for credible and peaceful elections. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate this relationship. If more police personnel and military observers are indeed deployed to more complex peace-building situations, then this positive relationship is evidence that PKOs engage to a greater degree in civilian activities in the difficult cases.

Figure 5: First elections and autonomy




Figure 6: Battle deaths




Figure 7: Size of PKO police




Figure 8: Size of PKO observers





Figure 9: Size of PKO troops



However, the effect of military troops points to a more complex story behind the degree of civilian engagement of UN peacekeeping operations. As figure 9 shows, peacekeeping troops are negatively related to the predicted PKO engagement score. This relationship is largely driven by the fact that the peacekeeping missions with the most wide-ranging and extensive civilian functions rely on NATO troop deployment, as UNAMA in Afghanistan or UNMIK in Kosovo, or other international security forces, as UNMIT in East Timor (ISF). Moreover, the effect of peacekeeping troops is smaller than the effect peacekeeping police personnel and military observers, as clearly shown by the lower predicted civilian engagement score in figure 9. I conclude that personnel-heavy

operations are associated with more extensive civilian activities when taking personnel from other UN-mandated foreign troops into account.

## 5 Conclusion

This paper introduces a new dataset on the activities of 37 UN peacekeeping missions during 99 electoral periods in 27 conflict-affected countries from 1990 to 2012. It builds on the other existing quantitative data collection of UN peacekeeping missions' activities by Dorussen and Gizelis (2013), extending its temporal scope and spatial range and adding categories for electoral security, conflict mediation, national reconciliation, four state-building tasks and civilian protection - activities found to be relevant when coding the UN secretary-General reports. The data present a comprehensive assessment of discrete activities conducted by UN peacekeeping missions. Descriptive statistics show that there is substantive variation across PKOs in terms of their peace-building activities and degree of engagement in each activity beyond other mission characteristics, such as troop strength. This paper also shows that the data can be used to evaluate where and when the UN invests more resources into the activities of its PKOs. The statistical analysis of six civilian peace-building activities reveals that PKOs engage to a greater degree in these activities if the risk of electoral contention is higher. This evidence suggests that we are more likely to under-estimate than over-estimate the effectiveness of PKOs' civilian engagement when not controlling for selection.

Much more can and should be done with these data. Electoral security is not only a function of the organization of and stakes in elections, but also of violence opportunities and the risk of punishment associated with using violence. Thus, another composite index could be constructed for peacekeepers' security-related activities to contain electoral violence, such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, controlling arms or security sector reform. Factor analysis of the engagement scores for the 22 activity categories would also be a useful method to explore further underlying dimensions of the many different peace-building activities of UN PKOs. Resulting empirical measures for PKOs' activity profiles may allow us to directly test causal pathways for why peacekeeping succeeds and fails in building (electoral) peace. Currently, the data is limited to electoral periods. It would be great to extend the data collection for the full life span of UN peacekeeping missions to better analyse temporal dynamics and changes in their activity profiles.

# Appendices

## A Differences between my data and PKOLED

Two cases in my data do not match PKOLED data for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration activities. My data record that UNOMIL in Liberia 1997 monitored disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This decision is based on the following quote in report S/1997/478, paragraph 19: "The (UNOMIL) field stations established during the disarmament process have been successfully converted into electoral observation bases." PKOLED does not record evidence of any engagement in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process based on the reports covering the electoral period. However, PKOLED codes "demobilization/disarmament/registration of ex-combats" (event code=88) based on the report immediately preceding the electoral periods (S/1996/858). Therefore, I conclude that my coding is valid and the discrepancy is due to differences in coding rules. Furthermore, my data records that UNAVEM II in Angola 1992 assisted disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. This decision is based on the following quote in report S/24556, paragraph 12: "the number of (Government and UNITA) troops remain dangerously low, particular in the case of FAPLA. (...) Troops on both sides have chafed at being kept so long in the assembly areas and poor living conditions and shortage of food and medicines have occasionally led to riots (...). UNAVEM, in cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP), has often had to render assistance." PKOLED does not code any engagement based on the reports covering the electoral period. However, in the PKOLED the report S/23191 published before the electoral period includes evidence that is coded as "PKO (supervision of) disarmament" (event code=5). Therefore, I conclude that my coding is valid in the sense that UNAVEM II has assisted the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process in ways that go beyond monitoring but remain short of taking over the process. Discrepancies between my data and PKOLED must be due to difference in coding rules.

