# The Diffusion of Inclusion: An Open Polity Model of Ethnic Power Sharing [*]

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**Abstract**

While there is a growing consensus that ethnic inclusion produces peace, much less is known about why governments in multiethnic states include ethnic groups through power sharing rather than impose dominance. The few studies that have addressed this question have usually proposed explanations stressing exclusively domestic factors. Yet, power sharing is not only increasing over time but also spatially clustered. This suggests that diffusion may be at play in addition to mechanisms internal to the state. Inspired by studies of democratic diffusion, we study the spread of inclusive policies with an "open polity model" that explicitly traces diffusion from inclusion in other states as well as the most relevant linkages. Focusing on how ethnic dominance gives way to power sharing, and the reverse transitions to exclusion, our findings indicate that the relevant diffusion processes operate primarily at the level of world regions rather than globally or between territorial neighbors. Thus, the more inclusive the region, the more likely a shift to power sharing. Observed shifts away from inclusion to dominance are less common in the post-World War II period, but our findings also suggest that they are more likely in regional settings characterized by ethnic exclusion.

# Introduction

Ethnic politics matters. Recent studies suggests that ethnically inclusive practices are associated with a series of favorable outcomes, including the equal provision of public goods (Cammett, 2011), effective taxation (Wimmer, 2012), as well as economic growth (Birnir and Waguespack, 2011).[1] Perhaps most prominently, there is a growing consensus that excluded ethnic groups are more likely to experience civil war (e.g., Gurr, 1993*b*; Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010). Most scholars follow in Lijphart's (1977) footsteps, arguing that power sharing helps reduce conflict (e.g., Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007; Mattes and Savun, 2009) although others have voiced skepticism (e.g. Rothchild and Roeder, 2005). Moreover, the view that inclusion begets peace is also shared by an increasing number of policy makers.

Indeed, there are signs that inclusive practices have become more frequent over time. Explaining the decline of ethnic warfare since the mid-1990s, Gurr (2000*b*) postulates that a new regime of accommodation is taking root. In a previous study, we confirm that Gurr was right, and for the right reasons (Cederman, Gleditsch and Wucherpfennig, 2015). At the same time, we also know that the trend toward declining exclusion is not present in all parts of the world. On the contrary, it exhibits considerable heterogeneity: while some areas have experienced major gains, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, others have seen hardly any improvement at all, as illustrated by the Middle East and North Africa (Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013, Chap. 9).

The fact that inclusion and power sharing, and their opposite, ethnic dominance, appear to be regionally clustered constitutes a puzzle. Since the literature has focused mostly on the consequences of inclusion and exclusion, we know relatively little about why governments choose to include ethnic groups in the first place. There are merely a handful quantitative studies that attempt to explain such decisions by studying inclusion as a function of the state's internal characteristics (see e.g. Roessler, 2011; Wimmer, 2015; Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, forthcoming). Yet, given the clustering pattern, it may not be enough to explain state-minority relations based on a "closed-polity" model. Those studies that have opened up the state in the search for explanations of inclusive practices have either assumed a global diffusion of norms (e.g. Meyer et al., 1997), or limited themselves to studies of specific regions, such as the Balkans (Mylonas, 2012). In short, we are lacking a systematic study on the transnational determinants of ethnic inclusion.

Prominent scholarship on democratization has demonstrated explicitly the role of diffusion patterns in relation to internal causes (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Inspired by these approaches, but

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[1]For an overview see Singh and vom Hau (2014).

without equating ethnic inclusion and nation-building with democracy, we investigate to what extent diffusion mechanisms can account for the increase of ethnic inclusion. We do so by assessing whether an open-polity model (OPM) adds explanatory power to the baseline constituted by a closed-polity model (CPM). Focusing on which level diffusion processes operate on, our analysis compares influences at the global level, within world regions, and between contiguous neighbors.

Accounting for how ethnic dominance gives way to power sharing, and the reverse, our findings indicate that the relevant diffusion processes operate at the regional level rather than globally or between territorial neighbors. The more inclusive the region, the more likely becomes a shift to power sharing. Conversely, shifts away from inclusion to dominance are more likely in regional settings characterized by ethnic exclusion, although exclusive transitions in the post-World War II period makes this finding less certain from a statistical point of view. Explicitly comparing different sets of linkages, we find little evidence of global effects, and our results suggests that the relevant influences seem to extend beyond immediate neighbors, reflecting larger regional practices and institutions.

The paper is structured in the following way. After reviewing explanations of inclusion in the literature, as well as studies covering democracy diffusion, we derive hypotheses from the CPM and OPM. The following section introduces our data and explores patterns therein, thus preparing the ground for empirical evaluation of the CPM and the OPM. In addition, we present effect analysis using prediction. The concluding section summarizes our results and discusses their importance for theory and policy.

## Explanations of inclusion and democracy in the literature

To reiterate, there is a large literature on the consequences of inclusion and exclusion for internal conflict. Building on Gurr's (1993*a*,2000*b*) pioneering work, a growing number of studies have established that excluded and disadvantaged ethnic groups are more likely to rebel against the state than those that are in a more secure position (Cederman, Wimmer and Min, 2010; Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch, 2011; Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug, 2013), and that including ethnic groups helps prevent or end civil war, either through territorial autonomy and decentralization (McGarry and O'Leary, 2009; Cederman et al., 2015) or governmental power sharing (Lijphart, 1977).

Given the asserted importance of inclusive policies for peace, understanding the deeper causes

and conditions favorable to inclusion—from where such policies come in the first place—is of direct relevance to theory and policy. Yet, the question of what causes shifts between exclusion and inclusion has not attracted nearly as much scholarly attention. There is a long-standing, classical literature on nation-building in historical sociology (see e.g. Deutsch and Foltz, 1966; Rokkan, 1999), but contemporary political science has had much less to say about this important topic. Broadly speaking, existing scholarship can be classified as either *closed-polity* approaches, which seek explanations within the state itself, or *open-polity* accounts, which go beyond the borders of the state to explain inclusion as the result of transnational factors and processes. We briefly summarize the closed-polity studies before turning to research that goes beyond purely domestic explanations.

## Closed-polity approaches to ethnic inclusion

Ethnic diversity plays an important role in explanations of ethnic inclusion, either as a root cause of inclusion, or as an intermediate variable. Either way, the central importance of ethnic diversity for state's decisions to include or exclude ethnic groups is intuitive and straightforward. Indeed, in ethnically homogenous states, the need for ethnic power sharing never arises in the first place, and under such conditions, shifts away from ethnic dominance make no sense.

