Autonomy, secession and conflict 1
Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Julian Wucherpfennig
Département de science
politique et
relations internationales,
Université de Genève
Paper prepared for presentation at the
Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association
(San Francisco, September 1-4, 2015)
First version: February 2015, this
version: Mar 6, 2015
Abstract
Whether granting regional autonomy to specific ethnic groups helps
pacifying conflictual plural societies is hotly debated in the
literature. In part this has to do with the scarcity of data on
groups demanding and profiting from specific autonomy
concessions. Based on a dataset covering detailed information on the
type of autonomy granted to administrative subunits and data on which
ethnic groups profit from these arrangements, we assess whether such
institutional arrangements have the desired pacifying effect. To do
so we rely on a formal model focusing on the interactions between a
government and a group possibly demanding autonomy and/or
secession. Based on this model we proceed by employing a strategic
estimation of the structural form. This allows us to evaluate in a
novel way the interdepencies among demands, concessions and conflict.
Footnotes:
1 T h i s i s a n e a r l y v e r s i o n o f a m o r e s p e c i f i c p a p e r d e a l i n g w i t h a u t o o m y , s e c e s s i o n a n d c o n f l i c t i n t h e c o n t e x t o f a s t r a t e g i c m o d e l .
F i n a n c i a l s u p p o r t b y t h e S w i s s N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e F o u n d a t i o n
( G r a n t N o . 1 0 5 5 1 1 - 1 4 3 2 1 3 ) i s g r a t e f u l l y a c k n o w l e d g e d .
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