Two cases in my data diverge from PKOLED in the category 'controlling arms'. I code that UNOMIL in Liberia in 1997 monitored the arms circulation and UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone in 2002 assisted the government in collecting arms. For UNOMIL, I base my coding decision on report S/1997/478, paragraph 17, which states that "(a)s of 13 June, the cumulative total of arms and ammunition recovered and verified by military observers was 10,036 weapons and more than 1.24 million assorted pieces of ammunition, while approximately 3,750 weapons had been reported surrendered to ECOMOG outside the official disarmament sites." I infer that UNOMIL military observers were engaged in this process and, thus, code 'monitoring' for the activity category 'controlling arms'. In contrast, PKOLED does not record any engagement. However, in the report published before the electoral period, PKOLED records evidence for 'technical on-site inspections' (event code 80). Thus,

Table 6: Comparison of my data and PKOLED for six electoral periods

Activity category	PKOLED	Matched/Total
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	PKO military/policing operation PKO (supervision of) disarmament donations on disarmament and demobilization PKO preparation to implement disarmament and demobilization demobilization/disarmament/registration of ex-combats completion of disarmament/demobilization process; disbandment of former armed factions	4/6
Controlling arms	PKO (supervision of) demilitarization technical on-site inspections discovery of weapons	4/6
Media assistance and public information	Civic education campaign Press release / media coverage or assistance	4/6
Electoral security	Not available	
Police reform Military reform Justice sector reform	PKO military/policing operation Provision of technical assistance to policing Non-PKO military operation / non-PKO police operation Conduct of military exercises technical assistance in rebuilding the army	5/6
Elite-level conflict mediation	High level talks / negotiations / meeting / consultations Provision of technical assistance to confidence building	6/6
Trust-building (non-elite)	Not available	
Electoral assistance	Preparing and monitoring elections election campaigns/preparations for elections	6/6
Institution-building	signing/passing of bills/laws	6/6
Power-sharing and concessions	Signing peace agreement Agreement on transfer of control over territory PKO preparation to implement peace agreement (...) PKO (supervision of) territory transfer	3/6
State-building I: Extension of state authority	Provision of assistance to government structures	4/6
State-building II: Humanitarian relief and economic development	Provision of humanitarian aid Natural disaster / major incident Economic / resource monitoring (re) open office/schools/camp economic and agricultural rehabilitation programme	6/6
State-building III: Refugees and IDPs	Return of refugees / exiles / internally displaced Civilian displacement / refugees counting of foreign refugees	6/6
State-building IV: De-mining	Not available	
State-building V: Quick Impact Programs	Not available	
State-building VI: Regional integration	Not available	
State-building VII Regional stability	Not available	
Civilian protection	Not available	
Monitoring security	Violation of peace agreement / ceasefire Disturbances / harassment / threats / violent behavior Assassination / assassination attempt / killings Criminal activity / robbery / vigilantes / property destruction Removal / attempt to remove 'legitimate' government Demonstrations / protests / hunger strikes Occupation of territory Explosion / firing upon / attacked / ambushed Kidnapping / hostage taking / torture Conduct of military exercises Genocide continuation of fighting troops defecting to the other side violation of sanctions eliminatory (ethnic) cleansing	1/6
Human rights	Provision of technical assistance to human rights protection	3/6



I conclude that my coding is valid. For UNAMSIL, my coding is based on the following report S/2002/267, paragraph 13: "UNAMSIL has so far destroyed a total of 24,944 weapons, including 10,800 collected before May 2001. Some of the weapons were turned into tools under a project implemented jointly by UNAMSIL and GTZ (...)." While PKOLED does not include any evidence for 'controlling arms' based on the reports covering the electoral period. But based on an earlier report (S/2001/228), PKOLED codes 'PKO (supervision of) demilitarization' (event code 7). I thus conclude that the differences in coding 'controlling arms' between PKOLED and my dataset are due to differences in coding rules.