Viewing ethnicity as being inert and deeply rooted in history, primordialist scholarship tends to be pessimistic about the prospects for power sharing, primarily because ethnic cleavages are assumed to be associated with deep mistrust and in some cases even hatred (e.g., Geertz, 1963; Connor, 1994). Drawing a direct link between ethnic essences and political institutions, this school of thought expects exclusion to be directly proportional to cultural distance and especially pronounced after conflict (Kaufmann, 1996).

Modernist theories also assume that ethnic diversity plays a role, but view such patters as products of state formation and other political processes, rather than as immutable structures. Adopting an explicitly constructivist perspective, these theories stress how political institutions, including educational establishments, language and religious policies in state bureaucracies, contribute to ethnogenesis and assimilation (e.g., Gellner, 1983; Brubaker, 1992). European history shows that state-centric nationalism, has tended to produce more inclusive, civic identities through assimilation as opposed to unification or separatist types of nationalist mobilization, which are more closely associated with ethnic nationalism (Hechter, 2000). Strong state capacity, then, should be associated with broad trans-ethnic coalitions and successful integration representatives of minorities into

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governing elites (Wimmer, 2015).

Other explanations highlight democracy as a source of inclusive politics. Strictly speaking, both democracy and power sharing in multi-ethnic states are about inclusion, although inclusion concerns individuals in the former case, and ethnic groups in the latter case. The main logic stresses that ethnic minorities enjoy more freedom to organize in democracies, and thus cannot be suppressed as easily (e.g. Diamond, 1994). While group rights are more likely to be granted by democratic regimes, it does not guarantee actual inclusion in the government (i.e. representation). Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to expect democracies to be less likely to cling to ethnic dominance (Gurr, 2000b). In contrast, Mann (2005) proposes that democracies often exclude and discriminate along ethnic lines, at least during the process that produces ethnonationalist cohesion.

Finally, existing work has implicitly treated ethnic inclusion as a tool for conflict-management, based on either past or anticipated conflict. One important question is whether governments tend to include or exclude ethnic groups that they expect could rebel in the future (Fearon, 2011). Roessler (2011) proposes that state elites in Africa tend to exclude potential coup-makers even at the risk of triggering peripheral war , since this limits the risk of coups d'état (see also Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015). Yet, this does not appear to be a general tendency. Indeed, by applying a statistical instrument for the level of ethnic inclusion based on ethno-geographic differences between British and French colonies, Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman (forthcoming) find that governments by and large include potential "troublemakers, " thus "calibrat[ing] the levels of exclusion to what they can get away with" (Fearon, 2011, 19).[2] Finally, the literature on post-conflict settlements illustrate that inclusive arrangements are resorted to as a way to prevent recurrent conflict (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007).

## Open-polity approaches to ethnic inclusion

Having briefly summarized the most prominent closed-polity accounts of ethnic inclusion, we now turn to mechanisms proposed to explain inclusive and exclusive practices in open polities. Clearly, these perspectives are less numerous and influential than those that focus on explanatory factors internal to the state. Generally, this class of explanations tends to trace normative change at the global level toward more inclusive practices. The most prominent representative is Meyer's (1997) global polity school that postulates a sweeping macro-historical process that has been propagating

[2]Relatedly, the risk of conflict also appears in Walter (2006) reputation-based explanation of why governments are reluctant to offer autonomy accommodation to specific ethnic groups.

a "rational world culture" across the globe since the age of the Enlightenment. To some extent, Gurr (2000*a*) expects a similar development, but his "regime of accommodation" is less sweeping and compatible with more regional variation.

At the regional level, explanation of ethnic groups' power access typically show how groups with transnational ethnic kin risk being excluded on grounds that their loyalty is questioned. In a classical study of the "Macedonian syndrome," Weiner (1971) shows how a climate of suspicion and paranoia leads to increasing polarization both within and between Balkan states. Covering the same region, Mylonas (2012) has more recently extended this perspective by showing how revisionist foreign policies reinforce such exclusionary tendencies. According to his explanatory framework, governments will exclude, and possibly even discriminate, groups that are ethnically linked to rival states with which the host state has ongoing rivalries. These conjectures are yet to be tested beyond particular cases. In order to extend the theoretical and empirical scope, the next section shifts the attention to the democratization literature to establish more depth in terms of possible diffusion mechanisms. This allows us to highlight several important parallels in terms of the drivers of both democracy and inclusion.

## Diffusion of democracy

Scholars have noted that many of the domestic conditions held to favor democratization change slowly over time and suggested that that the likelihood of a transition in one country changes in response to international factors and events in other states (see e.g. O'Loughlin et al., 1998; Starr, 1991). Moreover, transitions to democracy are not a one way street, and for much of 20th century forms of autocratic rule such as one party states also appeared to diffuse.

Gleditsch and Ward (2006) argue that although the specific trajectories of individual transitions may be diverse, they can be subsumed under a framework focusing on power, mobilization, and the preferences of important actors, where democracy emerges as a rational compromise when no single actor is able to dominate (e.g. Olson, 1993; Przeworski, 1988; Vanhanen, 1990). They relate the diffusion of democracy to how linkages to external actors and events influence the relative distribution power and the preferences of relevant groups in conflict over political institutions (see also Simmons, Dobbin and Garrett, 2006).

Outside actors can promote democratization by providing assistance to reform efforts and undermining autocratic rulers. Opposition groups in autocracies connected to democratic societies are more likely to receive support from transnational actors, and neighboring states are likely to be

particularly relevant. External shocks can alter the domestic distribution of power, and the impact is likely to be particularly dramatic when there are shifts and upheavals in neighboring entities and protest can emulate efforts elsewhere. Schelling's (1971) "tipping model" and the idea of cascades have often been applied to fall of socialism in Eastern Europe (e.g., Kuran, 1989, 1991; Lohmann, 1994).

The prospects for democratization also depend on the perceived benefits and costs of particular institutional arrangements. Many powerful actors traditionally resisted democratization over fears of the consequences of unmitigated popular rule (see Muller, 1999). However, resistance declined as elites observe that democracy in other countries did not lead to the expected disastrous outcomes, such as redistribution of private property or economic chaos, and many elites were able to retain considerable power after competitive electives. Moreover, democratization has also been facilitated by a popular association between democracy and good governance. Maintaining autocratic rule becomes more costly as other countries democratize and remaining autocrats are more likely to be subjected to sanctions and ostracized as remnants of illegitimate rule. Again, countries are more likely to be compared to neighboring states.