There are two non-matching cases for the activity category 'media assistance and public information'. My dataset records that UNOMIL in Liberia in 1997 and ONUB in Burundi in 2005 implement their own media programme. In contrast, PKOLED does not record any engagement for these two cases. This difference can be explained by the fact that PKOLED does not record whether the peacekeeping mission sets up its own radio. PKOLED applies a stricter version of coding 'PKO implementation of media assistance and public information' because the dataset does not infer from the presence of UN radio stations that the PKO conducts a 'civic education campaign'. I conclude that differences in coding between my data and PKOLED are due to differences in coding rules instead of coding errors.

A category for electoral security assistance is not available in PKOLED.

Regarding the activity categories police, military and justice sector reform, I compare my summary variable for these security sector elements with the coding of security-sector related activities in PKOLED. One case in my data does not match PKOLED. I have coded that ONUMOZ in Mozambique in 1994 is 'assisting' the security sector based on evidence in report S/1994/1449, paragraphs 14, 15 and 16, which state that ONUMOZ chaired the committee responsible for military sector reform and building a new army: "The General Peace Agreement did not initially foresee a role for the United Nations in the formation of the new army. However, at the request of both the Government and RENAMO, the Security Council, by its resolution 850 (1993) of 9 July 1993, approved my recommendation that ONUMOZ chair the CCFADM (Comissao Conjunta para a Formacao das Forcas Armadas de Defesa e Seguranca de Moambique)." The discrepancy between my data and PKOLED must, therefore, lie in the interpretation of 'technical assistance to rebuilding the army' assuming that PKOLED does not code 'chair the CCFADM' as evidence for this activity since it does not spell out the concrete action of ONUMOZ.

My coding of the following activity categories match to a full extent with PKOLED: Elite-level conflict

mediation, electoral assistance and institution-building.

Regarding the activities of UN peacekeeping missions related to power-sharing, my coding in three electoral periods does not match PKOLED. This may be due to the fact that my choice of classifying four PKOLED event categories as related to power-sharing - signing a peace agreement; Agreement on transfer of control over territory; PKO preparation to implement a peace agreement; PKO (supervision of) territory transfer - is ambiguous in the sense that these event categories may not fully match my definition of power-sharing. For UNMIL in Liberia in 2005, I code no engagement. However, PKOLED code that UNMIL supervised territory transfer (event code 6). The evidence cited in PKOLED reads as follows: "evacuation of people who reside illegally in the sapo national park, until 24.8.5; 286 people had been evacuated while others left on their own". This evidence questions my classification of PKOLED's event category '(supervision of) territory transfer' as related to power-sharing. Thus, difference in coding rules explain the mismatch. Furthermore, while PKOLED codes no engagement related to power-sharing for ONUB in Burundi and UNAVEM II in Angola, my data codes that these two PKOs monitor and assist the power-sharing processes. My coding decision for Burundi is based on the following evidence from report S/2005/328, paragraph 52, 53 and 54: "Two areas will require significant attention: the first involves the provision of international assistance and guarantees to ensure that the remaining aspects of the Arusha Agreement, as well as subsequent power-sharing arrangements, are fully implemented (...). It should be recalled that the Implementation Monitoring Committee was established under the provisions of the Arusha Agreement to monitor, supervise and coordinate the implementation of the Agreement. Having played a critical role in the peace process since September 2000, the Committee is expected to be dissolved at the end of the transition. Consequently, and as indicated in my previous report to the Council, my Special Representative has started consultations on the possible establishment of an international support mechanism that would accompany the elected government through its first term." I infer that the Special Representatives, the head of ONUB, has also started consultation on the aspect of power-sharing, mentioned as one of the areas that require "significant attention". Interestingly, PKOLED records ONUB assisting power-sharing or rather engagement in the event category 'Agreement on transfer of control over territory' based on the report S/2005/728, which was published after the elections. For UNAVEM II in Angola, my coding decision for activities related to power-sharing is based on evidence from report S/24585, paragraph 46, which states that UNAVEM offered material assistance, e.g. transportation, to make a government of national unity (in which main rival parties share power): "Meanwhile, the Government has continued with its plans to convene the newly elected Assembly and form a new government of national unity and reconciliation. (...) UNITA (former rebel group) did not send a delegation because of concerns over their security, although the Special Representative offered to arrange for them to be transported to Luanda in a UNAVEM plane and by accompanied at all times by United Nations

military and police observers and security guards.” However, PKOLED codes event code 21, e.g. assistance to signing a peace agreement, for an UNAVEM II activity in May 1991 based on UNAVEM background information found here: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/Unavem2/UnavemIIB.htm>. Thus, PKOLED codes an activity related to power-sharing activity for UNAVEM II just before the elections of 1992. I conclude, that the difference in PKOLED and my data are due to difference in coding rules instead of coding errors.

Regarding the activity category 'state-building I', there are three electoral periods where coding decisions in PKOLED do not match my data. These are Angola 1992, Burundi 2005 and Liberia 1997 and 2005. Regarding UNOMIL in Liberia 1997, while my data codes 'no engagement' based on three reports covering the electoral period, PKOLED codes 'provision of assistance to government structures' and states the following evidence: 'technical and logistical assistance to LIEC'. I would code this evidence under institution-building instead of 'state-building I', since it refers to increasing the competitiveness in the legislative branch and not to the extension of state authority. Hence, the mismatch for UNOMIL in Liberia 1997 is due to differences in coding rules. Furthermore, my dataset records that UNMIL in Liberia in 2005 provided assistance to 'state-building I' activities, but PKOLED codes no engagement. I base my coding decision on evidence from report S/2005/560 in paragraphs 62 and 63 under the section title 'restoration and consolidation of state authority', which states that "(f)urther progress was made in extending and consolidating State authority in all of the 15 counties of Liberia. In mid-July, the Chairman of the Transitional Government commissioned all 15 county superintendents. Almost 95 per cent of civil servants have returned to their duty stations in the counties and at border posts and their salaries can now be paid at offices of the Central Bank of Liberia, which have been recently constructed with UNMIL assistance in Kakata, Buchanan and Gbarnga." Furthermore, my data records that the PKOs in Mozambique and Angola monitor 'state-building I activities'. PKOLED does not record any engagement. This discrepancy is due to the fact that PKOLED does only code the 'provision of assistance to government structures', whereas my dataset also records whether a UN peacekeeping missions monitors the extension of state authority under 'state-building I'. Overall, I conclude that difference between my data and PKOLED must be due to differences in coding rules instead of coding errors. I further speculate that PKOLED defines its category 'provision of assistance to government structures' more broadly including also assistance to legislative competitiveness.

In the activity categories 'state-building II: Humanitarian relief and economic development' and 'state-building III: Refugees and IDPs', there is a 100 percent overlap between my data and PKOLED. It should be noted though that PKOLED records in the evidence column that UNAVEM II 'start helping further 270000 refugees return from zaire and zambia' but then assumes that UNAVEM II only takes monitoring functions,

which matches with my data. The report S/24556, paragraph 22 states that 'The office of the United Nations High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) reports that 60,000 refugees have returned to Angola from Zaire and Zambia (...) UNHCR planned to help further 270,000 refugees return.' Hence, my dataset records that UNCHR is assisting refugees while the PKO UNAVEM II only monitors it.