## Diffusion of inclusion

Going well beyond the issue of democratization, the diffusion literature encompasses a large set of theoretical approaches that have been applied to various policy areas and institutional constructs (Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2006). The most influential theories can be summarized under the headings of coercion, competition, learning and emulation. Coercion, widely construed, presumes that choices are imposed on decision makers by external actors, through conditionality, policy leadership or hegemonic ideas. In contrast, competitive mechanisms exert market pressures that leave little room for choice. Learning requires the adopter to consider the consequences of specific policies and institutions, which are internalized into the own incentive scheme. Finally, emulation assumes that models of governance are spreading through normative, cultural principles enshrined in habits or formal arrangements. March and Olsen's (1998) well known logics of consequences and appropriateness captures the distinction between the two last type of mechanisms.

In principle, the mechanisms highlighted by diffusion scholars in general, and by students of democratization in particular, could plausibly also apply to ethnic inclusion. Successful transitions to inclusion in other states may inspire excluded groups to make similar demands and emulate the strategies of contestation that have proven effective elsewhere. Governing coalitions could become

less resistant to granting inclusion if they observe that the consequences of shifting away from exclusion in other states have been less dire than feared. Finally, states that engage in significant exclusion are more likely to look worse or stand out more to outsiders in comparison to other states as exclusion becomes less common in other states they are likely to be compared with. This may in turn translate into sanctions for maintaining exclusion or incentives to offer inclusion in terms of improved relations or acceptance in more discriminating international organizations. However, there are also some limits to the direct analogies to experiences from democratization. Whereas democratic rule is essentially a universal norm, applicable to all countries, countries are likely to face less uniform expectations about power sharing given variation in diversity, as ethnic inclusion or exclusion requires some degree of diversity in the first place. For example, the potential benefits of power sharing and the costs of not introducing power sharing are likely to be much lower in a situation where any non-included group is very small, as in Austria where Slovenian minority in Carinthia–the only group besides the Austrians–constitutes only 1% of the total national population.

# Hypotheses based on the closed-polity and open-polity models

In this section, we derive a series of testable hypotheses that summarize the theoretical expectations of both the closed-polity and the open-polity perspectives. Rather than studying ethnic inclusion in general, the main goal is to explain shifts from ethnic dominance to shared rule, and vice versa. We refer to these two types of events as inclusive and exclusive shifts respectively.

## Closed-polity hypotheses

To establish a baseline for these transition, the first step is to take ethnic diversity into account. Building on our discussion about constructivist and institutional principles, rather than on primordialist assumptions, we expect ethnically diverse countries to experience more transitions to power sharing than uniform ones. Thus, we use ethnic fractionalization as a proxy for state-formation processes that create ethnic homogeneity. As argued above, a strong and long-standing tradition of statehood backed up with inclusive, identity-conferring institutions is likely to produce uniform ethno-demographic configurations. Indeed, ethnic homogeneity should be seen as a proxy for or outcome of state capacity rather than as an exogenous factor (see e.g. Wimmer, forthcoming). Based on this reasoning, we derive our first pair of hypotheses describing transitions between

ethnic dominance and power sharing:

H1a.  Ethnic diversity increases the probability of inclusive shifts.

H1b.  Ethnic diversity decreases the probability of exclusive shifts.

The literature review in the previous section reminds us that the link between democracy and power sharing is a complex two-way street. Clearly, there is no one-to-one relationship between democracy and ethnic inclusion. Some democracies discriminate along ethnic lines, and some non-democracies practice extensive power sharing. Furthermore, stable democracies may be less likely to see change in their demos configurations than less established and only partly institutionalized democratic regimes. Yet, on the whole, it can be expected that the chances of inclusive transitions would be higher in democratic states since such environments tend to be characterized by a political culture that supports the willingness to make compromises and seek consensus solutions Gurr (2000*a*,*b*). To cover transitions in the other direction, we postulate that autocratic polities will typically be more exposed to the risk of coups and purges that initiate ethnic dominance. Again, we summarize these expectations with a second set of hypotheses:

H2a.  Democracy increases the probability of inclusive shifts.

H2b.  Democracy decreases the probability of exclusive shifts.

Work on democratization stresses that transitions to democracy are less difficult when countries have previous experiences with democratic rule and institutions and organizations can be reestablished and do not need to be created from scratch (see, e.g., Dahl, 1971; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Huntington, 1991). By analogy, countries that have previously had power sharing can be expected to be more likely to return to such arrangements. We therefore factor in previous levels of inclusion. Based on historical path-dependence, we would expect that inclusive shifts are more likely in countries with a history of inclusion. Without institutional or normative legacies, power sharing will be more difficult to devise or develop, and proposed arrangements will often run into ideological opposition. Likewise, a history of dominance can tempt some members of the elite to continue to monopolize power. Thus, we propose the following two hypotheses:

H3a.  Previous inclusion increases the probability of inclusive shifts.

H3b.  Previous exclusion increases the probability of exclusive shifts.

Finally, as suggested by the extensive literature on power sharing as part of post-conflict settlements, we would expect changes toward inclusive arrangements to be especially common in countries that have already experienced civil war. Although previous conflict may motivate some

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leaders to opt for ethnic dominance, as illustrated by Rwanda and Israel, we anticipate a general tendency toward forming grand ethnic coalitions as a way to prevent future conflict. As illustrated by many cases in Sub-Saharan Africa, peace agreements typically try to avoid conflict-inducing "spoiler" effects by embracing inclusive solutions (Stedman, 1997). In the absence of clear expectations for the effect of previous conflict on exclusive shifts, we limit ourselves to a one-sided hypothesis in this case:

H4a. Previous conflict increases the probability of inclusive shifts.

## Open-polity hypotheses

Turning now to the open-polity perspective, we formulate hypotheses at three aggregation levels of potential diffusion, namely globally, within world regions, and between territorial neighbors. Each of these levels constitutes a plausible context within which diffusion mechanisms may be operating. For all these three levels, we postulate that external actors affect both ethnic groups in power and marginalized groups. While dominant ethnic elites come under pressure to open the doors to previously excluded ethnic groups, representatives of groups that are deprived of governmental representation are likely to be encouraged to redress their situation. However, since these dynamics tend to go hand in hand, it is difficult to tell apart the specific diffusion mechanisms for each level of aggregation, a task that we leave for future research to resolve. For example, the top-down logic associated with international organizations does not imply that learning and emulation mechanisms are irrelevant.