Regarding the category 'monitoring security', there is little overlap between PKOLED and my data. Only for Burundi 2005, the coding decision matches that of PKOLED. This discrepancy is first and foremost due to differences in coding rules. I use 'monitoring security' as a residual category and otherwise further classify evidence related to monitoring security. For example in Angola, PKOLED codes '11 former UNITA generals w/drew from AAF to protest elections' as event category 'Violation of peace agreement / ceasefire'. I used this bit of evidence to code both monitoring 'military reform' and monitoring 'electoral security'. As a result, PKOLED codes some engagement in 'monitoring security for Sierra Leone in 2002, Angola in 1992 and Mozambique in 1994, whereas my data codes no engagement. For UNOMIL in 1997 and UNMIL in 2005 in Liberia, my data codes some form of monitoring security, whereas PKOLED codes no engagement. I base my coding decision on report S/1997/478, paragraph 16 stating that "Relative peace and stability have continued to prevail throughout Liberia (...) Although a few minor incidents have occurred" and on report S/2005/560, paragraph 15 stating "During the reporting period, the security situation remained calm, yet fragile. The threat posed by ex-combatants awaiting reintegration opportunities diminished as the receipt of additional funding for the reintegration and rehabilitation programme allowed for the implementation of additional projects. The excombatants are a volatile group, however, and concerns remain about their susceptibility to manipulation by elements seeking to disrupt the October elections." I conclude that my category 'monitoring security' is conceptually too broad to be meaningful in an analysis of what peacekeepers do on the ground. I may either refine the category or delete it for the purpose of analysis of the peacekeeping activity data.

Three cases in my data do not match the coding decisions for human rights-related activities in PKOLED. My data records some engagement by the peacekeeping missions in Liberia 1997 and 2005 and Burundi 2005. However, the PKOLED data does not record any engagement in these cases. My coding for Liberia 1997 is based on evidence from report S/1997/478, paragraph 32 under the section title 'Human Rights': "During the reporting period, UNOMIL has conducted a series of missions throughout the country in order to assess the general human rights situation (...) UNOMIL is conducting investigations into recent widely circulated allegations that one person was killed (...). The Liberian human rights community has been strengthened with the creation of at least four human rights organizations, all of which collaborate with UNOMIL and function as members of the Liberian Human Rights Centre (...) UNOMIL, in collaboration with member states,

hosted a two-day seminar for 55 representatives of Liberian human rights and related organizations.” My coding for Liberia 2005 is based on evidence from report S/2005/560, paragraph 56 under the section title ‘Human Rights’: ”UNMIL continued its monitoring and protection activities throughout the country, and continued to work with the Transitional Government and other partners to improve the human rights situation in Liberia.” My coding for Burundi 2005 is based on evidence from report S/2005/328, paragraph 33: ”On 12 May 2005, ONUB issued a report that documents human rights violations committed by the Burundian parties during the period from June to November 2004. My Special Representative presented the findings of the report to President Ndayizeye in March 2005. ONUB intends to issue periodic reports on the human rights situation in the hope that it can contribute to redressing the culture of impunity that has prevailed in Burundi.” I conclude that there must be differences in coding rules leading to the discrepancies between my data and PKOLED.

To estimate the rate of agreement between PKOLED and my data, I divide the number of matches (58) by the number of possible matches (13 times 6 equals 78), which yields a rate of agreement of 74.36 percent. When deleting the ambiguous category ‘monitoring security’ the rate of agreement is 79.17 percent, that is 57 matches divided by 72 possible matches.