We start by considering the global level. Along the lines of Meyer et al. (1997), it is possible to interpret the increasing adoption of inclusive practices as a part of a world-wide emulation of dominant models of governance. It is plausible that international organizations, especially the United Nations, drive such a trend, but the development of the norm could also be more informal. Constructivist scholarship analyze this type of normative evolution with respect to governance forms (see e.g. Dobbin, Simmons and Garrett, 2006; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998). As a part of a general trend toward liberal values in world affairs, such a macro-historical diffusion process can be expected to trigger shifts to inclusion if the world becomes more inclusive in general (Simmons and Elkins, 2004). Conversely, an illiberal counter-trend could provoke moves toward exclusive

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rule. We formulate these expectations in the following way:

H5a. Higher global inclusion increases the probability inclusive shifts.

H5b. Higher global inclusion decreases the probability exclusive shifts.

Rather than being a truly global phenomenon, the diffusion effect could instead be limited to territorial neighbors. There is considerable variation and heterogeneity across different parts of the world over time, and this is difficult to reconcile with the idea of universal influences affecting all countries alike. To some extent, the "Arab Spring" of 2011 illustrates this pattern of diffusion between neighboring states. Starting in Tunisia, the wave of democratic protest spread like a forest fire from country to country in the Middle East, but had only limited impacts in other parts of the world such as East Asia. Previous studies of the diffusion of democracy have typically operationalized and found support for such processes at the level of contiguous states (Kopstein and Reilly, 2000; Gleditsch, 2002*a*; Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). Subscribing to a similarly decentralized approach to diffusion, Kuran (1998) proposes a model of "dissimilation" that explains how ethnicization of politics leads to divergent identification patterns spreading across state borders through demonstration effects and reputational mechanisms.

In their attempt to craft a statistical instrument for power sharing, Cammett and Malesky (2012) assume that such institutions tend to spread in states' spatial neighborhoods. To our knowledge, their study is the only example of a formal investigation of diffusion of power sharing, although the diffusion mechanism is primarily assumed for methodological purposes rather than as a central theoretical component in their argument or analysis. Again, it is reasonable to expect the mechanism to operate both in expanding and contracting inclusion. Indeed, there may also be "countervailing incentives" that demonstrate how ethnic inclusion may spread based on negative experiences with exclusion or positive experiences with inclusion (see e.g. Fearon, 1998, 112-113). As authoritarian neighborhoods are likely to hamper democratization, we postulate that the same holds for the adoption of inclusive practices and institutions.

Thus, we postulate a neighborhood-level version of our diffusion account according to which the adoption of power sharing in one country sets the incentives for both governments and representatives of excluded groups to follow suit. In principle, such a diffusion scenario could be compatible with imposed diffusion, especially in case of asymmetric neighborhood relations. Yet, the most likely setting features voluntary learning or emulation. Again, we summarize our expec-

tations with a pair of hypotheses:

H6a. Higher neighborhood inclusion increases the probability inclusive shifts.

H6b. Higher neighborhood inclusion decreases the probability exclusive shifts.

Finally, we consider the possibility that the relevant diffusion mechanisms may occur between linked countries in groupings that are larger than the immediate geographical neighbors but more confined than the global level. In the case of democratization, some argue that the third wave of democratization spread far beyond immediate geographic neighbors, and that the transitions starting in Southern Europe helped inspire transitions in other countries sharing similar language or structurally similar autocratic regimes in Latin America. We surmise that larger geographic regions may constitute important reference categories for the diffusion of power sharing, owing to the perceived similarities between countries that are not direct geographic neighbors as well as the possible influence of continent-wide regional organizations, such as the European Community/European Union and the Organization of African States/African Union, as well as smaller regional organizations with a focus on governance and security such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Southern African Development Community or the Visegrad Group. As is the case in the context of territorial neighborhoods, mechanisms of decentralized learning and emulation are certainly possible within world regions, but the continental scale of diffusion suggest that institutional imposition may also be at play. Indeed, many organizations impose various political conditions for states to become members or active engagements.

As is the case with democracy, world regions diverge drastically in their level of ethnic inclusiveness. This fact can be plausibly attributed to both formal institutions and less formal "inclusive political culture" favoring more or less accommodative political styles. For example, Rothchild and Foley (1988) report that "political incorporation of all major social interests" constitutes the main approach to politics in most African states. In terms of formal organizations, the degree of interventionism in the area of minority politics varies from non-interventionism, as illustrated by ASEAN and the OAU, to more interventionist organizations, such as the European Union. Thus, in some cases regional organizations set incentives, as the EU does through conditionality (Brusis, 2003) or provide mediation and attempt to influence the constitutionality and inclusiveness of politics of their member states, especially in post-conflict situations (Williams, 2011). Arthur (2010) argues that ECOWAS played an important role in addressing the ethnic conflicts motivating the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and was able to act decisively and mobilize resources when the United Nations was not. However, such influences do not have to be formally promulgated by the organizations themselves, but may also flow from informal politics involving interventions

in peace processes and political crises by regional heads of state, diplomats and other elite politicians. Indeed, African politics is characterized by a high degree of informality and institutional weaknesses that reduce the chances of formal power sharing, especially those imposed by externally by actors outside Africa (Spears, 2013).

We summarize our theoretical expectations at the regional level with a final pair of hypotheses:

H7a. Regional inclusion increases the probability inclusive shifts.

H7b. Regional inclusion decreases the probability exclusive shifts.

## Conceptualizing and measuring ethnic inclusion

Having laid out our theoretical conjectures about the factors and processes driving shift to and away from ethnic inclusion, in this section we introduce our main data sources. We also present some descriptive statistics that highlight important variation across space and time. Our main data is the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Core Dataset 2014 (Vogt et al., 2015). The EPR data provide an encompassing list of 819 politically relevant ethnic groups for all sovereign states of the world with a population of at least 500,000. The current version covers the period 1946 until 2013. For each group, the EPR dataset codes the group's relative size as a share of the country's total population, as well as the group's access to state power, that is power at the national level. Access to power is coded in an ordinal manner according to three main categories:

1. The group rules alone.

2. The group shares power.

3. The group is excluded.

Thus, the difference between the first and the second category is whether a single groups holds state power, or whether this is shared between multiple groups. For our analyses we include all country-years in which ethnicity is "relevant" and there is more than one politically relevant group. For example, this excludes countries such as Germany and Sweden, where ethnicity is never deemed to be politically relevant.[3] Based on the EPR data, we define ethnic inclusion at the

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[3]However, countries can also move away from a situation with politically relevant ethnic groups to ethnicity being irrelevant (e.g., Cuba, 1960) or move from ethnicity being irrelevant to politically relevant ethnic groups (e.g., Brazil 2003).

state level based on whether there is powersharing between two or more ethnic groups. By implication, states are considered to exhibit significant exclusion if the state is controlled by a single group.[4]

Beyond the EPR coding of group status we use two important additional criteria to identify transitions and levels of inclusion in other states. The EPR data focus on inclusion at central government level, and the inclusion of a party representing an ethnic group in the government coalition is a sufficient condition for inclusion by our criteria. However, we do not code the exit of such a party as a transition back to exclusion unless the group becomes actively discriminated. For example, the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania was a junior partner in many government coalitions since 1996, but we do not code a return to exclusion when the party becomes part of the opposition as happened after the 2012 legislative elections. This can be seen as analogous to the role of turnover as a litmus test for democracy. Many see democratic transitions as incomplete unless there has been an actual turnover where previous autocratic incumbent coalitions voluntarily leave office after a defeat (e.g, Przeworski et al., 2000). However, the victory of a party associated with individuals from an old autocratic coalition such as former members of Communist parties does not by itself imply a return to autocracy unless leaders actually move to undermine democratic institutions.

Most regions include both countries where ethnicity is relevant and countries where it is not according to the EPR data. Although countries where ethnicity is irrelevant may not exert much of a pull towards inclusion in other states they cannot be characterized as states with exclusion and are also unlikely to deter inclusion. In order not to exaggerate the extent of inclusion by restricting rates of inclusion to only states where ethnicity is relevant we treat all countries where ethnicity is irrelevant as implicitly included when calculating regional rates of inclusion.

We first examine the proportion of states with inclusion as defined above over the period 1946-2013. The left panel in Figure 1 indicates the proportion included for for all countries, suggesting a clear increase to the present. However, the change in the global proportion with inclusion from one year to the other could also be affected by changes in the population of states, especially with

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[4]This measure of inclusion does not consider the size of the groups involved. We have also considered an alternative measure of inclusion further requiring that power sharing must encompass at least 50% of the population of relevant groups. In practice, however, power sharing with involving less than 50% of the population (inclusive minority rule) tends to be rare, and only one such case exist in 2013, namely Nepal, where the included groups are just short of 50%. In other words our results do not change much with the size requirement, and we focus only on the simple power sharing measure here.

the introduction of new independent states during decolonization. In the right panel in Figure 1 we focus only on countries in continuous existence since 1946. Interestingly, this indicates a less consistent positive trend, with some shifts towards lower share both in the early and late part trend, although the general levels still trend clearly upwards over the period (for similar graphs covering democracy, see Gleditsch and Ward, 2006).

Figure 1: Proportion included; (left) all countries, (right) countries in continuous existence 1946-2013



Figure 2 plots the actual transitions between states in individual countries to/from inclusion over time. This does not suggest a simple pattern of transitions clustering in specific time periods, although there is some evidence for a peak in transitions away from inclusion in the 1960s and 1970s and a large number of transitions to than away from inclusion in the post-Cold War period. Over the entire period we have 44 transitions from exclusion to inclusion and 18 transitions from inclusion to exclusion.

In Figure 3 we show separate trends for different geographical regions. This shows that the global trend masks considerable geographical variation and differences across regions. There has been a clear increase in inclusion and shifts away from ethnic dominance among African states and to some extent Latin America as well, but this trend does not extend to other regions such as Europe.

Mapping the spatio-temporal distribution of inclusion provides an alternative overview of regional variation. Figure 4 depicts four global snapshots, highlighting a global increase in inclusion,

Figure 2: Transitions to/from inclusion over time, 1946-2013



especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The figure also yields some initial indication for spatial clustering within these broader geographical regions, as countries with inclusion (blue) tend to be surrounded by other countries with inclusion. Moreover, changes appear to take place on a geographically clustered basis, with groups of contiguous countries likely to change status between different time periods.

Before delving into our empirical analysis, we also look at the relationship between our inclusion vs. exclusion measure and other types of political representation and status. It is straightforward to show that inclusion is *not* simply synonymous with political democracy. Inclusion is slightly more common than democracy over the whole period (45%) than democracy (36%),[5] and Table 1 shows that the degree of overlap is moderate at best. Exclusion is more common among non-democracies, but even for democracies the countries with inclusion remain in a minority over the period. Indeed, across our sample, just over half of the observations (50.7 %) place on the diagonal, attesting that we see many cases of inclusion outside democratic regimes and many ethnically exclusionary democracies. In short, inclusion is different from political democracy.

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[5]We define democracy as having a value of 6 or above on the 20 point Polity scale, see Jaggers and Gurr (1995).

Figure 3: Proportion included by region



Figure 4: Dominance and Inclusion, 1950–2010

Inclusion can be more or less encompassing, and dominance can be more or less exclusionary. Examining the density distribution of inclusion for the share of included population across democracies, non-democracies, countries with power sharing, and countries with dominance by a single

Table 1: Inclusion and Regime Type

|  | Exclusion | Inclusion |
|---|---|---|
| Non-Democracy | 2497 | 2086 |
| Democracy | 1450 | 1141 |

group (see online appendix) we find that all have a clear peak in the upper end of the distribution, indicating that the included groups tend to be numerically large and that the excluded population share tends to be relatively small in all countries. However, non-democracies and countries without power sharing regimes have a smaller peak at the high end a much more noticeable tail over lower values of inclusion toward the left.

## Operationalizing the Closed and Open Polity Models

Before turning to the OPM, we need to establish an analytical baseline, which is the task of the CPM. Our derivation of hypotheses from the CPM identifies classes of properties that are likely to shape exclusion and the resistance or willingness to transition to a power sharing regime, such as ethnic demography, political institutions, security and conflict.

Under the heading of H1a,b, we have argued that more diverse countries should be more likely to see demand for power sharing than less diverse countries, and the value/cost of accepting/resisting such agreements should also depend on diversity. For our measure of ethnic demography we use the fractionalization (ELF) index as a simple measure of the diversity of a country, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (Hirschman, 1964). More specifically, the ELF index is defined as $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{N} p_i^2$, where $p_i$ is a measure of relative size as a proportion of all the $N$ groups in a country. Higher values indicate a more heterogenous population split among a large number of significant groups. Low values indicate lower heterogeneity, as a single large group $p_i^2$ approaches one, or very small groups have only a limited impact on the overall index value. We measure group sizes using shares in the EPR data, after normalizing so that all politically relevant groups considered in a country in a given year sum to 1.[6]

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[6]We have also considered a number of other plausible measures of ethnic demography and political status, including the overall number of groups, excluded groups, shared included population, as well as non-monotonic relationship. However, none of these appeared to make notable contribution after considering ELF, and there is no evidence for any clear non-linear effects in the effects on transitions from exclusion to inclusion.