## B Robustness checks

Table 8: Linear and GLM with logit link model for PKOs' civilian engagement

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	OLS	GLM logit link
First elections	0.090*	0.468**
	(0.049)	(0.223)
In conflict	-0.049	-0.248
	(0.048)	(0.216)
Battle death	0.000*	0.000**
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Conflict Duration	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Victory	-0.070	-0.379
	(0.090)	(0.441)
Plurality	-0.025	-0.112
	(0.055)	(0.245)
Presidential	-0.028	-0.178
	(0.057)	(0.297)
Autonomous regions	-0.143*	-0.702*
	(0.083)	(0.397)
PKO troops	-0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
PKO police	0.000***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)
PKO observers	0.000	0.001
	(0.000)	(0.001)
Population (ln)	-0.069*	-0.335**
	(0.034)	(0.166)
Constant	1.355**	4.218*
	(0.516)	(2.527)
Observations	99	99
R-squared	0.445	

Robust standard errors in parentheses

\*\*\* p&lt;0.01, \*\* p&lt;0.05, \* p&lt;0.1

Table 9: Correlation between observed and predicted Composite Index

	Index observed	OLS pred.	Logit GLM pred.	Cloglog GLM pred,
Index observed	1			
OLS predictions	0.6669	1		
Logit GLM predictions	0.6804	0.9968	1	
Cloglog GLM predictions	0.6869	0.9897	0.9952	1

## References

- Anderson, C. J. and S. M. Mendes (2005). Learning to Lose: Election Outcomes , Democratic Experience and Political Protest Potential. *British Journal of Political Science* 36(1), 91–111.
- Autesserre, S. (2014). *Peaceland. Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
- Ball, N. and L. Van de Goor (2006). Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration: Mapping Issues, Dilemmas and Guiding Principles. Technical Report August, Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague.
- Beardsley, K. (2011). Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict. *The Journal of Politics* 73(04), 1051–1064.
- Beck, T., G. Clarke, A. Groff, P. Keefer, and P. Walsh (2001). New tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions. *World Bank Economic Review* 15(1), 165–176.
- Benson, M. and J. D. Kathman (2014). United Nations and Force Commitments in Civil Conflicts. *The Journal of Politics* 76(2), 1–14.
- Betz, M. and H. Papper (2015). UN peacekeeping radio. In J. Hoffmann and V. Hawkins (Eds.), *Communication and Peace. Mapping an Emerging Field*, pp. 163–178. Routledge.
- BINUB (2009). Sixth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi. Technical report, United Nations Security Council, 30 November 2009, New York.
- Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992, December). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. *International Relations* 11(3), 201–218.
- Bove, V. and A. Ruggeri. Kinds of Blue. Diversity in U.N. Peacekeeping Missions and Civilian Protection. *British Journal of Political Science*.
- Brancati, D. and J. L. Snyder (2011). Rushing to the Polls: The Causes of Premature Postconflict Elections. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(3), 469–492.
- Brancati, D. and J. L. Snyder (2013). Time to Kill: The Impact of Election Timing on Postconflict Stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(5), 822–853.

- Call, C. and M. Barnett (1999). Looking for a Few Good Cops: Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and CIVPOL. *International Peacekeeping* 6(4), 43–68.
- Caplan, R. (2004). International Authority and State Building: The Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina. *Global Governance* 10(1), 53–65.
- Carbonnier, G. (1998). Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the Literature. *WSP Occasional Paper* (2).
- Colletta, N. J., M. Kostner, and I. Wiederhofer (1996). *The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa*. Washington: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank.
- Costalli, S. (2014). Does Peacekeeping Work? A Disaggregated Analysis of Deployment and Violence Reduction in the Bosnian War. *British Journal of Political Science* 44(02), 357–380.
- Daxecker, U. E. (2012). The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-election Violence in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research* 49(4), 503–516.
- Daxecker, U. E. (2014). All Quiet on Election Day? International Election Observation and Incentives for Pre-election Violence in African Elections. *Electoral Studies* 34(2), 232–243.
- Dorussen, H. and T.-I. Gizelis (2013). Into the Lion's Den: Local Responses to UN Peacekeeping. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(6), 691–706.
- Doyle, M. W. and N. Sambanis (2000). International peacebuilding: A theoretical and quantitative analysis. *American political science review* 94(4), 779–801.
- Doyle, M. W. and N. Sambanis (2006). *Making war and building peace: United Nations peace operations*. Princeton University Press.
- Durch, W. J., V. K. Holt, C. E. Earle, and M. K. Shanahan (2003). *The Brahimi Report and the Future of UN Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: The Henry L. Stimson Center.
- Fortna, V. P. (2004a). Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace? International Intervention and the Duration of Peace After Civil War. *International Studies Quarterly quarterly* 48(2), 269–292.
- Fortna, V. P. (2004b). *Peace time: Cease fire agreements and the durability of peace*. Princeton University Press.
- Fortna, V. P. (2008a). *Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents' Choices After Civil War*. Princeton, Oxford: Princeton University Press.



- Fortna, V. P. (2008b). Peacekeeping and Democratization. In A. K. Jarstad and T. D. Sisk (Eds.), *From War to democracy. Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, pp. 39–79. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
- Gilligan, M. J. and E. J. Sergenti (2008, July). Do UN Interventions Cause Peace? Using Matching to Improve Causal Inference. *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 3(2), 89–122.
- Gilligan, M. J. and S. J. Stedman (2003). Where Do the Peacekeepers Go? *International Studies Review* 5(4), 37–54.
- Gleditsch, N. P., P. Wallensteen, M. Eriksson, M. Sollenberg, and H. v. Strand (2002). Armed Conflict 1946 - 2001: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5), 615–637.
- Hänggi, H. (2005). Conceptualising Security Sector Reform and Reconstruction. In A. Schnabel and H.-G. Ehrhart (Eds.), *Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector*, Chapter 1, pp. 1–11. Tokyo: UNU Press.
- Hartzell, C. and M. Hoddie (2003). Institutionalizing peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management. *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2), 318–332.
- Hegre, H., L. Hultman, and H. M. Nygard (2011). Simulating the Effect of Peacekeeping Operations 2010 - 2035. In J. Salerno, J. S. Yang, D. Nau, and S.-K. Chai (Eds.), *Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction*, pp. 325–332. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
- Heldt, B. (2011). Peacekeeping and Transitions to Democracy. In H. Fjelde and K. Höglund (Eds.), *Building Peace, Creating Conflict? Conflictual dimensions of local and international peacebuilding.*, pp. 47–71. Lund, Sweden: Nordic Academic Press.
- Höglund, K. (2009, June). Electoral Violence in Conflict-Ridden Societies: Concepts, Causes, and Consequences. *Terrorism and Political Violence* 21(3), 412–427.
- Höglund, K. and H. Fjelde (2012). *Building Peace, Creating Conflict? Conflictual Dimensions of Local and International Peacebuilding*. Nordic Academic Press.
- Höglund, K. and A. K. Jarstad (2011). Toward Electoral Security: Experiences from KwaZulu-Natal. *Africa Spectrum* 46(1), 33–59.
- Howard, L. M. (2008). *UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hultman, L. (2010). Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence? Unintended Effects of Peace Operations on Violence against Civilians. *Civil Wars* 12(1-2), 29–46.
- Hultman, L. (2013, January). UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation? *Journal of Peace Research* 50(1), 59–73.