According to H2a, democratic institutions and political competition should also increase will-ingness to power sharing and decrease resistance, and vice versa (H2b). To operationalize democ-racy, we consider whether a country has democratic political institutions, using the a binary indi-cator of whether a country has a Polity value of 6 and above. We use values at the beginning of the year to ensure that we do not consider simultaneous transitions.

Transitions may be more or less likely, depending on previous trajectories or consolidation ef-fects (see H3a,b). We consider a measure indicating whether a country has previously had inclusion or a power sharing regime up to $t - 1$ for transitions to inclusion (and previous exclusion for tran-sitions to inclusion). We further consider time at the state at $t - 1$, entered as a cubic specification to allow for non-monotonic relationships (Carter and Signorino, 2010).

Finally, in order to evaluate H4a, we consider two measures for security and prior conflict. The main measure considers the aftermath of previous conflict, that is whether a country has previously seen a civil war, based on the ACD2EPR data, linking the actors in the Uppsala Armed Conflict data to ethnic groups in the EPR data through ethnic claims on behalf of specific groups (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012). A complementary measure indicates whether a country has an ongoing ethnic civil war.[7]

Inclusion may also be affected by various other country characteristics such as level of develop-ment or country size. We consider a country's GDP per capita and population size, using the most recent version from the Expanded Trade and GDP data (Gleditsch, 2002*b*). We log the absolute values, as we would expect the impact to be disproportionate so that the impact of a given absolute difference should be relatively less important with higher base values.

The features above together constitute the CPM, in the sense that they only consider features within individual countries. We then compare this to the OPM that captures how the likelihood of transitions depend on inclusion and power sharing in other states. We analyze connections at all three levels, referring to H5a,b, H6a,b and H7a,b respectively. The *global* level encompasses all other countries in the world, and our measure for a given country $i$ indicates the global proportion of all other countries in the world, expect for $i$ itself. We then consider a measure of inclusion for other states within a country's geographic *region*, separating between the Americas, Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, Asia, and Oceania. Finally, we consider the share

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[7]We have also considered the length of time that a country has remained at peace, either since a previous conflict or independence. However, we found that this did not appear to make a notable contribution after considering the other conflict and security related measures, and do not report this result here.

of inclusion among *neighboring countries*, using a 500 km buffer around the outer boundaries of a state based on the Cshapes data (Weidmann, Kuse and Gleditsch, 2010).

The distinction between internal and external factors is slightly more ambiguous here, since many of the internal factors emphasized in the close polity model may themselves reflect international factors, such as democracy, political development, and even civil war. However, a comparison of the two models would allow us to examine to what extent levels in other states appear to have an additional influence on transitions, once we consider domestic factors.

It is now time to consider how specific factors affect the likelihood of transitions from exclusion to inclusion and vice versa. We rely on a two-way transition model between binary states, similar to the models used in studies of transitions to and from democracy. In brief, we estimate the likelihood of one state conditional on the previous state in two separate models, i.e.,

$$Pr(y_{i,t} = 1 | y_{i,t-1} = 0) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mathbf{X}\beta}}$$

and

$$Pr(y_{i,t} = 0 | y_{i,t-1} = 1) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-\mathbf{X}\gamma}}.[8]$$

Our theoretical arguments are mainly focused on transitions from exclusion to inclusion, but we consider transitions in both directions, since we expect that regional and international factors would play a role for both type of transitions (cf. Gleditsch and Ward, 2006; Przeworski et al., 2000).


## Empirical results

We first estimate the CPM. The results in the first column in Table 2 displays the estimates of a model of transitions to inclusion in a country with exclusion at time $t - 1$ while the second column displays the estimates for transitions from inclusion to exclusion. A quick perusal of the table reveals that the estimates from transitions in one direction are not simply the mirror image of transitions in the other direction. We comment first on the estimates for transitions to inclusion.

As expected by H1a, we find a significant positive coefficient for the ELF index in the first

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[8]This transition model can also be estimated as a single equation with interaction terms between the right hand side covariates and lagged values. However, since the variance in limited dependent variables must be assumed for identification, the results do not differ between joint estimation and separate models (Beck et al., 2001, 4).

### Table 2: Closed Polity Model of Transitions

|  | *Dependent variable:* | |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | Trans. to inclusion | Trans. to exclusion |
|  | (1) | (2) |
| ELF | 3.053*** | −4.019*** |
|  | (0.804) | (1.302) |
| Democracy | 0.126 | −0.232 |
|  | (0.485) | (0.581) |
| Previous civil war | 0.659 | 1.541* |
|  | (0.433) | (0.860) |
| Ongoing civil war | −0.756 | 0.518 |
|  | (0.484) | (0.567) |
| Ln GDP pc | −0.230 | −0.316 |
|  | (0.204) | (0.256) |
| Ln population | 0.096 | 0.290 |
|  | (0.151) | (0.213) |
| Previous inclusion | 1.075** |  |
|  | (0.491) |  |
| Time at excl. | −0.055 |  |
|  | (0.087) |  |
| Time at excl.$^2$ | 0.002 |  |
|  | (0.003) |  |
| Time at excl.$^3$ | −0.00003 |  |
|  | (0.00004) |  |
| Previous exclusion |  | −0.281 |
|  |  | (0.609) |
| Time at incl. |  | −0.088 |
|  |  | (0.150) |
| Time at incl.l$^2$ |  | 0.005 |
|  |  | (0.008) |
| Time at incl.$^3$ |  | −0.0001 |
|  |  | (0.0001) |
| Constant | −4.870** | −3.795 |
|  | (2.099) | (2.677) |
| Observations | 3,180 | 2,816 |
| Log Likelihood | −178.868 | −90.283 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 379.735 | 202.566 |

*Note:*  $^*$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01

column, indicating that transitions to inclusion are more likely in more diverse countries. Democracies are also more likely to have transitions to inclusion, but the effect is not fully statistically significant at conventional levels in this specification, thus offering only weak support for H2a. In keeping with H3a, we find a large coefficient for previous inclusion, indicating that the likelihood of transitions is much higher if a country has previously had inclusion. By contrast, there is much less evidence for an effect of time at inclusion, and the polynomial terms are not jointly statistically significant. Previous civil war has a positive coefficient, indicating that inclusion becomes more likely in the aftermath of conflict, consistent with H4a. However, ongoing civil war has a negative coefficient, which can be interpreted as greater resistance to transitions, but the effect is not statistically significant. Both GDP per capita and population size have negative coefficients, but neither is statistically significant. In sum, we conclude that our expectations for domestic factors affecting the likelihood of transitions to inclusion are reasonably consistent with the findings.