- Hultman, L., J. D. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2013, May). United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science* 00(0), n/a–n/a.
- Hultman, L., J. D. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2014). Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting. *American Political Science Review* 108(04), 737–753.
- Hultman, L., J. D. Kathman, and M. Shannon (2015). United Nations Peacekeeping dynamics and the Duration of Post-Civil Conflict Peace. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, FORTHCOMING.
- Hyde, S. D. and N. Marinov (2012). Which Elections Can Be Lost? *Political Analysis* 20(2), 191–210.
- Jarstad, A. K. and T. D. Sisk (2008). *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Kathman, J. D. (2013, July). United Nations Peacekeeping Personnel Commitments, 1990-2011. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 30(5), 532–549.
- Krasner, S. D. (2004). Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. *International Security* 29(2), 85–120.
- Kreutz, J. (2010). How and When Armed Conflicts End: Introducing the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 47(2), 243–250.
- Kumar, K. (1998). *Postconflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance*. Boulder, Colorado; London, UK: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Lake, D. A. and C. J. Fariss (2014). Why International Trusteeship Fails: The Politics of External Authority in Areas of Limited Statehood. *Governance* 27(4), 569–587.
- Lederach, J. P. (1997). *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*. Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace.
- Lehrmann, I. A. (1999). *Peacekeeping and Public Information. Caught in the Crossfire*. London: Frank Cass.
- Melander, E. (2009). Selected to Go Where Murderers Lurk? The preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26(4), 389–406.
- Menkhaus, K. (1996). International Peacebuilding and the Dynamics of Local and National Reconciliation in Somalia. *International Peacekeeping* 3(1), 37–41.
- Metternich, N. W. (2011, August). Expecting Elections: Interventions, Ethnic Support, and the Duration of Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55(6), 909–937.

- Paris, R. (2004). *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Pettersson, T. (2014). UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset Codebook. *Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Version 5*.
- Piccolino, G. and J. Karlsrud (2011). Withering consent, but mutual dependency: UN peace operations and African assertiveness. *Conflict, Security & Development* 11(4), 447–471.
- Pickering, J. and M. Peceny (2006). Forging Democracy at Gunpoint. *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3), 539–560.
- Pouligny, B. (1999). Peacekeepers and Local Social Actors: The Need for Dynamic, Cross-Cultural Analysis. *Global Governance* 5, 403–424.
- Price, M. E., B. D. Noll, and D. De Luce (2002). Mapping Media Assistance. *The Programme in Comparative Media Law & Policy, Centre for Socio-Legal Studies University of Oxford*, Retrieved from [http://repository.upenn.edu/asc\\_papers/62](http://repository.upenn.edu/asc_papers/62).
- Przeworski, A. (1991). *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Ratner, S. R. (1996). *The New UN Peacekeeping: Building Peace in Lands of Conflict After the Cold War*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Reilly, B. (2006). Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies. *Democratization* 13(5), 811–827.
- Reilly, B. (2008). Post-war elections: Uncertain Turning Points of Transitions. In A. K. Jarstad and T. D. Sisk (Eds.), *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, pp. 157–182. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press.
- Ruggeri, A., T.-I. Gizelis, and H. Dorussen (2012, July). Managing Mistrust: An Analysis of Cooperation with UN Peacekeeping in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 57(3), 387–409.
- Schulhofer-Wohl, J. and N. Sambanis (2010). *Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs: An Assessment*. Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy.
- Sisk, T. D. (2008). Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence. In *Paper Prepared for The ISA Annual Meeting, San Francisco, March 24-28, 2008.*, San Francisco, pp. 1–23. The International Studies Association Annual Meeting.

- Spear, J. (2006). Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration. In O. Furley and R. May (Eds.), *Ending Africa's Wars: Progressing to Peace*, pp. 63–80. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- Straus, S. and C. Taylor (2012). Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2008. In D. A. Bekoe (Ed.), *Voting in Fear: Electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa.*, pp. 15–38. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.
- Themner, L. (2013). UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook. *Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP); Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute Version 4-*.
- Themner, L. and P. Wallensteen (2013). Armed Conflicts, 1946-2012. *Journal of Peace Research* 50(4), 509–521.
- UNAVEM (1992). Further Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II). Technical report, United Nations Security Council 25 November 1992, New York.
- UNIOSIL (2010). Fifth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone. Technical report, United Nations Security Council 4 December 2007, New York.
- UNMIBH (2000). Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Technical report, United Nations Security Council 30 November 2000, New York.
- Weinstein, J. M. (2005). Autonomous recovery and international intervention in comparative perspective. *Available at SSRN 1114117* (57), 1–35.
- Werner, S. and A. Yuen (2005). Making and Keeping Peace. *International Organization* 59(2), 261–292.