Turning to transitions from inclusion to exclusion in the second column, we find much fewer consistent influences. The negative sign for ELF indicates a symmetric effect, in that transitions away from inclusion to exclusion are much less likely in more diverse countries, thus corroborating H1b. The signs for democracy and ongoing civil war are also consistent with expectations, but the estimates are not significant (cf. H2b). None of the other factors is statistically significant, including previous exclusion. Moreover, the estimate for the intercept is considerably larger than for inclusion, indicating generally higher baseline transition probabilities.

In the first column of Table 3 we expand the CPM to form the OPM by adding a term for inclusion at the global level, not counting observation $i$ itself (see H5a). This returns a positive but insignificant coefficient, indicating that countries may be more likely to see transitions when the global level of inclusion is higher. The other results do not change notably when adding the global inclusion term.

Given our discussion above we would expect to see a stronger relationship between regional and neighboring inclusion than inclusion at the global level. In the second column of Table 3 we add two additional terms, a first term comparing at differences between neighbors (H6a), and the broader geographical regions first indicating the proportion of inclusion among neighbors within the 500 km buffer (H7a). Both coefficients are positive and highly statistically significant. Once these terms are added, the coefficient for inclusion global level is dramatically reduced and no longer significant, thus casting doubt on H5a. The results indicate that countries become more likely to see transitions when a higher number of neighboring countries have inclusion, and countries in regions with higher inclusion than neighbors become yet more likely to see inclusion.

## Table 3: Open Polity Model of Transitions

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Transitions to inclusion | | | | Transitions to exclusion | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) |
| Global inclusion (-i) | 6.237 | | | 0.965 | −6.839 | | | −2.996 |
| | (4.766) | | | (5.601) | (6.679) | | | (7.543) |
| Neigb. inclusion (-i) | | 1.521** | | 0.287 | | −0.658 | | 0.389 |
| | | (0.694) | | (0.945) | | (1.083) | | (1.423) |
| Regional inclusion(-i) | | | 3.213*** | 2.797** | | | −2.064 | −2.115 |
| | | | (0.951) | (1.324) | | | (1.508) | (2.229) |
| ELF | 2.970*** | 2.808*** | 2.926*** | 2.930*** | −3.986*** | −3.897*** | −3.845*** | −3.864*** |
| | (0.815) | (0.851) | (0.819) | (0.854) | (1.296) | (1.286) | (1.264) | (1.273) |
| Democracy | 0.109 | 0.103 | 0.402 | 0.276 | −0.180 | −0.205 | −0.174 | −0.131 |
| | (0.480) | (0.504) | (0.504) | (0.528) | (0.589) | (0.581) | (0.586) | (0.591) |
| Previous civil war | 0.607 | 0.701 | 0.716 | 0.660 | 1.608* | 1.482* | 1.466* | 1.475* |
| | (0.436) | (0.459) | (0.437) | (0.461) | (0.863) | (0.851) | (0.850) | (0.853) |
| Ongoing civil war | −0.783 | −0.818* | −0.785 | −0.748 | 0.482 | 0.579 | 0.522 | 0.461 |
| | (0.485) | (0.490) | (0.488) | (0.494) | (0.573) | (0.582) | (0.577) | (0.599) |
| Ln GDP pc | −0.287 | −0.218 | −0.164 | −0.191 | −0.340 | −0.336 | −0.436 | −0.421 |
| | (0.208) | (0.204) | (0.203) | (0.215) | (0.260) | (0.262) | (0.276) | (0.278) |
| Ln population | 0.103 | 0.020 | −0.001 | 0.021 | 0.258 | 0.262 | 0.228 | 0.214 |
| | (0.153) | (0.157) | (0.156) | (0.165) | (0.218) | (0.215) | (0.216) | (0.221) |
| Previous inclusion | 0.777 | 1.217** | 0.961* | 0.975* | | | | |
| | (0.535) | (0.517) | (0.506) | (0.592) | | | | |
| Time at excl. | −0.062 | −0.061 | −0.042 | −0.065 | | | | |
| | (0.086) | (0.089) | (0.087) | (0.090) | | | | |
| Time at excl.$^2$ | 0.002 | 0.003 | 0.002 | 0.003 | | | | |
| | (0.003) | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) | | | | |
| Time at excl.$^3$ | −0.00003 | −0.00003 | −0.00003 | −0.00003 | | | | |
| | (0.00004) | (0.00004) | (0.00004) | (0.00004) | | | | |
| Previous exclusion | | | | | 0.200 | −0.227 | −0.036 | 0.172 |
| | | | | | (0.751) | (0.607) | (0.616) | (0.752) |
| Time at incl. | | | | | −0.079 | −0.090 | −0.080 | −0.079 |
| | | | | | (0.152) | (0.150) | (0.150) | (0.152) |
| Time at incl.|$^2$ | | | | | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 |
| | | | | | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) | (0.008) |
| Time at incl.$^3$ | | | | | −0.0001 | −0.0001 | −0.0001 | −0.0001 |
| | | | | | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) | (0.0001) |
| Constant | −7.585** | −5.083** | −6.426*** | −6.745** | −0.038 | −3.055 | −1.314 | 0.012 |
| | (2.970) | (2.153) | (2.190) | (3.255) | (4.509) | (2.924) | (3.269) | (4.459) |
| Observations | 3,179 | 3,108 | 3,179 | 3,108 | 2,815 | 2,735 | 2,815 | 2,735 |
| Log Likelihood | −178.033 | −166.160 | −173.292 | −163.587 | −89.754 | −89.993 | −89.331 | −89.072 |
| Akaike Inf. Crit. | 380.067 | 356.319 | 370.584 | 355.173 | 203.507 | 203.986 | 202.663 | 206.145 |

*Note:* *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Adding the regional and neighboring terms, thereby helping to account for possible diffusion and heterogeneity, also changes the findings compared to some of the corresponding CPM estimates. In particular, we now find a clear and consistent effect for democracy, and the significance of the past civil war term is also strengthened.

Turning to transitions to exclusion in the third and forth column of Table 3, we find less clear support for strong differences between the CPM and the OPM. The term for global inclusion has the wrong sign in column three compared to H5b, indicating that greater global inclusion makes transitions to exclusion more likely, although the coefficient is not statistically significant. The regional and neighboring terms have the expected negative sign, thus yielding some support for a symmetric effect where countries are less likely to see transitions away from exclusion when direct or regional neighbors have higher rates of inclusion, as anticipated by H6b and H7b. However, the coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional levels.

## Substantive effects

Logit coefficients indicate effects on the log odds of the response and are difficult to interpret directly in substantive terms, since the substantive impact on the probabilities of the response depend on the values of all factors affecting the baseline odds. To evaluate the effect of differences in the regional environment on transitions from exclusion to inclusion we estimate the predicted likelihood for a median profile, letting the neighboring and regional environment change from zero to universal inclusion rates. To ensure realistic scenarios we consider the median values for observations with exclusion at $t - 1$. The left plot in Figure plots the implied marginal effect, with a 95 % confidence interval for the predicted values. Although the likelihood of transitions at the median is relatively small, transitions become consistently more likely in a local environment with more inclusion.

Since the baseline likelihood of transitions also changes with other factors in the model, the net impact of differences in other countries will also be large in a scenario where change is more likely. In Nigeria in 1996, following other changes in the region, the predicted probabilities of a transition to inclusion exceed 0.35. Nigeria does indeed see a transition to power sharing in 1999 in our data, with the transition to democracy and a government including parties representing the previously excluded Yoruba.

Turning to transitions from inclusion to exclusion, we find similar results, where transitions to exclusion become notably less likely in a local environment with higher rates of inclusion.

Figure 5: Transitions to inclusion/exclusion by regional contact, OPM



However, the error bands are much larger in this case than in the case of transitions to inclusion. Note, however, that the higher constant term implies a higher likelihood of transitions, possibly indicating greater volatility in transitions to exclusion depending on whether smaller groups are included or not. Yet, since there are few other things with clear influence on the baseline odds we do not see the same degree of variation in the predicted probabilities, and the observation with the highest transition probability (Central African Republic in 1987) is only about 0.112.

Another way to consider the added value of the open polity model over the closed polity model is to look at the changes in the predictions of the model. Figure 6 displays Receiver-Operating-Characteristics curve for the closed and open polity models, indicating the relative share of correct 1s and 0s under different prediction thresholds. A curve closer to the upper left corner indicates more accurate classifications. For transitions to inclusion we find some evidence of an improvement for the open polity model taking into account connections to other countries. The Area-Under-the-Curve (AUC) value is $0.801$ for the closed polity model of transitions to inclusion and $0.826$ for the open polity model. However, the improvement is more limited for transitions to exclusion, where the closed polity model has an AUC of $0.816$ and the open polity model is $0.827$.

Separation plots provide an alternative way to represent differences in the classification of individual observations by different models (Greenhill, Ward and Sacks, 2011). A separation plot orders the observations in increasing order of the predicted values, and marks the value of observa-

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Figure 6: ROC plots



tions as 1 and 0 by indicating darker and lighter color. A model with better separating ability will have a higher share of the 1s towards the right hand side and less dispersed that a less discriminating model. The separation plots for transitions to inclusion in the left panel in Figure 7 indicates that the open polity model does a better job at assigning higher probabilities to the cases where we see actual transitions, and the predicted probabilities show a much more dramatic up-tick, with much higher absolute values at the right end, compared to the closed polity model. For transitions to inclusion the improvement is less prominent.

# Conclusion

Starting from the asserted importance of ethnic inclusion for the prospects of peace, the main aim of this paper has been to increase causal depth by examining the factors that affect where and when governments shift from ethnic dominance to inclusion. As anticipated, these determinants can be found both within and outside the state. While previous studies have focused on domestic explanations, we have found strong evidence of a diffusion effect operating within regional contexts. Significantly, however, we have not been able to confirm any consistent spread at the global level, thus casting doubt on sweeping theories of an emerging world polity. The support for diffusion among contiguous states is also weaker than expected. To some extent, these effects can also be

Figure 7: Separation plots



found in the opposite direction, from inclusion to exclusion, thus suggesting that there is a potential lock-in effect that prevents single countries in regions dominated by ethnic exclusion from adopting power sharing.

Contrary to ethnic diversity or other structural factors that are almost entirely beyond manipulation, inclusion is inherently a policy choice that can in principle be influenced. From a policy-making perspective, this makes our findings about the open-polity dimension particularly good news, since fostering power sharing and inclusion in one country is likely to have positive externalities in neighboring countries by raising the odds of similar arrangements being adopted there too. There may even be regional "tipping phenomena," otherwise seen in connection with democratization and the adoption of norms. Sub-Saharan Africa appears to have experienced such a wave of inclusion since the Cold War.

Given the link between exclusion and conflict, it is conceivable that the spread of inclusion helps to account for regions of peace as well. However, as we have highlighted, this is no one-way street. Spatial processes that operate in the opposite direct – shifts toward exclusion – ultimately risk creating not only clustering of exclusion, but also conflict. If this is true, it may explain why the Middle East is not only the region that hosts the most exclusive regimes in the world, but also why its states experience some of the highest rates of civil war in the contemporary world.

Of course, we do not expect this analysis to be the final word on what explains ethnic inclusion.

Future research, will have to unpack the causal mechanisms driving decisions to abandon or adopt exclusive practices. To be sure, we have made no effort to distinguish between explanations that draw on emulation and learning. Nor have we attempted to separate those that stress voluntary demonstration effects from those that depend on international pressure through international organizations or great powers. For example, additional analysis is needed to tell whether the diffusion effects in Sub-Saharan Africa are driven by regional organizations, such as the African Union, or more informally organized post-conflict intervention offered by regional leaders volunteering as mediators.

While we have controlled for previous conflict, the endogenous relationship between exclusion and conflict would also need to be further analyzed. There is strong evidence suggesting that leaders in post-colonial states typically include those groups that are seen as potentially threatening, but these results have not yet been extended to other parts of the world (Wucherpfennig, Hunziker and Cederman, forthcoming). To fully endogenize inclusion and conflict, it would be useful to disaggregate the analysis of diffusion effects to the group level. This would also render possible a more nuanced analysis of mechanisms relating to transborder ethnic kin and irredentism (see e.g., Cederman et al., 2013).

For now, we conclude that our initial exploration of how inclusion spreads has yielded promising results that call for more research. In light of these exploratory findings, it will prove difficult to uphold the assumption that state elites make choices between ethnic dominance and inclusion without considering the conditions in contiguous or regional neighbors, very much as leaders do not appear to democratize their polities without looking across their own state borders.

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